ML081840744

06/19/2008 NFPA-805 Workshop Handouts - Oconee NFPA-805 Lessons Learned

ML081840744
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	06/19/2008
From:	Goforth D Duke Energy Corp
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML081840360	List: ML081840398 ML081840534 ML081840731 ML081840735 ML081840744
References
NFPA 805
Download: ML081840744 (16)

Text

1 Oconee NFPA-805 Lessons Learned June 19, 2008 2 David Goforth Duke Energy NFPA 805 Technical Manager 3 How did all this begin?

In a nuclear era long, long ago-Duke to the NRC: We would like to build a nuclear power plant.NRC back to Duke: OK 4 What did we have to work with?

Oconee Nuclear Station:Three units, B&W design, very little separation (plant equipment or SSF)Quick responding RCSNo MSIVsor feedwaterisolationWide open plant areasSafety related gear located in the turbine buildingVery loosely written license basis 5 NFPA 805 Concern?

Paul Lain to David Goforth in a long forgotten pilot meeting:

"Hey, if you can transition Oconee, you can transition anyone" 6 OverallReconstitutionB-1 TableB-2 TableB-3 TableRadioactive ReleaseNon-power OpsPRAConfiguration ControlDocumentationLAR and UFSAR 7 ReconstitutionReconstitution should be completed prior to beginningWell documented Safe Shutdown Analysis

with open items where deterministic

requirements cannot be metModification reviews 8 B-1 TableMany exemptions to the BTP Few calculationsMany "Grey" license statementsVery little suppression and detection for the hazardGeneration of a new ca lc for the B-1 TableLAR Appendix T populated with many license conditions brought forward for NRC clarificationSome open items entered into the CAP 9 B-2 TableShould be similar for all three Duke nuclear plantsGenerated a B-2 calculationSome open items, entered into the CAP 10 B-3 TableDue to ONS design this was very complicatedFinal SSA for a given fire area turned into an iterative processMany open items came out of the fire area analysisTeam approach to resolving SSANeed more up front training prior to activating the teamSpecial cases for fire areas turn up in some casesChange evaluations de veloped from thisManual action feasibilityThermal Hydraulic calculations required 11 PRAONS required separate models due to unit differences -not originally envisionedNUREG 6850 turned out to be somewhat conservative (however NUREG 6850 provides a good foundation to build a FPRA)Ideally the PRA model shoul d be build with the new reconstituted SSA PRA/SSA Team interfacePRA quality versus Appendix B concernsSeparate Change Evaluation calculations 12 Radioactive ReleaseThis went fairly smoothThis was done by plant personnelSeparate calculation generated 13 NPOONS was very difficult to tie NPO components to KSF'sBOP Fire Area can present concerns as a

"pinch point"Process submitted for approvalFAQ 07-0040 was a very intense process to

develop. Approval to be done via the LAR.

14 LARMore up front training needed for review teamNot enough time was allotted for review -much overtime worked by all involvedStation management review required two sessions for approval -nuclear safety versus

completeness and accuracy. Change Evaluation summary pending 15 Configuration ControlThree site modification review process developedThe need for development of controls for new

calcs and LAR informationPost LAR, pre SER program developmentProject process controlsIntegration of the new FSA and NSCA into existing Engineering documents 16 OverallIts all about teamwork and communicationsLay out the proper sequence for transition -LAR due date versus a completion of the program dateDuke personnel were next to impossible to obtainPlant personnel frequently required for maintenance of running units or outage supportDifferent level of details in UFSAR for nuclear plants present some challenges to a generic NFPA 805 UFSAR This is a very complicated process and will be new to plant personnelReluctance to implement software in place of the traditional paperwork