ML16071A185

Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 5 of 8

ML16071A185
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch, Vogtle, Farley
Issue date:	03/03/2016
From:	Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML16071A108	List: ML16071A110 ML16071A126 ML16071A132 ML16071A136 ML16071A137 ML16071A140 ML16071A144 ML16071A146 ML16071A147 ML16071A149 ML16071A150 ML16071A152 ML16071A153 ML16071A158 ML16071A160 ML16071A166 ML16071A170 ML16071A174 ML16071A176 ML16071A180 ML16071A181 ML16071A184 ML16071A185 ML16071A187 ML16071A188 ML16071A193 ML16071A195 ML16071A198 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 1 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 2 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 3 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 4 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 3: Hatch EAL Calculations - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 3 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 3: Hatch EAL Calculations - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 3 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 3: Hatch EAL Calculations - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 3 of 3 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 3 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 4 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 5 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 6 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 3 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 4 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 5 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 6 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 7 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 8 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Vogtle Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 4 ... further results
References
NL-15-1898
Download: ML16071A185 (46)

Text

APPENDIX A -ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AC ....................................................................................

Alternating Current AOP .....................................................................

Abnormal Operating Procedure ATWS............................................................

Anticipated Transient Without Scram................................................................................................

B li ..............................................................

r nd W ....................................................................................

.................

..... ................................................................................

AS................................................................................. CD ......................................................................................

Calen CF ....................................................

Co e notF dral Regulations ( M ...............................................................................

Counts P jr n riut CTMT/CNMT............................................................................Comte DoseEqialnent CSF.............................................................................Cd ofrFedeal Raegy ulations CD TCN........................................................................................Contineturent EAC ..............................................................................

CEmritclgaety FuctionLel EC....................................................................................Cyste B,........................................................................................Dz

..................

E DCN..........................................................................DEcgnc o ircati Currentor EAL........................................................................

Em ergncyNt Afcation Levele ECC....................................................................

Emergency COrerCooing Systemur ECA....................................................................EmeirgnencyCassifitcation Lgevel........................................................................

r.............

t..t...............

str EP... ................................................................

EmergencyOereSatin ro [cedure EPAA...................................................................Envidromnal Protection A gein cyraio FPR .......................................................................

E F udcraturea of~c Inesiation FEMA .......................................................

Federal Emergency Management Agency A-1 SAR....................................................

Finad Safcty, FNlP ..........................................................

F~arlx Nuciear Plant IIS .............................................

lederal l elcconirnuinjcatjons S\ stem GE ....................................................................................

General Emergency.................................................................................................

Hl, C!.............................................................................Ha Ca-pacit S:'Tcmpcratur Limi t O .......................................................

t...d...r....Oeratins.O.i.er.N.RH IC...................................................................................nitatin.Conitio SID......................................................................................Hua nside Diamterfc...........

(........................................................................

t... n..................( .RC lISFI................................................................IIdpnetSetFe trg Insalat ioch n'r KICr.....................................................................IEfcieNurniMutipiatinCondiation ID..................................................................................In...ide...Diameter..

LOA...................................................................................L.....C..I,';+

PEE C... ............................................................................

M ancin Cont~ro oar0d MC ..........................................................................

Ineedn pn Fulotorag Ionstallatint

.............................................................

Effective......Neutron.....Multiplication......

Fato CO.................................................................................Lmin Czndtiz zfe

.... A............................

.......................................................................

t ,eedeT ............................................................................

Mallll7inl Control1 Boardi MtCi...........................................................................................Moo mcn rol -C urir m...e. remRM................................................mi...-Rontgen.E.uvalent.M n C...............................................................................

ain.....C...ntr.....l Rom NI...........................................................................Nuclear.Energy .nsite NPS ................................................................................

ai NuamlclartPone Plant NR ...................................................................................

mmisio NORAD...........................................................MNaimria eosaeDfns SCommannd Njt 1 nus -ual iven.....m.e.....rem

...mREM..................................Ntca d.miliRe ntgen2 Mauni OE.......................................................................Operaing.Bais.Earhquak NEI ..............................................................................

Nuclear Eonergyle Intiuea NPP ..............................................

OfitDoeCluaon

...............

Nula PoerPanta OO..................................................................O..-i.e.Rspons.Orgaizatin PA..........................................................................................Proe .te .Are OCKIILA...-..........

.. ..ol ...,,....;- i+

...

Cntolld re A-2 ACS..............................................................

Priarity Aet".atizn and Contrzl PAG..........................................................................

Protective Action Guideline................................................................................................

P................................................................................................

PRi ........t

• r b~bil:izoi:

Safety Aarncmnt PI3X.............................................................................

Private lBranch Exchange PWR ..........................................................................

Pressurized Water Reactor................................................................................................

P PI......................................................................PonsperSurtetIznh Gugem PS.....................................G....................................................PonsprSur InchGagen R..........................................................................................Roentgen.....

ClC ......................................................................

Reacter Cere Cee!ing RCDI .......................................................................

Reactor ('oolanflt Drain Jlan RCS ..............................................................................

Reactor Coolant System Remn, remn, REM..............................................................

Roentgen Equivalent Man RI Il R.............................................................................

Residual IIleai Remox al RPS ...........................................................................

Reactor Protection System RPV ..............................................................................

Reactor Pressure Vessel RVLIS ..................................................

Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System W CU .......................................................

Reactor W ater Cleanup AR..............................................................................a.ty

.........RpS,"...........................................................................

Sa.... t......................

SA ........................................................................................

Sgenc SBAO.....................................................................SSl-Cnane trathing Apparatu SFP ......................................................................................

S pt \eaEnt 'ergeoo SCB.................................................................................SlCotie Breathn Apparatus SI P.........................................................................................Spfenty neuctiPonl SGC............................................................................

StuhrnNceam Generato SIDS.........................................................................

SaftyPrae e t isly Snyetion................................................................................................

S RSPD..........................................................................Sft Paraeter Dipay Syst emta TEDE ..................................

Total Effective Dose Equivalent TOAF..................................................................................

Top of Active Fuel Threshold Value A-3 V I)X ..................

....................................

... V olts D irect Current VOIP ..................................................

Voice Over Internet Protocol W I II ..........................................................

W aste I loldup lank.... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... ..Op.....................................

............... ,

Ow.,r+, Grzup+A-4 APPENDIX B -DEFINITIONS The following definitions are taken from Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, and related regulatory guidance documents.

General Emergency:

Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.Site Area Emergency:

Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; I) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; 2) that prevent effective access to, equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA PAG exposure levels beyond the site boundary.Alert: Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION.Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA PAG exposure levels.Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE): Events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated.

No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.The following are key terms necessary for overall understanding the NE1 99-01 emergency classification scheme.Emergency Action Level (EAL): A pre-determined, site-specific, observable threshold for an Initiating Condition that, when met or exceeded, places the plant in a given emergency classification level.Emergency Classification Level (ECL): One of a set of names or titles established by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for grouping off-normal events or conditions according to (1) potential or actual effects or consequences, and (2) resulting onsite and offsite response actions. The emergency classification levels, in aseendifig order of severity, are: General Emergency (GE)Site Area Emergency (SAE)Alert Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE)Fission Product Barrier Threshold:

A pre-determined, site-specific, observable threshold indicating the loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier.Initiating Condition (IC): An event or condition that aligns with the definition of one of the four emergency classification levels by virtue of the potential or actual effects or consequences.

B-I Selected terms used in Initiating Condition and Emergency Action Level statements are set in all capital letters (e.g., ALL CAPS). These words are defined terms that have specific meanings as used in this document.

The definitions of these terms are provided below.CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY:

Ilhe harrier(s) lxtx~een alreas containing radioactixe substantes and the ce\ ironment.(ln~er

a. cite specific definitidcn fcr this ten"D,.) Devdapeir:

Nct.: The CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: Pecr [NP- l(2}-SI P- 18.4. %{ontainment Integrity Veritfication and CIonsure".

Dcvzepeer .The. prceedura!!l, de.fanei or -eti-c:!..

taken tae cecu.re EXPLOSION:

A rapid, violent and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment due to combustion, chemical reaction or overpressurization.

A release of steam (from high energy lines or components) or an electrical component failure (caused by short circuits, grounding, arcing, etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosion.

Such events may require a post-event inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosion are present.FAULTED: The term applied to a steam generator that has a steam leak on the secondary side of sufficient size to cause an uncontrolled drop in steam generator pressure or the steam generator to become completel depressurized.

Devclopcr N-te Thiso term ic -pliae t......nly FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear pox.cr plant INPP) or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included.

HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area tO(A)).HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.

IMMINENT:

The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met within a relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI): A complex that is designed and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage.B-2 t;;enrty fc'/.r hc-..: 'clu7."ding the .cuar, cnt pe-ek ;'olte.OWNER CONTROLLED AREA t(OCA: b he area that encompasses all controlled areas '\ ithin the NI:N site boundary but outs ide the seeurity protectedl area fencc(ne., ....t....... i defin'iticn for De, .... ,^ e.,t^, Thi: t... ic; typizally take+n t.....n the cit .........by, Cr' ct~her+:;,'iee under. +th ....... ef the liaer;......

In ........ cc it.may be .... "iet for a licenc+ee te defin:'e a emalter =Dreg with a perimeter claere te the plant P.ret.cted Area peri.t.r..

.g.. ,, ......w th.......

C. her z..... ...... .....f ..h..... .... .... .m ax' be a cig.nific-.t dta-o, fr.. th... Pr+ otected Area). In the..... ea ...,e-os^.,dvee

-,hel ..n..e uc ...:g.the+

defin..ed the R0+.+t,+++

er Scue O.... er C.... trolled Area ( CA/SOCA).

^ The araan endr elce fcr++ ceheme uce must.+ be .c.neictn the deripie Cf the came a...a and..... .. ,.. -bau"ar..nt.n

.in th ..... Seurt Pla.... ,.+.;,.h .ecrito fe PROJECTILE:

An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.PROTECTED AREA (PAt: [he area that encompasses all controlled areas within the secturity protected area kncmc.(l e .... te.......

...........

nf.r.. h... t.. .)............t......te

.ic- typ..icall taken- t ..ean the ...... under ccntnu..............m..

r÷.itn and.

+an an..ed pretecticrn ac "de:ceribecd in, the site. Secu.rity' Plan, REFUELING PATHWAY: this includes the reaetor refuel cav it\. the fuel canal. and the spent fuel po~ol. canals and pools through v, hich irradiated fuel mas be mo\ved. but not including the reactor vessel. (!ne:' a cite epecific definition.

for. thic .....) Dr'd.... , ...te Thi- dee-cription ch-'u-d include' all the .....ec tube,+., ..... and p-ale^,

which.iradiat RUPTURE(D):

The condition of a steam generator in which primary-to-secondary leakage is of sufficient magnitude to require a safety injection.

Dnecebepr Nae Thi term. .... applicabl SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related.

Dce'e~apcr Ntet Thicg te,,rm may be ,madifled te in=clud'e the SECURITY CONDITION:

Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.UNISOLABLE:

An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely or locally.UNPLANNED:

A parameter change or an event that is not I) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient.

The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown.B-3 VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to a component or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis.

The visual impact of the damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affected component or structure.

B-4 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant Enclosure 5 Hatch Marked-Up EAL Schemes HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS INITIATING CONDITIONS, THRESHOLD VALUES, AND BASIS TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 REGULATORY BACKGROUND.............................................................

1 1.1 OPERATING REACTORS.......................................................................1..

1.2 INDEPENDENT

SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI)...........................

1 1.3 NRC ORDER EA-12-051.....................................................................

2 1.4 ORGANIZATION AND PRESENTATION OF INFORMATION...............................I 12-1-1.5 IC AND EAL MODE APPLICABILITY

......................................................

13--3-5 2 GUIDANCE ON MAKING EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS

.......................

221,147 2.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS................................................................

2 t~l--2.2 CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY.........................................................

22228 2.3 CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE EVENTS AND CONDITIONS...........................

222,28 2.4 CONSIDERATION OF MODE CHANGES DURING CLASSIFICATION

...................

232-38 2.5 CLASSIFICATION OF IMMINENT CONDITIONS...........................................

2323 2.6 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL UPGRADING AND DOWNGRADING

.......232r39 2.7 CLASSIFICATION OF SHORT-LIVED EVENTS.............................................24-244 2.8 CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSIENT CONDITIONS...........................................24-24.

2.9 AFTER-THE-FACT DISCOVERY OF AN EMERGENCY EVENT OR 3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS ...........

26261L1 4 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS ........535227 5 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) ICS/EALS .....808047 0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS.........................................

838350 7 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS.........................................................................

10110O265 8 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS............................................

12913088 APPENDIX A -ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

........................................

A-i APPENDIX B -DEFINITONS

.................................................................

B-1 D-EVE OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR .-NON-.PASSI!VE REA..CTORS 1 REGULATORY BACKGROUND

1.1 OPERATING

REACTORS Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Energy, contains the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations that apply to nuclear power facilities.

Several of these regulations

'govern various aspects of an emergency classification scheme. A rcvic-' cf thc rezk. ant -,cct:.,n..

lbt:cd bc!lzw "will aid the rzaaL in u"nderc't"andingA:" the key termin.l'evgy prs,;idzd in "S ection';" 3.0 ctlfhc rclex ant sections of this document arc :,* 10 CFR § 50.47(a)(l)(i)

• 10 CFR § 50.47(b)(4)

• 10 CFR § 50.54(q)* 10 CFR § 50.72(a)* 10 CFR § 50, Appendix E, IV.B, Assessment Actions* 10 CFR § 50, Appendix E, IV.C, Activation of Emergency OrganizationI hcse regulations are supplemented by various regulatory guidance documents.

4I:hfee-dl)ocuments of particular relevance to NEI 99-01 afeinchude:

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, October 1980. [Refer to Appendix 1, Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants]NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR § 50. 72 and§ 50. 73 Regulatory Guide 1.101, Emergency Response Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors'lhis list is not all-inclusive.

a*m4i4--ll is strongly recommended that scheme developers consult with licensing and regulatory compliance personnel to identify and understand all applicable requirements and guidance.

Questions may also be directed to the NEI Emergency Preparedness staff.1.2 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI)Selected guidance in NEI 99-01 is applicable to licensees electing to use their 10 CFR 50 emergency plan to fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR 72.32 for a stand-alone ISFSI. The emergency classification levels applicable to an ISFSI are consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR § 50 and the guidance in NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP-1.

The initiating conditions germane to a 10 CFR § 72.32 emergency plan (as described in NUREG-1567) are sub~iffe4-contained within the classification scheme for a 10 CFR §50.47 emergency plan.The generic ICs and EALs for an ISFSI are presented in Section 85, ISFSI ICs/EALs.

IC E-lHU 1 covers hecr-spe'i-e*.

credible natural and man-made events included within the scope of an ISFSI design. This IC is not applicable to installations or facilities that Riay process and/or repackage spent fuel ...........

d..R.tri..a...

Sterage Facility or an..... pntfe poeigfciiy............AddiionaII>, appropriate aspects of IC HU1 and IC HAl shoutd-'.\ill also be included to address a HOSTILE ACTION directed against an ISFSI.The analysis of potential onsite and offsite consequences of accidental releases associated with the operation of an ISFSI is contained in NUREG-1 140, A Regulatory Analysis on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees.

NUREG-1 140 concluded that the postulated worst-case accident involving an ISFSI has insignificant consequences to public health and safety. This evaluation shows that the maximum offsite dose to a member of the public due to an accidental release of radioactive materials would not exceed I rem Effective Dose Equivalent.

a Notification of Unuua E... nt in ..

