Text

Turkey Point, Initial Exam 2009-301 Draft Simulator Scenarios
	ML091740144
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	06/23/2009
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; Florida Power & Light Co
References
	Download: ML091740144 (455)
	v • d • e

{{#Wiki_filter:( TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Facility: Turkey Point Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 2009-301 NEW Examiners: Candidates: US -------------------- RO BOP /" Initial Conditions: Mode 1,60% MOL. 3C charging pump out of service due to ,,' j/ \. Turnover: Equipment OOS: 3C charging pump out of service due to packil)gl ge. S* service in 14 hours. Thunderstorms reported in the area \ Event No. 2 5 TAHUVBSC 15 TAHUVBMC 2.20000 TFFVP1A T TFl10101 = T Maintain 60% Online risk -green B train protected both units Event Type (TS)SRO 3C RCP alarm at and 16 mils shaft. The to alarm directed to 3-0NOP-041.1 .. In with the fold out page, warraoj evaluation only. \c. \. '-'::""<<::.:.", ... ,,:)f 3A SGFP to place the control //0,w""s){Vitch to Tnts",should initiate an automatic TFU1lRRD = T / ,/" (I})RO C)BOP ,rurtls),ack to responds per 3-0NOP-OB9. A of the nl{lbclpk circuit requires the BOP to manually run u,rit back to A failure of automatic rod control will control inserting when demanded. The RO (M)ALL and match TavelTref. The US will use the rod control failure. Should a unit . trip occur,e\fent three will be skipped. Sequential drop of two control rods. Control Rod HB will blow a tationary coil fuse dropping control rod HB. The crew will ondper 3-0NOP-02B.3. The second rod drop H4 requires o to manually trip the unit. The reactor trip switch on the console and Vertical Panel Bravo (VPB) fails revealing an A TWS condition. The crew will respond to the A TWS per 3-EOP-E-0 and FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close on Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3-EOP-E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization. (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1 TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #1 Event 1 -C RCP vibrations increase to 3.2 mils frame and 16 mils shaft. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.1 Reactor Coolant Pump Off Normal. " .... f/:'" /./"'" Event 2 -3A SGFP shaft shears requiring the BOP to place the control switS,l;:tl0 9ff per O-ADM-211. This should initiate an automatic runback to 45%. The per 3-ONOP-089. A failure of the runback circuit requires the BOp,/to the unit back to 45%. A failure of automatic rod control will prevent C1"'ontr:61 rodS'{rOtTlj,nserting when demanded. The RO will take manual control and 't4$ will use of 3-0NOP-028 to address the rod control a unit trip OCCblL three will be skipped.'" I' \., "'%t ./,./t, "', d/ Event 3 -Sequential drop of two control rods. blow.. tionary coil fuse'\,*4.***/' dropping control rod H8. The crew will respoh,ppe,r; .. 3-0NQP::' . The second rod drop H4 requires RO to .manually trip the rip switches on the console and VPB fall revealing an A TWS condltloA.., .... J/' f'Y "'. Event 4 -The crew will respond to the 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting iQ S"a.I .... !ailure Train A safety injection fails to automatically CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close \>n A.:requiringQJanu'aloperation from VPB. Event 5 -The crew resp Secondary '" .::. .,'C;-' ** _ * ",>. '"'< '\\.. \ ,'-""""'<<:_ <<,f .-::, ..;'/::' .,;/" .".'::;<;:;;." ...*.*. :1/ """\., '\o, \/,f' .,.,;f/' .the SQ1all break\L09A per 3-EOP-E-1 Loss of Reactor or nt and'%3-P-ES-1. LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization. \ 2 TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Scenario XXIV NRC 1 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-24 (60% MOL) Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIV _NRC_1.lsn Place simulator in run Start 3B charging pump and secure 3C charging pump ___ ""f l' fit'" Trigger lesson steps: ",),f ,/' a. SETUP -3C Charging pump OOS, ATWS, RJ)cf failure, Train A SI fal ...) CV-6275B failure, Automatic Turt;Ylne/f'Onback fa' actuates TAB1Pos'tI:4p<'f/ RACKOUT, TFL2XBSE =T, TFL2XASE = T;'.JFL:3t:;IA 1 = T, 6 7C = T, TCE6DQ8C = T, TFL3V1 = F, TFL 10101 = T) ...*. . Place simulator in freeze. /.y ..... Place clearance info tag on 3C '>'" "\ Provide shift turnover Select 3A QSPDS to an to pag.e.,212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA and at the RC ,/desk to'ttJe Fill in blender & SP n boro I at console blender station. Data for each IC may d in the E(lC;& Shutdowu diuidelines Book in the simulator IIF. '>>" ,/,1)

"_;_" __

.,\, l'" , '--"'---;; .. ,,, ,- 3 TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Event 1 -C RCP vibration alarm Initiated immediately after shift turnover. The crew will respond to annunciator alarm F 1/1, Rep motor/shaft hi vib. The annunciator response procedure will direct the crew to check remote and control room indications and perform 3-0NOP-041. 1 for readings above the alarm setpoi The US begins performing 3-0NOP-041. 1 at step 1. When directed -Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 -3C RCP VIBRATI TAHUVBSC = 15.0, TAHUVBMC = 2.2) ARP F1/1 step 2a. -Respond as NSO if directed to check vi cable spreading room. Local indication on Bentley-Nevada re shaft. The Crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.1 Fold out page item 1 -Respond as E 3C RCP. 4 ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Event 2 -3A SGFP SHAFT SHEAR WI FAILURES 3A SGFP shaft shears requiring the BOP to place the control switch to off per 0-ADM-211. This should initiate an automatic runback to 45%. The crew responds . per 3-0NOP-089. A failure of the runback circuit requires the BOP to manually run the unit back to 45%. A failure of automatic rod control will prevent co I rods from inserting when demanded. The RO will take manual control an m h TavelTref The US will use of 3-0NOP-028 to address the rod co ral ilure. Should a unit trip occur, event three will be skipped. When directed -Trigger lesson step EVENT 2 -3A SGFP S FAILURES (actuates TFFVP1A = T, TFL 10101 = T, TFU1 The Crew responds per 3-0NOP-089 turbine runb k Step 5.3 -Respond as Load Dispatcher and Plant G er entry into 3-0NOP-089 for the shaft shear n 3 runback. Step 5.6 -Respond as SM if called; ac n 100-1002. Step 5.7 -Respond as Techni C, or AOM. Acknowledge failure of Rod Control to operate in 5 TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Event 3 -Sequential Dropped Rods . Sequential drop of two control rods. Control Rod HB will blow a stationary coil fuse dropping control rod HB. The crew will respond per 3-0NOP-02B.3. The second rod drop H4 requires the RO to manually trip the unit. The reactor trip switches on the console and VPB fail revealing an A TWS condition. Following the report to the I&C Supervisor in step 5.2.3.2 above a w en directed -Trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -DROPPED ON ROL ROD H8 (actuates TFLlD41 = T) The Crew responds per 3-0NOP-028.3 Dropped RCC Step 10-Respond as Reactor Engineering; Acknowledge d If called respond as WCC, or AOM. Acknowledge Following the report to the reactor Engineer, foil p and when directed -Trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -DROP TROL ROD H4 (actuates TFLlD31 = T) 6 TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Event 4 -ATWS W/3C RCP SEAL FAILURE The crew will respond to the A TWS per 3-EOP-E-O arid 3-EOP-FR-S.

1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA).

Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close on Phase A requiring manual ope tion from VPB Entered from Event 3 on drop of second control rod or, Event 2 on manual The Crew responds per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1 Response Generation I A TWS 3-EOP-FR-S.1 Step 7.a -May be performed as an early action. Respo direction to open the reactor trip break After a two minute delay, TRIGGER les 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 Step 17 -Respond as NS , in service on unit 3 using 3 0 system. Trigger lesson ste -7 of step 4 and to continue tion 7.1.2 complete, PAHM in service g direction to check local stream line TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Event 5 -SBLOCA Response The crew responds to the small break LOGA per 3-EOP:'E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Goo/ant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LOGA Goo/down and Oepressuriz ation. 3-EOP-E-1 response Step 4.a -Respond as Chemistry to take periodic activity samples of all SGs Step 4.b -Respond as Chemistry to check DAM1 monitor reading Step 4.c -Respond as Health Physics to take radiation readings on mai te Step 16.b&c -Respond as NSO, Acknowledge direction to unlock an 10 breakers: After 3-5 minutes T . et Locally unlock and close the b. followin breakers c.

30616 for MOV-3-* 30621 for MOV-3-86 * -866A \ 1 BREAKER ALIGNMENT.

Report to verify radiation shield doors closed for d charging pump room to survey the Pipe & valve room and Electrical penetration radiation 'str 0 align PASS for sampling the RCS Unit 4 RO, Acknowledge direction to secure U4 EDGs. as NSO to go to 3A Diesel Generator Engine Control Panel and establish communications with the control room spond as NSO to go to 3B Diesel Generator Engine Control Panel 3C13B and establish communications with the control room 3-EOP-ES-1.2 Step 3.d.1 -Respond as SNPO, acknowledge direction to Proceed to Unit 3 West Electrical Penetration Room and reset group A Backup PRZ Heater lockout relay 8 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:_1_ Event No.:_1_ Page_1_ of Event

Description:

3C RCP vibration alarm at 3.2 mils frame and 16 mils shaft. The crew responds to alarm Flil and is directed to 3-0NOP-041.1 and Tech. Spec. 3.4.1. In accordance with the fold out page, vibration levels warrant evaluation only. . .. /' Time /p Position Applicant's Actions or BOP Recognizes/reports unexpeoted alarm 'CP HI VIB to the unit supervisor (US). '% BOP Perform actions of 3-ARP-097.CR fo .. \....../.../.fY

1. Verifies alarm by checking RCP vibratioo reo¢rder R-3-369. ,,ff"""'>""'"

Note: Finds 3C R*;P'Cfi.t3:2m.[,!s frame ad* .. t ';'<0-', \, \c, ... ",:::, 2a. Dispatches

t{hecK:'Vii::![atiOI1'.

the cable spreading room. \, \\ .f" .( *** _.......\.. \ **. /,)/' ..* / ** ,,0" .*** " ****** / will not be lit. Setpoints at 20 m if s on fr{IotGtr. to RCP greater than setpoint at 16 <\. \ ... mils .* .. )1 response. U .. ' 41 . 1 , f CAUTION ain"'N;flt

)"ries shall NOT be performed wilen there are indications of all Rep I packa fai/llfe 1111ti{ the reactor is shutdown and ReS pressure/temperature is re ced to mhl[;fiize leakage .. --------NOITS* ----------.

Foldout Pa98 is f"equfted to be monitored throughout 07iS proced'ure. , Off-nonna/ RC,:P that requ:'re $,IJutdoltv't: of a R:CP sh.all be verified by I . Cfo.s.s-checki.ng ell Ft'CP pararne-ter,s. If e/thsr 3B or 3C RGPs are stopped by the perforrnane-s* of this procedure .. then the associated ReS loop pre:S:J.uriz*-r -spray' 'laIve should be closed to preve'.rd b£u::k-floVl through the valve. ______ I 1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: 1 l Event

Description:

Time Position 3C RCP vibration alarm at 3.2 mils frame and 16 mils shaf The crew res to alarm F1I1 and is directed to J.ONOP-041.1 and Tech. Spec. 3.4.1. I. accordance with the fold out page, vibration levels warrant Enginee, evaluation only. Applicant's Actions or Rep viihr@hgD Crileria J.E. fra:rne 'librate,Ctt fP,nints::r 5,. 10) is fP',,.,-&"ter eqt.:lcf: C"Jntact Engineering Nl EvakJ8.ls thE condition. . ,.' RCF STOFPING CRITERIA IF c:;,ny of the fo ilc; .. Rep iir=t:its ,are -reachec, TH EN rn .. tri6:::::t:: EO'" netNo,k.8J1lil step thE 8nscted RCP. --'.' .. OR EC;*UAL TO 23..5<;::;:. I'D} -GREATER. THAN OR ECtUAL TO -5 r .. ,l!:LS -GREATER THAN OR EGlU.AL TC 20 MILS bash: of 'Dctaining d,ata for si-ar1vp, fDr baf,l3nc1ng 3n ReF', or for shutdown O-perati,ons; 1he Eie-ciJ"ica' (anCB Supoefvist>r ,Dr Component Engi-nE<-er:ing S'upen""=,Df may cc-ntinued R(:*P 'h'4h or statDr w:!"'lcling t-en1;perat\;lr*- above 'stopping crteri,a noted in FoldQut Ps:ge Ite;-on ,::L Tni-s irlz-atio-"I is required tc, be-obtair..:eo Pr1-0f starting the Hep. 2 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_1_ l Event

Description:

Time Position ROI BOP RO BOP RO 3C RCP vibration alarm at 3.2 mils frame and 16 mils shaft. The crew res onds to alarm FlIl and is directed to 3-0NOP-041.1 and Tech. Spec. I accordance with the fold out page, vibration levels warrant Enginee . g evaluation only. Applicant's

nr Foldout -Reviews fold out page. Note: Item 1, Rep vibration assessm contacting Engineering to evalu not apply. Foldout -Contacts Engineering to eval 1 Checks for proper s
PI-3-131A

-gre te

jection f w o 6gpm on all RCPs C ckthe RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI FLOW alarm-12 RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI TEMP ff A1/3 RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER La FLOW off 3 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_1_ Page -+/--of l Event

Description:

3C Rep vibration alarm at 3.2 mils frame and 16 mils shaft. The crew res onds Time Position BOP RO to alarm FlIl and is directed to 3-0NOP-041.1 and Tech. Spec. 3.4.1. I j accordance with the fold out page, vibration levels warrant Engineering evaluation only.'" Applicant's Actions or Behavi 4. Check for proper cooling to RCP pump "".' J/

RCP bearing temperatures on -less than 210°F
Number one sealleakoff on."t'RDADS -less 215°F <::. :\

\< .. 5. Check VCT temperature on -1,ss .. a .,\.,. __ ::,'.,t'" 6. Check RCP standpipe HI level

G2/1 for RCP Aci ""'''

""'+;"

G2/2 for RCP B
G2/3 for RCP C\ 7. Check RCP standpipe'\p //(7 _?,-;.-J';

./"G3/1 for"RCP A '. /' "' \\ '\ j/ "j'(;,3/2 foc R(}P B \,\ : G3/3 fC).1 J P C \ --,--,. -.heck I),ep oi alarms -off ,,' .i'*.,f* .. **** .. * .. ''''' .\/E32/4 f for RCPA the following alarms are off: H9/1 RCP A MOTOR BEARING HI TEMP H9/2 RCP B MOTOR BEARING HI TEMP

H9/3 RCP C MOTOR BEARING HI TEMP
H9/4 RCP MOTOR BEARING COOLING WATER HI TEMP
H9/5 RCP MOTOR BEARING COOLING WATER LO FLOW
H9/6 RCP A/B/C PUMP/MOTOR HI TEMP BOP b. Verify RCP motor bearing and stator temperatures on ERDADS-Stable or decreasing 4

Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _1_ Page2 0f Event

Description:

Time Position RO US BOP 3C RCP vibration alarm at 3.2 mils frame and 16 mils shaft. The crew rysRonds to alarm Fill and is directed to J.ONOP-04

1. 1 and Tech. Spec. 3.4.1;jlh ) accordance with the fOld out page, vibration levels warrant evaluation only. /' 10. Check RCP seal bypass valve, CV-3-3, fl' Note: RNO sends ou to ste 12./ .;:,;1' ,

12. Directs SM to evaluate plant

/f" a. Check O-ADM-115 Notification

b. Review TechnicaJ/§, ecification 3.4.'1'f,,?r

-\\;,. " Note: T.S 3.4.1 is meei\.wl the close of the ONOP r . ew, Trigger lesson step EVENT 2 -3A SGFP SHAFT 5 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _2_ Page_1_of l Event

Description:

3A SGFP shaft shears requiring the BOP to place the control switch to off per Q ADM-2II. This should initiate an automatic runback to 45%. The crew s nds Time Position BOP US per 3-0NOP-089. A failure of the runback circuit requires the BOP ally run the unit back to 45%. A failure of automatic rod control will control rods fram inserting when demanded. The RO will take manual ontra nd match Tave/Tref. The US will use of 3-0NOP-028 to address the r Should a unit trip occur, event three will be skipped. Note: If a reactor trip is required n continue at EVENT 4 rify the automatic actions are functioning to stabilize Intain plant conditions or assume manual control: Main turbine control and Reheat intercept valves modulate closed (VPA)

Steam dumps arm and open on Tavg/Tref mismatch (console)
Automatic rod control adjusts core reactivity to match TavglTref (console)
Main Feedwater control valves respond to maintain programmed level (console)
Pressurizer level and pressure controllers function to maintain pressurizer level and pressure (console) 6

( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:_1_ Event No.: 2 ' Page of L Event

Description:

3A SGFP shaft shears requiring the BOP to place the control switch to off per Q ADM-211. This should initiate an automatic runback to 45%. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-089. A failure ofthe run back circuit requires the BOP to IYl'artually run the unit back to 45%. A failure of automatic rod control will rods from inserting when demanded. The RO will take manual w)l.frol}lfid match Tave/Tref. The US will use of 3-0NOP-028 to address the rod oontrol< ilure. Time Position BOP BOP RO Should a unit trip occur, event three will be Step 4.1 (lOA) BOP recognizes/reports t9/U run back as evident by:" "'=\ ilure of the automatic, ".

Main turbine control and stable (VPA) J'
Main Feedwater control valv level (console)
Steam dumps",cl f \. ?"':. Step 4.1 (lOA) BOP us.es\It), '>, Note: Approximate/x 3 " '<; tnta,iring . .eO% programmed f/' F '\/. Note: If the unit is ru' ,f' clos'ecl, a turbin '

valves trip signal will occur continue <<.at** f\lf 4. 1with rod motion demanded(console) essurizer level and pressure controlielS controlling to . tain 60% pressurizer level and pressure (console) . g pump flow decrease in response to increasing . er level 1 (lOA) RO paces rod control in manual and inserts control rods in a controlled manner to match Tavg/Tref. Note: O-ADM-211 allows +/-4°F during transient Note: If the crew is too slow in responding, the US may direct a manual reactor trip based on SG levels, continue at EVENf4. Note: Control bank D should end up around 110 steps 7 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_2_ Page of.JL Event

Description:

3A SGFP shaft shears requiring the BOP to place the control switch to off ADM-211. This should initiate an automatic run back to 45%. The cew r Time Position ROI BOP BOP per 3-0NOP-089. A failure of the run back circuit requires the BOP m ally run the unit back to 45%. A failure of automatic rod control will ve control rods from inserting when demanded. The RO will take manual ontro nd match Tave/Tref. The US will use of3-0NOP-028 to address the r I fa reo Should a unit trip occur, event three will be skipped. Applicant's Actions Step 5.2 Verify the following condi' n

Steam Generator levels an
Steam dumps closed
Tavg matche
Pressurizer I e nd the Plant General Manager in -115, notification of plant events .6 Notify Shift Manager to review the requirements of 1002, failure investigation process(FIP), b determine if a FIP team should be activated If reactor power has changed by greater than or equal to 15 percent, then notify Chemistry department that RCS sampling is required per Technical Specifications table 4.4-4, item 6.b 8

. Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_2_ Page -+/-. of l Event

Description:

3A SGFP shaft shears requiring the BOP to place the control switch to off per Q ADM-211. This should initiate an automatic runback to 45%. per 3-0NOP-089. A failure of the run back circuit requires the BOP t.0"m1:J;Hually run the unit back to 45%. A failure of automatic rod control will rods from inserting when demanded. The RO will take match TavelTref. The US will use of 3-0NOP-028 to address the r d c9Htr0J' Time Position US Should a unit trip occur, event three will be skipped. Directs response for the failure of AutQ 028 Reactor Control S stem Malful}etb

If the Rod Control System is inopera \,

Urgent Failure or other cause, the shall immediately . . //" -.'\""--.,

If a transient r

by boration / dilution or changes i Reador sQ'a1i be tripped and a transition made t RE:n:1ZQR TRip OR SAFETY INJECTION. ")

. _ "

or turbine load will effect shutdown "./ (margin andla . I offset. Ifplant conditions permit, the Shift Manager . shall be gens ed for metti to achieve and maintain stable '\ lant cpndltlons. )' " /" .* ,."........ Ai jo'f[ RCC(s) torrrove when demanded, (e.g., ROD CONTROL t:!gGI5.f'jT FAILURE), constitutes inoperability of the associated RC<:<<(s):\Jhe requirements of T.S. 3.1.3.1 apply. 1 -(I'OA) Place Rod Control Selector switch to the MAN position CAUTION r URGENT FAILURE condition rod motion is blocked. The cause must be corrected before moving rods. Resetting the URGENT FAILURE prior to correcting problem could result in ratcheting the mechanisms when the RESET pushbutton is depressed. RO Step 5.2.1 -DO NOT increase reactor power without permission from the Reactor Engineering Supervisor and the Shift Manager 9 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _2_ Page .2.. of 2-Event

Description:

3A SGFP shaft shears requiring theBOP to place the control switch to off per G ADM-211. This should initiate an automatic runback to 45%. The crew s nds per 3-0NOP-089. A failure of the run back circuit requires the BOP ally run the unit back to 45%. A failure of automatic rod II:)ntrol will p ntrol rods from inserting when demanded. The RO will take manual nd match Tave/Tref. The US will use of 3-0NOP-028 to address the r Should a unit trip occur, event three will be skipped. Time Position RO Step 5.2.2 -Manually position the state conditions

1. !E the RC control bank will still no state conditions with Tavg equal to US PED CONTROL ROD H8 e held during or at the close of the ONOP. 10 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _3_ Page _1_ of .JL Event

Description:

Sequential drop of two control reds. Control Rod H8 will blow a stationalJ:": coil fuse dropping control rod H8. The crew will respond per JONOP-028.3AH second rod drop H4 requires the RO to manually trip the unit. The re"'PTnr;Fr Time switches on the console and VPB fail revealing an A TWS c:mditi Position Applicant's Actions or B RO Recognizes/reports to US the Dropped Con US following indications:

IRPI for H8 indicating 0.0
H8 rod bottom light lit
NIS/RPI ROD DROP ROD S
N41, N42, N illuminated system has been installed per TSA 08-002. tTl indication for ControJ Bank B rods Bl0, , ility of RPJ indication for control rod B10, P , K2. B6, F14, or question, tile redundant indicating sy.stem may be I lieu of the RPI Indication In question.

refel lees in this procedure to the RPI indication for Control Bank B, other than for -2, c ,be interpreted as either the console RPJ indication or the redundant indica !/lstaf/ed by TSA 08-002. assuming the indication being referenced he (:ontro/ rod bottom light is a function of the RPf circuit and not RPI indication. 811se of this, the rOO bottom IIglJt will function if using either the Control Bank B RPf ication or the redundant indication system instalied by TSA 08-002. Misaligned rods are addressed by 3-0NOP-028. 1, RGG Misalignment. 11 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page .-£ of L Event

Description:

Sequential drop of two control rods. Control Rod H8 will blow a stationary coil fuse dropping control rod H8. The crew will respond per }ONOP-028.3. rod drop H4 requires the RO to manually trip the unit. The reactor trip .on'the console and VPB fail revealing an A TWS condition. . Time Position 1. T.S. :U.1. f* SHUTDOWN MARGlN ;:;ov*:rec -n Sti'PS 11 '3l'\11 13

hour'D 'H!/iy AND repe."! ",'_erl12 hours. 2. T.S 3.1.::U . GROUP ROD HEIGHT 3. rawn, appty'Tech Sp!?:: :3<.0,.3. RPis Step

1: /I/er'1' 4 hours,. 1::-\\ithl" guide:;"es of COLR -§'iI'fc,Dl?r,,::lJ!,_.

RPis COJnt.ers '*\!ery 4 hours. ::::o:vere(i r Step f. , how'D perform AND required every ""00r 1hereafter whii*e QPTR exceeds. 2%'. if OP"'-R is* greater :han pOVler ;?;,%, 'for e\l'erf '1 %. GPTR eoc;:*:eeds -1 !Nfihin 3D' n'l:inute;, if CiP-R is. grea1er lhen reduce poler 21% fer i %. GPTR exc-eeds 1 'Nitfm 2 hours F:educe 1he NLS trip ';.etoc1nts ihe sane: arnoun1 viith-:,:,tr the n*);t -4 !leurs. 12 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_3_ Event

Description:

Sequential drop oftwo control rods. Control Rod H8 will blow a stationary coil fuse dropping control rod H8. The crew will respond per }ONOP-028.3. rod drop H4 requires the RO to manually trip the unit. The reactor trip the Time console and VPB fail revealing an A TWS condition.'/' ,P Position RO Step 1 Check Number Of RCCs DROPPED -Than One a, Check the followmg r'llore than one rod bottom light CAUTIONS .' Do NOT'" the ReS while performing this procedure until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN calculation has been performed using O-OP-028.2, SHUTDOWN MARGIN CALCULA TlON. "ho NOT increase reactor power while performing this procedure. Do NOT use control rods for power or temperature adjustments until the cause of the dropped rod is identified and determined not to affect any other rods. 13 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: _3_ JL Event

Description:

Sequential drop oftwo control rods. Control Rod HS will blow a stationary coil fuse dropping control rod HS. The crew will respondper 3-0NOP-02S.3. The second rod drop H4 requires the RO to manually trip the unit. The reactor trip switches on the console and VPB fail revealing an ATWS condition. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Step 4-Verify Automatic Controls Are Functioning To Stabilize The Unit AND No Transient Is In Progress a. TavgiTrehvilhin TF b PZR level/pressure trending to program c. S/G level trending to program Note: Turbine will be use RO Step 5-Check,,4cF'O'WilfTf.Q RAOC ,,>, '<0-,.AX'l'Ah.,FlO% T S. Llt.,ilIT FF VVithi, 11inutes, reduce reactor power to less than using 3-0NOP-100, FAST LOAD REDUCTION, while continumgwith thIS proced LIre. % there are no'FD restrictions, see next page for curve .\. ,\, HourlyQPTR, Determination Using P .1 0, OF , T POWER TILT RATIO Until QfTR Results Are Satisfactory OR orfower Is Less Than 50% 'Reactor power is Jess than 50% Step 7 -Declare the dropped RCC Inoperable BOP Notifies Work Control of the failure of H8 14 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_3_ Page 2 of.JL Event

Description:

Sequential drop of two control rods. Control Rod H8 will blow a stationa oil fuse dropping control rod H8. The crew will respond per Time Position second rod drop H4 requires the RO to manually trip the unit. The' . switches on the console and VPB fal revealing an A TWS condi,t1 Applicant's Actions or Behavi RAoe LIMITS DEFINED IN eOLR POWER 5U POSITIVE LlH1TS 25 20 NEGATIVE l.IMfTS 30 40 50 60 70 80 PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER Z'sI)() I 15.0(lO 100 CALCULATED RAoe LIMITS (POWER -INTERCEPT)! SLOPE !'(lWER POSITIVE NEGATIVE LIMITS LlMlTS JO 55 :n.2 HI 2104 -26 65 1M -24 70 17.3 <!2 16 ,20 gO 14.2 *13 12.4 ,1G 90 ]t).ti -I,: 1---' 95 I H.B ,*l2 tuO -10 01,.f)19 Rl!<{. {t 15 ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _3_ Page of Event

Description:

Sequential drop oftwo control rods. Control Rod H8 will blow a stationary coil fuse dropping control rod H8. The crew will respond per 3-0NOP-028.: y'fl1, second rod drop H4 requires the RO to manually trip the unit. The refl:ctor)rip switches on the console and VPB fail revealing an A TWS conditi9n: /' ," ;i"f J" Time Position Applicant's Actions or Sehavi0"r RO Step 8-Reduce Reactor Power To Less Than 50 0/.t" ,/"f Within 1 Hour a. Within one hour, reduce r-eactor p less than 50O,{) using 3-0NOP-100, LOAD REDUCTION. vifhile contimrinq this procedure' -RO Step 9-Check The Following:

group step counters every 4 hours! , ,P!Y 'Nith Technical Specification Surveillances

4. 1.3. 1.1 and 4.1.3.6. Reactor Engineering of Dropped RCC ------------------.

NOTE I AifARGlf\l shall f)e v/ithin 'f h'ou( of a D.R-OPPED R-GC and e'le!j' I thereafter

_. 16

( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _3_ . Page of Event

Description:

Sequential drop of two control rods. Cmtrol Rod H8 will blow a stationary coil fuse dropping control rod H8. The crew will respond per }ONOP-028.3. The second rod drop H4 requires the RO to manually trip the unit. The react91'trjJ switches on the console and VPB fail revealing an A TWS conditrim./'/ ./ /.p' _:9":'" Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step 11 -Verify Shutdown Margin Adequate a. Check RCS boron concentration Greater than or equal to pre-event value OR Greater than the tv1ini Boron Versus ReS", Function of Bmnup' the Plant Curve Bo! Figure 5 b. Log SHUTDOWN U /C' <:'' PJ:D CONTROL ROD H4 eq;rod m'a,nual reactor trip revealing ATWS f \. .) "'\., to US the Dropped Control Rod H4 based upon the .d******"". )oJlowir1'§I"indi ations: \' \. IR'PI" i 4 indicating 0.0 '\,,{"

H4 roCfbottom light lit ylns to step 1 17 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _3_ Event

Description:

Sequential drop of two control rods. Control Rod H8 will blow a stationary coil fuse dropping control rod H8. The crew will respond per JONOP-028.3. The second rod drop H4 requires the RO to manually trip the unit. The react t' Time Position RO RO RO switches on the console and VPB fail revealing an A TWS condition. Applicant's Actions or B Check Number Of RCCs DROPPED -More Than One a. Check the following More than one rod bottom tight -OR More Ihan one rod position AT ZERO b. c. Go to 3-EOP-E-O, R Injection 4 for 3-EOP-E-O and EOP-FR-S. 1 actions be conducted on the transition 18 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _4_ Page _1_ of Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close on 8 e A requiring manual operation from VPB. US Directs response per 3-EOP-E-O RO Step 1 (lOA) -Verify Reactor Trip

Rod bottom lights -ON
Reactor trip and bypass bre
Rod position indicators -T
Neutron flux -DECREA Note: verifies reactor is not tripped RO Step 1 RNO -Manuall t """FtJN,c,IIO L TUS TREES . ..

RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION! ATWS, Step 1. erforms a and b subste s. e: Crew may perform and early action for step 7.a NRO todirect a trip of the reactor locally e: Adverse Containment conditions and SI may occur during 3-EOP-FR-S.1 response, crew should recognize both conditions as they occur 19 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:_1_ Event No.:_4_ Page of Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. Time Position US RO 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring mal).l!.l'aJ actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close A requiring manual operation from VPB. Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION Reps should not be tripped with reactor r ----------- _tf::::" ......:;.J_ --------1 NOLe: f+'" I ----;r--.f I Steps! nnei 2 are .,\\ -----_:_----_:- Step 1 (IOA)-Verify Reactor Trip .r've_. Perfor \,. ,tpllowing: "'" reactor. b. IF. 't

Rod bottom lights -0\ '\
Rea .... ytoFTr:rpatJd

\ ,/ \ t Y i/Ro.P'*'position 'nd\cators -A:r i" f"/ZERO I \ \ \ fl. !lE.cB .. trip, THEN ....* ,....\/ . . ensure***conftol rod insertion /ff" Man ua I . ** *. , .. i .. roasiltJnanual Failure to insert negative \'f ref(ttivity by driving rods in manual within one minute (u "f;?ne\Q1inute after they stop moving in automatic) to drive thf1 tor subcritical. FR-S.1, Task G ,jep\ Turbine Trip i f a. turbine stop valves-./ /CLOSED a. y/ 4' -"*",."i &""J Perform the following:

1) Manually trip the turbine. 2) IF turbine will NOT trip, THEN close main steam line isolation and bypass valves. 3) Go to Step 3. Note: critical task -(TG-WOG/PRA)

Failure to trip the Turbine prior to com letin FR-S.1, ste 2 20 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. Time Position Start BOP Time RO 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (S CA). Train A safety injection fails to automatical¥ actuate requiring actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to clos 0 requirin manual 0 eration from VPB. Applicant's n,r I--\ph b. Verify Moisture Separator

b. Steam Valves -CLOSED

MSR Main Steam Supply Stop MOVs
Reheater Timing Valves
MSR Purge Steam Valves d. Open Emergency Boration Valve, MOV-3-350 21 c. Align charging pump suction to the RWST as follows: 1) Hold closed LCV-3-115C control switch. 2) Direct an operator to open Breaker 30669 for LCV-3-115C. 3) WHEN 30669 is open, THEN release LCV-3-115C control switch. 4) Go to Step 4e. d. Perform the following:

1) Open Boric Acid To Blender, FCV-3-113A.

( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: _4_ Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-0 and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure.,"""", (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate l reg.t1fring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB..f" " Time Position Applicant's Actions or Be 2 . '. /' anual Emergency Valve, 3-356, is close Blender To FCV-3-113B. \\ ....* , .*..*.* ", *** %". '%%, %',6) Step 4e. xl" e. Open Charging Flow HCV-3-'t1 \/ ,/ .. \ ___ ,<' Afhctfging Isola\on,\ '% / / GY-3-310A-OPItN \ *. ' *. . *1:/-3-110 -GREf\;TEFn:kI.AN Open Loop C Charging Isolation, CV-3-310B . Start additional charging pumps AND align valves as necessary to establish emergency boration flow. .. i/****. ", 22 Perform the following:

a. Verify PRZ PORVs and block valves open. b. IF PRZ PORVs and block valves are NOT open, THEN open PRZ PORVs and block valves until PRZ pressure less than 2135 psig.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. Time Position 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring actuation. CV-627SB, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to closE?on,ltf1ase A requiring manual operation from VPB. CO ( Applicant's Actions or Beh BOP Step 6-Verify Containment Ventilation -ISOLATE .a. Verify Unit 3 containment purge exhaust and suppl fans -OFF b. Verify Containment Purge Exhaust Isolation valves -CLOSED '0 ';""%" ':'C'*:",,_ "'c,,,,,-,,,_ ny purge valve can OT be closed, THEN "",pull fuse(s) for any ope \, FJI,Jrge valve( s) from '\benic[1d VPB:

XG? for POV-3-2600 POV-3-2600 POV-3-2601 ff""'."".">>XLAG for POV-3-2601 CAUTION
XEQ for POV-3-2602
XLAH for POV-3-2603

c. IF neither valve can be closed, THEN locally close Containment Air Bleed to Purge Air Return Line Isolation, MPAS-3-00S.

If SI signal exists or occurs and the reactor is subcritical, proper safeguards alignment is required to be verified using Attachment 3 of 3-EOP-E-O, J REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, while continuing with this procedure. Note: CV-3-2819 and CV-3-2826 will be closed by the RO on VPB 23 / ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_4_ Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure/f' . /' (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actyafe Ge'quiring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, f;al'fs to'close on Time Position RO Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. Applicant's Actions or Beb Step 7 -Note: 7.a may have been perlel;m. </f' Check If The Following Trips Have <..... '\ a. Reactor trip a.',.ln .. MCC foft*l .. 1J\I (:f-" b. 24 '\'"

0' 3 3B Reactor Trip Break " .
Open Reactor Trip ss Break!?rs.\"!

"'\,/1' .. G set generator Ii() rs.

Open NB MG set motor input Breakers.

Locally trip turbine at turBine front standard. Perform the following:

1) Manually open breakers.

2) IF breakers do NOT open THEN actuate Emergency Gen Bkr Trip Switch for the affected breaker(s).

3) IF breaker position indication is NOT availaBle AND turbine speed is NOT decreasing, THEN direct Field Operator to perform the following:

a) Obtain key 17 from the Shift Manager key locker. b) Locally trip Mid and East GCBs from the switchyard .

8W33
8W68 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _4_

Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBlO Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring m ua actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close P se A manual 0 eration from VPB. Time Position Applicant's ,...-------------- I NOTE I W,"nm adverse containment conditiOns exist .. Gamma .... _----------- RO Step 8-Power range chann a. THAN 5% b. ction taken to trip reactor, transition tostep 17 may be CAUTION T I vel decreases to less than 10%, maJreup water sources for CST will be s ry to mailllain secondary heat sink. 25 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _4_ Page -.JL of Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. ime 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (S CA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring nu actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to clos ase A requiring manual operation from VPB. Position Applicant's Actions or BOP Step 9 Monitor S/G Levels a. Narrow range level in at lea one S/G-w NOT greater an gpm, THEN ma ally start pumps align valves to establish greater than 750 gpm. 3) Maintain total feedwater flow greater than 750 gpm until narrow range level gre?ter than 6% [32%] in at least one S/G. No e: op should stop feeding 5Gs to keep in band, may require 51 reset and securing one pump. Verify All Dilution ISOLATED a. Check FR-3-113 -NO PRIMARY WATER FLOW 26 a. Perform the following:

1) Close Demin Water To Blender, FCV-3-114A.

( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: 4 Page.JL of Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. Time Position RO 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (S,CA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring" actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to clos requiring manual operation from VPB. Step 11 Applicant's Actions or Behavior 2) valy:*s:i' To Chemical f\*itJition Tan -359A ,-f----(/ ",,: __ ,-, i\ .* P'ri(l1ary \fI£afer. om Chemical \\Adlii.!i9P1/T 3-272 "'\. ,\,,,,<. -,c*

MalQual Valve, 3-353A Check For Uncontrolled RCS"CoCllddwQ

.... .. ***'a:**'GtQP any controlled '\\ .,/"'-< ,,-j" , rn,*'oldown. res -'Q E'q,F,<*AS IN G ,f'( AN NTROL[}E\ D\fVlANNER

b. Go to Step 15. * ':R \."\

An Y.fi>If3 I N G .I\NUNGQ ... NTR o LI]::Ji'MAN N ER . / -CLOSED Faulted S/G(s) a. Check pressures in all S/Gs
ANY S/G PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR Manually close valves. a. Go to Step 15.
ANY S/G COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED Note: RNO transitions to step 15 27

( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _4_ Page --.1Q.. of Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the A TWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SB Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring m actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close ime Position RO requiring manual operation from VPB.

These cautions apply to AFW pump operation II
If two AFW pumps are operating on a sing trai shut down within olle hour of the iflitial sta Step 15 FEEDWATER SYSTEM, Subsection 6.2. 28 F core . temperatures greater than 1200°F and increasing, THEN go to SACRG-1, SEVERE ACCIDENT CONTROL ROOM GUIDELINE INITIAL RESPONSE, Ste 1. Perform the following:

1) Continue to borate. 2) IF boration NOT available, THEN allow RCS to heat up. 3) Perform actions of other Function Restoration Procedures in effect which do NOT cool down or otherwise add positive reactivity to the core. 4) Return to Step 4.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring r;r:rany,a1 actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to A requiring manual operation from VPB.,'/(\ Time Position US BOP .... /' Applicant's Actions or ", Borariofl should continue during sU/Jseque margin is obtained. Step 17 -Return to procedure and ste Note: Transition is made back to J.EO Step 2 Verify Turbine Trf'R a. All turbine stop a control valves -. ,ter Timing Valves Steam Valves jt f Check Mid and East GCBs -OPEN (Normally 30 second delay) 29 b. Manually close valves. IF any valve can NOT be closed, THEN close main steamline isolation and bypass valves. c. Manually open breakers. IF breakers do NOT open, THEN actuate EMERGENCY GEN. BKR. TRIP SWITCH for the affected breaker(s). Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-F RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SB A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring man I Time Position BOP CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close on Ph manual operation from VPB. Step 3 Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Bu Check the 3A and 3B 4 KV a. buses-MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED 30 b. Attempt to emergency start the de-energized Unit 3 bus diesel generator

c. Perform the following:

1) IF lockout of 3D 4 KV bus NOT present, THEN perform the following:

a) Verify 3C CCW pump -BREAKER OPEN. b) Verify 3C ICW pump -BREAKER OPEN. c) Operate bus supply breakers to restore power. Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Page of -.lQ... Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the A TWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. Time Position RO BOP 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (S!3r.'O,CA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to ciosl?l1ase A requiring manual operation from VPB. " ( =:;==="'7======l1 Step 4 Applicant's Actions or Beha Check If SI Is Actuated

SI Annunciators

-ANY CJf.J .. / ( OR <: -----1 :" Complete The Prompt This Procedure '\___ .f:) .. _-.-."",,,,,'" Note: attachment 3 while the RO continws in procedure. ,}<lo vtI,,,,,thfl.t/OAs., are 3C RCP should be secured, CV3-303C closed, and in'rpafTf,{al and closed. ,./'Attathment 3 Ii \" ed ?1ci to a e23 of event 4 to continue with "\c" \\, BOP "\ rocedure "', "''\ 1;' Check The Load Centers 0 if issociated With " ' """'" ,i/ /if "The Energized 4 KV Buses -"",j' ENERGIZED '\\"'V'\/'

3A LC
3B LC
3C LC
3D LC
3H LC 31 Close the Load Center supply breakers.

( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _4_ Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close.A5,r; 811ase A requiring manual operation from VPB./p' <: ,f! Time Position Applicant's Actions or BehaviQr"" \, BOP Step 2. Check If Main Steam lines Should B a. Check main steam line isolation and bypass valve ANY OPEN b. Check if either main steam isolation actuated

High steam low S/G press\lr OR low Tavg OR \ Verify n;t1ai steam and bt!Sa valves -CC'OS'F!D

_f h{;.f/ Ste¢'O\. .",f "X\ Isolation Pladl3\m;;lrj feedwater pump switches/in STOP IFeedwater control valves -*{CLOSED 11./ Feedwater bypass _'c. CLOSED .j' Close feedwater isolation "\.

d. MOVs Verify standby feedwater

e. pumps -OFF 32 b. c. d. e. c. Push manual Steam line Isolation push buttons on VPB OR manually close valves. Manually close valves. Manually close valves. Locally close valves. IF standby feedwater is aligned to Unit 3, THEN stop standby feedwater pump(s).

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Page.-1.§.. of Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. Time Position 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (S CA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to clos re manual operation from VPB. Applicant's Actions or B BOP Step 4. Verify Proper ICW System Operatio Verify ICW pumps -AT a. LEAST TWO RUNNING b. Verify ICW to T8 Exchanger -I c. 3-50-339 for POV-3-* 4883 IF both ICW headers are intact, THEN direct operator to tie headers to ether. Perform the following:

a. 1) Start or stop CCW pumps as necessary to establish ONLY ONE RUNNING CCW PUMP. 2) Verify Emergency Containment Coolers -ONLY TWO RUNNING 3) Go to Step 5c. b. CCW pumps -ONLY TWO b. Start or stop CCW pumps as RUNNING necessary to establish ONLY TWO RUNNING CCW PUMPS. 33 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Page -.1§... of Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. Time Position BOP 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SI3f:JSlCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring rpehypl'l actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to A requiring manual operation from VPB. .. ( c. ====11 Applicant's Actions or Bph::l\lio CCW headers -TIED TOGETHER c. '0 .ifltaot':/THEN direct a field" f"; oloe'rator to tie the headers*' <: .. J,/({ *.* together.

d. RCP Thermal Barrier CCW "ct *"** .. ,IF con, p nt isolation Outlet, MOV-3-626

- B .. XOT actuated AND CCVv,,Vcfdiation levels are fA,%. .. i AND RCP number l'*""'" on'e .. \ temper§itur(;(. is less than ,,*,,*** *.. manually \ '\ .""., .* .!Y10\;l£3-626. IF j$ ****s".Q26 qa-n NOT be manually fl' opened, THEN direct operator to open MOV-3-62610call . Manually start or stop __ #1'" .,"'''',:::".:,::"""",,:.:,:: .

a. kemergency conta"tn'ment

a. emergency containment coolers to establish

-ONLY ONLY TWO RUNNING \\, .,\,. \\. --'<<:-.:;,.;.>>\ "<:'Y';"c containment fans -',,;t:(f LEAST TWO . erify 81 Pump Operation At least two high head pumps a. . running b. Both RHR pumps running 34 TWO RUNNING. b. Manually start emergency containment filter fans. Manually start high-head

a. pump(s). b. Manually start RHR

( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Page --.1L of Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA). Time Position BOP BOP Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring man actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close on"Jz requiring manual operation from VPB. Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step 8. Verify SI Flow a. RCS pressure -LESS THAN 1600 PSIG[2000 PSIG] a.,//;y'o Step 9. f.f,ff /F f' ,,' b. High-head SI pump flow indicator -CHECK FOR FLOW <no Manual pumps AND ./\., \ s to establish an """ in]'*!cti9 flowpath. " < c. RCS pressure - 250 PSIG[650 PS1;G] ****/.4. C. G'Q. to / tep 9. d. RHR pump flow -CHECK FOR FLOW\ -, ">=", Note:"yBC?,e.!1,ete'rf(!ines R " jP// qireC;ts'l:Q st 9. ' f/S*Ir;P,/',.J <:. Realign §J/Sy t8m .. /"" .\ .... .. 8>\ head., . .8'1 pumps -8:,,/,fperform the following: U N N I NG """\. -, ,. 1) Operate Unit 3 and Unit 4 head SI pumps to establish injection to Unit 3 from two head SI pumps. 2) Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to align Unit 4 high-head SI pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using ATTACHMENT 1 of this procedure.

3) Go to Step 10. b. Stop both Unit 4 high-head SI pumps AND place in standby Note: BOP should recognize A train SI failure if not already corrected and initiate train A SI aI/owing unit 4 pumps to be secured 35

( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _4_ Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure\. (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to aubmatically manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails 6 clese on Time Position BOP ,j BOP Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. >",",. Note: Step 1 0 is a critical step: (WaG) F . 0 close mntalhmel1t isolation valve(s) so that least 0 ation valve in . critical phase A penetration (tlo th exists for unisolated*. leakage from the RCS to c9,,(taIp*tTtent prior to the end of the tas . /' Step 1 O. Verify Containrl\eht*

. , .... perform Isolation

.. **** .... .. 'Mllf'H,'a., .... !I.y actJah.e ...... tainment Valve White Light.;; 0"*..",, '>;; .. VPB -ALL BRIGH\. '\1\ . '\ \. Coflt-a-lpment Isolation \ ',ytlase A valve is NOT closed, \ \. THEN manually close valve. IF \valve(s) can NOT be manually THEN manually or locally [Solate affected containment "'penetration . . ".,',\, "'Note: B .. OP's.hould identify CV-3-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation 't."" \\, and manually close valve on VPB \'0<\::., .,,:::> 1,1. SI Valve Amber Lights ,On VPB -ALL BRIGHT 12. Verify SI -RESET Step Manually align valves to establish proper SI alignment for an injection flowpath. Reset SI 13. Verif Containment Phase A -RESET Reset Phase A 36 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _4_ Page of Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-F Time Position BOP 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fals to automatically act e r: quiring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, f . s t close on Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. Step 14. Reestablish RCP Cooling a. Check RCPs -AT LEAST RUNNING b. Open CCW to normal containm cooler valves *

o to step 15. Stop all RCPs Reps all will be secureq if running AND
PR-3-6306B 37 a. Perform the following:

1) IF containment spray NOT initiated, THEN manually initiate containment spray. 2) Verify Containment Isolation Phase ACTUATED.

3) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B valve white lights on VPB -ALL BRIGHT.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:_1_ Event No.: _4_ Page of Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBL Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring an Position BOP BOP actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to clo on hase A requiring manual operation from VPB. Step 16. Verify Containment an a. Manually align equipment

b. for Control Room emergency recirculation.

uld be in service within 30 minutes of a valid SI signal. They should I anner to support decision-making related to hydrogen generation I I -------------------_. Step I e Hydrogen Monitors In Service Using -OP-094, CONTAINMENT POST ACCIDENT MONITORING SYSTEM Note: BOP will call NSO to ali n PAfM 18. Verify All Four RUNNING EMERGENCY START any available EDG NOT running. 38 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:_1_ Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure.", 'k. (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automaticallyactuat5ipfequi'ring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, <;105e on Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. w' . / Time Position BOP Applicant's Actions or Be Step ft'*; -'" 19. Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV B,vs'es./and Load Centers ,4 ,'0 a. Check the 3A, 3B and 3D 4 KV buses -ALL ENERGIZED 39 if' ,,#P ".)/\.,* <:"_ ".,,; Pelform te foJ.J6wing: '\',<..,//" 1)"'{'Qfornl(fhe Unit Supervisor th'al Atta.chment 3 is the exception of bus or , Supervisor not to energize the de-energized bus or buses, THEN go to Step 20. 3) IF the Unit Supervisor decides to energize 3A, 3B, or 3D bus, THEN perform the following: a) IF 3A 4 KV bus energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-0NOP-004.2, LOSS OF 3A 4KV BUS. b) IF 3B 4 KV bus energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.3, LOSS OF 3B 4KV BUS. c) IF 3D 4 KV bus energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.5, LOSS OF 3D 4KV BUS. ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR;&B,,1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failuref" . (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fSlifs to;:close on Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB./ "', Time Position BOP Applicant's Actions or Step 20. Notify The Unit Supervisor That T VERIFICATIONS Attachment I That Had To Be Taken Note: BOP informs US of completio and CV-3-6275B closure " ./ .... ".. ,. A SI actuation, Note: BOP should re;ceive'a ... tyrnover frotiJ*t,he*"R. .. O and continue in the EOP netwo'rk." ..... \., .. , <:: 40 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Page of Event Description The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBL9CA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to A requiring manual operation from VPB. ..,# .... J Time Position RO "?'?"=='<;;=====ll Applicant's Actions or -,,<;, Note: US and RO continue in 3-EOP-E-0 Step 6 T ing: .J'!" . 'a,,,, Manu.aIIY4.apen valves to AFW pumps ru*nq ... .. n .. b. IF an"I,\FW,.!?ump is tripped, I.HEN dfs(;>atc.q an operator the AFW tu(J)inelri,ps. ""-""" ,," c. IF require AFW AND only one AFW pump is available, THEN perform the following:

1) Verify all TRIPPED 2) Establish 270 gpm AFW flow to each unit. 3) Use a setpoint of 270 gpm for required AFW flow instead of 345 gpm specified in subsequent Steps and Procedures.

s were started in 3-EOP-FR-S.1 STEP 3 Verify AFW Valve Alignment-Manually align valves to PROPER EMERGENCY establish proper AFW ALIGNMENT ali nment. Note: Steps 6, 7, and 8 are critical steps: (WOG) Failure to establish minimum AFW flow before transitioning out of 60. (E-O, task F). 41 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_4_ Page 24 of Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR,;!,6)<1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure./," ..... . Time Position RO (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically manual CV-6275B, SG. B Blowdown isolation, !?ifs on Phase A requIring manual operation from VPB.'\. b. Maintain feed flow to S/G narrow range levels between 15%[32%] and 50%. 42 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ EventNo.:_4_ Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the A TWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-F Time Position RO RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (S 0 ). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requirin m ual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to cl e Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. Step 9 Check RCP Seal Cooling a. Check all RCP thermal barrier alarms-OFF

A 1/1, RCP THER COOLING WAT
A 1/2, RCP TH COOLING WATE efer to ATTACHMENT 2 for component KW load rating Start one charging pump at minimum speed for seal injection

g. Adjust Charging Flow To Regen Heat Exchanger, HCV-3-121, to maintain ro er seal in'ection flow Note: Ste 9.b transitions to ste 10 43 c. Go to Step 10. d. Reset SI.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ 30 Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the A TWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fals to automatically act e r Ime Position RO manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, f . s t Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. Step 10 Maintain RCS Cold Leg Temperature STABLE AT OR TRENDI

TO 54rF IF ANY RCP RUNNING LESS THAN STABLE IF N
RUNNING 'mit tal feed flow to 3 m until narrow ge level greater an 6%[32%] in at least one S/G. 3) IF cooldown is due to excessive steam flow, THEN close main steam line isolation and bypass valves. b. IF temperature greater than 547°F AND' increasing, THEN perform the following:
Dump steam to condenser.

