ML20129F721

Insp Repts 50-454/96-07 & 50-455/96-07 on 960821-0926. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations, Maintenance,Engineering,Plant Support & Plant Status

ML20129F721
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	10/18/1996
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20129F685	List: ML20129F681 ML20129F709 ML20129F721
References
50-454-96-07, 50-454-96-7, 50-455-96-07, 50-455-96-7, NUDOCS 9610290199
Download: ML20129F721 (15)

See also: IR 05000454/1996007

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION III

Docket Nos: 50-454, 50-455 l

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License Nos: NPF-37, NPF-66 '

i Report No: 50-454/96-07,50-455/96-07  !

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Licensee: Comed Company

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j Facility: Byron Generating Station, Units 1 & 2 '

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! Location: Opus West III ,

! 1400 Opus Place l

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Downers Grove, IL 60515

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Dates: August 21 - September 26, 1996  !

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Inspectors: S. D. Burgess, Senior Resident Inspector

N. D. Hilton, Resident Inspector

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C. K. Thompson, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety

Approved by: Lewis F. Miller, Jr., Chief,

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Division of Reactor Projects  ;

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EXECUTIVE SUMARY

Byron Generating Station, Units 1 & 2

NRC Inspection Report 50-454/96-007,50-455/96-007

This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, l

maintenance, and plant support. The report cover: a six week period of i

resic it inspection.

DoeratLg_qi

. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and

safety-conscious. The addition of a separate control room briefing for  !

maintenance, radiation protection, chemistry, and the extra operating shift  ;

effectively eliminated personnel and outage activity distractions from the

main control room shift briefing (Section 01.1). l

. Operators responded promptly and effectively to a turbine trip and the l

equipment failures subsequent to a resulting reactor trip (Section 01.2).  !

. The inspectors identified a violation regarding inadequate procedures that

resulted in running the 2A chemical and volume control pump without

essential service water to the pump's lube oil cooler (Section 01.5).

. The inspectors identified poor heusekeeping in the 2A and 28 diesel oil i

storage tank rooms that resulted from fire protection system testing on

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July 22,1996 (Section 02.1). j

Maintenance

. Maintenance and surveillance activities were completed thoroughly and

professionally with maintenance supervisors and system engineers monitoring

activities (Sections M1.1 and M1.2).

Enaineerina

. Engineering department personnel provided sound and thorough safety

evaluations regarding the Unit 2 steam generator (SG) A and SG C loose part

retrieval plan and the evaluation of all four Unit 2 SG tube inspections

(Section E2.1).

Plant Support

. The inspectors noted good radiological controls and ALARA briefings in the

Unit 2 refueling outage. Sound radiological protection controls and

careful radiological work practices were also noted during the performance

of surveillances and maintenance activities (Section RI).

. The identification and confiscation of a .38 weapon and ammunition

indicated the licensee's search techniques were effective (Section S1.1)

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REPORT DETAILS

S- ry of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at power levels up to 97 percent until September 11, 1996,

when a reactor trip occurred as a result of a turbine trip. The unit was

returned to service at 6:48 a.m. on September 12, 1996. The unit has since

operated at power levels up to 97 percent.

Unit 2 was in a refueling outage (B2R06) during this entire inspection period. ]

I. Operations

01 Conduct of Operations l

01.1 General Comments (71707)

Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent '

reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of l

operations was professional and safety-conscious. Early in the outage, "

the licensee implemented a new control room briefing format where

personnel from the extra operating shift, radiation protection, l

chemistry, and maintenance were briefed separately in the shift

engineer's office. The main control room briefing only included the i

on-duty operators for both units. The inspectors noted that the new

briefing format significantly reduced the number of personnel in the

main control room and distractions from outage activities. Specific

events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below.

01.2 Unit 1 Reactor Trio as a Result of a Turbine Trio

a. Inspection Scope (93702)

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On September 11, 1996, at 12:17 a.m. (CDT), a Unit I reactor trip

occurred due to a turbine trip. While performing a monthly turbine trip

surveillance, a non-licensed operator inadvertently placed an operating ,

tool on the manual turbine trip lever instead of the turbine trip bypass

lever as required. The operator realized the error; however, in j

attempting to remove the operating tool, the operator caused a manual i

turbine trip. j

b. Observations and Findinas

All safety related equipment automatically actuated as designed.