• a 10 CFR 50.1A7 ..m....n.y plan (e.g., to pro.'ide azietanc if. frequested).

A o, ic...2...." Emergency;

.......e Organization (EROf, 1.3 NRC ORDER EA-12-051 The Fukushima Daiichi accident of March 11, 204-.2i' It, was the result of a tsunami that exceeded the plant's design basis and flooded the site's emergency electrical power supplies and distribution systems. This caused an extended loss of power that severely compromised the key safety functions of core cooling and containment integrity, and ultimately led-Ieadirag to core damage in three reactors.

Zh-i4e-Altthough the loss of power also impaired the spent fuel pool cooling function, sufficient water inventory was maintained in the pools to p~'eehe-prcvcnt fuel damage from the loss of cooling.Following a review of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the NRC concluded that sei'efa measures were necessary to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety under the provisions of the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(ii).

A~mong them t... proi O.ne such meaure v~as that each spent fuel pool he pra ided with reliable level instrumentation to significantly enhance the ability of key decision-makers to allocate resources e..ec.ive~y-following a beyond design basis event. To this end, the NRC issued Order EA- 12-051, Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, on March 12, 2012, to all US nuclear plants with an operating license, construction permit, or combined construction and operating license.NRC Order EA-12-05 1 states, in part, "All licensees

... shall have a reliable indication of the water level in associated spent fuel storage pools capable of supporting identification of the following pool water level conditions by trained personnel:

(1) level that is adequate to support operation of the normal fuel pool cooling system, (2) level that is adequate to provide substantial radiation shielding for a person standing on the spent fuel pool operating deck, and (3) level where fuel remains covered and actions to implement 2 make-up water addition should no longer be deferred." Te thise.ei,-All licensees must ihcr~clorc provide:* A primary and back-up level instrument that will monitor water level from the normal level to the top of the used fuel rack in the pool,.* A display in an area accessible following a severe event;--atd.

• Independent electrical power to each instrument channel and pi'e4de-an alternate remote power connection capability.

NEI 12-02, Industry Guidance for Compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051, "To Modif Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation

", provides guidance for complying with NRC Order EA- 12-051.NEI 99-01, Revision 6, includes three EALs that reflect the availability of the enhanced spent fuel pool level instrumentation associated with NRC Order EA- 12-051. These EALs are included within existing IC RA2, and new ICs RS2 and RG2. Associated EAL notes, bases and developer notes are also provided.It is recommended that these EALs be implemented when the enhanced spent fuel pool level instrumentation is available for use.The regulatory process that licensees follow to make changes to their emergency plan, including non-scheme changes to EALs, is 10 CFR 50.54(q).

In. azcccrdanzzc

.ith thi'.regul1ation,.4 .ticensees are responsible for evaluating a proposed change and determining whether or not it results in a reduction in the plaif+, effectiveness-eof4he-ple.R.

As-f a rsz4:l................

laiscd otn this determination, the licensee will either make the change or submit it to the NRC for prior review and approval in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90.3 A A AAI U liAmi nilr-mv1kKii1lll IH IIU NliiVVC Th .............

ra ke t...... tht appe"" the.ughut t...he .E!.9... methedelegy.

T~Emergency Cinecificatien L::'el.-Ne.e .44 e -N-te (I) ......n ,zain an.me...y.....

etn.th Emergency iEctrmuct cncidy a-llsisfr~e hn bcin cntepoe ccetc nIiitn edto.Ti One cC a cet efnamec er tidec ectablLbed by ffie US Nuclear Regulatery Cammicsior.(NRC) for greuping cif nermal event er ear.diticnc acecrdir.g te (I) peter.tial er actual dicete or canceguencec.

and (2) reculting oncite end offsite respence actiens. The.mergcncy claccifleatien levelc, in accending order ef severit;'.

arc: uI rPriricrIen.IP2 unucual nv,,'rt 4 2, .I. ["Ixormcanon or unua ,S ve n'C' tr E-vents; are in: progress or hav.e occ'ured w-hieh indicate a potential degradation of the le-vel of ca.t of the_ lant, r in.i..t......u...

hea t........

failt p.....t....h......n ini..at.d.

No r.eleas..

of"'- rd...... e'^ materia reuiin ,C offit esoseo mntoig.r") "-AeI4,.derIto !f telelf fctyf the pln r ... curit....

evn that....i..

J pb........if..threaten.ng rc t...... it ..ers.nn.l or dam..ge..

tosie equipmen, because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to e li !mited small !;-aetocn of the EPA PAG readily a-,ailable tc respond th " ...u..o becom"c.m.re...r..u.

• r t...... perf plant functi.n needed.. for4 protecti...

n f the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or maliiou .....: 1)" toward cite personnel!

or equimen t.at..o..proviac upoates Ta me pursue snrougn government autnornies.

2.1.4 General

Emergen...y (GE)Events are i.n progress or ha-ve occurred which involv',e actual or IMM'tNENT su.bs'tantial ACTION tharesu in an act-'l loss of physical co.ntrol of the facility*. can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA PAG exposu-'re lev'els ofibite for more than the 4.I l~I'~ tzrm ~rn+/-tim~ 11zru1~O u Ur.:zuai 1A'cnl ULI c1~IZ ~Imiklr s:te ~ne~itiZ t:rminzl.

I h~ t"-r~............

5 Purpese! 1hz purpose ef the General Emergency declarntien is te initiate predetermined protective actiens fcr the public, te prvJde continucus assessment ef information from the licensee and efisite erganizatienal measurements, to initiate additiena~

measures (15 indicated by actual er potential releases, ta provide censultatien with ofisite authorities, and to previde updates for the public threugh gevemment autherities.

2.2 INITI?.TINC CONDITION (IC)An event er condition that ali~s with the detinitian ef one ef the feur emergency lassiticatien leveL by virtue of the potential or aetual effects or eznse~uenees.

Di~cu~ion:

An IC describes an event or cenditien.

the severity er censeguenees

& which meet the definitien ef an emergency classifleatien level. An IC can be xpressed as a esotinucus, measurable parameter (e.g.. RCS leakage), on event (e.g., an~anhgualse) or the status of one or more fission product ba~iers (e.g.. loss of the RCS Appendix I of NUREG 0651 dccc net aontaln exmnple Emergency Action Levels (EALs~ for each ECL, but rather Initiating Cenditions (i.e., plant cenditians that indicate that a radisisgical emergency, or events that could lead to a radiological emergency, has~eeurred).

NUREG 0651 states that the Initiating Cenditiens ferm the basis for estab!ishment by a licensee of the specific plant instrumentatien readings (as applicable)

.~hieh, if exceeded.

would initi~e the emergency classification.

Thus, it is the specific ins~mcnt readings that weuld be the EALs.Considerations for the assignment of a particular Initiating Condition to an emergency Jassific~ion level are discussed in Section 3.

'.L

-'r.SZ; ;

tho prek d....termin..., site spcfc beral hehldfre ntatn odt ta.........met.....r...,......d , plce the... pln in... a gi..n eme,,rgency laifctnlee....

Disuo mA+++,i on: .i, E .....teent may. utli..e..

vari.ty..

f critcPalincluding...

--instr.me.

..+:., .n...t..us indi.ati.n

..bserkable event..: r -esults of h cacuat.n..d..

ay 2.1 PRODuCT- B°A."fl+ER A pre d.......n...

site specific, obser,'able threshold indicating te lo.....D'ie:s'ue.':

Fission product b'rrier thresholds represent threats to, the defense in maintained intac.t, preclu-de' the re lease., of s+gnifieant am-ounts of radioactive fission* Rea'ctr CooantSse RS

Upo.n do.tom:nat'ion that ono or me.=. fizsion product barrier throohol.ds h'-avo boocn-..---o.dod, th.a......mbin.at.ion""'^

of barrir lass a~ndior potntial ................

iz comparod to..... fi:i- pro: uct bar.... I ..... o. .. t...... t-,a ..........

to ap r itoE ............

a..... .................

th ...... and ........ przr o i n to Ab ..ral 7 An effcc+ti e cmcrgencj, classifcation scheme mu...... inc.r.rat a r.a...t......

accurate -a sssment of risk, beth to plant wyorkers andA the public. Thaere are bicu;ia..'may? oecur d.uring an ........tic.:' The+ qNE1[ 99 01 emergency scheme....m.. to+ strke aapropriate

.+ bala.c bt. en r..a..n..

bl. aticipat....

e....nt. or There are a range cfhnon emergent;y event",S repored to the US Nu'clear Regulatory Crommission (NC ...... in..... rd..... ith.the.re.uire.

en .of...........

CFR 50.72 may also require the deelartion of an emergency.

rh.....rt-+-

+il.- .... dtr ineth .......e .of:. .a.h ECL.

• goal- .... thi [pross i"s toa I! Typical abnormal and e.mergency operating proced.aure

....int and.. tans.ti. n criteria+..

I Typical Technical Specification limits an-d centrols Manul... I (+ODCM) r.adiolog+Ica releas limits+* eiwo slce patdialSfy Anl.i Reor ....S,, R) acciden a.... l.ys....* NUR.EG Appendix 1, E.acrg+'cytc .c:io:t Le;cI "oi+c.+&lss cfor Nx.'kwc'c~

Poxsrr* Indstary' Operating Experience t'he of IPs a-nd Emergenc...

Acto Levels ...(E117A Is. The team dec.;.ide to........s (e ,.g,.... helping an Emergency Director underotand why. .... p-.----.;ar condtio s c!assifd as an Alert). It soulda be str...ed tat de'.elop....

not......

p t*o-. rcdefin. these attribute or apply. thmi.n aho htwudcanetegnrcgiac otie 8 3, .1. Notification o~f Unusu'.al E;"..nt tNrOIJFEA (13 A minor. l... of ..ntr.. of .-.adioa..i.

ma......iL or the to* control radiation (C) A consc, un e ...........

i..i ...a.t.......t.......nt .n.ti ...ati .n.t loa, St....a..Fcdc Al autorii.

icnvokes: fisson+,n pr-duct baricr ,B) An event'- or c-ndtio .adi~n that :infcntly ,edce th ari t.o, ... loss;., ..r ,.ten.,l lo conditions of this tsya in multiple.........

r"e~ .y.tem......

c!uade those that challenge the andior control ot 9 (C) A release Cf radioactive m than 10% ef an EPA PAG (D)A HOSTILE ACTION cc:ateralas to the en;'irenment that ceeulda result in daese creater c'-rr~beyond the site boundary.~g within the plant PROTECTED AREA 3.1l.1 General Emergency ar condition that invelves: (B), A ......r. r evetcronditien that, unmitigated may "-ad t +a les of all. tree + fissicn;directl ..... eer d...age an less ef containment integrity.(D)A HOSTILE AC,,.TION reculting in the ls o.... y caf.... fun.. eti...ns-

....t.., cer eelin/RP ....ter... I or. RC heat. removal) ,fr dama..e te ..... fue:l-.........t.re.ult...T...that.

end, .... the ..........

an e certain .....nd t.+ atc conciocrpl romeveralI cite speciric progu++llisu sarety assecmetsll+(PSA also known as probabilistic risk ..se..ment.

ppX). Sen generi.c:

insights frem eent.ributerc t.e core dam-age frequency at m...y Pressuri.e W_.ater.+

Reaetorc (PW~s, gratr hn 5 iutsw th h ln to ... b........

He ....do.n, wa, assiged a EC,-L f-Site Area Emergency..P.usrevnst es falA pew:er w-ere als.Regulat.ry Gud ......,.................., may be u.......det.rmine...time....e criterin.to.dmarcate

.....c a StAraEmergency and a General Emerg..ncy.

2 c. Fo evere core damage .....s uncertaintie exist..:o in phenomena important te accid.ent pragreAa~n: .ading te ............

failur......

ause....t...e..unc...ai.ti...

10

nio:: u.v ¢ nt.in*ment,,:*

ntegrity) atone blowin:'g Emergency.

3.......indi.at.d.tha....ading

..ntribu...s....lat...

fat."2 tie --eequene .: in... * .'ing..period,.v and-' a reactor.....

colant pump ea.l-o failu... The generic EALs. methodology n.eed-'o.._r .......v-'nt booed !Co EALo. Each type i. diocu-*zed b"e.lo'..Symptom baz;ed ICo an."d EAL.o are pa.-am'etero or conditiono that are meazurable Fiozion product b'rrier bazed ICo and EALsar"e the ouboet, of zy.mptom ba"..d......that.r..er opcfcyt h .......! o..... h.. l...ng.. t th... principal against the potetial:.,',.

loot and .lo.t and the .total numb- of b-: .... under challenge...

Event booed I'2o and EALs define a v'ariety of opecfi..ocurrence that haet rp to ohut+ do the.. ractor...

natural phenomena (e.g., an .... q" .... ma..3.3 NSES DE~IcN DirrEnuxcEN The NEI 99 01 emcrcencv;

Iazoification ocheme accounts for the deoi~diff.ereneeo b~etw4.een PWRo BWP~o by specifying EALo unique to each typ'e at a.ong PlRD NSSco; theefre guida. nc i.. provide d to^ .aid.: inhe- d v-evelopmT:en:

t: of EA approp-ite toe differen't PWR NSSS. type. Where n'ecezo:ty, deve'lopment, gu-idance alzo the, intent of generic ICo and EALo w"ithin the constraint

.m o.... by the, plntdin n 11 document:

thece ehangec ~iIl be reviewed for acceptability by the NRC no part of the~cheme approval proceco.The guidance in NEI 99 ~i ic not applicable to advanced poccive light water reactor with NEI 07 01, Mcdccdo!ogy for Devole.e.~vora~'

of E-~r-' 1~'-~31-41 .40 ORGANIZATION AN D PRESENTATION OF Gf~qNfA-t-INFORMATION The scheme's ge.mefe-information is organized by Recognition Category in the following order.R -Abnormal Radiation Levels / Radiological Effluent -Seetien -6 C -Cold Shutdown / Refueling System Malfunction -Seetie*n 7 E -Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) -eec~ien 8 F -Fission Product Barrier -8ten 9ii-H -Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety -cetien 10O S -System Malfunction -Seet44,n

-5 ECL the accigred emergency elcciflhea'tion le;vel for the IC.EAL+c are iPe. L~arc tom be uc.dlt cJ+l~accif evnto+ ar T lono generic app :-...... roach-- tc the development oflan exam'ple cannot .... be (e.g., an"....u..d ini....m......i:n range ic net a;vailable at the. the devel.. e , ... u..d, For PRecagnitin Category" F, the ficcion prduct ba+rrier ae.- presented in tale applcal toBA n W, n agdb fcinpout n h degre .oft .a... hal.e(ie.pteta..oo oc) hcprcntonmt

-- ho "

cyergiom the ÷ thr.... d,.t and cup4 t a... urate. a cohec'÷o m--nto.+l

'12 caleulationc, etc. Develeper netee ~hculd net be included in the cite' c emergency clas~iticaticn ceheme bacic decument.