OR

Dump steam using S/G steam dump to atmos here valves. Note: RCS continues to Coo/down due to S/ flow 44 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _4_ Page ...1L of Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the A TWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-F 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically act manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, f s t Time Position RO Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. Step 11 Check PRZ PORVs, Spray Valves And Excess Letdown Isolated a. PORVs -CLOSED a. c. Auxiliary Spray Valve, CV-3-311 -CLOSED 45 Mo' Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-0, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES. 2) Go to 3-EOP-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1. IF PRZ pressure less than 2260 psig, THEN manually close b. valves. IF valve(s) can NOT be closed, THEN stop RCP(s) as necessary to stop spray flow. c. Manually close auxiliary spray valve. IF auxiliary spray valve can NOT be closed, THEN close Charging Flow to Regen Heat Exchanger, HCV-3-121. ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-F Time Position RO 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically act te qUlnng manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, f s t close on Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. d. Excess letdown isolation valves -CLOSED CV-3-387, Excess Letdown Isolation

Valve From Cold Leg To Excess Le Heat Excha
HCV-3-137, c Letdown Flow Controller

a. Go to Step 13. b. Go to Step 13. ead SI Pump -AT LEAST ONE c. Go to Step R NG AND FLOWPATH 13. VERIFIED : Reps rna be secured based on subcoolin 46

( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_4_ Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically ¢quiring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, ta:close on Time Position RO Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. ,."/""\.,\ .. " Applicant's Actions or Step 13 Check If S/Gs Are Faulted J,4'" // a. Check pressures in all SGs'/ ff/' ;:ii/Go to Step "'... ,., / ,/ f 14:

ANY SG PRESSURE IN AN MANl;JER

.. perfsro::!".:he fo II OWj2 ' 1T*Mo.nitdt Critical $af [ CRI1\I.C STATUS ..I / .. '\\-."\\,., Functions using SAFETY REES \\\," to f'3-E*Ofl .. _ ... .,.,.,\,., '\Y'" '\" '. .i/* GE'M"ERAT.QR IS. TI ON, Ste " >i.i/* * .. *... *.. f """ .. : RNO sends you to step 14 "'\ la. Check levels in all S/Gs and secondary radiation levels:

ANY SG LEVEL INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR
Condenser air ejector radiation, R-15 -HIGHER THAN NORMAL OR
SG blowdown radiation, R-19-HIGHER THAN NORMAL 47 a. Go to Step 15.

( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_4_ Event

Description:

The crew will respond to the A TWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR Time Position RO 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actv9,; quiring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, t9l'rls ta/Close on Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. ..., Applicant's Actions or OR

ERDADS SG or seconc;;ia'rYJ;adiation readings -HIGHER 1",\,< \\., OR
Local steamline radiation

-"'Pi,IGH THAN N9FZ L \, b. Perform the foli"lD 1) Monitor {ety i'Rg",3-E OP-F-O, TREES t,fiii '0"'/ GENERATOR

R I PTURE, f '\ .Containment radiation

-'N,PRMAL Perform the following: ", pressure -NORMAL 1. Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-0, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES. Containment sump NORMAL

LI-3-630BA
LI-3-630BB

2. Go to 3-EOP-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1. Note: RNO transitions to 3-EOP-E-1 Loss of reactor or secondary coolant. A crew brief should be conducted at the transition 48 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_5_ Page _1_ of J1L Event

Description:

The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST L Time Position All Cooldown and Depressurization. Applicant's Actions or Behavi r-----------NOTE --Foldout page IS required to be monitored mm'lJrrnnm

1. ADVERSE CQNIAINMEXI CQNDITIQN:S

2. 3. If eilr!l!f" of ihe ccndicons

!iSled be!ow occurs. Con"linment ilI1:m::Ispl"lE're !e!l1perature

2. 18[1';; W. Conlarnnent

2. 1.3;.: if} PJhr ccmainment paran"1!?\.ers crop below the ilIboYe !". oort!ainmen!

doserooe has not exceeded RECIRCULATION

lytlE 8:1 QCKAGE If RHR Il'Jfl1P !low AND aMpS beOO'l"le.

erratic OR abnormally low after fi;()\rtutaba, has been e.stablishlro. to

1. lOSS OF mERGENCY COOLANT REClRGULA Step 1. CST MAKEUP WATER CRlIER!I\*

If CST level decreases 10 *ss ihan HJ%. JlifI'1 add miilkeup to csr 3--Cf'.{l18.

t. Condensaie SiOraqe Tank. 9. LOSS OF tlFF5tTE POWER OR 5! ON O1l!ER UNIT If 81 has been aJ:ill. eitl"\E'f ofl'site power is Iosi.!JR 51 on lhe olher unit. JlifI'1 reS!ore safequaro-s ID required cormgurZllion.

Rel'Ei to ATTACHMENT 3 fores'SenliaJ Ioa!is. 49 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:_1_ Event No.:_5_ Page of--.1JL Event

Description:

The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3-EOP-E-1 Loss Time Position RO BOP Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST Cooldown and Depressurization. Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step Step -,," (*8.1 ( Monitor Conditions To Determine If Should Be Stopped a. RCPs -ANY RUNNING b. High-head SI pumps -AT LEA RUNNING l Checlypr {{.'c,.; **.** "'.;,.;, *** ,

t)J6 UR ... "

L REAS I N G"lf'I.te*At<J* ()NCONTROLLED M\ NER \'%\ COMPLETELY SURIZED 50 Go to Step 2. Go to Step 2. Go to Step 2. Go to Step 2. a. IF any SIG is faulted AND that SIG has NOT previously been isolated, THEN go to 3-EOP-E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1. a. Maintain total feed flow greater than 345 gpm until narrow range level greater than 6%[32%] in at least one S/G. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_5_ Page of-.JJL Event

Description:

The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3-EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LOC Time Position BOP Cooldown and Depressurization. Step Applicant's Actions or Behavior c. Narrow range level -LESS THAN 50% 4 Monitor Secondary R a. d. Go to 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Ste 1. CAUTION PRZ PORV opens because of high PRZ pressure, it is required to be verified or isolated after pressure decreases to less than the PORV setpoint. 51 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_5_ Page of Event

Description:

The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3-EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LO Time Position RO RO RO Cooldown and Depressurization. Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step 5 Check PRZ PORVs AND Block Valves a. Power to block valves -AVAILABLE

b. PORVs -CLOSED c. Block valves -AT L OPEN "\ ...*. , .. '. S 'x, **"**"**t e p\ '\"

.'\:\, 8<';./ Ai r To Cpntainment\ .* "Verify Air qontainment Isolation, CV-3-4803 -OPEN j "Verify instrument air pressure, PI-3-1444 -GREATER THAN 95 PSIG 52 RestoreltQwer to block valves .. /. i"--/ F".I?Rz: ..... p*ressure less than THEN *"ma:Qually close PORVs. IF ... lve can NOT be manually clos6<itsE;ltpck valve. ock valve .p .. **C;'.*"'", .. it was closed to i;6!f3te an open PORV. Phase A and Phase B b. Restore instrument air pressure using O-ONOP-013, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR, while continuing with this procedure. ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:_1_ Event No.:_5_ Page of Event

Description:

The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3EOP-E-1 Loss 9f\", Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LO Time Position BOP RO Cooldown and Depressurization. Step 9 Step Applicant's Actions or Behavi Check Power Supply To All Charging Pumps -ALIGNED TO OFFSITE POWER capacity '\ a<;lequ,Fi'fe to run three chargirt IF adequate diesel g.a'pacity is rCiEN A TT ACH M ENT 3,{or cOrY].ponent KW load ratln " 10 Check \ .gharging A .. Attachment 4 ON*I::\.RUNNING (',if ",f"" establish charging. ",;'" '\,\ ,/f ':",_ '\, Adjt4st as neqss 'ry to estalljis!i'\

b. 9,esir r ing tc)

S .,." .....* ,/./ r,\, Adjust Charging Flow To Heat Exchanger, " *. HC\l-3-121, to maintain seal injection flow 53 c Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _5_ Page of Event

Description:

The crew responds to the small creak LOCA per 3-EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LO 'A Time Position RO Cooldown and Depressurization. Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATTACHMEHT 4 (Page 1 of 1) ESTABUSH CHARGiNG FLOW 1. Verify CCW ROIW Alarms To Rep Therm.a:I Barriers* OFF

A. 1;1, RC;P THERMAL BARR COOLING WA""ER Hi FLOW !W.
A 1,'2, Rep THER'MAL BARR COCt.ING ','ATER Hi TEMP !W.
A. 113, ReP THERMAL WA "fER LO FLO'i'll c, AdjuSl:

Flow To Regen Heat E)(chal1{jef, HCV-3-121. to maintalm proper seal injection fiml Notify The thln: SUpel'\'50r That The ESTABUS*I CHARGING FLOW Atiachment Complete If. pc!\'I'a" is l::lQI aVallable. II:W1 >;heci\ diesel capacity ade.quale ttl run <one chargil1{j PUI1ll. If dlesE" capacity is NOT THE.'NSheci non*essential bads. Refer to A 9'ACHMENT 3 lOr component KW load rating. a. !E offsiae power available, :wftI oiled<: diesel oapac1!y mquale 10 I'Iln addltlOnilii dl.arging pumps.., Note: RO starts A and/or B charging pump 54 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _5_ Page of Event

Description:

The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3-EOP-E-1 Lossof, Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LO A Time Position RO Cooldown and Depressurization. Step 11 a. b. Applicant's Actions or " Check If SI Should Be Terminated RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs -GREA TER,,/'.f A"/" "'8 . ./ 60 to Step 12. /' jf THAN 30°F[Refer to Foldout Page Item 3 Adverse Value] '/ \\/,l/f'",'f '\'S-:. condition THEN go to Secondary heat sink

Total S/Gs -GRE 345 GPM OR

/ y

Narro,,¥ range I \ el 19 t intact giG" GREtA ijER THAN\ 6 o/lff3 2J1'o ] \

-STABLE OR -GREATER THAN 17%[50%] Go to 3-EOP-ES-1.1, SI TERMINATION, Ste 1 55 '> S "'" '----"'._"':;: Try to stabilize ReS pressure with normal c. PRZ spray. Go to Step 12. 12 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _5_ Page of Event

Description:

The crew responds to the small break LOCA per SEOP-E-1 Lo of Time Position RO Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST C Cooldown and Depressurization. Applicant's Actions or Step 12 a. Containment spray pumps ANY RUNNING b. Check the folio

Emergency Filter Spray CLOSED lose Containment Spray Isolation valves
MOV-3-880A
MOV-3-880B CAUTION High-Head 51 ffow and ReS StJlbcooting are required roo be monitored.

If Head Sf Row or RCS Subcool'ing in <t11 l.mconrTolled .fMl1fl\e'l; the RHR pumps musr be manually resrarred wsupp}y wwterro me ReS. 56 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_5_ Page of Event

Description:

The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST Time Position RO BOP BOP Cooldown and Depressurization. ,,/ Applicant's Actions or Beha Step 13 Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped a. Check RCS pressure -GREATER THAN 250 [650 PSIG] b. Check RHR flow -LESS THAN 1000 gpm .j;'f! c. Verify SI -RB,S ' \ ,-, .... , .. " 14 Check RCS f>.nd S/G Pre * 'J -..... /' -",;/'" Ii '\., * ",. S1'A§,LE.Q.R INCRB;t'1: '\ \. 'vi "" .,/' """ '\

Ct.feck RCS pressure -res \ "\,

OR DECREASING , '\,\' £I' IF greater ",i' THEN g9'{o 15. ', .. /f'/* .. Observe NOTE prior to Step 1 AND return to Step 1. /Yot'e,,: RC Squre should be stable 1$ Diesel Generators l lShould Be Stopped a. Check the A and B 4KV -l' sF buses -ENERGIZED BY ,,;, OFFSITE POWER 57 a. Perform the following:

1) Direct System Dispatcher to restore offsite power to Unit 3 startup transformer AND 3C transformer.

( c Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_5_ Page --.1Q.. of Event

Description:

The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3-EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST La A II -ri ..... e Position Cooldown and Depressurization.

b. Stop any unloaded diesel generator and place in standby using 3/4-0P-023, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

3) IF neither computer room chiller is running, THEN perform the following:

Refer to ATTACHMENT 3 for component KW load rating. b) Start one train of chilled water. 4) Continue with Step 15b. Note: EDGs are secure per 3-0P-023 see next page 58 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _5_ Page --.11. of -.1lL Event

Description:

The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LO Time Position BOP Cooldown and Depressurization. Applicant's Actions or Behavior 3-0P-023 6.1.2 Procedure Steps 3. 1. Direct an operator to go to 3 Control Panel 3C 13A. a. Establish communication the Unit 3 Diesel Generator Diesel Generator Normal StoplNormal Itch in the NORMAL STOP position (spring return to normal). a. Verify the DG3B Engine Idling AMBER light is ON. b. As 3B Diesel Generator decelerates, verify the DG3B Ready to Start RED light energizes. 59 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: _5_ Page of JlL Event

Description:

The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3-EOP-E-1 Loss"lPf" Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST Lqei\ /) Cooldown and Depressurization. ,/l/'//J/ Time ,0/ Position Applicant's Actions or BehavioCfP/' RO \, '< Step 16 Verify Cold Leg Recirculation Capability recirculation ", a. Verify at least one RHR pump -AVAILABLE FOR RECIRCULATION Ity can NOT be go to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1, . / SS OF '. Sfet' 1 piyl",/,i . \, .. /\",)' ",,/0/ b. Locally unlock and close the f01\owinsyoreakers

30605

""\\\1',

30615 MO , '\,
30616 I,. "'>,v:>

21 fo r 11.",.,/ /,.f?

30'82, 6 fo r M dV -:t:89 /.l* . /" ..*. ".'., **f.. \, (. /1' J,e. Loc8,jly 4nlock the following breakers .//6/ ... /"

for MOV-\ \i" '. \',jl'/ 30 1.:z'otof'1'VlOf;J2A '\'1/,// ** 30731 for MOV-3-751 ',0732 for MOV-3-866A ally Verify Radiation Shield Doors -CLOSED

Containment spray pump room
Char in ump room . calls SNPO to verify doors closed 60 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_5_ Page of J1L Event

Description:

The crew responds to the S11all break LOCA per :>-EOP-E-1 Loss of Time Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LOC Cooldown and Depressurization. Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step 18 Initiate Evaluation Of Plant Status a. Check auxiliary building radiation -NORMAL 1) Check plant vent process monitor, R-14 "', 2) Check auxiliary building area radiation monitors 3) Check spent fuel p,ifS"Ftlf:-;JG-4 " , monitor"!." "t' .* , \ i" 4) Direct H.P. to th'Ep for abnormal radiation) "< * ... .. rOOm\i'i/'" "\'" -'c. __ /_:,Y 0 n rQ;? m /.1:5< ,£.er1f y nt ,f" ,rtlonitors -IN'S RVICE \ \ 1/t'-,.-""",,;)'" '\ \ '\; / ,; i.,,\ Sclt)p,ij.rig Q,f.th'e"RC.S / J core

-OPERATING

.

injection pumps pump's'

i W}liary feedwater system ,.ntainment spray system ,.Emergency diesel generators fuel Ji supply and starting air supply
ICW system
CCW system
Emergency containment coolers
Emergency containment filters 61 b. to identify AND S,e leakage.

auxiliary builCtiQg ra)diation is due' a sig£J.if(cant loss of r coolant outside inment, THEN go to 3-EOP-ECA-1.2, LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, Step 1. Perform the following:

1) Verify PASS system has been aligned using 3-OP-094, CONTAINMENT POST ACCIDENT MONITORING SYSTEM. 2) Direct Chemistry to obtain grab samples locally. components

.. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_5_ Page of-.11L Event

Description:

The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LO Time Position RO US Cooldown and Depressurization. Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step 19 Check If RCS Cooldown And Depressurization Is Required a. RCS pressure -GREATER THAN 250 PSIG[650 PSIG] ESSURIZATION, Step 1. crew brief should be conducted on the transition CAUTIONS .. If WST level decreases to less than 155,000 gallons, the SI System is required to be aligned for cold leg recirculation using 3-eOP-eS-1.3, TRANSFeR TO C LD LeG ReCIRCULA TlON. " High*Head SI flow and RCS Subcooling are required to be monitored. If either High*Head SI flow increases or RCS Sub cooling decreases in an uncontrolled manner, the RHR pumps must be manually restarted to supply water to the RCS. .. CCW System load requirements of 3*0P*030, COMPONeNT COOLING WA TeR SYSTeM, SHALL NOT be exceeded. 62 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_5_ Event

Description:

The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3-EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LO II Tie Position US US Cooldown and Depressurization. r L 1. 2. 3. Applicant's Actions or Behavior

51 TERMtNATl(lN CRITERIA lEail conditions liMed be!QI'I' occur, 10:-;" a. RCS based on 00I"e exit i Cs -GR T b. Tetal flew to intact SGs -GREATER THAN :3 intact SIG -GREATER THAN 6%[32%; c. ReS pres'!i\M'e

-GREA" THAN lro::i PSIG[2000 pSi d. PRZ -GRE.A.T 1 ,B:ep 1: ed manner OR has col1'pieteiy d!epreli<surized" AND Ifuat E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOU\T1O'N, nefOR arI)1' 3rG radiation, THEN manually NERATOR TUBE RiJPTURE. Step L Subw!t;:alit;: foIUClaM pm't*r -GREATER THAN 5% Core Cooling: Core exit TCs -GREATER THAN 1200'f . Heal Sink: Nam:rli range !;weI inil'!I BIGs -LESS THAN AND total bI-LESS THAN 345 GPM * -Inlegrity: Cold leg der.rease -GREATER 100"F IN LAST 00 MINUTES AND any RCS roldi leg temperature -HAS BEI=...N LESS THAN 200°F e. Containment C;:;n;!ainment pre55UrI: -GREATER TH.;/l.N 55 PSIG IIDVER5E CONTAliffMEWf CONDITIONS Adverse oorl!ainMent oonditoos are cleifinedi as eik ill oorl!ainmenl al:tnosphere greater than Dr equal 10 180'F OR cor1:alnrneni radiaticm levels greater iIlan cr eql.Mlii to 1.3)(10" R,'hr. iIlE<Se wnd,b:ins the !>e1poim values in bracO;els, are reqUIred 10 be used. !E oontainment ll!mperaiure. falls below iW'F, THEN normal setpo-nl varRS may be U54:cL !E ClOOrtllrnMent radlatcn ievel tails be\ow 1.;r1ot' Rlt.r AND esc siaff has determined t?W the doSE' to ron,awFnent is le<ss ti'2!n to Rads, THIEN l1erma se!;pOlrn values May be used. 63 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_5_ Page of Event

Description:

The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3EOP-E-1 Loss of Time Position RO BOP Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LOC Cooldown and Depressurization. Step 1 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped a. Check RHR pumps -ANY RUNNING Perform'the following: \Direct System Dispatcher to restore A"zfK\/'bu's'S*, *..***.. ... \/".Qffsite power to Unit 3 startup 64 transformer AND 3C transformer. WHEN offsite power has been restored to Unit 3 startup transformer OR 3C transformer, THEN restore offsite power to 4KV buses using 3-0NOP-004.1 , SYSTEM RESTORATION FOLLOWING LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER. Check diesel capacity adequate to run charging pumps. IF adequate diesel capacity is NOT available, THEN shed non-essential loads. Refer to ATTACHMENT 2 for component KW load rating. d. Continue with Step 3. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _5_ Page -1L of Event

Description:

The crew responds to the small break LOCAper 3-EOP-E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LOCA II -rirYIe Position RO Cooldown and Depressurization. Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step 3 Verify PRZ Backup Group Heater Lockouts -RESET a. Verify the A 4KV ENERGIZED

b. Verify SI -RESET c. Place group A PRZ Backup Group Heater control switch in OFF "'" d. Direct operato 0 P9't"f<il((!:

the following , '" heck the A and B 4KV bus -BOTH ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER 65 e. Perform the following:

f. 1) Place group B PRZ Backup Group Heater control switch in OFF. 2) Direct operator to perform the following:

a) Obtain key 29 from Shift Manager key locker. b) Proceed to 3D Load Center Room. c) Place PRZ Backup Heater 3B Key Switch to EMERGENCY. Check diesel capacity adequate to energize group A and B PRZ heaters (450 KW ( Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _5_ Page of Event

Description:

The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3EOP-E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior f Note: Following direction to the NSO to reset inform the crew you now have the shift, rflmCjin' in pI not to discuss the scenario. 66 NRC XXIV NRC SEN 1 ---OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO: Field Supv.: Outside SNPO: Admin RCO: ANPO: Unit 3 Unit Supv.: RCO: NPO: Status Unit 3 Mode: 1 Power: 60 MWe: 420 Gross Leakrate: .02 RCS Boron Cone: 794 ) erational Concerns: U3 Antici Results of Off oin Focus Area: I Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 60 % Gross: .02 gpm A 6615921'i\ MWe: 420 Unidentified .01 gpm B Tavg: 561.5°F Charging Pps: .01 gpm C RCS Pressure: 2251 psig RCS Boron Cone: 794 ppm Abnormal Annunciators: Annunciator: //// Comp Actions: Annunciator: ,/p// ** i,//F.,,,,,,\ .. ,,::> Comp Actions: Annunciator: ",,\,,\..\,\\, .f' ... /f' .. ///./ ...*. Comp Actions: Annunciator:

\".'v/

Comp Actions: Annunciator: .:;:'f .. '."' .... ". ",.\".\, .. \\ ... , Comp Actions: Annunciator: '\.,\ ... \\.\' .. ' ... ".'.' ... "".:;'. .... ' ... , .. ... " ..... \\\, ... ","",>> Comp Actions: Annunciator: \\ "'\""',4)' Comp Actions: Annunciator: /."/::::f J"'* \\\ ii) '\ \ Comp Actions: Annunciator: "pi' ///.l/l , ... ,.", .. ,", ......... Comp Actions: Annunciator: \*'\'i .* ".,.'." .*..*** ,' .. , .... ,"',.",/.f'* Comp Actions: ,/l'* ....* ,.,'.,.,' ""\' .. " 1.,\",. '\"\" Current t'pee Actiila Stlltemeil'l&: (Diles Not .Include "For Traekin. Only Items" nco' "\ \ Reaso . Entry Da . T.S.A.S I . 1 Reason: Entry Date: " T.S.A.S / Component, Reason : "\, Entry Date: T.S.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: T.S.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: T.S.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: Unit 3 Status erator Work Around Status: ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Facility: Turkey Point Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 2009-301 Examiners: Candidates: NEW US RO Initial Conditions: Mode 1,50% MOL. 3C charging pump out of service due to packing Turnover: Equipment OOS: 3C charging pump out of service due to packi Event No. 2 3 TCE6DS1C=O TFB1LTLV=T TFKCSMB = T ,. __ ._,- ";, service in 14 hours. Thunder storms are in the area. Maintain 50% Online risk -green B train protected both units Event Type* (C)RO (C)BOP (T.S,C)SRO (I)RO (TS,I)SRO Unit experiences a loss of 3'P06 dQe to operator inadvertent operatiop.ofs{{l?ply breaker. control of plant and ente.rs to restQre pqwer L makeup. The crew .. 4/6 that directs them to OF BORON C*eJNTROL SYSTEM and Tech Spec .. and 3.'9, .2.Zt// Water (ICW) pump experiences a 'ed shaft. TDe crew responds per 3-0NOP-019 and 3-0P-,.,e1 tart the" q'PY pump. safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 ***. (R')R:6" /" require the Cre " to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. 3.7.1.1. The crew will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the T.S. call and use 0-ONOP-1 00 to reduce "'" *"r,}.Qwer to 30%. \ "/(I)Bbp ots,llSRO -}' if " **t.U*lr 5 to 10% power change, L T 488 S/G B controlling level channel fails high requiring manual control of FC-488 S/G B feed regulating valve (FRV) per the prompt actions of annunciator alarm C 6/2, SG B LEVEL DEVIATION. The crew refers to 3-0NOP-049.1 Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels. 1 ( 6 TFP8SWYD =T TFQ5GAFS =T TFQ5B20A = T TFG1B86S = T TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description (M)ALL (C)BOP (C)BOP (C)SRO (C)SRO A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. The crew responds per 3-EOP-E-0 and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but its output breaker close requiring the crew to use the blackout tie. made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 following power restoration. (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor .. ,Fc.;!", Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #2 <\l;\" ... """",,:;} Event 1 -Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to opera, inacIvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and 3':';ONO,P::'b03.6 to restore power "... / Event 2 -LT-3-115 fails low initiating a crew responds to annunciator alarm A 4/6 that .. ,tQe*rh*"tQ .. ", ALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION ..... Tee c 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2. \ \. < -'<'c.' Event 3 -The 3B Intake Cooling Water (IC\/\() p\.lmp a"sn,eared shaft. The crew responds per 9 and th'e'stqpl'aby pump. Event 4 -OOS main and RV-1401 require the crew to reduce

% Jo T.S. 3.7.1.1. The crew will be given the OOS iQ,f6rrpaiion, asked .. ito yalidate the \.S: \call and use 0-ONOP-1 00 to reduce P ower'<tn

...... o. c' ,. ............. \, . '"::\: '\', *,'..../f.// .................. "c., ** ,.,,,. ,1/ Event 5 -After 5 to "hQ%fJowE?fchange, S/G B controlling level channel fails high #"," "retftiirl[lg ntrol of FC-488 S/G B feed regulating valve (FRV) per the prompt ./' " .* ac1i,Pns'**eiannl}lJc r alarm C 6/2, SG B LEVEL DEVIATION. The crew refers to 3-f/ ONa . or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels. \ nt 6 -A lightnin caus spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of \he*pwitchyard. The crew responds per 3-EOP-E-0 and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 ,.,.... 3A Generator (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG ',starts but its breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout tie. ade to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 following power restoration. 2 TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Scenario XXIV NRC 2 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-2 (50% MOL) Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIV _NRC_2.lsn Place simulator in run Start 38 charging pump and secure 3C charging pump "r Trigger lesson step: SETUP -3C Charging pump TAB1 POSM = n.t-\\J"LIU . pt" Place simulator in freeze. Place clearance info tag on 3C Charging Pump sta ",p01tQh ",",// Provide shift turnover checklists Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 .. on VPA and at the RCO desk to the Fill in blender & shutdown boron station. Data for each IC may be found in & Shut,O'}Jdelines*BGMJ1( in the simulator I/F. \-'\, 't 3 TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 1 -Loss of 3P06 Initiated immediately after shift turnover. Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters 3-0NOP-003.6 to restore power When directed -Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 -LOSS OF 3P06 (actuates After one minute call the control room and report the inadvertent opening of PO due to operator tripping and hitting the breaker. Respond as FSITO, acknowledge direction to perform attachment 1 Attachment 1 actions: Attachment 4 1. 2 minutes after direction to perform att EVENT 1 -STRIP 3P06. 2. After 4 minutes inform control room, energized.

3. Trigger lesson step EV RECLOSE3P06BRE K ... 'L, .........

KERS 1 THRU 14. VENT 1 -RECLOSE ed, Trigger lesson step, EVENT 1 -hen complete inform control room all on I hem verify Pressurizer PORVs are closed essurizer level control selector switch is in position 3. ter v 'fic 'on, Trigger lesson step, EVENT 1 -HOLD IN RELAY LC-4 CX. 0 control room relay LC-460CX is being held in. en ower i estored to 3P06 and direction given to release relays, inform co tr room relay has been released. 4 TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 2 -LT-3-11S FAIL LOW L T-3-115 fails low initiating a continuous automatic makeup. The crew responds to annunciator alarm A 4/6 that directs them to 3-0NOP-046.4, MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL SYSTEM and Tech Spec 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2. When directed -Trigger lesson step EVENT 2 -LT-3-115 FAIL LOW (ac = T) The Crew responds per 3-ARP097.CR Step 1.b.2. -Respond as SNPO; acknowledge direction to che the Charging Pump room. After 2-3 minutes rep CVCS VOLUME CONTROL TANK screen. 3-0NOP-046.4, MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONC Step 41 -Respond as responsible supervisor; ackno Step 42 -Respond as SM and ackn failure 5 L SYSTEM ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 3 -38 lew PUMP SHAFT SHEAR The 38 Intake Cooling Water (ICW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019 and 3-0P-019 to start the standby pump. Trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -38 ICW PUMP SHAFT SHEAR (actuates TFKCS The Crew responds per 3-0NOP-019 Intake Cooling Water Malfunction a,.Jl ARP 14/4 ARP -Respond as NSO to determine total lew flow Respond as ANPO to check requested pump for startin 5.2 ICvV Pump STart (Svstem ill Operation) ).2.1 IniTial Conditions

1. All applicable prerequisiTes as listed' At least one oTher IC\V Pump running. IT rhe ICW Pump reqlllrecl for operaTion That 11ltake bel)'. H:n(,' PrecFlutions'Ll

'.:.: Procedure Steps /""',." i. Inform rhe (f wlti;:h pl _ 0 be dlecked our " >>'<,;",%:, r --------

-'t ! Tile ",quore Alirs-Cklimef,' motor hilS 0/)"1. ori Ie-' U/J{.H:9t unci ,,:] IOHifH s{qntOloss \ I I L___ .:.. J I '-TO be sTflrtecl is open (mark the he IC\V Pump that has been checked out at VPA in the Control Room. The pump motor amp" decrease to less than 49 amps. discharge pressure of the pump started is between 11 psig and le8.c , Ilwn speC'iffe(i SilOUkl !love a PWO inlt/area iJut (Ioes not affect pump :iA am! 38 have packlilQ leaiwff lines O/JservalJle paci(lllQ /eokoff SI101I/(1 lev\! Pwnp 3C doe.:; not hDve i:1 packfnQ Jeakcitf line ::;hOilici i)8 at feast J 20 (Ipr)) OlJDervaiJie packmg fea/(off Chock IC\:I/ Pump seal p<lCking followtllg pump start S. \' enfy all log elltrie"pecifiod lJl Sub,eClioIl 2.:; haye been recorded.

9. Complete the QA Record Page for this subsection, 6 TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description ( 3-0NOP-019 Step 8b. Respond as NSO, Acknowledge direction to check TPCW supply header temperature, TI-3-1432 less than 110Fand trend. Report back temp. 89F and stable. ( 7

( TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 4 -RV-1400 and RV-1401 out of service OOS main steam code safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 require the crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with TS. 3.7.1.1. The crew will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the TS. call and use 0-ONOP-100 to reduce power to 30%. When directed call 4906, inform the control room that you are the Operations pM " er. Engineering has informed you that a review of the "as left" lift settings for steam code safety valves RV-1400 and RV-1401 are outside the 1 % tolerance of and are now OOS. You have validated their data and you want the crew to of Tech. Specs and reduce reactor power to 30% using 3-0NOP-100 as possible. ) "\\ //'\, ,.$'" \, If asked, the documented "as left" setting for RV-1400 is 1 'jg and RV-1401 is 113d\psi \\ 3-0NOP-100 Step 3 -Respond as system dispatcher; acknowledge TP' to 30%. , {t/ Step 7 -If call, respond as SM and acknqwled.ge request to ref'*lr td\Q-EPIP-201 01 and O-ADM-115 '. \", ',.\." '<-\, 8 TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 5 -L T-3-488 FAILS HIGH L T-3-488 S/G B controlling level channel fails high requiring manual control of FC-488 S/G B feed regulating valve (FRV) per the prompt actions of annunciator alarm C 6/2, SG B LEVEL DE VIA T/ON. The crew refers to 3-0NOP-049. 1 Deviation or Failure of Safety RelatC7cfc or Reactor Protection Channels. f/ When directed -Trigger lesson step EVENT 5 -LT-3-488 FAIL TFF1 MMABH = T),/l' f"" /:" '\\: '\>>. If a unit trip is required during response to L crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-O, continue at ',\. The Crew responds per 3-0NOP-049.1, Deviation or Faij Protection Channels. f j/ 9 ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 6 -Loss of all AC A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbinelreactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 38 EDG starts but its output breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout tie to power unit 3. /,fl\ Following 5-10% power reduction Trigger lesson step, EVENT 6 -LOSS OF TFP8SWYD == T, TF05GAFS == T, TF05B20A == T, TFG1 B86S == T) ,/ ",J _f'l ,f/" , # . ,l'"lf ,," \:\. -_L '\ Step 7.a -Respond as NSO, Acknowledge direction to locally After 2 minutes TRIGGER lesson step EVENT 6 -3A ED" CKOUT RESET.' or:): back lockout will not reset. '\, Step 9.d -Respond as NSO, Acknowledge direction y synchrop' B emergency "\v ,'\ diesel generator to 3B 4KV bus using EM.I2'R9. CY DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE.""", /,/.f ","'',/ , Ji a. after 10 minutes, notify step 14 and that the 3B EDG is running sat like permisi5'i'Qn fu,!ocally energize 3B 4KV bus. """ '%," b. following permission, A EDG LOCAL OPERATION. After 3 minut'es "i3AiiQG qi:/tput breaker will not close. .... -",.,., t /p _',c:"_ ** ,,,{p-/1' /" ";;;;":. It,, \%:f h' Step 11 -Respond as dire,tioQfto locally open breaker 30S06 on MCC 3D. Aft* tylinutes Sllep EVENT 6 -OPEN 30806 BREAKER. ) ./ \, \ Step 12.e -Re, s NSO; diree iOr1'\to locally open MOV-3-S43A or MOV After JjY'minutesiffl'ot,cl' ,eo to stop, TRIGGER lesson step EVENT 6 vyJJ1'en completed. '>, '"."f/' ""'",,/ as direction to locally close: Va Va C Seal Injection Manual Isolation Valve

MOV-3-381, RCP Seal Water Return And Excess Letdown Isolation Valve
MOV*3-626, RCP Seal Cooling Water Outlet Valve 10 TP-2009-301 Scenari*l

2 Event Descripti*ln Step 24 -ResP*lnd as NSO; ackn*lwledge directi*ln t*l reduce DC I*lading as using ATTACHMENT

3. 3-0NOP-04.2 J"\ Step 12 -ResP*lnd as unit 4 RO, c*lnfirm 4D 4KV bus P*lwered from 4B 4KV bus:.".4B bus is being P*lwered fr*lm unit 4 . ¥ J--,P-/' /f';/'" <"

Step 13 -ResP*lnd as unit 4 RO, ackn*lwledge request t*l place all equipment

ln 4B 4KV bus in *lff *lr pull t*l I*lck. Rep*lrt bac n*ln running safeguards equipment is in st*lP *lr pull t*l I*lck. Step 14.b -ResP*lnd as unit 4 RO, ackn*lwledge directi*ln

!"" TRIGGER less*ln step EVENT 6 -CLOSE 4A,,!)Q /' :(J Step 17 -ResP*lnd as NSO, ackn*lwledge directi*ln t*l 3A 4KV bus breakers. After 4 minutes rep*lrt no\ breakers. 3-EOP-ECA-O.2 (" "'\ 4AD07 breaker. After>45 ep*lrt 4AD07 breaker \. kertargets exist *ln n 3A 4KV bus \ Step 7 RNO a.2 -ResP*lnd as NSO, ackno\tVI8'c;J e tQ perf*lrm,flttachment 1 *lf 3-EOP-\,-\. " .---"-.. "'.-. --" ECA-O.2 t*l align unit 4 RWST t*l unit'O SI pu,rnp .....j \. f' "'" \ "0"''0,, ".,' ** ".j;';;?"',."" \. h 11 c l Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:..2.. Event No.: _1_ Page _1_ of JL Event

Description:

Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters 3-0NO -3.6 Time Position ROI BOP US to restore power Applicant's Actions or B Trigger lesson step, Event 1 -LOSS OF 3P Determines and reports loss of 3P06 ba

Loss of power to channel 1 i
S/G A FW control shift to ma
S/G C FW control in lockup * * *
pi 3P06 e open prior to ti1e {QSS of JPOO, B T or low pressurize.r pfeS$Uf'e. -----=_ ._,. ----,_,. -=_ --__ I NOTES I RED) channel indicffOOnlcontrols are 9ffected by failure of I Endcrsure 1 provides a listing of lost functions" mdlee/ions..

and I controls. I :--=----------,. -,. _ ... Check If A Rl1_tor Trip H.as Occurred Perform the f¢lk1WiI'1J: a, IF a reactor iiiI' is THEN 3-EOP-E:.a REACTOO TR!P OR SAFEW INJECTION. ViI1ile continuing this procedure.

b. IE reaCIonrip is.wn: required.

IW;!i Note: Crew should be able to control plant during restoration of power without the need to trip the unit. Foldout page directs restoration of ower. 1 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:_1_ Page L of JL Event

Description:

Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters 3-0NO -3.6 Time Position US BOP to restore power Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1. Dispab:.1h an operator to restol1e power ioJiPiJ6 using AIt 3. Jf. a ReaClor Trip has perfonn It; a. C,ose MOV-3--1407

b. CicseMOV-3-1408

b. ClO$e MO\J-3-14lJ9 . place ALL breakers to OFF. including mam panel powered by CS Inverter at 4P06A Vital Instrument AC Selector SWiTCh m [he m . . d by the CS Inve11er. noufy the Nuclear PlanT SuperVIsor.

CAUTION DO NOT proceed with this procedure if 4P06 is powered by the CS Inverter. IF 4P06 I, ::-lOT powered from CS Inverter. I!!!d! place SPARE lllverter CS ill service 10 ,upply 3P06 Viml Instrument AC BU$ load as follow,: a. At Vital Instrumem Panel 3P06A III the Cable Spreading Room, place Vital Ul,munellt AC Selector Switch 3POOA to the ALTERNATE stJPPLY STA ... 'lDBY STATIC INVERTER CS (AC LINE) position. 2 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _1 _ Page l of Event

Description:

Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters 3-0NOP:003.6 Time Position to restore power Applicant's Actions or Behav' ATTACHl\IE:\,T 1 (Page 2 of2) RESTORATTO:\' OF 3P06 VITAL INSTR If System Output Breaker, . CBS. overcurrent condition and the amps'~~I.t:ion. , :ptoom when aU breakers are closed. 3 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.:_1_ Page.£ of JL. Event~~

~~Description:~~
Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters 3-0NOP-003.6 Time Position to restore power Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATIACHIHE:\'T 4 (Page 1 of2) PRE&SL'1liZER LEYEL Al\'U PRESSURE (,ONTRO Pressurizer level s/Jould be monitored do during perfotmance of tire following steps to hearers or causing a hi level trip .. I I PCV-3-145 is in AUT loss of 3PfJ6 shooJd be 1... ______ _ 1. Perform the foHowing: 11 Le1d01NIl Fmm Regen Heat Exchanger Isolation C\'-3-204 High Pressure Letdown Isolation From Loop B Cold Leg. LCV-3-460 orifice Isolation valve to e;t.abhsh desired flow. Comply with the 6-houf Acnon b of Techll1cal Specification 3 A.3. Presstlnzer. IS NOT increasing wllh heaters energized. proce'l"d 10 Rack 20 front ve dle power fuse from the front ofPC-444 C&D to dose the Spray Valve};, 4 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:_1_ Page of l Event
~~Description:~~
Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters 3-0NOP-003.6 Time Position to restore power Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATTACHMENT 4 {Page 2 of2) 3. !!: the above preferred method of energIzing JYfoceed as follows: a. b. 5 . valves were removed in Section L Step 2. THEN PC-444D in Rack 20. -.2, PRESSURIZER SYSTa1. Perform the foRowing:
a. 1£ ReS solid, THEN petioml the foi!O'Mng 10 prevent Rep damage 8!::!Q. mainl<ilin RCS pressure:

1) Stop AU Reps 2) Stop and start charging pumps as necessary to maintain Res pressure.

b. 1£ RHR coolIng is in service, AND . MOV-3-750 is closed or stroking closed, l.I;;iD:!
~~stop the oper<ilting RHR pump(s} AND go to 3-0NOP-050, LOSS OF RHR, while contiflUing with this procedure.~~
~~c. IF OMS is in LOW PRESSURE OPS AND PORV-3-456 is required to be open for pressure contrrn, THEN manual action shal! I}e taken to control RCS pressure.~~
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 1 Page of L Event~~
~~Description:~~
Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters 3-0NOP-p03.6 Time Position RO RO to restore power 3 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Control Pressurizer Pressure As Follows: a. Reduce chargwl<J fl.oW to mirTmum required to maintain Rep seal Injedron using the 38 OR 3C charging pumps in MANUAL sp**d control b. Chec.k Pressurizer PORVs -CLOSED r-'--------- I . I Excess Letdown. I ill Verny Dr.,erl to V'iDS, C'/-3-.38'3. is aligned to the VeT (switch to NORMAL) 5) Slowly open Excess Letdow'fl Flow Control Valve, HCV-3-137. (,) CbE.e Excess Letdown Flow Control Valve .. I-1CV-3-137. T) Open Excess L TON Stop \/,,1',18, eV-3-3B7 8) Open Excess L TON Flow Contro!i-er. HCV-3-137 AND adjust flow to control Pres.surizer Level 6 . less than selpcint PORVs. IF anv s hiockvaive. --. ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-..L Event No.: _1 _ Page L of JL Event
~~Description:~~
~~Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters to restore power ,.f?, Time Position BOP~~
Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTIONS Reducing feed flow to less thall steam flow by 6 reactor trip due to low level trip logic on Channell f Steam Generator JA level controls are in JA FW Bypass Valve fails closed.. .. '*,*,*/* 3A Steam Generator Level Recorrier is SteallJ Generator 3C level controls are in Main Generator load should /)e maintained as §table Control Valves are res tqyefNq, Auromatic control, . "" "-.. _---=----'; ..

~~., I I L "NOTE/" "'''~~

-. ",."-_.",,,-.--;;;.,---- -:\-:;::.""'-' He. ,Jti/'-.:; .... ---, "" of The Following Plant Parameters -1£ any reactor trip SBtPOlrJ\ is approached or exceeded, THEN manually trip the reactor 8!iQ pelform REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY 'INJECTfON.'Nhile continuing with this procedure. Tavg
Reactor power

Pressurizer Pressure Pressurizer V'V'ater le"isl

Steall1 Generator V'/.3ter 'Ievel 7 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:..--L Event No.: 1 Page JL of Event
~~Description:~~
Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters to restore power'#' .,f Time Position US Applicant's Actions or Behavi 7 Check Power Restored To 3POG T be restored to 3POj3 27-'-. __ p*:liccm the actons cal SpBcrfrcations as Note: Ste s 1 thru is restored. "'" '0'", Auto/Manual ¥ Id e returi1'ed",to ioto until vital power has been completely r6tsto \ "' ,,:I'J-8 tAuto station, the AUTO iight should s the tviANUAL light should turn on nanuEI conlrol of tile process IS Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:_1_ Page JL of JL Event
~~Description:~~
Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters 3-0NOP-,003.6 to restore power /"\} Time Position RO/ BOP US 8 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Restore Equrprnent To AUTOMATIC Controls As Follows: a. Pressunzer Pressure Control using section 2 of An ACHMENT 4 b. Steam GeneTator Level control as 1) Manuallv control feed i'iow to ret steam generator to required band plant operating mode 2:1 M;cmuafly adjust feed flow to match flo\!\<' 3) 4) 9 control is NOT available £:lB desired, ltJ.f!:i m.31ntain controls in MANUfl.L d. Perform the actions of the appropriate Annunciator R.esponse procedure for the affected alarms. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: L Event No.:_2_ ,Page _1_ of l Event
~~Description:~~
L T-3-115 fails low initiating a continuous automatic makeup. The crew responds to annunciator alarm A 4/6 that directs them to 3-0NOP-046.4, Time MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL SYS and Tech Spec 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2. Position Applicant's Actions or B Trigger lesson step EVENT 2 -L T 115 FAIL RO Recognizes/reports unexpected alarm unit supervisor (US). BOP Performs actions of 3-ARP097.CR man wet variable leg, I RO Step 1. * ------ical & Volume Control System 3) djust LC-3-112 AUTO setpoint potentiometer until demand be 'ns to indicate greater than zero, read the pot setting, en turn to previous setting. orrective actions: a. IF LT-3-115 has failed high, THEN take LCV-3-115A control switch to VCT position.
~~b. IF actual HI level, THEN perform the following:~~
(1) Verify LC-3-112 adjustable setpoint at 37% -40% AND LCV-3-115A diverts to HUT according to program. (2) Verify LCV-3-115A fully diverts at 86% (reset 76%) 10 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.:_2_ Page of l Event
~~Description:~~
L T-3-115 fails low initiating a continuous automatic makeup. The crew responds to annunciator alarm A 4/6 that directs them to 3-0N 0 p::aLf.'6A , MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL SAfSTEM and Tech Spec 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2. /f'" //"y Time Position ,y-' , J! Applicant's Actions or
~~a. IF L T-3-115 has failed high, THEN switch to VCT position., ,/' /",p' ".\, b. IF actual HI level, THEN perform tj;lE:{foliowing:~~
,:::,d'P' /J;;}Y"'\'<:, (1) Verify LC-3-112 at -90% AND LCV-3-115A diverts to HUT acco,[din*gto f:?j,6'rfl'. '<'0;., ,.,.'- --,. ,.:/" (2) Verify LCV-3-115A fully diverts/at 86%, "-C' (3) Verify propeJchscQing-letdown b"* level, THBf'J following:"'\, i, (1) At 4%, verify sWRP 0 RWST, LCV-3-115B"o ,s AND:lCV-3-1"t*5C cle> s. \\ , ,f s"':" auto charging flow. ""f ii. "V'l back to VCT at 11 %. F -115 d;'.THEN take action using 3-0NOP-046.4, I\BORON CONCENTRATION CON1R°ItSYSTEM.
"\;\_. . _/I f' ,c_._ ' **.* ,c o;;;";.,".,,, ** ,::,,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,.

.,._
.::::::::/P" 'i'e .. R9'fer to,Teci:1.,S ec 3.1 1 and 3.1.2.2. based on LT-3-112 indication on ERDADS and indication on VPA that L T-3-115 has failed low. '\, "\:" .. ,---.,* . . MaYipiree,t SNPO to check L T-3-112 local indication "'_" -""". --,,-/ to T.S 3.1 .2.1.and 3.1.2.2 11 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page of l Event
~~Description:~~
L T-3-115 fails low initiating a continuous automatic makeup. The crew responds to annunciator alarm A 4/6 that directs them to MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL and Tech Spec 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2. //( (/ \-, Time Position Applicant's Actions or BehaviGYf 3/4.1.2 80:;;;A nON SYSTEMS FL(l'lV P,l:.,TH -SHLfTOOV'4h! 3 1 :.1 .:"5 a !'*,drnm/\TJ, one of the foliowing boren irJecliclI1 flow paths shai powei,"?O freT" an :')PERASLE ernerger<iy' pO*J.'er a. A flow pa.ti'l from, the be(,oaclo sto pump 10 the Rea':.tof Coolant Sy'sle O='ERA.B_E. or o APPLiCA.81L1TY 'edf)'in::;1 th.:lit the temperature of the rooms con!aiimng 110'11 path . equal to, 55*F when a flow path from the boric acid taslKS is uSA2d. r 31 clays by verifying! ina; each valve, {manual. pC'Ne r-operate<i , 01 "wi.omat,*o) at is rot locked. sealed. Gt cd1rerwise secured in position. i.sin iisooneic1 12 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_2_ Page of l Event
~~Description:~~
L T-3-115 fails low initiating a continuous automatic makeup. The crew responds to annunciator alarm A 4/6 that directs them to MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL S STJ?M and Tech Spec 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2. ,) Time Position Applicant's Actions or F:E';CTI\/ITY CONTROL SYSTEMS *a The SOUTce path 'from", boric. o3,:,,;d storage via a boric pump s\iotion', and At least one d tile two sOllrce p.ath. s,uctic,n: ard, c. The f.e*OW path from theoh",rging rR1mp re*geT'le*r aiive heat
1. 1 % ;14;/\1; at 2QO'Fwithi'l the ne:d 6 hOllrs; restore the boraton .;w*o stc4age to OPERA8LE stalus within the next 72 hOllTS witnT! the next 3D hours. oath OPERABLE or th*e regenerative heart exchanger flow oath resiorE :he requir-ed flow p,,-,ths to OPER.ABLE status ... ",ithin 72 hOUTS or ::':FAHD8Y and borated to a SHUTDO\NN equi'"alent 10 at "east i% Ih*" next 6 hOllifS: resiO're at ,'east l'1'iO boratonsourcE pams to OPERfI.8LE next 72 hours or be in COLO SHIJTOOVVN within the next 3D hOtlfS hh,r."h'"*
s<thlrce pa.thfrcma borloacici s.torage tank and the charg;ing pump discharge regenerative he",! exchanger inoperable . .,liihin 'One rDuf inAbate boration to a MARGIN jo 1% J.klk at 200Fanci;;lo i.o GOLD SHUTCHJWNas soon ... "".,, 'Of t"',e Deration and press,.irizer Ie veJ cemt"'1o! functions of the 13 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _2_ Page -2.. of l Event
~~Description:~~
L T-3-115 fails low initiating a continuous automatic makeup. The crew responds to annunciator alarm A 4/6 that directs them to 3-0NOP-4, MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL S T and Tech Spec 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2. me Position US Determines T.S. 3.1.2.1 does not apply, and US Directs actions per 3-0NOP-046.4, M CONCENTRATION CONTROL SY RO Step 1 Check Boric Acid OR Primary Water Makeup Flow ABNORMAL Note: FR-113 and F flow 9.4 gpm an Transitions 'to step 28. on wet variable leg and a common dry reference e if the common dry reference leg fails. ch ging and letdown flow; therefore. a transient determine which level transmitter has failed. _____________ -J ck For VCT Level Transmitter, LT-3-115, aili Or Failed High -115 -ABNORMALLY HIGH
LI-3-112 -DECREASING DUE TO FULL DIVERT OF LCV-3-115A e: transitions to step 31 Check for LI-3-115 Failing Or Failed Low

LI-3-115 -ABNORMALLY LOW Go to Step 31. Go to Step 34.

