ML20134P822

Insp Repts 50-254/96-15 & 50-265/96-15 on 961001-1106. Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Ler 50-254/95-02,URI 92201-06 & URI 50-254/94020-05 Re HVAC & RHR

ML20134P822
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	11/22/1996
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20134P802	List: ML20134P799 ML20134P811 ML20134P822
References
50-254-96-15, 50-265-96-15, NUDOCS 9611290305
Download: ML20134P822 (15)

See also: IR 05000254/1996015

Text

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION lli

Docket Nos: 50-254;50-265

License Nos: DPR-29; DPR-30

Report No: 50-254/96015 (D RS); 50-265/96015 (D RS)

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed)

Facility: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: 22710 206th Avenua North

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Cordova, IL 61242

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I Dates: October 1 through November 6,1996

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Inspectors: E. Duncan, Reactor Engineer

l L. Collins, Resident inspector

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l Approved by: Mark Ring, Chief, Lead Engineers Branch

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Division of Reactor Safety

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9611290305 961122

PDR ADOCK 05000254

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ouad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2

NRC Inspection Report No. 50-254/96015 ( D RS); 50-265 /96015 (D RS)

This inspection report contains the findings and conclusions for a specialinspection

conducted from October 1 through November 6,1996, to review the following issues:

e Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-254/95002," Improperly Sized Overloads Found on

the Control Room Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System Due to

inadequate Original Design Analysis"

e Unresolved item (URI) 92201-06," Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Heat Exchanger

(HX) Room Cooler inoperable"

• Unresolved item 50-254/94020-05,"RHR System Water Hammer issue"

Assessment of Performance

e immediate and long-term corrective actions for a problem regarding undersized

thermal overloads on the "B" train control room HVAC booster fans and supply fan

appeared adequate to provent recurrence. A discrepancy regarding the evaluation

of the safety significance of the problem between Dresden and Quad Cities was

identified (Section E1.1).

e A licensee calculation concerning RHR room cooler operability assumed a non-

conservative cooler inlet temperature. However, other conservative assumptions in

the calculation coupled with the age of the problem and actions being taken to

inspect the coolers every refueling outage led the inspectors to conclude that a

further review of the calculations was not warranted (Section E1.2).

e The identification of weaknesses in the trending of RHR cooler differential pressure

testing was an example of a weak performance trending program and was a

deviation from corrective actions committed to in LERs 50-254/92008and

50-265/92007(Section E1.2).

e Procedure revisions concerning the potential for water hammer following a loss-of-

offsite-power (LOOPn while in suppression pool cooling were appropriate, but were

not initiated in a tirmly manner (Section E1.3).

Summary of Ooen Items

Deviations: Identified in Section E1.2

Violations: None identified

Unresolved items: None Identified

Inspector Follow-up Items: None Identified

Non-Cited Violations: None Identind

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REPORT DETAILS

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Ill. Enaineerina

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E1 Conduct of Engineering

E1.1 LER 50-254/95002."Imoronerly Sized Overloads Found on the Control Room HVAC

System Due to inadeouate Oriainal Desian Analysis"

a. Insoection Scoce  !

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The inspector reviewed LER 50-254/95002," Improperly Sized Overloads Found on l

the Control Room HVAC System Due to inadequate Original Design Analysis." )

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b. Qbservations and Findinas

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1. Q.qssriotion of the Event

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On January 3,1995, during a routine surveillance of the safety-related "B"

train control room HVAC system at Dresden Station, the Air Filtration Unit

(AFU) booster fan tripped unexpectedly. A root cause evaluation determined

that the booster fan thermal overloads were undersized. in addition, the

licensee determined that due to the improper sizing, the booster fans could

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fail to operate during a degraded voltage condition. The fans were

subsequently declared inoperable and the overloads were replaced with the

correct size.

Subsequently, Quad Cities was notified of the Dresden Station control room i

HVAC event, since the HVAC system at Quad Cities was similar to the l

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Dresden design. Subsequently, the licensee determined that the same

condition existed at Quad Cities for the "B" train control room HVAC booster

fans as well as the "B" train HVAC supply fan. The "B" train of control room

HVAC was declared inoperable on January 20,1995, and the licensee i

entered a 14-day, dual unit, limiting condition for operation (LCO). '

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Setpoint changes were subsequently written to replace the thermal overloads

for the control room HVAC booster fans and supply fan. The thermal

overloads were replaced with properly sized parts, the system was retested

satisfactorily, and the "B" train c,f control room HVAC was declared operable

on January 21,1995.