Develepere may elect te include informatien reculting frem a de;'eleper note actien in a bacic ceetien.U ELL A~ngnm:nt Attributes Lecated within the Develeper Netec cection, epecifiec the a~ribute uced for accigning the IC tc a given ECL.Jt,-51.5 IC AND EAL MODE APPLICABILITY th'e applicability e.f ICc and EALs "will ;'ay with plant. mede. For :::ample.

c.ome Trhet folowngb tale hodws maed-ecogfpnitiowenCallftegorie re-auplibarble iearch lnt mode. The ICs and EALs for a given Recognition Category are applicable in the indicated modes.MODE APPLICABILITY MATRIX Category Mode R C E F H S Power Operations X X X X X Startup X X X X X Hot Shtadbwn X__XX X___ X Hotd Shutdown X X X X X ColeSutdowng X X X X Refueling X X X X Per'm.anently

--__ ________ ___13 Ilhitch I Jnits I and 2 technical Spc~cifieations ab 1. -rovides the fuliowine mode definition<:

XI'C ltcReatctor Mod Average Reactor Switch Positon nieau (F 1 Power Operation Ron NA 2 Startup or Startup./ttot Standby NA 3 1 lot Shutdo\n~

Shutdow\n

>212 4 Cold Shutdoxxn 5 b Shutdown 2I21 5 Rcfucling°"'

Shutdowvn or ReFuel NA (a) All reactor vessel head elosure holts fully' tensioned.

lb) Orte or more reactor vessel head closure holts less than full) tetnsionted.

In add it ion to these dcIi ned modes. "Dc fuecld" is also appl icahle to the f latch ltAl scheme. consistent w.ith NEI 99-01! l)clitclcd is a +No Modce" ondition wvhcer all (ot the Fuecl has been removed from thle reactor vessel I i.e.. Full core oftload during refueling or extended outages I.I hese modes arc used throughout the Ilatoch I A! s w i th no nmodifticat ions from N lI 99-01.I WVhen a unit is de fueled, thle Initiating ( onditions designated as Mode Condition "AI VI , or 1I)cfucled&

arc applieable.

T~ecbmcal pec.qca~anP:"+

+ r ............

(1)+'": ..... Swic in Run ton St..t. (2): Ma,. c S.it. Start.u/Hat+

S,,andby+++14

& DEL'EL/OP MEDlt, rW J1IDlANCE Thi.. v.-tic .........

ctail: guidanecefor

.....pi...a..i...p.c......

m.rg.n....a......

ati.It is importXant that the NEI 99 01! emergency classification scheme be implem~ented as an int.egrat.ed package. Selected usea ,?f portions ~f this gu.idance., is strongly discouJraged as it w:ill I.i

'clf sho uld attemp tha keepth e n!.a*.dir site specific dchemes as a eac he benri gcuidfatace asft possible.t~r her god~g is tomet te maintet of t:he generic Inititin postioin : theme dsptcifutur industry..

wid... schem.. enhan.. em. nt... ...... e ...Whn rpel dveoed heI~ ndE~sssud eunmigou ndradl 1*11- capital ieuerc I~LC., ALL ~ Inc Octlmtlznc are precentee in A~pcnOIX H.Deflfti~efts, II The ICc wi:thin a may be. pve in......r....cr..r....

........tin pu..........g...., ct_ with:a a Ge~neral Emerge~noy at. the. lefftzp ef a user aid.......

flw ,d by .it. Ara m- gecy.e .nd...U ....tThe Initiating Condition num.bering may.. K., .h... d£ The fi--t letter af a Recegnfitin Catcgcr;v designato m..y b .h.nged ac follaw.....

.....ma.........

in. lieu !+ tef.... ... ..... ........(fo.r" Abnormal) may. be:..+ chmaged to "R" (for.... R-adiatien).

This moans that. th..e..acc;ci.tedIc changed to RU I .RU1 .l,)D etc.....Th .........d.........m Rogite ...t.g..i.. S+ and.... Cmay be ino,-peoated into a co.mmon (eag.. ene t~blc) pro..ided.

that' all relatedA n-tec and.* T~he ter-me EAL and threchelshod may K' "uc.ed interchangeabz+ly.

IC .an AL ct..........

Thi: m....ri:l ic act rcq..:.a tc be in the -,nal ...ergen...cy 1.2 CR!{TICAL Ac".' diccu:ced abeve.', deve l~oper r .........d te .. ee.. their.. cite Fcpceiic c..h.emc a intent ic mainaine.

With urespe....

te Rec.gnitin Catgor F. a cit spegcific echem,. mu.et :.i.,dea .m.. of" ...... :ai te facilitetimely and..accurate U h EALe. Operating

..od..ev Applicbilit criteria.......and..a.i...nfo.m..ion ae technically'" ...p... andv-.'...

.+ accurate (i.e., the-y centaiin the informat.--ion nececcar,, to.* EAL tamte.mentc; uce obiceti'e, criteria a.nd eberv.'.abl.

v'aluec3.16

• !Cs, EALs. Operting Mode Applicability Nte and ;whefeneeesse'.

U The scheme fac-ilitates lassification cfm.-lti.clc cn~current eventsor conditions.

>1.3 l'>TR;I',tF'T AT!fh. I n~ roE n lnstumctaton rfcrnce inEAL tatmcns souldincudetha desribd i th...mo eagingypwrsuc; h- o bevreaiya, ....:L deprs .h.uld ; .......t. ner.., ...Ftdig* insru c t ntat. i............r.uti .l ..mant.ind.i..

ac. rdan.... th.......gra.

and rocedures.

Aelated roEfALne in EAL s.e taticm isn.s shoul be !'ste cn thatae thC wosit.1.1 PnI~r;TATIo\

or Sciiv~tr IM'OIttiATIO'~.

TO Lt~iIU5 maintain thrs capailit to ,asss eeret, !-.s:sify n eclanpocdre an mrgene eunditiorn prmtly presenatin emarethod, stha-- besn suppores, the end , rs by fheilCe ats n Raccurmfate-an timely t m....... cl.... icat.on...

To.thi....n....

de.. el.pe..;...hould.

cosider the followng~

pints...The....~ u:er of'ic acns emerenycatorsi.f.-catos prcedure tabtre th.. op....t...

in the Cotrl om.Duig healoobe lssfiato tmeprid.thym17hv rD .......n.. ta .... la readily us:able and eacily, unde.. tad... la io:eatian t...aL, (e.g., a Directoe, and/o~r OficitPe:F Reence Organizatian percannel.

A............

ic an aceal pr:ccctatian me~thad prav'ided that :t c.t..... all,?1 the kep --ith ec=h applcablc EAL or ..........

a...m.....r.a..nd.ref.re..e..

a r...........

a ,Natc ic a-'ccep+table as, long a'.s the inr:,,-matir.n i:; adequavtely captureda on the wailb',.eard bu-t it choul'd be readSily a--ailahle toe mergency clacciticati.on decsicin maerer.In seime cac.=c, it may be- ad ......geu t... deva" a t.. wo' ........ ard. .... fo ..... during-pa--er peratianc.

ctat-..up a-nd hot` =eandtian, and. another for ca!l shutawn--

and refueling.

can...on.....

Alt.erative.

precen`at`ian m-ethad" the. Rec......a

+" C and~ prduct, typ tabec De-elopc-" ....... encure that... thesiteepcitemta dr. l ..trecodcmiain n lciiainatae hw nteBRZ W A 15 I" lrcu.ntIONt or~ I/'s/1EAI.

• i~rTI!* PL*~

nulo A rie u in`g."+i.

~f IC E-AT^ " .....:.. int plant ... :- F~ u-e ic nat ress.camm

!end .Thc ppa hwul greatly..........

inre e the..... ad ....trtve ..ntr... n wer......for m..in...inin

.pr ..........

O h te han d, pefonRC ane" ca lln gesa may,+`,.v.eri eanto ........ f...... m e aetin +.an CZ EAL imrcn= ... c l... the..... ...............

n..d durti .) t i n plantS: prcdrcaetn h rae/crt oc the cite

'm..... .. ...[ -..lecii.....p..eur

.ca cue could... b... pl.ced..in..emergency............ng.;.... .+ ....... oper ting praedr ecA .larm recpcn...

pr... aeduec:::e=-+.

and nar m rae,"'"tic ........ ..... " cbt zpee.L "d-- ...zEA.........

~ fc chccc~zcit3 .f.........

' NO....T.,o+

, 18 A basis document ic an ir.tegral part cf an emergency claccification scheme. The material in thic document cuppartc proper emergency claccification decision making by providing informing background and development infcrmation in a readily accessible fcrmat. It can be referred to in training cituatians and when making an actual emergency classification, if nceeccary.

The document ic also uceful for ectabliching configuration management eantrolc for EP related equipment and eaplaining an emergency clascifleation to offcite autho~tiec.

The ccntent of the basic dozument chould include, at a minimum, the following:

U A cite cpecific Mode Applicability Matrb~ and deceription of operating madec, cimi!ar to that precented in ceetion 3.5.£ A diceuccion of the emergency classification and declaration proeecc reflecting the material precented in Section 5. Thic material may be edited as needed to align with cite cpecific emergency plan and implementing prcccdure requirementc.

• Each Initiating Condition along vith the associated EALs or fiscion praduct barrier thresholds, Operating Made Applicability, Notes and Bacic information.

• A licting of aeronymc and defined termc, similar to that precented in Appendicec A and B, respectively.

Thic material may be edited as needed to ali~ with site speeifie* Any cite cpecific baekground or technical appendices that the developers believe wauld be use~l in coplaining or ucing clcmentc of the emergency elascificatian seheme, the meaning intent A Basic ~ cor.tain that cauio maolly Cr~f the ascociated IC or EAI. Such information should be ineo~arated

~ithin the IC or EAL ctatcmentc, or as an EAL Nate. Information in the Basic chould only clarify and inform decicion making for an emergency elaccification.

Basic information chould be readily available to be refcrenccd, if nececcary, by the Emergency Director.

Far cx~ple, a eapy of the basic document could be maintained in the apprapriate emergency responce facilitiec.

Because the information in a basic document can affect emergency clascific~ion decicion making (e.g., the Emergency Direetor referc to it during an event), the NRC~taffexpectc that ehangec to the basic dacument wil! be evaluated in accordance vith the provisionc of 10 CFR 50.51(q).Ac reflected in the generic gu.idance, thc criterie'a/value s ued in se'eral EALc and ficcion prde barrier....h......... be.........fr.m

..................

and FO.s hi appr.ac....c intended -to .maitai ....... .. betee oprtional,...

., dance,,c" -v":.... andemrgn 19

4.8 912'ELOI'EII

A1~.D 1J~ER FEEDBACK Quc~ticr.~

zr czrnm:nt~

zcn~rning th~ matrial in this i3cum.n1 may bc directed tc th: NEI Emergcncy Pr~pa cdn~z ztaff, NEI EAL ~ fcr~z mzmbzr~ zr zubmittcd tz tb~Em.~rgcncy Pr~par~xtnc.,~

Frz~iu~ntlv Azkzd Qu~,tionc prc~c~.20 52 GUIDANCE ON MAKING EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONSI GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS Wrhf.tk .. .i..g"-e nior any. emergency classification, the emergency director must consider all information having a bearing on the proper assessment of an initiating condition (IC).This includes the emergency action level (EAL). l+is-the associated operating mode applicability, notes. and the informing basis information.

In the recognition category F matrices, EALs are referred to as fission product barrier thresholds; the thresholds serve the same function as an EAL.NRC regulations require the licensee to establish and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency action level has been exceeded and to promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of the appropriate emergency classification level. The NRC staff has provided guidance on implementing this requirement in NSIR/DPR-ISG-0 1, Interim Staff Guidance, Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants.All emergency classification assessments soeid-4x ill be based **pon valid indications, reports or conditions.

A valid indication, report, or condition, :i oei eha4-has been verified Ohfe-*gh-using appropriate means. su.ch t~hat there :altar ing no doubt regarding the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy.

For example, validation could be aeeempliched through an instrument channel check, response on related or redundant indicators, or direct observation by plant personnel.

The validateien ofindications she*14d-\ilI be ... ...in a manner that supports timely emergency declaration.

For ICs and EALs that have a stipulated time duration (e.g., I.S 30..

eta.), the emergency director shudwitl not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but sheel4-will declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. If an ongoing radiological release is detected and the release start time is unknown, it sheu4d-wiIl be assumed that the release duration specified in the IC/EAL has been exceeded, absent data to the contrary.A planned work activity that-reeultsresultin2, in an expected event or condition which meets or exceeds an EAL does not warrant an emergency declaration provided that 1) the activity proceeds as planned and 2) the plant remains within the limits imposed by the operating license. Such activities include planned work to test, manipulate, repair, maintain or modify' a system or component.

In +these-such cases, the controls associated with the planning, preparation and execution of the work will ensure thaI-compliance with the opcratiflg license is maintained, with all" aspect ... f the operating license provided thaI-the activity proceeds and concludes as expected.

Events or conditions of this type may be subject to the reporting requirements of 10 § CFR 50.72.Th...........men.

f Some EALs is-arc assessed based on the results of analyses that-&e necessary to ascertain whether a specific EAL threshold has been exceeded-(erg.,,-aes a......m.n.., chemstr ........., tR-C leak. rata ealculatien, etc.);. The EAL and/or the associated basis discussion will identify the necessary analysis.

Iin these-ee, ;The 15-21 minute declaration period starts with the availability of the analysis results that show the threshold to be exceeded (i.e., this is the time that the EAL information is first available).

The NRC expects licensees to establish the capability to initiate and complete EAL-related analyses within a reasonable period of time (e.g., ................ no .......... -W-hi4e-Although the EALs have been developed to address a full spectrum of possible events and conditions which may warrant emergency classification, a provision for classification based on operator/management experience and judgment is still necessary.

The NEI 99-01 scheme provides the emergency director with the ability to classify events and conditions based upon judgment using EALs that are consistent with the emergency classification level (ECL) definitions (refer to Category H). The emergency director will need to determine if the effects or consequences of the event or condition reasonably meet or exceed a particular ECL definition.

A similar provision is incorporated into the fission product barrier tables; judgment may be used to determine the status of a fission product barrier.CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY To make an emergency classification, the user will compare an event or condition (i.e., the relevant plant indications and reports) to an EAL(s) and determine if the EAL has been met or exceeded.

Thez evaluation eflAn EAL(s) e~aluation must be consistent with the related operating mode applicability and notes. If an EAL has been met or exceeded, t-heft-the IC is eefriideared-met and the associated ECL is declared in accordance with plant procedures.

When assessing an EAL that specifies a time duration for the off-normal condition, the"clock" for the EAL time duration runs concurrently with the emergency classification process "clock." For a full discussion of this timing requirement, refer to NSIR/DPR-ISG-0I..¢,2.3 CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE EVENTS AND CONDITIONS Wbhii-ln the cnt of multiple emergency-emcrlcncic., e,,e+&sor conditions-ae-pre~e44, the user will identify all met or exceeded EALs. The highest applicable ECL identified during this review is declared.

For example: If an Alert EAL and a Site Area Emergency EAL are met, whethar at one unit or at two,' different units, a Site Area Emergency ill be declared.There is no "additive" effect from multiple EALs meeting the same ECL. For example: If two Alert EALs are met, wh"ther " ...n... uni or ..t. tzo +- .i..r.n unit', an Alert should-\ ill be declared.Related guidance concerning classification of rapidly escalating events or conditions is provided in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2007-02, Clarification of NRC Guidance for Emergency Notifications During Quickly Changing Events.22 CONSIDERATION OF MODE CHANGES DURING CLASSIFICATION-The mode in effect at the time that an event or condition occurred, and prior to any plant or operator response, is the mo~de that dletermines whether et-eta IC is applicable.

If an event or condition occurs; and results in a mode change before the emergency is declared, the emergency classification level is still based on the mode that existed at the time that the event or condition was initiated (and not when it was declared).

Once a different mede is reached, any; new e'.en Z~r eznditicn, nct related tz th... eri...........