LI-3-112 -INCREASING DUE TO AUTO MAKEUP OR STABLE DUE TO LCV-3-115A DIVERTING 14 I \ Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_2_ Page of l Event
~~Description:~~
L T-3-115 fails low initiating a continuous automatic makeup. The crew responds to annunciator alarm A 4/6 that dirocts them to MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL S)fSTlZ'lVl and Time Position RO US Tech Spec 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2. i'//" ,.f/'* 4' CAUTION ... ,'; ,/' \,\. '\ With no operator action, LT-3-115 failed low flow greater than flow could result in overpressurization of . e-,c' .. ,,::/' I NOTE****", >.\ *...... l' Failure of L T-3-115 low will result in the fol/owing: '\ -Annunciator Alarm' 41 ****'!'HliL.r;; LEVEL. -------Auto makeup starts, Ell!! \,
~~LCV-3-115A modulalin\\{e contfbi:levef at the VCT Level Contrqller.~~
LC-3-112. se in't,,\ ./ '-.c. '\/ , --------,.l ...... -----------\, \,. R'eport AI quipment Failures OR Malfunctions To The Responsible II Sqpervisor t t!,'forms wee and SM of failure ofL T-3-115 "\ .. *,1"'42 Notify The Nuclear Plant Supervisor To Evaluate Plant Conditions "v i a. Refer to O-ONOP-046.3, LOSS OF BORATION FLOW PATHS b. Review Technical S ecifications 15 ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _2_ Page of l Event
~~Description:~~
L T-3-115 fails low initiating a continuous automatic makeup. The crew responds to annunciator alarm A 4/6 that directs them to 3-0NOP;.G2f'6$4, MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL S;e'STIiIVl Time Position RO and Tech Spec 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2. /J'.J ,/ Step 43 Applicant's Actions or Check Repairs To Equipment Complete 16 t o.--\ __ _ I J" a .... *............\ain performing one of e folJ.oWil)g: "'"
IF dVG;j"'i'evel transmitter perform manual makeup using """ .. 046, CVCS'\,.BOR9N C"* ENTRA,ldl'1, CONTROL. '\,/

IF due to primary water or boric acid flow related problems, THEN repeat Steps 4 Through 26 as necessary to maintain VCT level and proper boron concentration.
~~b. WHEN repairs are complete, THEN continue with Step 44.~~
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _3_ ,Page _1_ of Event~~
~~Description:~~
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (lCW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. Time The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019. Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -38 lew SHAFT SHE BOP Identifies I Reports indication of 3B ICW pump' BOP BOP Note: Sheared shaft is identified by th
38 ICW pump current dro

Red indicating lamp lit *

3-: P-019, Intake Cooling Water rdinates with the NSO to start the second ICW pump. If m is started using OP, pump start section of OP listed for e next page.' teo Crew may elect to use 3-0NOP-019 to start second pump. If NOP is use ski to a e3 of 10 17
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.: _3_ . Page -2.. of Event~~
~~Description:~~
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (lCW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. Time Position The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019. Applicant's Actions or Behavior 5.2 ICW PlUUp SImi (System ill Operation) 5.2.1 Initial Conditions I. All applicil hIe prel'equisi tes as listed ill Se 2. 3. IF the lew Pmnp required for that intake bay. THEN verify 5.2.2 Procedure Steps 1. -r----2, plttllR.,to 1'* started is open (mark the been checked out at VPA in the Control Room. or amps decrease to less than 49 amps. that the disc arge pressure of the pump started is betwe<!ll 11 psig and 35 pSlg. less all specified should have 8 PWO initiated, but does not affect pump I W Pumps 3A find 38 have packing leakoff lines. Observable p<1cking leakoff si10uld b at least 20 dpm W Pump 3(; does 1101 11£Ive a packing ieakaff fll?e. Observable leakoff siJOuid /)13 at least 120 dpm. ______________________ 1 .., 8. 9. Check ICW Pump seal packing leakofffollowing pump . Verify all log entries sp<!cified in 2.2 have been recorded. Complete the QA Record Page for this subsection. 18 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _3_ . Page of Event
~~Description:~~
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (ICW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. Time The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019. Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs response per 3-0NOP-019 BOP CAUTIONS Step 1 VE?riry'7\II'+Qtake Cooll "/Wa!e r ,!.2b,lmp'\t\larms -f OrF \ ,-;! 1" /,/,'/,/. I 4/1, ICWP,A/B/C MOTOR OVERLOAD . .d,,/f _.,-"-:",-<,,,., -, _____ """_.;_,_" __ " I I QWfi>"f\/BLC T RIP.? __ ;/,.,;:::::;;--, ICWP AlBIC 0T,OR BRG HI TEMP " '+ 1. Have operator check pump(s) locally . Determine affected intake cooling water pump . 3. Start standby intake cooling water pump. 4. Stop affected intake cooling water pump. Qheck Traveling Screens -CLEAN Go to 3-0NOP-011, SCREEN WASH SYSTEMII NTAKE MALFUNCTION
Alarm I 3/3, Traveling Screen HI llP -OFF

Traveling Screen DP -LESS THAN 7.5 INCHES OF WATER 19 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--.£..
~~Event No.: _3_ . Page of --.1JL Event~~
~~Description:~~
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (lCW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. Time The crew res onds er 3-0NOP-019. Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 3 Verify Intake Cooling Perform the following: Water Pumps -AT LEAST ONE RUNNING 20 started from N dispatch erform the
~~3M 19 for 3A ICW pump. 3AB17 for 3B ICW pump. c. IF no intake cooling water pumps can be started, THEN perform the following:~~
1) Maintain component cooling water temperatures using 3-0NOP-030, COMPONENT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTION.

2) Remove reactive load from main' generator.

3) Shut down components cooled by turbine plant cooling water using 3-ONOP-008, TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTION.

4) Return to procedure AND step in effect.
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.: _3_ . Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (lCW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. Time Position BOP The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019. Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step 4 Verify Intake Perform the following: Cooling Water Pumps -TWO RUNNING c) IF unable to reduce total ICW flow through a single ICW Pump to less than 19,000 GPM, THEN reduce Unit Load using 3-GOP-103, POWER OPERATION TO HOT STANDBY, to limit heat input into the TPCW system and throttle ICW flow to the TPCW Heat Exchangers using TPCW HX Outlet Combined ICW Iso Vlv 3-50-401 until total ICW flow is less than 19,000 GPM. d) IF a single ICW Pump has operated at flows greater than 19,000 GPM, THEN refer to 3-0P-019, INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM. Note: BOP starts 3A ICW PP and secures 3B ICW PP 21 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page of Event
~~Description:~~
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (lCW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. Time Position BOP The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019. Applicant's Actions or Behavior I NOTE I An operable intake cooling water header consis supplied by at least one intake cooling water I Step 5 Verify Adequate Intake Cooling Water Header Flow: a. Check alarm
~~1. Dispat ..... ope{ ..~~
to investigate HEADER AlB [j .... system -OFF \\\'\ '"., ,/,:<"_ ,.:0 Coolin ,Water 1'-l'Eja ,/l" GREATeR / PSIG,/ '\"\ ", /. \",'\/f: 16 2 .... "'. '<. / J '/, ""\\ 22 ""':;'-';/"<<", __ * """<>*t y/IF sta'rtltts .. @ti"available intake cooling water pump will NOT overload an EDG, THEN start available intake cooling water pump(s) as follows: a) IF offsite power is NOT available AND diesel generator load is greater than 2250 KW, THEN shed smaller loads until diesel generator load is less than 2250 KW. b) Start available intake cooling water pump(s). c) Restart any loads which were shed to allow intake cooling water pump start. ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-.L Event No.: _3_ . Page of Event
~~Description:~~
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (lCW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. Time Position BOP The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019. Applicant's Actions or Behavior 3. IF leakage is foul)d;fTbl1iN the following:' . ..,.., intake c water pumps 'an ign V<;lJ necessary to .. , ... " .... t one operable intaK .. water header. Step 6 Verify Intake Water Header Press LESS THAN OR Ed\1p\, o S G '\ ..... the investigate <'focilnta'k,El cooijPlg water system h/ "" *. ,I:l'fockag e :'",.J f T \ .. ,. '\, PI-;?",1619 , " _f/'-\.. / IF blockage is found, THEN align \ valves and start intake cooling \+water pumps as necessary to establish at least one operable intake cooling water header. CAUTIONS )" PO -. 4882", or POV-3-4883 must be locally opened using the hi}[Jdwhel,. ther) the Technical Specification 72-hour action statement for\m inoper;fj.iffe lew header is required to be entered. Verify proper intake cooling water lineup to turbine plant cooling water heat exchangers:
a. Check Safety Injection on Unit 3-terminated

b. Verify both ICW to TPCW Heat Exchanger valves-open
POV 4882

POV-3-4883 23
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _3_ Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (lCW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. Time Position BP The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019. Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTIONS .,,# J{/' If not corrected promptly, reduced intake flo 0 Turbine Plant Cooling Water Heat Exchange,rs mjflY result in da.age' to vital plant equipment. I' ,\;, _d"; Step 8 /,4/ J:<<> \ < §i,) Verify Cooling To Turbine Plant Cooling Water Heat Exchangers:
~~a. Check alarm I TEMP/LO PRESS':, 0 '.,"~~
"', ""'" " .f / ........ ", Di're"et operator to locally the following: """'.c. "c_. 1. IF: as not reduced dugh ICW Pump """'". flow, IlljEN)open TPCW . b. Locally check PI!ant /"" " OutlelCombined ICW Cooling Water Supply,\He*lder sola n Valve 3-50-401 TI-3-143'2 a 'Ie/c' essary to mal'ntal'n 0'0')=,,< \,,/,/,/ ii/,."'. .\\ j Turbine Plant Cooling <;,/(os;afly che<;:(k li:urbine PI, Water Supply Header p/9 oolin g Wa" r He 1. er\ Temperature less than Temperatu , J'I-3-1432 - 110°F AND maintaining OR DEC SINe3', .;} required minimum ICW \, f"f lY ,.J' flow through the CCW v,\, "".}' HXs. 2. Verify proper heat exchan er ali nment. CAUTIONS 'yf rlpt corrected promptly, reduced intake cooling water flow to the r;ol1[lponent Cooling Water Heat Exchangers may result in damage to }Vit q 1 plant equipment. /" .<, Verify Cooling To Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers
a. Check alarm H 8/5, CCW HX OUTLET HI TEMP -OFF 24 Direct operator to locally perform the following:

1. Verify proper heat exchanger alignment.
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (lCW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. Time Position The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019. Applicant's Actions or Behavior b. Check Component Cooling Water Supply Header Temperatures -LESS THAN 120°F
~~TI-3-607A~~
~~/", 2. IF bask'et ine, d press u than 1.5 psid,'\~~
~~TI-3-607B~~
~~'///' ... '. IjEN refer to 3-0P-01 /' 7.0, for '", "," 4// backwas' instructions ' ',', / c. Check Component Cooling Water,\\..\" / Supply Header Temperatures -'\,./' STABLE OR DECREASING~~
~~TI-3-607A~~
~~\j. '\ ,. , ""~~
d.
~~strainer' THAN 1.5 PSID \\o;-,f"'- ":p,,f-~~
~~PI-3-140D\~~
~~.,'. PI-3-1 .1~~
dPI-3-14,e)2

dPI)4940
_q",_ Step /' 'l. O'f\Liairtt",in Cooling For Turbine rra[lt OQoling Water Heat """""",,--- ... ,.::::> Chect<i'/alarm I 5/4, TPCW HI TEMP/LO PRESS-OFF Locally check Turbine Plant Cooling Water Supply Header Temperature, TI-3-1432 -LESS THAN 110°F c. Locally check Turbine Plant Cooling Water Supply Header Temperature, TI-3-1432 -STABLE OR DECREASING 25 Perform the following:
1. Remove reactive load from main generator.

2. Decrease turbine load as necessary to maintain Turbine Plant Cooling Water Supply Header Temperature less than 110°F.
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.: _3_ Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
~~The 3B Intake Cooling Water (lCW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. Position RO US The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019. Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step 11 Maintain Cooling Step~~
TI-3-607A

TI-3-607B continuing with this procedure.
Verify Current Plant Alignment Meets Technical Specification Requirements 13 Return To Procedure AND Step In Effect 26 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _4_ Page _1_ of -.JL Event
~~Description:~~
OOS main steam code safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 require the crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. 3.7.1.1. crew will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the T.S. call '#d':)lse Time Position US O-ONOP-I 00 to reduce power to 30%. '" Applicant's Actions or Behavi0f, .. * \\., .<:\,., "\\ Receives call from the Operations both and RV-1401 are associated with the 3A to T.S. "\"i 3.7.1.1.b .i lf' ,.,if l;. Note: determines with 2 code sa,efie; OS on ol)e a power reduction to < 33% is required. 1 inC;J(/df7t:1 next for reference. 'i *. ,,\... *,\\,./ *** f**/ .i"#'/'/ -if 3.7. U All main steam line Code safety valves associated with e rh."generator shall be OPERABLE with 11ft settings as specified In Table 3 .*.***. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2, a ACTION: With (3) reactor coolant loops and line Code safety valves inoperable, and a. ,), with a positiv ur'S.,either the ino igh Trip Setpoint IER IIsted'tn Taqle 3.7-1; oth OT SHUTDOWN wilhm the followi """", one or more main steam /-perature operation may continue provided s) are restored to OPERABLE status or the Power Range to the maximum allowable percent of RATED THERMAL in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in oderator Temperature Coefficient: or in Mode 3, with a Coefficient. operation may continue provided that. *fgl are restored to OPERABLE status or reactor power is 'um allowable percent of RATED THERMAL POWER listed in T STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN TABLE 3.7-1 \,\\", MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER LEVEL WITH \JNOPERA.BUi*hEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES DURING THREE LOOP OPERATION '\ !: MA:XIMliM NUMBER OF INOPERABLE 1 .. $AFETY VALVES ON ANY OP,ERATING STEAM GENERATOR oj' 2 3 27 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER LEVEL (PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER) 53 33 14 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:_4_ Page of l Event
~~Description:~~
OOS main steam code safety valves, RV -1400 and RV -1401 require the crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. 3.7.1.1. The crew will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the T.S. calta:6d:vse 4'*-J" Time Position O-ONOP-l 00 to reduce power to 30%.' VALVE NUMBER ;I Applicant's Actions or Behavi9j/' TABLE 3.7-2 Loop A Loop BLoop C 1. RV1400 RV1405 RV1410 2. RV1401 3. RV1402 4. RV1403 16 16 16 16 -The lift s at nominal operating temperature and pre, /' / f,t are within +/-'I% of the lift setting value listed in Table 3.7-2. ontrol Room Personnel Using Attachment 3 ,,"a.re: rate should be used as directed by the Operations '\ .. 9 gallons per % shoLJd be used for the boron '\ calcutatfun to determine 180 gallons required at a rate of 18 'gallons per minute. The remainder of attachment 3 will be "reviewed with the crew. Attachment 3 included next for .l reference. 28 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: L Event No.:_4_ Page of.JL Event
~~Description:~~
OOS main steam code safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 require the e Position crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. 3.7.1.1. will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the T.S. c O-ONOP-IOO to reduce power to 30%. Applicant's Actions or 3 (Page 1 of 1) FAST LOAD REDCCTION T.S 3.7.1.1.b
~~1. Reason for load reduction~~
~~__________________________~~
2. Target power level 30 % Power 3. 6. Time to Shutdown from 100% Load Reduction Rate MWimin Load Reduction Rate ')/Oimill 1 %! min Ex lected Tavg/Tref j, T 1°F I* mpletely withdrawn and I t (use a value between 9 and 18 rl'B,.joa,d'f,*iduction from full power). i minutes = gallonsiminute.
ter and Contingency Actions ted' T band. not to exceed +/-1 OF of expected. slow ramp to restore ballel. 8/ . ROD BANK LO Ll\UT alarms. the load reduction shall be slowed. iteria -:'vhumaL reactor and turbine trip:
Tflve 6 OF :> Tref

Rod Insertion Limits (RIL) are exceeded 7. Review' required actions from other procedures cUlTently in effect (example.
~~stop Rep). 8. Questions or crew input? 9. End of Brief 29 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.:_4_ Page of l Event~~
~~Description:~~
OOS main steam code safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 require the Time Position RO crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. 3.7.1.1. will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the T.S. c O-ONOP-IOO to reduce power to 30%. Applicant's Actions or B Step 2 Begin Boration a. Set the Boric Acid Totalizer value determined using Attachment 3 b. Set FC-3-113A, ric Acid Flow Controller. 0 a p of 8.0 e determined amount of nder by performing the ned amount using l11.l1ueric keypad. 180 Press COUNT A. Press LI:NHT 1 and verify desired am01.Ult was properly entered. (7) Press COUNT A. 30 ( Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-.L Event No.: _4_ Page 2.. of l Event
~~Description:~~
OOS main steam code safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 require the crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. 3.7.1.1. Time Position BOP ROI BOP crew will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the .S. all and use O-ONOP-l 00 to reduce power to 30%. Step 3 Notify The Following
System Dispatcher

Plant ersonnel usin Step 4 Reduce Unit Load a. Check for borati (reducing Tavg d. Stop or slow power reduction to control temperature.
~~If necessary, place control rods in manual and maintain Tavg within the expected Tavg/Tref of Attachment~~
3. fter a 5 to 10 % reduction in load go event5 eJ:l 5 Monitor Annunciator B 8/1, ROD BANK LO LIMIT -RESET 31 Perform the following:

a. Slow load reduction until alarm is reset. b. Re-evaluate boration amount and rate and make adjustments as necessary.
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _4_ Event~~
~~Description:~~
OOS main steam code safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 require the crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. 3.7.1.1. The crew will be Time Position US ROI BOP given the OOS information, asked to validate the T.S. call and use -OP-100 to reduce power to 30%. Applicant's Actions or Beh Step 6 Notify The Shift Manager To Refer To
0-EPIP-20101, DUTIES OF

0-ADM-115, NOTIFICATI r--------I I Axial ffux difference is allow entering O-OP-059.
9, Operati . Verify load reduction rate and auto rod control is maintaining the expected TavglTref baT identified in Attachment 3 32 -----.1 a. IF directed by the Unit Supervisor, THEN increase charging flow as follows: 1) Throttle open TCV-144, NRHX Temp Control Valve, bypass valve 3-834 to raise flow to approximately 600 gpm. 2) Start an additional charging pump. 3) Place an additional letdown orifice in service . b. Stop or slow power reduction to control temperature. If necessary, place control rods in manual and maintain Tavg within the expected TavglTref baT of Attachment
3.
~~( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.: _4_ Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
OOS main steam code safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 requirethe crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the T.S. can al4'd use .lfi'!' __ Time Position RO RO O-ONOP-IOO to reduce power to 30%.// \,/ Step 8 Applicant's Actions or j/ .:/'--'-pi'-" Ener ize Pressurizer Backu Note: step 9 does not apply, onlycl{,e/16ed pump ning. .,\ P-' ----------- ...... -I NOTE',,,\\.*,\,,,V" -----. I Boration should be slopped above the target power to '" .. :\ --------.-....---------j-Y'>:",,,--- -_\ Step 10 '\ \. " Monitor Wi rh, Power Level StoJ;? ollows:> Go to Step 11. ..... """ .. q.' .. \\. '\/.,/,./,./J' ./ ' .. Reacft?r Selector Switch to / .. fI*,i' ,/,,#'//AUTO,'" '\ /J" ,j" b. !3-113A, Flow Controller pot setting as desired \ .. ", \. .. Control Switch to START place reactor makeup switch in STOP due to L T-3-115 fai/ute, Target Load -LESS THAN 450 Mwe Check Station Service Loads Supplied From The Startup Transformer 33 WHEN directed by the Unit Supervisor, THEN transfer station service from the Auxiliary Transformers to the Startup Transformer using Attachment
2.
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _4_ Page -.JL of JL Event~~
~~Description:~~
OOS main steam code safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 requirethe crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. 3.7.1.1./7nt8;:Few will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the T.S. c'n '!J¥d use Time Position BOP BOP O-ONOP-IOO to reduce power to 30%. f Step 13 Check Auxiliary Steam directed by the Unit Supplied From Another Unit "J' ervisor, lJ;E;:N align sts;asupply from " "i" II", art'Q!her)tlfl' ing Attachment ", .. , ",/ " NOTES "i,. I, --"\ I I* Boration should be stoP1?ed?rget power level toprev$(lt excessive boration. or at 2: 25% power if the unit 'it line., "<1, I. Remaining procedure stepls sh riate fOI:1h.e power level. . I L _______ ..\_ _',:::::: _____ J C"Xx___ (---"\<\\:, \". /-
~~a. Verify Turtpine load le.,ss \han -450 MWE l.i'\,'~~
~~S;9'"~~
~~drai pgmp \, b. than -400 MWE .",f; 1)vPlace the Feedwa er Pump Turbine Runback Defeat switch "to DEFEAT X_"'_ ';;;\>\;, 2'J\Sto'RJhe SGFP with recirculation valves open \\\~~
~~3) recirculation valves control switch in the CLO'SED/AUTO position Verify Turbine load less than -300 MWE~~
Stop the remaining heater drain pump d. Verify Turbine load less than -275 MWE

Stop one Condensate Pump e. Verify Turbine load less than -200 MWE

Place the running SGFP recirculation valves control switch in the OPEN osition Note: may secure 3A heater drain pump and 38 condensate pump 34
~~( Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:_4_ Page of l Event~~
~~Description:~~
OOS main steam code safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 require the crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. 3.7.1.( J!l{e rew will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the T.S. c {'all( use O-ONOP-IOO to reduce power to 30%. Time Position Applicant's Actions or B f. Verify Turbine load less than -150 35 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _5_ Page _1_ of ..l Event
~~Description:~~
L T-3-488 S/G B controlling level channel fails high requiring manual * ""P", Time control ofFC-488 S/G B feed regulatmg valve (FRV) per the proU1pt"> "' actions of annunciator alarm C 6/2, SG B LEVEL DEVIA TI9M. J;Jl.e crew refers to 3-0NOP-049.1 Deviation or Failure of Safety'Related or Reactor Protection Channels ;.1 \\, Position Applicant's Actions or Beh Trigger lesson step EVENT 5 -LT-3-488 J;Jl H BOP Recognizes and reports the failure of .. t:'f3/488 to US ,l'P BOP Note: BOP determines failure bai'bf! JpQn th"., 0;, indications: '\,' >\',f"/# ,/,;f "'" 1
~~L 1)'/: 88 pegged~~
~~'/ "\~~
~~ala//n\.C~~
\;,? '-_,_/ .... ". _/'/; '0'<<:::,,<,._ -'\. \C. \ __ f unit trip dr;curs du 'ng,attempt to restore SG B level transitiOn to EVENT l I .I 'al control of FC-488 to control SG B mke manual control of leYel retnm ch<:'cklllg the following: !eYel LI-4S6 or LI-488 vs kVe'J program from controlling first stage pre>> (VPA) ."n.e"',','", actions IF alarm is due to instrument failule, THE;'\" refer [0 3-0:\fOP-049, L DeviahoJl or Fadme ef SaflO!" RlOlated 01' Reacrer Prote'ction Chamle-Is Directs turbine load reduction stopped and response per 3-0NOP-049.1 36 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _5_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
L T-3-488 S/G B controlling level channel fails high requiring manual p:\:-Tim e Position BOP BOP control ofFC-488 S/G B feed regulating valve (FRV) per the > actions of annunciator alarm C 6/2, SG B LEVEL DEVIATI01)llfh}i)"crew refers to 3-0NOP-049.1 Deviation or Failure of Safety Protection Channels ,f'" Applicant's Actions or Behav' .... -------------- I NOTES .
~~Momentary spiking of a channel thai quickly r imminent channel failure. The bislables for .. a c nnel shou/d./6e tripped position as soon as possible.~~
~~with a maxlrr;umde/ay lirry,e'6f for further investigation by I&C. '>"'/'"~~
Instrumentation failure may occur in such a mann'eK. as instrumentation loop to devia! the actual monitored or extreme amount. Sucl may be in a direc protection or safety related ot occur on thaf"if] though the se/point for the tr; u by the a" Step ---I 5.1 Verif loop fail re 1:5 . mparison to adjacent loops and k rJA:>t§Titrqarclr eters an(:l C<<hditions.
~~? g/ /' p ,/ §i>1ep{( "5,,2 \7*',[ify nopff:no 'st on the adjacent channels which are 0 remain ir P '> "" LJ~~
~~" **** ,J~~
"', ""\'::""':' control transfer switches are in the position which US ehQ'lina+/-es ui 'Ie<t, loop. Of transfers 38 SG L VL CaNT XFER switch to chan 11/ L T-486. t control function was placed in manual control due to the failure, lJrfEN verify the control function is returned to automatic. i;..;_, .;/ Step 5.5 Refer to Technical Specifications 3/4.3, Instrumentation, AND verify the minimum channels operable. 37 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-.L Event No.: _5_ Page of --L Event
~~Description:~~
LT-3-488 S/O B controlling level channel fails high requiring manuaJ Time Position US BOP control ofFC-488 S/O B feed regulating valve (FRV) per the pr t) actions of annunciator alarm C 6/2, SO B LEVEL DEVIA TIO .. e ,'W /' crew refers to 3-0NOP-049.1 Deviation or Failure of or Reactor Protection Channels FUNCTIONh UNIT 11 12. 1.2 Feech\3ter Flow Mismatch IF any .. COh\rol\Valve is in Manual control due to this .. Fe, ... Should be maintained as steady as FeetlwQter Control Valves are restored to "\jfAutEimatic co"nftb+:.",,,.,,.// .te a Plant Work Order AND notif the I&C Supervisor. \fo". " WheqS/C3 B FRV returned to automatic and T.S. referenced, \ . .Event &.can be tri ered. 38 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _6_ Page _1_ of Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Ge ra r (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it ut t Time AFW Start time breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ( Position Applicant's Actions or B US Directs response per 3-EOP-E-O RO Step 1 (lOA) -Verify Reactor Trip
Rod bottom lights -ON

Reactor trip and bypass b

Rod position indicators
~~-AT~~
~~Neutron flu~~
,,'" BOP Step 2 (IOA)Verify Turbine . Check Mid and East GCBs -OPEN (Normally 30 second delay) 39 ",' a Manually trip turbine. IF unable to verify turbine trip, THEN close main steamline isolation and bypass valves. b Manually close valves. IF any valve can NOT be closed, THEN close main steamline isolation and bypass valves. c Manually open breakers. IF breakers do NOT open, THEN actuate EMERGENCY GEN. BKR. TRIP SWITCH for the affected breaker(s). Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: --.L Event No.:_6_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/re(lctor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Gep{f"\ r (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it§tOtit t Time Position BOP US breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout .. Step 3 (IOA)Verify Power To Emergency 4 Check the 3A and 3B 4 KV a. buses-MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED /" /".J' '. ../f '\"" "",,-.,. "",","'// "1 to emergency y Unit 3 ffit:.ai e diesel ge" '< *** IF n A nor 3B 4 .. Qus energized, / . ******,::[HE!';J"go to3-EOP-,// LOSS ALL AC p/ POWER, Ste 1. wm"qe'}:msuccessfuIA and B EDGs are lockedlwtl transitiod . .to Y:-EOP-ECA-O.O ,./'" '; '-, *. /' .:,00'0'.'" (v c)P:E '=0.0 --------------------. NOTE I
~~2 are IMMEDIATE ACTION steps. \,.~~
~~are required to be monitored for information only. FRPs shall NOT '§d. --------------- ______ 1 -Verify Reactor Trip~~
Rod bottom lights -ON

Reactor trip and bypass breakers -OPEN

Rod position indicators
~~-AT ZERO~~
~~Neutron flux -DECREASING 40 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_6_ .Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but its t t ime Position BOP breaker fails to close re uirin the crew to use the blackout ti Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step 2 Verify Turbine Trip a. All turbine stop a. valves -CLOSED b. Verify Moisture b. Separator Reheater Steam Valves -CLOSED
~~MSR Main Ste Supply Stop MOVs 1) IF breakers do NOT open, THEN actuate EMERGENCY GEN. BKR. TRIP SWITCH for the affected breaker(s).~~
~~2) IF breaker position indication is NOT available AND turbine speed is NOT decreasing, THEN direct Turbine Operator to perform the following:~~
~~a) Obtain key 17 from Shift Manager key locker. b) Locally trip Mid and East GCBs from the switchyard.~~
8W33

8W68 Note: MSIVs may be closed in step 2.b. 41
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _6_ Page -...1.. of Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but itoutpttt Time Position RO breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ti Step 3 Check If RCS Is Isolated a. PRZ PORVs -CLOSED b. Letdown isolation valves -CLOSED
~~c. Excess~~
~~.. valves -CLO\>ED" *. ,'"~~
~~CV-3-.387,~~
~~... Let Isolation Valve\Frd .. Excess'h..et ///,/"'I'te q t EXchanger \ /,/' "'\1" //~~
~~HCY'-3-37, ExceS$ Let.ao Flow Contrpll Check"A.l?W pumps -AT TWO RUNNING 42 c. plliGally close valves. '\, "\~~
~~close valves. a. IF both units require AFW, THEN perform the following:~~
~~1) Establish 270 gpm flow to each unit. 2) Use a setpoint of 270 gpm for required AFW flow instead of the 345 gpm specified in subsequent steps AND rocedures.~~
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _6_ Page 2. of Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor Time Position trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Ge (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but its breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ti Applicant's Actions or b. Verify total AFW flow -GREATER THAN 345GPM V ify proper alignment A valves. IF ali me t NOT proper, THE ma uallyalign es necessary to ta 'sh proper lineup. 3) IF AFW can NOT be established, THEN restore AFW using 3-ONOP-075, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, while continuing with Step 5. : (TC-PRA) Failure to trip AFW pump B or C ithin 6 minutes of initial startfollowing a loss of main edwater when both pumps are running on AFW train 2. Also ritical in other applied scenarios when one hour limit is exceeded CAUTIONS
If SI has been reset or SI actuation occurs on the other unit, safeguards equipment needs to be restored to the required configuration. " If an SI signal exists or is actuated during this procedure, it must be reset to ensure restoratIon of a power source and to ensure controlled loading of equipment on the 4KV Bus. 43 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.: _6_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard 3A Emergency Diesel Ge ra r (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but its ut breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ti . Time Position BOP I _ Applicant's Actions or NOTES Attachment 5 prol/ides a reference for Ern If a Sequencer failure has occurred an SI breaker may not ciose unless SI loS resel. L.. ___________ _ Step 5 a. b. Return to procedure AND step in effect c. Go to Step 6. d. Manually start equipment as required.
e. Implement FRPs as required, unless this procedure was directly entered from outside the EOP network. Note: BOP uses attachments 1 and 2 to verify bus stripping then transitions to step 6 from 5.c RNO. Attachments 1 and 2 listed next. 44
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: 6 Page of -.1L Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/re,!ctor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but Time Position BOP breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout . lE 3A 4KV Bus is de-energized AND 3D 4KV B Blackout Tie Permlssi."e Blue light '5 ON AND 4. lE 3;1\ 4KV Bus i3 de-energized AND 3D 4KV Bus is P"rmlssive Blue L":Jht i'3 mT THEN venfy the following 3AA22. 3A 4KV bUB THEN venty Feeder To 4K\i Bus 30.3/1./'\17. is open. Blackout Breaker., 3A,D07. Reactor Op6'(al0[ to open Station Blackout Breaker. 4.4D07. \/"nry breaker for Intake Cooling "<Vater Pump 3C. 3ADOS. is open. V"riry breaker for Component Cooling VVater Pump 3C. 3AD04. is open. lE breaker for Intake Cooling "Nater PtJlllp 3C. 3AD05. OR breake c for Component Cooling 'Water Puml 3C. 3AD04. C,l!lliQI he opened, THEN open Feeder To 4KV BliS 2,0, 3AA17. AND Supply Frtlm 4K\-'-Bus 3."" 3.11DOI Unit :3 Reactor Operator that 3A 4KV bus stripping is complete. Note: BOP will perlorm the verifications of step 2 and 3 then notify RO 3A 4KV bus stripping is complete. 45 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _6_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Generator Time (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 38 EDG starts but its ou breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout tie. Position Applicant's Actions or B BOP 1 2. A TT AC HMENT 2 {page 10i1) !E 3B 4KV Bus is de-energized.8.l':i.Q. 3D 4KV BllS i Blackout Tie Pem1issive Blue Itght is ON A!:iQ. !E 3B 4KV Bus is de-energized AND 3D 4KV Bus i Permissive Blue Light is OFF, I.!:!§;! venfy the followin , is closed, pariom1 the fol1Qwing: Unit 4. Reactor Operator to open Station Blackout Breaker, 4ADO? Intake Cooling Water Pump 3C, 3ADD5. is open. !E breaker for Intake Coohng Water Pump 3C. 3AD05, Q.8..breaker lor Component Cooling Water Pump 3C. 3AD05. can!iQI be opened. open Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D. 3AB19, 81:!!:lSupply From 4.KV-Bus 3B, 3AD06. . Notify Unit 3 Reactor Operator thai 38 4KV hus stripping is complete. Note: BOP will perform the verifications of step; 1 and 3 then notify RO 3A 4KV bus stripping is complete. 46 ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:2 Event No.:_6_ Page -.JL of Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/re9-ctor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ('/ Time Position BOP BOP _.,.)-.-.. ,' Applicant's Actions or
~~. ,Jf"/ Step 6 Verify The A And B 4KV Bus Lockout Relays -RESET \ .\ ... , ....... Note: 38 EDG lockout '. elciy is~~
~~.' A Step 7 .. < Perform the following:~~
a. Locally reset affected emergency diesel start failure relay by depressing the alarm reset pushbutton.

b. Reset affected emergency diesel lockout relay. c. IF neither lockout relay can be reset, THEN go to Step 10 . . 3A EDG lockout relay will not reset, NSO will be set to attempt local reset but will not reset. 47
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:2 Event No.:_6_ Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but itscfutpyr( breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout //" ,oo'\h< Time Position BOP Step 8 Try To Reenergize The A 4KV BU9.' Generator
~~a. Manually start 3A emergency diesel generator from Control Room~~
OR :c'B,§J2,id start ",.f" ""'" '6'f!\

Norm!al start / ,:
~~3,4"4KV'!:lU9, srri p) ning,*,fr,001 '" , 5" ,'F""'_, , / A 1fr ACHMENi '1'",/ '\<.,~~
c.
SI -RESET ',', synchronize 3A emergency diesel generator to 3A 4KV bus Note: B.a RNO transitions to step 9. 48 b. IF any load can NOT be disconnected from 3A 4KV bus, THEN go to Step 9. d. Locally synchronize 3A emergency diesel generator to 3A 4KV bus using 3-0NOP-023.2, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE, while continuing with Step 9. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.: _6_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel G(,1.n'erajior (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout !i.et' <./ Time Position BOP Step 9 Try To Reenergize The B 4KV Generator
~~a. Manually start 3B emergency diesel generator from Control Room~~
~~Emergenc,%~~
~~st \ OR~~
Rapid start C':\,{jfy SI -RESET synchronize 3B diesel generator to 3B 4KV bus b. IF any load can NOT be disconnected from 3B 4KV bus, THEN go to Step 10. d. Locally synchronize 3B emergency diesel generator to 3B 4KV bus using 3-0NOP-023.2, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE, while continuing with Step 10. Note: 38 EDG breaker will not close from the conso/eand operator will be sent to the EDG to trylocal/y.
~~Operator will report back breaker will not close local/yafter 13 minutes. 49 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:_6_ Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/re[l.ctor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but)t" Time Position BOP breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackoul./tie. Step 10 Check If AC Power Has Been Restored a. Check the 3A and 3B 4KV buses -AT LEAST ONE "":. ENERGIZED Verify required safeguards equipment -OPERATING .+f: '. store AC power *.using the following
LOSS . F BUS LOSS o 3B 4KV BUS 2) WHEN power is restored to the 3A or 3B 4KV bus, THEN observe the CAUTIONS prior to Step 32 and go to Step 32 to perform recovery actions. 3) Observe CAUTION prior to Step 11 AND continue with Step 11. b. Manually start equipment as required.
c. Check if 3-EOP-F-O, c. Implement FRPs as required, unless this procedure was directly entered from outside the EOP network. CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES being monitored FOR INFORMATION ONLY prior to entering 3-EOP-ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER d. Return to procedure AND step in effect 50 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.: _6_ Page of 40 Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Ge r (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it ut t breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout f . Time Position Applicant's Actions or B BOP Continues per 3-0NOP-04.2 Verify 3A 4KV bus stripping using ATTACHMENT 1 b. Check 3A 4KV bus -AUTOMATICALLY REENERGIZED
~~c. Return to procedure and step in effect Note: attachment 1 completed earlier 51 b. Observe CAUTION prior to Step 2 AND go to Step 2.~~
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-.L Event No.: _6_ Page -.l1.. of Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Ge r or CEDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it ut t breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout f . Time Position BOP Step 2 Check 3A 4KV Bus Lockout Relay -RESET CAUTION es out relay. b. IF 3B 4KV bus is energized, THEN perform the following:
1) Determine and correct cause of 3A 4KV bus lockout relay actuation.

2) WHEN cause of 3A 4KV bus lockout relay actuation is determined and corrected, THEN reset lockout relay. c. WHEN 3A 4KV bus lockout relay is reset; THEN observe CAUTION prior to Step 3 AND 0 to Ste 3. If an SI signal exists or is actuated while performing this procedure, it is required to be reset to ensure restoration of a power source and to ensure controlled loading of equipment on the 4KV bus. 52 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: _6_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ti*': .i' Time Position BOP BOP Step 3 Step 4 Applicant's Actions or Behavi6( Verif SI Reset Check 3A Emerghen",y ,...."" Lockout \ Relay -RESET is energized, o determine and corr .. cause of 3A Emergency Diesel Lockout Relay actuation.
b. Locally reset 3A Emergency Diesel Start Failure Relay. c. IF the 3A and 3B 4KV buses are both deenergized, THEN reset 3A Emergency Diesel Lockout Relay. d. IF 3A Emergency Diesel Lockout Relay can NOT be reset, THEN observe NOTE prior to Step 6 AND go to Step 6 . . local relay and lockout reset already attempted will not reset transition to step 6.
NOTE

I tim! SI is reset lJr.lOr 10 closil1Q Startup Transformer LiUS supply breakers stlOuici I I i)eft) to ensure tile (Jl8akers wi/.I close.

________________________
~~1 53 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _6_ Page of 40 Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/re5l:ctor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts 01l'tPut breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the / // Time Position BOP Step 6 Try To Reenergize 3A 4KV Bus From a. Check Unit 3 Startup Transformer Potential White Light on VPA -ON b. Check Unit 3 Startup Transformer Lockout Relay -RESET v . . ... ... fo;TTACHlV'IEN:CJ/":' d.\eril}z .. SI -RESET X\. "a:ctup Transformer SA 4KV Bus 3AA05 (' " " 1) I'){to offsite poVlle.{ to it 3 Sta rtu p ransfo{I)1I'Elr using 3-);i-/"". 0 *Oli-092.3, STARTUP MALFUNCTION.
2) Observe CAUTION and NOTE prior to Step 7 AND go to Step 7. c. WHEN bus stripping is complete, THEN go to Step 6d. I d. Reset SI. f/Close Startup Transformer

f. Locally close breaker. jl 3A 4KV Bus Supply, 3AA05 g. Place Startup Transformer Sync To 3A 4KV Bus 3AA05 to OFF AND remove handle h. Check 3A 4KV ENERGIZED

i. Go to Step 16 54 h. Observe CAUTION and NOTE prior to Step 7 AND go to Step 7.
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:.l Event No.: _6_ Page --.1L of 40 Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/rei;lctor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the p'/' Time Position BOP I ItVhl?J1 Unit :3 startup rra'nsforrn*-r is 3Y'afta.ble, Lislng .3-0-P-C'04.1', SYSTE.hJ
~~PO\/VER.~~
.... ---. -. ,- ---Step 7 Try To ... Startup Startu\, \#, .. /,,/,;1 // . el1 .. 1.potentiaftr .... f\te LI ht on VPJt, -ON \" \ a. Observe CAUTION and NOTE prior to Step 8 AND 0 to Ste 8. ,#'."" ......... "..........#\.' or:,/BlacNout l1e"bii:l,\S, .... be used only 11lrren both the 3A and 3B 4KV ar;!f'tle.energized. ' . ,;V' DUS*,cS are DC'In d'eene:rglzfHi
.cffsit:e pO'l'lf!r and tlnil 3 {3eneratora

are {VtJT aV'aiiabt*!
~~ne<ed.s to be' rezt-ored to at le:a.st~~
~~ti1e.s's 4i<'/ bvoea lfldh.in .,.,0 r:ninuiE'S to satisfy station b}acK'o.ut re*qtn'rernenls.~~
~~critical task: (TC-SBO Analysis)~~
Failure to restore power to 4KV bus from the opposite unit via the SBO within 10 minutes after reading the caution in 3-0NOP-004.2. 55 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:.-L Event No.: _6_ Page -.11L of Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout !it(' 41'/ ,li' \, Time Position BOP Step 8 Determine If Station Blackout Ti Line May Be Used
~~Check 3B 4KV bus -DEENERGIZED , if the Shift A/' ,ger wants to '\ <~~
3A 4KV bus from 4:KV bus using Check 4A and4J? 4KV buses * -AT LEAST16NE'**
~~.... ENERGIZEO\~~
~~\ AlI A(:)tjMENT 2, while ... with this /",. t6 reenergize 3A ,j!' from the following:~~
3A Emergency Diesel using Steps 4 and 5. OR

Unit 3 Startup Transformer using Step 6. OR

Unit 4 Startup Transformer using Step 7. c. WHEN 3A 4KV bus is energized, THEN go to Ste 16. Check 3D 4KV Bus Lockout Perform the following:
Relay -RESET 56 a. Reset 3D 4KV bus lockout relay. b. IF 3D 4KV bus lockout relay can NOT be reset, THEN go to Step 15. { \ Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-.L Event No.:_6_ Page of 40 Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor Time Position BOP trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel r (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but t breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ",,/ Step 10 _f' /f" J Check 3D 4KV Bus - the following: TO 3A 4KV BUS ,/' / ,i'"
Supply From 4KV Bus 3A, . 3AD01 -CLOSED

Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D, 3AA 17 -Ope r To 4KV Bus Supply From 4KV "". 'h 3B",,3AD06
":\,,-\\" c. Clos9""Sup{(ly From 4KV * ... 1 To 4KV Bus , j e. IF 3D 4KV bus can NOT \. ertf)("Station Blackout Blue Light For StaftCln 81 q ckout Breaker, 3AD07!c:/d N 57 \, be aligned to 3A 4KV bus, \ THEN 0 to Step 15. Perform the following:
~~a. Open the following breakers:~~
3AA02, Auxiliary Transformer 3A 4KV Bus Supply

3AA05, Startup Transformer 3A 4KV Bus Supply

3AA20, 3A Emergency Diesel To 3A 4KV Bus

3AA22, 3A 4KV Bus Emergency Tie To Unit 4 Startup Transformer
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _6_ . Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but its oytPu1,.* breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout tie. f' Time Position BOP Step 12 Check 4D 4KV Bu ENERGIZED
All 10. akers on 3A and 3t::A. , , -es "" , , )J:f IF>station blackout permissive ,f , .* f" fian NOT bi.sfied, THEN \, "\.p to Ste .,' --------11 " Perfo?n:;l the ..* following: " '\ '\, ic..,
~~RO to , bus using f4.;: .. LOSS OF 4D 4K\J*'Bkj.S*.~~
~~b. IF 4D 4KV bus can NOT be energized, THEN go to Step 15. tMion exisfs,. fO'?6il'1g 0,'1 each Unit '" Emergency~~
... ratar shall .be' limited ta 3695 Kit!'. 44;'<11 bas supplying powe'i'" to the' 40 4KV bus is energized by an EOG n Blac({cHt Breaker 4A007 is non-I'l.mning safe-guards the bus supplying pO>l"er snouJd be plii'lced in PUL.L-TO-LOCK or t <ltlltost<ltrt and possibte o'lerioa.d of the FOG. 4KV bus is being powered from unit 4 58 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-.L Event No.: _6_ . Page.2L of Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Generator Time Position BOP (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but its breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout tie. Step 13 Applicant's Actions or Behaviop;f _4' Check 4KV Bus Supplying Power To 4D 4KV ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE/' a¥ft only onefl;Jnit 4 4KV bus is POWER ( f'," from an one of ',<
~~j. /' -'\,1.)~~
that the Unit 4 RO \/;}as'Gompleted Step 2 of " \, AttacHl1Jent 2 of 4-EOP-'\" ES-0,,1. '6'R that Unit 4 RO has completed Step 3 of Attachment 2 of 4-0NOP-004. b. IF the Unit 4 RO has not completed one of the above, THEN wait until complete AND go to Step 14. c. Have the Unit 4 RO place non-running safeguards equipment in LOCK or STOP on the Unit 4 4KV bus supplying the 4D 4KV Bus. d. IF loads can NOT be reduced, THEN go to Step 15. CAUTION If offsite power to the Unit 4 4KV bus supplying power to the 4D 4KV Bus is lost after Station Blackout Breaker 4AD07 is closed, the associated EDG output breaker will NOT close until 4AD07 has been opened. 59 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.:_6_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but its ou ut Time bus restored breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout tie. Position BOP Step 14 Applicant's Actions or Beh Try To Re-energize 3A 4KV Bus Line Close Station Black a. 3AD07 using keylock Number 82) b. Go to Step 1.5. BOP Step 15 CAUTION Is is the t bus restored following a loss of offsite power, Load Centers shall energized as directed in the applicable Emergency Operating Procedures or in OP*004, LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER. Locally verify no breaker targets exist on 3A 4KV bus breakers 60 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: L Event No.: _6_ Page of A!L Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel G er or (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it out t II -ril"Y'\e Position US breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout Step 18 a. Go to procedure in effe to Centers 61 ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.:_6_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Ge er or (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it ut t breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout f . ime Position RO Note: US continues in 3*EOP*ECA*0.0, the 3A 4KV bus, Transition will Step 11 recovery actions.
~~co a' ent coolers -STOP .....~~
filter fans -STOP AND OPEN Breaker Emergency Containment Filter Fan 3B, on MCC 3D e: 'RO places all listed pumps and coolers / fans in pull to lock. Directs NSO to open breaker 30806 on MCC3D. 62 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.:_6_ Page of 40 Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor Time Position trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but' 0 breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackou RO Step 12 Check Status Of Unit 4 High Head SI Pumps a. Check CCW supply for Un High Head SI Pumps -ALIGNED TO UNIT 3 OR S cooling based on ess than 30°F [210°F] OR
PRZ Level -can NOT be maintained greater than 17% [50%] e. WHEN CCW is aligned to Unit 4 High Head SI pumps, THEN verify MOV-3-843A OR MOV-3-8438 open AND start the Unit 4 High Head SI Pumps as required 63 WHEN CCW is aligned to Unit 4 High Head SI Pumps, THEN place the Unit 4 High Head SI Pumps in Standby. Go to Step 13.
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _6_ Page -.1.1.. of 40 Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but its breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout tie.(/ I Time Position RO RO Applicant's Actions or 8ehavi Note: CCW to unit 4 SI pumps is alignedto./.tl** Note: MOV-3-843A and MOV-3-843B w loss. Opening requires local Directs NSO to locally open Step 13 ,. " Locally Close V;rrves .. To Isolate ',( _' "" '''''''''''''--_' "_', """""0",),
~~3-297A, RCP . .Q Manuallsplatien Valve '\'.,~~
~~""%,-"-"-,,,,.,- ':'" ,'\--. ** -';;\~~
3-297B, RCP Valve

3-297C, RCP C Valve
__ .",,,,_ \ ._,;.':/:"" RCP Return And Excess Letdown f ........ JS'olaliQn (" i' \ i \ \ /". RCP C6plin Water Outlet Valve .* SIG Status isolation 8F\pj;}-ypass valves -CLOSED b. Main feedwater control and bypass valves -CLOSED c. SIG blowdown isolation valves -CLOSED Manually close valves. IF valves can NOT be manually closed, THEN locally close valves. CAUTIONS A faufted or ruptured S/G that is isolated shall remain isolated. Steam supply to the AFW pumps must be maimained from at leasl one intact SIG. 64 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.:_6_ Page of..1Q... Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard 3A Emergency Diesel Ge er (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it ut t Time breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout t' Position RO Step 15 Applicant's Actions or B Check If S/Gs Are NOT Faulted a. Check pressures in all S/Gs b. Control AFW flow to maintain narrow range level between 15%[32%] and 50% c. Narrow range level -LESS THAN 50% 65 a. Maintain maximum AFW flow until narrow range level greater than 6%[32%] in at least one S/G. c. Stop feed flow to any S/G with narrow range level greater than 50%. IF narrow range level in any S/G continues to increase in an uncontrolled manner, THEN go to Step 19. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _6_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ti*e. t" J/' Time Position RO RO Applicant's Actions or .. f Step 17 /" ,;!;/ ///)' Check If S/G Tubes Are f?-ffF'
Condenser air ejector radiatiori, R-15 -/ § NORMAL '. /J' p/ \'c. .i?