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2. Control Room Ventilation Svstem and Thermal Overload Device Descriotions

Control Room Ventilation Svstem Descriotion

The control room ventilation system at Quad Cities and Dresden consists of

two trains. The "A" train is a nonsafety-related system built at the time of

plant construction. It utilizes nonsafety-related power supplies, nonsafety-

related service water for chiller cooling, and commercial components and l

design. The "B" train was installed in about 1982 in response to

NUREG-0737. The "B" train was designed, procured, and installed as

safety-related. A safety-related power supply, and safety-related backup

cooling water supply was provided in the design. The "B" train also contains  !

an air filtration unit (AFU) used to provide filtered makeup air to the control

room emergency zone to pressurize the control room and minimize in-leakage

following an accident. The AFU is required to meet general design criteria

(GDC) 19 radiological limits for control room personnel following an accident.

Except for the limited redundancy within the "B" train, the control room

ventilation system does not meet safety-related redundancy and single failure

criteria. There is only one safety-related train powered from a single safety-

related motor control center, if the accident included a loss of off-site

power, the "A" train power and cooling water is unavailable and the

recirculation dampers fail to align the "B" train air handling unit (AHU).

Thermal Overload Device Descriotion

The most commonly used device for protection of small alternating current

(AC) motors at operating loads is a thermal overload device. It simulates the

temperature condition in the motor winding by means of current in a heating

element which varies with motor current. In the event of a current of

sufficient magnitude and duration which causes excessive heating of the

motor winding, the heating element causes a control circuit contact to open

for de-energizing the contactor in the motor circuit.

For continuous duty motors with a service factor of 1.0, which is the case

for the control room HVAC fans in question, the thermal overloads should be

selected such that 90 percent of the motor fullload running current falls

within the range specified in the manufacturer's table. In addition, the trip

rating should be about 110 percent of the fullload current for motors with a

service factor of 1.0, but cannot exceed 130 percent of the fullload current.

3. Root Cause

The licensee attributed the cause of the event to failure of the "B" control

room HVAC design to properly consider operation under degraded voltage

conditions during selection of the thermal overload devices. Specifically,

although the thermal overload devices were originally selected using the

Commonwealth Edison thermal overload selection guide, tolerances in the

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thermal overload relay tripping characteristics were not appropriately

considered in the guide. As a result, the thermal overload was undersized.

In addition, motors procured for the "B" train of control room HVAC were

found with a nameplate rating of 480 Vac Motors for this system should

have been rated at 460 Vac. The motor vendor was contacted by the

licensee to determine the impact of sustained operation at degraded voltage

for the higher nominal voltage rating. The motor was determined to be

acceptable. However, this error contributed to the problem, since higher

normal operating currents due to the larger motor size decreased the margin

to the thermal overload setpoint.

4. Safety Sianificance

The licensee determined that in the event of a design basis LOCA congruent

with a degraded voltage condition, the "B" train of control room ventilation

could have failed due to the undersized thermal overloads. If the "B" control

room HVAC system failed, unfiltered air could have entered the control room,

subjecting the operators to increased dose.

5. Licensee Corrective Actions

As part of the licensee's immediate corrective actions, setpoint changes

were immediately written to replace the undersized thermal overloads for the

affected control room HVAC booster fans and the supply fan.

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As part of the licensee's long-term corrective actions, a search was

performed for other safety-related, three phase induction motors rated for

480 Vac. No other motors were identified. In addition, the licensee

investigated whether other undersized thermal overload devices were

installed. None were identified.

At the time of the inspection, the licensee had engineering procedures and a

tracking mechanism in place to evaluate load additions as they related to

degraded voltage. Therefore, prior to any motor changes, nameplate data

was to be evaluated for fit, form, and function. If an evaluation revealed

that the change is not like-for-like, a design change was to be performed.

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6. Insoector Review i

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's immediate and long-term corrective l

actions and concluded that the actions taken in response to this event were

appropriate. However, during a review of Dresden LER 50-237/95001,

which reported the findings and conclusions at Dresden, the inspectors noted ,

that although the event at Dresden appeared identical to the event at Quad  !