Zr cenditia:n, requiring emergency clacgifieaticn be ev"-luated agiAteI&adEL a....li..ab.....

te .... .. .epating ......t.t....i...f.th.........

n in ..... Shet'ew ............ -r Refueling mce^ ee if.. Het Su td cwn.. ..... a.. higher m.... enter a.pp!lcablc .cnly te ...nt. tha int. te i.,.,n ,th. I Su, t..,a......

mcde cr higher..-,-2.5 CLASSIFICATION OF IMMINENT CONDITIONS Although EALs provide specific thresholds, the emergency director must remain alert to events or conditions that could lead to meeting or exceeding an EAL within a relatively short period of time (i.e., a change in the ECL is IMMINENT).

If, in the judgment of the emergency director, meeting an EAL is IMMINENT, the emergency classification should will be made as if the EAL has been met. While applicable to all emergency classification levels, this approach is particularly important at the higher emergency classification levels since it provides additional time for implementation of protective measures..-62.6 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL UPGRADING AND DOWNGRADING SN(C poliex is that once an emergent?

classification is made. it cannot he dos, ngradcd to a class ilfcat ion. I cnninau ion criteria contained in procedure NM P-I P-110t.l mergencs Classification and Initial Actions shall be coinpleted ibr an es em to hc ternmiated.

At termination, on an es e nt specif'ic has is. the site can either enter norntal operating conditions or enter a recosers condition with a recovery organization cstahlished for turnover from tlte [R( An ECL. may b .... dcnrc .......t...... t.....cendition that mectc the highect IC .d EA n, -.ng, ....... t.... othe ..i .. :pei.i dzw:ngrading requirementz are met. If dzwngrading the ECL ic ... ... deemed ne ELwoldtenbebce n lwr ppiabe Ce)ad ALz. heEL3a nateti arxtve. gLuitlance caneeming ciactincatien ci rapitil:.

etealaling .z~cnu er centlitiant

' prav:itt.x In vI ,,U.' ,,,,,,CLASSIFICATION OF SHORT-LIVED EVENTS A..dicuced n S..in.....

,.. eLvent-based ICs and EALs define a variety of specific occurrences that have potential or actual safety significance.

By their nature, some of these events may be short-lived and,-theso,-......e.*

end before the emergency classification assessment can be complete~d:--, f an. event eccu.rt that m.ctc÷ a~r exce.edc an EAL, the aeccatd CLmttb...

lae ,g........

.. it ..ntnu. ,.r.....ncu..e at r th aimue ot declaratien'.

....p... f~ or example. an earthquake.

f.......t..n.u.....falur o the reactor protection system to automatically scram/trip the reactor followed by a successful manual scram/trin ra -'"..CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSIENT CONDITIONS Many of the ICs and/or EALs eentainied-in this document employ time-based criteria=Thcet criteria will that require tha4he-IC/EAL conditions be present for a defined period of time before an emergency declaration is warranted.

In cases where no time-based criterion is specified, it. it recognized' some transient conditions may cause an EAL to be met for a brief period of time (e.g.. a fcv. .c,:cnd.,t..

a few. ...n...... The following guidance ill be applied to the classification of these conditions.

EAL momentarily met during expected plant response -In inttancee v~hcrcWhien an EAL is briefly met during an expected (normal) plant response, an emergency declaration is not warranted, provided that associated systems and components are operating as expected, and operator actions are performed in accordance with procedures.

EAL momentarily met but the condition is corrected prior to an emergency declaration

-If an operator takes prompt manual action to address a condition, and the action is successful in correcting the condition prior to the emergency declaration, then the applicable EAL is not considered met and the associated emergency declaration is not required..tFor illustrative*'°'

pur..... w es~, contider the rcllowing e~ml.li' " " nip1 presents an illustra tion: An ATWS occurs and the auxiliary fedte .............

fal to auoaial start. Sta eeaeRPV' levels- rapidly decreases and the plant enters an inadequate RCS heat ..... eval ...............

RPV l~evel condil ion (a potential loss of beth-the fuel clad barrier and a loss otf the RCS barriers).

If an operator manually starts the a..ili.r.

fe.........

t:......RC1C in accordance with an EOP step and clears the inadequate RCS hea ......... , ' Water Level condition prior 24 to an emergency declaration, then the classification should be based on the ATWS only.It is important to &I'esnotc that the 15-minute emergency classification assessment period is not a "grace period" durfing-wh'iehto dela3 a classification

&l4tw--he--io order to perform anee-&f-a corrective action that would obviate the need to classify the event,-. Emergency classification assessments must be deliberate and timely, with no undue delays. The provision discussed above addresses only those rapidly evolving situations where an operator is able to take e.

action If betbre te-the emergency director ee 4ecifng-cornpletes the review and necessary steps fleessafy-to make the emergency declaration.

This provision

...........

te ensures t-hat any public protective actions resulting from the emergency classification are truly warranted by the plant conditions.AFTER-THE-FACT DISCOVERY OF AN EMERGENCY EVENT OR CONDITION In some cases, an EAL may be met but the emergency classification was not made at the time of the event or condition.

This c",, occur w;k'n pzrvornhe!

Iersonnel could discover t-hat-an event or condition existed which met an EAL, but no emergency was declared, and the event or condition no longer exists at the time of discovery.

T-his-tt may be d*~e-4e-the event or condition not be-fig-recognized at the time. or there w.a> an error ..............

in the emergency classification process.In these cases, no emergency declaration is but the guidance contained in NUJREG-1022 is applicable.

Specifically, the event ehtdwilt be reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR § 50.72 within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared event or condition.

The licensee shudwill also notify appropriate State and local agencies in accordance with the agreedf-*a-on arrangements.

in NUP.E" 1022.25 63 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS GENERAL SITE AREA EMRENY EMRENYALERT UNUSUAL EVENT RGl Release of RS1 Release of RAI Release of RU1 Release of gaseous radioactivity gaseous radioactivity gaseous or liquid gaseous or liquid resulting in offsite resulting in offsite radioactivity resulting radioactivity greater dose greater than 1,000 dose greater than 100 in offsite dose greater than 2 times the fie mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem TEDE or 500 than 10 mnrem TEDE .....i:ie-e .......mrem thyroid CDE. mrem thyroid CDE. or 50 mrem thyroid Op. Modes:" All Op. Modes:" All CDE. ..... .Op. Modes: All limits for 60 minutes or longer.Op. Modes: All R(G2 Spcnlt hidc p0(11 IRS2 Spent hiefc pool RA2 Significant RU2 UNPLANNED]cx ci be level ai lowering of water level loss of water level ectoied ) to le~ixi be'e above, or damage to, above irradiated fuel........ Lw"':v^ 3 .cxci 3. irradiated fu~el. Op. Modes:" All) .... 3 tu, 1/I Op. Modes:" All 60 Nin nulex or loixeer, RA3 Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown._____________

_____________Op.

Modes: All 26 RG1 ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (I or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director sheI4- ill declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

(1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (-itc m-c:*--i:c I~ n h....a*,zchold (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond :h st bo*... (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond site 23~ VZRa4M~to~

~wtMiOn~r# Q9&IS~B~~~f.rmc'

~oIlt1d~~!t~

zpz~itiz dccc r.x~pt3r p3rnt):* Closed window dose rates greater than 1,000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.

Releases of this magnitude will require implementation of protective actions for the public.27 Radiological effluent EALs are els~e-included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

I he monitor reading threshold values are determined using a dose assessment method that hack calculates from the dose \,alues specified in the IC. The meteorology and source term tnoble gases. particulates.

and halogens)used are the same as those used to determine the monitor reading threshold values in ICs RSI1 and RA !, This protocol will maintain inter\,als betxveen the threshold alues for the three classifications.

Since doses are generally not monitored in real-time.

a release duration of one hour is assumed, and the threshold values are based on a site boundary, (or beyond) dose of I1000)mR/hour whole body or 5(000 mR/hour thyroid, whichever is more limiting.The TEDE dose is set at the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes..... eff+ luent l+.,-; A a... in....cl.a, :uded taroid ..... for clazifin ..... nte tha... can,-beradalyze in esified ran, the:azi , plant:, canditian lane.+ 1hz incluz:ian

.... bat,+h .... at !Cz1EAL mare fu~llly drse h pcw fpsil vneadacdn Whil* e thiz IC m+a y be+*:, met+ ab.eent+.

chalenge ta multie fhizzion .r.du. b*+Jarrzi praviez clazifiatiandiverity ad ma beue vn ta al a ec h hgvizian r, du.. barrir.. chllengd..bu.r.thr.the....n of...radi...

ac..i.. ity. re ...........

the and, the c.mm.tt.d..ffectivewid h e tetuivalent iCEDE),+or as ....... cm.....d..a.

e Tuialen (CDEi'. Fari th --e purp .... fth 1 ... ICE1.e,I the.+' dazel- qunity tata effect-+ie daze co:i'rThcef tEP PAG gide,* rvde o heueafautthri dz ageca fca hWe-ve r, .am. tte h-....ave decide bae preateetv eta ancid t h ..... id.......

.oNuclear pawer ..-a plant I+I+ .... A.z netab r .aitn ...th .th pra...v aetian 1 .... adalag.., ez emp byth Statee thei EP.z. Thew CDE daze uzed in the, IC..~++. and .. EAe zhauld be adjuzed azneeczag

' t a.ignj+l v with State paetv e atin eczin akngcrteia Th "ie peiicmaiarlzIan hrehl vlus zaldbedtemie2wt a Memter rea~t:nc.~

will te ealeuIat~I ucmc a cet at a..cumed meteerelegical data or..m..... i di" ... r... i- f...... r... th d... .. ar f....r.......t...f.r

......h ...d.b .th same ac, those empleyed tecalcu...t..t.....n.t........

n.. fo ....... .....and ....... A ............

efth. ic .. :nonate includ,A bu .....n...limitesd.*

to -th -nd .,lu ...d.n..h tecle dmi hudbe th...........

.... .. as t.at.m....d...

.......m. nt.....dig

...r..., RE....S!ODC..M., an ;',:u- use in... the s te' ..... ierg -:cncy dose rssmn ecethodel o its* eps--ending uponh thc m ethod'oloein u.ed te-' cal"ulath the [ALsablec,--

th.......

may b me o the ..... value m..n.. th:a:t .,n ..urc a :, tgisal eC alaio in.. the ECL.~ec'c!

P. relet h cva ntenc c cfth exmpergrcypan vm, ando preadurl meght d' l gy ucedo/ te det/ennin.

effst...means there may bhoe etm t difrn'-ed in.th.....a...f....

te........p....t

..the .al .ul ..d..._en ndictat ionth E*:AL alu bein tiendors d ircjct wisthm".r et!e'din the usberge addcl:'rngeric E i th!nditaument.

af ) rem arper~za nc auc ytematcfaue tarct may render ' the gccnicrreEading invalid '-e g.. an aute npurge feature trigg.red at a p;,icula:

in.i.. ti.n level.. ... ..., Iticrcizdttthcndtndeebebyhi Cmyrctinadilgalefunvae ECL ,Accianment A,,trltt-f-es: .i. I1.'..29 30 RG2 I.( 1 :(monc'th onrcnrolc>

Inilialting ( o ndlition:

Spcit 'tonl poolI Icvc ! cu.li ot bn rcs toind to at[

(5 .,t .!,ci Lz';'! 3...... v .... ,lcx cl 3 itor Ott o ontcii, or Irloonr ()ller<iting t pplict'hibilix All UI~niegr~tnc. .ldion I*l cls: I N o Ic: ll n nm n rn., olcT d ] rc ctolr she~l dtt- ', ill docc l 'nc Ih i ( inc ram l I-:l Ocr ac n,,c p ro in~top tix upo dctct ini on7 that 60t mitoutns:

has hcnin excccded, or iii iliknlx hn c'xcccdndI, 1) .Slpcntoi~fe pool !ci c~i1 1oon hc rnstoinld to, at InnI pCi ..... 3...........

ncI 3 tbr Ot( i/ii or loonniI hiii I ( atd drsscs a SlilcnIo<s of spen t ftloni pool o/ \ not!Or coot rotl aidt rakni p capabhili it Iinadtin to n prolono<cd tonott cr\ ot spmnti ta.ct. Ihis> co'oditcll hi cd to loci daotno )oloicat release to thc no ironlnoct.

It is rcnconiscd tihat thi.i I(' woold likcn>Ix~

not" ixt'{ mc I until sl nFtlcr aootlhicr (jixrni tor, n illrunocs.

I(; Vii.1 toilt{ hoint.tCc~'

it tS hinihdcd to idc classilication dlix rsitt.el: f Ke; -I.. .÷. .I. t.. .. -.... .. +*o. -1 .. ...IILL r~zczgnmcnt

~urtnuxzs:

c. I. I.L 31 RS1 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director declare the Site Area Emergency promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

(1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond cltz specific d-z receptcr (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond dMo~o~e4~a

~~39pcMsIte e&tmc~C 71~ ~pcMs~ ~.feiu~Qe* Closed window dose rates greater than 100 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 10%-perceni of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.

Releases of this magnitude are associated with the failure of plant systems needed for the protection of the public.32 Radiological effluent EALs are atso-included to provide a basis for classifyuing events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

f he monitor reading threshold

\alues are deterniined using a dose ass~essinent method thai hack calculates from the dose values SpeCified in the I('. [he meteorology and source term (noble gtases. pailiceulatcsM and halog~ens) used is the same as those used to determine the monitor reading threshold

\alues in Its k( I atid RA 1. [his protocol maintains iinterxals betwe.en the threshold Ior the three cla~ssifications.

Since doses are generallx not monitored in real-time, a release duration of one hour is assumecd, and the threshold v alues are based on a site boundarx (or hey ond} dose otf (10 inR/hour whole body or 50)0 inR/hour ih roid. wh iches er is more Ii iin tig.The TEDE dose is set at 1 0-%-percent of the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 500 mrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Escalation of the emergency classification level ...... -b -= -:se IC...pra.ide ea.afiata dieriy n may bo .'.e ~ en uh!ened to e ....... evnt th....t w l n....r...h.th.

analy....d in the Updated Final, Safety AnaI:,:! Reo , th.. dierimonat-;

.. ill. ;nt be, the numb..er The EPA PA p e arc ex~p.eaeed int; m ... f. t+he.... aum h fetv ...... (EDE)The EPA PAC guidanee pra-videc fcr the uce af adult thyroid deae con-veriaon factore: haev. Sat etatec h.... dcided ta b.... prteti...t.....hid....d DE Ncl The 'cite apc!fie m..............nd..h......d.........

..h.....be .d .....i..d .wit...The.effluent...n.t.r.r.ading.

ch ...... err~espond ta a doze af 100 mrn:em TEDE ar 5020 mremCD at the+ "aite crccificd o+rcecptor (eanciatent with the. eaeulatian mcthadalacv emolavad')

far ane haur af eanocure.33

.p .I.-nitr ...l,..s ",will ne

.,g '.-*..t

.,'i..

mt-..i ..-atmaspheric dispersian factars; the data ar factars selected tbr usc shauU be the same as RAf t=

his infe..-matisn include., but a.r..nat li!:ited to. the ESOC n h.................

a.u.. use ....h.....' emergenc.y dose assesment metheadalogy.

• Depe.nding -p-an the m.ethadology

'-sed ta the EA.L "alues, there may be averlap ot the.s... v'alues in a ma.nner that ensu-res a legical escalation in the ECL.m.Ther ',s.ite sp....ifi d........ta

¢air::is th~ge dstneds) andc by t..he l ,ene t; d..ingi. ; etween. an, .it. a;nd. defsic daeds:'- The; sel"cted di.tance s) = lctehignst achcudreaet te content..

of. the ......nc ;lan, andt-the procedural if the dlyue t",;deterin body" te.dsc and. F Protethisrc A ction Rcema. The aiat"icn.?.

i;*n .electe.... th .a..ul.te dcc ane t fr-cm th i: ta s~ite.'..