S/G blowdo?,.r diation, R

ERDADS A " NORMAL 1; 0' S te p,f1'S,/,""'" '-.., /' -f-_fr/ '\
~~24. ,) Go to Step 19.~~
'6f IJ.*riA to be performed within the first 60 minutes of a l'Oss of a.lt"AC power event if both the 3A 1 and 3A2 battery chargers are inoperable. ""\. *****',l;' Cneck DC Bus Loads a. Direct operator to reduce DC bus loading as necessary using ATTACHMENT
~~3. b. Dispatch personnel to periodically monitor Note: Attachment 3 listed next for reference.~~
Only step 3 currently applies. No communication will be given back during scenario. 66 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.: _6_ Page .IL of 40 Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor Time Position trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Ge (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it ut breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout f . ATTACHMENT 3 (Page Iocr::) !f. 3A 1 battery charger and 3A2 battery charger are a. Go to 12!iV DC Bus :?IDG1. is jn Standby .. It!5!::!. place Breaker :3DG1-48. Feed to 3A Si.:Wo in OFF. !f. AS hw' .EF is in 5Ioodb)' .. piace Breaker 3001-54. Feed to AS Stetic kwerter. in OFF. ihe fu1iawing breakers on Pane'; Df' 312 in lhe OFF posi!ioo; DP 312. Brea1!er 4. AC 0\\' DC Feed to LP 39. fO\\' the Unit:3 Spent Fuel Pit area li9il1iing. 2} DP 312. BrellAer 6. AC (IT DC Feed to LP37, flN Unit:3 Coolainment li9hling. 67 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.:_6_ Page of 40 Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor Time trip followed by a loss of the switchyard 3A Emergency Diesel Ge (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it ut breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout f . Position Applicant's Actionc:: nr K,l'>h:: ATTACHMENT 3 (Page ZO'f21 2. If 381 Nltery charger and 382 battsry ct",arger
4. a. GO' to 125V DC Sus 3D2*3. Add makeup to the CST from any available source using 3-OP-018.1, CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK, OR consult with the TSC for available methods for filling CST. CAUTIONS I; SIG pressures shall NOT be to I" .. s than 80 psig to prevent ifljectkm of accumulator nitrogen i.n-to the RCR II SiG ThilITOW range level is required toO be maintained greater than 6%[32%J in at least one fnta<!t StG.. If level o.an NOT be maintained, S/G depressuril'iftion is required to beS'topped unfflle"E'l is restored in at teast one SIG. 68
~~" \. ( Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-0-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_6_ Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it§, .. ,o'Utpitlt breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout tj,e:' <",.', ,,:; "' Time Position I .
I

RO Step 26 3/G.s it'!'e reqUire'a to be depre$.$urize.d
~~t,t n tODS. Manually dump steam at rate using S/G steam dump to atmosphere valves c. Check RCS cold leg temperatures~~
-GREATER THAN 350°F 69 rna'Y OCctN' due I 1) Maintain maximum AFW flow until narrow range level greater than 6%[32%] in at least one S/G. 2) WHEN narrow range level greater than 6%[32%] in at least one S/G, THEN do Steps 26b, 26c, 26d and 26e. Continue with Step 27. c. Perform the following:
~~1) Control S/G steam dump to atmosphere valves to stop S/G depressurization.~~
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _6_ Page...1Q.. of 40 Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor Time Position RO trip followed by a loss of the switchyard 3A Emergency Diesel tor (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but' 0 ut breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackou Step 27 d. Check S/G pressures -LESS THAN 180 PSIG steam dump to atmosphere valves to stop S/G depressurization and allow RCS to heat up. rur.i;,am:m of SlGs wili relJ%..lit in SI aclttaticm. SI fa to beresel to permit I ffJiidil'rg of equipment 0.1"1 4KV buses, I ---------------- ______ 1 Check SI Signal Status a. SI -HAS BEEN ACTUATED b. Verify SI-RESET 70 a. WHEN SI actuated, THEN do Steps 28b, 29, 30 and 31. Continue with Step 32. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: -.2.... Event No.:_6_ Page of 40 Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor Time Position RO RO trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Geperatpr jP' . ./ (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout tiJir( .f,i* Step 29 Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve White Lights VPB -ALL BRIGHT a.tJ'nit 3 containment purge ..... and supply fans -'**\, .. OF'!'; ,. ". b. V . (};entrol Room venation status panel -PROPER EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION ALIGNMENT 71 '\ IF containment . olati,on phase A valve is QT dqsed, THEN martqally'<;lose valve. IF . NOT be . Ll,£lIlY closed, THEN *'rn.*lotl'ally or locally isolate affected containment enetration.
~~a. Manually stop fans. b. Manually align equipment for Control Room emergency recirculation.~~
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.: _6_ Page -.R of 40 Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss ofthe switchyard 3A Emergency Diesel ne tor Position RO (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but' so breaker fails to close re uirin the crew to use the blackou Step 31 Applicant's Ar.tj*,. In!':: nrRAI,:: Check Containment Pressure -HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 20 PSIG
~~PR-3-6306A~~
~~a. PR-3-6306B . Verify con inm t isolation phase whit igh on VPB -ALL ,~~
isolation phase alve THEN anually close valve. IF valve(s) can NOT be manually closed THEN manually or locally isolate the affected containment penetration. are operating Of! iii single train" one of the pumps needs to be OfN? nour of the initial start signal tlsing j-OP-075, AUXILIARY TEM. 6.2, " I two AFW trains are OfJ'f!l"iiI'til1g and one of tI'fe AFW pump!; has been openting *tn an a,'erage flow of les6 than 60 gpm, file pump should be' 6hut OOwn within eootIF of operating iii le6.5 thiifl 60 gpm IJsing J*QP-075, AUXILIARY EDWA TER SYSTEM, Subseciion 6.2. Check Core Exit TCs -LESS THAN 1200°F 72 IF core exit temperatures greater than 1200°F AND increasing, THEN go to SACRG-1, SEVERE ACCIDENT CONTROL ROOM GUIDELINE INITIAL RESPONSE, Step 1. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: _6_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ,./ Time Position BOP Step 33 Check If 4KV Bus Power Is Restored a. Check 3A and 3B 4KV buses -AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED FROM THE 3A OR 3B .* "0'0':;>,.<:,,,,-,. ?'V"",,,,,,,<
b. Check 3A and 3B 4KV buses -AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED 73 b. '-> IF Unit 3 )<!J bVlis being fed from ", e tion Blackout Tie "AN NL Y ONE Unit 4 4'K \5 is energized ANl:9 .... from,an EDG, THEN .... perforl'l;) " fj"St*;lbilize S/G """"ipressures by setting S/G steam dump to atmosphere valve controllers to maintain S/G pressures stable OR by manually controlling S/G steam dump to atmosphere valves to maintain stable S/G pressure.

2) Go to Attachment 4 of this procedure.
~~Continue to control RCS conditions and monitor plant status: 1) Check status of local actions:~~
4KV bus power restoration

RCP seal isolation

DC power supply Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.:_6_ Page 34 of 40 Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Ge r (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it ut t Time Position breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout f Stabilize S/G Pressures
~~a. Set S/G steam dump to atmosphere valve controllers to maintain S/G pressures~~
-STABLE 74 4) Locally perform 0-ONOP-025.3, DC EQUIPMENT AND INVERTER ROOM SUPPLEMENTAL COOLING. 5) Observe CAUTION prior to Step 15 AND return to Ste 15. a. Manually control S/G steam dump to atmosphere valve(s) to maintain stable S/G ressure. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:_6_ Page of 40 Event
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Ge r (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but its ut Time Position BOP breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ti Applicant's Actions or , Steady state roiifding on each Unit 3 Em exceed 2500 KW. Load transients up 10 additional equipment ,. Steady state (oiifding 0.11 .each Unit 4 E yell Step 35 exceed 2874 KW. Lo.ad transients up to 31 additional equipment Verify The Folio 'ng Buses oom Air Conditioners ne AUXiliary Building Exhaust Fan Spent Fuel Pit Exhaust Fan Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Water Pump i. Radiation Monitors Unit 3 SFP SPING
Plant Vent SPING

SJAE SPING 75 Manually close load control center breakers to energize 480 volt load centers.
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.: _6_ Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Ge r or (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it ut t breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout f . ime Position Applicant's Actio,,>:> 'U' L.}t;;' , RO Step 36 Select Recovery Procedure
a. Verify SI NOT required OF ALL AC POWER RECOVERY 1 CAUTION ther offsite power is lost or 51 actuation occurs on the other unit, ay be required to restore safeguards equipment to the required I SF status trees are required to be monitored for information only. FRPs shall NOT be I
~~_____________ I RO Step 1 Verify SI reset 76 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.: _6_ Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor Time Position RO RO trip followed by a loss of the switchyard 3A Emergency Diesel n ator (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but' so breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackou Step 2 Applicant's Actions or Dt::lldVII Check RWST Level -GREATER THAN 155,000 GALLONS c. Go to Step 3. Manually align valves to establish proper SI ali nment. Thermal Barrier CCW Isolation Status RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Outlet, MOV-3-626 -CLOSED a. Observe CAUTION prior to Step 5 AND go to Step 5. b. Manually isolate CCW from RCP thermal barriers: 77
~~Close RCP Thermal barrier CCW Outlet, MOV-3-626.~~
OR
~~Locally close CCW return manual isolation valve outside containment, 3-736.~~
~~Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:---.L Event No.: _6_ Page...l1L of Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/re5l;ctor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ti.e(" {i/' Time Position BOP ,,'f'-CAUTION Steady state loading on each Unit 3 shall NOT exceed 2500 KW. Load transients up to 2750 Kw.are agceptable when ing additional equipment. <' .. \\, Step """ 5 Manually Load I 4 ke'C)GQling Water Energized Buses a. b. '\-. water pumps j"" /" To T close valve(s). IF -ISOL*, TE .' valve(s) can NOT be / \\ closed, THEN locally close 1 the following valve(s): -_ .. F ChecK intake cooling water c. headers -TIED TOGETHER 3-50-319 for POV-3-4882
3-50-339 for POV-3-4883 IF both intake cooling water headers are intact, THEN direct operator to tie headers to ether. t>l6te: starts A and C ICW pumps f/ CAUTION CCW System load requirements of 3*0NOP*030
~~.. COMPONENT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTION, SHALL NOT be exceeded. 78 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _6_ Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel GSn'f' ..... r (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but t breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout <./ Time Position RO Step 6 Manually Load Component Cooling Water Pumps On Energized Buses a. CCW Heat THREE IN SERVICE 9: Check CCW headers -TIED ITOGETHER Note: Starts A and C CCW pumps 79 ,.pr stop CCW PUtTIRS as.,necessary to establ'ish O:NL Y ONE 1-'("14.1:\.1 1\.1 P U M P. .. ,-",-,,,,. i ,J 2').I!..0'hly two CCW Heat Exchangers are in service and MOV-3-749A and MOV-3-749B are open, two CCW Pumps are required to be maintained in PULL-TO-LOCK
3) Go to Step 6c. b. Start or stop CCW pumps as necessary to establish ONLY TWO RUNNING CCWPUMPS.

c. I F both CCW headers .are intact, THEN direct operator to tie headers to ether.
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: _6_ Page 40 of Event~~
~~Description:~~
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor Time Position trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel G91 r (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout !ie':f ,// f- .. ,\ Applicant's Actions or Behavio£;"J'/ ======= RO Step 7 Realign SI System ;/1' f ' a. Verify Unit 3 high-head SI ,/ PerforljA,lhEj.:loliowing: pumps -TWO RUNNING \, .. , .... '<.,\.,,////"'/. "'", 1) Qperate Unit 3 and Unit "" 4'hjgh-head SI pumps '!.p es,tpblish injection to UhiJ 3frpm two heaCl\?I/pumps. DI Unit 4 RCO to . n Unit 4 high-head SI pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using ATTACHMENT 1 of this procedure.
~~3) Go to Step 8. 't:!ote,:~~
2 HHSI pumps from unit3, directs \, l\attachituynt 1 to be completed 1 "f Take shift from crew to end scenario 80 ( NRC XXIV NRC SEN 2 OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Field Supv.: Admin RCO: Unit 3 Unit Supv.: RCO: NPO: Plant Status Unit 3 Mode: Power: 50 MWe: 334 Gross Leakrate: .02 RCS Boron Cone: 831 )perational Concerns Maintaining 50% at System request/S'chedule<:I .. !o return 3C charging pump is out of serviy((f?:,):pfepal'l'&. back Thunderstorms are in the area" f . \ Focus Area: Maintain 50% Inside SNPO: Outside SNPO: ANPO: Unit Supv.: RCO: ( I Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 50 Gross: .02 A 6614 pi'\" MWe: 334 Unidentified .01 B 6631)/ if> Tavg: 558.2 Charging Pps: .01 C E?,620,,/ RCS Pressure: 2251 RCS Boron Cone: 831 Abnormal Annunciators: ,.,;f"/,"\,/i P* "\\", 'ii"", Annunciator: 7/ "'<""" ('ii/\. Comp Actions: Annunciator: "'\,,", Comp Actions: -(:, 7/ Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: "<"" *"v f .""",;,J"" Comp Actions: Annunciator: . \"'/',\"'\'" .*. ,,,,,, .. Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: "" .* ii"'*"""""'*'"", Annunciator: \"\1 \\\ ";:: Comp Actions: Annunciator: ii,/,li/i', """""'""", \\\, /)" Comp Actions: Annunciator: """"""",,,,\,,,,, """,."",,/,:,;,:,;\" Comp Actions: ,/,/' ', .. ,' '\,,,. "\\,,\ Current l{ch$llec Acti"Oll St'hiemeifts: (BJ)es Not Include "For Trackin2 Only Items" .\\,\ \ii. \,'\.,> ReasoIT'l.,. t i. Entry i* Reason: i llil)" Entry Date: T.S.A.S / Component, >/// Reason:* Entry Date: T.S.A.S / Component: ',' Reason: Entry Date: T.S.A.S / Component: Reason: ( Entry Date: T.S.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: ( 13 train protected both units .)nline risk is green Upcoming Reactivit U Evolutions or Com Unit 3 Status ment: General Remarks, ijihdpperator Work Around Status: Aux. steam supp.ly aligned from.Jtfnit .. Condenser inleak'age . -'" ,./ 'A TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Facility: Turkey Point Examiners: Initial Conditions: Mode 1, 100% MOL Scenario No.: Candidates: 3 mod OpTest No.: Turnover: Equipment OOS: 3C charging pump out of service due to packing leaka hours. Thunder storms are in the area. Maintain 100% On line risk is green B train protected Event Event Type* No. 2 3 4 TFH1TV59 = T (I)SRO I RO .TVFCLK1 = 0.020000 TFS1MAML = T Tr . A and B AFW fail to auto start 1 2009-301 US RO BOP TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #3 Event 1 -L T-3-459 fails low isolating letdown, deenergizing pressurizer heaters, and driving 38 charging pump to full speed. The crew responds per the ARPs and 3-0 P-41.6 Pressurizer level control malfunction. Event 2 -The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphe condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014 a stabilize condenser vacuum. Event 3 -Following the load reduction, PT-3-447 fails 10 insertion. The crew will respond per per 3-A and then 3-0NOP-049.1 to address the faile 2 ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Scenario XXIV NRC 3 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup Restore IC-1 (Mode 1 MOL) Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIV_NRC_3.lsn Place simulator in run Start 38 charging pump and secure 3C charging pump .. '\: "'\ '<8<, \. "\. :;;'\ Trigger lesson step: SETUP -3C Charging pump, . charging purftp",/' service, blocks AFV:'( a start'fandJaiis POV-4882 as IS. (Actuates TAB1POSM = RACK'Q ABI)Jl270,;=/O, TABM291 = 0, TABM290 = 0, TFKC882A = T, TFF5AFAF = T:'Q;fF5AFBF,)"'T) Place simulator in freeze. --,. " '\\"'" \ :> 3 ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Event 1 -LT-3-4S9 FAIL LOW Initiated immediately after shift turnover. L T-3-459 fails low isolating letdown, deenergizing pressurizer heaters, and driving 38 charging pump to full speed. The crew responds per the ARPs and 3-0NOP-041.6 Pressurizer level control malfunction. When directed -Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 -LT-3-459 FAIL LOW (Actuates TFH1TV59 = T) If called -Respond as AOM or wee, Acknowledge L T-3-459 f* 4 ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Event 2 -LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphere resulting in lowering condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014 and reduces unit load to stabilize condenser vacuum. When directed, Trigger lesson step EVENT 2 -LOSS OF CONDENSE (actuates TVFCLK1 = .020000) The Crew responds per 3-0NOP-014 Main Condenser Loss of VacuIJ 3-0NOP-014 /)<':-' Step 4.1 -Respond as Turbine Operator, Acknowledge the steam (SlAE) hogging jet in service. Wait one ig?er
~~step, t'"" PLACE SJAE IN SERVICE. Inform controJ.*too.lTi hoggmg] n serVIce after 3 .' minutes. ( . Step 5.1 -Respond as Turbine Operator, Acknowledge 045. No action required.~~
after 3 m'ifi!lte 3-0NOP-100 Step 3 -Respond as System Dispatcher, condenser efer to 0-EPIP-201 01 and 0-ADM-115. 5 ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Event 3 -PT-3-447 FAIL LOW Following the load reduction, PT-3-447 fails low resulting in continuous control rod insertion. The crew will respond per per 3-ARP097.CR to place rod control in manual and then 3-0NOP-049. 1 to address the failed channel. When directed -Trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -PT-3-447 FAIL TFS1 MAML=T)/,f ... ::,/jf If called -Respond as AOM or wee, Acknowledge PT-3-447 6 ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Event 4 -3C S/G FAULT I RUPTURE 3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV-4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The crew will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and transition to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate the faulted steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addressed per Steam Generator Tube Rupture. J/f.f:} i/ ji" ,j/ /4 When directed -Trigger lesson step EVENT 4 -3C S/G FAULT I (actuates TVSBVL 15 = 0.2600, TVHHSGC = 3.0000) "\" 3-EOP-E-O attachment 3 Step 17 -acknowledge direction to place PAHM in
Trigger lesson step, PLACE PAHM IN §.e'R)It E

After 5 minutes inform CR steps 7.1. // ,Q'ugh 3 are complete

Request CR continue with step 7.1 '\,

Acknowledge direction to complete,I,ine'tlp after is completed

After 5 minutes report to CR that is\tgf teo 3-EOP-FR-S.1 Step 3.3 RNO -Acknowledge directiQ,p After 5 minutes, Trigger's'
CR when completed. "'-" AF SS-3-O'O'7. tep;'Al..IGN TRAlN 1,AFW. Report to "\'\c ,d ff Step 3.f -Acknowledge qJreetiQ,Q, to open, ' -,t 5 bres(/3DO'1-27 and verify valve closed minute\, lesson step, OPEN MOV-3-1405 ",. ..f/:' "" \, \" % BRE E;,R: Inforil;1 CF when oompleted. J Step 6.a/b - as direction to take periodic activity of 1 readings. c ;/ '" ,."", .. :I,,.1/'* .. /:it# -'c' ,:,,: Physics, Acknowledge direction to take radiation / re'i:I9Jngs&[l '. in steam lines. '*::. %\'\. -""t ........ . 2.a -Respond"iPs Radiation Protection, Acknowledge direction to take radiation . readiry9s,bn main steam lines. "\"', ._< ,,_.,,/ _II Step 2:, ... p "s Chemistry, Acknowledge direction to sample steam lines for ""acli Ity \; <,,,. "" ""if' Step 5.b RNO -Respond as NSO, Acknowledge direction to use 3-EOP-E-3 attachment 5 to align aux. steam supply from unit 4. After 5 minutes, Report to CR attachment 5 alignment complete. No action required. 7 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_1_ Page_1_of Event
~~Description:~~
LT-3-459 fails low isolating letdown, deenergizing pressurizer heaters, and driving 3B charging pump to full speed. The crew responds per and 3-0NOP-041.6 Pressurizer level control malfunction. "' ' Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Tri er lesson step EVENT 1 -LT-3-4S9 FAIL LOVY RO Recognizes the failure of L T-3-459 based and informs the US: BOP / *
Alarm A 9/3, Pzr control hi/loV\{ Alarm A 9/4, Pzr low Ivl htr & \,

Alarm A 8/4, Pzr 10-10 level ale'

Alarm A 6/6, Seal wtr inj fltr hii'1 P /"""""

Alarm G 1/2, G'ngpum}l,Qi speed "\
~~_ ' ,~~
~~Alarm B 3/1, pi'{ h' ter"contr'fa,Q off t '"" '.~~
~~'t \.~~
~~CV-3-200A, p valve';"Qosure'~~
'\ /.?'''', . """:
~~C\(.:.3::j60, Hi press"w "isolaliotlLiclosure~~
,,_;/;jf'-: _ '\,_ .;If'Pressurizer heaters'secure ,,/ /';,. . ----"\-\,. \t t: //'. /LI-3-45 P 4 r level channel, pe ed low s./A 9/3 and A\9/4"direct response for failed level control malfunction. se

I NOTES r Level t,,1aifunctioh is a result of a failure of the 3-459CX or 3-460CX . ted by a loss of letdown flow with a loss of Pressurizer Heaters with no I of Level Transmitters 3-459A, 3-460, 3-461), use 3-ONOP-003.6 or 3-460CX failure. OR 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 4, for 3-459CX ance for establishing Letdown flow and Pressurizer Heaters, on relays 3-459CX or 3-460CX are used to restore Letdown flow and comply with Tech Spec Action Statement 3.4.3 Action b. the manual control of Heaters from the Electrical penetration room is used, comply with Tech Spec Action Statement 3.4.3 Action a. -----------------

______ 1 5.1 Check pressurizer level indicators LI-3-460 AND LI-3-461, 5.1.1 IF one level indicator deviates significantly from the others, THEN place CHANNEL SELECT PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL switch in a position that will NOT include the defective channel. 1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _1_ Event
~~Description:~~
LT-3-459 fails low isolating letdown, deenergizing pressurizer heaters, and driving 3B charging pump to full speed. The crew responds per t and 3-0NOP-041.6 Pressurizer level control malfunction. Position Applicant's Actions or Behavio Note: RO will select channel 2 or3 to remo RO Step 5.2.1 5-'5 5("':'1 575
~~t' 2 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _1_ Page2-of Event~~
~~Description:~~
LT-3-459 fails low isolating letdown, deenergizing pressurizer heaters, and Time driving 3B charging pump to full speed. The crew responds per th and 3-0NOP-041.6 Pressurizer level control malfunction. Position Applicant's Actions or Behavio RO Step 5.4 IF LR-3-459 is selected to a defective CHANNEL SELECT PRESSURIZ L another position. Note: LR-3-459 is selected to an RO Step 5.5.1 10 Isol Vlv from Loop B Cold Leg eturn Lower Pressure Letdown Control Valve, PC\l3-145 t utomatic. contro alfunction caused pressurizer heaters to deenergize, EN restore PRZ heaters to automatic operation or take manual ntrol. 5.8 Maintain pressurizer level to be consistent with programmed level as indicated in Enclosure
~~1. US Step 5.9 Perform actions required by 3-0NOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION CHANNELS.~~
~~3 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.: _1_ Page --1. of l Event~~
~~Description:~~
L T-3-459 fails low isolating letdown, deenergizing pressurizer heaters, and Time driving 3B charging pump to full speed. The crew responds per th and 3-0NOP-041.6 Pressurizer level control malfunction. Position Applicant's Actions or Dt::llld\l'11. US Directs the actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 BOP US ,...--------------- I NOTES
~~Momentary spiking of a channel that quick! t imminent channel failure. The bistable for t tripped position as soon as possible.~~
with ma' for further investigation by lee, n exist on the adjacent channels plicable control transfer switches are in the position . ates the failed loop. F a control function was placed in manual control due to the Ilure, THEN verif the control function is returned to automatic. Note: LC-459G will stay in manual until Pzr level is restored to Step 5.5 Refer to Technical Specifications 3/4.3, Instrumentation, AND verify the minimum channels operable. 4 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.:_1_ Page20 f L Event
~~Description:~~
L T-3-459 fails low isolating letdown, deenergizing pressurizer heaters, and Time Position driving 3B charging pump to full speed. The crew responds per and 3-0NOP-041.6 Pressurizer level control malfunction. FUNCTIONAL UNIT 'l. Manuai Reacior Trip L P'mver Neutron Fiu::.:' a. High
~~b. Low Setpeint 3.~~
~~Raf;ge, Neutron Flux 4, Source-Range. Neutron Frux a. Startup h-.~~
~~c. SI-rutdown O .... elie-P1oerature~~
.:1 T 7, TOTAL NO (lFCHANNELS , ? ',"-1##,2 1##,2 2# 3,4,5 3" 5'" 1,2 13 2 13 2hoop 2floop 2hoop 2il-oop channels one less tllan the Total nurn]}er of channel's, TUP andior PO\<VER ()PER4,IION may proceed provided the inqperahlH channel is in tile tripped cOllclition 'Nilhin 6 r,oo[s, For su!;sequen! required DiGITAL NEt o PER", TIONAl TESTS the inoperabloe ch,annei may ;)8 place(\ in tatusf.;;;;[ LIP to 4 h,ours '\. '\ functional unit # 9, action 13 6 hrs. to tri bistables Take appropriate actions as specified in Technical Specifications. CAUTION Tl7e failed channel bistable(s) is required to be placed in the tripped mode within 6 hours of the failure determination, except if other channel bistable(s) are in the tripped or test position and would result in an undesired Engineered Safety Features actuation or Reactor Trip actuatiol), The overall effect of a failure of this type is a reduction of instrumentation redundancy and, therefore, a possible reduction In plant protection. 5 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
LT-3-459 fails low isolating letdown, de energizing pressurizer heaters, and driving 3B charging pump to full speed. The crew responds per thO' 1-\, ",r Time Position BOP and 3-0NOP-041.6 Pressurizer level control malfunction. Step 5.11 Applicant's Actions or IF any other channel has failed, T trip bistables for the failed chan 5.11.1 IF plant conditions a su associated with the f . ed without an undesired R perform the following: C -CONTROL RELATED P -RX PROTECTION RELATED S '_ SAFETY INJEcTION RELATED Ref Owgs 5G10-T-l1. Sh 18; 5610-T.O.15 TION p c LOGIC AFFECTED pre.Sosl..Hizer hlgh le .... e! (92%). wiVl p.i' a.11!sfled causing rMctor tn s' nal "re' Qf the Eagle 21 'System. Annunciator J 7:4. EAGLE 21 TROUBLE expectoeod when the apphcable d in the tnpp-eod 6 ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: _2_ Page _1_ of -.lL Event
~~Description:~~
The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphere resulting in Time lowering condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014 reduces unit load to stabilize condenser vacuum. Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior/ ,.;I..'" "".J'' Tri er lesson step EVENT 2 -LOSS OF BOP Determines condenser vacuum lowering
Main condenser vaCL\ *

US Directs response per 3-QNOP-014 BOP '\". , .........
,,"' .. y I .... N \. Hot water may be emitte'4 fr2lfJ1 the injury. \*t.. """;;,.****** .. ".h -\ \ >f I for personnel . 19 Jet Valve. 3-30-043. .' .. ly*to Hogging Jet Valve. 3-30-44, to obtain 250 to 260 Ig l3-PI-l:J97) supply pressure. (pen the Condenser Air Removal to Hogging Jet Valve, 3-30-010. %, . -------------------. NOTES ...,.ll\\ EoI' the re inder of this procedure, the mosl conservative of the following three i1dicalions of Main Condenser vacuum should be used to determine the appropriate I actions: and PI-3-1406 on VPA iitJDPSA105-3 on ERDADSIWTime DDPSA 105-3 on WTime indicates Main Condenser bac/{pressure. vacuum from backpressure: To determine I I L _ __ _ ______ 1 BOP Step 5.1 Close Ho in Jet Drain, 3-30-045 BOP Step 5.2 IF only one set of SJAEs is in service. place the standby set in service using Attachment I. Note: all SJAEs are in service. 7 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.: _2_ Page .2. of JL Event
~~Description:~~
The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphere resulting in Time lowering condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014 reduces unit load to stabilize condenser vacuum. Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi BOP Step 5.3 IF vacuum can NOT be maintained by th reduce turbine load as necessary usin 300 :134 4ifJ .LOAD-MW rects response per 3-0NOP-1 00 Brief Control Room Personnel Using Attachment 3 Attachment 3 included next for reference. 8 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.: _2_ Event
~~Description:~~
The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphere resultin lowering condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014 Time Position US reduces unit load to stabilize condenser vacuum. Applicant's Actions or Behavior J (Page 1 of 1) TIme to, Sl!utdoWllfnm no mil!! 7M\Vfm1m 3. 9 ( ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _2_ Page...1. of Event
~~Description:~~
The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphere resultillg in lowering condenser vacuum. The crew responds per reduces unit load to stabilize condenser vacuum...//' / if "j'# Time Position RO < Step 2 Begin Boration boration is not required, THEN go to a. Set the Boric Acid determined using Attachment
b. Set FC-3-113A,J2.pric Acid Flow Controller to al"ot"setting of 8.0 \"

c. Place the Switch to BORA ltE' ""'0 Step 3 d. Place the RCS M Cq,rftrq);,*, .. , .. ,.,***** SWttcR*.tp START \,i,i ,f """",)'/ No te:;Step'
'2, aci tot;jlizer is set as follows: _J"' . tel\ the determined amount of lder by perft)nning the , wl amount using numeric keypad. 180 Press ENT. Press COlJNT A. Press LIl\!fIT 1 and verify desired amount was properly entered. (7) Press COUNT A. 10 ( ( Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2-Event No.:_2_ Page .Q. of JL Event
~~Description:~~
The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphere resulting in lowering condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014 reduces unit load to stabilize condenser vacuum. Time Position BOP Step 3 Notify The Following
System Dispatcher

Plant personnel using the P e BOP Step 4 Reduce Unit Loa p a. Check for borat (reducing Tavg) Monitor Annunciator B 8/1, ROD BANK LO LIMIT -RESET 11 d. Stop or slow power reduction to control temperature.
~~If necessary, place control rods in manual and maintain Tavg within the expected TavglTref t::.. T of Attachment~~
3. Perform the following:

a. Slow load reduction until alarm is reset. b. Re-evaluate boration amount and rate and make adjustments as necessary.
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _2_ Event~~
~~Description:~~
The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphere resulting in Time Position US RO/ BOP lowering condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-Ol reduces unit load to stabilize condenser vacuum. Step 6 Applicant's Actions or Behavio /,Ji\i;" \\ /" ) Notify The Shift Manager To Refer To lhE}J!C;lIowing / / '\
0-EPIP-20101, DUTIES

0-ADM-115, NOTIFICATIO
> "J"." ./" Note: Respond as SM to refer to proced¥s ifflfrected """c.> ..... ---------------, "",NOTE i, I I I Axial flux difference is aI/owed reduction without , entering O-OP-059.9, Operation I Space. _______ _ ________ J t \ . ./,::., ",'!i'/'

~~CO;'?/;~~

Step 7 9l1e<;j<,'PlanJ Re,sponse \ ,-:iY-F "\ /J/ level, , f '" ' "ram '\ \ Verify load reduction rate and auto rod control is maintaining the expected Tavg/Tref b" T identified in Attachment 3 12 a. IF directed by the Unit Supervisor, THEN increase charging flow as follows: 1) Throttle open TCV-144, NRHX Temp Control Valve, bypass valve 3-834 to raise flow to approximately 600 gpm. 2) Start an additional charging pump. 3) Place an additional letdown orifice in b. service. Stop or slow power reduction to control temperature. If necessary, place control rods in manual and maintain Tavg within the expected Tavg/Tref b" T of Attachment
3.
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.:_2_ Pagelof L Event~~
~~Description:~~
The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphere resulting in e Position RO BOP RO lowering condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014 reduces unit load to stabilize condenser vacuum. Step 8 Step 9 Applicant's Actions or B Verify Turbine Load Less Tha 570 MWE Go to Step 11. e RCS Makeup Control Switch to START Check Target Load -LESS THAN 450 Mwe Check Station Service Loads Supplied From The Startup Transformer 13 WHEN directed by the Unit Supervisor, THEN transfer station service from the Auxiliary Transformers to the Startup Transformer using Attachment
2.
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _2_ Page JLof L Event~~
~~Description:~~
The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphere resulting in lowering condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014 n Time Position BOP BOP reduces unit load to stabilize condenser vacuum. Step 13 Check Auxiliary Steam Supplied From Another Unit -----, I. Remaining procedure st L _____ _ _ ____ J Step 14 Turbine Runback Defeat switch Stop the SGFP with recirculation valves open P ce SGFP recirculation valves control switch in the o D/AUTO position rbine load less than -300 MWE
Stop the remaining heater drain pump d. Verify Turbine load less than -275 MWE

Stop one Condensate Pump e. Verify Turbine load less than -200 MWE

Place the running SGFP recirculation valves control switch in the OPEN position Note: Following load reduction and stable vacuum trigger next event 14 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.:_3_ Page 1_ of L Event
~~Description:~~
Following the load reduction, PT-3-447 fails low resulting in continuous control rod insertion. The crew will respond per per 3-ARP097.C Time place rod control in manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1 toaddres channel. Position Tri er RO RO identifies the failure of PT-3-447 base RO BOP * *
Alarms C 7/1, 7/2, 7/3 Hi steam * * *

tep ------------.
TES I kly returns to normal may be a precursor of I for that channel should be placed in the a maximum delay time of 6 hours, to allow ----------- ______ 1 rify instrument loop failure by comparison to adjacent loops nd known plant parameters and conditions. 5.2 Verify no off-normal conditions exist on the adjacent channels which are to remain in service. Step 5.3 Verify applicable control transfer switches are in the position which eliminates the failed loop. 15 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: --L Event No.: _3_ Page.1.. of L Event
~~Description:~~
Following the load reduction, PT-3-447 fails low resulting in continuous ime Position BOP US control rod insertion. The crew will respond per per 3-ARP097.C place rod control in manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1 to -'P'U channel. Note: RO selects PT-3-446 as controllin Step 5.4 IF a control function was placed' failure, THEN verif the control Step F(;'lCTIONAl JNI'C ll1W>..l!I<el' 1 Vbreilile< 2 2 2 2 2 3-2: l ! lICRililer l!mf_, ACTIO'i 1.2 6 2# 7 7 7 t.2 11 11 \2 810 &', S' 9 1.2 e 'F . -' 9 #' ' .. _ 7_'4 -;. wnr man the MtirnlJ11 of OPEfl'AEU, wltrln 1 holE by rJ;!he tJ'te mte1cu In requ!rett <<ate fl)f the cmJijllloo. Cf Spedflcm 5,,[1.3, ------------------------. !!QIS I If lee determine.s a Test Sequence ProCB8f30r for an Eagle-21 Channel has failed, then I I that associated Eag/e-21 Channel may remain in service if Attachment 6 .'13 performed once I per 4 .hours, (Reference Safety EWliuaiioll
1)
~~______ I 16 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--.L Event No.: _3_ Page 2.. of L Event~~
~~Description:~~
Following the load reduction, PT-3-447 fails low resulting in continuous II Tiirne Position BOP control rod insertion. The crew will respond per per 3-ARP097.C place rod control in manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1 to addres channel. Step 5.11.1 Applicant's Actions or B IF plant conditions are such t associated with the failed undesired RPS or ESF a following: R.f Dwg' 5.1O-T.O-18A.18B.12A,12B &17; 5010-T-ll, Sh 17.21 & 22A Load l1<n11 l..OOPAHI STM FLOif' FC475 cOOP B HI STM flOW FC46!, LOOP CHI STM FLOW FC49£i ANNUNClA TOR SGA C 7/1 STEAMLiNE HI FLOW 5GB .712 STEAMLINE HI FLOW SGC C 7/3 STEAMUNE HI FLOW C _ CONTROL RELATED P -RX PROTECTION RELATED S _ SI\fETY INJECTION RELATED TION LOGIC AFFECTED p-1. 1/2 k.rt;.ine first slage > 10% pao.ver!o aiiow at PO".,;af tnps (P*lO .al'So p ;!In inptlt to omable B't power trips) 212 turbirnl first stage pressL::f'& "100/,;-and .314 ;\.f.r;I($1" ronge cr.aollals <: 10% blocks at ..... ar if. $, 2r2 dumneb :0 70% turbine power, ai,ows p I1m'l for N1StRPI roo drop si nal (Runwci<; or. ROd Oro D&I&"1OO 1/2 on 2i3 SfGs nigh 'Ste<lm fkNi S :;. program with 2/3 loYi Tnvg Of 213 kr ..... SfG ress:.Ire f614 s" In channels on 213 S!Gs hfgh s.team trow S :;. program 2!31ow T3't'g (543"'F) or 213 lOW SiG r*SSlJrE! 614 sk 1f.2 channels on 213 $tGs high Iklw S ;:. progmm with 21'3 low Tavg (543"f) Of 2:(3 SfG sstlre i614 s' \ te: Following T.S and bistable identification, continue with next event. 17 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.:_4_ .lL Event
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to Time Start time for RCP auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The ill respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and s' on to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate t fa ed steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse per -E -E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Position Applicant's Actions or Tri er lesson step, EVENT 4 -3C S/G F US RO Step 1 (lOA) -Verify Reactor Trip BOP c. Check Mid and East GCBs -OPEN (Normally 30 second delay) Note: MSR main steam su 18 a. Manually trip turbine. IF unable to verify turbine trip, THEN close main steam line isolation and bypass valves. b. Manually close valves. IF any valve can NOT be closed, THEN close main steamline isolation and bypass valves. c. Manually open breakers. IF breakers do NOT open, THEN actuate EMERGENCY GEN. BKR. TRIP SWITCH for the affected breaker(s). valves closed b BOP ( Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_4_ Page .£ of .lL Event
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to Time Position BOP auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The cr ill respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and tr<>Kf",itim 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate the ul generator. The steam generator rupture will be addressed er -E Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Step 3 Verify Power To Emergency 4 K a. Check the 3A and 3B 4 KV buses -MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE E ERGIZED 19 KV bus is energized, THEN go to ECA-O.O, LOSS ALL AC POWER, Step 1. b. Attempt to emergency start the de-energized Unit 3 bus diesel generator.
c. Perform the following:

1) IF lockout of 3D 4 KV bus NOT present, THEN perform the following:
a) Verify 3C CCW pump -BREAKER OPEN. b) Verify 3C ICW pump -BREAKER OPEN. c) Operate bus supply breakers to restore power. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_4_ 2L Event
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The c ill respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and tr sit' n to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate the aul Cl steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addressed er -E -E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. ime Position RO Step us US 4 Check If Slls Actuated -* SI Annunciators -ANY --*,1 --_. ove '"am, THEN noonal setp:wrus can .n be uSlCd OOlie rale iC,l'R.ad., ditions lis-led below OOOlJ1 *. I!::WIi trip all RePs: ".limps -AT LEAST ONE RUNNiNG AIm 51 FLO'NPATH VERW'IEIl. LESS THAN 2S'F!65'Fj llW:/.1rip all RePs.. SiG p!'!!59J!1e decrea'Sing in .m unoomrolled manne, OR any S1G THEN following f1"iiIY bE! perfoonel: ---Maintain low Redwater !low til"", 345 gpO> lIntl r,_ range iiwel in at 1Nst one SiG is qte03S !han e%{3-2%1. iWale AFW IIow to SiG(s/. S!labilize Res hot leg terrperalure usng S1s3m Wrnps when faulted SIG has blown Min to lass ihan 10% wide range. RUPTURED sm ISOLATIOO CRITER!A IF """i SfG mw=i1SES in an ,,,,controlled mamer 'OR mt SIG hal> abnonnai nKif;alion. AND narrow ranq* '<2'\1,,1 in affilc1ed
,'Gis) .. greOh'er 1han lli5t:! feed IIow "'31' bE! stoppe:!"'iC"

50. AFW SYSTEM OPERATION CRJTERIA " Jf !.'iQ AFW pumps are 00 a single train. Jl!a1.one of the pumps shall be ;hut down within om! hour 01 initialsta!1

b. IF 1WC API/v trilins are o;>>er.1!i"Q
<Ii1!'r.t 00<: allhe AFW pumps ha.s l>eEn operatin9 at tow flow of 1l1:) gp!'"! <;If tess lor one haur, lli5t:! !hal AFW pump shail be shut down S. CST MAKEUP WATER CRjJEEfA Jf CST:evei de---.reases to )*sse than 1{)';' ** .II;!I;tt 3>+/-i makeup to CST using 3-OP-1l1E.1, CONOENSA TE STORAGE TANK. 20 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_4_ Page 4_ of .1L-Event
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV-4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The cr ill respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and tr si n to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate the aul a steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addressed er -E -E-3, Time Position RO Stop ..J time BOP Start ..J time for AFW Steam Generator Tube Ru ture. Applicant's /l.r-tinnC! nr R, Note: Actions per the fold out page the following:
~~Justed to zero to isolate flow to 3C S/G. HIC-1401 Band HIC-1457B adjusted to establish~~
>345 pm total flow. not identified as ruptured initially feed flow may be stablished until identified as ruptured. Cr ic I task: (WOG) Failure to establish minimum AFW flow before transitioning out of E-O. (E-O, task F). abilizes RCS hot leg temp. using steam dumps when 3C wide range level is less than 10%. Continue With Attachment 3 To Complete The Prompt Action Verifications While Performing This Procedure Note: Attachment 3 listed at end of scenario. 21 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_4_ Event
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV-4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The f j' Time Position RO respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and' s.iJii'6n to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate th steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be .. Steam Generator Tube Rupture. " Step 6 Applicant's Actions or B Check AFW Pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING , (v 't '., \ \. 'Prfform the !s'11Q,yving: ,,;> lVta.flu;il*fi'; valves to AFW pumps run(1ing., '<,.. b. IF an\AF . ,,, .. !H EN di's,p .. Ily' /tll .. / **.** , .i' ump is tripped, an operator the AFW c. IF require AFW AND only one AFW pump is available, THEN perform the following:
~~1) Verify all TRIPPED 2) Establish 270 gpm AFW flow to each unit. 3) Use a setpoint of 270 gpm for required AFW flow instead of 345 gpm specified in subsequent Steps and Procedures.~~
er 3-EOP-E-0 foldout a e Verify AFW Valve Alignment-Manually align valves to PROPER EMERGENCY establish proper AFW ALIGNMENT ali nment. Note: Steps 6, 7, and 8 are critical steps: (WOG) Failure to establish minimum AFW flow before transitioning out of 50. (E-O, task F). 22 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _4_ Event
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and t ns' 'on to Time Position RO 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate t a ed steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse per 3-P-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Step 8 Verify Proper AFW Flow a. Check narrow range level in at least one SIG -GREATER THAN 6%[32%] '" 1) AFW flow greater ,,' than 34 . pm. b. Maintain feed flow to SIG narrow range levels between 15%[32%] and 50%. 23 "'" AF fl less than HEN manually rt mps AND THEN man ally start pumps AND align valves to establish greater than 345 gpm flow. 3) IF total feed flow from all sources greater than 345 gpm can NOT be established, THEN perform the following: a) Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES. b) Go to 3-EOP-FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK, Step 1. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_4_ Event
~~Description:~~
3C SIG experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The e will Time Position RO respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Stearn Generator Isolation to isolate generator. The stearn generator rupture will be address Stearn Generator Tube Rupture. Step 9 Check RCP Seal Cooling a. Check all RCP thermal barrier alarms-OFF
~~A 1/1, RCP TH COOLING WA Refer to ATTACHMENT 2 for component KW load rating Start one charging pump at minimum speed for seal injection~~
~~g. Adjust Charging Flow To Regen Heat Exchanger, HCV-3-121, to maintain ro er seal in'ection flow Note: Ste 9.b transitions to ste 10 24 c. Go to Step 10. d. Reset SI.~~
~~( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _4_ Page 8_of Event~~
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to Time Position RO auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The y will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate t4.e***falllt{d steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be Stearn Generator Tube Rupture./'/'/;//\\\
'f"., Step 10 Maintain RCS Cold Leg Temperature STABLE AT OR TRENDIN

TO 54rF IF ANY RCP RUNNING LESS THAN STABLE IF NO

RUNNING of'* IF",temlilerature'is THEN +,periQrm the following:
\\,\.\ 1 J\\ Stop dumping steam . * ';\-** '0:: ?) LI'h:1itt9tal feed flow to *"'** .. until narrow level greater han 6%[32%] in at least one S/G. 3) IF cooldown is due to excessive steam flow, THEN close main steam line isolation and bypass valves. b. IF temperature greater than 54rF AND increasing, THEN perform the following:
~~Dump steam to condenser.~~
OR
Dump steam using S/G steam dump to atmosphere valves. Note: RCS continues to Coo/down due to S/ flow 25 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3-. Event No.: _4_ Page 9_ of ...fL Event
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The e will Position RO respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate t fa generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse Steam Generator Tube Ru ture. Applicant's Actions or Step 11 Check PRZ PORVs, Spray Valves And Excess Letdown Isolated a. PORVs -CLOSED a. Auxiliary Spray Valve, CV-3-311 -CLOSED 26 2) Go to 3-EOP-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1. IF PRZ pressure less than 2260 psig, THEN manually close b. valves. IF valve(s) can NOT be closed, THEN stop RCP(s) as necessary to stop spray flow. c. Manually close auxiliary spraj valve. IF auxiliary spray valve can NOT be closed, THEN close Charging Flow to Regen Heat Exchanger, HCV-3-121. ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: _4_ Page 10_of Event
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFWfails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The <-",.-Time Position RO respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and p-ansjxion to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate the"1aqlfed steam .,/" ... ,'\. generator. The steam generator rupture will be Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Applicant's Actions or d. Excess letdown isolation valves -CLOSED /$t:9" CV-3-387, Excess Letdown Isolation Valve From CgJe Leg
To Excess Lelddw. Heat

HCV-3-137, E%c Letdown Flow\, Controller
~~_"z,.i" '-'" __ '<<,>", ,I I Chec;k'If Shoul /' "'"'"''''''''''''''''''''''''' C3/'C -//f "-h%,,,""o "b.tsj1eck RCS subcooling -LESS THAN '\\", "\::.,~~
c.
SI Pump -AT LEAST ONE RUf'(NING AND FLOWPATH VERIFIED d. Stop all RCPs 27 a. Go to Step 13. b. Go to Step 13. c. Go to Step 13. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.:_4_ Page 11_ of.lL Event
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The crew will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and transit'on to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate the faul,"<>,rt ,,-Time generator. The steam generator rupture will be addressed per 0 --3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Position Applicant's Actions or B RO Step 13 Check If S/Gs Are Faulted a. Check pressures in all SGs
ANY SG PRESSURE AN UNCONTROLLED M OR

a. Go to Step 14. itionsto 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response Thermal Shock Condition.
~~CAUTION Check RCS Pressure -IF RHR Flow greater than GREATER THAN 250 PSIG[650 1000 gpm, THEN return to PSIG] procedure AND step in effect. CAUTIONS~~
~~Low range flow indication is NOT available when using main feedwater instrumentation and an alternate source of feedwater.~~
Changes ill ReS temperature and SIG be used to control feedw8ter flow. " If the AFW pumps are lhe only available source of reed flow, the steam supply to the AFW pumps needs to be maintained from at lea.sf one S/G. 28 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_4_ Page 12_of Event
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The cr'Will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and tr .. (to 3-me Position EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate the f: te team generator. The steam generator rupture will be addressed r 3-E -E-3, Steam Generator Tube Ru ture. . Applicant's A"ti,...nC!1"\1" .J:{, ... -------------- I NOTE I !f Reps aro NOT running and Steps 19 through I TUBE RUPTURE, are in effect, this procedure sha I G ERATOR I I --------------- Step 2 Check RCS Cold L Temperatures -STAUlLL-"'J'h;' INCREASING NOTE steam dump to re valves -CLOSED. b. Verify steam dump to condenser valves -CLOSED. c. IF RHR system in service, THEN stop any cooldown from RHR system. d. Control feed flow to non-faulted S/G(s) to stop RCS cooldown. Maintain total feed flow greater than 345 gpm until narrow range level greater than 6%[32%] in at least one faulted S/G.
faulted S/G is any S:lG that is depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or is completely I depressurized.

L _______________________
~~J 29 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-..l..- Event No.: _4_ Page 13_ of 2L Event~~
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. to auto actuate and POV-4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. Thee"w;;will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and!r Ibn to Time Position BOP BOP 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate th,ei[a steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse "l-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. 3 Minimize Coofdo'l>"fl From Faulted
~~a. C,heck Si<3s -~~
FAULTED o. Check ReS oold le9 ternperatUrE:5 -DEGREA.3ING ,:;. 'Verify mair isolat>on and bYP3:'S.'S 'y"*ah/es dos-eo fClf f1ed :S'/G GIGs --,!.N' SiG NOT FAULTED n. Control feed fiDw at 26 gprn to any fal/ted StG(S) for ReS control Isdate fe'2'd'Nater to aP faulted SlG(S:i NOT needed for ReS ternpera'ture contrcf
~~A.FSG-3-00S~~
.,. A.FS-'s-3-007 g.. IF at! SIGs f.,iUhed, THEN control f"ed fl"',,"' at 25 glOm to each So. AND go to Step 4. ate: Directs NSO to close AFSS-3-006 and open AFSS-007 to I train 1 AFW from 38 S/G. Note: Places HIC-1458A and HIC-14588 in manual closed to isolate feed to 3C S/G . 30 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _4_ Page 14_ of R.. Event
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to Time Position RO RO auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The c ill respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and t 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate th generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse Steam Generator Tube Ru ture. 4 5 P'RZ ?ORV Block Valves i\ Po\VE;4' to block valVe'S -AVAILABLE
b. Siock valves -AT LEAST ONElJPEN Che-ck High-Head 51 Pumps -ANY RUNNING Che-ck tf 51 ShOllld Be Terminated

b. VErify.at least one PR.l PORV open. WHEN pressure l;ass!han 400 psi". THEN verif)'a!!
PRZ PORVs closed Oir isolrued. Gonlinue 'with Step 6. d. Verify.at ie.asi one PRZ PORV open. WHEN prer.sure less ihan 2335 THEN 'laity a!! PRZ PORVs closed C! isolated. Cornir.ue with Step a. e. Manuaily close PDRV. 1£ any vallie can NOT be closed, THEN manually dos-e ill> bklck vaive. Go to Step 13. Ge tc Step 27.
ReS wbooolin.g baseod 00 core exit res -G REA TER THAN BO"'FI26D"F]

RVlMS (QSPDS} plooum iru:lication
~~-GREATER THAN 0% US Note: transitions to ste 27 31 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _4_ Page 15_of Event~~
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to Time Position RO auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and t 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate th a ed steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse per -E Steam Generator Tube Ru ture. Applicant's Actio 27 Check. If An Rep Shoufd Be starte<l * ,Am Reps -STOPPED US Note: transitions to s US 32 US 33 ease RGS presSUI'E! UI".t1! the ReS temperatwe soak has been compieted
~~5) ReS cooldown is permilhed after 1 how so.ak has beel"! completed t!) Maintain ReS pressure AND cold leg temperalwes wkthin ine Iii,-"i!s of FIGURE j 7) Maima'n coot,;liy~~
.... n rate .n ReS ccld Jegs less ihan 51YF '" any eO-min'ute Deri.:>d during subs'equel"!t recovery ac,tions Return To Prooedtrre AND Step In Effect 32 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _4_ Page 16_of Event
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to II Ti,-ne Position US BOP auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate t fa generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse pe Steam Generator Tube Rupture. --_ .. _---* I Res hot leg tempera/ure sho
blown down to less than 10% S Manually dose valves.

a. IE all SIG pressures decreasing in an uncontrolled manner. THEN go to 3-EOP-ECA-2.1.
~~UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS. Step t.~~
ANY SiG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR

ANY SIG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED
~~a. Search for initiatmg break:~~
Main Steam lines

Main Feedlines

Other secondary piping Goto Step 5 CAUTI'ON If the AfW pumps are tIle only available source of feed flow, a steam supply to tile AfW pumps must be maintained from at least one SlG. 33
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_4_ Page 17_of Event~~
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. Thee will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and 'on to /' ./ 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Stearn Generator Isolation to isolate t!+e"lau+/-t'ed stearn Time Position BOP 4' " generator. The stearn generator rupture will be Stearn Generator Tube Rupture. . i'//'" 4 Applicant's Actions or FiHJlien03;f'j' Radiatioo Drect Chemistr;' to ;"":e pericdic iy cf aH BIGs. b. erect Chemistry to check e,4M 1 mort1or reading (-. l -_ .. ' ..... ,,---_ .. --_ .. --.
r" ** **"""".",, ..** "'...... NOirES I be neces..sarv for sarnp/inq during V";'is procedure, I -_ .. ..:. --.'-'_ -_ .. --_ .. --_.1 Conditions To Determine If Reps Should Be Stopped a. Reps -.ANY RUNNiNG b. High-head SI pumps-.AT LEAST ONE RUNNING c. Res subcooling
~~-LESS THp,N 25°F[65 C F] l-i Controlled plant cooldoWTl -!iQI INITIATED~~
~~e. Stop all Reps 35 a. Go to Step 2. b. Go to Step 2. c. Go to Step 2. d. Go to Step 2.~~
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _4_ Page 19_of Event~~
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The c w ill respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and t nsi' n to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate th au d steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse er -E -E-3, Time Position BOP Steam Generator Tube Ru ture. Applicant's Actions or Identify Ruptured SfG(s) iii. Direct Radiation Protection to take radial' readings 011 main steam lines 8!:ill. blowdown lines b. Direct Chemistry to sample the steam lines for acti vity 3C SIG as ru tured and Faulted CAUTIONS
f the AFW pumps are the only available source of fee<iwater fl'ow, the steam supply Co the AFW pumps must be maintained from al/east one SIG.