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Cities, the Dresden evaluation of safety significance was different. The

Dresden LER stated that the safety significance of the event was minimal l

because a means was readily available for the operators to manually restart  !

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the booster fans within a reasonable time period, and because only one of

the fans would be needed at a time to support the operation of the control ,

room HVAC system. The inspectors concluded that although problems I

concerning undersized thermal overloads were identified at both Dresden and j

Ouad Cities, the licensees' evaluation of the safety significance of the events l

inexplicably differed from one another.

c. Conclusions

immediate and long-term corrective actions for a problem regarding undersized

thermal overloads on the "B" train control room HVAC booster fans and supply f an

appeared adequate to prevent recurrence.

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A discrepancy regarding the evaluation of the safety significance of the problem

between Dresden and Quad Cities was identified. This LER is open pending a

resolution of the differing evaluations.

E1.2 Unresolved item 92201-06,"RHR Heat Exchanaer Room Cooler fnocerable" j

$ a. Insoection Scooe

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The inspectors reviewed URI 92201-06,"RHR Heat Exchanger Room Cooler

inoperable."

b. Observations and Findinas

1. Descriotion of the Event

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As documented in a 1992 service water system operational performance

inspection, the licensee identified significant flow restrictions on the 1 A and

1B RHR room coolers following internal cooler inspections conducted in

November 1990 and January 1991 in response to Generic Letter (GL) 89-13

concerns.

In addition, although the licensee determined that the flow restriction

affected the heat removal capability beyond the cooler's 17 percent design

margin, the licensee f ailed to recognize and subsequently address the

plugging of the Unit 1 coolers as a potential operability issue. Consequently,

required NRC notification of the degraded condition of the Unit 1 safety-

related coolers was not promptly made. The inspection report also

documented that similar coolers on Unit 2 were not inspected until March

1992. Inspection of the Unit 2 RHR room coolers also identified substantial

plugging in excess of design margin limits. Following completion of those

inspections, the licensee determined that both Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR room

coolers were potentially inoperable and generated Licensee Event Reports

(LERs) 50-254/92008and 50-265/92007to report the findings.

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The inspection report conclusions stated that the licensee failed to take

appropriate corrective action to address the degraded Unit 1 RHR room

coolers that wer9 identified as plugged because timely action was not taken

to inspect and evaluate the operability of the Unit 2 RHR room coolers. The

inspectors also concluded that the Unit 2 RHR room coolers appeared to

have been inoperable for about one year while Unit 2 was on line, which

could have affected the operability of the RHR system during this period. As

a result, URI 92201-06 was opened to track this issue.

In a letter dated July 14,1992, which responded to URI 92201-06, the

licensee stated that an engineering evaluation verified that the fouling of the

RHR room coolers would not have prevented the RHR system from

performing its immediate safety function.

2. Root Cause

The licensee identified that the RHR room coolers were fouled due to

insufficient cleaning, since the coolers had not been inspected in more than

ten years. Since regular inspection and cleaning was not required or

performed for the coolers in over ten years, blockage occurred due to

accumulation of silt and debris.

3. Licensee Corrective Actions

As part of the licensee's immediate corrective actions, the RHR room coolers

were cleaned when the individual coolers were identified as fouled. This

action ensured that the RHR room coolers would be capable of removing the

design heat loads from the RHR corner rooms, and maintain the rooms below

their equipment qualification (EO) temperature limits.

In addition, the licensee made the following commitmont in the July 14,

1992, letter which responded to URI 92201-06 and in the LERs which

documented the fouling events:

e To prevent the recurrence of significant fouling due to long periods

without cleaning, the station was to inspect the "A" and "B" RHR

rooms coolers at least once per cycle through cycle 13 with a long-

term inspection frequency to be determined prior to the cycle 14

refueling outage.

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• A method of monitoring the room coolers was being implemented

through the installation of pressure gauges on the cooling water

piping at the inlet and outlet of the coolers. In addition, a procedure

to trend and analyze these pressures was to be developed to ensure

that if a cooler was becoming blocked, action could be taken before

the design margin was exceeded.

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4. Insoector Review I

Corrective Actions Review

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and verified that

the RHR room coolers were inspected at least once per cycle as committed

to in the licensee's response to URI 92201-06. The inspectors noted that

the results of those subsequent inspections identified some minor fouling

which did not adversely impact cooler performance. The inspectors also

determined that the licensee planned to conservatively continue to conduct

RHR room cooler inspections every refueling outage beyond cycle 13.