..........

.... a ... .....Deve...l:.....Aper

+ .. +shu;d reeac raditi- 1cita deign. dcucts .,thrifcmta saure~ a esuretha I)theEAL alu beng ensiere iswithn te uableresans an 34 LLLXzIgnrn~nt~"~ttrItutcc:

~5.I3.C 35 APPENDIX A -ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AC ....................................................................................

Alternating Current AOP .....................................................................

Abnormal Operating Procedure ATWS............................................................

Anticipated Transient Without Scram................................................................................................

B li ..............................................................

r nd W ....................................................................................

.................

..... ................................................................................

AS................................................................................. CD ......................................................................................

Calen CF ....................................................

Co e notF dral Regulations ( M ...............................................................................

Counts P jr n riut CTMT/CNMT............................................................................Comte DoseEqialnent CSF.............................................................................Cd ofrFedeal Raegy ulations CD TCN........................................................................................Contineturent EAC ..............................................................................

CEmritclgaety FuctionLel EC....................................................................................Cyste B,........................................................................................Dz

..................

E DCN..........................................................................DEcgnc o ircati Currentor EAL........................................................................

Em ergncyNt Afcation Levele ECC....................................................................

Emergency COrerCooing Systemur ECA....................................................................EmeirgnencyCassifitcation Lgevel........................................................................

r.............

t..t...............

str EP... ................................................................

EmergencyOereSatin ro [cedure EPAA...................................................................Envidromnal Protection A gein cyraio FPR .......................................................................

E F udcraturea of~c Inesiation FEMA .......................................................

Federal Emergency Management Agency A-1 SAR....................................................

Finad Safcty, FNlP ..........................................................

F~arlx Nuciear Plant IIS .............................................

lederal l elcconirnuinjcatjons S\ stem GE ....................................................................................

General Emergency.................................................................................................

Hl, C!.............................................................................Ha Ca-pacit S:'Tcmpcratur Limi t O .......................................................

t...d...r....Oeratins.O.i.er.N.RH IC...................................................................................nitatin.Conitio SID......................................................................................Hua nside Diamterfc...........

(........................................................................

t... n..................( .RC lISFI................................................................IIdpnetSetFe trg Insalat ioch n'r KICr.....................................................................IEfcieNurniMutipiatinCondiation ID..................................................................................In...ide...Diameter..

LOA...................................................................................L.....C..I,';+

PEE C... ............................................................................

M ancin Cont~ro oar0d MC ..........................................................................

Ineedn pn Fulotorag Ionstallatint

.............................................................

Effective......Neutron.....Multiplication......

Fato CO.................................................................................Lmin Czndtiz zfe

.... A............................

.......................................................................

t ,eedeT ............................................................................

Mallll7inl Control1 Boardi MtCi...........................................................................................Moo mcn rol -C urir m...e. remRM................................................mi...-Rontgen.E.uvalent.M n C...............................................................................

ain.....C...ntr.....l Rom NI...........................................................................Nuclear.Energy .nsite NPS ................................................................................

ai NuamlclartPone Plant NR ...................................................................................

mmisio NORAD...........................................................MNaimria eosaeDfns SCommannd Njt 1 nus -ual iven.....m.e.....rem

...mREM..................................Ntca d.miliRe ntgen2 Mauni OE.......................................................................Operaing.Bais.Earhquak NEI ..............................................................................

Nuclear Eonergyle Intiuea NPP ..............................................

OfitDoeCluaon

...............

Nula PoerPanta OO..................................................................O..-i.e.Rspons.Orgaizatin PA..........................................................................................Proe .te .Are OCKIILA...-..........

.. ..ol ...,,....;- i+

...

Cntolld re A-2 ACS..............................................................

Priarity Aet".atizn and Contrzl PAG..........................................................................

Protective Action Guideline................................................................................................

P................................................................................................

PRi ........t

• r b~bil:izoi:

Safety Aarncmnt PI3X.............................................................................

Private lBranch Exchange PWR ..........................................................................

Pressurized Water Reactor................................................................................................

P PI......................................................................PonsperSurtetIznh Gugem PS.....................................G....................................................PonsprSur InchGagen R..........................................................................................Roentgen.....

ClC ......................................................................

Reacter Cere Cee!ing RCDI .......................................................................

Reactor ('oolanflt Drain Jlan RCS ..............................................................................

Reactor Coolant System Remn, remn, REM..............................................................

Roentgen Equivalent Man RI Il R.............................................................................

Residual IIleai Remox al RPS ...........................................................................

Reactor Protection System RPV ..............................................................................

Reactor Pressure Vessel RVLIS ..................................................

Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System W CU .......................................................

Reactor W ater Cleanup AR..............................................................................a.ty

.........RpS,"...........................................................................

Sa.... t......................

SA ........................................................................................

Sgenc SBAO.....................................................................SSl-Cnane trathing Apparatu SFP ......................................................................................

S pt \eaEnt 'ergeoo SCB.................................................................................SlCotie Breathn Apparatus SI P.........................................................................................Spfenty neuctiPonl SGC............................................................................

StuhrnNceam Generato SIDS.........................................................................

SaftyPrae e t isly Snyetion................................................................................................

S RSPD..........................................................................Sft Paraeter Dipay Syst emta TEDE ..................................

Total Effective Dose Equivalent TOAF..................................................................................

Top of Active Fuel Threshold Value A-3 V I)X ..................

....................................

... V olts D irect Current VOIP ..................................................

Voice Over Internet Protocol W I II ..........................................................

W aste I loldup lank.... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... ..Op.....................................

............... ,

Ow.,r+, Grzup+A-4 APPENDIX B -DEFINITIONS The following definitions are taken from Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, and related regulatory guidance documents.

General Emergency:

Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.Site Area Emergency:

Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; I) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; 2) that prevent effective access to, equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA PAG exposure levels beyond the site boundary.Alert: Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION.Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA PAG exposure levels.Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE): Events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated.

No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.The following are key terms necessary for overall understanding the NE1 99-01 emergency classification scheme.Emergency Action Level (EAL): A pre-determined, site-specific, observable threshold for an Initiating Condition that, when met or exceeded, places the plant in a given emergency classification level.Emergency Classification Level (ECL): One of a set of names or titles established by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for grouping off-normal events or conditions according to (1) potential or actual effects or consequences, and (2) resulting onsite and offsite response actions. The emergency classification levels, in aseendifig order of severity, are: General Emergency (GE)Site Area Emergency (SAE)Alert Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE)Fission Product Barrier Threshold:

A pre-determined, site-specific, observable threshold indicating the loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier.Initiating Condition (IC): An event or condition that aligns with the definition of one of the four emergency classification levels by virtue of the potential or actual effects or consequences.

B-I Selected terms used in Initiating Condition and Emergency Action Level statements are set in all capital letters (e.g., ALL CAPS). These words are defined terms that have specific meanings as used in this document.

The definitions of these terms are provided below.CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY:

Ilhe harrier(s) lxtx~een alreas containing radioactixe substantes and the ce\ ironment.(ln~er

a. cite specific definitidcn fcr this ten"D,.) Devdapeir:

Nct.: The CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: Pecr [NP- l(2}-SI P- 18.4. %{ontainment Integrity Veritfication and CIonsure".

Dcvzepeer .The. prceedura!!l, de.fanei or -eti-c:!..

taken tae cecu.re EXPLOSION:

A rapid, violent and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment due to combustion, chemical reaction or overpressurization.

A release of steam (from high energy lines or components) or an electrical component failure (caused by short circuits, grounding, arcing, etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosion.

Such events may require a post-event inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosion are present.FAULTED: The term applied to a steam generator that has a steam leak on the secondary side of sufficient size to cause an uncontrolled drop in steam generator pressure or the steam generator to become completel depressurized.

Devclopcr N-te Thiso term ic -pliae t......nly FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear pox.cr plant INPP) or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included.

HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area tO(A)).HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.

IMMINENT:

The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met within a relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI): A complex that is designed and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage.B-2 t;;enrty fc'/.r hc-..: 'clu7."ding the .cuar, cnt pe-ek ;'olte.OWNER CONTROLLED AREA t(OCA: b he area that encompasses all controlled areas '\ ithin the NI:N site boundary but outs ide the seeurity protectedl area fencc(ne., ....t....... i defin'iticn for De, .... ,^ e.,t^, Thi: t... ic; typizally take+n t.....n the cit .........by, Cr' ct~her+:;,'iee under. +th ....... ef the liaer;......

In ........ cc it.may be .... "iet for a licenc+ee te defin:'e a emalter =Dreg with a perimeter claere te the plant P.ret.cted Area peri.t.r..

.g.. ,, ......w th.......

C. her z..... ...... .....f ..h..... .... .... .m ax' be a cig.nific-.t dta-o, fr.. th... Pr+ otected Area). In the..... ea ...,e-os^.,dvee

-,hel ..n..e uc ...:g.the+

defin..ed the R0+.+t,+++

er Scue O.... er C.... trolled Area ( CA/SOCA).

^ The araan endr elce fcr++ ceheme uce must.+ be .c.neictn the deripie Cf the came a...a and..... .. ,.. -bau"ar..nt.n

.in th ..... Seurt Pla.... ,.+.;,.h .ecrito fe PROJECTILE:

An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.PROTECTED AREA (PAt: [he area that encompasses all controlled areas within the secturity protected area kncmc.(l e .... te.......

...........

nf.r.. h... t.. .)............t......te

.ic- typ..icall taken- t ..ean the ...... under ccntnu..............m..

r÷.itn and.

+an an..ed pretecticrn ac "de:ceribecd in, the site. Secu.rity' Plan, REFUELING PATHWAY: this includes the reaetor refuel cav it\. the fuel canal. and the spent fuel po~ol. canals and pools through v, hich irradiated fuel mas be mo\ved. but not including the reactor vessel. (!ne:' a cite epecific definition.

for. thic .....) Dr'd.... , ...te Thi- dee-cription ch-'u-d include' all the .....ec tube,+., ..... and p-ale^,

which.iradiat RUPTURE(D):

The condition of a steam generator in which primary-to-secondary leakage is of sufficient magnitude to require a safety injection.

Dnecebepr Nae Thi term. .... applicabl SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related.

Dce'e~apcr Ntet Thicg te,,rm may be ,madifled te in=clud'e the SECURITY CONDITION:

Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.UNISOLABLE:

An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely or locally.UNPLANNED:

A parameter change or an event that is not I) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient.

The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown.B-3 VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to a component or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis.

The visual impact of the damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affected component or structure.

B-4 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant Enclosure 5 Hatch Marked-Up EAL Schemes HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS INITIATING CONDITIONS, THRESHOLD VALUES, AND BASIS TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 REGULATORY BACKGROUND.............................................................

1 1.1 OPERATING REACTORS.......................................................................1..

1.2 INDEPENDENT

SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI)...........................

1 1.3 NRC ORDER EA-12-051.....................................................................

2 1.4 ORGANIZATION AND PRESENTATION OF INFORMATION...............................I 12-1-1.5 IC AND EAL MODE APPLICABILITY

......................................................

13--3-5 2 GUIDANCE ON MAKING EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS

.......................

221,147 2.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS................................................................

2 t~l--2.2 CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY.........................................................

22228 2.3 CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE EVENTS AND CONDITIONS...........................

222,28 2.4 CONSIDERATION OF MODE CHANGES DURING CLASSIFICATION

...................

232-38 2.5 CLASSIFICATION OF IMMINENT CONDITIONS...........................................

2323 2.6 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL UPGRADING AND DOWNGRADING

.......232r39 2.7 CLASSIFICATION OF SHORT-LIVED EVENTS.............................................24-244 2.8 CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSIENT CONDITIONS...........................................24-24.

2.9 AFTER-THE-FACT DISCOVERY OF AN EMERGENCY EVENT OR 3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS ...........

26261L1 4 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS ........535227 5 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) ICS/EALS .....808047 0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS.........................................

838350 7 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS.........................................................................

10110O265 8 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS............................................

12913088 APPENDIX A -ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

........................................

A-i APPENDIX B -DEFINITONS

.................................................................

B-1 D-EVE OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR .-NON-.PASSI!VE REA..CTORS 1 REGULATORY BACKGROUND

1.1 OPERATING

REACTORS Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Energy, contains the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations that apply to nuclear power facilities.

Several of these regulations

'govern various aspects of an emergency classification scheme. A rcvic-' cf thc rezk. ant -,cct:.,n..

lbt:cd bc!lzw "will aid the rzaaL in u"nderc't"andingA:" the key termin.l'evgy prs,;idzd in "S ection';" 3.0 ctlfhc rclex ant sections of this document arc :,* 10 CFR § 50.47(a)(l)(i)

• 10 CFR § 50.47(b)(4)

• 10 CFR § 50.54(q)* 10 CFR § 50.72(a)* 10 CFR § 50, Appendix E, IV.B, Assessment Actions* 10 CFR § 50, Appendix E, IV.C, Activation of Emergency OrganizationI hcse regulations are supplemented by various regulatory guidance documents.

4I:hfee-dl)ocuments of particular relevance to NEI 99-01 afeinchude:

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, October 1980. [Refer to Appendix 1, Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants]NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR § 50. 72 and§ 50. 73 Regulatory Guide 1.101, Emergency Response Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors'lhis list is not all-inclusive.

a*m4i4--ll is strongly recommended that scheme developers consult with licensing and regulatory compliance personnel to identify and understand all applicable requirements and guidance.

Questions may also be directed to the NEI Emergency Preparedness staff.1.2 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI)Selected guidance in NEI 99-01 is applicable to licensees electing to use their 10 CFR 50 emergency plan to fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR 72.32 for a stand-alone ISFSI. The emergency classification levels applicable to an ISFSI are consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR § 50 and the guidance in NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP-1.

The initiating conditions germane to a 10 CFR § 72.32 emergency plan (as described in NUREG-1567) are sub~iffe4-contained within the classification scheme for a 10 CFR §50.47 emergency plan.The generic ICs and EALs for an ISFSI are presented in Section 85, ISFSI ICs/EALs.

IC E-lHU 1 covers hecr-spe'i-e*.

credible natural and man-made events included within the scope of an ISFSI design. This IC is not applicable to installations or facilities that Riay process and/or repackage spent fuel ...........

d..R.tri..a...

Sterage Facility or an..... pntfe poeigfciiy............AddiionaII>, appropriate aspects of IC HU1 and IC HAl shoutd-'.\ill also be included to address a HOSTILE ACTION directed against an ISFSI.The analysis of potential onsite and offsite consequences of accidental releases associated with the operation of an ISFSI is contained in NUREG-1 140, A Regulatory Analysis on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees.

NUREG-1 140 concluded that the postulated worst-case accident involving an ISFSI has insignificant consequences to public health and safety. This evaluation shows that the maximum offsite dose to a member of the public due to an accidental release of radioactive materials would not exceed I rem Effective Dose Equivalent.

a Notification of Unuua E... nt in ..

• a 10 CFR 50.1A7 ..m....n.y plan (e.g., to pro.'ide azietanc if. frequested).

A o, ic...2...." Emergency;

.......e Organization (EROf, 1.3 NRC ORDER EA-12-051 The Fukushima Daiichi accident of March 11, 204-.2i' It, was the result of a tsunami that exceeded the plant's design basis and flooded the site's emergency electrical power supplies and distribution systems. This caused an extended loss of power that severely compromised the key safety functions of core cooling and containment integrity, and ultimately led-Ieadirag to core damage in three reactors.