At least aile SIG must be maintained available for ReS coo/down.
~~36 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.:_4_ Page 20_of Event~~
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The,!?'fe<<>will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate tije(fallited steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be address /f -E'QP-E-3, Time Position BOP Steam Generator Tube Rupture. 3 Control Ruptured SIG(s) Steam Dump To Atmosphere V.alve a. .A,djust ruptured 8/(3(3) steam dump atmDsphere controller setpoint to 1060 b. Check ruptured SiG(s) steam dump to atlllDsphere -CLOSED 3) lE steam dump to atmosphere can liQl be closed, I.I:l.f.li locally close affected steam durn p to atmosphere isolation v'live: a. Reset SI. }*I 0-001 for SfG A 3* 10-002 for SIG 8 3*10-003 for SIG C b. Reset AMSA.C. Verify supply aligned to both t'3H15 of c. Reposition AF'vV stearn supply cross-pumps from intact S/G(s) co-nne-ct vah'es to pro\qde stearn frorn intact SiG(s) to all ,A,F"W pumps. Mamtain steam fiow to A FV'v' pLrmps ">'Nhile cross-connect valves. d. Close .A,FW pW'np steam supply 1-.'!C)\/ 011 ruptured SiGfs) e Dispatch an operator to perform the follO' .... ing I i Open AFVI pump stearn -suppiy MOil breaker on ruptured SlG{s} 2) Verify .AFV ...
~~pump steam stlppl,!, \10V en ruptured SiG(s) . CLOSED 37 AFSS*3-006 AFSS*3*007 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-0-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_4_ Page21_of Event~~
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and on to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate tlJ,e'falJ,Med steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse ,/p P-E-3, Time Position BOP BOP Steam Generator Tube Rupture. 5 Applicant's Actions Isolate Miscellaneous Flowpnths From Ruptured S/(;'(s) a. Verify blowdownlsolation valve(s} ruptured SiG(s) -CLOSED NSO to use 1it1r'D[T1 u/JIt 4. " Veri Sample Stop Valves -CLOSEB MOV-3-!427 MO'l-3-'1425 CAUTION isolated within the first If any ruptured SIG is also faulted and is NOT needed for ReS coo/down, feed flow to that S/G is required to be maintained isolated during su/)sequent recove.ry actions. 38 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _4_ Page 22_ of .1.L Event
~~Description:~~
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be Time Position BOP BOP ..J Steam Generator Tube Rupture. ." ' 8 9 Applicant's Actions or B Control Ruptured SfG(s) level a. Narrow range level-GREATER THAN 6%[32<?hl b.. Stop feed flow to Verily Ruptured SlG(s) -INTACTSIGs -""<""'--'---""'-""---<",, . until each ruptured SIG(s) at least one intact S/G(s) to ReS cooldown. !E any ruptured SiG(s) can NOT be isolated from at least one intact SIG, !.!:!I!i go to 3-EOP-ECA-3.1 SGTR Vv'lTH LOSS OF REACTOR COOlft,NT-SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED. Step 1. ilure to isolate feed and steam for a "\\ fifulft:jd SG rior to Tra17sitionin from 52. (E-2, Task A) Go to 3-EOP-EC,t>.-3.1, SGTR 'WITH lOSS OF RE,ACTOR COOLANT-SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED, Step 1. now have the shift, remain in place and not to discuss the scenario. 39 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4att.3 Page1_of_1_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
~~3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions ime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step 1 Check The Load Centers Associated With BOP Step 2. The Energized 4 KV ENERGIZED~~
3A LC

3B LC

3C LC

3D LC

3H LC

Hi-containment pressure 20 PSIG Verify main steam isolation and bypass valves -CLOSED 40 b. Go to Step 3. c. Push manual Steam line Isolation push buttons on VPB OR manually close valves.
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 2_ of Event~~
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions ime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step BOP 3. Verify Feedwater Isolation Place main feedwater pump a. switches in STOP Feedwater control valves-b. CLOSED Feedwater bypass valves-c. CLOSED d. e. IF sta b edwater is t nit 3, THEN top feedwater
~~a. Start ICW pump(s) to establish at least two running. Manually close valve(s).~~
~~IF valve(s) can NOT be b. closed, THEN locally close the following valves:~~
~~POV-3-4882~~
~~-CLOSED 3-50-319 for POV-3-4882 c.~~
~~POV-3-4883~~
-CLOSED Check ICW headers -TIED TOGETHER Note: BOP closes POV-3-4BB2 41 c. 3-50-339 for POV-3-* 4883 IF both ICW headers are intact, THEN direct operator to tie headers to ether. Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 3_ of _1_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
~~3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step 5. Verify Proper CCW System Operation~~
~~a. CCW Heat Exchangers~~
~~-THREE IN SERVICE .;t ... , ... ,.~~
~~a. .* / , .* 1" stop CCW pumps as <<' ,. J)'ecessary t blish ONLY '. Q.NE RU CCW PUMP. --'<-, 2),'!e'?i<fy/' . rgency C*o.(ltainrtfent Coolers -ONLY~~
~~. , TvVC:A R .... N I N G {'" "'--"><'<<:'""" .,". \ '\:.............. Go to~~
~~b. CCW pumps -ONL pumps as RUNNING\.~~
~~'\ ./l *.Ift*!*ces.l?ary l'gestablish ONLY \ \ *t1/TWO R:t1N'NING CCW PUMPS. -, i'" -TIED \ (c. \ R C P~~
~~arrier *..........~~
\\jJtf: .. E .... O ..... I'll "' " .. , Containment Cooling IF both CCW headers are intact, THEN direct a field operator to tie the headers together. IF containment isolation phase B NOT actuated AND CCW radiation levels are normal, AND RCP number one seal leak-off temperature is less than 235°F, THEN manually open MOV-3-626. IF MOV-3-626 can NOT be manually opened, THEN direct operator to open MOV-3-626 locall . Manually start or stop a. Check emergency containment
~~a. emergency containment coolers -ONLY TWO RUNNING coolers to establish~~
-ONLY b. Verify emergency containment filter fans -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING 42 TWO RUNNING. b. Manually start emergency containment filter fans. ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 4_ of _1_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position BOP BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step 7. Verify SI Pump Operation At least two high head pumps a. . running b. Both RHR pumps running Step 8. Verify SI Flow a. RCS pressure -LESS THAN a. 1600 PSIG[2000 P b. High-head SI pum indicator -CHECK FLOW b. Stop both Unit 4 high-head SI pumps AND place in standb 43 a. Perform the following:
1) Operate Unit 3 and Unit 4 head SI pumps to establish injection to Unit 3 from two head SI pumps. 2) Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to align Unit 4 high-head SI pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using ATTACHMENT 1 of this procedure.

3) Go to Step 10.
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 5_ of _1_1_ Event~~
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step 10. Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve White Lights On VPB -ALL BRIGHT BOP Step a gn valves to establish proper SI alignment for an injection flowpath. Reset SI ',}>'f "I"\r1'Ic"'inment Phase A -RESET Reset Phase A N 'te: BOP is required to go back to the contanment isolation racks and rest the six phase A lockout relays, (three lockout relays on each rack) 44 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 6_ of Event
~~Description:~~
~~3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step 14. Reestablish RCP Cooling a. Check RCPs -AT LEAST ONE RUNNING b. Open CCW to normal contai valves MOV-3-1417~~
c. Reset and start coolers BOP Step 45 a. Perform the following:

1) IF containment spray NOT initiated, THEN manually initiate containment spray. 2) Verify Containment Isolation Phase ACTUATED.

3) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B valve white lights on VPB -ALL BRIGHT. 4) IF any Containment Isolation Phase B valve did NOT close, THEN manually or locally isolate affected containment penetration.

5) Stop all RCPs.
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2.-Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 7_ of_1_1_ Event~~
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step BOP 16. Verify Containment and Control Room Ventilati Unit 3 containment purge a. exhaust and supply fans -OFF Verify Control Room ventilation status panel -b. PROPER EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION ALIGNMENT " e ice Using YSTEM 46 s listed be/ow. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2--Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 8_ of _1_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
~~3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior I NOTE~~
~~Hydrogen lAunitar..; hi' in SE'J'lfice Iffi/hin 30 m!Du "--'---_ .. _;".--------~~
7.1.1 Initial Conmti;am, 1. luI prEf.eql.1isites 7.1.2 P;rrn;edm;e .-_ .. _ .. --_i --NOTES -- SYSletU to FARM Headel: hol<lOOll Valve 2A{6 mm) PACV Vmt aDd Sample 5ystetUtc FARz\*! Header Valve (RR), P * .!llii,,1-3 -002B (5 tum,;) od; A_ .... D open PACVS hot \'1 ..... Penet 53, IDl-3-3, in D'Oll:t cfthe 'Cuit 3 . --Spray Pump. Room (An Akej' 1:> required for lock.) Unloc.k open PACVS Iso! \'11i Pellet 16, HV-3-1, located: in !he lk."'llih AWl: Btcliiillway, (An A key B reqtrind:fur this lock.) 47 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 9_ of _1_1 _ Event
~~Description:~~
~~3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 4. REqr!;!SI the Reactor Oper;uDTp*rfcl!l1 dIe following:~~
~~l. Verif .. : the fbl1o'NmE tl11lctLQU~~
-;eieC!OI )U1.aJ}'zeJ." huels are L; the S.'V.iPLE p (2) QR ,S2 d 48 roof near the 0\7it '3 0Dntainment ! ________ : __ 1 'h, fr*:)Ul .,VHT Pp Bad;. ;"IPAS-3-004 EMERGENCY START any available EDG NOT runnin c Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 10_ of _1_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step 19. Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses and 0 a. Check the 3A, 3B and 3D 4 KV buses -ALL ENERGIZED 49 a. 2) IF the nit upervisor t t energize the' bus or buses, Step 20. 3) IF the Unit Supervisor decides to energize 3A, 3B, or 3D bus, THEN perform the following: a) IF 3A 4 KV bus energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-0NOP-004.2, LOSS OF 3A 4KV BUS. b) IF 3B 4 KV bus energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.3, LOSS OF 3B 4KV BUS. c) IF 3D 4 KV bus energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.5, LOSS OF 3D 4KV BUS. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 11_ of_1_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions II -rime Position BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step 20. Notify The Unit Supervisor That The PROMP' VERIFICATIONS Attachment Is Complet That Had To Be Taken Note: BOP informs US of completion 4882 was required. Note: BOP should receive a turno the EOP network. 50 ( ( NRC XXIV NRC SEN 3 ---OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT Shift Mgr: Field SUpv.: Admin RCO: Unit 3 Unit SUpv.: RCO: NPO: Unit 3 Mode: Power: 100% MWe: 760 Gross Leakrate: .02 gpm RCS Boron Cone: 670 ppm Jperational Concerns: 3C charging pump out of service Thunderstorms reported in the U3 Antici ated LCO ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Inside SNPO: Outside SNPO: ANPO: Plant Status Focus Area: Maintain 100% .1 Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 100% Gross: ,02 gpm A 6615 g,s" MWe: 760 Unidentified ,01 gpm B Tavg: 574,2°F Charging Pps: ,01 gpm C §.827 gal RCS Pressure: 2250 psig RCS Boron Cone: 670 ppm Abnormal Annunciators:
l"'\,. .. \.;l' .. . "\c Annunciator:
j .... "\\\ .. \. \"\\ *.. \ Comp Actions: Annunciator: {:/ /, '\\\\;.::;> Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: (,r ......... Comp Actions: Annunciator: .\;\\\\'.....' .. "" ... ................ , ... \\.\,:>1 Comp Actions: ( Annunciator: Comp Actions: // ** ,/i.' ......... " .... " *. ,,\ .. Annunciator: <H) '\\\, Comp Actions: Annunciator: ,,// .. Comp Actions: Annunciator:
~~\\. .....~~
~~...... fj'**://Ji/ ... ***'*'****'~~
.. *,** ..*...* "' *. , .. , *....* , .. ",/1*>' Comp Actions: . (Do:s Not Include "For Trackine Only Items" TSA.S ","1. \ ,'\ '0 Reaso . Entry Da )J Reason: Entry Date:",\., TS.A.S / Component,,, Reason:\ ... Entry Date: TS.A.S / Component:
.... ,. Reason: Entry Date: TS.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: TS.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: '3 train protected both units Jnline risk is green ment: Unit 3 Status ECOs to Han and lor .... ,,,. Evolutions or Com erator Work Around Status: TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Facility: Turkey Point Scenario No.: 4 mod Op Test No.: 2009-301 Examiners: Initial Conditions: Turnover: Event No. 2 3 3.a TFK1A611 = T TFK1S611 = T TFS1MWEH = T TVHNL1A = .00101 Candidates: US RO BOP Mode 1, 100% BOL Equipment OOS: 3C charging pump out of service due to return to service in 14 hours. Thunderstorms are in the area. -,;/ // '\ \\. Maintain 1 00% On line risk is green B train rotected Event Type* (C)RO (TS,C)SRO (I)BOP (TS,I)SRO 3B CCW pump trips due to G, PC-3-611 isolation, was following pump auto start test, preventing'§n of 3A or 3B C()V::; puh;Jps. A CCW pump is started per 3-0NC)f-m1JoQt(nt Cooling Watr;r M function. gener el to increase. 3A S/G 78 is m ual to return 3A S/G level to channels and return 3A ,.::f . The crew responds to annunciator A 1/5, RCP e directed to 3-0NOP-041.1 , Reactor Coolant eal continues to degrade requiring a unit shutdown. -ONOP-041.1 to shutdown the unit. A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are blocked requiring a anual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the console fails requiring the rator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main steam isolation valve fails to atically close requiring manual operation to terminate the steam leak. 3-EOP-E-0 is entered for the reactor trip response with a transition to ES-1.1 to terminate safety injection. 3B ICW pump breaker fails, 3A ICW pump fails to auto start, and 3A SI pump fails to auto start requiring operator action. (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1 TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #4 Event 1 -38 CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.5, CCW pump auto start test, pr enting an auto start of 3A or 38 CCW pumps. A CCW pump is started per 3-0N0I;,.: Component Cooling Water Malfunction. f"/ /' J'/" pr' Event 2 -FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increa .. 3A feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return l:>{ogram. 3-ONOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling channels and control. f"\\ ,.,' "",.. \, ., - Event 3 -3A RCP #1 seal degrades. The crew responds A 1/5, RCP hi flow and are directed to 3-0NOP-041.1, Rea t661ant Pum Off-normal. 3a"1t.1 ) seal continues to degrade requiring a unit sh '-\§/ Event 3.a 0NOP-1 00 is used per 3-0NOP-041.1 to s ,.n.Jne lJ ':r,,' f" Event 4 -A steam line break occurs on th?/c.Q,!11mon header turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. ACltorralie.,trips are blockeqreCl{Jiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from to trip the unit from VP8. 38 main steam requiring manual operation to terminate the steam s.,) ......, ** ".",.. ,,,,,,f 'i; _ -_____ j/r J""--' ,,' ----> Event 4.a EOP-E-0 .. ( the reador . ,/ with transition to 3-EOP-ES-1.1 to terminate)?a'f:!),(,irtjeEtiof\ 38 breaker fails, 3A ICW pump fails to auto start, and .. f 'Is fp auto staV operator action. i .,..\ ...... ,., ... ', .... ... ) >._'*" ... . ' .. /,,;-' 2 ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Scenario XXIV NRC 4 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup Restore IC-11 (Mode 1 BOL) Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIV_NRC_ 4.lsn /,,)""'\\ Place simulator in run .4'/ / fi'f< Start 3B charging pump and secure 3C charging purpp/f' /' .P,.//,/".,/,Y'/\".,. Trigger lesson step: SETUP -3C ... Rem. charging from service, blocks 3A SI PP as IS. (Actuates TAB1POSM = RACKOUT:\TABM270 70' TABM291 = 0, TABM290 = 0, TFK1 A611 = T, TFK1 S611 = T, = l' ) }"'"". "'i,")'" Trigger lesson step: SETUP - FAILURfi'"RsQ'l0ves 3A SI and 3A ICW auf"G,tor trip, blocks 3B ':;FL2XBSE" T Place simulator in freeze." \, ....... "cliff" /,;f ", '*"i" ... 'i'i., i",j .,-Jff":'
~~0, *. ",/-><<;.,,-%, "'I;f/" /1'" Place clearance info. iF Provide shift ii,... ,,/\ Select 3A PDS to page z1z (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA and at the'HCO/{ieskto the UtiMi,es.S'c;reens.~~
""'it;:\_ c,<' addition placards at console blender station. Data for fob{ld in"l,be & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator IIF. f" /f//*i "ii",""", 'i,\, '\ i,., J' I } '" '/,' 3 TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Event 1 -38 CCW PUMP TRIP Initiated immediately after shift turnover. 38 CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.5, CCW pump auto start test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 38 CCW pumps. A CCW pump is started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water alfunction. ,"ii" ii'-When directed -Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 -38 CCW PUMP TRII} 4/ (Actuates TFK 1 B 13T = T) l 4/ "\, 3-0NOP-030/""'\, '\ <,',p/,/I \" '\\,\ Step 34.d. -Respond as NSO, Acknowledge direction to using FI-3-1407, 1408, and 1409. report to ... verified on all CCW heat exchangers. IF as follows: 'I, ,;l;:
FI-3-1407 329 gpm '"

FI-3-1408 297 gpm

FI-3-1409 324 gpm "', .... ,.\"'. ./,/ "<\" f Step 45.a -Respond as NSO, direction flow from charging pumps on FI-3-660, After 2 mir;l{*th3s%'report to CR on"E;1-3-660 verified.
\ '% Step 53 -Respond as NSO, Acknowledee heat exchanger on FI-3-618. Afte\ 2 verified. n tcJve,rJfy C ... w from seal water f'w on FI-3-618 .? Step 54 -Respond wledge ,ire; tion to verify CCW flow from spent fuel pool on 622. Aft" inutes report to CR flow on FI-3-622 verified ... /f" j",;' '\\ j Step 55 - Ion to check 0-EPIP-20101 and tech. satisfi'e,d. \, iii';; " ',o, . . :"c."'*"' .* ,;.;. 4 ( ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Event 2 -FT-3-474, 3A SIG Steam Flow Fail High FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increase. 3A S/G feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return 3A S/G level to program. 3-0NOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling channels and return 3A FRV to automatic control. When directed -Trigger lesson step EVENT 2 FT-3-474 FAIL HIGH A"O' ") (Actuates TFS1 MWEH = T) 3-0NOP-049.1 5 TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Event 3 -3A Rep #1 SEAL FAILURE 3A RCP #1 seal degrades. The crew responds to annunciator A 115,' RCP sealleakoff hi flow and are directed to 3-0NOP-041. 1, Reactor Coolant Pump Off-normal. 3a #1 seal continues to degrade requiring a unit shutdown. When directed -Trigger lesson step EVENT 3, 3A Rep #1 SEAL FAILU (Actuates TVHNL 1A = .00101) 3-0NOP-041.1 Step 1 -Respond as NSO, acknowledge direction to check local sea seal injection. Flows aprox. 8 gpm. 3-0NOP-100 Step 3 -Respond as System Dispatcher, acknowledg Step 6 -Respond as SM, Acknowledge direction to refer If called respond as chemistry to take sam If called respond as FS/NSO to align aux te' onse back required. 6 TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Event 4 -STEAM BREAK DOWNSTREAM MSIV A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbineiesulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are blocked requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the console fails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VP8. 38 main steam isolation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual operation to terminate
~~p/,%pteam leak. 3-EOP-E-O is entered for the reactor trip response with a transition to 3-E0/1i..ES,r':tf.1 to terminate safety injection.~~
38 ICW pump breaker fails, 3A ICW pump fails to a,l,Jto sjffrt, and 3A SI pump fails to auto start requiring operator action. '" /' ,fl //'" "\ When directed -Trigger lesson step EVENT 4 -STEAM BRE /\NNST' MSIV (actuates TVSBVL 10 = 0.25000) -.<><\ 3-EOP-E-O Step 19.a -Respond as Chemistry, Acknowledge samples of all S/Gs /,,\ > ""'", ,/",/ ' Step 19.b -Respond as Radiation Protection, to take radiation readings on main steam lines. '" i/ ,P"', '\, "/,. -'<:, 3-EOP-E-O attachment 3\" 1;>,,,4,,,.'\, ".", Step 9.a RNO -Respond as unit 4 ROt unit 4 high-head SI pump suction to unit 3 u'SiR9 1',\9f3-EOP-E-O. \ .,/"" ""<';""'<'l,. ( Step 14a. -Respond to surv lines. Report back after 1 0 alh{'team q.t;'6ackground readings. j'/'/' \\\: "\\'\ Step 17 - tg place service per 3-0P-094 * <!ri SERVICE * .. . through 3 are complete
~~with, step 7.1.2.4 of'" ,,0'"~~
~~ae d"", irection to complete lineup after step 7.1.2.4 is completed~~
~~/ /"~~
5 report to CR that PAHM is in service. , .. /l' ",1/-'"t ,.::" . . //,PS,,*E'OP-E-O attac 5' " ,\,\, 3 -Respond N'pO, co 3A SFP cooling pump running. ", I',' I acknowledge direction to shutdown MSRs using 3-0P-"'\\ "I, perform 3-0SP-089 main turbine valves operability test. ."'\;"',\, _____ ,--p/::.J---- Step 16.d as NSO, Acknowledge direction to reset group A backup pzr heater lockout relay in the unit 3 west electrical penetration room. After 2 minutes Trigger lesson step, RESET GP A BACKUP HEATERS, inform CR when complete. 7 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:_1_ Page _1_ of Event
~~Description:~~
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.5, CCW pump aut9,stal;t test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 3B CCW pumps. A started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water MalfuJ)e'tiOli( ,,;,,4' " Time Pump Trip Start Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi ._",,"" Tri er lesson step, EVENT 1 -38 CCW Pq,MP ",RIP RO RO recognizes and reports the loss pump as evident by th'e, .. following:,.*""*"",f/ '\ RO RO US
Annunciator 7/3,./ 7/5, H 9/5, X 3/6 ""'"..'" ""./.P'

3B CCW pump amps .,\,

3B ca<lv

FaiIUre'Qf'SA"or"4CC'C'W,pumps'ls\st

on low *it. ""'" .... pressure\, '\ .... ,> "+" .'. ".".'
\\., May CCW action per Q.ADM-211 anpiOS diTec{ion or wei,! f6fdjr.eCtion in 3-0t'JOP-030. t.pperator action to manually on high flow ARP guidance will be used to Water Malfunction / jt' any Rep Dil3ffng J&f!lp&raWH! 3!1f1Uncfaror alarm f11; associaTed /,moror Milrtflg J&mp'llJ'3UA"e IS grwf9trtla'l1 1$5"f;. TflfJ rtl&r&oi'Ct'Oral1d smp :n'1& __ .' _., --_ .* ---.:_ --.:' __ i'_ *. __ I NOTE I FolrJotlf psg? be proceaUre, I ______ I Reviews the followin 1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _1_ Page -.£ of Event
~~Description:~~
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.5, CCW pump autOlSl[ar;[ Time Position us test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 3B CCW pumps. A CC\\l started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water Malfu tio. }, A MZl:l;ral;ylrip the rei!1:to," B. Isolate letdll'Wll Ml.d D. e i\W:w. It: ai,QOl/tl!d mwor :er :1lMt D!m trip re.actw aud RePs.
~~1l1l!:l! CC\l: S,'stl!Ill Hlir has been fl!t!<OO'l!d sball be w,rnm ,be op>>.Jlltizig dons Qf 3-0P*030 mmmllr:zed a, follow,: [Commitment~~
~~-Step D.2J :"-: (CW P\lm,Ps N= Qf CC\'r Hlt, atigue;i to CCW) '. . All CC \\' H&;Uliernce whei RHR IDSE'!'I,;X'e .2& Wltlt ooJy 2 (:CW !ill .enne!!. plac.e 2 CCW P<lmrFi :0 ili.lU-!l}-Lodt~~
~~!viammum of 5 out trf 6 CCW Em !..Mds. 2~~
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 1 Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-7010, PC-3-611 isolatj,9n, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.5, CCW pump aut.sY'§tii)t test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 3B CCW pumps. A is started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water jl' \h Time Start Position BOP RO ..J 1 2 Ver1ty Pow;ar T., 4'KVBua3D
~~a. Malrt,<3,!n 4KvaidS JiG~~
~~-P.J.lGNED TO AN E:.NEJ'I.G\ZED 4KV ,5US Varity compCtmmt In; S6ft'lce to start CCW pump (s) within 5 .ff f ri'/ mJnutes after failure. Can be accomplished~~
~~J i63"ONOP-030.:~~
\ --,<, .".-po " .... , .. ,. i'leaIilE1' A me;?t,!ol2'.f5 3 /' . if one was not started earlier. a. I;F CCYiJ f'lc,w to Reps cal'! ,NOT estatHI&ne:l,lHlEN t1p ;'1e reilj:j:.y A.ND "em#\! reacror tip uSing; ttle EDP NBI\\%Jf$;..I\:,WD ttJ1!l'!5tCP all FI:CPs E!!.!2. pErllJrrn me :c%:ov.mg: Iso:',,'!*: l.et'joi ... n anil Exoe:ss l*lilolttn 2.. .If. any o!1argtrlg. pump iEi nJrt1il1g THEN (;pera1e at r1aXir7Jlr $pEeiJ UiniF .I:.HachlrJ1!rt IS an t.o e¥ .. 3tHiE--h *{'1ler':;.ilencv Cc.::i!l:l'1l W;iofBf to dEs!re>;j crargli'lg pump ueih; Ntacl-rnE,"L 1, ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _1_ Page -+/-. of Event
~~Description:~~
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.S, CCW pump test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 3B CCW pumps. A started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water "j/ -" Time Position US "J'/" Applicant's Actions or
=
I

I I

I

I Tn*'
~~Of tt;,E Spproidff":;3,!'E-,t)f 25% ,';,,v,;,,'v.:,o tf a eyes;5 Ue zet{f*',er;" e unNJ As* LV1l: !l:a Y -Ci? belote' ca'TI:e;!: L.-____ , I I~~
~~I ot! Si:alie lOWi I . f'" ___ ,.1 RO 4 1,1 componl?nt COOllrtg¥i&i&r liill'lders SIl!iJ,uMj 86 T!a d Tog;I?IfI&r~~
~~b. Cn:ecN. fJ1tl -has iD*ee'rl j'CdSt M') CC.VIl reader . F'0-B13A for A F -.)*6 j J*;5f1:1' hE;;;!.l*r B Open OJmponentIN,,};ef surge Tank MakEJl),.~~
~~"I."**,.r,',,,,;.~~
~~asne-";:E;sary 7; ",:ld -fli:l$.eup~~
-

--Jf Comp:;r,ent
"*I*ate! Surge Tank .. El can ,W;!Itre pel1:Xl11 ttle c:, Slop aN RCPs. Perfci;1n3-EOp*E-G, TRiP OR S.AFE1YINJ5::::110N. WW'l lfii61::m:NJ6d1me, 3* s:)OS-*PlE' ,\iOTE.8 :prot 10: S1:ep 5) ano gCf :'c: S:-tP ;9" C, iF "!\,)wln ooth cew 'le c ,3:JETS Is !NlTma/, THE1!l >;?) to ::4. Note: CCW headers are tie to ether, RNO a 4 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: _1_ Page 2.. of --.1JL Event
~~Description:~~
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, Time Position RO was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.S, CCW pump aut test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 3B CCW pumps. A CCW started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water Malf'upclio VIlr11'j' COmpOr&.ifit cooling walEir F-rom Unit 4 . NOT REQVIRED b. \/e:ify -A -L::";!..:?T RLNNlh i:; '.UTtON Prior To-!J.tiiP 43 .And Go To 4:J CAUTION 2} S tep c:c<.<cj:l?J by cornp:::fv.rt OO:::Vlng )!tater as ll!?<::e:.:.ary lcst3t:HtreCC4Tlpooen! oJcHng willer IBmperatur*! .3) IF arM roITiPCn2111.DCQ{ed ur OJ(4!rq walfr mu:st DE' cpeor.J!fd MiD Eta-tHE CCCi1p:merrt rocHng wafer IBmperal.u"e '1:.3[1 Lim CE'
~~.D;;iWoowr,'.e NOTE prior lc :3<tep3F.. "nc go to StEp 36, CO!11jtMJfl&lHCOoHng~~
'l\<'cteFw all,.. cOIDpcm&nr ffcE O&i?J1 foST iWld can nOT tJ& r&SJor&(f, rJla'f. COlTlpcm*<fR st:dff lJ'1a ma;'Jff.a'meo m pifJJ*ro-LocK or orr 1'0 pr6'W91lf 9qUJpmllm 11am39&. 5 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _1_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.S, CCW pump test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 3B CCW pumps. A is started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water A Time Position RO RO 43 '1'.[.rffy >cooopc.ruePlt Cooling Vlet&r Ie BeIng $U!jlp!tiid "le. The FouCI'tllngcol!11pOH1Jrrts
H}J!,H1E3i:l 51

RHR purrips
~~__ Jfi-'-<',\\ . '. COfl1jllxlerl:!>~~
~~"1 or Cft, ", AFFECTED In SlJOsequEnt -PLA,CE A;:':FECTEO~~
~~'4ENTS IN eTA.'IOE'( in~~
~~s:epE .1/""'-._~~
__ ;__ "'\_" \!\ N,fi>1e:)6w floW; for components cleared when a CCW pump .f j was st ed;' 6 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--+/-.-Event No.:_1_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.5, CCW pump aut test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 3B CCW pumps. A is Time Position ROJ BOP :"p---":# started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water Mal flqlCti o{I:' 45 {):)cdrq p'Jrt:'5.
~~=1-;-5EO~~
-t. G'lECl; charglng;:U11FS' AT :.E.A.ST RUNNING Maml.ah rrMrtm' 6Eiii fflie'cHor RO 46 'v'arll'y 'RCP TMGf"1Ua1 Samar CC'i'V outlet, -QP',EN ;:, Close R;::;P Tt,ermaI5arne,- celli C'Jliet 4 ci13rglngn:::w
ina' CrargmQl Flo"li :0 H:e.at Exchanger, HC\/*]:,..12'1, 11>> mairt.'Ill thermal OMrier !JP tl1;;11 n ?ncne:e. 01 !N:ater <11-'ilEfiDl rea.ctor -TRIPPED mow and CMMglngF'kJw to REgen HCV-;;;-12t, 10 mainlatl t/"srm,,§ oiuller OP qreater than G ifH::<f!E'S af '.'iM?f -Note: If MOV-3-626 has closed on hi flow from pump start; ARP may have been used to reopen, if not, it will be opened here. 7
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _1_ Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.5, CCW pump aut t test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 3B CCW pumps. A CCW; u Time Position RO started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water Malfi 49 Applicant's Actions or B a. RL'NNING b. Estabflsl'1 oormal OO:lt1hT'61t cooi'i'ig 1,1 Verrtt compor$!1t OOCilng Glerro r<lm1aJ cooler:<< -AVAllJI8lE ChijrlCk II!' leWO'N1'lI Or Ul:cIown SilWlUlt:I 6& PIae9d iel'VilC1l
a.
plImpi -AT LEAST ONE RUN NI I\fB Lel00M1 52B. IN SERV1CE PR!OR TO COOlING WATER\tA::'FUNCTION b.. IJ;eI'!'r:lrm lie 1! Vert!'y nrun Go to &ell' 51 , Note: normal letdown still in service, RNO to step 53 applies. 8 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:_1_ Page of J..L Event
~~Description:~~
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.S, CCW pump test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 3B CCW pumps. A started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water MalfUl;Jctio:Q:;'" /'.,' '-, Time Position BOP 53 Applicant's Actions or Behavid" .-;2>"'\ LOc-.lil], oOffiilommt GDoFflg ',Vater FNyw Flii)lTlll4illill'j'ater Heal E:.X:tIOOgllW, FI,.3;*J2;1 e BOP 54 US \ Notf)l calls NSO for local readi,( Verlfy app\!C3bie Tsct:nlCa! spe:;!i'1ca':iol'
-In

ng cperaUan t' fSftED t" ;P*srform 3W!!cab;fs TeCnntmlJ catrecJjve a cfians ' -""\;;. .'\\ te.;, calls'$hiff;;Manager refers to tech. specs to determine T.S.
~~8 1 applies until 38 CCW pump breaker is racked out. below. f t 1 1 9 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:.-..1.... Event No.: _1_ Page --.1Q. of JJL Event~~
~~Description:~~
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.5, CCW pump aut t test, preventing an auto start of3A or 3B CCW pumps. ACCW Time started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water Malfu tio. Position US F!..ANT SYSTEMS a. I'.Wl two CCV'l OPERAflLE bUt Mt ll'OO1 mdepeooenl poMr Sl.lppl1e6 b::I OPERASLE BY 'A1ll"m It-e !,;ext 6 nOUfs and ln COLD S/iL!TOOf\IN OP*';v.eLE. res"e 1m he$. eXchlrgEfs 10 He)"" 51' ANOO'1' wtnln !he nm Iii I'OOr'!. an.:! ln COLD Pen'arrn ilL system Gpef'3iF..!I'liS .3-{)p.iJ3iJ. COMPONENT COOONG WATER SYSTEllit II. J! 000lI1l9 'Ila1Ef 1& being supplied WjUrffit 4, .l!:I.eI!i.piJI:)E OO1h In ootd illS SO!lf'1 as p:1ESItie. Note; US exits 3-0NOP-030, no other procedures in effect. 10 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_2_ Page _1_ of Event
~~Description:~~
FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increase. 3A S/O Time Position BOP feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return 3A level to program. 3-0NOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling c return 3A FRV to automatic control. Trigger lesson step, EVENT 2 -FT-3-474 F _ * *
BOP Obtains US concurrenc per guidance of ARP. RO ce for manuel FRV 0 eration . zation evel, then enters 3-0NOP-049.1 11 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:_2_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increase. 3A S/G feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return level to program. 3-0NOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling clJa'hnc;,ls"and return 3A FRV to automatic control. ,/,f j. ( Time Position RO ./ // 0,,4// Applicant's Actions or .. "' / 3 ** "t.RF. 0.97. CR YELle?;,\, .' i)n*!lJr;; ica i; act au; to fllnltr i::"dl:'Iti<<:..:nn;;:N"iu':li!migllili! &z iW-,.;iwat;:: o:rm .. nll. din IF Mi to iU,!nln:J;o;lll fwur'i, mIN :9f9r to 3,C{!:.;1I)P'(49LD.,:iat:::Z;'iJl hib.l:; B;.,ql or' 5-,.Q:!,ctot:' C-o.u:t:d. l:l.J"::-:,I.:::,,,ut rJii*:zQ w b::,w'?J.k . fPl C::;mrc.*l S7tilll
~~l!.a.Ill";31ll J6l(.:: *D-l:, 19B T:;::b; :;ip;;,: S';c-u,o:c~~
'3 ,.J .:1 12 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 2 Page of Event
~~Description:~~
FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increase. 3A S/G Time Position feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return 3A level to program. 3-0NOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling return 3A FRV to automatic control. BOP 5.0 s,UBsrO!,]NT BOP BOP 5) ,\7 e::fr ,]Oi>:: by pHamaTtHltl:::i:olldmo'us . Note: determines FT-3-474 "\ Note: after the BOP ". ..... m flow channel 475 is se!ected. flow channel .. yellow "Pne on JJ1e console are used to accomplish "\. wl)en l(J.lteL.is program automatic control will be *(lst9l'ed. . .............. ".,.,,"'//'. ,W \'" T'?:.r..n:ical SpeCfl.C?lti.Ol1S J;43 .. I:nSti'1l1ni!ll1ati*,x!l,;\NIJ the InlIDUl'am '. ' . . T.S."t{!bl'el3-1 function 12 action 6 I and table 3.3-2 functions act'iclp f 15 and function 4.d apply. Tables show below. 13 ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-+/--Event No.:_2_ Page of-1L Event
~~Description:~~
FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increase. 3A S/G II Tirne Position US feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return 3A level to program. 3-0NOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling c return 3A FRV to automatic control. FUNCTIONAL UNr: 1. Sfe>1J1l VJaler L'!!/a-j,.J.J'if'oL-::w 2. Gena'ator Water LOW Cooalde11 VIt.l1 S'leJro' F_w Flow Mismalcll 2<biJ& Z l 12 11 11 12 !J'f' i:11i1l!'l!'ll>_1S one Jess iran TOI!al Nurrtler r:A TIJ 11i:)N rI'i&f prooaed untill'
~~fK100 nell AMLOG CH.t.;NNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided 1:h!!~~
Channe! l& tr"Il? cootJItl*on Wl'!11J!1 6 fQUl'S s 6 hours to tri bistables 14 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: --+/--Event No.: _2_ Page 2 of -.JL Event
~~Description:~~
FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increase. 3A S/O feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return 3A .. level to program. 3-0NOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling return 3A FRV to automatic control.,./'/' <"/' ,,I' "\ Time Position US r SC.e*3rl une fiiY,'i.<**Hi;r wtm :3t-e-3.i:1 Ge1EntO'r Jr "T"m;--3)W Applicant's Actions or Behavidk\i 15 2, *3,.:1 2. :<. 14 the r.umber QPER.i4ELEcttJnrels ore tilil'11 ttle Tolal Number::J C/,allreis, r\.lY until pertJrmance of 'tiE' next i'tquirelt .M4Jl.LOO CH';f,iMEL "MAL TEST or TRYP .ACTJ.ATING DEVICE OPSRA TIONAL TEST fYU,';dalt 1he cll1*anneY Is placed An tine tnpped o:mditiOn W'11!1ln 6 tIOiJl'Ii. .. :" 6 hours to tri bistables 15 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: _2_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increase. 3A S/O Time Position US feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return 3A level to program. 3-0NOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling "H.<UllJlV¥O return 3A FRV to automatic control. Applicant's Actions or Behavid'" TOTAL '0. ur.JiT Of CK>'>NNEL0 4 Uf-e l50: .. Ur>::r-Q D1f'Z<n1 Un? Ct'!rdc:.eont \t;lll-j l?en-e-TJXor Prfi:..';.,l)f!2-Low 2, \ 2, 3" 1-1:' :or T a-"lIfo*Lz,w 1*:' it.'1\' JPe>";31lng s,12a:-tl :2 22 !l;1th Ire rl.!:rnbero/::;'PER.I\BLE cl',annelscne tnan Ire Tola! Number zr Criannel,. Ilon r'>3Y drrJ pE<rCf111anCe of tel'" 'I2:1t Faqulrec GHI\NNEL '7EST or T:;;XP A.CTUATHMG GEV:fC£: OFE;;'A.TtONAi.. 'TEST p-:"O'dt1EC1 t1e is placed m !11* ti!ipE<!i ccnd!tlon witNr 6 I'oun .. No,te:\petermines 6 hours to tri bistables 16 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _2_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increase. 3A S/G feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return level to program. 3-0NOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling chSl'rtrieJs"and return 3A FRV to automatic control.,.// "." ./ Time Position Applicant's Actions or >fii'i 5 '\ 'ical .. US US t all rec\,u:red t;:;cabl115 ai,0daled W:1:.1 tbe iai1ed ; J.lI nndf:!sired RPS(lc! ESF JC:ti.mioc., !..!!!1! rovided as reference 17 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_2_ Page of L Event
~~Description:~~
FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increase. 3A S/G feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return 3J\, ... sfq*) level to program. 3-0NOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling c 4 n{,l,iSand Time Position US return 3A FRV to automatic control. Applicant's Actions or F-3-414 St'*'.liim A Main Steam Lin:f:/#tow A,s, CQrnp .. lre*d to other RACK a-mrA6LE Ho, No BlST.t.BLE fUMCnON 18 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_3_ Page _1_ of l Event
~~Description:~~
3A RCP #1 seal degrades. The crew responds to annunciator A sealleakoffhi flow and are directed to 3-0NOP-041.1, Reactor Cp6iatit Pump Off-normal. 3a # 1 seal continues to degrade requiring alJnit,sf shutdown .. f f ,J! ,,,t Time .. l" j Applicant's Actions or Behavid'F,,/""/ Position Trigger lesson step, EVENT 3 -3A Rep #1 5 /f f" \., RO Reports failure of 3A RCP #1 seal . . "",\. '\r" f' ,.,"'*"
Annunciator alarm A Hi flow

FR-3-15 A flow indicating"S,8 for 3A RCP ., '. "\,\, BOP Refers to ARP A 1/5 19 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:_3_ Page -.£ of l Event
~~Description:~~
3A RCP #1 seal degrades. The crew responds to annunciator A 115, sealleakoff hi flow and are directed to 3-0NOP-041.1, Reactor if ;,/ Time Position BOP Pump Off-normal. 3a #1 seal continues to degrade requiring alJrfit / . shutdown,// f 5:.[r DEncES Applicant's Actions or Behaxior\jl ATTACHMsn;-1 "'" Page:; of "" :?a:uai A 55: 3 ,. Sb 3. - ,\V;n:e:' ttl Rep Ted) 3,*4.4 i..t.:* -44.1.2. :;-_'4 4 tJ US Directs response per 3-0NOP-041.1 Reactor Coolant Pump Off-Normal 20 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_3_ Page of..L . Event
~~Description:~~
3A RCP #1 seal degrades. The crew responds to annunciator A 1/5, RCP sealleakoffhi flow and are directed to 3-0NOP-041.1, Reactor t Pump Off-normal. 3a #1 seal continues to degrade requiring a it Time Position US US shutdown I shan NOT b$. seal p.iCltage r.t!l1UI'"e utmr :cne S I j I I I 21 I I I I, I I -________
~~____ 1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _3_ Page --.1.. of l Event~~
~~Description:~~
3A RCP #1 seal degrades. The crew responds to annunciator A sealleakoff hi flow and are to 3-0NOP-041.1, Pump Off-normal. 3a #1 seal contmues to degrade reqUIrIng shutdown. .,. t' Time Position US "-. Rep :HOPPIHG CRITERIA IF anycr fcHcwngRCP rear.:t"Rf.l .!J!:!§:! man' r1:;p !lehto"); 11112 afi'ec;::leo RCP ty,JfSi-S or ootawd1g oal,a 10' tiHarCfng fV:P.: :cr ret'"" i:if*:Jlt>:gvn operaVO?1S; 1;'1*
~~,rD;? supev\"orcr COn)::mEr:~~
Erglneertrg SupePd!<Of Tayau:no1zE conllruedRCF opera:ul .. wttr* , \e'",,1 or Et3tCf v"tlll1rt,) IF.CrpeJailire at-oi;? stoppng orlena ntted I, FolttoJt page Item 2. 1N .. z;;.tlon i5 ri:qu.'fed leoe <Jttalne<J Vlor Ie Blartlng 111E' FtCF ermine foldout pa e does not a pi for con:litions 22 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _3_ Page 2 of L Event
~~Description:~~
3A RCP #1 seal degrades. The crew responds to annunciator A 1/5, RCP Time Position RO RO RO sealleakoff hi flow and are directed to 3-0NOP-041.1, Reactor C Pump Off-normal. 3a #1 seal continues to degrade requiring a shutdown. 1 Applicant's Actions or B
Rep 3A Trlef1T\31 Barrier tiP,

GREATER ""HAN ZERO !I'K:H .. RCP 32, Barrter !i? .. Pl*

GREATER ""'HANZER:O
~~!I'K:H 23 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _3_ Page of l Event~~
~~Description:~~
3A RCP #1 seal degrades. The crew responds to annunciator A 1/5, RCP sealleakoffhi flow and are directed to 3-0NOP-041.1, Reactor CIt Pump Off-normal. 3a #1 seal continues to degrade requiring a it Time Position RO shutdown N("15t:)f.i,! Lank I,(;PM) 1> -t ................. + ... .. 3 2 2:250 2e;oo not within enclosure at any ;IRE ffl LEVEl C!Ja!m fJf' C\51JPffll'fl:m,' _ me nlJl7ll:lSr i\!iIo
~~I ----.. -.. -----------... Ch£M:ik RCP OM S4J1ld Go to $Iep 21 (Iff' FR-3-fSl4A-GREATER UIPPER UMU OF 1 Ch6<CII Rep Sea! Byps8a VIItV9 CV-:!-3G7~~
-ttle CLO,sED 24 iI! MMlu;#fY ciOEe CV":3.sG7 b Chect for IXIrrEiSpoodflg de:CRiDe III ba'Ilief:!.P C. PerflJl'm mea Of ail RaP ie;ak(#t now tI Request. tre SY.'lt!nl Englrn!'e'f Opera'llcri< SUper.iGloo Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.:_3_ Page of l Event
~~Description:~~
3A RCP #1 seal degrades. The crew responds to annunciator A 1/5, sealleakoffhi flow and are directed to 3-0NOP-041.1, Reactor C9 \ Pump Off-normal. 3a #1 seal continues to degrade requiring a J.lliit Time Position RO RO shutdown , __ 1/---' 18 Applicant's Actions or AI! Rep Number One $eall&5'K-OM" fj,yiW!!; On -LESS THAiN Gt=tM C, prepar"(!O'rlS to s:nl.t;Cbwn AJ,msrop aftEcte:l Rep l1ilng ::.GCP-'Kn, POWeR Cpe"'.}<.TIC\;N T(>,'10TSTANOBY c Caruel Plant Man3§iSmen: t,oT nv1t;er gtbjan::e D'* !11.e;;'fcEcllS1 RCo un-1M :he cause 01 tile '!il!JJ Ill3JI\E1ctlcn nJS t>*en d*llS'm&1*d A.t:!D j i w11: sn,k:iCllln uSing FAST LOAD R,E.DUCTKH{ 2:. Inppi:'j, lliW1rlp t're :-eacto-r }, the reactcfiS lrtpped, THEN RGP;].). Note: Determines 3A RCP seal leak-off flow greater than 5.5 gpm and 3-0NOP100, fast load reduction is required.3A RCP is required to be tri ped after the reactor is tripped. US Transitions to 3-0NOP-1 00, Fast Load Reduction 25 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--+/--Event No.: Page _1_ of ..1.-Event
~~Description:~~
3-0NOP-l 00 is used per 3-0NOP-041.1 to shutdown the unit. II Til'YIe Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US US 1. Re!Hoo f.:tr load fe:klCti(lO _______ ll@mim ------_::-.. --_. 01 il'a.ral!l1!ten Aniol!;!i ref T not to ;;o.:i'ed
J j)f e:q:.ected, s:ww ramp m restore ball,t Sl. ROD BA:"K LO L.slIT alarms:. the load reootooo be 51owed. US Will determine load reduction and boration rate. Then conduct brief. 9 allons/% should be used to determine 900 al re uired 26
~~( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page.-£ of L Event~~
~~Description:~~
~~3-0NOP-l 00 is used per 3-0NOP-041.1 to shutdown the unit. II Tit"ne Position RO BOP ROI BOP RO 3 4 Applicant's Actions or Behavior El$gln BOIrai1oo~~
~~a. Se1lhe Bollt "dO Totalizer to value tl set FC-3-1 131<,. flQl"I!;;~~
~~Mt1 Fkwl to a pc< HtI.b;j << 3D C. Place 100 Millellp Se1el:Ior SWb 00~~

~~.. D-EP1?-2l?1l?t, OOTIES OF EMERGENCY COORr' .. #iNATOR~~
~~il-ADMf*j i 5, OF ?I.AN! EVENTS t1 soop Of SknII reoot'llOO 10 OO!1!rol IEmperal!.we.~~
If oolltrtt fMi in manual am malntai'l TiAlg YItlhb1tne TilttgiTrefl1Tr:1 .3. Perform the* it S!oW'ltJ\iI:I red\ictlon Ull4II ala m1 Is fEHt. t;, amoont aoo rale and mat'! ... ---_. --. --, --------_. --.' '1 I --I I ,AtXAai fIllX Is a.'R:i!t-tSC !l./ exc..eeo ttle e-ano Wr!r1J rtfE? .. iOaO wttoout I erilrerf1i{J Vilittt!!l U,e Axli!!.! F.VX D-tiT'elMce OperatJorr&l Space. 27 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page of Event
~~Description:~~
3-0NOP-l 00 is used per 3-0NOP-041.1 to shutdown the unit. Time Position RO 7 RO 8 BOP 9 BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior Plant R .. apC'DSI? 3, !il;r'JVlh'1!i progflfP ¢, O. iJi'3J:l raie anC auto FJG ;,. fn31r:ta1li1g1he T3llg%TrS' aTlttenllned In Al1ammert3 28 IE ':'"'ar-g:et LO;3::r is <3REATER. Trl,A/"4 451} \1Vi2< THieN p*rfocrn !re fl::ficNIIng
~~a. h6aintatl re2!"Jor :PC{.VE't a't D("~~
It>e largEI "laue u-s'ng: Corrtll)i R.oo 3';iIIJ£tcl1ems TIH1>ihe h:""j ad}llstrnents D. Maintain '"3"£1 \iMltdn +/- j "1" rI. -ret c. M::!lnt;a!n Pr*jS*Su.1Zil[ I;eVE} on pro;lf,3ID c hlalni:aln PreS1!* ... F!Zef fTe:&Sure on e t4amtat1 Sf;; Of! Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page -+/-. of Event
~~Description:~~
3-0NOP-IOO is used per 3-0NOP-041.1 to shutdown the unit. Time Position BOP BOP 12 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Cl'laeJo: S:lntlon S&rVlce From TIl& &tup TraMfOmler Note: transfers loads n aux steam usin att. 1 er event 4. 29 I
I *
~~( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_4_ Page _1_ of_1_ Event~~
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main valve fails to automatically close requiring manual the steam leak. ",/ J f'/ ""\" \, Time Auto Trip Failure <: --;'\,. ,-"" ", Position ior Trigger lesson step, EVENT 4 -STEAM BR RO/ BOP US RO Operators determine a reactor trip of:
Steam, n . -',

Steam fto "'"" "'Trjps from vertical panel B \, 3-EOP-E-O immediate operator actions to be performed. . 30
~~( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event Page _1_ of.lL Event~~
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are blockeq"l'*q",;!,irfng a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the console faUs'reqtiiring the / "> Time Reactor Tripped operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main steam isola!ion )[alve{ails to automatically close requiring manual operation to "'" J" -',.. \". Position RO ...J BOP 1 Verify Reactor Trip P,,"'CICf trip 31'0 bypass treakBcs -OPEN ""<>: ., *.. "' ...* ". ... trip !:"'9 Jtl 1'\.JE. rea;;;;;o! pCl'iBr is '0"" [::> <: 2;"",ler :han povier \.[$ Wll s:aqle'cr dede:asintJ, I,W;J1 / ., '\;, j' .;1 \' .. Saf?lY Functions US<llg '. 3-EQt'-F-G*. CR. CAL SA::-ETY '. S7A TUS TREES. '\ .v \ Critical Task: (TC-PRA) the reactor within one mjRotlteif'automatic fails to ttip the reactor. .j.f' MS,q St*¢.n"! Supply Step MOVs """"to ", .. >"'R'eC<<a(er T*11in2 Var,.;;,; "". "o, . . S';eaf"1 \/a '\'es c. ,;,".) Ea.: GC3s -()::E"j I N,y*rylaiiy
'