Channel A of the digital rod position indication (DRPI) failed during

the trip; however, channel B indicated all rods were fully inserted.

Other non-safety equipment failures during the transient included nine

failed open feedwater (FW) heater relief valves, and the starting of the

startup FW pump due to a breaker failure.

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DRPI troubleshooting showed that there was a reduced coil voltage for a

, single coil on the A train coil stack for two rods. . The reduced voltage

caused DRPI to spuriously misinterpret the location of the rod cluster

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control assembly for A train only. This in turn caused DRPI urgent

, failure and DRPI alarms. As interim corrective action, the licensee

removed several cards in the A train, which disabled that train for the

two rods. Train B still provided indication for the operators. Final

problem resolution requires the plant to be shut down and the integrated

j head package partially disassembled. This repair will be completed

during an outage of appropriate duration.

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The feedwater heater relief valves, installed as thermal relief valves,

experienced severe service and failed during the pressure increase

accompanying main feedwater isolation following the_ turbine trip. The

licensee's engineering department had been pursuing a potential

modification to alleviate the lifting and damaging of the FW heater

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relief valves. The nine FW relief valves were replaced prior to unit

startup. The startup FW pump breaker failure was due to the roller and

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can mechanism failing to latch. The breaker was replaced. As

corrective action for the turbine trip, the licensee placed a barrier

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over the hub of the turbine trip lever to physically prevent the

operating tool from fitting on the lever.

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! 01.3 Unit 1 Startuo Observations 0 1707)

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The inspectors observed startup activities in the Unit I control room on

September 12, 1996. The startup was characterized by clear operator

i communications, attentive reactor engineering oversight, and effective

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control by shift supervision. A shift turnover near the point of  ;

criticality was well-planned and controlled. The inspectors concluded

j that the overall startup was performed effectively.

01.4 Both Source Ranae Monitors Out of Service ,

a. Inspection Scone (93702)

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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions in identifying both Unit

2 source range monitors out of service (00S).

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i b. Observations and Findinas

On September 22, 1996, in Mode 5, the licensee identified that both .

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source range (SR) detectors were 00S for approximately 18 minutes during

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surveillance testing. The SR detector N32 Level' Trip Bypass switch and 1

j the High Flux At Shutdown alarm were blocked during the performance of l

4 surveillance 2BOS 3.1.1-21, " Train B Solid State Protection System

! Bi-Monthly Surveillance," due to excessive detector spiking. At the

time, N32 was considered inoperable as it was de-energized to perform

i the surveillance test. When the test for B train was completed, N32 was

j left blocked due to continued excessive spiking and placed on the

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degraded equipment list. N32 was considered operable, because the

spiking did not preclude count rate trending, could input to the boron

dilution prevention system, and the reactor trip breakers were open.

The licensee identified that a shift change occurred without an apparent

turnover on the status of SR detector N32. The new shift performed

surveillance 2BOS 3.1.1-20, " Train A Solid State Protection System

Bi-Monthly Surveillance." During the train A surveillance, SR N31 was

inoperable due to being de-energized, the reactor trip breakers were

closed, and SR detector N32 High Flux Level trip was in bypass. The I

test lasted approximately 18 minutes, after which the reactor trip I

breakers were open and SR detector N31 was energized and returned to l

service. '

Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.3.1, Table 3.3-1, identified two ,

shutdown conditions for which requirements were given for SR detector I

operability: (1) the reactor trip breakers closed and the control rod

drive system (CRDS) capable of rod withdrawal, or (2) the reactor trip

breakers open. During the train A surveillance, the CRDS was disabled

such that rod withdrawal was not possible and the reactor trip breakers

were closed. Therefore, the plant was in a configuration where no TS

action was required. However, TS interpretation 3/4.3.3.1-2, written by

the licensee to cover this configuration, stated to default to the TS

actions required in (1), and considered both SR monitors 00S. The

licensee stated that the TS interpretation was inappropriate and that

the TS was satisfied, in that, the plant was in a configuration not

covered by TS. The issue regarding the authority of TS interpretations

is considered an inspector follow-up item (50-455/96007-01(DRP)).

