05000445/FIN-2013007-10
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Incorporate the Refueling Water Storage Tank Vortexing Design Calculation into the Emergency Operating Procedures for Containment Spray Pump Operation |
Description | The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, states, in part, measures shall be establish to assure that the design basis for systems, structures, and components are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions. Specifically, since 2006 and 2007, the licensee failed to appropriately incorporate the RWST vortexing design calculations 6 percent indicated level into the emergency operating procedures for switching containment spray pump suction from the RWST to the containment sump to prevent damage to the pumps. The finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-2013-005739. The inspectors determined that the failure to appropriately incorporate the RWST vortexing design calculations 6 percent indicated level into the emergency operating procedures for switching containment spray pump suction from the RWST to the containment sump to prevent damage to the pumps was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more-than-minor because it was associated with the Reactor Safety, Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, Procedure Quality attribute and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, Emergency Operating Procedure EOS-1.3A/B allowed the operators the ability to delay transfer of containment spray pump suction source which could have caused damage to the pumps due to vortexing. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low (Green) safety significance because the finding was not a design deficiency and did not result in the loss of operability or functionality. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the change to the procedure due to the addition of the sump strainers occurred in 2006 and 2007, and did not reflect current licensee performance. |
Site: | Comanche Peak |
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Report | IR 05000445/2013007 Section 1R21 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
Inspectors (proximate) | T Farnholtz R Smith G Skinner B Correll C Edwards T Buchanan J Braisted |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Comanche Peak - IR 05000445/2013007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Comanche Peak) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Comanche Peak)
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