Zh-i4e-Altthough the loss of power also impaired the spent fuel pool cooling function, sufficient water inventory was maintained in the pools to p~'eehe-prcvcnt fuel damage from the loss of cooling.Following a review of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the NRC concluded that sei'efa measures were necessary to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety under the provisions of the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(ii).

A~mong them t... proi O.ne such meaure v~as that each spent fuel pool he pra ided with reliable level instrumentation to significantly enhance the ability of key decision-makers to allocate resources e..ec.ive~y-following a beyond design basis event. To this end, the NRC issued Order EA- 12-051, Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, on March 12, 2012, to all US nuclear plants with an operating license, construction permit, or combined construction and operating license.NRC Order EA-12-05 1 states, in part, "All licensees

... shall have a reliable indication of the water level in associated spent fuel storage pools capable of supporting identification of the following pool water level conditions by trained personnel:

(1) level that is adequate to support operation of the normal fuel pool cooling system, (2) level that is adequate to provide substantial radiation shielding for a person standing on the spent fuel pool operating deck, and (3) level where fuel remains covered and actions to implement 2 make-up water addition should no longer be deferred." Te thise.ei,-All licensees must ihcr~clorc provide:* A primary and back-up level instrument that will monitor water level from the normal level to the top of the used fuel rack in the pool,.* A display in an area accessible following a severe event;--atd.

• Independent electrical power to each instrument channel and pi'e4de-an alternate remote power connection capability.

NEI 12-02, Industry Guidance for Compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051, "To Modif Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation

", provides guidance for complying with NRC Order EA- 12-051.NEI 99-01, Revision 6, includes three EALs that reflect the availability of the enhanced spent fuel pool level instrumentation associated with NRC Order EA- 12-051. These EALs are included within existing IC RA2, and new ICs RS2 and RG2. Associated EAL notes, bases and developer notes are also provided.It is recommended that these EALs be implemented when the enhanced spent fuel pool level instrumentation is available for use.The regulatory process that licensees follow to make changes to their emergency plan, including non-scheme changes to EALs, is 10 CFR 50.54(q).

In. azcccrdanzzc

.ith thi'.regul1ation,.4 .ticensees are responsible for evaluating a proposed change and determining whether or not it results in a reduction in the plaif+, effectiveness-eof4he-ple.R.

As-f a rsz4:l................

laiscd otn this determination, the licensee will either make the change or submit it to the NRC for prior review and approval in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90.3 A A AAI U liAmi nilr-mv1kKii1lll IH IIU NliiVVC Th .............

ra ke t...... tht appe"" the.ughut t...he .E!.9... methedelegy.

T~Emergency Cinecificatien L::'el.-Ne.e .44 e -N-te (I) ......n ,zain an.me...y.....

etn.th Emergency iEctrmuct cncidy a-llsisfr~e hn bcin cntepoe ccetc nIiitn edto.Ti One cC a cet efnamec er tidec ectablLbed by ffie US Nuclear Regulatery Cammicsior.(NRC) for greuping cif nermal event er ear.diticnc acecrdir.g te (I) peter.tial er actual dicete or canceguencec.

and (2) reculting oncite end offsite respence actiens. The.mergcncy claccifleatien levelc, in accending order ef severit;'.

arc: uI rPriricrIen.IP2 unucual nv,,'rt 4 2, .I. ["Ixormcanon or unua ,S ve n'C' tr E-vents; are in: progress or hav.e occ'ured w-hieh indicate a potential degradation of the le-vel of ca.t of the_ lant, r in.i..t......u...

hea t........

failt p.....t....h......n ini..at.d.

No r.eleas..

of"'- rd...... e'^ materia reuiin ,C offit esoseo mntoig.r") "-AeI4,.derIto !f telelf fctyf the pln r ... curit....

evn that....i..

J pb........if..threaten.ng rc t...... it ..ers.nn.l or dam..ge..

tosie equipmen, because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to e li !mited small !;-aetocn of the EPA PAG readily a-,ailable tc respond th " ...u..o becom"c.m.re...r..u.

• r t...... perf plant functi.n needed.. for4 protecti...

n f the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or maliiou .....: 1)" toward cite personnel!

or equimen t.at..o..proviac upoates Ta me pursue snrougn government autnornies.

2.1.4 General

Emergen...y (GE)Events are i.n progress or ha-ve occurred which involv',e actual or IMM'tNENT su.bs'tantial ACTION tharesu in an act-'l loss of physical co.ntrol of the facility*. can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA PAG exposu-'re lev'els ofibite for more than the 4.I l~I'~ tzrm ~rn+/-tim~ 11zru1~O u Ur.:zuai 1A'cnl ULI c1~IZ ~Imiklr s:te ~ne~itiZ t:rminzl.

I h~ t"-r~............

5 Purpese! 1hz purpose ef the General Emergency declarntien is te initiate predetermined protective actiens fcr the public, te prvJde continucus assessment ef information from the licensee and efisite erganizatienal measurements, to initiate additiena~

measures (15 indicated by actual er potential releases, ta provide censultatien with ofisite authorities, and to previde updates for the public threugh gevemment autherities.

2.2 INITI?.TINC CONDITION (IC)An event er condition that ali~s with the detinitian ef one ef the feur emergency lassiticatien leveL by virtue of the potential or aetual effects or eznse~uenees.

Di~cu~ion:

An IC describes an event or cenditien.

the severity er censeguenees

& which meet the definitien ef an emergency classifleatien level. An IC can be xpressed as a esotinucus, measurable parameter (e.g.. RCS leakage), on event (e.g., an~anhgualse) or the status of one or more fission product ba~iers (e.g.. loss of the RCS Appendix I of NUREG 0651 dccc net aontaln exmnple Emergency Action Levels (EALs~ for each ECL, but rather Initiating Cenditions (i.e., plant cenditians that indicate that a radisisgical emergency, or events that could lead to a radiological emergency, has~eeurred).

NUREG 0651 states that the Initiating Cenditiens ferm the basis for estab!ishment by a licensee of the specific plant instrumentatien readings (as applicable)

.~hieh, if exceeded.

would initi~e the emergency classification.

Thus, it is the specific ins~mcnt readings that weuld be the EALs.Considerations for the assignment of a particular Initiating Condition to an emergency Jassific~ion level are discussed in Section 3.

'.L

-'r.SZ; ;

tho prek d....termin..., site spcfc beral hehldfre ntatn odt ta.........met.....r...,......d , plce the... pln in... a gi..n eme,,rgency laifctnlee....

Disuo mA+++,i on: .i, E .....teent may. utli..e..

vari.ty..

f critcPalincluding...

--instr.me.

..+:., .n...t..us indi.ati.n

..bserkable event..: r -esults of h cacuat.n..d..

ay 2.1 PRODuCT- B°A."fl+ER A pre d.......n...

site specific, obser,'able threshold indicating te lo.....D'ie:s'ue.':

Fission product b'rrier thresholds represent threats to, the defense in maintained intac.t, preclu-de' the re lease., of s+gnifieant am-ounts of radioactive fission* Rea'ctr CooantSse RS

Upo.n do.tom:nat'ion that ono or me.=. fizsion product barrier throohol.ds h'-avo boocn-..---o.dod, th.a......mbin.at.ion""'^

of barrir lass a~ndior potntial ................

iz comparod to..... fi:i- pro: uct bar.... I ..... o. .. t...... t-,a ..........

to ap r itoE ............

a..... .................

th ...... and ........ przr o i n to Ab ..ral 7 An effcc+ti e cmcrgencj, classifcation scheme mu...... inc.r.rat a r.a...t......

accurate -a sssment of risk, beth to plant wyorkers andA the public. Thaere are bicu;ia..'may? oecur d.uring an ........tic.:' The+ qNE1[ 99 01 emergency scheme....m.. to+ strke aapropriate

.+ bala.c bt. en r..a..n..

bl. aticipat....

e....nt. or There are a range cfhnon emergent;y event",S repored to the US Nu'clear Regulatory Crommission (NC ...... in..... rd..... ith.the.re.uire.

en .of...........

CFR 50.72 may also require the deelartion of an emergency.

rh.....rt-+-

+il.- .... dtr ineth .......e .of:. .a.h ECL.

• goal- .... thi [pross i"s toa I! Typical abnormal and e.mergency operating proced.aure

....int and.. tans.ti. n criteria+..

I Typical Technical Specification limits an-d centrols Manul... I (+ODCM) r.adiolog+Ica releas limits+* eiwo slce patdialSfy Anl.i Reor ....S,, R) acciden a.... l.ys....* NUR.EG Appendix 1, E.acrg+'cytc .c:io:t Le;cI "oi+c.+&lss cfor Nx.'kwc'c~

Poxsrr* Indstary' Operating Experience t'he of IPs a-nd Emergenc...

Acto Levels ...(E117A Is. The team dec.;.ide to........s (e ,.g,.... helping an Emergency Director underotand why. .... p-.----.;ar condtio s c!assifd as an Alert). It soulda be str...ed tat de'.elop....

not......

p t*o-. rcdefin. these attribute or apply. thmi.n aho htwudcanetegnrcgiac otie 8 3, .1. Notification o~f Unusu'.al E;"..nt tNrOIJFEA (13 A minor. l... of ..ntr.. of .-.adioa..i.

ma......iL or the to* control radiation (C) A consc, un e ...........

i..i ...a.t.......t.......nt .n.ti ...ati .n.t loa, St....a..Fcdc Al autorii.

icnvokes: fisson+,n pr-duct baricr ,B) An event'- or c-ndtio .adi~n that :infcntly ,edce th ari t.o, ... loss;., ..r ,.ten.,l lo conditions of this tsya in multiple.........

r"e~ .y.tem......

c!uade those that challenge the andior control ot 9 (C) A release Cf radioactive m than 10% ef an EPA PAG (D)A HOSTILE ACTION cc:ateralas to the en;'irenment that ceeulda result in daese creater c'-rr~beyond the site boundary.~g within the plant PROTECTED AREA 3.1l.1 General Emergency ar condition that invelves: (B), A ......r. r evetcronditien that, unmitigated may "-ad t +a les of all. tree + fissicn;directl ..... eer d...age an less ef containment integrity.(D)A HOSTILE AC,,.TION reculting in the ls o.... y caf.... fun.. eti...ns-

....t.., cer eelin/RP ....ter... I or. RC heat. removal) ,fr dama..e te ..... fue:l-.........t.re.ult...T...that.

end, .... the ..........

an e certain .....nd t.+ atc conciocrpl romeveralI cite speciric progu++llisu sarety assecmetsll+(PSA also known as probabilistic risk ..se..ment.

ppX). Sen generi.c:

insights frem eent.ributerc t.e core dam-age frequency at m...y Pressuri.e W_.ater.+

Reaetorc (PW~s, gratr hn 5 iutsw th h ln to ... b........

He ....do.n, wa, assiged a EC,-L f-Site Area Emergency..P.usrevnst es falA pew:er w-ere als.Regulat.ry Gud ......,.................., may be u.......det.rmine...time....e criterin.to.dmarcate

.....c a StAraEmergency and a General Emerg..ncy.

2 c. Fo evere core damage .....s uncertaintie exist..:o in phenomena important te accid.ent pragreAa~n: .ading te ............

failur......

ause....t...e..unc...ai.ti...

10

nio:: u.v ¢ nt.in*ment,,:*

ntegrity) atone blowin:'g Emergency.

3.......indi.at.d.tha....ading

..ntribu...s....lat...

fat."2 tie --eequene .: in... * .'ing..period,.v and-' a reactor.....

colant pump ea.l-o failu... The generic EALs. methodology n.eed-'o.._r .......v-'nt booed !Co EALo. Each type i. diocu-*zed b"e.lo'..Symptom baz;ed ICo an."d EAL.o are pa.-am'etero or conditiono that are meazurable Fiozion product b'rrier bazed ICo and EALsar"e the ouboet, of zy.mptom ba"..d......that.r..er opcfcyt h .......! o..... h.. l...ng.. t th... principal against the potetial:.,',.

loot and .lo.t and the .total numb- of b-: .... under challenge...

Event booed I'2o and EALs define a v'ariety of opecfi..ocurrence that haet rp to ohut+ do the.. ractor...

natural phenomena (e.g., an .... q" .... ma..3.3 NSES DE~IcN DirrEnuxcEN The NEI 99 01 emcrcencv;

Iazoification ocheme accounts for the deoi~diff.ereneeo b~etw4.een PWRo BWP~o by specifying EALo unique to each typ'e at a.ong PlRD NSSco; theefre guida. nc i.. provide d to^ .aid.: inhe- d v-evelopmT:en:

t: of EA approp-ite toe differen't PWR NSSS. type. Where n'ecezo:ty, deve'lopment, gu-idance alzo the, intent of generic ICo and EALo w"ithin the constraint

.m o.... by the, plntdin n 11 document:

thece ehangec ~iIl be reviewed for acceptability by the NRC no part of the~cheme approval proceco.The guidance in NEI 99 ~i ic not applicable to advanced poccive light water reactor with NEI 07 01, Mcdccdo!ogy for Devole.e.~vora~'

of E-~r-' 1~'-~31-41 .40 ORGANIZATION AN D PRESENTATION OF Gf~qNfA-t-INFORMATION The scheme's ge.mefe-information is organized by Recognition Category in the following order.R -Abnormal Radiation Levels / Radiological Effluent -Seetien -6 C -Cold Shutdown / Refueling System Malfunction -Seetie*n 7 E -Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) -eec~ien 8 F -Fission Product Barrier -8ten 9ii-H -Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety -cetien 10O S -System Malfunction -Seet44,n

-5 ECL the accigred emergency elcciflhea'tion le;vel for the IC.EAL+c are iPe. L~arc tom be uc.dlt cJ+l~accif evnto+ ar T lono generic app :-...... roach-- tc the development oflan exam'ple cannot .... be (e.g., an"....u..d ini....m......i:n range ic net a;vailable at the. the devel.. e , ... u..d, For PRecagnitin Category" F, the ficcion prduct ba+rrier ae.- presented in tale applcal toBA n W, n agdb fcinpout n h degre .oft .a... hal.e(ie.pteta..oo oc) hcprcntonmt

-- ho "

cyergiom the ÷ thr.... d,.t and cup4 t a... urate. a cohec'÷o m--nto.+l

'12 caleulationc, etc. Develeper netee ~hculd net be included in the cite' c emergency clas~iticaticn ceheme bacic decument.

Develepere may elect te include informatien reculting frem a de;'eleper note actien in a bacic ceetien.U ELL A~ngnm:nt Attributes Lecated within the Develeper Netec cection, epecifiec the a~ribute uced for accigning the IC tc a given ECL.Jt,-51.5 IC AND EAL MODE APPLICABILITY th'e applicability e.f ICc and EALs "will ;'ay with plant. mede. For :::ample.

c.ome Trhet folowngb tale hodws maed-ecogfpnitiowenCallftegorie re-auplibarble iearch lnt mode. The ICs and EALs for a given Recognition Category are applicable in the indicated modes.MODE APPLICABILITY MATRIX Category Mode R C E F H S Power Operations X X X X X Startup X X X X X Hot Shtadbwn X__XX X___ X Hotd Shutdown X X X X X ColeSutdowng X X X X Refueling X X X X Per'm.anently

--__ ________ ___13 Ilhitch I Jnits I and 2 technical Spc~cifieations ab 1. -rovides the fuliowine mode definition<:

XI'C ltcReatctor Mod Average Reactor Switch Positon nieau (F 1 Power Operation Ron NA 2 Startup or Startup./ttot Standby NA 3 1 lot Shutdo\n~

Shutdow\n

>212 4 Cold Shutdoxxn 5 b Shutdown 2I21 5 Rcfucling°"'

Shutdowvn or ReFuel NA (a) All reactor vessel head elosure holts fully' tensioned.

lb) Orte or more reactor vessel head closure holts less than full) tetnsionted.