01.5 Inadeauate Coolina to Chemical and Volume Control Pumn Lube Oil Cooler

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a. Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors reviewed a test where the 2A chemical and volume control

(CV) pump was run without essential service water cooling to the pump

lube oil cooler for 27 minutes.

b. Observations and Findt.ngi

On September 14, 1996, the licensee identified that surveillance

procedure 2BVS 1.2 3.1-1, "ASME Surveillance Requirements for

Centrifugal Chargir.g Pump 2A and Chemical and Volume Control System

Valve Stroke Test,' kevision 12, was performed with essential service

water (SX) isolated to the CV pump lube oil cooler for 27 minutes. The

discovery was made approximately five hours after the surveillance was

completed. '

The inspector identified that procedure 2BVS 1.2.3.1-1, failed to

provide adequate steps to ensure that SX provided cooling to the 2A CV

pump lube oil cooler. This is considered a violation of 10 CFR 50,

Appendix B, Criterion V (50-455/96007-02(DRP)).

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The licensee addressed the effects of having SX isolated to the 2A CV

lube oil cooler for 27 minutes. The inspectors reviewed the point

history for the 2A CV pump which revealed that the bearing temperatures

were within the ASME surveillance requirements.

c. Conclusions on the Conduct of Operations

Operators responded promptly and effectively to the turbine trip and to i

the equipment failures subsequent to the reactor trip. The inspectors

determined that the licensee's short and long term corrective action for

equipment failures experienced after the reactor trip were appropriate.

The inspectors identified concerns with configuration controls during

the conduct of surveillance tests. In one instance, the inspectors  ;

identified an inadequate procedure that resulted in the 2A CV pump being '

run without essential water to the lube oil cooler. In the other

instance, the lack of a thorough shift turnover resulted in both SR

monitors being 00S.

02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

02.1 Enaineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdowns (71707)

The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to walk down accessible <

portions of the following ESF systems: I

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. Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators A & B I

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Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were l

acceptable except in the diesel oil storage tank rooms. The inspectors l

nMed that valve 2D0003D, the 2D diesel oil transfer pump discharge

check valve, was not labelled. They also noted a large amount of dried

fire suppression foam on several fire nozzles in the 2A and 2B diesel

oil storage tank rooms, the floor, and some equipment. The fire

protection system engineer stated to the inspectors that the foam was

residue from a once-every-three-year surveillance of the foam spray

headers and deluge nozzles. This test was conducted on July 22, 1996.

The inspectors concluded that the two month delay in cleaning up the

residue was an example of poor housekeeping. The licensee initiated

corrective actions to label the valve and clean the rooms. The

inspectors had no further concerns.

08 Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)

08.1 (Closed) Violation 50-454/455-05013-03: Inadequate procedures for

the boric acid and diesel oil transfer systems. The inspectors

reviewed the corrective actions as described in a letter from the i

licensee dated April 17, 1996. The actions appeared adequate. l

However, the inspectors noted that there were minor j

inconsistencies between procedures 2BVS 0.5-3.DO.1, " Unit 2 ASME i

Requirement for Test of the Diesel Oil Transfer System," Revision i

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M1.2 Surveillance Observations

a. Inspection Scone (61726)

The inspectors observed all or parts of the following surveillance and

special test procedures:

. IBVS 0.5-3.CC.1-1 Surveillance Requirements for Component Cooling

(CC) Pump ICC01PA

2BVS 8.2.1.2.E-2 125V Battery Bank 5-Year Capacity Test

2BVS 8.1.1.2.f-14 2B Diesel Generator Sequencer Test

. IBVS 1.2.3.1-2 ASME Surveillance Requirements for Centrifugal

Charging (CV) Pump IB and Chemical Volume

Control System Valve Stroke Test

. IBVS 5.2.f.3-1 ASME Surveillance Requirements for Residual Heat

Removal (RH) Pump 1RH01PA

. SPP 96-055 Dual Train Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Transient

Hydraulic Test

b. Observations and Findinas

During the observation of surveillances, the inspectors questioned the

use of a dedicated non-licensed operator to reposition manual valves

when systems / trains were not considered out of service during the test.

The licensee stated that the use of dedicated operators was utilized for

systems that do not receive an automatic actuation.

The inspectors reviewed Byron operating procedure B0P RH-5, "RH System

Startup for Recirculation," Revision 9. The procedure noted that, in

Mode 4, the normally locked-closed RH recirculation to reactor water

storage tank isolation valve, RH8735, may be opened provided that a

dedicated operator stationed nearby will close the valve in the event of

a safeguards actuation to ensure adequate flow is available to all four  !

cold legs. The inspectors were concerned that the dependance of the l

operator created two new failure mechanisms: (1) the failure of the

operator to close the valve, and (2) the failure of the valve to close.

