05000266/FIN-2013003-08
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
---|---|
Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | The licensee identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of Limiting Condition for Operability (LCO) 3.0.4. Licensee LCO 3.0.4 states in part, When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the applicability shall only be made: When the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time. Contrary to this, on April 14, 2013, the Unit 1 entered Mode 4 with the Spray Additive System inoperable and LCO 3.6.7 did not permit continued operation in Mode 4 with the system inoperable. Specifically, the outage senior reactor operator elected to walkdown all existing tags prior to Uni1 transitioning from Mode 4 to Mode 3. The senior reactor operator identified a tag was hung on 1SI-831A, Spray Additive Tank Outlet Valve, and was unsure about the purpose of the tag because the system was required to be operable in Mode 4. Investigations showed that the tag should have been removed prior to entry into Mode 4, but was left hung due to a sequencing error between the Mode change checklist and the tagging process. The licensee immediately entered the LCO 3.6.7, Spray Additive System, restored the system alignment and exited the LCO; this evolution lasted approximately 16 minutes. This issue was entered into the licensees CAP as AR01865777 and immediate corrective actions to restore the system to operable were taken, and a root cause evaluation was assigned. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The finding also affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, with the Spray Additive Tank outlet valve closed it rendered the Spray Additive System inoperable in Mode 4. The inspectors and the R-III Senior Reactor Analyst reviewed IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, and determined that a Quantitative Assessment was not required; close spaces the issue was of very low safety significance. |
Site: | Point Beach |
---|---|
Report | IR 05000266/2013003 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | M Holmberg P Pelke S Burton J Laughlin D Betancourt K Barclay J Gilliam M Thorpe-Kavanaugh J Beavers E Sanchez V Myers J Steffes |
Violation of: | Technical Specification |
INPO aspect | |
' | |
Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2013003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Point Beach)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||