05000261/FIN-2010012-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Operator Transient Response Adversely Affected by Uncorrected, Known Plant Deficiency |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green finding for failure to correct a known equipment deficiency which adversely affected the operators ability to respond to reactor trip transients. Contrary to the licensees corrective action program, as described in procedure CAP-NGGC-0200, the licensee failed to address and correct an abnormal or unexpected equipment condition that affected and complicated plant events. The turbine building lubrication oil (lube oil) area fire protection detectors were known to actuate the turbine building lube oil deluge system after reactor trips when the 6A and 6B feedwater heater relief valves lifted. After the October 7, 2010, reactor trip, steam from the relief valves drifted to the area of the turbine building fire detectors, causing them to actuate the turbine building lube oil deluge system. This actuation caused distractions in the main control room because of several fire protection alarms sprayed fire protection water in the turbine building, and required the diversion of field operators to isolate the spuriously actuated deluge system. As an immediate corrective action after the October 7, 2010, reactor trip, the licensee directed the steam relief valve discharges from the 6A and 6B feedwater heaters and the 1A and 1B moisture separator drain tanks to an area outside the turbine building (NCR 425437). The failure to correct a long-standing deficiency that adversely affected operator response to reactor trips is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of human performance in that the performance of operators was adversely affected by the fire protection actuation after the reactor trip. This adverse effect included diverting operator attention and resources away from initiating event response. Using the Inspection Manual 0609, Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Worksheet, the inspectors concluded that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it is not a design or qualification deficiency, does not represent a loss of safety function, does not represent the loss of safety function of a single train of TS equipment, does not represent the loss of risk-significant equipment, and is not potentially risk significant due to an external events. The cause of this finding is directly related to the corrective action program component of the problem identification and resolution cross cutting area because appropriate and timely corrective actions were not taken for a known adverse condition. |
| Site: | Robinson  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000261/2010012 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 93812 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | F Ehrhardt S Rose R Musser |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Robinson - IR 05000261/2010012 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Robinson) @ 2010Q4
Self-Identified List (Robinson)
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