: s1!,yJrd delay; a.

rip turbi":e--.
~~IF lJf1able 'i-E-pfj~~
":;C'. THEN OiY5.e n1:itn siear:1Ene 6oJa1icn

b. \ilanu,,,Hy' valvEs, IF valvi? can NOT b .. c'OSed, THEN ,cTose .'!lain st;,;rPlh"";.F-bypass v,;;ve:s" Mamraiiy (1:';;0 If break",rs de NOT DOS", THEN ac:uate "!'\IERGEI'.CY
'tV tC1,= "f,'!Kti:':i " f Y ,<"J"Nqtb: BOP closes MSR main steam supply stop MOVs Critical Task: Failure to isolaB faulted S/G following automatic steam line isolation Note: 3B MSIV fails to close on automatic isolation signal 31 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page...£ of Event
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are blocked ,7 .f" Time Position BOP requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main valve fails to automatically close requiring manual operatiDn to . ::/? .J"--.,-;\, "'\ the steam leak..(/ .... J'r'v \\\ \\. '-<';,::\,(#' 3 Verify POWl?f To '* KV Buses a Chied; the 2A. and :38 4 KV buses -MA.INT ,t.,IN AT LEAST GkiE ENE.RGIZED
~~b. Safeguards.~~
equipMent -A.,.FC ern,:rtlelr,w start :he dies,,' ger,er;;;lcr. I) IF k,d(ou{ ,:,f 3D 4K'V' bus NOT 'iNesent. !.t!!ili. pE'riorm the fdlowng: c)C>j>srate bus supply breakers te, p:?Fler. -----------------------, f:tQlf I FCLOGtlT F<tge shall' be mOflirorr:d fef the remain:;!!?! of Ihis proor:dure. US Reviews foldout pa e 32 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page of .-lL Event
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are b!pcK¥ requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the co .. p'solS;rlails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main valve fails to automatically close requiring manual the steam leak. . .. / if \.. It Time Position US f U'S .... /;!' t. flDVi=BSE CONTAINMENT COijDIOONS
~~2. lE eili1*r >,f the c:fr,j:iions listecd below r;.::;C'Jr.~~
THEN u atNl:IJsr;:k::*re t.en'f!<E';",a:1ure 2: 1:80>:'F <'\oj/r"/'\;' " lied manner Q!l any SiG colT1Jieteiy depresSlJr:;:ed, It!§:!. \'" RUPTvRED SIG ISOLATION. CRITERlA 3,-r1V le\N?: increase-s in ,:,n n"13rV1-Er OR -"3'f",!; StG-has at.nonn*;;!: AND . ,In affcectedSIG{sjs 9",ater Ulan teed fha may d*. stoppej"1C"afrech:;Q \ .... ', \, "'AN SYSTEM OFERJ'ITION CRITERIA +-r.' are cp"rat!Pi2 en a single train, ItlffLcne of th1? purr;ps shall be shut dCftn \,. witn:in "DNsthoUf of inltal St3f1 -si,gnai })r. IF ,A,'pi-V tr*;ins -'are-381'\-(1: one, of ihe ,AF';; ptunps has .at kYf.lJ fittt'1' ()f 1m *gpm or Jes fo, one ,"cur. I!i5t! lila: I'Klmp %.311 he shu1 down # a.1 gAT MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA j' llE CST tc :*-ss than 10%,.I.IJf.bl aid tnak,J?up tD CST -using 1, CONDENSATE ,l' STORA.GE Tt..NK 3A Rep due to #1 seal failure 5 Continue Wiih At1acorrMmt 3 10 The Pm,mpt Actioo 'iJerifi,cattctIlliS Whil*< Perionrninlfj Thi's Procedure Note: US directs BOP to perform attachment
~~3. Attachment 3 steps on a e 53. 33 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page of 2L-Event~~
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the CO,lTS'oly,/fails f f' Time Position RO RO requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main steam,;solation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper'!;r6'ntQ the steam leak. ,[//0, //""\., \. '*.r" .,". 6 Check APo'( Pumps. -AT LEAST T'iV'O RUNNING b M{3:'-ll-t;;1fri r,*<Eoj fON S/vG narn:ft<'l (:;ai--'1ge 1<>,,.,,'5 between j 5%[:2%] and 51)% .. 34 1, ;0 establish two I9ped.lJ;!fti reset the 1>;f'!/4 AND Qnly*,oni: Se. THH; perfurm TRiPPED :;; Use" s"lpoil1i.of 270gp1'1 for f"qIJI11edft.FW flew instesj Qf 345gptnspecifiec in subsequent Steps ,3r't(1 Proc:edures Manually ali>!" vai'<'es to .. 5tabiisr, proper Ar'Y\'
3. f

:doviting:
.) PPi\1' few flpm. 2) .IE ,!i,FIN n,w lessrtlan345 gpm. THFN m3ihiaJly start pumps arw. a{;\l.r val'lli':s 1*1) eSlabiishgrea1er lhan 34:gpnflcw .. 3) lE 1ctal i:<?;1 f,bw fr,:t'11 .at-S.ryJrcE:5 @"".ater \1\311 345 gpm o*m J::WI. be Est3blis;i1ed. THEN perfc'nn th." 1Dllo<'ling; --;,j Saf:B1Y F;;nc:tions 'Join? CmTICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREEK I*j Go to 3-ECP*FR-H .1. TO LOSS OF SECCNDA.::;:Y HEtiT S'NK Steop 1. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ---+/--Event Page 2-of.2.L Event
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main olation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper *f! ", Time Position RO the steam leak. 9 Check Rep SfiaJ Cooling a: C';"!ot*CK all RCP th,err'1-.:."11 !naniEf OFF b
~~1>. '11, RCP THERM}'.L BARR C--::iCL;NG H1 FLCfi/V "';; FIG'."I TQ Regen Heal 121, te r"1aint-3.~~
~~1"1 , inje:non kytl 35 nEil barrier is 10Sl, -,n, Reset SJ. ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-+/--Event No.: Page of 22-Event~~
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are blJJCkep requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the c9JY'!sr c fails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main valve fails to automatically close requiring manual operqt{' tehpinate the steam leak. . "'\ Time Position RO 10 RO Maintain ReS CQld Ll?g Tempemturi!' STABLE AT.QB -F-H:.NGNG TOS4r ANY;:;:CP RUNNNG LESS THAN 547'F RCPRUNNING c, .A,t::rJiary Sp""ay \r-3j!/e, C\L;;; .. CLOSED 36 Dump-SlG 5te,am durnp to vah;-e's>
~~a. .If PR2 pressure jess lhan 73;.%5 psg\ lllfl1 manually dose POR'v's . .If an,. PRZ PORV"can NOT be okJsed. THEN IT"mually oose~~
laive. ! 6100'; val..,e 0,,,,1 Wl be closed . .It!El:l.oerform !he fcllow*ng n Ctb:.al Salet}' ;:; un:{Q!'**S lIsing 3-EC1"-F<1. eRe-CAL SAFETY FUNCTIGiN STATUS TREES 2:1. Go toO 3-EOP-E.-'!, LOSS Of REAC-OR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step t, b. IF P'P.z *znessure"ss 1han22eG PSi!;). "rntEN manu;;;!!y dose val .... es.IF val,.,eis) "an NOT be cbsed. I.ll6isb;)pRCP(s) as-fH?teSsary to' -spray _ M"iluall,. d.cs!! amiNal,)' sVay valve.. !E sp-ay
~~can.!!Q!. dcs-e,j-_~~
~~lllfl1 elese Charging Flow 'co q"ge",~~
~~HC';lw3*12-1.~~
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-+/--Event No.: Page of .1.f.-Event~~
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the cgJ'fs'olp/fails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main .. isolation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual the steam leak.,.,:! i/O "" Time Position d.. Exc-ess ieidc\\in lsoiat>:)n 'iaI .. 'e'S -CLOSED CV-.3-*3-87", Excess Letd:rit"ifl \/aSv:e Frotn L.eg To iExc:eS'5 LB'jdovm Heal HCV' .. 3-137, 80ntrciier RO 12 ;G PRESSURE DECRE':',SING
~~JNGC¢iTRCtLED .Q:B.~~
~~PoNY SG CCilIlPLETEL Y DEP.RESSURlZE£l b.. P!:;iorr:1 ihe roHowing; Monitor Critical Sa.ii!:1Y Functicns.~~
asing 3-EOP-F-C. CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION S-ATUS TREES 2;* Gc lC F,l;;UL -ED S-EAf,,1 <3E:NE,R.A,rCH is--{;'LATION. S:te,p 1 37 ----"'\"\//:/. 2i. GO' to Step. 14. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event Page of.1L Event
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are bi requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the c9R requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main s,te'am valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper . ./' JQ t Time Position RO the steam leak. 14 Check If SI'Gi Tub'E'5 Are Ruptured a -Che:k ietl,,-='_::S in ail S{3s and leVB'lS: \. NClTB; Directs HP to take local steamline radiation surve s Check If Res Is b Corrk,inlT&ll prEssure -NORMAL 38 Perform the follov<1ng: Monitor Crib:a! SafelY F"ilOlioilS llS<T1g CRF:GAL SlIFET( FUNCTION ST,Il,TUS TREES, 2. -3>:< to. 3**EOP--**1., LOSS OF OR SECONDARY COOLANT. Step ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-+/-- Event
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are bJ requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the c requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main Time Position RO valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper the steam leak. 16 THAN 345 al Safety FuneHons Using 3-EOP-F-O
. CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES Ch<.>ck S!G Lew:ls a Narrow 1.3r,;'" 'E"Jel-GREATER 'HAN 6% b ContrC'i feed fto"v to 8.1aint.,in r,:;:fJ"CNV L3:nge 50%. 39 d. Trj;' tD s:abihze Res pre's,s,t.V'e-
\Vl:h nOfm/:i_ PRZ spray, Go-to SleD 17. 3. tQ't:al felll than 345 gprn until r;arrcttl range \evel greater than -t6<';. in at ie*ast one S/G. ' .. - feed-f;:Vl to any SlG l,,*1th narrow '.?inge ie'llel greater!;h."n. 50%.. !.f. nam::w
e'!lel

:11*3irW SiG ';.onbnu:es
~~[!;) tncre<lise an IJnocGlroller! II:ll:il:/. go STEA10 TUBE RUP,URE, Slep 1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event~~
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are b!9e'k'¥ requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the c9.RS'o! .. $¥'fails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper .ibn)Q Time Position RO the steam leak.' ..... Check SeCOndalf'j' Radiation " Dire:>: fu\.idear ChErni!;lrY-lc 13k,. acfJirly 5;.atnp}e"s, of .sJ: StGs b Direct Ra.d\ ... ';tHon ?'rotech-ofl to :i3ke :'"ac::atbn n-::-ain RO 20 RO Reset S Air Gontairm"*ni GV-3-2BOJ -O?Et'4 b. Ve'ify instnm1ent ax pressure, "'\-3-1444 -b. Restcremsirument 3lf pressJre uSJng GRE?,TER THto,N 95 PSIG O-OHOP-Oi3. LOSS OF IN'STRUMENT AIR, while continuing wilh lhi!; proc>:dure. CAUTION If ReS pre55ure decre*3se.s in an trnoomroJl*d manner to less ;rJl<iiJl 2srf ,D6ig[6S{) psigJ,m<lJllf<l! <lcuon wiiJ be reqairedoo resrarr me RI-tR pttmpsiilfter rhey flavebeen secured. 40 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page -11. of Event
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are b ck requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the c sol ails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main SVO" .... u'*. Position RO RO valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper the steam leak. 25 Monitor ReS Pressure To If RHR Pumps Sho'illd BI! Stopped! b 1) PresS\Jre* GREATER THAN zoo PSIG[a50 PSIG; . 4criUS1 spee,d ClO111ro11ers as tt'!'CessMy to tstabii5h desTed charging l"low c. ./;.I1,U5t Chargil'!{1 Flow To Regen He .. 8:d1anger, HCV-3-12'1. to maintain prq:;er seal 4ljection ilO'W Perform the follomng:;
a. Chect diescl capacity lo run iiit !east charging pt.W11p. b. IF >llZlpilioity is Tf.!EN shed oonessentlilll loads-ReiEr to 'i\'i"TACHN"Bfi
for KW load rating. a. Perform Attachmenl 4 to estaO'fush cl1argir.g . ote: attachment 4 used to establish char, in 41
~~( ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: Page --.:!1... of Event~~
~~Description:~~
A stearn line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are b!obkej:l requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main valve fails to automatically close requiring manual operj,tfbn t"Q the stearn leak. <,/ J ..** /\\\ \ Time Position RO '\v** .. \:< Applicant's Actions ESTABLISH " t.. / 1 Verifoj' CCW Flow To ,/l,1I RCP Thermal Barriers 8m! A *i/2. Rep THERMAL 'ti4.-ER H TE',jp '" Start Olle Pump '{ '" "'""-}: " #' ReS M,lI1(*-up Control Switch in STOP ::la1 ackhional punps jf speed contn:dlers as
~~Ci e-st,3:' sh~~
~~harging~~
~~'10ij'ri c. ."'i1iust Chargir)g = un To Hea\ 1C sJ::al flow d. pwn::;* St.H::ticll to~~
~~8. il401ify The Unit Super .. icsorThat The ESTABLISH CHARGING FLOW Attaohment Compt.et*-~~
~~42 t .. a.~~
.
~~e:npeml'.Jl1?~~
~~for PC:: to .. be~~
h;n 236 F. ' JE seaJ fer E-sch Rep .*.** i* ess than 2J3,e F lI1Et1 go :0 2. ,.. "hI' .:?;,,;!:.

\>1 <' 011: --, '""f"?'>>;
~~... _ .IE -_it ... rr ..*. fa.",r.:; L _~~
~~r. /"'"qcaiiv lsofl'te *. :;eal '1 *. <:clicf! *:;.ifectec~~
/ RCF'<:: . .' mVling chargir>& purrps. -7.4. fer RCPA 3-:;073 fot RCP 6 d. seal injection is is!) aied io eacio; arreCle;! Rep. lJ:[I;l:l. ge to 2iep :2 If POI";;:, is NOT a'iilJ!able. THEN ct'ieck adequate tc charging p'Jmp. wpaeity is NOT ;;idiKhA3>:e. THEN shed non-essential .cads. Refer to A ":'tA.CHMENT
~~2 11)r component KV\' \!)a¢ ratng Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~~
~~Event~~
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine ,p" Time Position RO resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main §.(,j'solation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual operSJ,tlbn.J{) the steam leak. <"/,.;/4' . 28 "*,,,,/i Applicant's Actions Check If Diesel Generat,ofs She-ukl Be a Che::k ,:he A and B4f{V :t:.NERGtZED 8'{ OFF SiTE n)' unfoa,;je-b diese; ge:net,rnor and :;r,-dby us:ng ;':4-0P-023, :y DJ;ESEL GENERAT();q 31 Check C&pB?':it)E' adequate to (Un one computer room chiller; J.E. diese{ capadiy is.l::l.Ql adequa{e .* .Il::IE.rished non"e'S.51??l:1bd foads, Refet to An,I..,CHlvlENT 2 for component KVIi \",,4' r3l.ing. " .f to re are to secure EDGs usin J.OP-023 Perform .A.rracnrnmt 5 to .AligTh PIa",,! Equipment NOTE: Loops back to step 10 to meet SI termination criteria. Attachment 5 listed next for reference. 43 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-0-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are blocked requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main steam'lsQ;la.tion valve fails to automatically close requiring manual operatiojY{S Time Position RO the steam leak. f' < 1. Applicant's Actions or ATIACHMEIiiT 5 /"p (P"pe 1 .:.f 2.}/;:. "'#/'/ / W ,,< \. ALIGN P'LAtH EQUIPMENT ,/;' " ,,/f Verify the-3A ofK" bus* ENERGIZED
~~'Peiorh\ ihe bearing oil zump. D. DC ak see ba::-k:,JZf sea} td z$".vnp,~~
'\ \::', .... Verify At Le-ast One E\tilding'*h .% Exhaus.t Fan -ON '\') '. \. .' .,/ //J"'.'0 '" """) Cheok'sPl1'.nt Fui!1Pit ocroling\- ,/ S:art 0X;Ef{A TIN(j** *.. , \ \/ ,I/' 3--3P-G33, FUEL PUl"'lP using COOUNG .. ", .,/ SYSTEM '<., -<:- Be;;'ring am Lift Pump* RUNt41NG -'\. -.f Turbtne . ON TURNING GEAR 44 Pe:forrr the foliN'Iing i:l. bearing oii ihan 9 p51g. a'Jxjji"rj'" i? pW'1P -RJI**;NNG, b. *8onhnue witt: Step 6, Pe-ionr the fuliowing
a. tU':b**'1*
speed 'Jeere.?!ses t::; less :han eee fP!11. verify bearing oil it pump -RU1NIN8. O. Continue Step '7 > Pceiorn ... ihe fuliowing: i:l. ;u:iv:rJ1e speed to zero, THEN plao.:' t.Jrbine en tvming g1:3ff using :!>;JP.Qs7.:. -lJRNING GEAR D. 8cntinue wit" 51ep 8. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event .Page --.1Q.. of 2L Event
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are blocked requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the cons e 'ls Time Position requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main stea valve fails to automatically close requiring manual operatio to the steam leak. nr R 8. Verify FiE'ld Breaker -OPEN 9. 10. 11. Notify The UllR Supervisor Thiil: The AUGiN PlANT EQUIPM*HlAUachmem 1'5 Complete 45 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page of Event
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine "\ resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are bl0',r" ,.*4' Time Position RO requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the C9J1SO!" ails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper 'onJQ te'ftt:linate the steam leak. ','\ 10 Mainta:in RCS CDld Leg Ternpefatufi'! STAE;LE AT.QB. TRENC\NG TO 547> ANY RCP
~~c. A,vx;iiary-3pray~~
.. 31 t -CLOSED 46 \\, '\ "\". \ I..llat g: b. lE. 1 tire great*1 tnan:47'F .&Wl p.;;dbrm the fdlcwlng: Du rrp sCO\:irtl >3tr'1csph'E't*
l. E pp,z lESS Z3J5 psIg-, .ll:if11 {nanu.aJy close If. any PRZ PORV can NOT be ckl5ed.lliEN manually dDse iiS'5'Cd valv", if' hiccA valve cam liQI be dosed, .I!:idfpelfcrm the fuilowling

1) Moniror Crbcai Sa§ety Funct':ns using:
CRJTH::AL SAFETY Fl,JNCTION ST,I'.;T*US -:-PEES. 2) Go:o 3-EOP -E-l. LOSS OF REACTOR OR 2;ECCIND.4,R"{ COOLANT. Step 1, b, If PRZ ;:r,;:ssure tess than 22:f+/-;O -P'sJ.g 'mEN manlJaHy clOSE llah",s. IF vaJ\"'i'S) can NOT be ciosed,.I.tiSi 'St<:qRCP(s) as ne;;essil'y to stc*p spray fCNI. , Manually case ,'luxF;;;ry .... arve !E. auwHarj spray 'lr3{-Ve c.an !QI bE' dcs:ec!, .ll:if11 dose Charging FIOYI1D Regel H*,at Exchang*"<', 121. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: Page -.1L of Event
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are blpek'b}l requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the co requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main s valve fails to automatically close requiring manual opera the steam leak." Time Position Applicant's Actions d E:xoess ;,,:ldDwn isciatcf1 vai'il>Ss -CL()SED C\t .. 3-387 , Excess Letdcr-wn !SC/:r3:,t}On \/ F C:o id L.e-g ToE xceS'S LEldDwn Heat HCV-3-137, Exc*' 80ntrdier R012 G PR-E:3S\)RE DECREASiNG UNCCfP"R<}lLED bAA;NN'=R .QB.
~~toNY 8,3 C:)MPLETELY DEP b >='"rfwr11he Tollowtng:~~
t ',Monitor CritIcal Saf,,1y Functions 3-EOP-F-D .. CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES Lj GO'lD *3,..,EOP' .. *!E .. 2, F,A)JLTED GEt$ER.ATOR TICIN. Step 1 47 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page of .1.L Event
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are bl, requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the cS.lIs'ol,y<t'ails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main sJ,eam{iSolation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper ;;'* '.. inate Time Position RO the steam leak. 14 Check If Sit} TuboesAre Ruptured a Che::k 10:::,.,2"$ in all SiGs and ",,,c,,',,,<!I"'d r*"dat;:>n le'l*1s: Directs HP to take local steamline radiation surve s If Re*s Is b Containm:::m pressure* NORMAL c. sunpevel
~~NORMAL 48 Monitor Crit,;;al 3a.fety F'JnC1.icns llsng -;:,-EOP-F-fJ, Slt\FETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES, 2. 3<:* lo LOSS OF REA}:::"!"'OR CR 3EO:>NDARY CO'OLANT, Stepi,~~
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:....1.... Event No.: Page of 2L Event~~
~~Description:~~
A stearn line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main valve fails to automatically close requiring manual the stearn leak. f' Time Position Applicant's Actio RO 16 Check If 51 Should Be Terminated
.;' ReS SUbc<'Dl

-Lng -ba-sed en ,ccre e:t.ft -'-C's .*. GRE4TER TH;>,N 3trF o. Trl to s.:abihz:e RCS* pt*rSSurE'
~~\vth ncrr:;.a: PRZ -;,rn/)'. Go 10 Step 17. brief and transition is made to 3-EOP-ES-1.1 SI "'" 49 l Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event~~
~~Description:~~
A stearn line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are b CK requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the c sol ails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main "V'" ... UJW. valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper the steam leak. Time Position r------------, I I US 1. 2. UOOVAUJE 2: 210"F : US reviews foldout a e 50 I I Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: Page -2.1. of Event
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are r /' Time Position RO BOP BOP RO f, requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the cgusolJyfails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper,}vfon,tp tettpinate the steam leak./' \,,,,,./,.#'" Applicant's Actions 1 2 CO'ntJ JrlO'8r4 P!u,sa A Ana PI';J1S$ B 3 Vilrl1'/lrrstrumar,l Air 'T,\yCQ!l'!illl1rrrant ,3 +6Q,!allcr - \ "". ..;-,;":' "" 4{ 11 Flow Has f #' EatabllSMG, , ffc ,/" .1. * ./J.,-: LEAO-Ct\e , \ 51 1 J.E:. U'Nl Ie Cafl'8r 1S 'coR THEN OC3Iit* \E.O:3i& &E:aJ IrtEV;)or, to ;:;:':'scl*'i1 RG.::>;Si Cf'Xlre sta:t'ng (;1' .arg1ng pilmrE. Rep A ;-297B rer RGP 5 :-297C ftir C .2) .!E cti'st" !);:tN-2f'S NOT a\\3!i<!hlf'. THEN CflE:ck Ci*;S*; .1.;'"' cra;gng piir*{)i . .iE (:,:,.,a,<4ly is!'i9! i'!,,;,J13!:li? .I.!im"r;*d fCl1l-Essert131 Re:fE't" '/J .3 fCf r.:iN :03:.1 ,-a:n'1 4\ .I.E:. O'l2"gf11g r:,YN can,W.ll. t* establ':s*flE::.I. m;:;lr:3In 01" 81 Cl'TiP "-.or Res 1'l*/sr:CI1' c:;r:ro; .3-:)t'i°:)O.wG47 1 C'iARGING FLCii'IIN MOO=:3 i T"iROUGM .:. &mn.gn &:.eps of t11s ofiOcejtre. ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event
~~Description:~~
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are bJpck5P requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper"ationJQ,tel'tpinate the steam leak. . ',. Time Position RO RO " ")-<<. . .0"",' ,;>./< Applicant's Actions ocS"el)aVior ") S':3f: ;;Xitlli!Z:f!31 D:"lai"gfng P'Ji'rl='S as !;C. *st.3IJilr.i1 QaEit"ej crargJilg IlI:Wlf 21 ,";:!.¥J&i ccniro'*ere 1:0 'E'SCcf'i:::Hs'1 A(jPJEl C/"arging H::\!-,3, i i prC?ft!f sea' 1;0 sDto..'lQH;lQ bal;;*,j 01 cere ex;; -Cs
THAN )0' F :FtelEr!xl FclCQul. Z A:he-tE*" \lj!Le] a. \{anJa'ly elEJrt,s1 p:Jr';pe IQ resioee $U:;CQJI!fl;t AND go;:; 3-E(',;::\*=:*1, ':.0:3$ Ctf OR CC<::<.".I\1\7 step 1 t* Conln:!1 crargng i'io'W :{H1Ji reta!n P=<.z ;eliel. if P,RZ !E'tei car' NOT 02 tn31rrane:J.
THEN rnaru311f 'Sielfi 81 p:.1npe to fEdore P F:l 1*'!/ef <1<1:j ge to LDDS r;).;:" (>:>Ci .... 4/.JT, Gte,?" 1 Take shift from Crew followin verification 52 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 1_ of_1_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
~~3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP BOP Step 1 Check The Load Centers Associated With Step The Energized 4 KV ENERGIZED~~
3A LC

3B LC

3C LC

3D LC

3H LC 2. . .J.L Main 9, a steamlire\/ji'/ ,f,j-solatiop bypass"valves
~~-. ANY ) , \ b. Chey'/if iS9tation signal has*'8GtLl.ated --', _<, ___ ,//::,,'ir'" . ', ___ ,_ ,{,{iii~~
steam flow'witll either S/G pressure 614 psig OR low Tavg 543 F \, ',OR

pressure 20 PSIG Verify main steam isolation and bypass valves -CLOSED 53 ./ .... ,. .." .*. ",,,,,.,, .. .. Bel'soJRtEil.,ef
~~'>.'<:<;,l'~~
~~a. Go to Step 3. b. Go to Step 3. c. Push manual Steamline Isolation push buttons on VPB OR manually close valves.~~
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 2_ of _1_1_ Event~~
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step BOP 3. Verify Feedwater Isolation Place main feedwater pump a. switches in STOP Feedwater control valves-b. CLOSED Feedwater bypass valves-c. CLOSED Close feedwateC/iso[ation
d. MOVs ""*0." <"., b"l Manuallyefose valves. /' .", d. CbQally**close valves. v ';z, '\",;;"", .<>, >. c. Verify standby

e. pumps -OFF "ii-,f'
~~POV-3-4882~~
~~-CLOSED POV-3-4883 -CLOSED Check ICW headers -TIED TOGETHER 'i, " IF staitdbyfeedwater is "a'lig[led toJ1nit 3, THEN "*, .. ,stop "stsmdby feedwater p'iJrnp(s).~~
~~b. c. Start ICW pump(s) to establish at least two running. Manually close valve(s).~~
IF valve(s) can NOT be closed, THEN locally close the following valves: 3-50-319 for POV-3-4882 3-50-339 for POV-3-* 4883 IF both ICW headers are intact, THEN direct operator to tie headers to ether. Note: BOP starts 3A lew PP, 3B fails to start if attem ted 54 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-TestNo.: 2009-301 Event No.: 4att.3 Page3_of_1_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
~~3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step 5. Verify Proper CCW System Operation~~
~~a. CCW Heat Exchangers~~
-THREE IN SERVICE b. CCW pumps -ONL RUNNING . erify Containment Cooling a. IF both CCW headers are intact, THEN direct a field operator to tie the headers together. IF containment isolation phase B NOT actuated AND CCW radiation levels are normal, AND RCP number one seal leak-off temperature is less than 235°F, THEN manually open MOV-3-626. IF MOV-3-626 can NOT be manually opened, THEN direct operator to open MOV-3-626 locall . Manually start or stop a. Check emergency containment
~~a. emergency containment coolers -ONLY TWO RUNNING coolers to establish~~
-ONLY b. Verify emergency containment filter fans -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING 55 TWO RUNNING. b. Manually start emergency containment filter fans. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--.1.... Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 4_ of _1_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step BOP 7. Verify SI Pump Operation At least two high head pumps a. . running b. Both RHR pumps running Step 8. Verify SI Flow a. RCS pressure -LESS THAN 1600 PSIG[2000
~~b. High-head SI pum fl '" indicator~~
~~-CHECK FLOW a. Perform the following:~~
1) Operate Unit 3 and Unit 4 head SI pumps to establish injection to Unit 3 from two head SI pumps. 2) Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to align Unit 4 high-head SI pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using ATTACHMENT 1 of this procedure.

3) Go to Step 10. Note: 3A SI PP fails to star( BOP stops one of the unit 4 SI pumps. 56 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 5_ of _1_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step BOP 10. Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve White Lights On VPB -ALL BRIGHT Step a. Manually..,; Containment A. /.:f' /1/,/ ... b. Phase A'v;,eIV'e'ls NOT THEN mantu,flIlY'C(lo.? .;' x:/e. IF valve(s) can NOT closed, THEN isolate affected containment,pel1E;ltration. "*"i, A valves to , establish proper SI alignment for an injection flowpath. Reset SI BOP is required to go back to the containment isolation acks and rest the six phase A lockout relays, (three lockout relays on each rack) 57 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 6_ of _1_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position BOP BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step 14. Reestablish RCP Cooling a. Check RCPs -AT LEAST ONE RUNNING b. Open CCW to normal contai valves MOV-3-1417 MOV-3-1 Reset and start c. coolers Step 58 Stop all RCPs a. Perform the following:
1) IF containment spray NOT initiated, THEN manually initiate containment spray. 2) Verify Containment Isolation Phase ACTUATED.

3) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B valve white lights on VPB -ALL BRIGHT. 4) IF any Containment Isolation Phase B valve did NOT close, THEN manually or locally isolate affected containment penetration.

5) Sto all RCPs.
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:---+/--Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 7_ of_1_1_ Event~~
~~Description:~~
~~3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step BOP 16. Verify Containment and Control Room Ventilati~~
~~a. b. Unit 3 containment purge exhaust and supply fans -OFF Verify Control Room ventilation status panel -PROPER EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION ALIGNMENT .P""""""~~
l"/Y ./,-:-, /.4 /' ,/f align equipment or !2'ontrol Room recirculation. "::: .. --------I Hydrogen Monitors should be i I be available manner ',<= .. "f F es signal, They should I , :el'7 d to hydrogen generation I <<::04>' I in containment"', .* ,. I /' /j/'-... """,,,.,,_
~~"'\t<,.~~
~~'\ ,.",i f' ...... .. !". --r-' --------------~~
~~> 1 \ \ ) .J\, \. Place Using .~~
~~call NSO to ali n PAfM. 3-0P-094 ste s listed below. 59 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 8_ of _1_1 _ Event~~
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior '. i ",,"' -r!oT'E - -'?-tydro;gven !iionrrOfS b.e in servioe wfthin 30 minu!5$'of a 5! f I.>" ___ .-___ . _ _ _. __ _ . / / 7.U [nitia: Ccmmtwl1.s // ,/ 1. .. . " '.'/' /f', _"I< "\ 4' 0 ,... "t* d.n appltcabJe L't"te,d mS2ctwn ;. Ii '\\>>>. i ". ,/" '\,."",\ 'i"",J/ -_. __ . NDTES '\ ,f -::'<,. 0,,,,,=.,,<> ,?,..... .J; r'" -"" , .. .,...f< ;';"<'\ '" '"' ... .,."'oJ. ,D,.!iS-,:.- ... 3-001.04, and ,JwD02o'<at't? in the f00r outsIde' the 1..1",': J ,."."."." ..*. ,.. '\ .. , '\',\,., Fu,N rrav;:.! for rs Pl'o't:oiq?-;j not !)e da'lf1?g? L to reach .fDd rr:.;i'\C:;Uf\ "'""'-';; o\wJ'JP'" ,.1",,,. hemo',',," the +/-1odt G:i,?
~~t:e f::'lIlr,,;Lyg'l*::.h:e:~~
m:llg the reach:'od: }Y , ir-j j p' "'; ... U"_ ** '\. '., Sy"tem Return LIDe Vai,te, JfASS-H)(13 Ff\t1ll""'\ 1 "\. . \. -_:..>j It!: Analyzer PAITh1.-3-0GIA (5 turm) dltiet1'Jol, Pft.h:JM-3-0(llB (6 tuL-m) "'.", . (' Ie Sy?,tem to P,AJ1M He2:der r:oLa:icm. Vah-" ?>:Jll5) ....* ", PACV ,md Sample Sy:;tem to PJ!iJ111 Header V3lY!? (:(F...}: (5 t;ulock .\..'1) open PAC'v'S L,z,[\l.';P!?llet R".t-:?-:< ill from of ,he 'Cui.: 3 Co)ltai:::ment Spl'ay Pl.l.n:.p Room. (.:Jut A i:. req1.11re<:l for till:' lock.; --" t':nlod, A.D open PAn:;; :>0: v],: Peuet 16, }:""I;.].1.
~~ocati?<d i::S". !lJ.."'I]6~~
~~.:'.\lX :aidg '::31h,:;>.y. (."-... n A by 1 equiJed :'01 this tock ,} 60 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 9_ of _1_1_ Event~~
~~Description:~~
~~3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 4. Requli!st the R.eactor OperMO'rperbm !he following:~~
5. ii. Verify the tbllco.\olng ftlllCtioo selector switc: {;:. d. Analyzer P;me!s iI!e in 1M SA],!PLE (1) QR81 (2) QR&2 61 j..!P.A.S-3-004 EMERGENCY START any available EDG NOT runnin Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 10_ of Event
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step 19. Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses an a. Check the 3A, 3B and 3D 4 KV buses -ALL ENERGIZED 62 a. 3) IF the Unit Supervisor decides to energize 3A, 3B, or 3D bus, THEN perform the following: a) IF 3A 4 KV bus energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-0NOP-004.2, LOSS OF 3A 4KV BUS. b) IF 3B 4 KV bus energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3:" ONOP-004.3, LOSS OF 3B 4KV BUS. c) IF 3D 4 KV bus energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.5, LOSS OF 3D 4KV BUS. ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 11_ of_1_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step J / ". 20. Notify The Unit Supervisor That The PROMP{CAGfION\\ .... " VERIFICATIONS Attachment Is That Had To Be Taken /f' //Y " 63 NRC XXIV NRC SEN 4 ---OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO: Field Supv.: Outside SNPO: Admin RCO: ANPO: Unit 3 Unit Supv.: RCO: NPO: Plant Status Unit 3 Mode: Power: 100% MWe: 760 Gross Leakrate: .02 gpm RCS Boron Cone: 1300 ppm )perational Concerns: ........ " ... 3C charging pump out of service du *,to packlri.'g .. leakage. "\, _c, in 14 hours. Thunderstorms reported in the area. U3 Antici Focus Area: Maintain 100% J Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 100% Gross: .02 gpm A 6615 g,S", MWe: 760 Unidentified .01 gpm B 664,t'gal,'" Tavg: 574.2°F Charging Pps: .01 gpm C 9,627 gal RCS Pressure: 2250 psig RCS Boron Cone: 1300 ppm Abnormal Annunciators: Annunciator: '\\\/ "';'\;;\\, Comp Actions: Annunciator: ,//,/" 7'i '\\\;\,:>" Comp Actions: Annunciator: ""\\\,,\\\'\\; Comp Actions: Annunciator: ";\\\,';"/<:< Comp Actions: Annunciator: ('. ,:" ", Comp Actions: Annunciator: '\ \\';";";;;;;"';:,',";"',;"",,+,;;, Comp Actions: Annunciator: "\\ \,,/,(;/:::,,/1// Comp Actions: //"';""""";;;<';;\\; Annunciator: f;/",i:,':,;/"';;;;'"' '\ \\ Comp Actions: ') Annunciator: J __ \) Comp Actions: Annunciator: "';,,/// """""";""""""""""""/,;;;' Comp Actions: ;;;;"", ,//i#' ;",,","';'" ""\;, \\,;, ""'\ Current y*'ch/gpec ActiiJn Not Include "For Trackin!! Onlv Items" \ \ "',> Entry Dare,: ;; J Reason: jill i// Entry Date: TS.A.S/Compon,dl IV/ Reason: Entry Date: 1/"" T.S.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: T.S.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: T.S.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: 8 train protected both units .)nline risk is green U Unit 3 Status ment: ( Upcomin ECOs to Han and lor ( Evolutions or Com Generallnfdr:matiQn, Remarks, 0 erator Work Around Status: Aux, steam sUPpJy alt9,ned from :Jtfnit}' Condenser inleakage >>'/ """"", '\',.,,p/ ,,.Iff f \!"'-"" .)/'" TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description Facility: Turkey Point Scenario No.: 5 OpTest No.: 2009-301 MOD Examiners: Candidates: us -------------------- RO BOP Initial Conditions: Mode 1, 100% MOL. 3C charging pump out of service due to packing lea Turnover: Equipment OOS: 3C charging pump out of service due to packing Ie service in 14 hours. Thunder storms are in the area. Maintain 1000% Online risk -green B train protected both units Event Event Type* No. 2 3 TFH1TV60 =*1 (I)RO (C)RO (TS,I,C)SRO .00005 TVHPBOTL= 0.0006 akage verified greater than tech. specs is used to shutdown the unit. 01 ",LUQ"a 1 0% a reduction, offsite power is lost. The turJ2tQe failsl'O"'MJ r manually trip preventing a reactor trip rom he reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip requires the MSIVs to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start requiring manual operation. e ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to initiate. Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. 1 TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #5 Event 1 -L T-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm RCS leak begins concurrent with the L T-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 3-0NOP-041.6, but disc er that LCV-3-460 will not reopen. Excess letdown is placed in service and ch in flow reduced. Tech Specs are consulted, 3-0NOP-049.1 used to remove e f ed channel. 3-0NOP-041.3 may also be referenced for the RCS lea Event 2 -A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess let Ac in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakage veri 9-'9reater an ch. specs and 3-0NOP-100 is used to shutdown the unit. Event 4 -The RCS leak increases requiring safety injection initiation of SI and phase A is re . ed. 2 TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description Scenario XXIV NRC 5 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup Reset to IC-1 (100% MOL) Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIV _NRC_5.lsn Place simulator in run Start 3B charging pump and secure 3C charging pump Trigger lesson step: SETUP -MAIN TURBINE TRIP Trigger lesson step: SETUP -SI FAIL Place simulator in freeze. Place clearance info tag on 3C Chargin Provide shift turnover Select 3A QSPD on VPA and at e PDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS 3 ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description Event 1 -L T-3-460 FAIL LOW -LCV-3-460 FAIL CLOSE Initiated immediately after shift turnover. L T-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm RCS leak begins concurrent with the L T-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 3-0NOP-041.6, but discover that LCV-3-460 will not reopen. Excess letdown is placed in service and charging flow reduced. Tech Spec;/6(e consulted, 3-0NOP-049.1 used to remove the failed channel. 3-0NOP-041.3 may'als@'be referenced for the RCS leak. #" / / Trigger lesson step Event 1 -LT-3-460 FAIL LOW -LCV-3-460 F'AIL,CLt':9?E (actuates TFH1TV60 = -1, TFBVC01 = -1, TVHPBOTL = 0.0005) .r' '/"" . The Crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.6 Pressurizer Level COr;JttotJVialfunction ifrld ARP097.CR ./\\. j',f y.f"'" / t ,.//*"'" (p <. {//' Step 2 -Respond as NSO; acknowledge direction to flgw o(JFI-3-624 between 200 and 238 gpm. Report back in two minutes,"&,19 9I::gl1# ./ "',< 3-0P-047 CVCS-charging and letdown If called respond as I&C, acknowledge check 460CX,. relays energized. Report back after five minutes that the relays " .**. \. \"""-"l.,.", """"", ""',.;", '% \. '" t '\ '\ 4 ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description Event 2 -30 GPM PZR SURGE LINE LEAK A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is placed in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakage verified greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-100 is used to shutdown the unit. 3-0NOP-041.3 Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage #4'" Step 13 -Respond as SM, acknowledge direction to refer to EPIP-201SJ/ ./' ./ ./ Step 14 -Respond as Health Physics, acknowledge direction to and post radiation areas as required. ./ ') "', ". , If called respond as AOM, acknowledge unit 3 shutdown P*?f"'3-0NOP-100 in progress . ./ ./R <</ # 3-0NOP-100 Fast Load Reduction <e' <' . .' "> "\" ./".f"/ Step 3 -Respond as system dispatcher; acknowledge line due to ReS . ./ leakage. '" {' \'\", '>. ""'''%. ""'\'" ", Step 7 -If call, respond as SM and to refer'tQ 0-'EPIP-201 01 and O-ADM-115 \ '%""" ..*.** , ", '\. \ .* ,,% '\ \,. . ... """'" ....* ",.' If called respond as NSO, acknowledge to alIgn .. attachment 1 of 3-ONOP-100. No actiQJLcequired. \ ** / p F'
./ '\. , 1 i 5 TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description Event 3 and 4 -OPEN SWYD GeBs -TRIP U41 300 GPM LEAK Following a 10% load reduction, offsite power is lost. The turbine fails to auto or manually trip preventing a reactor trip from turbine trip. The reactor is tripped manually.
The failure of the turbine to trip requires the MSIVs to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start fj uiring . manual operation. The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to to* itiate. Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. When directed -Trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -OPEN (actuates TCE2Eon = -1, TCE2E07T = -1, TFP8SWYD = -1, TVH(/ -O. The Crew responds per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-E-1 3-EOP-E-1 Step 4 -Respond as Chemistry; acknowledge direction t check DAM1 monitor reading. No response re ire Step 4 -Respond as Health Physics; to t e r iation readings on main steam lines. After 10 minutes e t b kground. , '" """ Step 15.a.1 -Respond as System Dispatch r, ckn to store the switchyard power. No response required . Step 15.a.3.b -Respo as IJflf ,ackno ed direction to start one train of chilled water. Report fter tw mi utes that tr in of chilled water is running. Step 16 -Resp d 3-E wledge direction to take surveys in the pipe and valve and hemistry; acknowledge direction to align PASS for sampling the RCS. 6 TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description 3-EOP-E-O Step 14.a Respond as Health Physics; acknowledge previous direction to take radiation readings on main steamlines. After 10 minutes from last request, report adiation readings at background. 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 j'/ /l .;t/'f ,/ J {( <:/ii'" "_,' Step 17 -Respond as NSO, Acknowledge direction to place on unit 3 using 3-0P-094, containment post accident mo 'g lesson step -EVENT 4 -ALIGN PAHM FOR ,l",/i'i,\,"\,,\., 1. After 5 minutes report Section 1-3 are operator perform step 4//'\,),,/ '\', 2. Acknowledge completion and to C9f'1tfl)Ue " 3. After 2 minutes report sectioQ completE?",/PAHM in service '\ /l' I'" -.,--.,,"/-- 7 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: _1_ Page _1_ of JL Event
~~Description:~~
L T-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm ReS leak b,egins concurrent with the LT-3-460 failure. Operators respond per ,;f ,0 Time Position 041.6, but discover that Lev 460 will not reopen. Excess placed in service and charging flow reduced. Tech Specs 3-ONOP-049.1 used to remove the failed channel. rtlayalso be referenced for the Res leak. /",/ \,\\ '" Applicant's Actions or /i;;f/ . .,;",' Tri er, EVENT 1-LT-3-460 FAIL LOW-LCV-:3::46.0"FAIL CLOSE RO Determines L T-3-460 failed low by.U*{; \,.
~~Alarm A 8/4, Pzr Io-Id'ievel*"pler!~~
~~.. , -', J 1',>'~~
Alarm A 9/4, Pzr low Ivl I1t( off secured , .

heater

L T . . t \.

Letdowr1"isojation, htrs'bft, BOP \ p Refers to ARPs '\ .//
... "q....... ""-", ", "\, .. '" /5 A 9/4.be/().w. 2-3 gpm leak may not be detected //,plor to 30 eVine. leak. 1 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:l Event No.:_1_ Page -.£ of Event
~~Description:~~
LT-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm RCS leak ",._,.." .. Time Position BOP concurrent with the LT-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 3 041.6, but discover that LCV-3-460 will not reopen. Excess placed in service and charging flow reduced. Tech Specs ONOP-049.1 used to remove the failed channel. 3-0N be referenced for the RCS leak. US Directs response per 3-0NOP-041.6, Pressurizer level control malfunction. 2 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 1 Page of Event
~~Description:~~
L T-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm RCS leak concurrent with the LT-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 041.6, but discover that LCV-3-460 wiIl not reopen. Excess placed in service and charging flow reduced. Tech Specs 3-ONOP-049.1 used to remove the failed channel. may also Time Position RO RO RO be referenced for the RCS leak. . Applicant's Actions or ,.J" .,,/ NOTES'i'" /# I .. I I
I ..