In add it ion to these dcIi ned modes. "Dc fuecld" is also appl icahle to the f latch ltAl scheme. consistent w.ith NEI 99-01! l)clitclcd is a +No Modce" ondition wvhcer all (ot the Fuecl has been removed from thle reactor vessel I i.e.. Full core oftload during refueling or extended outages I.I hese modes arc used throughout the Ilatoch I A! s w i th no nmodifticat ions from N lI 99-01.I WVhen a unit is de fueled, thle Initiating ( onditions designated as Mode Condition "AI VI , or 1I)cfucled&

arc applieable.

T~ecbmcal pec.qca~anP:"+

+ r ............

(1)+'": ..... Swic in Run ton St..t. (2): Ma,. c S.it. Start.u/Hat+

S,,andby+++14

& DEL'EL/OP MEDlt, rW J1IDlANCE Thi.. v.-tic .........

ctail: guidanecefor

.....pi...a..i...p.c......

m.rg.n....a......

ati.It is importXant that the NEI 99 01! emergency classification scheme be implem~ented as an int.egrat.ed package. Selected usea ,?f portions ~f this gu.idance., is strongly discouJraged as it w:ill I.i

'clf sho uld attemp tha keepth e n!.a*.dir site specific dchemes as a eac he benri gcuidfatace asft possible.t~r her god~g is tomet te maintet of t:he generic Inititin postioin : theme dsptcifutur industry..

wid... schem.. enhan.. em. nt... ...... e ...Whn rpel dveoed heI~ ndE~sssud eunmigou ndradl 1*11- capital ieuerc I~LC., ALL ~ Inc Octlmtlznc are precentee in A~pcnOIX H.Deflfti~efts, II The ICc wi:thin a may be. pve in......r....cr..r....

........tin pu..........g...., ct_ with:a a Ge~neral Emerge~noy at. the. lefftzp ef a user aid.......

flw ,d by .it. Ara m- gecy.e .nd...U ....tThe Initiating Condition num.bering may.. K., .h... d£ The fi--t letter af a Recegnfitin Catcgcr;v designato m..y b .h.nged ac follaw.....

.....ma.........

in. lieu !+ tef.... ... ..... ........(fo.r" Abnormal) may. be:..+ chmaged to "R" (for.... R-adiatien).

This moans that. th..e..acc;ci.tedIc changed to RU I .RU1 .l,)D etc.....Th .........d.........m Rogite ...t.g..i.. S+ and.... Cmay be ino,-peoated into a co.mmon (eag.. ene t~blc) pro..ided.

that' all relatedA n-tec and.* T~he ter-me EAL and threchelshod may K' "uc.ed interchangeabz+ly.

IC .an AL ct..........

Thi: m....ri:l ic act rcq..:.a tc be in the -,nal ...ergen...cy 1.2 CR!{TICAL Ac".' diccu:ced abeve.', deve l~oper r .........d te .. ee.. their.. cite Fcpceiic c..h.emc a intent ic mainaine.

With urespe....

te Rec.gnitin Catgor F. a cit spegcific echem,. mu.et :.i.,dea .m.. of" ...... :ai te facilitetimely and..accurate U h EALe. Operating

..od..ev Applicbilit criteria.......and..a.i...nfo.m..ion ae technically'" ...p... andv-.'...

.+ accurate (i.e., the-y centaiin the informat.--ion nececcar,, to.* EAL tamte.mentc; uce obiceti'e, criteria a.nd eberv.'.abl.

v'aluec3.16

• !Cs, EALs. Operting Mode Applicability Nte and ;whefeneeesse'.

U The scheme fac-ilitates lassification cfm.-lti.clc cn~current eventsor conditions.

>1.3 l'>TR;I',tF'T AT!fh. I n~ roE n lnstumctaton rfcrnce inEAL tatmcns souldincudetha desribd i th...mo eagingypwrsuc; h- o bevreaiya, ....:L deprs .h.uld ; .......t. ner.., ...Ftdig* insru c t ntat. i............r.uti .l ..mant.ind.i..

ac. rdan.... th.......gra.

and rocedures.

Aelated roEfALne in EAL s.e taticm isn.s shoul be !'ste cn thatae thC wosit.1.1 PnI~r;TATIo\

or Sciiv~tr IM'OIttiATIO'~.

TO Lt~iIU5 maintain thrs capailit to ,asss eeret, !-.s:sify n eclanpocdre an mrgene eunditiorn prmtly presenatin emarethod, stha-- besn suppores, the end , rs by fheilCe ats n Raccurmfate-an timely t m....... cl.... icat.on...

To.thi....n....

de.. el.pe..;...hould.

cosider the followng~

pints...The....~ u:er of'ic acns emerenycatorsi.f.-catos prcedure tabtre th.. op....t...

in the Cotrl om.Duig healoobe lssfiato tmeprid.thym17hv rD .......n.. ta .... la readily us:able and eacily, unde.. tad... la io:eatian t...aL, (e.g., a Directoe, and/o~r OficitPe:F Reence Organizatian percannel.

A............

ic an aceal pr:ccctatian me~thad prav'ided that :t c.t..... all,?1 the kep --ith ec=h applcablc EAL or ..........

a...m.....r.a..nd.ref.re..e..

a r...........

a ,Natc ic a-'ccep+table as, long a'.s the inr:,,-matir.n i:; adequavtely captureda on the wailb',.eard bu-t it choul'd be readSily a--ailahle toe mergency clacciticati.on decsicin maerer.In seime cac.=c, it may be- ad ......geu t... deva" a t.. wo' ........ ard. .... fo ..... during-pa--er peratianc.

ctat-..up a-nd hot` =eandtian, and. another for ca!l shutawn--

and refueling.

can...on.....

Alt.erative.

precen`at`ian m-ethad" the. Rec......a

+" C and~ prduct, typ tabec De-elopc-" ....... encure that... thesiteepcitemta dr. l ..trecodcmiain n lciiainatae hw nteBRZ W A 15 I" lrcu.ntIONt or~ I/'s/1EAI.

• i~rTI!* PL*~

nulo A rie u in`g."+i.

~f IC E-AT^ " .....:.. int plant ... :- F~ u-e ic nat ress.camm

!end .Thc ppa hwul greatly..........

inre e the..... ad ....trtve ..ntr... n wer......for m..in...inin

.pr ..........

O h te han d, pefonRC ane" ca lln gesa may,+`,.v.eri eanto ........ f...... m e aetin +.an CZ EAL imrcn= ... c l... the..... ...............

n..d durti .) t i n plantS: prcdrcaetn h rae/crt oc the cite

'm..... .. ...[ -..lecii.....p..eur

.ca cue could... b... pl.ced..in..emergency............ng.;.... .+ ....... oper ting praedr ecA .larm recpcn...

pr... aeduec:::e=-+.

and nar m rae,"'"tic ........ ..... " cbt zpee.L "d-- ...zEA.........

~ fc chccc~zcit3 .f.........

' NO....T.,o+

, 18 A basis document ic an ir.tegral part cf an emergency claccification scheme. The material in thic document cuppartc proper emergency claccification decision making by providing informing background and development infcrmation in a readily accessible fcrmat. It can be referred to in training cituatians and when making an actual emergency classification, if nceeccary.

The document ic also uceful for ectabliching configuration management eantrolc for EP related equipment and eaplaining an emergency clascifleation to offcite autho~tiec.

The ccntent of the basic dozument chould include, at a minimum, the following:

U A cite cpecific Mode Applicability Matrb~ and deceription of operating madec, cimi!ar to that precented in ceetion 3.5.£ A diceuccion of the emergency classification and declaration proeecc reflecting the material precented in Section 5. Thic material may be edited as needed to align with cite cpecific emergency plan and implementing prcccdure requirementc.

• Each Initiating Condition along vith the associated EALs or fiscion praduct barrier thresholds, Operating Made Applicability, Notes and Bacic information.

• A licting of aeronymc and defined termc, similar to that precented in Appendicec A and B, respectively.

Thic material may be edited as needed to ali~ with site speeifie* Any cite cpecific baekground or technical appendices that the developers believe wauld be use~l in coplaining or ucing clcmentc of the emergency elascificatian seheme, the meaning intent A Basic ~ cor.tain that cauio maolly Cr~f the ascociated IC or EAI. Such information should be ineo~arated

~ithin the IC or EAL ctatcmentc, or as an EAL Nate. Information in the Basic chould only clarify and inform decicion making for an emergency elaccification.

Basic information chould be readily available to be refcrenccd, if nececcary, by the Emergency Director.

Far cx~ple, a eapy of the basic document could be maintained in the apprapriate emergency responce facilitiec.

Because the information in a basic document can affect emergency clascific~ion decicion making (e.g., the Emergency Direetor referc to it during an event), the NRC~taffexpectc that ehangec to the basic dacument wil! be evaluated in accordance vith the provisionc of 10 CFR 50.51(q).Ac reflected in the generic gu.idance, thc criterie'a/value s ued in se'eral EALc and ficcion prde barrier....h......... be.........fr.m

..................

and FO.s hi appr.ac....c intended -to .maitai ....... .. betee oprtional,...

., dance,,c" -v":.... andemrgn 19

4.8 912'ELOI'EII

A1~.D 1J~ER FEEDBACK Quc~ticr.~

zr czrnm:nt~

zcn~rning th~ matrial in this i3cum.n1 may bc directed tc th: NEI Emergcncy Pr~pa cdn~z ztaff, NEI EAL ~ fcr~z mzmbzr~ zr zubmittcd tz tb~Em.~rgcncy Pr~par~xtnc.,~

Frz~iu~ntlv Azkzd Qu~,tionc prc~c~.20 52 GUIDANCE ON MAKING EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONSI GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS Wrhf.tk .. .i..g"-e nior any. emergency classification, the emergency director must consider all information having a bearing on the proper assessment of an initiating condition (IC).This includes the emergency action level (EAL). l+is-the associated operating mode applicability, notes. and the informing basis information.

In the recognition category F matrices, EALs are referred to as fission product barrier thresholds; the thresholds serve the same function as an EAL.NRC regulations require the licensee to establish and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency action level has been exceeded and to promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of the appropriate emergency classification level. The NRC staff has provided guidance on implementing this requirement in NSIR/DPR-ISG-0 1, Interim Staff Guidance, Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants.All emergency classification assessments soeid-4x ill be based **pon valid indications, reports or conditions.

A valid indication, report, or condition, :i oei eha4-has been verified Ohfe-*gh-using appropriate means. su.ch t~hat there :altar ing no doubt regarding the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy.

For example, validation could be aeeempliched through an instrument channel check, response on related or redundant indicators, or direct observation by plant personnel.

The validateien ofindications she*14d-\ilI be ... ...in a manner that supports timely emergency declaration.

For ICs and EALs that have a stipulated time duration (e.g., I.S 30..

eta.), the emergency director shudwitl not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but sheel4-will declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. If an ongoing radiological release is detected and the release start time is unknown, it sheu4d-wiIl be assumed that the release duration specified in the IC/EAL has been exceeded, absent data to the contrary.A planned work activity that-reeultsresultin2, in an expected event or condition which meets or exceeds an EAL does not warrant an emergency declaration provided that 1) the activity proceeds as planned and 2) the plant remains within the limits imposed by the operating license. Such activities include planned work to test, manipulate, repair, maintain or modify' a system or component.

In +these-such cases, the controls associated with the planning, preparation and execution of the work will ensure thaI-compliance with the opcratiflg license is maintained, with all" aspect ... f the operating license provided thaI-the activity proceeds and concludes as expected.

Events or conditions of this type may be subject to the reporting requirements of 10 § CFR 50.72.Th...........men.

f Some EALs is-arc assessed based on the results of analyses that-&e necessary to ascertain whether a specific EAL threshold has been exceeded-(erg.,,-aes a......m.n.., chemstr ........., tR-C leak. rata ealculatien, etc.);. The EAL and/or the associated basis discussion will identify the necessary analysis.

Iin these-ee, ;The 15-21 minute declaration period starts with the availability of the analysis results that show the threshold to be exceeded (i.e., this is the time that the EAL information is first available).

The NRC expects licensees to establish the capability to initiate and complete EAL-related analyses within a reasonable period of time (e.g., ................ no .......... -W-hi4e-Although the EALs have been developed to address a full spectrum of possible events and conditions which may warrant emergency classification, a provision for classification based on operator/management experience and judgment is still necessary.

The NEI 99-01 scheme provides the emergency director with the ability to classify events and conditions based upon judgment using EALs that are consistent with the emergency classification level (ECL) definitions (refer to Category H). The emergency director will need to determine if the effects or consequences of the event or condition reasonably meet or exceed a particular ECL definition.

A similar provision is incorporated into the fission product barrier tables; judgment may be used to determine the status of a fission product barrier.CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY To make an emergency classification, the user will compare an event or condition (i.e., the relevant plant indications and reports) to an EAL(s) and determine if the EAL has been met or exceeded.

Thez evaluation eflAn EAL(s) e~aluation must be consistent with the related operating mode applicability and notes. If an EAL has been met or exceeded, t-heft-the IC is eefriideared-met and the associated ECL is declared in accordance with plant procedures.

When assessing an EAL that specifies a time duration for the off-normal condition, the"clock" for the EAL time duration runs concurrently with the emergency classification process "clock." For a full discussion of this timing requirement, refer to NSIR/DPR-ISG-0I..¢,2.3 CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE EVENTS AND CONDITIONS Wbhii-ln the cnt of multiple emergency-emcrlcncic., e,,e+&sor conditions-ae-pre~e44, the user will identify all met or exceeded EALs. The highest applicable ECL identified during this review is declared.

For example: If an Alert EAL and a Site Area Emergency EAL are met, whethar at one unit or at two,' different units, a Site Area Emergency ill be declared.There is no "additive" effect from multiple EALs meeting the same ECL. For example: If two Alert EALs are met, wh"ther " ...n... uni or ..t. tzo +- .i..r.n unit', an Alert should-\ ill be declared.Related guidance concerning classification of rapidly escalating events or conditions is provided in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2007-02, Clarification of NRC Guidance for Emergency Notifications During Quickly Changing Events.22 CONSIDERATION OF MODE CHANGES DURING CLASSIFICATION-The mode in effect at the time that an event or condition occurred, and prior to any plant or operator response, is the mo~de that dletermines whether et-eta IC is applicable.

If an event or condition occurs; and results in a mode change before the emergency is declared, the emergency classification level is still based on the mode that existed at the time that the event or condition was initiated (and not when it was declared).

Once a different mede is reached, any; new e'.en Z~r eznditicn, nct related tz th... eri...........

Zr cenditia:n, requiring emergency clacgifieaticn be ev"-luated agiAteI&adEL a....li..ab.....

te .... .. .epating ......t.t....i...f.th.........

n in ..... Shet'ew ............ -r Refueling mce^ ee if.. Het Su td cwn.. ..... a.. higher m.... enter a.pp!lcablc .cnly te ...nt. tha int. te i.,.,n ,th. I Su, t..,a......

mcde cr higher..-,-2.5 CLASSIFICATION OF IMMINENT CONDITIONS Although EALs provide specific thresholds, the emergency director must remain alert to events or conditions that could lead to meeting or exceeding an EAL within a relatively short period of time (i.e., a change in the ECL is IMMINENT).

