05000266/FIN-2013002-06
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Finding | |
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| Title | SAFETY-RELATED Bus 2B-04 Supply Breaker Installed with Incorrect Setpoint |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed when the supply breaker to safety-related bus 2B04 tripped prematurely. Specifically, on June 6, 2011, when energizing pressurizer heaters, the feeder breaker to safety-related 480 volt bus, 2B04, opened due to an over-current condition; and it was later determined that the setpoint for the breaker was incorrectly set at 2000 amps versus 3000 amps as required. The issue was entered into the licensees CAP as AR01657810. The trip setpoint on the breaker was immediately corrected, and this action restored compliance with the design requirements. Additional corrective actions were initiated to revise the maintenance procedure to list the task as a high risk activity and to add a verification step relative to the set point adjustments. The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Human Performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, and determined a detailed risk analysis was needed. A RIII SRA performed the detailed risk evaluation and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, human error prevention techniques, because the licensee failed to implement peer-checking techniques commensurate with the safety significance of the task (H.4(a)). Specifically, a peer check was not used to validate that the safety-related trip setpoint of the bus 2B04 supply breaker was accurately set; had it been used, the peer check could have prevented the occurrence. |
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2013002 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Cameron M Jones M Thorpe Kavanaugh N Feliz Adorno P Smagacz R Winter S Burton V Myers |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2013002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Point Beach)
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