05000266/FIN-2012009-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Have Adequate Work Instructions and Procedures for Work Performed on the TURBINE-DRIVEN Auxiliary Feedwater Pump |
| Description | A preliminary finding of low-to-moderate safety significance and an associated Apparent Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed, in that, on November 8, 2011, the licensee failed to ensure that the work performed on the safety-related turbine for the TDAFW pump 1P-29 via Work Order (WO) 40101094 and routine maintenance procedure RMP 9044-1, an activity affecting quality, was prescribed by documented instructions or procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances. As a result on May 21, 2012, approximately 70 minutes after the start of the second quarterly Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance test since the November 2011 maintenance, 1P-29 was shut down following failure of the turbine-to-pump coupling. This issue was documented in the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as action request (AR) 01768931 and the licensee performed a root cause evaluation. As a remedial corrective action, on May 23, 2012, the licensee performed corrective maintenance to repair the failed coupling and address the turbine-to-pump alignment issue, and 1P-29 was subsequently returned to service. In addition, on June 20, 2012, the licensee implemented a permanent modification to the turbine exhaust steam piping by installing a wedge between the exhaust pipe flange and the turbine exhaust flange to eliminate stresses on the turbine. At the end of the inspection period, the licensee had implemented corrective actions to address the WO and procedure deficiencies to prevent a future occurrence and continued to implement additional long-term corrective actions. The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012. The finding involved an actual loss of function of a single train of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) for greater than the TS allowed outage time and required a detailed risk evaluation. The Region III Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) performed a detailed risk evaluation of the finding and concluded the total delta core damage frequency (ACDF) was 8.7E-6/year, which represents a finding of low-to-moderate safety significance (White). The dominant core damage sequence involved an unsuppressed fire in the control room or cable spreading room, followed by failure of alternate shutdown and failure to recover the AFW function. The inspectors also determined this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, corrective action program, because the licensee failed to implement a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues completely, accurately, and within a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance (P.1(a)). Specifically, during the maintenance that occurred on the TDAFW 1P-29 turbine during November 2011, several conditions adverse to quality were encountered during the actual maintenance activity; however, condition reports were not written to address the issues. |
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2012009 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | AV: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Betancourt P Pelkel Kozakm Kunowski R Krsek |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2012009 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2012Q4
Self-Identified List (Point Beach)
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