If, in the judgment of the emergency director, meeting an EAL is IMMINENT, the emergency classification should will be made as if the EAL has been met. While applicable to all emergency classification levels, this approach is particularly important at the higher emergency classification levels since it provides additional time for implementation of protective measures..-62.6 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL UPGRADING AND DOWNGRADING SN(C poliex is that once an emergent?

classification is made. it cannot he dos, ngradcd to a class ilfcat ion. I cnninau ion criteria contained in procedure NM P-I P-110t.l mergencs Classification and Initial Actions shall be coinpleted ibr an es em to hc ternmiated.

At termination, on an es e nt specif'ic has is. the site can either enter norntal operating conditions or enter a recosers condition with a recovery organization cstahlished for turnover from tlte [R( An ECL. may b .... dcnrc .......t...... t.....cendition that mectc the highect IC .d EA n, -.ng, ....... t.... othe ..i .. :pei.i dzw:ngrading requirementz are met. If dzwngrading the ECL ic ... ... deemed ne ELwoldtenbebce n lwr ppiabe Ce)ad ALz. heEL3a nateti arxtve. gLuitlance caneeming ciactincatien ci rapitil:.

etealaling .z~cnu er centlitiant

' prav:itt.x In vI ,,U.' ,,,,,,CLASSIFICATION OF SHORT-LIVED EVENTS A..dicuced n S..in.....

,.. eLvent-based ICs and EALs define a variety of specific occurrences that have potential or actual safety significance.

By their nature, some of these events may be short-lived and,-theso,-......e.*

end before the emergency classification assessment can be complete~d:--, f an. event eccu.rt that m.ctc÷ a~r exce.edc an EAL, the aeccatd CLmttb...

lae ,g........

.. it ..ntnu. ,.r.....ncu..e at r th aimue ot declaratien'.

....p... f~ or example. an earthquake.

f.......t..n.u.....falur o the reactor protection system to automatically scram/trip the reactor followed by a successful manual scram/trin ra -'"..CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSIENT CONDITIONS Many of the ICs and/or EALs eentainied-in this document employ time-based criteria=Thcet criteria will that require tha4he-IC/EAL conditions be present for a defined period of time before an emergency declaration is warranted.

In cases where no time-based criterion is specified, it. it recognized' some transient conditions may cause an EAL to be met for a brief period of time (e.g.. a fcv. .c,:cnd.,t..

a few. ...n...... The following guidance ill be applied to the classification of these conditions.

EAL momentarily met during expected plant response -In inttancee v~hcrcWhien an EAL is briefly met during an expected (normal) plant response, an emergency declaration is not warranted, provided that associated systems and components are operating as expected, and operator actions are performed in accordance with procedures.

EAL momentarily met but the condition is corrected prior to an emergency declaration

-If an operator takes prompt manual action to address a condition, and the action is successful in correcting the condition prior to the emergency declaration, then the applicable EAL is not considered met and the associated emergency declaration is not required..tFor illustrative*'°'

pur..... w es~, contider the rcllowing e~ml.li' " " nip1 presents an illustra tion: An ATWS occurs and the auxiliary fedte .............

fal to auoaial start. Sta eeaeRPV' levels- rapidly decreases and the plant enters an inadequate RCS heat ..... eval ...............

RPV l~evel condil ion (a potential loss of beth-the fuel clad barrier and a loss otf the RCS barriers).

If an operator manually starts the a..ili.r.

fe.........

t:......RC1C in accordance with an EOP step and clears the inadequate RCS hea ......... , ' Water Level condition prior 24 to an emergency declaration, then the classification should be based on the ATWS only.It is important to &I'esnotc that the 15-minute emergency classification assessment period is not a "grace period" durfing-wh'iehto dela3 a classification

&l4tw--he--io order to perform anee-&f-a corrective action that would obviate the need to classify the event,-. Emergency classification assessments must be deliberate and timely, with no undue delays. The provision discussed above addresses only those rapidly evolving situations where an operator is able to take e.

action If betbre te-the emergency director ee 4ecifng-cornpletes the review and necessary steps fleessafy-to make the emergency declaration.

This provision

...........

te ensures t-hat any public protective actions resulting from the emergency classification are truly warranted by the plant conditions.AFTER-THE-FACT DISCOVERY OF AN EMERGENCY EVENT OR CONDITION In some cases, an EAL may be met but the emergency classification was not made at the time of the event or condition.

This c",, occur w;k'n pzrvornhe!

Iersonnel could discover t-hat-an event or condition existed which met an EAL, but no emergency was declared, and the event or condition no longer exists at the time of discovery.

T-his-tt may be d*~e-4e-the event or condition not be-fig-recognized at the time. or there w.a> an error ..............

in the emergency classification process.In these cases, no emergency declaration is but the guidance contained in NUJREG-1022 is applicable.

Specifically, the event ehtdwilt be reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR § 50.72 within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared event or condition.

The licensee shudwill also notify appropriate State and local agencies in accordance with the agreedf-*a-on arrangements.

in NUP.E" 1022.25 63 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS /RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS GENERAL SITE AREA EMRENY EMRENYALERT UNUSUAL EVENT RGl Release of RS1 Release of RAI Release of RU1 Release of gaseous radioactivity gaseous radioactivity gaseous or liquid gaseous or liquid resulting in offsite resulting in offsite radioactivity resulting radioactivity greater dose greater than 1,000 dose greater than 100 in offsite dose greater than 2 times the fie mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem TEDE or 500 than 10 mnrem TEDE .....i:ie-e .......mrem thyroid CDE. mrem thyroid CDE. or 50 mrem thyroid Op. Modes:" All Op. Modes:" All CDE. ..... .Op. Modes: All limits for 60 minutes or longer.Op. Modes: All R(G2 Spcnlt hidc p0(11 IRS2 Spent hiefc pool RA2 Significant RU2 UNPLANNED]cx ci be level ai lowering of water level loss of water level ectoied ) to le~ixi be'e above, or damage to, above irradiated fuel........ Lw"':v^ 3 .cxci 3. irradiated fu~el. Op. Modes:" All) .... 3 tu, 1/I Op. Modes:" All 60 Nin nulex or loixeer, RA3 Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown._____________

_____________Op.

Modes: All 26 RG1 ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (I or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director sheI4- ill declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

(1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (-itc m-c:*--i:c I~ n h....a*,zchold (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond :h st bo*... (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond site 23~ VZRa4M~to~

~wtMiOn~r# Q9&IS~B~~~f.rmc'

~oIlt1d~~!t~

zpz~itiz dccc r.x~pt3r p3rnt):* Closed window dose rates greater than 1,000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.

Releases of this magnitude will require implementation of protective actions for the public.27 Radiological effluent EALs are els~e-included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

I he monitor reading threshold values are determined using a dose assessment method that hack calculates from the dose \,alues specified in the IC. The meteorology and source term tnoble gases. particulates.

and halogens)used are the same as those used to determine the monitor reading threshold values in ICs RSI1 and RA !, This protocol will maintain inter\,als betxveen the threshold alues for the three classifications.

Since doses are generally not monitored in real-time.

a release duration of one hour is assumed, and the threshold values are based on a site boundary, (or beyond) dose of I1000)mR/hour whole body or 5(000 mR/hour thyroid, whichever is more limiting.The TEDE dose is set at the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes..... eff+ luent l+.,-; A a... in....cl.a, :uded taroid ..... for clazifin ..... nte tha... can,-beradalyze in esified ran, the:azi , plant:, canditian lane.+ 1hz incluz:ian

.... bat,+h .... at !Cz1EAL mare fu~llly drse h pcw fpsil vneadacdn Whil* e thiz IC m+a y be+*:, met+ ab.eent+.

chalenge ta multie fhizzion .r.du. b*+Jarrzi praviez clazifiatiandiverity ad ma beue vn ta al a ec h hgvizian r, du.. barrir.. chllengd..bu.r.thr.the....n of...radi...

ac..i.. ity. re ...........

the and, the c.mm.tt.d..ffectivewid h e tetuivalent iCEDE),+or as ....... cm.....d..a.

e Tuialen (CDEi'. Fari th --e purp .... fth 1 ... ICE1.e,I the.+' dazel- qunity tata effect-+ie daze co:i'rThcef tEP PAG gide,* rvde o heueafautthri dz ageca fca hWe-ve r, .am. tte h-....ave decide bae preateetv eta ancid t h ..... id.......

.oNuclear pawer ..-a plant I+I+ .... A.z netab r .aitn ...th .th pra...v aetian 1 .... adalag.., ez emp byth Statee thei EP.z. Thew CDE daze uzed in the, IC..~++. and .. EAe zhauld be adjuzed azneeczag

' t a.ignj+l v with State paetv e atin eczin akngcrteia Th "ie peiicmaiarlzIan hrehl vlus zaldbedtemie2wt a Memter rea~t:nc.~

will te ealeuIat~I ucmc a cet at a..cumed meteerelegical data or..m..... i di" ... r... i- f...... r... th d... .. ar f....r.......t...f.r

......h ...d.b .th same ac, those empleyed tecalcu...t..t.....n.t........

n.. fo ....... .....and ....... A ............

efth. ic .. :nonate includ,A bu .....n...limitesd.*

to -th -nd .,lu ...d.n..h tecle dmi hudbe th...........

.... .. as t.at.m....d...

.......m. nt.....dig

...r..., RE....S!ODC..M., an ;',:u- use in... the s te' ..... ierg -:cncy dose rssmn ecethodel o its* eps--ending uponh thc m ethod'oloein u.ed te-' cal"ulath the [ALsablec,--

th.......

may b me o the ..... value m..n.. th:a:t .,n ..urc a :, tgisal eC alaio in.. the ECL.~ec'c!

P. relet h cva ntenc c cfth exmpergrcypan vm, ando preadurl meght d' l gy ucedo/ te det/ennin.

effst...means there may bhoe etm t difrn'-ed in.th.....a...f....

te........p....t

..the .al .ul ..d..._en ndictat ionth E*:AL alu bein tiendors d ircjct wisthm".r et!e'din the usberge addcl:'rngeric E i th!nditaument.

af ) rem arper~za nc auc ytematcfaue tarct may render ' the gccnicrreEading invalid '-e g.. an aute npurge feature trigg.red at a p;,icula:

in.i.. ti.n level.. ... ..., Iticrcizdttthcndtndeebebyhi Cmyrctinadilgalefunvae ECL ,Accianment A,,trltt-f-es: .i. I1.'..29 30 RG2 I.( 1 :(monc'th onrcnrolc>

Inilialting ( o ndlition:

Spcit 'tonl poolI Icvc ! cu.li ot bn rcs toind to at[

(5 .,t .!,ci Lz';'! 3...... v .... ,lcx cl 3 itor Ott o ontcii, or Irloonr ()ller<iting t pplict'hibilix All UI~niegr~tnc. .ldion I*l cls: I N o Ic: ll n nm n rn., olcT d ] rc ctolr she~l dtt- ', ill docc l 'nc Ih i ( inc ram l I-:l Ocr ac n,,c p ro in~top tix upo dctct ini on7 that 60t mitoutns:

has hcnin excccded, or iii iliknlx hn c'xcccdndI, 1) .Slpcntoi~fe pool !ci c~i1 1oon hc rnstoinld to, at InnI pCi ..... 3...........

ncI 3 tbr Ot( i/ii or loonniI hiii I ( atd drsscs a SlilcnIo<s of spen t ftloni pool o/ \ not!Or coot rotl aidt rakni p capabhili it Iinadtin to n prolono<cd tonott cr\ ot spmnti ta.ct. Ihis> co'oditcll hi cd to loci daotno )oloicat release to thc no ironlnoct.

It is rcnconiscd tihat thi.i I(' woold likcn>Ix~

not" ixt'{ mc I until sl nFtlcr aootlhicr (jixrni tor, n illrunocs.

I(; Vii.1 toilt{ hoint.tCc~'

it tS hinihdcd to idc classilication dlix rsitt.el: f Ke; -I.. .÷. .I. t.. .. -.... .. +*o. -1 .. ...IILL r~zczgnmcnt

~urtnuxzs:

c. I. I.L 31 RS1 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director declare the Site Area Emergency promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

(1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond cltz specific d-z receptcr (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond dMo~o~e4~a

~~39pcMsIte e&tmc~C 71~ ~pcMs~ ~.feiu~Qe* Closed window dose rates greater than 100 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 10%-perceni of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.

Releases of this magnitude are associated with the failure of plant systems needed for the protection of the public.32 Radiological effluent EALs are atso-included to provide a basis for classifyuing events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

f he monitor reading threshold

\alues are deterniined using a dose ass~essinent method thai hack calculates from the dose values SpeCified in the I('. [he meteorology and source term (noble gtases. pailiceulatcsM and halog~ens) used is the same as those used to determine the monitor reading threshold

\alues in Its k( I atid RA 1. [his protocol maintains iinterxals betwe.en the threshold Ior the three cla~ssifications.

Since doses are generallx not monitored in real-time, a release duration of one hour is assumecd, and the threshold v alues are based on a site boundarx (or hey ond} dose otf (10 inR/hour whole body or 50)0 inR/hour ih roid. wh iches er is more Ii iin tig.The TEDE dose is set at 1 0-%-percent of the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 500 mrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Escalation of the emergency classification level ...... -b -= -:se IC...pra.ide ea.afiata dieriy n may bo .'.e ~ en uh!ened to e ....... evnt th....t w l n....r...h.th.

analy....d in the Updated Final, Safety AnaI:,:! Reo , th.. dierimonat-;

.. ill. ;nt be, the numb..er The EPA PA p e arc ex~p.eaeed int; m ... f. t+he.... aum h fetv ...... (EDE)The EPA PAC guidanee pra-videc fcr the uce af adult thyroid deae con-veriaon factore: haev. Sat etatec h.... dcided ta b.... prteti...t.....hid....d DE Ncl The 'cite apc!fie m..............nd..h......d.........

..h.....be .d .....i..d .wit...The.effluent...n.t.r.r.ading.

ch ...... err~espond ta a doze af 100 mrn:em TEDE ar 5020 mremCD at the+ "aite crccificd o+rcecptor (eanciatent with the. eaeulatian mcthadalacv emolavad')

far ane haur af eanocure.33

.p .I.-nitr ...l,..s ",will ne

.,g '.-*..t

.,'i..

mt-..i ..-atmaspheric dispersian factars; the data ar factars selected tbr usc shauU be the same as RAf t=

his infe..-matisn include., but a.r..nat li!:ited to. the ESOC n h.................

a.u.. use ....h.....' emergenc.y dose assesment metheadalogy.

• Depe.nding -p-an the m.ethadology

'-sed ta the EA.L "alues, there may be averlap ot the.s... v'alues in a ma.nner that ensu-res a legical escalation in the ECL.m.Ther ',s.ite sp....ifi d........ta

¢air::is th~ge dstneds) andc by t..he l ,ene t; d..ingi. ; etween. an, .it. a;nd. defsic daeds:'- The; sel"cted di.tance s) = lctehignst achcudreaet te content..

of. the ......nc ;lan, andt-the procedural if the dlyue t",;deterin body" te.dsc and. F Protethisrc A ction Rcema. The aiat"icn.?.

i;*n .electe.... th .a..ul.te dcc ane t fr-cm th i: ta s~ite.'..

..........

.... a ... .....Deve...l:.....Aper

+ .. +shu;d reeac raditi- 1cita deign. dcucts .,thrifcmta saure~ a esuretha I)theEAL alu beng ensiere iswithn te uableresans an 34 LLLXzIgnrn~nt~"~ttrItutcc:

~5.I3.C 35