The inspectors conducted a plant tour and verified that pressure gauges had .

been installed on the RHR room cooler cooling water piping. The inspectors

reviewed the licensee's program developed to trend and analyze these

pressures and noted the following weaknesses:

e At the time of the inspection, although surveillances to measure

cooler differential pressure had been performed monthly, the data had

not been entered into the trending system for the last 12 months.  :

System engineering personnel subsequently determined that trending i

of the data was inadvertently discontinued following a turnover of

responsibilities to another individual. The inspectors also determined

that a procedure to trend and analyze these pressures had not been ,

implemented as committed to in the subject LERs. The failure to j

accomplish this action is considered a deviation for which a Notice of l

Deviation is being issued (50-254/96015-01(DRS); 50-265/. i

96015-01(DRS)).

A concern regarding trending of plant parameters was identified

during a July 1996 Engineering and Technical Support inspection

documented in inspection Report No. 50-254/96010(DRS);

50-265/96010(DRS). The inspectors concluded that identification of

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weaknesses in the trending of RHR cooler differential pressure testing

results was another example of a weak trending program,

e The inspectors reviewed Quad Cities Operating Surveillance (OCOS)

5750-09," Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and Diesel _

Generator Cooling Water Pump (DGCWP) Cubicle Cooler Monthly

Surveillance." This procedure was implemented to obtain RHR room

cooler cooling water differential pressure data. During that review,

the inspectors identified that on July 7,1996, an incorrect 1 A RHR

room cooler differential pressure was recorded in OCOS 5750-09 due

to an arithmetic error in calculating the difference between the inlet

and outlet cooling water pressures. However, due to a weak

operations review which failed to identify the error, and a weak

trending process which failed to input tne data into the trending

program, the error went undetected, although the value recorded was

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double the values recorded during the previous six months. In

addition, the inspectors noted that OCOS 5750-09 failed to include

acceptance criteria related to the measured differential pressures,

which could have provided an additional opportunity to identify the

error.

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Walkdown Observations

The inspectors walked down portions of the RHR system, including the RHR

room coolers. During the walkdown, the inspectors identified that RHR room

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cooler louvers were in some cases inadvertently mispositioned to block flow

rather than direct flow, or in poor materiel condition due to being either bent

or disconnected. Although the overall operability of the coolers did not

appear to be impacted, the condition of the louvers indicated that actions to

improve the materiel condition of the cooler louvers could benefit cooler

performance in addition, the inspectors noted housekeeping problems, such

as graffiti and unnecessary materials in the rooms, including a large piece of

garlock draped over a section of RHR piping.

Enaineerina Evaluation Review

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's engineering evaluation, which

concluded that the room coolers would have performed their safety function.

During that review, the inspectors identified that for the 2B RHR room cooler

(worst case), the calculated heat removal was 333,539 british thermal units

, per hour (BTUs/hr), which slightly exceeded the RHR room design heat load

of 330,000 BTUs/hr. However, the calculated heat removal was obtained by

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assuming a cooler inlet water temperature of 87oF, which was somewhat

, less than the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) design

temperature of 95oF. The licensee's response letter to URI 92201-06

discussed this assumption, and added that the maximum historical

Mississippi river temperature recorded at the station was 88.7oF, with the

majority of river water temperatures less than 86 F. The calculation also

assumed a blockage of 40 tubes, although 38 tubes were identified as

blocked during inspections of the 2B RHR room cooler.

The inspectors discussed this information with licensee personnel who stated

that in addition to the factors discussed above, the calculations did not take

credit for heat removal losses from natural circulation which are present in

the 1 A,1B, and 2A RHR rooms due to the physical room configurations and

the ability to obtain natural circulation heat removal in the 2B RHR room

through removal of the RHR room floor plug.

The inspectors concluded that non-conservative assumptions were

incorporated into the licensee's calculations. However, due to the age of the

issue, calculational conservatisms, heat removallosses not taken credit for,

and the licensee's actions to inspect RHR room coolers every refueling

outage, a further review of the calculations was not warranted.

