05000285/FIN-2015001-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Conduct and Evaluate Simulator Testing In Accordance with ANSI/ANS-3.5-2009 |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green finding with four examples for failing to conduct and evaluate simulator performance testing in accordance with the standards of ANSI/ANS-3.5- 2009. Specifically, the licensee failed to do the following: - Set initial reactor power at 15 percent in accordance with plant design for all performances between 1990 and 2014 of Transient (6), "Main Turbine Trip from Maximum Power Level That Does Not Result in Immediate Reactor Trip" - Set the instantaneous main turbine load reduction to 1 0 percent as supported by design basis data in the 2014 performance of Transient (11), "Maximum Design Load Rejection" - Evaluate the results of the 100 percent power Steady-State Performance Test using the correct acceptance criteria in accordance with the standard, Appendix 8, Section 8.1.1 - Evaluate all transient test results versus acceptance criteria 4.1.4(1) in accordance with the standard, Appendix 8, Section 8.1.2 After NRC identification of the transient test issues, licensee evaluation revealed that the initial conditions for Transients (5) and (1 0) were in error as well. The licensee initiated corrective action documented in condition reports 2014-14190, 2014-14208, and 2015-02547. The licensee's failure to conduct and evaluate performance testing in accordance with the ANSI/ANS-3.5-2009 standard as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.149, Revision 4, was the performance deficiency. Per licensee Procedure TQ-AA-306, "Simulator Management," the licensee uses ANSI/ANS-3.5-2009 as the standard for their simulator testing. The performance deficiency is more than minor because if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency could have become more significant in that not completing the required simulator testing correctly can lead to not detecting and correcting errors in the simulator so it actually models the plant correctly. This can both leave the potential for negative training of licensed operators and call into question the ability to conduct valid licensing examinations with the simulator. Using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 4, Tables 1 and 2 worksheets, and the corresponding Appendix I, "Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process {SOP}," Flowchart Block No.14, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it dealt with deficiencies associated with simulator testing, modification, and maintenance and there was no evidence that the plant-referenced simulator does not demonstrate the expected plant response or have uncorrected modeling and hardware deficiencies. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the change management area of human performance, associated with leaders using a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that nuclear safety remains their overriding priority. There were efforts on-site to change to the 2009 version of the standard as early as 2011, but the efforts were rescinded by plant management in December 2011 for unknown reasons. When they officially switched from the 1985 to the 2009 version of the standard (on March 1, 20 13), there is no evidence an effective change management plan was implemented. Efforts to transition between the testing and maintenance requirement differences were complicated by lack of allocating necessary resources to support this effort. There was minimal simulator staffing during the extended plant outage (April2011 to December 2013), and no effective plan to deal with knowledge management to compensate for simulator employee turnover. Internal audits in May 2014 and October 2014 found numerous issues with their simulator testing and configuration management program, many of which could have been averted or addressed earlier with an effective transition plan in place (H.3). |
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000285/2015001 Section 1R11 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2015 (2015Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.11 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Buchanan B Hagar G Miller M Cummings P Elkmann S Hedger S Schneider |
| CCA | H.3, Change Management |
| INPO aspect | LA.5 |
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Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2015001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2015Q1
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
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