05000266/FIN-2013005-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Provide Adequate Work Instructions |
| Description | A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, occurred when a surveillance procedure was performed with several steps marked not applicable which resulted in Unit 1 power rising over the license limit. Specifically, when the Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was operated as part of a post-maintenance test, the discharge isolation valves remained open which resulted in a small unplanned positive reactivity change. This issue was entered into the licensees CAP as AR 01920721. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure of the control room operators to respond promptly could have led to the final reactor power being higher than during this issue. The inspectors determined that the finding was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone, specifically the configuration control attribute of operating equipment lineup. The inspectors determined that the finding could be evaluated using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the inadequate work instructions did not result in a reactor trip. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work control, planning, because a human performance error was made during the planning process in an effort to reduce the work load during the test, and due to a cognitive error, the post-maintenance test was made inadequate. Specifically, steps were marked non-applicable that would have placed the pump discharge valves in their required position for the next portion of the surveillance test. |
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2013005 Section 1R19 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Bartlett D Betancourt D Mcneil D Reeser J Cameron J Jandovitz J Laughlin K Barclay V Myers |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2013005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2013Q4
Self-Identified List (Point Beach)
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