05000266/FIN-2013002-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Properly Implement a Compensatory Fire Watch as Required by the Fire Protection Program |
Description | A finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-citied violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.h, Fire Protection Implementation, for Units 1 and 2, was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to implement compensatory fire watches for multiple fire zones in the plant auxiliary building, in accordance with the fire protection program requirements. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement the guidelines for compensatory fire watches as described in Operations Manual (OM) 3.27, Control of Fire Protection and Appendix R Safe Shutdown Equipment for the affected fire zones. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as AR01855430. The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during plant operations. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix F, because the finding degraded the ability to adequately implement fire prevention and administrative controls affecting the ability to reach and maintain safe shutdown capabilities. A Region III (RIII) Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) performed a modified Phase 2 evaluation and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, because the licensee failed to define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel did not follow procedures (H.4(b)). Specifically, the expectation for procedural compliance, for when the fire zones become high radiation areas, requires that fire rounds be performed by Operations instead of security. |
Site: | Point Beach ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000266/2013002 Section 1R05 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
Inspectors (proximate) | J Cameron M Jones M Thorpe Kavanaugh N Feliz Adorno P Smagacz R Winter S Burton V Myers |
Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2013002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Point Beach)
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