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Conclusions

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Although a licensee evaluation concerning RHR room cooler operability assumed a

non-conservative cooler inlet temperature, other conservative assumptions coupled

with the age of the problem and actions being taken to inspect the coolers every

refueling outage led the inspectors to conclude that further effort on this issue was

not warranted.

The inspectors concluded that the failure to implement a procedure to trend and

analyze RHR room cooler cooling water differential pressures was a deviation from

corrective actions committed to in LERs 50-254/92008and 50-265/92007. In

addition, the identification of weaknesses in the trending of RHR room cooler

differential pressure testing results coupled with trending program weaknesses

identified in inspection Report No. 50-254/96010(D RS); 50-265 /96010( D R S)

indicated a weak performance trending program.

Unresolved item 92201-06is closed.

E1.3 Unresolved item @-j254/94020-05."RHR System Water Hammer issue"

a. insoection Scooe

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The inspectors reviewed URI 50-254/94020-05,"RHR System Water Hammer

issue," related to the potential for water hammer in the RHR system if a loss-of-

coolant-accident (LOCA) concurrent with a loss-of-offsite-power (LOOP) were to

occur while the system was aligned for suppression pool cooling (SPC).

b. Observations and Findinas

1. Descriotion of the Event

As documented in Inspection Report No. 50-254/93026(DRP);

50-265/93026(DRP),the licensee's evaluation of Information Notice (IN)

87-10, " Potential For Water Hammer During Restart of Residual Heat

Removal Pumps," concluded that followup actions were not required and

provided an explanation to support that position. However, the inspectors

reviewed the licensee's explanation and concluded that the evaluation

performed was inadequate and a potential existed for a water hammer under

the stated conditions. As a result, inspection followup item (IFI)

50-254/265-93026-03 was opened.

As documented in inspection Report No. 50-254/94016(DRP);

50-265/94016(DRP), the licensee re-evaluated IN 87-10 and concluded that

the potential for a water hammer was considered remote and that an

analysis had been perforrned which indicated that if a water hammer were to

occur at the time emergency core cooling was required, the system would

still perform its design function. As a result, IFl 50-254/265-93026-03was

closed.

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As documented in inspection Report No. 50-254/94020(DRS);

! 50-265/94020(DRS),the inspectors re-opened this issue following concerns i

j raised during an Engineering and Technical Support (E&TS) inspection. I

During that inspection, the inspectors identified that although the licensee's I

evaluation of IN 87-10 concluded that the residual heat removal (RHR)

system would have only minimal susceptibility to water hammer, in fact, a i

i substantial loss of water could occur given the initial conditions prescribed l

by IN 87-10, resulting in a severe water hammer. In addition, the licensee

was unable to retrieve the water hammer analysis which demonstrated that

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if a water hammer were to occur, the emergency core cooling system

(ECCS) would still function as designed. As a result, IFl

50-254/94020-05(DRS)was opened.  !

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During this inspection, the licensee provided General Electric (GE) report

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NEDC-32513," Suppression Pool Cooling and Water Hammer," dated

December 29,1995. This report was prepared for the Boiling Water Reactor

Owners' Group (BWROG) Residual Heat Removal / Suppression Pool Cooling ,

(RHR/SPC) Committee to address the concerns raised by IN 87-10. In that I

report, the following conclusions were reached: l

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• The intent of the original LOOP licensing basis was to " assume offsite l

power was not available" and did not require that a LOOP be '

considered mechanistically in the licensing basis assumptions.

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e The probability of occurrence of the postulated event scenario of a

l LOOP /LOCA with one or more RHR loops in the SPC mode that leads

to water hammer was extremely low (< 10E-6 per year).

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j * Predictions of piping system response due to water hammer loads i

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tends to be unrealistically conservative because of conservatisms in l

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the modeling and assumptions. As a result, actual water hammer l

events indicate that the damage is less severe than predictions and l

usually limited to pipe hangars and mounts. l

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e Given the extremely low probability of the postulated concurrent

LOOP /LOCA scenario that leads to a water hammer, and the low

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likelihood that the water hammer would totally incapacitate the

affected system, a significant public risk did not exist and substantial

. additional effort for resolution may not be supported by a cost / benefit

analysis.

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2. Information Notice 87-10 Descriotion

Information Notice 87-10, " Potential for Water Hammer During Restart of

Residual Heat Removal Pumps," was issued on February 11,1987, to alert

licensee's of the potential for water hammer in the RHR system. The

specific condition of concern involved a design basis LOCA coincident with a I

LOOP, with one or more RHR loops in the suppression pool cooling mode.