The inspectors discussed this issue with the NRC technical staff and

determined that the use of the dedicated operator was not an unreviewed

safety questions since the bases for TS 3/4.5.3, ECCS Subsystems - T,,, <

350'F, allowed one operable ECCS subsystem without single failure

consideration in Mode 4 on the basis of the stable reactor reactivity

condition and the limited core cooling requirements. The inspectors had

no further concerns with the use of dedicated operators for performance

of this procedure.

M1.5 Conclusions on Conduct of Maintenance and Surveillances

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Maintenance and surveillance activities were completed thoroughly and

professionally with maintenance supervisors and system engineers

monitoring activities.

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III. Encineerina

E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment )

E2.1 Unit 2 Steam Generator Tube Leak & Tube Repair So-ary I

a. Inspection Scope (37551) l

The inspectors reviewed procedures and documents related to the Unit 2 I

steam generator (SG) A loose part retrieval and subsequent tube repairs.

Also reviewed were the non-destructive examination results for all four

Unit 2 SGs performed during B2R06 refueling outage.

b. Observations and Findinas

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On August 9,1996, Byron Unit 2 was brought to cold shutdown due to a

primary-to-secondary leak in SG A. Byron engineering developed a l

comprehensive plan to investigate the location, extent, and cause of the

leak. The source of the leak was found to be in tube 16-110 located on

the cold leg side of SG A approximately one inch above the tube sheet.

During eddy current examination, the licensee determined that the tube

was damaged by a piece of metallic debris approximately 1-1/2" x 1" x

1/32" in size and triangular in shape. The loose part was retrieved and

sent offsite for analysis. The licensee plugged four tubes in SG A as

corrective action. The licensee also retrieved a previously identified

loose part in SG C. The SG C loose part was identified as

" wedge-shaped" metallic debris and was also sent offsite for further

analysis. The loose part was located in an area where the tubes were

plugged in previous outages. The part had not moved; therefore, no

further tube plugging was necessary.

A total of 30 SG tubes were plugged during the Unit' 2 forced outage and l

the Unit 2 B2R06 refueling outage. All tubes were inspected from the

hot leg tube end to the cold leg tube end using a bobbin eddy current ,

inspection. Additional inspections included 25 percent top of tubesheet i

(hot leg) using the rotating pancake coil (RPC), 25 percent row I and

row 2 U-Bend using Point Plus, and 25 percent preheater expansion region

using RPC in SG A.

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c. Conclusions

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Engineering personnel made sound and thorough safety evaluations  ;

regarding the Unit 2 SG A and SG C loose part retrieval plan and.  !

evaluation and the evaluation of all four Unit 2 SG tube inspections.

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E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92902)

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E8.1 (Closed) LER 50-455/96-003: Missed TS surveillance regarding SG tube <

inspections. On September 4,1996, the licensee identified that 26 I

tubes in SG D and 4 tubes in SG B were not inspected and analyzed in '

accordance with the original inspection plans for previous refueling

outages B2R03 and B2R05. The tubes were not inspected because they were

misencoded with the wrong tube number. The licensee performed a review

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j of previous and subsequent refuel outage tube inspections and determined

i that the 30 tubes contained no detectable degradation. The licensee's '

corrective actions were appropriate and the safety consequences were

minor. This licensee identified and corrected violation is being

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treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the

NRC Enforcement Policy. This item is closed. e

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IV. Plant Supoort

R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls

The inspectors noted good radiological controls implemented in the Unit

2 refueling outage during frequent tours of the radiologically protected ,

i area and ALARA briefings. The inspectors also noted sound radiological

v protection controls and careful radiological work practices during the

surveillances and maintenance observations.

