05000445/FIN-2013007-06
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Perform Adequate Operability Assessments |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation, with three examples, of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, that states, in part, Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Specifically, for example 1 on February 28, 2013, for example 2 on June 5, 2013 and for example 3 on June 8, 2013, the licensee failed to follow procedure STI-442.01, Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment Program, Revision 1, Attachment 8.B page 3 of 5 which states, in part, Identify the topics that are applicable to the quick technical evaluation and include information for applicable topics within the evaluation such as: for example 1, The effect or potential effect of the degraded or nonconforming condition on the affected SSCs ability to perform its specified safety function, or for example 2, Compensatory Measures are recommended, or for example 3, Whether there is reasonable expectation of operability, including the basis for the determination. The finding was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program as Condition Report CR-2013-006599. The inspectors determined that the failure to perform adequate operability assessments was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more-than-minor because: Example 1: It was associated with the Reactor Safety, Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, Configuration Control attribute and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, shutting off of the containment spray pumps during a large break LOCA inside containment would allow containment pressure to increase. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 3, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low (Green) safety significance because it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment (valves, airlocks, etc.), containment isolation system (logic and instrumentation), and heat removal components or actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. Example 2: It was associated with the Reactor Safety, Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the compensatory measures established in the first operability assessment did not ensure that offsite power would be maintained at minimum grid voltage. Example 3: It was associated with the Reactor Safety, Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, Design Control attribute and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the operability assessment initially credited the use of the battery chargers after the emergency diesel generators restored power to the bus, without evaluating design basis for the battery chargers. For examples 2 and 3, the inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low (Green) safety significance because these examples were a deficiency affecting the design or qualification that did not result in losing operability or functionality. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the licensee failed in all three examples to conduct an effectiveness review of a safety-significant decision to verify the validity of the underlying assumptions to identify possible unintended consequences during the original operability assessments. |
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000445/2013007 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Farnholtz R Smith G Skinner B Correll C Edwards T Buchanan J Braisted |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Comanche Peak - IR 05000445/2013007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Comanche Peak) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Comanche Peak)
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