05000445/FIN-2013007-07
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Provide Appropriate Acceptance Criteria and Testing Procedure Instructions |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, that states, in part, A test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Specifically, since 2001, the licensee failed to provide appropriate acceptance criteria and testing procedure instructions during modified performance tests involving Class 1E batteries for the 1-minute critical period testing data which incorporated the requirements of IEEE Standard 450-1995 to ensure the battery would meet the required design voltage for the duty cycle. The finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-2013-005673. The inspectors determined that the failure to provide appropriate acceptance criteria and testing procedure instructions involving Class 1E batteries for the 1-minute critical period testing data during modified performance tests was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more-than-minor because it was associated with the Reactor Safety, Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, Procedure Quality attribute and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, Procedure MSE-S0-5715 does not direct the technicians to record and evaluate the voltage at the end of the 1-minute critical period to ensure it does not drop below the designed minimum voltage, which would indicate the battery would not be capable of meeting the required design function. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low (Green) safety significance because the finding was not a design deficiency and did not result in the loss of operability or functionality. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because Calculation EE-CA-0000-5121 was implemented in 2001 and did not reflect current licensee performance. |
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000445/2013007 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Farnholtz R Smith G Skinner B Correll C Edwards T Buchanan J Braisted |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XI |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Comanche Peak - IR 05000445/2013007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Comanche Peak) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Comanche Peak)
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