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j R3 RP&C Procedures and Documentation i

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R3.1 Review of License Conditions

j The inspectors reviewed the license conditions and the TS administrative

controls section for discrepant conditions or practices. The inspectors

i identified minor discrepancies in section 6.12, "High Radiation Area"

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and section 6.14, "Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (00CM)." Both

! sections had not been updated to reference the applicable sections of 10

i CFR Part 20. Section 6.12 also defined the high radiation area dose l

i equal to or less than 1000 mR/hr at 45 cm instead of 30 cm. 10 CFR Part

20.1008, " Implementation," states, in part, that the 10 CFR Part 20 i

requirements must be used in lieu of the requirements that are cited in l

l the licensee's TS. The inspectors confirmed that the licensee was in

full compliance with the more restrictive requirements of 10 CFR Part

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i 20. The licensee was already aware of the discrepancies and had made

j the necessary changes to their proposed Improved Technical

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Specifications. The inspectors had no further concerns.

P1 Conduct of Emergency Protection Activities

Pl.1 Yearly Emeraency Preparedness Meetina

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i On September 19, 1996, the inspectors attended the annual emergency

! preparedness meeting. The meeting was attended by the licensee's

! station management, Comed corporate management, and state and local

! officials. The meeting presented the 1997 EP pians for Byron Station.

j The inspectors noted no concerns.

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S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities (11750)

j Sl.1 Identification and Confiscation of a Weapon

1 On September 5,1996, a contractor attempted to bring a .38 caliber

j revolver, a speed loader, and 62 rounds of ammunition into the protected

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S1.1 Identification and Confiscation of a Weacon

On September 5, 1996, a contractor attempted to bring a .38 caliber

revolver, a speed loader, and 62 rounds of ammunition into the protected

area. The weapon and ammunition was identified during a lunchbox search

after detecting a undefinable mass in the x-ray machine. Since the

contractor did not have a permit for the weapon, the Ogle County l

authorities were notified. '

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The licensee's investigation determined that the contractor did not have '

a harmful intent in bringing'the weapon into the protected area. The

individual had placed the weapon in the lunchbox after showing it

outside the owner controlled area the previous night and had forgotten

to remove it prior to entering the facility.

Security implemented an aggressive program to improve search techniques

as a result of recent SQV audit findings. The identification and

confiscation of the weapon and ammunition indicated the program's

effectiveness. The inspectors had no further concerns.

F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection Issues (92904)

F8.1 (closed) Violation 50-454/455/94020-01: Failure to follow fire -

protection procedure requiring tags be placed on fire doors that

were impaired. In August 1994, the inspectors identified two fire

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doors that were apparently impaired because the door sills had

been temporarily removed and two doors that were impaired by being ,

blocked opened. None of the doors were tagged as required by

procedure BAP 1100-3, " Fire Protection Systems, Fire Rated

Assemblies, Radiation, Ventilation, and Flood Seal Impairments."

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions as

discussed in letters dated October 31, 1994, and March 15, 1996.

The responses stated that the door sills were subsequently i

reinstalled, returning the doors to an unimpaired state. The

responses also stated that the two blocked open fire doors were

not considered impaired if personnel were nearby to close the

doors in the event of a fire. However, the licensee acknowledged

that BAP 1100-3 did nct specifically exempt tagging of impaired

fire doors if personnel were stationed nearby. As part of

corrective action:,, fire marshall office personnel were counselled

on management expectations regarding procedure adherence. The

fire marshall also stated that fire door impairment requirements

would be emphasized in annual station training and that procedure ,

BAP 1100-3 would be revised to clearly state the exemption.

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08.2 (Closed) Violation 50-454/455/95009-04: Failure to follow fire

protection procedure requiring tags be placed on fire doors that

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were impaired. On September 18, 1995, the inspectors identified

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S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities (71750)

S1.1 Identification and Confiscation of a Weapon

On September 5,1996, a contractor attempted to bring a .38 caliber

revolver, a speed loader, and 62 roud s of ammunition into the protected

area. The weapon and ammunition wa' Jentified during a lunchbox search

after detecting a undefinable mast . the x-ray machine. Since the

contractor did not have a permit i the weapon, the Ogle County

authorities were notified.

The licensee's investigation determined that the contractor did not have

a harmful intent in bringing the weapon into the protected area. The

individual had placed the weapon in the lunchbox after showing it

outside the owner controlled area the previous night and had forgotten

to remove it prior to entering the facility.

Security implemented an aggressive program to improve search techniques

as a result of recent SQV audit findings. The identification and

confiscation of the weapon and ammunition indicated the program's

effectiveness. The inspectors had no further concerns.

