05000266/FIN-2012004-05
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Finding | |
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| Title | Boric Acid Not Removed from Containment Isolation Valve as Required by Procedure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to clean boric acid from the Unit 2 reactor coolant system hot leg sample isolation valve 2SC-955. Specifically, during the containment closeout tour performed by the inspectors, the inspectors identified that boric acid leakage on valve 2SC-955 had not been cleaned as required by the boric acid program. The licensee subsequently cleaned the valve prior to restart of the reactor and entered the issue into its corrective action program for resolution as action requests AR01782290, AR01765986, AR01780951, and AR01797802, for evaluation and development of additional corrective actions. The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of reactor coolant system equipment and barrier performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Additionally, if left uncorrected, it could impact the operators ability to verify a containment isolation actuation, thereby adversely affecting the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, Tables 2 and 3, dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2 for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, dated June 19, 2012. The inspectors answered Yes to Exhibit 2, Question A.1 in Appendix A for mitigating structures, systems, and components, and functionality. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, systematic processes, because the licensee failed to use a systematic process when making decisions related to the cleaning of boric acid components during the unplanned shutdown. Specifically, the licensees communications and interfaces for performing the activities and developing corrective actions were not approached rigorously and systematically when the duration of the unplanned outage was significantly shortened, and plant startup timelines modified the expected boric acid cleaning plans |
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2012004 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Zoia J Jandovitz M Kunowski S Burton R Krsek V Meghani M Learn M Thorpe-Kavanaugh P Cardona-Morales K Carrington |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2012004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Point Beach)
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