05000266/FIN-2013004-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Operability/Functionality Evaluation Process Following Radiation Monitor Failure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, for the licensees failure to follow procedure EN-AA-203-1001, Operability Determinations/Functionality Assessments. Specifically, when the Unit 1 main steam line A release monitor, 1RE-232, went into high alarm due to high ambient temperatures, the licensees immediate functionality determination failed to evaluate the potential impact of the degraded state of the radiation monitor in the emergency plan. Additionally, a functionality assessment was not requested as specified by the procedure. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as action request (AR) 01902921. The inspectors determined the finding to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, because if left uncorrected, the failure to perform operability and functionality evaluations, and to recognize conditions that could render equipment inoperable, had the potential to lead to a more significant concern. The inspectors determined that the finding was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, because the main steam line radiation monitor provides reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 1, because they answered No to the questions under the Barrier Integrity screening questions. The inspectors concluded that this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, decision making, because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making after the receipt of the unexpected high alarm on 1RE-232 and did not request a functionality assessment to ensure that the condition and proposed actions were fully understood. Specifically, operations personnel did not request a documented evaluation to support understanding why the alarming monitor did not affect the functionality of the instrument as it related to the instruments emergency plan functions (H.1 (b)). |
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2013004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Rutkowski D Betancourt K Barclay J Cameron M Thorpe-Kavanaugh P Smagacz V Myers J Steffes |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2013004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Point Beach)
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