F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection Issues (92904)

F8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-454/455/94020-01: Failure to follow fire

protection procedure requiring tags be placed on fire doors that

were impaired. In August 1994, the inspectors identified two fire

doors that were apparently impaired because the door sills had l

been temporarily removed and two doors that were impaired by being

blocked opened. None of the doors were tagged as required by

procedure BAP 1100-3, " Fire Protection Systems, Fire Rated

Assemblies, Radiation, Ventilation, and Flood Seal Impairments."

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions as

discussed in letters dated October 31, 1994, and March 15, 1996.

The responses stated that the door sills were subsequently

reinstalled, returning the doors to an unimpaired state. The

responses also stated that the two blocked open fire doors were

not considered impaired if personnel were nearby to close the

doors in the event of a fire. However, the licensee acknowledged

that BAP 1100-3 did not specifically exempt tagging of impaired

fire doors if personnel were stationed nearby. As part of

corrective actions, fire marshall office personnel were counselled

on management expectations regarding procedure adherence. The

fire marshall also stated that fire door impairment requirements

would be emphasized in annual station training and that procedure

BAP 1100-3 would be revised to clearly state the exemption.

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08.2 (Closed) Violation 50-454/455/95009-04: Failure to follow fire ,

protection procedure requiring tags be placed on fire doors that I

were impaired. On September 18, 1995, the inspectors identified j

two untagged fire doors that were blocked open during flushing of '

some floor drains. As discussed above, the violation occurred i

because of an inappropriate interpretation of procedure ,

BAP 1100-3. l

The inspector concluded that the fire door problems in 1994 and 1995  !

were isolated events and that adequate corrective actions had been '

taken. During the current inspection, the inspectors observed that

impaired fire doors were tagged as required.

V. Management Meetinas

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee

management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 26, 1996.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during

the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary

information was identified.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

K. Graesser, Site Vice President

K. Kofron, Station Manager

D. Wozniak, Site Engineering Manager  ;

T. Gierich, Operations Manager

P. Johnson, Technical Service Superintendent

E. Campbell, Maintenance Superintendent

M. Snow, Work Control Superintendent

D. Brindle, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

K. Passmore, Station Support & Engineering Supervisor

P. Donavin, Site Engineering Mod Design Supervisor

T. Schuster, Site Quality Verification Director

R. Colglazier, NRC Coordinator

B. Gossman, Chemistry Supervisor ,

S. Gackstetter, Thermal Group Leader ,

R. Wegner, Shift Operations Supervisor  :

M. Rasmussen, Operations Engineer Unit 2  ;

W. Kouba, Long Range Work Control Superintendent I

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 37551: Onsite Engineering

IP 61726: Surveillance Observations

IP 62703: Maintenance Observations

IP 71707: Plant Operations

IP 71750: Plant Support Activities

IP 92901: Followup - Plant Operations

IP 92902: Followup - Engineering

IP 92903: Followup - Maintenance

IP 92904: Followup - Plant Support

IP 93702: Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors

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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, Alm DISCUSSED

Opened

, 50-455/96007-01 IFU Both Unit 2 source range monitors out of

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service.

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' 50-455/96007-02 VIO Inadequate procedure regarding SX cooling to the

2A CV pump lube oil cooler,

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50-454/455/95013-03 VIO Inadequate procedures for the boric acid and

, diesel oil transfer systems, '

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} 50-454/455-94010-01 IFI Weakness in the emergency operating procedure

.' verification and validation process.

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50-454/96-017 LER Unit I trip due to personnel error during

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surveillance activities.

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50-455/96-003 LER Missed TS surveillance regarding SG tube

!. . inspections.

50-454/455/94020-01 VIO Failure to follow fire protection procedures.. >

] 50-454/455/95009-04 VIO Failure to follow fire protection procedures,

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

BOS Byron Operating Procedure

'

BVS Byron Surveillance Procedure

CC Component Cooling Water System

CRDS Control Rod Drive System

CV Chemical and Volume Control System

DRPI Digital Rod Position Indication

4'

ECCS Emergency Core Cooling Systems

E0P Emergency Operating Procedure

'

ESF Engineered Safety Feature

FW Feedwater System

i 00S Out of Service

RH Residual Heat Removal System

RPC Rotating Pancake Coil

SG Steam Generator

SR Source Range

SX Essential Service Water

TS Technical Specification

V&V Verification and Validation

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