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During the power loss and subsequent valve re-alignment, portions of the

RHR system could void because of the drain down to the suppression pool as

a result of elevation differences. A water hammer may occur in those RHR

loops that were in the SPC mode when the RHR pumps restart after the

diesel generators re-energize their respective buses. As a result, the integrity

of the RHR system could be in jeopardy, which could endanger all modos of

RHR, including low pressure coolant injection. l

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3. Licensee Corrective Actions  !

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The inspectors determined that although no system modifications were being I

considered, the licensee planned to revise appropriate procedures to reduce i

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the probability of this event from occurring. These planned procedure l

revisions included caution statements to warn operators of the potential

consequences in the event of a LOOP while in suppression pool cooling, as

well as to allow only one loop of RHR to operate in suppression pool cooling i

at a time.

4. Insoector Review

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions concerning the )

proposed procedure changes. The proposed changes appeared appropriate.

However, the inspectors concluded that the licensee's actions to revise the

procedures were not timely, since the licensee was aware that they were

susceptible to water hammer following discussions in 1994.

In addition, the inspectors questioned whether GE report NEDC-32513 was

accurate concerning a conclusion that the intent of the licensing basis did

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not require that a LOOP be considered mechanistically in the licensing basis I

assumptions. This question hes been forwarded to NRC headquarters for

technical review. 1

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j c. Conclusions  !

A question concerning the intent of the original licensing basis was forwarded to

NRR for review. Procedure revisions concerning the potential for water hammer

following a LOOP while in suppression pool cooling were appropriate, but were not

initiated in a timely manner.

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Unresolved item 50-254/94020-05(DRS),"RHR System Water Hammer issue,"

remains open pending a technical review by NRC headquarters staff regarding the ,

LOOP licensing basis. )

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E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment

E2.1 Uodated Final Safety Analvsis Reoort (UFSAR) Review

A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) description highlighted the need for a

special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or parameters

to the UFSAR descriptions. While performing the inspections discussed in this

report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to

the areas inspected. The inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was

consistent with the observed plant practices, procedures and/or parameters.

V. Management Meetinas

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the preliminary inspection results to members of licensee

management on October 3,1996. In addition, the final inspection results were presented

on November 6,1996. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection

should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

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Licensee

D. Craddick, System Engineering Supervisor

R. Baumer, Regulatory Assurance

. R. Luebbe, System Engineering

W. Quinn, System Engineering

i R. Robbins, System Engineering

B. Strub, System Engineering

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

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! IP 37551: On Site Engineering

IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor

Facilities

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! ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

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. Ooened )

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1 DEV 50-254/96015-01(DRS); Deviation from commitment to trend RHR room cooler

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50-265/96015-01(DRS) differential pressure and to develop a procedure for this

i trending

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Closed

URI 92201-06: RHR Heat Exchanger Room Cooler inoperable

Discussed

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LER 50-254/95002: Improperly Sized Overloads Found on the Control Room

. HVAC System Due to inadequate Original Design

Analysis

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., URI 50-254/94020-05(DRS): RHR System Water Hammer Issue

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q LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

) AC Alternating Current

AFU Air Filtration Unit

j AHU Air Handling Unit

l BTU British Thermal Unit

i BTUs/hr British Thermal Units Per Hour

. BWROG Boiling Water Reactor Owners' Group

Comed Commonwealth Edison Company

! DGCWP Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump

j F Degrees Fahrenheit

ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System

E&TS Engineering and Technical Support

EO Equipment Qualification

. FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report

, GDC General Design Criteria 4

GE General Electric

-

GL Generic Letter

,

HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning

i HX Heat Exchanger

IFl inspection Followup Item

IN Information Notice

IR Inspection Report

i LCO Limiting Condition for Operation

1

LER Licensee Event Report

. LOCA Loss-Of-Coolant-Accident

+

LOOP Loss-Of-Offsite-Power

MCC Motor Control Center

$ OCOS Quad Cities Operating Surveillance

i RHR Residual Heat Removal

! SPC Suppression Pool Cooling

i TS Technical Specification

UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

URI Unresolved Item

? Vac Volts Alternating Current

j VIO Violation

.

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