I .. I-S 1 ,>' /" ,'.*"\., t{
Ni* :; f'.eS4:1l ct 13"fafture ot seCt:' or re.t3VS ,'as C'l a i0;3;,5 01 .. n ffOt4' Joss eff '" vtfrt? no Of "LEvel P"a>,'15fp/tt,;rs 5 .. '4;.sii:\4, J-cJl10P-(.t13,O Attaci;msnl 4, tor ':;{,,,i':e, QR 3-D."t'OP-iXO 9 .t, 3*4S:;'::;X taSLY'E= 25 to}' LErdov,,?l . if me Gi'7 f*J'Sy:S *34S;lCX 'Or are L'fitf:JPI/i
~~ffOw ?l1ij PfE;jStNlZEf~~
"'feel"! SPi?:: . b <" "\" if tti.:e f:13f1'£Jd1 i:Of:t/O,i O*{t:; }s OS,E*f}, v:{tlJ TEef; Spec' .*4:::ri:?ti .' A ':" -, ----* -- -f:;' -----," .., '4 '!".::, ... , ** '...-.,.;iI 1 . .,., *. '., ..... _:\ "" < ?' ' ,,,"',, C!1EC. ?_,,,c'nZ.I ,e"E_ .ud._ " .*. +,.-;,-+('rf",A:."\D L .. ,_--o1. 5. le .. ill::iiCJ; thE ot.') .. :;, TEES plm /", " .. SELEC7 LFyEI. . /' thJS lllClu.de Cil\. d .. fiS;;nye dllJrme:. " lace 460. /,' l:'"",***"" If "re" **d:i*;>J le"",'1 :104""'11;'" .; "" ./7'1;l "7' ',- ,'CF:_"1.!;"V L\ G.* .. ,,"'U.>1P '...t ** ' TRO perE:rlt::fu<.?.:f;;:Js
~~f,'If ir:.::iividJ.lilZ COlEtrO:Jen m 110: fcl;"Wlal!:~~
~~THEN il.lcii:I,':r.km] I.JL:t".o:::\G Pl:)f? COSTRO:"'LB5 -in ufa;jntai:l progr?!El!l!ed Le':i'l peT E'r:.dD,l:r:~~
, -:1l.; pm::p is not a.'01e ,0 ll.1i't::ll1i'1:!1 p:ogfO::t:Jl.leC level pel' Encio,',Ir*
~~J. <lE to ?::ogr?l::rm:ed per } pr')grn:n:ued~~
~~'lJS nmo:Bd. :J ,rol,1;lewworing of l'if:eceil dUJ'ging ml::t:.'t' " ie,ire*j.~~
~~refP.1 ,0 3*CP*047. eVes. . GtJlr::m:a; Jlltj Lercowll. lwi'J:e,;JDolir:.g Gmo.e. --3 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:_1_ Page of.JL Event~~
~~Description:~~
L T-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm RCS leak concurrent with the L T-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 3-0ij .. eJP=:941.6, but discover that LCV-3-460 will not reopen. Excess letdown i,$fplaP{d in service and charging flow reduced. Tech Specs are 049.1 used to remove the failed channel. so\'b,e Time Position RO RO RO referenced for the RCS leak.. ('., Applicant's Actions .-/ /;7 ).. Thrintl* :",qy, .. Pr*,.viJr* LTD); PCV-3-J+:iilry to p:revent L7D}l .. fmm 50 per l:-v. -.,'\." /i' :: ,5,1 ,:oo1roi -J-14.5, limit pT*S'l'.lr*"sr!:1:.*. \', {f ... -"\.. % 55J '% Note: Lv3'::466'JiViII not 0 Sl1r!Zer heater> to deenergire,. IliL:l restore PRZ e manllal con:rcl. ;:onSiWi'll!Wlth programmed level iH lnclica:eci ill recllUred by 3-0}'"OP-049J, DEVI/UlON OR FiULURE OF SAFEr:{ F.'"".CT()R"PROTECTION CH.A.L\,}:ELS.. 4 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: _1_ Page 2-of -.JL Event
~~Description:~~
L T-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm ReS leak begins concurrent with the LT-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 3-0lj6p 041.6, but discover that Lev 460 will not reopen. Excess Ie d'6v IS placed in service and charging flow reduced. Tech Specs ar co Ited,3-ONOP-049.1 used to remove the failed channel. 3-0NO -04 3 also Time Position be referenced for the Res leak. mioo.tes have wsed. THEN dose E:tce'S CV-3-137. '-. CV 337 A!iD o1.wmre Conta'i.omem Sump I -304 have "thed. ly open. E%CeS5 LE1dI)Vt'l1 Fw,w .. HCV-3-B7. altOWiug the 1({hliuger tc Wi'!rmup.
~~9. Moolto:r heai ac!w:iger outle1 teQwa1:UI'e .at E:SC.t>li Ltim :m Tem.t! IodiCA1o:r.~~
rI-J-l39.* -lO. u::. VCT Divert toHoLd-11P 11;. LCV-3-115A. reaches the 1 00 diVErt PCCiitiou (Red llgl1! Gre*il.llm! OfF) OR if dmmi to direCT waft.!!rro the RCDT. tHEN atizll BYJar>> Lttfu OI-3-3S9, io the ReDT 5 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: _1_ Page of JL Event
~~Description:~~
L T-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm ReS leak begins concurrent with the L T-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 3-0ij 041.6, but discover that LeV 460 will not reopen. Excess le!sIbwp<IS placed in service and charging flow reduced. Tech Specs 3-ONOP-049.1 used to remove the failed channel. 3-0NO" )\,2 rrla¥ also Time be referenced for the ReS leak. Position Applicant's Actions or US Directs the actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 BOP BOP ..... ----------- I NO
Momentary spiking of a channel that quickly imminent channel failure, The bistables for tripped position as soon as possible, v\lith a maxi for further investigation by C, j/ , 'Y be a precursor of Id be placed in the e of 6 hours, to aI/ow I

Instrumentation failure\ m instrumentation loop to'qevi or extreme amount, Such protection or safety relat' though the setpoint for the cause a particular I 4: by either a finite vlatipn maf"bii.,in a di Ch, that a reactor I, nCliortma¥ not occur, en that mylrOment loop, even I tion haJ;b'e ,',
~~actual parameter, 1 ,\-",/,?",.;:~~

~~I /n"o off-normarc'of'lditions exist on the adjacent channels c'lQ are to remain in service. '\..~~

'\ \(erify a'p.t2U;?able control transfer switches are in the position ',; elimi'nates the failed loop. " ! I i "\ ,-loter LR-3-459 is in an alternate channel, erformed earlier \, B O'\",P'/ Y Ste'p 't\., '\'<1.'--.::if" "'\\. ,/ 5.4 IF a control function was placed in manual control due to the "jf/' failure, THEN verif the control function is returned to automatic. US Note: LC-459G may be in manual until Pzr level is restored to ro ram Step 5.5 Refer to Technical Specifications 3/4.3, Instrumentation, AND verif the minimum channels operable. 6 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:_1_ Page of..L Event
~~Description:~~
L T-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm ReS leak concurrent with the L T-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 041.6, but discover that LeV 460 will not reopen. Excess .. placed in service and charging flow reduced. Tech Specs 3-ONOP-049.1 used to remove the failed channel. 3-0Nqp:(1).,.3 Itt<l;yalso be referenced for the ReS leak. / ,,'\. '. Time Position US =="'o;====ll Applicant's Actions or FUNC, I ONAl UNiT 2. PU<'iter Range, Neutron
a. High S-etpDfnt

b. low Setpcint .3. intermediate Range, Neutron Rux 4. SourcB Range. :l\te:'utm-n:
Ffux 3. Startup h. c SI',urdown T.ABLE 3.3-1 j{P .1F RE."'cTOR TRIP TOTAL NO. <<'CH:'ELS OF CH.ANNELS \,"\. TO TRIP '" '\:t 2 \J 2 'h. 2 2 21001' 2 1 100p 2ftoop If!oop APPLICABLE MODES 1,2 3"',.4\ 5'" 1.2 1##,2 1,2 ' ? I, _ 1,2 number of OPERABLE c11annels one less than the Toml numiJer of channels, 2 2 4 5 9 13 I 13 13 ami/or PO'NER OPERII riO r'irnay proceed proy,ided the inoperable channel is tripped conciitioo within 6 hours. For subsequent required DIGITAL OPER::',TIONAL TESTS the inoperable channel may l)e placed in bypass status for up to 4 0AJUrs. functional unit # 9, action 13 6 hrs. to tri bistables Take appropriate actions as specified in Technical Specifications. CAUTION The failed channel bistable(s) is required to be placed in the tripped mode within 6 hours of the failure determination, except if other channel bistable(s) are in tl1e tripped or test position and would result in an undesired Engineered Safety Features actuation or Reactor Trip actuation. Tl1e overall effect of a failure of this type is a reduction of instrumentation redundancy and, tl1erefore, a possible reduction in plant protection. 7 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: _1_ Page of JL Event
~~Description:~~
LT-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm RCS leak begins concurrent with the LT-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 041.6, but discover that LCV-3-460 will not reopen. Excess placed in service and charging flow reduced. Tech Specs ar¥/con.sllhed, 3-ONOP-049.1 used to remove the failed channel. 3-0NO ,::::0 3 rl1<lyalso be referenced for the RCS leak.\\ Time Position BOP Step 5.11 Applicant's Actions or B.{:.7nav):Or .,,-/'i __ ,'f it y ,:/"" IF any other channel has faiJed, lfiEN perfor following to trip bistables for the failed cn$3nrfeJ. 5.11.1 IF plant conditions bistables associated with the failed be tripped RPS tuation, THEN perforni;th fo/TOw.tQg: -t. -
1.
~~forth +ed loop in test~~
~~2. Verify g corresponding II . \FJZ' B jilt.~~
~~L BISTABU: UET LE'-lEL DE\lIA~~
~~"1: .. E'<iE:L LOGIC AFfECTED 2'3 cr,,arn-el t:"91 )eve: P ,'S27c!-_~~
~~'/dtl'", ;:::*7 s;:;:S':e<<1 (;'x,l&hg r;::m;;,:;riro!i r.;,;l~~
'Z

i=L C :..C-L.O ALERT C * :CO:J<ffR,Z,L RELI!. TED P
~~RX PROTECTION REL4 TED S -SAfETY l'NJ:ECT!!OH~~
~~RELATED identification of bistables, continue toevent 2. 8 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _2_ Page _1_ of JL Event~~
~~Description:~~
A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is IJH."'V",", Time Position RO BOP US in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakage greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-l 00 is used to shutdown Applicant's Actions or Behavio Tri Note: G 5/3 CV sump alarm will alert leak orts alarm G 5/3 containment 3t-t-t-t-4 HHHH-+-+-+"""",, om VPA, R*6J,DS.i\ ,,::.d K-630:SEI;;;b:iud It.;, Reo: i ).,_ S"-fS7.E.1&,f lEiilL!GE. d),D 1acl-_'ii ci:..:"Q-:t;4. R .. 4'w ,*o!;Ch Sp .. : 34.6.1 RCS RrYERE7"CE.:': . T"d:, Sp;,,: 34.*t6.1 Directs rcc>,,,nnse er 3-0NOP-041.3 ReS s Note: excess letdown be secured if in service. 9 ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _2_ Page -.2. of .JL Event
~~Description:~~
A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is £laced in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-l 00 is used to shutdown the llliti1. . .#' /. Time Position RO 1 RO 11. R{:S Jr',ellot 1'1& i:ilr*>;;t;:;<lby t'je U,ll S.,lCer;1::,;:;r
~~Mal1tam crderi'J b-Jr<lro-moos OR /"", b. str: a6jlii:)r'<1'~~
~~':'l1 to 'TW* 'maintained .#'. , \. *:t "Tr<? \". \." 'leG .eaK fill.*' uBlnO In*' aprt;p1a!e '\"<0 '<';';;"..,r, . <l.. * ...,. , i)*o.S:P.Q4 L2. CO()U01T SYSTEM U::"'¥ Ah,.:} lEA1<~~
2)
~~ICenrl'j t'1e t:t ti're 1'2>.'<\~~
~~I'F Is r',-r;1 Ri--THEN PiO!10l7i 1 10 f f # J'~~
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:_2_ Page of JL Event~~
~~Description:~~
A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is Rlaced Time Position BOP in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakage 1 ed greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-l 00 is used to shutdown 't. '11 Applicant's Actions or Behavior: Check for IMicmrorU!, 01' ReS Leakage a. Vertl'?R STABLE OR: C*CREASING tl. Vei'1fy R-j 2 -STAB C.V-3-2a21 0JrItl CV-3-2B22. Sf Pel'foorl 3-0/Iii0P-J)5'" ;:v.DIOACThI'E EFFLUENT WlIJiE! cortilruing \\I'lli'! thIS prooeClUre . t:. ::>erfoon .3-O!i0P-057. RAOlOAC71VE EFF1..i..':JiT RELEASE. willie OOftIrfJ!ng Q. '::>el'ti>'m 3-0NOP-iJ712. STEAM GENER.ATOR TU&E LEAKAGE. 'I#lt.\! OOI1I.m!lingiMlI'i 1Ns prooeiU'e. <e. \tem'y ReS te CCOlp:olleni Cooir.g '1\'_r e, 3-ON!.Y::<.()67, RAOlOAC17iJE OOUI".dary -!t..!TI'ICT EffWarT RELEASE. oorsrumg wltl1 fils procer.llJRt
R*lf A .sTABLE .QIi DECREASlNG

R-lfBSTABLE OR DECREASING 11
~~( ( \ Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: 2 Page of L Event~~
~~Description:~~
A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is placed in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakage ye:ified greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-l 00 is used to Time Position US 12 US Applicant's Actions or Beha Detarrrilne If RGS Laetaga Wlihln Unllfs Of Technlca! Spe>1:lncmt'i.l1!ll!
~~tn tAOOE' ,3 * .D:iEli' iJl)k) s-r-iJtC1:tvl'n 5, Hot as o.:P"Cl11Edt1 Tatil? 3.4-1 up to "' maxJr,ur11Jf:5~~
<;PM at a 'Rl?s,ctor ()Doant syOotem "C{ ,: 2J fn::m any ReaclcrCODiant $)'&ter'l PnENLl1e ise'iatlcn Vak\i'! Jry PRESSURE LEA . .r;:ASE, Of '!ezaagp. un! wiftNn I trot, bE *n a: HOT STII.'iDBY w.1trm 6 "'OlJfS an::! In CDLD SHUTDOWN wtthm thefcdc'lllnq -,"Ill', ,.;n y " (:>Joant S}lieT V"", .. r:3. b 1 01. 21 "rea .. !&" .than a/'Iy one. 01 ire .. .::Iel:? .. e !lrrJt<.", I IE:_J.';3£R.
~~=tRES;JURE~~
&:-;i.Jr*JDAF.Y LE,A,KA;:3E, and frnr"j CC{,iam r'E':@j;,J,e 1li? fiH*-1D ;JkHrJ/11frrH.s wJf.ttn ;:l rll)JfS Dr c:<* tl id le.-J51 ,(:.1' -STl'.NJ5Y wHrHr-1r>e: next 6 .af)j ir C/)LD ::c-1UTt:;iY'J.NN N!t,l" U-'i;' rOi;owmg ,yJJ rouf". Wllh Jry Reactor Coolano; SyS1:811 Pre!5Sv'-e t;Ei)}a'Ucn \l:Mv* j:eaKa'Q*' by 3.4.f 2,12 atove op&"Mllon ruy canlJrue pro"Kled 'tVt-'1ln
~~4. nOJl'S tt'Z! at lea.&~~
~~'i7ive's V) eacr rrgr** pressurE a flJnr:lJolul '/,31.\i'!3r.~~
~~3r,j ,'B'11a't; In l,t,aJ f',)itiEo~~
':;Jri'!:':EpCf)j!ng rot'le I.e., manual ,'Jives JE'Jall be io:;(M 11 :n12 c:t.)*sEd posrtlcr. rnator;;peralet1 ',a',16& srahtle p(3ced Ir the tiD's&:! posmcn 3rtj paM"; PedcN. appliCati'e .AC7ICN stZi?Ement fo; IttE a1fe::ted JE"IOot*l'l.an::! 12 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:_2_ Page -2 of.JL Event
~~Description:~~
A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is placed in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakageyert&ed greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-I 00 is used to shutdown the ua-it. /' /"/ Time Position US US 1 /' Applicant's Actions or Behavio}f/ BTIM Cc.ntrol Rc.e:m Pal"a(}J1I1&.i U;s:lng Attllof1rrent S R,E(kKti.0!:l it.:UE miu Iti2"'-"", 2 1 >:£1:1 1
' o:n. E:';y*':fe,:\

n'E
~~..l. T\ + ";: ,f":;';';: 1""'" 2 'F 1 J. __ .. ,,,,,j!' ,,/ ...... ------,.q'O -.---. --. --. .~~
J""

f.-l "\ t ":\ .;f/
~~.:: s;; g.:n'v:iS %~~
(:0/1[1';;; !jeff! 'htrr:Ct?,i:r"" ,3t'<J /' 03v;:j\!aoi e , :.tt s ;;t?: % ',"r'irr' <lei f71::wer1e:r/ (05,l? a .eeLlit'S; 1"e &f*.** ,.. I if (! ';0\) t;;A:;C:I:;r, ::'C'Tl f:ii} ;;cw*'f! '<>"'\ t it P.\3Y* dJ rl1e I ',., 7' t: -* .. :O: .. ,"" * -.' ---* -.----* (u,..: ___ 10t:l1 glJJ(XIE ___ :.ru::u:e, = ___ gailo!:,.:.ni:::ll:e " ", ?1n::,'!So!:!:'O':'?J.J:'.l::le:e::; ?lld:::'I)::l7.i:u,,"J:<Y Actio:::, ....
~~E';~~
~~ci ,l&lN rtl::lp m In,u;i. !! .-\U!lUl:i;;H. ..0, ., :,Uc.; 3.4._,.1>. LC' ,!>M:t:lS, tie r.:dllC:!Otl ,[:In )10 :;"y\\*-:i _, _ 0 ,\, f/". , zOP z-o) -).i7!!:"UJJ ri!ltcC'J Toy: , * '<,~~
F
~~Ta1;e t 'F l~~
tU:::'Jcll;; fJ;)5l Ul ef:ect (e'X-lmple., stop Rep) Note: 900 gal BA required, rate picked will determine flow rate. Foldout a e next if covered. 13 ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: _2_ Page of -.JL Event
~~Description:~~
A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is placed in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-l 00 is used to shutdown u,J!it. Time Position US Applicant's Actions or Behavi FOLDOliT PAGE L J-EClP-E-O Transition Crft*Tia lEary of l11e foJowing \;f1iiiS are reached. THE' REA,C-OR TR1P C?: S.AFETY a ReS T,,"'g -{3REATER TH,t.N 578 ¢F PI.:,,): 11'>: Reaotor Gel*';;;tor SViltoll to
l RCD Oilrtrol D#Atct"i io 3:¥'6b?--fT*

J"fep'a":}eme::t PlCi1i personnel L6!rg 1I',e P';lEl:iCC<Q;l 14
~~( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 2 Page of..JL Event~~
~~Description:~~
A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is l?,laced in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakageyeri51ed greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-l 00 is used to shutdown}ne lj)1it. Time Position BOP RO US 4 5 6 ,/ Applicant's Actions or Behavior:.'#' .* J? Art,Jsl FC .. 3-i j 31'. Eo1c Act:; "{(YS "o/' to nb:.a!n :te mI.;: " /' "/ P /"<:;. -,fl ,,2* *'C, /' / \\, /i /' ,"/-.':' .,\, .f;'""'" The Shitt T r,..('The \ .* C-E"':P .. ;::JV . :lCTIES \ IJFIC)I,TION 0\ P';7NT , ,.,,<' o.iA;\:Ui f,;d.Jcllofi 10 ':>In!:rci 'lECe"";";"'lry, plac,," c,Jrt:o; ". {X'" in f1)!l't1!J31 an:! rnam't;:'1$l -3';9 A11hn lhe J."'" d
~~3. \" ', .... PerforM~~
~~'3'0' Sbw alarm ls r*'set .,. '", atncunt :a:e *ar,;j I \, 'A. ',,-,**joTE ----------~~
~~. , I* A(ial{?w:~~
~~difference /8 alh:Jw.,d to e.q:;eed the Target Band during/he load r",:iverien With-OW , .. 0p..t;{59 9, ODl:'ratiori 'vtitl,jl"l [he A,<iaJ FillX Differerrce Gperatt.:.nal Space .~~
I . ", ". ";, .. -'t,*.
___________ '. _ : ____ _ \.. < \ Ch*!ck Pbi'hJ'Resp,mse '\ It Check !e-v1:1 ptogram \/eri)' load "edl.;ctiDr "-a:e :::trd auto roo oorirol i s 'ling :he .iT 'dE'mii,*c l '1 t 3 15 a. IE. dire>:;,ed b*y ,hi! Unit Svper.<isor, THEN ircre*ase fAlW as 1;' Threnl" open TCI/ .. 144. "lRHX T:emp Comrol Vat'!'?:, oypass valve 3--e34 to raise to ;,oprotmlately e,iJO mxrL 2) Stan an addtiDrai charging pump. 3;' F" ace an addiiinr,ai letdoWfl orifi,:,e h SEd'vice.
b. StOI:' elf slow PO\'IlE1 to control ter",pE-ratl..lrE', 5 neceS5.ar.:/', pi;li::;.e onnt"o1 ro.ds h and rna'n:afn Tsv>g fue P8ctec T .a v g,'T j. T :::f ,t..tt.achrrv:nt

3.
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _2_ Page of JL Event~~
~~Description:~~
A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is placed in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-I 00 is used to shutdown .t1fe uJ1:it /,,'V .. :i-Time Position Applicant's Actions or RO 8 Energize Pres*stlrizer Bac,kup Heaters BOP 9 Verify Turhine Load less Than 570 MWE -Open the SGFP valves for ihe feed\iatBr pur:;p to b-e stopped ...... _------. I I Boraric-r sJ,ouid' be stopp-e-d I BOP 10 12 Che.)k Station Service l03ds Suppli*'d From The Startup Tr"nsformer J£ Ta'get Ulad is* GREA.TER THAN 450 Mwe, THEN perform bllow,ng: a, rvlaJ!rt::.ir fe,act-Of' -or oe!'0w the target usin!;1: Conjrol Rod adj'ustments Tvrbine bad adjustments
b. Maintair, Tevg within +/- t 'F c.f Tref. c. Maintain P"es5vri::er lev;?, en progr*am.

d. Maintain Pressurizer pores5ure on prog:oram.

e. Maintain SO on p'rogl.EH11<.

f. Refer to other CHOPs in effec.!. g. Go 10 prooedllre and step in efiect WHEN directed by the Unci Sup*'Nisoc THEN tr.3,rlsfe*'
~~statlc 2 n sEf\i'ic.e' from tbE ,A..trdkary Trans:forrn-ers 10 :Ive Startup Tr.ansforr:er us.ing~~
~~2. Note: Attachment 2 may be used to swap station loads Attachment 2 next. 16~~
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: _2_ Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is placed Time Position ROJ BOP in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakage jed greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-100 is used to shutdown 'It. Applicant's Actions or Behavi ,f' / NOlliE: ----w I -'c TD doz.*' 4;<',/ .btlS .':)upply brea-k-ers: I I
~~tli'e syrr;-hroscope' mu.atbe on: '12 CJci'ock~~
~~+/. 2 I . {ncOttvl1'g-Ei-,*,d running 1:< Close START-tip~~
-.
~~I * . 3ABn2. to TIUP. WHEN directed by the Unit Supervisor, THEN .!i:qg.n Eh...lxih-:1('Y~~
~~'S'l.e*,ar:" 'Sup'oly from ar*-{dhet~~
~~' .. Jr:t G"5-::n9 Ag-;, ..~~
~~1. ""'", . '::\:'"._~~
__:.-::/./ ____ su"lie.d.1l'om unit 3 from turnover brief. " f Note's"Afte( 5 to 10% load reduction tri er next event. -,\. 17 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _3_ Page _1_ of Event
~~Description:~~
Following a 10% load reduction, offsite power is lost. The turbine fails to auto or manually trip preventing a reactor trip from turbine trip. reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip MSIV s to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start If '\; Time Position ROJ BOP operation.,f Tri er, EVENT 3 -OPEN SWYD
~~' ,J Recognize and report the loss of 96wer base~~
~~Numerous alarms~~
~~I, t,.,~~
Units 3 and 4 start-up vdR*lge" Ii *

indicati Prima).¥ of loa on: d-US Directs and actions a 3-
\ \"/f,f' ',,' !pdh:.atOfS:. -AT ZERO -:JECREASING M;;WIIJ;aNy trip reacior, 1f. reG!ctDr is greJ'tH ,han 5% OR imarmedi:aie ral'ige oeN"ex 15l:LQl.st3bie or d;;re.;3sing, .L!:IEl:I. perform tha fcrllc.wir{r
a. Moniter Crllk:*al Safety Functions usiG<J 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL SAFET"," FUh!CTION STATlJS TREES. b -Gcdo 3-EOF-FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO "4LiCLEAR POWER GENERA.TIONi

',T'lv'S, Step 1. ed from the console . 300 gpm pressurizer surge line leak is initiated automatically with the loss of off site power. 18
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.:_3_ Page of JL Event~~
~~Description:~~
Following a 10% load reduction, offsite power is lost. The turbine fails to auto or manually trip preventing a reactor trip from turbine trip. Tpe f" reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip MSIV s to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start rCJluiril;,g'manual Time Position BOP ..J operation. 1"" " 2 Applicant's Actions or Verify Turbine Trip o fv1c'sb..lfB S:epa;.atty RehestEf St':am -CL:J!':;ED ..0. C '1E-ck .and E -.: Norm,; Hy :;:; secor\J 9 ... If do , NOT op2n. THEN actuat2 EMERGENCY / GEtflh<F: TRIP SWITCH for til': a"fecf*.d break,er(s) "?,/ .... .:-." ! -; \. "\ '/N,9(6: to trip mtJ(l'!af,ly; MSIVs and bypass valves are ma.m steam supply stop valves are """"'" '. d' \, c/o§;ed . '\""'f)..( . Critlbal {ask: (WOG) Failure to manually trip the turbine prior to '\. completing immediate operator actions. '\" 19 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _3_ Page of JL Event
~~Description:~~
Following a 10% load reduction, offsite power is lost. The turbine fails to auto or manually trip preventing a reactor trip from turbine trip. reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip t.Ire MSIV s to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start Time Position BOP operation.
f < 3 Verify P'OWl?f T <) Emerge n;cy 4 KV Buses it C

f'tE"ok the 3*A a:nd -3B 4 p(\l bus;?s -MAiNTA! hi AT LE.AST ONE EN!:::RC"ZE;!5 C-he'ck the 2*.A. a no V-A}NTAfN 8-<OTH 20 a} \le,rify 3-C C.CVt/ BREA.KER OPEN. b) \/erifyaC IC-Vil BREAKER OPEN. -e,) OpeTsle bvs .'Clpply bre*akefs to re"s.tore ootter. started
~~(' Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_3_ Page of JL Event~~
~~Description:~~
Following a 10% load reduction, offsite power is lost. The turbine fails to auto or manually trip preventing a reactor trip from turbine trip. T Time Position RO reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip he MSIV s to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start re}ltlirillg manual
~~fl;-operatIOn.~~
~~4 Applicant's Actions or Check 1f S I Is Actuated e=quiprne-nt -AI}T() STI-,PTED flnw low S/(3 -,=. 14 pOSJg 2!i 10 T*avG'} {543 iF} RCSsubrocling I?ased on co-re Exil -res LESS THAN~~
~~PRZ level* CAN !:iQ! BE M.AINTAlNED GREATER THAN 12:'%{50:'%]~~
~~b IF SI is reQuired .. THEN m<>nvatly actuate Si ar:d phas,-e A. 1l1i!2. go to Step :; !.E SI is !iQ!fequke<:l. !!lli!:!perfOl"m the~~
~~1:; Viof';itc5f Crhica! 5,3ratv FUf'lc:th:ms usj;r,.g STATUS TREES, 2} Go t;) 3-EOP-ES-:U.~~
REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE. Step 1. Note: Depending on timing, conditions for 51 may not be pesent when first checked. Transition will be made to 3EOP-ES-O.1. Within a few minutes transition back to 3-EOP-E-O STEP 1 will be made for initiation of safety injection. Automatic 51 is blocked requiring manual actuation. The first few steps of £5-0.1 are included. 21 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No,:_3_ Page 2-of Event
~~Description:~~
Following a 10% load reduction, offsite power is lost. The turbine fails to auto or manually trip preventing a reactor trip from turbine trip. Tpt!( '\ reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip MSIV s to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start manual /" \; Time operation. /' " "'\co ,,,', Applicant's Actions or Position US Directs response per 3-EOP-ES-O.1
~~I C A Yill: Q<N p', \\,~~
J"',",' .. ,1" If SI actuation occurs during this procedure,. FjEA C fJ21ti fRiP OR SAFEfY fNJECflOfJ, is reqaired to be p",rforrned starfirr9\at Stli'fY1. /#" ;/ " , '-">.'. " '., ------1'-; - '\"'.-, ." 't, FokJout page .E3 reqaire,g tc " "'.' e v ,<>< \" \-",/,9.f ,0,, *.. ,;. ,'< FO\,POOT PR£iEEDIJRE ES.\). '1 ** / \. \,,7 // # \ hSifd befow CoC:C;'JrS. 'f1:iEN S L aCilJate A . .3.nd flO io .. ::1q .Ste p 1 R-'; SU} -HA,h 30Z,F '. THAN j 2% < *. " EMERf3tNCY BOR,4TIGN CRITERJA 'if Qr:e Q;f the: for QvA'IQ ccmdi:ions exists, TH EN OC" JSiriQ ERGENCv B::1P.A TidN. :'Irt*l ten>" In atlo""l or;teria an? -;;;;;-Ytf,X1Y Leg t£.mperatllre cecre-as.Es to less tha1 52c;F b c cor,troi; fOOS !!QI. fully inse*rt,gd. "\.. CST MAKE\?( CRITERIA IF CST leve' 10 jess than ;0>%, THEN a>dd rakeup to CST *us}ng 3-0P-018.1, C*ONDENSATE T AJ>\J;--t --I ED PAnt
~~SUMMARY~~
I ;;;ny conditie.n lislec below THEN go ttl 3-EOP-F-O, CRITiCAL SAFETY FU'KTIOH STATUS S:eo 1: --;) Subcrrticam:r POW!?; GREATER TH * .;rt. f*% b CO"Eo-CocHr'fr Core Tes GREATER TH,;..t<J12CiJIl'j:::
c.
Si'ik: r'J"vrow ra*!")g.e le'le' j., 8,J S,'Gs LESS TH,'; ,:i% AND ,otal f ... dw.3'"" fi,;)w -LESS THAN 340 GPM I",*gnt{: Celd I'?g. , .. mr-:,?catwe O'ecrea!ie . GREATER Fl.'>'N lDO'F 11-; L,c,ST 60 .\HNUTES £l.!:!!l.<1ry ReS, '.:,.o!'d lEg t-9r'.oeral\,m? -HAS; 8EE!",J Tl-A,: ... *i e Cornainnl?:"""{t press-ure - e'5 PSIG Note: transition will be made back to J.EOP-E-O step 1 based on ressurizer level < 12%. 22 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:_3_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
Following a 10% load reduction, offsite power is lost. The turbine fajls to Time Position BOP BOP RO auto or manually trip preventing a reactor trip from turbine trip. T .. , reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip MSIV s to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start ,f'" operation. Applicant's Actions or 1 2 Check Power Availahle to BOTH UNIT 3 llliQ. UNlT 4 Check AFW Pumps* AT lEAST TWO RUI'mlNG 23 270 gpm for req.uirea ead of the 345gpm SLlbse1:luent s.;eps and Eme::rgep<-:;y lor unccmroUe'd cc,:)loC'('vn vs/ng 3-0'N,:]pw{)45.
~~1. "MERGE"'leY FORA,TION~~
~~'thE", CO!'"Jti;""Ali:ng w,t, proCeClH"i? , 1E. tempe-attife. than tej'1" .. is d"cr"asmg, TH EN~~
~~h,* ro-No'/l;ng:~~
--b) \"ev'fy SiG bkfw'a.<:)wn lsctation v .. i:fv*es c} fF 'ContinuE-'s, THEN eow. t.otal feed -flew t.h.an ::45 gpm I.H,N r'::U"l'ge le'vel greatr$f th.3<;n iJ% \'1 31 one S/G. C 1 [F c-oo!C-O!Il' oOnbr1'...!Es-due t:) ;;;'C:2'SSlV* stea:m 1"'-0'11, THEN cios*e 03_nd byp_r1ss. '.;aJvE5 2) !E. tempe:rat:"irE' greater t"1an eA7;'F AND tempEfSiu.re is THEN p'1'riorm tbe foMo'IAng: Dump st*sm tls.irv;,! SJG sieam dump b atlw,sphere v,ai'""s, ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.:_3_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
Following a 10% load reduction, offsite power is lost. The turbine fails to ."."\ Time Position BOP auto or manually trip preventing a reactor trip from turbine trip. The ') reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip re¢fre::;v(he MSIV s to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start operation./ . 4 "" Applicant's Actions or Check Feedcw.at.;,r Status a Ch;;'OK ReS a'.'era*;!e ternper.3:ures -LESS ES4'F ,_". n12ir .... a!vE-s -::LOSEO AN:: IN rv(o"N,J:.!l;L.
~~I \Jeri,)'~~
CLO':;*EC: Rods -FULLY fNSERTED Verify Chargil1g -IN SERVICE 24 WHEN less l'"oJn 554'F, THEN 4c, 4d. and 4e. 5," [ ./' ¥' />' A/:; clos*ce va(Iies. e. Est3blish greater th,m 2':5 gpm feed floW! to he SiG:. 'rom one 0' the fc{ ,o'll*ng: ." Sjlsten1; on byoas.s valves fF 1'11'0 cr "1ore o:c.ntrol mds N CIT fully . .D:l.5.t:1 for 'stuctt; comrQ! reds liE-:;ng 10 EMEPGENCY 50RA7H:IN. while-oontmArg \f.,:i,h tr'ds prccetL .. Jre. 3., \/er,fy VeT lTI.i1keup s.et for centf':>!.
b. SL;r: at least C"le on.:;-g:ng pump. c. A,dj.d5t Chargir\:.J Flow Tt, R-egen Heat Exchanger, HCV-3-121, and ci1argin!;l P,Ir"P speed to est.ab1ish desi-ed f;ow. d. fF ohar" ir.g fiow' C.?,I" NOT be lllli!:!.
s;:;t";;n-e 31 1);Ji'l',C RC2., CCi'it1"O' 2-0NOP-D47,1, LOSS OF ALL CHARGiNG FLOIN iN MODE:? 1-4. while cDl"tinving ..... llh ihis prcced..rre. ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_3_ Page.JL of L Event
~~Description:~~
Following a 10% load reduction, offsite power is lost. The turbine fa'ls to auto or manually trip preventing a reactor trip from turbine trip. 11:1 reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip MSIV to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start l)'itliri operatIOn.' Time Position RO US 7 Check PRZ Lev .. 1 -GREATER THAN 15% . grea.ter than 15%. and 9. Contir',ue with -., :-.. ---NOTE --., -.. -.,; -.. -.., I ----I Steps f thrcH.f:9h 4 ,are 1/J//'AED.fATE ACTJON' steps. ------------ ______ 1
~~Rod bottom fights -Or*' Read.:<r and bypass b'f.!akers~~
-OPEN Ma.!1vaHy trip reac-tor.. 1E r:eaJ::tor pO'lf*r is greatN(h"m 5'% OR kHl?rmedia!f.! rang .. powe.r is !:l.QI st!,b,f.! or ;,,,,;asirig, I.I:I.E.!:l. perfom'j the foI!lO' .... ir}a: a . Monitor Cnteal SafetY' '.Ising 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL S.AFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES. o GQ tQ 3-EOP-FR-S. j, RESPO"'ISE TO NUCLEAR PO'WER GENERA.TION} p,TWS. Step 1. Note: Containment temperature will reach adverse containment setpoint during this event. 25 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.:_4_ Page _1_ of Event
~~Description:~~
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Time Position BOP BOP Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. /c'; ,p 2 3 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Turbine Trip Z1 AI! stop Cif ",ssod&t;ed
-

>ontroi a
-GLD:3ED o 'v'e-dfy tiJ1o;sur-f? S,eparatO';" Rehe:,:;-ter St2am Valves -ClO/3ED 3D 4 h'V bus -,AN ENERGIZED" I{,v BUS 26 a, Perform the following: 1} to E',mergenc*}, sla-1 any Unit 3 .ziv3,JJabhe.
~~di:esel uen:erator.~~
2} IF n.edher 3A net 3B 4 KV bus is ;;;,ergized, go to 3-*EOP-EC.A:-Q ,0, LOSS .ALL AC POVifER, Step 1. :t. A'l!*em--D1 t:t e:.rnergenC':t start tr'* de*-e-ne*;g..:zed Unli: :3 bus-dies-e*i gienefaior " Perk "11 th" foll':iwing:
1) Jf. Ioclwllt (;If 3D " KV bus J:!Ql prese,nt, l!:!.lli perform the;ollowil1Y z"i \/edfy a-c -c,.cvv purnp -BREA.I(ER OPEH. b:: \/erify;JoG JG\l'V p>"'imp -BREAKER OPEN. C,; Opera:" bus selppl), b,e-akeTs to restcJre started earlier
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: _4_ Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
The Res leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto il)itiate. Time Auto SI Signal SI and Phase A initiated Positio n RO Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. ,f' \, 4 Applicant's Actions or Behavior C If 5 J ls Actu ated <5afugu,:-.,"os. -;"UTO 3T"'HED '}\ , line dff"rental "t!r;?ssc.:,. .. -100 ps"d "'\', 10\\l SlG 4:1:;'9 QB. low Res* *s ... dJv;Jcdil1g based on exit ..... Cs - THAN PRZ I*",'ei -CAN !:illI. 8E lVlAl'FAINED GREATER THAN b, IF SI is reQui'ej, THEN m';;'luaiiy S1 pr.as*B A. 8!::ill: go to St=p 5, c. 1£ 31 IS!:!QI I.!iS!i perform tile following: 1:: \/\onitor C.rt:ic..?<t SafEtv Ft .. Jn;:,:kms 3-ECP*F-D. SAFETY =Lt<CrC<f'1 STATUS TREES. :30 to 3-EOP-ES-J. '" -PIP RESPON:3E. Step 1, Critical task: (TCWOGIPRAj Failure to manually safety inject ./' /Y and actuate Phase A within 1 minute if an 51 actuation
~~I -setpoint is exceeded following a LOCA and automatic 51 actuation fails to occur. ------------.. -----27 -I -.~~
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: _4_ Page of JJL Event~~
~~Description:~~
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Time Position us Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOI DOUT FOR PROCEDURE E*g ADVERSE CONTA1NMENT CONornONS 1f of th* oonditions tlsted beioN >oc:C;I,.;*r, .II:if.t::! use a C{).ntai:nrn*'_nt .strn'cs:phe.rE-tEmpemjure-::: 180-:;;: c.ontmnrnen1. lev-e*,is 2.. 1 Rlh:r 'VVHEN paf.8mete:!"s drop betow the -If. :h*B TSC det-ermiroes
integra.te'>

2. Rep TRIP CB1TERJA -8 !E beth ccn<iiiions o l:isted:
~~ooctlf, I.!:!lli kip ad -1} H;gb-head SI -AT LEAST ONE 2-; RC-S 5UDC-tKlhng -~~
~~o. 1£ phase 8ac("3tea lillJi:iEP all 8-"lfl"2r OR any SP3 h.;;s .abnorTA-al r:=tdkT1ion, AND r,a),TOW [3'2%1, .Il:I.W. feed f!G\\' may -be Conlim.H?~~
With Attachment 3 To COlnp'iete The PHl'mpt Action Verifications* While Performing This Procedure . BOP will perform attachment 3 while the US and RO continue in 3-EOP-E-O. Attachment 3 actions included at the end of lesson uide. 28 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: _4_ Page -..1. of J1L Event
~~Description:~~
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto in.!tiate. Manual initiation of S1 and phase A is required. /"' i"\... Time Position RO RO RO 6 7 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Check AFIN Pumps* AT lEAST TWO RUNNING :0" %1aintain fe*ed f,lo:w to SiG narrO'I'l range Ioevels betNeen 1{ 5%[32%1 and 50%. align valves to est.wli:sh ,AFVV r; 'Verifol AF\N Hew grea-ter than 345 g.,Oln. C', IF ;:'PN 'ilow ie,s than 3 6 5 gpm, slart pumps AND _ali;gr_ valv*'s to 'Es-tabksh 345 gpm"low. 3) IF ;otai feedflovf/ kern *ali souroes greater than 345 glOm c;;m !:iQI be Established .. I.!:llili. perform the foilo\virtg: .3} Monitor Criiical Safety FunctiPf1s. "sing :3-ECP-F-C. CRITICAL Si',FETY FUNCTION STATUS "'"REES. OJ Go to 3-EOP-FR-H.
~~1. SECONDAR\'~~
HEAT SINi<. Step 1. Note: narrow range levels <32%(adverse conditions) Verifies AFW flow >345 m. 29 ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Page.2. of Event
~~Description:~~
~~The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto iI1itiate. Time Position RO Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. /' '\ 9 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Chec.:RCP~~
~~!ie*",! Cooting a. ene-ok al! RCP thermal barrier a"itlrms -a, OFF ,A,1!1, Rep THER\lAL B,t;.RR C:)OLlHG VV.ATER}-H~~
,. ;',1(2, RSP Ti-IER\1AL BARR CO-:)llhG \l1/,L.TE.R Hi TE.MP 0, Go to *S:t:o 1*J aE Rep SEaFf'*:li'm ,are h:s'S tt-:ar F d. -v'Edfy Si* RESET e .!.E. orsilE power '5.!:!.Q.l ca oacity 3 j"/' oni: p.lInp, JF ad d § ',';jJ:;,flphy is fW:l sh%B ,,",/-:i" // 't. \; ,,4 "" R-efe to T'"':'".4t HfvlEh T 2 fer //'i <'bi i03d!.3i tn£l ,,\. l l \. Start ctyi'rg ir<g pump !'"ninirq: .* H'f1 \ for 1, Af '>', '. l
~~19.~~
HCV-3-t2f. !6"fl'1<3ht.a}'l'"J seal il'jEDf;or, flow 9.,b transitions taste 10 _ESE, TkA.h 54?:;: AND ST,48LE IF Rep RCNNit*;G --30 IF is THEN *rfOinl he follmving --.2} Lh-*'!:it 1()tal feBc flow m 345 'JP-!"(l w;tl r 3!nge 5%[32%; l!) at Of"JE S.'(3. 3;-IF <::o;:;:kJown due 1-':1 THEN dC'Sore: mal" stE-a"'l."'jfir"e ar-d byo.$ss ,*alves. o I*F g:re-,a;ter
~~han 547 4'F AND :;:;'c.fe.asing, !!::f1t! p*riorm the following:~~
~~Dump ste.an1 usmg SH3 st.eam dumr-:.< to a:rn!)sp"le-re valves. ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Time Position RO Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. ' 11 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Cl>eck PRZ PORVs, Spray Valves And Exc",ss Letdol'm Isolated $' A., " ,;:,' ., '\, a pfuS5dfE' !e-ss iJ"jan 2335 psrg'}' /,/THEt:r!h"nuaFy 'OloS", PORVs 1E Jny**' .* " P§:Z' POR\' can .!iQIoe ciose'd It!..5!i j'/'/' Its vJt!\!.:. iF b;<ock '', f ;/ .... valve can. NOT,OI!?Y,;csed, TH dfperform
~~..f the j/' "\ .*** , ',.;f /' '\.. \ **.** Mcpr.br Saf"ty ;:Ounoti!ms~~
'\ yslng 3;.EDP-F-C', CRITIC.4'_ SAFETY STATUS TREES. Go t"t3-E(}P-E-1, lOSS OF SECONDAR:Y Cl..h .. ", .. er 1. " " b !E °RZ lhan 2250 psig, . *THEN c,;Cse ,;ai.,es lF nh'*d) carr 'NOT be -cbsed,lt!..5!i stopRep/51 s10p spray flow au)::ih*arf If a>db3rf spray vll'l'.'t can!iQ! be closed, l.t!.lli close Crarghg Flow' tD R'.'tgen '-i;;.at Exchanger, HCV-3*121 . /"iltf!: letdown was placed in service earlier and not \ \ secui"ed, it, will be secured here. Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped b. Ch'.'tck RCSsAIi:<ccQling -LESS ThAN 26'F[tl6'Fi Hign-I-;;;ad 31 Pump -AT LEAS"" ONE RUNNING FLO'N;"'A.TH
~~1 SiOP all Reps Note: All Reps secured 31 a Go to 13, I), Go to Sl'.'tp13,~~
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _4_ Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto ig,!tiate. Manual initiation of S1 and phase A is required.' Time Position RO 13 RO 14 Applicant's Actions or Behavior ,.:I,NY SG PRESSURE DECREASING .Q.B. ,II,NY S(; C:OMPLETEL '{ o EPRESSUR IZEO o Perform :he following: i} 2. ,4,DS -8<3 C: tsdiatio-r, ,gs -HIGHER :"l.AN NORMAL : .... c*cal ste?mhne ... -H:iGHER THAN NORMAe.. -1) k'tcrdiot Crkic.al usin9 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL S.l.,FETY FUNcrlON S.TATUS TREES :2 j Go to 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERIHOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1 Note: No faulted or ruptured S/Gs 32 ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2-Event No.: _4_ Page of .11L Event
~~Description:~~
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. \ Time Position RO US Applicant's Actions or Behavior 15 C l1e,ck If RG.S fs Intact a. Gcntaknnent N:)RMAL
~~L! e 3083 Note: Based on containment conditions, will monitor critical safety fu"ctiqns and transiito[l Loss of Reactor or step f,,'*\, " '\", Directs response per~~
\' " '\ .- -";.... ---\-tl?J"'rt;' ----------- I * ,.+/ ',J/"'v"e, \ \,? I .<l"*/* FOJd.,."Jr pa,j:. is r.:erluired r;\i(,e tnrc1tlqhovt this f ,<<" ., i '" / y ____ ./ .... __ * "';;:0, .... __________
~~'\, \\, ,/' ,,l,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, , \, ,> .f 33~~
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:_4_ Page 2 of-.1L Event~~
~~Description:~~
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Time Position US Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. 1 Applicant's Actions or Behavior FOLDOUT FOR PROCEDIJRE E*' ADVERSE CONTAINMENT COND!HONS 1£ i?i1h'er of cot)(FticrIS CCCfJr5" ll:I.fl::L ad ... '*!?r:;e ,,;,:tmc-soh-erf' .. :tfa'tvre 2: '18{FF .QB raC\31i:Df1 i .3:< 1 O!':\ Rlhr dlDP below 1E. c(')ntair-nlerrr. dose, rate ha's. !?X,C"-:t?'
~~2. Rep TRW GRITERIA a. I,F an cr.mditions li-s,t.ed D-ekl'w-OOCilr, THEN tp0 1) 31 pumps-,t., T LEASi"ONE R'UNN ReS sl/bccokng~~
~~-LES.S THA.N 2:5"F[65(>F]~~
~~3) Conironed.~~
Res: ct)oidmvn-::5. NOT in p-mgf"E'SS C. !E. phase: S .aU' .lRCP-s 3. III TERMINATiON ('RIIER!Jf P ">" !.E. air ksted be'b";;' COG a i"'i')arHl*er .QB. ha-s l;>:Ol'llp!etely depressurlzE->j, Ati.Q. that FAULTED STEAM GENER; TOR ere-,aSES ,:fl a-n V1COn1rOn.ec
nann<?r any SiG !"las abnornu! rad'iabon,.Il:;U;H rnenuJ:.lIy g>ts t,o TUSE RUPTURE, :Step 1

0 h?5S than \55. DOD
';10 to 3-EOP-E S-1. 3. TR.t.,f'*J;SFEH TO -C,GtD TIOn. Step 1. RHR ar;-:.p.s bewrne 'uraL:-:; OR abnor,,;,-ally iON has. e-stahFshoed, EN 3:EOP.-ECA.1.'1 L-OSS OF C.ooLANT REC-IRCULAT-?Ot-t -Ste-p 1. LOSS OF 9FFS!TE POWER PH S1 ON OTHER UNII IF 8-1 -n.-3,:. beEn res>:::'t, AND either offsite-power Ls bst OR. Jct-ustes: en the ather und. THEN E---Zjl../p:rnert Refer toT.np/::;Hr ... 1ENT '-3 for e--swnt\at ba.d-*. --34 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _4_ Page of --.1JL Event
~~Description:~~
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Time Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. Position RO 1 BOP 2 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Monitor Conditions To Determine> If RCPs Shou Id Be Stoppe>d 3. RCPs -,,'.NY FUNNING o High-head 31 plwnps -.A T LEAS"'" ON E RUNNI"lG c. Res SU;Dcoci;ng -LESS T'"Lt;N a. Dire>ct N uci",l;{ Ch"n1Jsky to t",ke periodic -ac\lvi1Y sarnphes of an SiGs D. Direct Nudea, Ch'Bn1i!iky to che>ck DAM '1 t"f'!'io::niioT readir\g ':'. Direct Health Physics 10 take radi.aiion readings or ste'amLines
d.
r-adiaiion -NOHAAA.L N'EAH ROUTINE OPERATION VAUJE 35 suited AND that SiG has l '.Il:iEti, g.o c2,. FAULTED STEAM oJ. Mair1,!1;jr feed l)l:)IN gre'.3tE?" t;:"iiH'1 341: gll"'-' ,mtil narr'O'N ran'Je 1'9,<e>1 in at I*, ... c**ne SiG C Si):)p f*ol/( to: 8:ny S/G Wi.trl range le'vsl 9p2-B1er than 5D'%, . .!E rrange tevs 'in any SiG continql?s 10 increase \,'1 an unccntrolle>d msrne'L to STEA'\l GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1. dGo to 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GEhlEFA,TOR ""U8E RUPTURE. Step 1. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:_4_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto Time Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. Position RO 5 RO 6 BOP BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION If allY PRZ PORVopl?ns because of high P'RZ prBS'Sure dosed or i'Solated after pre6sure deecrea6es to leiS6 PRZ PORVs Valves b P{)R\/s -Cl.OSED C. "lalve un!es's-;'1 iJj"_?/S a. Charging pumps -AT lEASTCIN E RUNNiNG o Ad}I.Jst speed cO'rJtrofiets as to establish desired charging flow to establish Sl Termhnabor ,oordiiions C. ,.!;d;lUS: Cr",Iii);ng F\'Ow' T.:> Reb-len He",! E:<ch*arrger, HC\L3--t2 t, to l'1"!::slntsir'l pmper sE'al inject.on fiow 36 lCPi$(ll.2te:;;a,'l open POR\!. b. R-e-s!-ore-ak Jsing (J-ONOP-013, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR whde contimdng with ihis procedure. Check diesel adeqUi31e ie:, run three t,harginq pumps. J.E adeqvate diesel cap;sei:y 's !:!Q! ,3vailaibl'e. !!!.5!:! shed ronessen,ti.:;J leads. Refer to ATTACHMENT 3 f'Or ,;:.Qrtlponem 1<"i.N lo-ad raiing. a PE-no-'fm A:tta'-chfn,er,t 4 to esia:bFiEh oflargmg ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_4_ Page R of Event
~~Description:~~
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. " /' Time Position ", /",Ji. ,j/ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Note: attachment 4 will be used to start char iii ATTACHMENT -4 fPage 1*:;f 1'1 /' ESTABLISH CHARGING f 1. Verify flow Alarms To All Rep to tGrf£f is I:.,t. Therm.al Barriers -OfFe,e<;,ionT'. me folioi/,jft:Q' > "" A 1;1. RCP THERM.AL 8;!.RR COOLING WP,-:ER H FL01/\' a:t.Il A 1 1 2, Rep ,a. 'I;fe(yfy s
b. ')[ seal tenperatvre fur iEach F:CP '5 'ess F> Il::i!fl:i go to St!!? 2. '\ <, W':',-:ER He TEMP '. . lE is 2: 236 F, '" THEN seal injec1ion 10 "%,
RCR,(s/! slarJng a:t.Il A i;3, W.A -ER LO '=L:)'"" ""'\, " \'\, Pump PlacE' R{::S CQntrol Switch in STOP \,. "'\ "\\\.., Ettahli5h Ch.1rging F!ow J St3rl acdi:b'hl" charging 1: 4..1'1"1'5 f and o:tsrt-e p:!fIer availabli: Adjus.: Chargrg Flcw T,:, REgen '-lea! E;.,:hanger, HCV-3-121, t? Main\a, n proper sea injection Fe>.'1 d c:nargY"l,g PUf1P aUD:> t'r',fers R.WS-6. Notify The Unit Supervis4)rThat The ESTABLISH CHARGING FLOW A'!lachment Is Gomp&ete 37 *""l.hi.i11PS -.. : >*';'*'* ... *3_ 7971!. A t';. ".",< " o. seal injeC":ion is is'D31ecil0 eaCf'l afee:.*< R:'::P, Il::l.Et:l.go to 21ep:1 Jf. offs:e PC,V£f is WI <lv.lilacJe .II:l.El:t diesel C;l':>3City adequiite to ".!.;", one charging p'JnlO, If die5E coapacily is NOT THEt(sI,;?o non-essential 'cads. Ref?? tc 3 fiDr component hVI' \o:N ratmg. a. lE power 10 NOT available, <:he.t:k aOe=tp.Ja1e to run 31;J;j'itiork¥ 01';3(9in9
~~tvmps ..~~
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page -.1l. of Event~~
~~Description:~~
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto Time Position RO Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. 11 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Check If SI Should Be Terminated a ReS cn -core exH -Cs -3. Tl-LAJJ
~~0 FodC'J( F:,i;?* lten*3 A.:j'ierse Value-1 Total 'feed now to-~~
~~3/8s -:3RE!..-'t:F TH;'.N 34:5 GPM c. Res pre:sS!twe-38 section, transitions to ste 12.~~
~~( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: _4_ Page of Event~~
~~Description:~~
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto Time Position RO Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. 12 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Che<::k IfCoota'inment Spray Should! B'i! J spray !1YJmps -ANY RUNN1NG 3,:'. EC;:-Spray 29D5 CAUTION Res Subcoofing' are reqajred ro be moniTored. If High-Cht'Ck If RHR Pumps Sh*ouJo:l8e Stowed <I. ;::hetk R:CS pressure -GREATER THAN Ci. JE RHR Flow greater1han 1000 gprn. 250 PSIG :650 PSG] I.!:!$.! go 1D Step 15. c. \leidy Sl -RESET Note: RHR 39 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_4_ Page of-.1L Event
~~Description:~~
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Time Position ROI BOP BOP Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. 14 15 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Check ReS And S{G PrE'ssures pressure in a.) SfG5--STABLE.QB. iNGR:t:,ii.oSiNG GheckRCS pressure -STABLE 2B DECREA,SING Check If Diesel Generators Should Be Slopped a. Check 71!!' A and 8 41<V buses -ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE Pt:l'iV'ER loaded dies* Qene'f,110r and by usiln@ 3/4:0P -023, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERA TOR: 2<, .IE neither room *ell iller; .. .I!:!..§! perform tllefcllo\Yllg
) Check dies,;

", .c;;pac,ty adei;jlJale i.o n.m on" train of *chiII ed water for conpubef room !.E ;;dequate o'e.el (

"'{I.:;;dly is NOT av",il3dne.
THIENi sh",d loads. ,t.,TT.I\'CHMENT 3 for 'ocrpcnent V:W bad [ahng, hi Stan one tr,:;;n of chilled water. Directs U4 RO to start chilled water 40 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: Page of JJL Event
~~Description:~~
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Time Position RO BOP Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. 16 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Verify Coid Leg Recinrulatron Capabffiit.y if" Verify at one RHR p:ump -AVAiLP.BlE FOR RECiRCULATION b.. Locally urkdl: arn:l ciose 1he iollowing .3OI'JJ5 for MOV-3-ee4B
30015 for MOV-3-750 " 300 1 i3for MOV-3-8e2S

30021 for

300213 for MO\l-3-Be*:lB
~~c. LQ.:aily i.ldJX:k.~~
~~and I:wwilers 41 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.:_4_ Event~~
~~Description:~~
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Time Position US Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. 18 Applicant's Actions or Behavior initiate Evaluation Of PI.Iin! Status .3, Check aUXiarj building radiaten -NORM.!.,L b "', Check plant ve11i prooeS5 raQ;,,;don 1)crtilcr R-' 4 .;: :'::heck au:c.3ijl building area r;;k:; '11.xdcrs
~~4) sysler-,~~
cCilt.atrrnent co'oiers Ernerg'e'"!<:Y 'filters. 42 a. . a si-gnificant 10'5-5 of 1'1'. outside o::n,iainI1'"Em, (;;) 3-EOP-ECA-1.2. LOCA CONTAINMENT, Step 1. has bee" align;:d CCiNTt..INMENT ,ACCIDENT MONC;-ORiNG
~~2) Direct Chel1'"istry to obtain grab d,~~
~~align compon;:nts to availability of 00011119 corrtpO'nei"'l;1sh ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event~~
~~Description:~~
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Time Position RO US Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. / " 19 Applicant's Actions or Behavior If Res Cooldow& And 15 Required ,J ReS -GF:E.A,TER 2£0 "? Greco "?,GI a. Perfu;yf!;,,-e f9a6w,",,? fir,,,, gre31,o:r
han / If£l1J gpm. 10 3:ep 20, "y" ,/' ;(i HHR pun-p

h;r Of eClJal to iJDC b, :3D lC 2,<E:J "'-=3-1.2.
H:JST tOCA AND DEPRESSIJI'(IZII,00N. '" 3-EOF'-E'sc1.2"T LOCA "'COOL Transitions to Depressurization, step \ \, '. '. '" /f , , \ \ .4,{/,j: ,,/,'1' \\, \.,' Inform tfle,fcrew you pave stJift, remain in place. , / > "\ , ,j/ \' y ,-\ 43 ( ( Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: i Event No.: 4att.3 Page1_of_1_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
~~3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavio BOP Step BOP 1 Check The Load Centers Associated With The Energized 4 KV Buses -ENERGIZED~~
3A LC

312 LC

3C LC

3D LC

3H LC

Hi-containment pressure 20 PSIG Verify main steam isolation and bypass valves -CLOSED 44 b. Go to Step 3. c. Push manual Steamline Isolation push buttons on VPB OR manually close valves.
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 2_ of _1_1_ Event~~
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step BOP 3. Verify Feedwater Isolation Place main feedwater pump a. switches in STOP Feedwater control valves-b. CLOSED Feedwater bypass valves-c. CLOSED /{" b y'/Manually
~~. e1os,e valves. "'> .}' ,4,f} "~~
'\ ,*
~~' ;;."" 'e.... 'M&lrluaJly close valves.~~
~~Close feedwatet:.AsQLEltion* . "" d. LO<<ally.c .* I.ose valves. d. MOVs . . ', .**. *.. ...... IF is Verify standby fe'edw,pter"afigIled thJ::fnit 3, THEN e. pumps -OFF .... feedwater~~
~~e. pump'(s).~~
~~""\ StE?P/' \ ....;. Proper lew 4" I ' \ \ a\. Verify,/fCw:.purnps,-::.AT '\ /' a. \ '" TWO RUNNI]'\J(9,'~~
c. /S' '<:\ "\:>c \."'%-.
~~\<. Verify to TPCW Heat -ISOLATED~~
~~POV-3-4882~~
-CLOSED POV-3-4883 -CLOSED Check ICW headers -TIED TOGETHER 45 b. c. Start ICW pump(s) to establish at least two running. Manually close valve(s). IF valve(s) can NOT be closed, THEN locally close the following valves: 3-50-319 for POV-3-4882 3-50-339 for POV-3-* 4883 IF both ICW headers are intact, THEN direct operator to tie headers to ether. ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 3_ of _1_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
~~3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step 5. Verify Proper CCW System Operation~~
~~a. CCW Heat Exchangers~~
~~-THREE IN SERVICE~~
a. /#/"'#,///',J

1 staft or stop CCW pumps as b. CCW pumps -RUNNING ,'-
.. d ... -TIED F,I :;POGETHI1R 1 ..;.p: po/' ' /"'/ ., .;fe";> _oi .,j/ \, R C P \'\..\ccv x lOu,tlet'*MOV-3-62 .. ::>*6P£?N ' .""", .. ","., 4' , \, \,., Containment Cooling s/' filscessary t blish ONLY C>I::JE RUt)j, CCW PUMP. rgency . Coolers -ONLY TWC\R NING ", IF both CCW headers are intact, THEN direct a field operator to tie the headers together. IF containment isolation phase B NOT actuated AND CCW radiation levels are normal, AND RCP number one seal leak-off temperature is less than 235°F, THEN manually open MOV-3-626. IF MOV-3-626 can NOT be manually opened, THEN direct operator to open MOV-3-626 locall . Manually start or stop a. Check emergency containment
~~a. emergency containment coolers -ONLY TWO RUNNING coolers to establish~~
-ONLY b. Verify emergency containment filter fans -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING 46 TWO RUNNING. b. Manually start emergency containment filter fans. ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 4_ of _1_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step BOP BOP 7. Verify 81 Pump Operation At least two high head pumps a. . running b. Both RHR pumps running Step 8. Verify SI Flow a. RCS pressure -LESS THAN 1600 PSIG[2000 P b. High-head SI pum indicator -CHEC,Ar.rI. .... ,". FLOW a. Perform the following: 47 1) Operate Unit 3 and Unit 4 head SI pumps to establish injection to Unit 3 from two head SI pumps. 2) Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to align Unit 4 high-head SI pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using ATTACHMENT 1 of this procedure.
~~3) Go to Step 10.~~
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:2. Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 5_ of _1_1_ Event~~
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step BOP BOP 10. Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve White Lights On VPB -ALL BRIGHT Step -\ 11. Am bet:. I qrlVPB B RIG H, \, Perform the follo+,V!(in ,/' '\, a. Manually gctugie Containment I so I ati A. ./f/"{' b. ation Phase NOT I ' THEN
~~e. IF valve(s) can NOT bs\ma'f\ugJIY closed, THEN manuallY'QE 10" IIy isolate affected containmenl~~
.* .p tration. valves to . establish"proper SI alignment {I for an injection flowpath. Reset SI Reset Phase A Nq'te:"/30P is required to go back to the contairment isolation f .l' /racks and rest the six phase A lockout relays, (three lockout / relays on each rack) 48 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4 att. 3 Page 6_ of _1_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
~~3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step BOP 14. Reestablish RCP Cooling a. Check RCPs -AT LEAST ONE RUNNING MOV-3-1417 ,/ \.. Reset and start~~
c. coolers " Step '".' '''':'''
~~'\ .'. ,::(7'~~
~~15. Morlit6r Cont<8inment pr,ess.tlre J" TJo'Ve,rifyG,ont'ainment Spray ,NOT /*ReJ:rtlired "j ., \ ;/ /" i. " ,,/ a.~~
~~-HAS, \ EMAIN5D LE!8S,,:J:IdAN 20'PStG a. t<<' .;.:., .... 0-.~~
~~"" \. > '. I?'R-3f63'06A", i '\{}' AND '"' 49 ", '\"~~
~~'\, c.\\Stop all RCPs "\, 0' Perform the following:~~
1) IF containment spray NOT initiated, THEN manually initiate containment spray. 2) Verify Containment Isolation Phase ACTUATED.

3) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B valve white lights on VPB -ALL BRIGHT. 4) IF any Containment Isolation Phase B valve did NOT close, THEN manually or locally isolate affected containment penetration.

5) Stop all RCPs.
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2-Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 7_ of .1.L Event~~
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step BOP 16. Verify Containment and Control Room Ventilati Unit 3 containment purge a. exhaust and supply fans -OFF Verify Control Room ventilation status panel -b. PROPER EMERGENCY RECIRCULATIO ALIGNMENT ------- I I Hydrogen Monitors should be I in a timely manner In I lid SI signal. They should I d to hydrogen generation I I ill call NSO to ali n PAfM. 3-0P-094 ste s listed be/ow. 50 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 8_ of _1_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE I -Hydrogen hfom'tcrs S!oukI. be in .5eJ'l.'ice within 30 min '--=--,._--------=. 7.1.1 initial Concll bort'; 1. .4..11 applicable pm-.equisites 7.1.2 Prcc:eIDiQJi! .--------, -NOTES-- SY.'rtelU to FAHM Headel' holarioo. Valve 2A{i6MUZ) PACV Vl!ut and SaqJ.e System to FARM Header Isoliltlon. V;;h1! (RR), P.4HM-3-OO2B (5 turns) ock :\ .. '\'D open PACVS hoi VIv Penet 53, HV-3-3, in front of the Gmt 3 . em Spl7lY Pump Room. (..l\n A key is required for t.hi; lockJ clock .-\,;'\11) op*.U PAC'I/'S Isol \1" Peuet 16. HV-3-1, WC<rtM in. the OOlih Au:" Btd.gEillway.. (An A key is fort.his iock-1 51 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:..2-.- Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 9_ of _1_1 _ Event
~~Description:~~
~~3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior -I. M'J.ues: the Re"cter Opera:or periorm dle fc,llowiug~~
a. b. c, d. ";/e:r:ifr the .f6]J01: l lU:,Z ftlll:ti,ou

.ebectol A .. '1..'l]j'z.er hue!

are i.:; me S . ..IJ;.1PLE C) QR?:
QR £1 Phce the ;:'Oun'e:. switch:" .J' Depm;:; tbe A.L:L'l\I re;et f/ j '5 .i'-!, the onuiflB cl:te. Unit 3 BA EY,!,p R:<;{O!ll, cap .'L ,\'1) .dose '}d'rr ,;Ii ;;."t'" _,Tn.u:ter Pump D1::d1..,rge to '\Rae: 'i" aste MPAS*t)O 1 ,)."'f tl1mj .* "\, , ,. '. \',% .. . .." . . "\.r the. ',\}ot" pyap9tatol

~~ttre R..'lci'W,l:r.e qldg. Am: Bldg KHT 1:,,:,'\to F',\;c*,;*,,-.,te~~
~~. , .* TI.:, 1 /j'l,........~~
"'." r-.. -----... --"!'"" ""'. "!'"" -,- .. 7 ---I \ I Th.e on the< Bw$din'iJ roof near !'he Un"t*3 conta;nmellt ___ _1: __________ i ,/ L ) , '" ' \. \ /f' ,/.//' 6. f;:,1l01J::Ug: \ '\ < "" <,.\ .} from W:n Pp
~~VlPAS*}-!JC-I~~
",' to F'.u-ge Air ?-.m, MJ'AS*3*(;{!5. "\ \"" \.,. "'" \. 0 \'<' /J"" 52 DilteTi:n:e Completed: EMERGENCY START any available EDG NOT runnin Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 10_ of Event
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step 19. Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses an a. Check the 3A, 3B and 3D 4 KV buses -ALL ENERGIZED 53 a. '\, 3) IF the Unit Supervisor decides to energize 3A, 3B, or 3D bus, THEN perform the following: a) IF 3A 4 KV bus energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-0NOP-004.2, LOSS OF 3A 4KV BUS. b) IF 3B 4 KV bus energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.3, LOSS OF 3B 4KV BUS. c) IF 3D 4 KV bus energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.5, LOSS OF 3D 4KV BUS. ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4att.3 Page11_of_1_1_ Event
~~Description:~~
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step 20. Notify The Unit Supervisor That The PROMPt. f},CTION\"'\, VERIFICATIONS Attachment Is CompleteAQd'Note AnyAations'" That Had To Be Taken §+ //" -' Note: BOP informs US of 3 . ..,y,.' c Note: BOP should receive a the /!,*J a'nd continue in the EOP network. V", "'>,. 54 NRC XXIV NRC SEN 5 OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Field Supv.: Admin RCO: Unit 3 Unit Supv.: RCO: NPO: Unit 3 Mode: Power: 100 MWe: 760 Gross Leakrate: .03 RCS Boron Cone: 670 ")perational Concerns: JC charging pump -OOS due to area. Focus Area: Maintain 100% Plant Status Inside SNPO: Outside SNPO: ANPO: Unit Supv.: RCO: f;lnit 4 100 758 Gross'", .03 Leakrate:",\ 2,00 ) --- I Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator Mode: . 1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 100 Gross: .03 A 6615 /!/\, MWe: 760 Unidentified .01 B 664;;" /,3 Tavg: 574.2 Charging Pps: .02 C 9 6'27 L"( RCS Pressure: 2250 ..p./.f,F:: <,.\ t--R_C_S_B_o_ro_n_c_o_n_c_: __ 6_7_0 _____________________ ",/./"f"\,., ** \ ** , """"\', Abnormal Annunciators: ",/,,', .""t, Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: t---Annu_nciato_r: Comp Actions: \ \.,:::r""""",,,,"",.,.,// Annunciator: Comp Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: f"/' tl'lvf ,/ \ .. , \., t---Com_pActio_ns: .. '\ . """"""" ....... ,',.,"'" .. ,)', ** )) Ann un cia tor : ,.,., ..... ,,,'/ Comp Actions: T.S.A.S / / .... , .. /,l Reason: \,'\, Entry Date:'\. TS.A.S / Component\\ I> I Reason: ' Entry Date: 1\" T.S.A.S / Component: W Reason: Entry Date: TS.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: TS.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: Unit 3 Status ment: u erator Work Around Status: Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-O-1 Facility: Turkey Point Scenario No.: 6 Op Test No.: 2009-301 MOD Examiners: Candidates: US ----------------------- RO ----------------------- BOP Initial Conditions: Mode 2,4% power, MOL. Turbine rolling at 1800 RPM ready to sync generato 0 load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 30% f a flu Turnover: Equipment OOS: None significant Event No. 1a TFFXOILB =T 2 VKD001X = 1.0/ 2 min ramp TFK3B11S = T 3 TFF1M86H = T 4 TFS1MREH =T TFSW13A=T 5 K30P11BR = F Place unit on line and increase power per 3-GOP-301 beginning Event Type* (N) ALL (TS) SRO (C) SRO/BOP ain generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially blocked resulting in a igh air temperature condition. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for ann ciator E-9/4. The crew manually trips the reactor when exciter hot gas p ture exceeds 90°C and performs the actions of 3-EOP-E-0. Once the re t ripped, the switchyard relays out. 3B EDG starts but fails to auto cally load 3B 4kv bus due to a bus stripping failure. 3A EDG fails to start and can not be manually started. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply both units. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B TPCWP breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and can not be opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to reenergize 3B &3D 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak. 6a The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 since PZR level < 17[50]% or SI actuated due to the effects of the steam leak. (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1 ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #6 Event 1 -Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2 Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 30% for a flux map. Event 1 a -Once feed regulating valves are placed in automatic, an NSO calls i AFWP governor has an oil leak. Event 2 -3A (running) TPCWP bearing failure. Failure of 38 (standby) C 0 omatically start following trip of running pump. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-08 nd ma ual starts the 38 TPCWP. Event 5 -Main generator exciter air cooler temperature condition. The crew responds manually trips the reactor when exciter hot g s t m actions of 3-EOP-E-0. On r ctor is trip e , fails to automatically 10 bus ue to a u can not be manually 2 ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description Scenario XXIV NRC 6 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup Restore IC-20 (4% MOL, Ready to sync generator to grid) Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps: SETUP -3B TPCWP AUTO START FAIL (actuates TFK3B11S = SETUP -3A EDG START FAIL (actuates TFQ5GAFS = T) SETUP -3B 4KV BUS STRIPPING FAIL (actuates f SETUP -B AFWP GOV OIL LEAK (actuates TFFXOILB l,,;f) SETUP -MOV-3-1405 FAILS TO OPEN (actuatesTJ;1=XM 5=T) '", Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled 9,' Acknowledge any alarms and place sill)u,Jetor in freeze.\\\, /" "<<<<:'-""'/8':
~~";" '"~~
Provide shift turnover checklists & p to step 5.52.2 The crew is to place the unit on line and to'So.?{o for \:-. ':::;> ---""'+""", .. ,.,-,--' Select 3A QSPDS to page?11 (SAT) (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA and at the Utilities sGree;rfA .J'!" ,\-", '-:t ",(,-'" W"''''''' \ ,,/' Fill in blender & shy n boro'n aqdition plapal,{!s at console blender station. Data for each IC may be}6u/ in the EO:C Shutdow{l a,uidelines Book in the simulator IIF. <' <""i*F '\ \, This scenario
~~o. a s rrQ9il'fJfOperator for SGWLC. He will turn over and leave .f' 3~~
( TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description Event 1/1a -Place unit on line I B AFWP out of service Initiated by crew based on shift turnover. The crew performs 3-GOP-301 beginning at step 5.52.2 to synchronize generator to grid, increase power and swap s/g level control to main feed reg valves cont 'ng in . automatic. Note that a surrogate operator will be required to maintain SG Respond if asked as SM that auto synchronization is to be used for generator on line. (Step 5.54 is n/a) Respond as System if notified of placing Unit 3 on the grid (135 MWe). If asked aboutVARS, request 100 MVAR 0 at Respond as Chemistry when notified to sample for Respond as NSO when notified to commence purgl Respond as NSO if directed to complet 3-0P-072 secti service. After 7-10 min. report compl Respond as NSO if directed to perform per 3-0P-072.1. Once feed regulati and report that t laced i a tomatic, call in as a turbine bldg. NSO nor has n illeak (oil leak entered at setup). lrected to perform local actions to initiate MSR tube bundle purge Respond as SO if directed to check Bently-Nevada for turbine vibration alarm. Reset expected turbine eccentricity alarm. Click on TURBOVISORY TCUFRST -TURBINE BENTLY-NEVADA ALARM RESET TRUE then INSERT. 4 TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description Respond as SM if asked about transferring main turbine load from the governor to the load limit. Direct crew to wait until after power reaches 30% power before doing this. Respond as NSO if directed to check PSS voltmeter inside the voltage regulator cabinet. Report back that meter reads zero volts. Respond if asked as Chemistry to verify SGs are within 0-NCOP-002 .. lj I s chemistry request power be held at or below 30% until SG chemistl)lfveriff d within limits. As Reactor Engineering, request power be held at 30% untjJ/ffbJ.x ap comp ,fl") / .rP' Respond as SM/FS if asked to verify 3-0SP-089 during tur startup. Report that this surveillance requirement rT)et sjttlsfactorily .4 l""" .c"" '*"%<< Respond as FS/NSO if asked about status of hydrog .. service. \\,. '\,./' / .,\.<, j} * .. I'>,.. . \\ "'\,. Respond as FS/NSO if asked to begitfl'plaC1\:lQ MSRs in se""<ice' \. V<, eport that it is in Power should be stabilized at 30%, 554':"§,,;:f'&rur/Jin '\ \' 7"225 MWe. 5 ( ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description Event 2 -3A TPCWP bearing failure Once steam dumps have been realigned for normal at power operation (or as directed by lead examiner), trigger lesson step EVENT 2 -3A TPCWP BEARING FAILURE (actuates TVKD001X = 1.0 on 2 min ramp). Annunciators 1-5/1, 5/2 & 5/4 all alarm when 3A TPCWP trips. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-008. The BOP will need to start 38 TPCWP manually since the aljt6 sian function was failed at startup. ,F // ;/w < . '\ Respond as NSO if directed to locally check 3A TPCWP. the inboard motor bearing is smoking and very hot. If directed to do post-staCtctlecks CQ 3B, TPCWP, report back that the pump is running normally. . .. "\ ""'\0 y '" /", ,ii/ * " Respond as NSO when directed to locally check TPC)A{sWPly temp (TI-3-1432)\\, "\"" <110°F and stable/decreasing. Click on TURBIN'!::) PLANT TPCW HEAT header " temperature at top of page. '-",f ,j'f';;:' ,'/ -', '., Respond as NSO when directed to TPCW From TPCW HEAT EXCHANGERS system on basket strainers downstream of &'4883,. \, * '\ "'j. .. Respond as NSO when directed to check cooled by TPCW. After 8-10 min., report all /?%",<.//" /" \ Vi .. ff ,(;'- '\-:. \ .. When requested 8-;10 min out breaker 3AA 11 by triggering lesson step RACK OUT BKR 1 TAK3A11 P = RACKOUT (3)). \.. f' 6 ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description Event 3 -FT 487 fails high Trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -FT-3-487 FAILS HIGH (actuatesTF1M87H = T). This causes FT-3-487 to fail high which causes FCV-3-488 to fail closed. To avoid automatic reactor trip on 38 slg low level, the operator must take manual control of FCV-3-488 and restore feed flow and return slg level back to program. The responds per 3-0NOP-049. 1 and takes FT-3-487 out of service. 38 slg Ie . "ntrol is returned to automatic using FT-3-486 for contro/. Respond as WCC if directed to initiate a PWO and contact I&C. directed to generate an ECO for the bistables tripped per 3-0N 4" -',. Respond as FS/NSO if directed to reset the AMSAC TRQt:JSJeE'alarm (0-7/6) AMSAC panel in the Cable Spreading Room. After 2-4*/nliQ<,;l"'trigger lesson step 3 -RESET AMSAC TROUBLE (actuates TCL4RST = T): .... r{eg.drt when c plete. ,J' /\. \.0., '-\\. 7 ( ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description Event 4 -PT-3-1608 fails high I CV-3-1608 fails open After FT-3-487 bistables tripped & 38 SG level control returned to automatic, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 -PT-3-1608 FAILS HIGH I CV-3-1608 FAILS OPEN (actuates TFS1 MREH = T & TFSW49D=0.1 then TFSW13A = T 5 sec later). CV-3-1608 fails open and increases steam flow. Without operator action, p6wfjJf will eventually stabilize at 34-35%. Consistent with O-ADM-200 sect. 5.4.3 f(iJf plant transient, manual turbine load is reduced to return reactor to J'P%. pI ,A' If crew is slow to take action, call as reactor engineering and is, so far over the 30% hold which was supposed to be in progress. /r",'\,// '\. },>:>0"/' j./T" '\'" Respond as NSO if directed to close the air isolation bleed air off the 1608 operator. This will have no effect. Report steaJ:F(cqA1inues to out of the ,,,;.,. silencer with the greatest noise/vibration on CV-3(160(. .' /' )'" '" ""'% tJ (>" '<\,.. .,// <1'-/{' Once power is stabilized at 30%, CV-3-1608 can When directed as NSO, wait 2-4 min then trigger lesson step EVENT'4 -LOCALLY ISOLATE CV .>>'-;; . ><:'"" \., 1608 (actuates TASBV003 = 0.0 on 1 min ramp)."'VVhe.Q,.S2omplete, rep<<rt with the valve closed, although much less than before, f1ow,is still ott1 the silencer. Respond if called as the 'VVCC to get M?cl\anroot assistance 3C SG ADV. '\ 'i.......... . ..... "'. '\ .. J/" '\ /;/ "'\.""" ""1-\ ,/' 8 TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description Event 5 -Exciter air cooler TPCW blockage I Reactor trip After FT-3-487 failure crew brief, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 -EXCITER AIR COOLER TPCW BLOCKAGE (actuates TVUJINF = 0.98, TVUJINFB = 0.98, TVUJINFC = 0.98 & TVUJINFD = 0.98 all on 1 min ramp). This will cause exciter air temperature to increase. The crew responds per 097.CR for annunciator E-9/4. When exciter hot gas temperature the crew manually trips the reactor and 3-EOP-E-O immediate actions 9 ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description Events 6 -Loss of all AC power After the immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O are completed, trigger lesson steps EVENT 6 -3A811 STUCK CLOSED (actuates TFK3B11S = T) , then EVENT 6 -LOSS OF SWITCHYARD (actuates TFP8SWYD = T, K30P11 BG = F, K30P11 BR = F, TCE2Eon = T & TCE2E07T = T). f\, '\. This causes a loss of AC power from the startup transformer. 38 EOG stqris pdt fails to automatically load 38 4kv bus due to a bus stripping failure. 3A EOG f,?:lfs and can not be manually started. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.0:'" MOV-3-1405 failure to open (entered at setup) with 8 AFWP OO,Sf(frotTf"ftven{
~~1) requires C AFWP to supply both units. . ", ,/ '. ""\ " ./'% .,' Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of}I!3' 7}?6Wp breaker 3AVi311'\.~~
which has a blown breaker trip circuit control power fl{se gAd can not be opened );.'Qm', VPA. Prior to closure of the S80 tie from unit 4, 3AB(11)Slocally ope.ned allowing j'P3., } EOG to reenergize 38 & 3D 4kV bus. Transition to 3-EoP-ECA-O. 1 or ECA-O.2 depending on plant conditions at that time.""" J J /., "\'<2 ':'<<>" :I . J' Respond as NSO if directed to locally trip 3B1 & 3B2 CWp 3AB16 & 3AB18. Trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -TRIP3AB1.Q, AND TCK4CC = F then TCK 4DC = F 1 min later). Report when complete., \, '\ .\\., .... ' "'"", "'" """",,, .. ," .. ,\,., \'> . If called as NSO to investigate breaker 31\8;11, reR$Jrttrafthe.breat<er is closed, the blue & white lights are on while the red 8:\green (io<1icative of a blown trip circuit fuse -reference 131Kf'I::WQ 1 B). "'*."f " "-";-,. ':; /' -/ ...* ;<) _J+ .... ;i*""":<<:--<<.u,\, '\ '\ 'i"': Respond as NSO Wa§ked to reset 3!\.. EG>G start failure relay by pressing alarm reset pushbuttqr1:' f3,eport back,tha/the 3A EDG twbocharger suffered catastrophic failure with damage.toEblG,exhc\us,F piping. "" . ",,,,,t' .... " .. ,,<< **.. , ..... . """"".,,;;,f is supplying U4 HHSIPs. Report HHSIPs. / 'i/" ,,/f' "'"" "\'" '. '\ '\."\,,\. /Refopond as NSQ,if a,;:;ked'tQ open MOV-3-843A or B. After 2-4 min., trigger <' lesson 6\.,.,t(JCALL Y OPEN MOV -843A (actuates TFMVV01 0 = T) or "" EVENT 6 - Y OPEN MOV-8438 (actuates TFMW020 = T). Report when complete . . '" t \, as NSO to locally isolate RCP seals by closing 3-297 AlBIC, MOV 1ilgger lesson step EVENT 6 -LOCALLY ISOLATE RCP SEALS (actuates 0 .. TAHN97B = 0.0 after 1 min delay, TAHN97C = 0.0 after 2 min delay, TFBVC60 = T after 3 min delay &'1FK\162f}C = T after 4 min delay). Report when complete. '\. ,,' \' Respond as NSO if directed to open AFSS-3-007 to restore train 2 steam flow to C AFWP. After 1-3 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -OPEN AFSS-3-007 (actuates TAFF07 = 1.0 on 30 sec ramp). Report when complete. 10 TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description Respond as NSO if directed to deenergize and close MOV-3-1405. After 1-3 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -DEENERGIZE MOV-1405 (actuates TCF5MA27 = F). Respond as NSO if asked about status of steam from the 3C SG AOV CV-3-160B. Report that steam is still coming out of the silencer on the unit 3 main steam tform. Respond as U4 RO when status of U4 4kV buses is requested. Report at A & 4B 4kV buses are both on their respective EOGs and 40 4kV bus is ali ed t 4B 4kV bus. Respond as U4 RO when requested to place 4B 4kV bus non-r T-L or OFF. Trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -48 4KV ESF L = T, TCE2E20T = T & TCE2E27T = T). If 4B HHSIP is not running ri er lesson step -48 HHSIP PTL (actuates TFM2D4BS = T & V80H30 = T). Afte -3 in., report complete. Respond as U4 RO when requested to close 4A CLOSE 4AD07 (actuates TCE2E33C = T). Respond as U4 RO when asked about B EOG loading. lic POWER & 01 SEC report MW reading under breaker 4A 1. After 3A 4kV bus energized from the SB 0.0 call as NSO and tell cr hat 3AB11 's EVENT 6 -LOCALLY EN 3 Respond as U4 11 ", e 35 of 3-EOP-ECA-o ne Trigger lesson step ( ( TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description Event 6a -Loss of all AC power recovery This event entered when 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 completed. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA 0.2 since 51 is required (based on PZR level <17%) due to the leak on 3C 5G ADV CV-3-1608. ,::: .. , -.,'> Respond as NSO if directed to check if MOV-3-1426 & 1427 are closed. fo1'te(./1-3 min., report that these valves are closed. Note that it is not required to .. AtqV:3-6386 since MOV-3-381 is closed in the same line./'/.. "\ ./, .* /# .. 4'/*****\**\\...\\ Respond as NSO when directed to place PAHMS in service minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -PLACE U3 PAHM .. \ TAC2V02A = 1.0, TAC2V02B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TA .f 0.0). Report whe', complete. 12 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 1 Page _1_ of Event
~~Description:~~
Time Position us RO Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2. InCl:ease load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold lfoNebat 30°1 f fl ./",/ /0 or a ux map. ' .ff Applicant's Actions or Behavi Note: Following a turn over brief, the cre at step 5.52.2. 5,52.2 ----------- ..... -NOTe$ V'\Ihen reactor pOF/er is gre.ater than 5 percent r Gornrnunication bettveen ' plant startup ROs I7llipf'i reactor and turbine p0ltv'er posfHon. '\ '\ AmlWlcfator B 4/4. T A VG! r.;; The afar, '-- ---' ,,.:-.f" ___________ _ I Ll' C;.eill1nence n'll' i 4' ,Aisl11g o-op-elf.:! <,/ control rod§/ to behveen 5 and 7 percent by dilution (jjoncentration Control. OR by 'iYlthdrmyillg \ '<Co_ ,:.' ito increase power. QOP-046 steps '\'\ for.,1Jilytion Iisted"'feX't,fclr reference. \. 1 ( Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-0-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_1_ Page of Event
~~Description:~~
~~Time Position RO Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step load lace the feed re ulatin valves in automatic and hold l" ower at 30% for a flux map. i'E?-';:: 5.3 5.3.1 5.3.2 uncerraintks,~~
When less rhrn 1 % *
$/1 f J' challenged','";,, 1. 2 RW'u<nJcm nfe'ffii'IlrS a re flO! lIlu? .6Eietmlllatioll.. of prinlllv "7!.teJ" qtk..iutitr m*a:v* be made lTv mine the lesnhs of the d.w to 'd;,v a;:!i,,j,tie$ a-i'xl>:!Jrted 'with temper-a.7Jre:
~~ctu<e to ;:h.mge,s, reactl"" .. 1:t;l x,enO-lli aft!;r" load chang,,),.Q.&~~
~~III of the Plant ClUye book tOl lzcger Chatl:;'.!" ',t.e" load~~
2.
the apprc,XUllElE qU>iiutity of pmnary ',YIter required to ch.mge leaci1:iry by the nemed :nuo,mt b If le.,,,. thau 1",;, THL', mdepel,deuily 1:en:}' the rr-t-:tr'"n:t): OI prl:.'<lllry yr;.':;tel l)2q\ured ro clilnge leas6.1ty by the necsu-ed =l;nt ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.:_1_ Page of J.L Event
~~Description:~~
Time Position RO Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hOlclpower at 30% for a flux map. .... ." _{t" I}{lTIA:' .. S. .u.:D. VEx';-Applicant's Actions or Behavi()(
c. (1) (2) (3) pos.ition to' ,minirn;1z8 the in1.psp;;t 60 tbe k7 the VCT and ensl<ViTIg ,RC<3 h:vdrog'£orf I I D!LUT£ {Fia is only tvn-e.n ra'pJd }0iA1 c< rod I rnol.'l?f1:i*'nl requfre.s or-tlnen .. mmea¥ate, reactivity confro{ is tfe.S\Pi?d.
~~____________________ 1 3. PLKe ili>* Reactor klal;e1lp Selector S\vitch in Dll.UTE or . .:lJ.TDILt'TE.~~
4. PeJ+/-atm the foTicwiug:

a. b. c. d. 3 T1J:ru the ReS Iv1?.kellp COlln'Ol Switch to STA.'r{T.
~~Verify Ked START li:g.ht i" energized. II.~~
~~>eiectsr.~~
?;:vitch is lJITJJTE AJ\D FC",'**H4B. Blena,,! to V(1l valye d'Lle to flow. clevizuon. place FCV***l HE switch MOPEN*. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:. 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event No.: 1 Page -+/--of Event
~~Description:~~
Time Position RO INITl'A,SS rxn VEVJ:: Applicant's Actions or .¢/' ""po/" 5. 6. RCS, Mo1eup (onn*,::<l 51.\'::c1 to SHun. CAUTIONS U,',tl> differ significanrly fr<Dm expected vallles,. the Shift .Miinager shall lInfler dikl1icn cfthe ReS is permissibJe; h<Dwever.Giire shoukl be (Ire excessfIe reduooon in ReS boron oonGenml'lion does nOl oocur .
~~VlhiJe\iCr Leyel Controner LC-'-112A.~~
~~is in i\MNU.4L. continuous monitoring of lie r levells required.~~
~~b. }.<lallullly driYe the ru,maud on vcr Level C(mndl"'J.~~
~~LC-<-112.'\.,lo zen). c. Place VCT LB':eJ (outrone), to AVrO. 4 ( Appendix D Op-Test No.: .2009-301 Event~~
~~Description:~~
e Position RO Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario No.: l Event No.:_1_ Page 2 of--.1L Applicant's Actions or 5.3.2 (C om'd; B. 14. a;. AutomiJti', c is set to !he IlllYA tl!a!n¢ RCS _ .allan pel' Section. ill of lne Plant CUI'."\! Bock
. Bolic.&.1

id Flow C-troller.
~~BA M:!ll b. Primary\1iMer .!l.uto Setpoint. mC-'**114~~
~~17.~~
~~Wt Pr:ilmJy Flow FC-"*1l4A. 1S iuAUIO. 18. E:!l.>W'l! log n1:Iles specified til Subs<<tion 2.2 are re<:orcled.~~
~~19. Complete the QA Re..."Ol-G Page i'm' tbi.s :mbseelioIl~~
.. -----------------------. !iQI.S Changes to blowdown flow should be minimized dUflng main generator loading to 40 Ml-Ve. I If blowdown flow is needed to control SG level or ReS temperature, then blowdown flow I L mey be adjusted accordingly. I ----------------------- BOP 2. IF blo\vdown flow is establishecl THE.N maintain stahle. -* ..;;;;.;;;=;;;;;..;. 5 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _1_ Event
~~Description:~~
Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold at Time Position BOP 30% for a flux map. g/" J ./. ... Applicant's Actions or Ahgn the SDYA C0I10'011(:"r5 a., £0110\\,.,:
~~a. b. A difference of 2{{ psi~~
.......... \. \ )/./ .... , ..... " staggered setting. ... N1 as rrecessar)' to frorn a1/ tf1{ee getle r ator.s, J:"': yrJ1& Gteatn g\nerdto r with the !O\/EH" hid: .require additional fe-ed ,';, t , f' .... ' staggered tG:1JlISI tht' setpoil1t for SDT A controller in manual to 1000 pSlg. e", Use. the SDTA coutl'oller Uece%ary, .....1. in manual to make mmor adju,>unenh to -----------. T:he following
~~step may be pedormed as SOrA controllers are adjusted ar,d steam dens/afar leveis are siabdized~~
)1 /_,' s"<3e Perform the foHowing in preparation for &ynchronizing the main generator; '\C",,' . .,,:/ , ,v 1. Verify that the :\tlain Exciter DC Regulator Control is in the full lower positlon (approximatel): 10 percent Oll DC Regulator Control Inchcator}.

~~NOTE The generatot leads distance relay is susceptible to vibratio.n t:\i{th the generator field circu/t breaker open and rnay cause a generator~~

/oci<out and subsequent turbinE trip. I To prevent th,s occurrence., the paddle IS removea' fforn tl"?/s relay cii.}f,ing the Turbine I:'o:n:.:e ____ _ 6 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: _1_ Page of t***. Event
~~Description:~~
Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2. Increase Time Position BOP load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hOldFpowEir at 30% for a flux map. ff I (/ /,p '"\" NOTE /' "' " /./ '\1, The generator leads bac!wlJ distance relay is 'libra/Ion wdh the generator"l !"". fleid CI(Gwt breaker open and may cause a and sub§,equent turbme trip, '. [ "i I ocevent Ih"s occ;irrence, the padd!e,"s ,thIS relay Main Turbine 1 [\.f L:::1tartup and rs Jf!.sraUed prior to closing rile g fN 2;rator/i efa CffCUJt 9reaker:/' I ------------,:L d"'!.. -----r ------.;., "'::;".::,: .. .. '' -:;... -----"+ " "\., ' " '<>>.' ><:;., "'\ t , ""'," " Annunciator E 8/2, Gal FletO T may come ill and clear, \::., ,,,f""'" ./J'," ""0><.""",,,,,, j> 0":,, \, \ __ ,,/" j/ * )Altlsn the field (5 'clog/;lJ, the exc#er arnps and generator voflage may ",/ V8f)'?b'f.'is'/!t!d,.pn g'eI,eralor conditio . e .. cold from a refueling outage 0, reiatively hot / (r6m a SNO\ if 9XGiter amp,a or 9 , [DtOT voltage are not within Ihe specified band, 'I"'" J""Systert1 shall be co/}tacte:g for fLather gUidance. / " . , <</ ___ *. ___ !:\ ____________ . BOP ", '-so . '\ ,,/ .:. . \.;/ I'" 3 ",<:JoseJlit" t"XCHer fidd vent\! response on Control Room or local 1 \, than 0 and 90 amps. " ./ . ,,, .. ,,/ BOP Verify exciter field atl1meT<:>r responds \\'irll each adjustment Verify <'Ill three generator ,:oltmeters are indicating <:>qual yalues. 1\*,\ /' j , ,/" "\" /' y' Generator operation greater than 23,100 volts may damage the genera10r windings. CAUTION ""'",,,If Exciter field current is limited to 135 amps at no-load to ellsure acceptable gellerator voltage. BOP 6. RaIse generator yoltagf until yoltage i" between 21.5 KV and 22.5 KV 011 all three phil'SfS , .... *lib exciter field <Imps be1:\veen 100 amps and 130 amps on the generator 1;oltmeter" and exciter field ammeter. (The Control Room or local exciter field al1ulleter may be used) 7 ( ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: _1_ Page .JL of -.1.L Event
~~Description:~~
Time Position BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP RO Applicant's Actionc::. {)Ir 7. Place the Voltage Regulator Control Swity r -------- --NOTE -/J""" The requlato" rmsrrwtcl:meter ma'/ the spe-ed CJlar.'ges. . <<( due to rnin'or '\, \,. '-------------..;;:..-
~~8. Slov"ll' adiust the AC regulaTOr mismatch 111eter. 9. trot $vi/itch in regulator 10 Place the Generator pos.irion.~~
'tiiltZ;lll gEa';:,t.,. Bus '--'"'';"'''' " "'"",, "" the 11 t/' \. JnteC!loIL " '\ ,fff';' """" ing,./'the, .. Q6vemor Speed Changer .. rudicator i's slmvly in the FAST _f/ ,-,.:;:;;1"--; .. ;::('" Jt;;ij,ust the .. ,e g ulator ',/nl1ul1ng Yo1t}1ge.{ . IF set the mcommg voltage equal to the I L.. reactor p 5 and 7 percent, THEN wrify the following II very "lo\v rate of change: le)B'rS'ttre'stahi,e or ludi 4""'"",,,,, .. / Tayg (549" to SSIT) " 'NoTEs ---------. sync,'ironizrng is inoperable or undesimb{e the Shift Manager rnay authorize the -of l\4anuai Synchronizing lvlode-. . Auto A'fade. the turbine speed and generator are automatically adjosted, fj.. .. hich rnay require sel1era! rrunutes to the system logic. llf the auto sync1c:rOl)izlng' push.button is 179)6 for greater than '10 seconds. the auio-syncilro"lIzing logic wii! be disabled bef'Jre a second auto-synchrOnizing altern,ot at bf'ea-ker closure is ir!itiated. 8 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: 1 Page of Event
~~Description:~~
Time Position BOP BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior 553 Perform auto ,y'nchronization as foI10\V5: (";\J.'A if maml1ll mode 5.53.1 Place the Gen SynchfOl1izmg East Bus COlll.roi to 5.53.2 Verifv East Bm Breaker white light abov positi'on, mdicating synchronized cOl1diti 5.53.3 Veniv the Ina.dvertent syndi.roscope is LIT. .if Ea-st Bus Breaker fails to close, to .be notilled prior to of' if)*! voorOit"tator evaluate iso/a ted .be.fore Glosin 9 light above the \.. ..f / -.... j,/ ...... -----.,.,,// y' .;/J"fi . ;1;J Systetns ()oeratio-ns needs the\..lv1id' Bus' Breaker,. -since Sy,ptems OperatoJiPower tfJe\,Ngh illlesilo.uld be ii'dh th z piant to expedite. y\,\/-",-seconds, the reverse 11 o'clock position. depress and hold the er indicatlng lights to verify breaker closure load is less then IOM\V",. THEN increase load to y[\Ve nS111g the Generator Governor Speed "\ .. in the OFF position.
vfatch the flag Oll the East BllS Generator GCB Control S\vitch by taking the ,.,,,,itch to CLOSE V erify' the Inadvertent Protection Scheme Armed amber light above the s),uclu-oscope is OFF. 6. Verit")* Generator .tunps are within :2 pe-[cent on all three phases. ---------------------
NOTES To prev*snt excessrve ciJar"!ges in ..-3/G pressure and level the SDTA should be checked to venfy that the):-are responding prior to each addi:tl'ona.i load step. # }ncreas{na n7.f],it) ,Generator load shaH be .coo{clina.te-d with the operator Gon-troNing' stearn gerJetator levels '----------------- 9 ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I*),' Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _1_ Page --.1Q. of -.1L Event
~~Description:~~
Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold gcfwe): at 30% for a flux map.' "," Time Position RO / BOP BOP f Applicant's Actions or Behavior 5.55 Perform the following to mrbine load: _________ ....:.v _ .. .L ____ -. 1\,./: NOTE ./ ,J /' >'" The fnrnw'nry '-'fen i1:' DeriOtmed b v it-ie ... to,.r,1tro.i.lilf.G:./ steS'rn q,enerato( leve!s , Iv I. '(w' ,.) * . .. , .* 'l x"-,of _ -and orestiures. \, .... ______________ _______ . 5.55.2 .. -!'. "', '" IT the Steam DU'lllP"'to.",Atmosphere (SDJA)";yalve& are being used. THE:\" perform the\fo gSteP5 until all
~~,:alves are closed and the T 3yg -T ref delt.:; T lS*1>Y1t.~~
~~tband'pt:9::'lded by the{,J S.> \. '" "-('" .....***. '*, ':\'.'~~
~~1. Verify the~~
';11e SDTA ,.'alves: as ;;team is df1'lv,**u off to tli'1. turbiuiJ;!' /<"". . *.* ," ; " ./ 4' ....f 2./ .. dos,e the steam flow with the /' $QJA in atltomati<< and make minor adjnstme-nt, to Ta"g, \ / iri . ,1""' ---+ ------------ .. ' ;1".' /' l .* .. \"+\1 1 :':"" 'vlihen tl7ere sl,ou,'d be a balance between the , \. rnain tli:',j:'1* steanj usage vlith /ittle pert1.ltbatton in n1Clin I """ sft i{et1r) h>?tije.r pre-ssure"'"a:;;')trfNzL creased. If. >>"1:{ie ,CJ-f';,TA can be verified to be closfng by abserv,i,ng rne/n stearn header as the rnain generator is }oaded, ".,i"*""**'*'* ,./), ........ ,,"" .. '" "'" ..... ",I
~~The~~
'c?!mt'OJier set/,'ngs may be ad/us ted In ISmail increments as necessary to f", '{TIall7tain levels. t. ,not be necessary to close the S[)TA j/alve in rnanual as a pre--ernpilv'*- action 1 the lna,;n generator OUflJut breaker is closed. " 11 "'\<< \ '**'i. -"""S-, -l-le-a-c-le-.l-* -p-r-e-s-sl-lf-e-\-,,-'h-i-le-*-l-o-a-c-h-n-g-. -th-e-n-la-j-n-g-e-n-e:-.r-a-to-l-*-t-o-----jl // maintain a balance between the SDTA valves dosing and the steam bemg BOP BOP -,' used to increase-load. 4. ",lIE?\, "team generator levels and pressure'> stabilizI;" follO\ving a load mereage, notify the operator comwUmg: the main gl;"ne:rator to mereage load by 5 to 10 MWe. S. Continue monltormg and controlling in thl;" steps above until Step 6 belmv 1S completed. 10 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.:_1_Page of Event
~~Description:~~
Time Position BOP Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold p6WE;); at 30% for a flux map'f'/ .",c/" r The SDT.A valvBs should be closed by 6. \VHE::'\" the SDIA \'alve"in ant'.: vah-e In ll1alllli"\l is clo<,ed and Tavg. / BOP 7 iI. (1) (2) b. aI,"e .. t .. Y-3-16G7. is CLOSED. A,tl11diipllere ValYe, CV-3-1608. is CLOSED. e following to align the steam dump to condenser for AUTO: Steam Dump to Condenser Control switch in the ON position. l\'iomentarily place the :VIocle Selector switch to RESET Place the Mode Sel.ector Switch to AUTO. CAUTIONS
Communication betweell the Reactor Operators on the control board is critical during plant startup. ROs mtlst inform each other of imponam parameter changes such as reactor and turbine power, S/G leve/stand changes in blowdown flow. ,. Intermediate Range to Power Range overlap is required prior to blocking tile fl1termediate Range Trip alld the Power Range LO Range Trip. ,. Block of the Intermediate Range Trip and tfle Power Range to Range Trip is required prior to increasing power greater than 20 percent. 11
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: 1 Page..J1.. of Event~~
~~Description:~~
Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2. Incr:ease Time load lace the feed re ulatin valves in automatic and hold welt at 30% for a flux map. Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior/ R) 55? Perform the following to slowly increase reactor power: 5.57.1 "\VHE-" $i(T levels are stable. THE-" conrYIl I!lCrellSe chin/lOll using O-OP-046, CVcs-::-.aplon.JsonCeIltfaTjol1 withdrawing control rods. ///"[4'/ // 5.57.2 :v[onitor and adjust SiG levels it),AesP91'l'iie to ri.ing rei;reib;; power and turbine load. ..... <; /s \, / RO 5SS Power level is greater than orm the foHowing: 5.58.1 Verify PO\VER ABOv'E P-IO ,Iatns li;h ON. \" 5.58.2 Verify AT Po\\1?R"fRiPS BLOCKED stahght on,JlPA goes Off. " 5.58.3 Pres;, A;\D holA,fo Push to Block pll\h 5 . .58.4 Verify' 25% INTE OCKED ,latus lIght on VPA is ON. .!.ll:.t'1.1:ustrv Lab that RCS sampling is reqmred by Technical Specification 3A.8, ete Section 5.0 of 3-0p-On. ::Vlain Steam System. e Feedwater Pump Turbme Runback switch on 3C01 is in DEFEAT. 5'40.3 Commence purging the ?vISR tube using 3-0p-On. L MOisture Separator I Reheater<;. tel BOP may direct field actions of J.OP-072 and 3-0P-072.1 to ,', be completed. CAUTION Prior to opening the feedwarer isolation MOVs, evaluate for leak-by, 12 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:l Event No.:_1 __ Page of--.1L Event
~~Description:~~
II TnYle Position BOP SUR 5.61 WBElIi is between 10 and 20%, TBElIi sta following to place the FRVs ill antoma.tic:--" I .. 5.61.1 En'3ul'e open the Feedwater Isolation val F\V I .. ol Sun Geu 3A, MOV-3-I al the discretion ' I I ------_. 'IS to automatic as follows: ve is being automatically controlled. tef control valves are ill AUTO: 7-3-498 Verify the F\VBypass Valves are CLOSED: .. FCV-3-479 .. FCV-3-489 .. FCV-3-499 EVENT 1 a: Once feed regulating valves are placed in automatic, call in as a turbine bldg. NSO and report that the B AFWP governor has an oil leak (oil leak entered at setup). 13 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event Page _1_ of _1_ Event
~~Description:~~
Time Position BOP US Once feed re ulatin valves are laced in automatic that the B AFWP governor has an oil leak. Applicant's Actions or Behavior Relays report from NSO of oil leak on B AFWP Declares B AFWP out of service Determines TS 3.7.1.2 action statem
Verify two operable indepen

Fix B AFWP in 30 days Directs wee to have M Ie 3.7-3 and associated t auxiliary feedwater trains inoperable, either restore the within 72 hours, or place the affected unit(s) in at least o s* and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. er 'ains inoperable, within 2 hours either restore both trains one train to an OPERABLE status and follow ACTION , If neither train can be restored to an OPERABLE status of both standby feed-water pumps and place the affected ) in at least HO Y within the next 6 hours' and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the ing 6 hours. Otherwise, initiate corrective action to restore at leas! one auxiliary feedwoler o an OPERABLE status as soon as possible and follow ACTION statement 1 above for the o ,r train. gle aUXiliary (eedwater pump inoperable, within 4 110urs, verify OPERABILITY of two t auxil11lfY (eedwaler trains, or (ollow ACTION statements 1 or 2 above as applicable, alion of the OPERABILITY o( two independent auxiliary (eerJwater tralns. restore the auxilimy feedwater pump to an OPERABLE status within 30 days, Of place the operating unit(s) in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 Ilours' and in HOT SHUTDOWN WRhin the following 6 hours. The provisions of Specification 3.0A are not applicable during tim 30 day period for the inoperable aUXiliary feedwaler pump. Note: following T.S. reference, trigger event 2-3A TPCWP BEARING FAILURE. 14 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:. 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:-.L Page_1_of Time Position RO Recognizes/reports annunciator 1-5/1, 5/2 US Directs response per 3-0NOP-008 I BOP 3

Mcm.itoring Main G changed due to the frydrogen is gradient increases. (R Turbine Plant .cooling!
~~Waler Pumps -AT LEAST ONE RUNNING Check Turbine Pbnt Cooling l+eac!\!l'T PrE'Ssure~~
~~151'4. TPCW HI TEMPILC PRESS!!Q.I UT 15 ------a. Determin>e a:ffe¢tec lurtine p;arrt coolmg water pump. -I D. Check if standby turbine piant cooling water pump .... do-slanec.~~
!E standby turbine plant cooling water pump did ootauto-start a!:m offsite pow& is available. start slallldi:ly turbine pian! oooiling Wi3iter pump. c.. StO!P affecled turbine plan! cooling water pwnp. Perform loMowing:
~~a. .I.E. cifsite power is available. start one t1Jrain>e plant oooling watEr P"..Imp. b. If nertnef rural"" piant cooling Wa1<lr pump c.>n be started, !!:!§!.:!~~
manually tnp reactor turbine. !£. TPCV"r head& press'..Ife is less Ih<lfl 75 psig. start a second TPCW pump. Appendix 0 Op-Test No.:. 2009-301 Time Position BOP 4 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Scenario No.: Event No.:..L Choeck Proper intake C<Xlling Waler Lineup To Turbine Plant Cooling Water Heat Ex:cnangers
~~a. Check Safely Injeclioo 0'1 Unit 3 -TERMINATED b Check both rcw To ,PCW Heat vailies -OPEN~~
POI/-3-4B82

POV-3-4B83 rator to klcaily l'I1oni1or lurbiil'le water s.ufge tank le'JeiJ Check Cooling To Turbine Plant CooI!ing Waia Heiit Exchan9fli!<<"s Check alarm I :ii4 *. TPCW HI TEMPflO PRESS-OFF b Locally cl1ecl! Turbine Plant Cooling Water &wi)'
~~T!-3-1432-LESS 11~~
~~o. Locally checl! Turbine Plam Cooling Willier Sl!pIlly HeOOer Te!'rll'EfatiJrE'.~~
~~TI-3-1432-STABLE OR DECREASIWG 16 POV-3-4882 POJ-3-4883~~
3) .IE. neither I'CW To TPCW Heal valve oan be opened. l'I1.11ooaMy trip reactor .8W:L main turbine. a. Go 10 Step 12. DirEd operalDr to loca!1y lhe IOlkming:

1. Open ,PCW Hx CanDled lew Oullei' \laiNe, 3-50-401 necessary to maintain Turbine Plant Cooling VI'atel' &!wI)' Keader lesslhain 110<F. 2. Vedy prop!!!' hs<ai excl!anger 3. start all ICW Pwnps using :'l-OP-019, 1t.'TAKE COOLIOO WATER SYSTEM Appendix 0 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 n BOP 13 BOP 14 BOP 15 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Scenario No.:l Event Applicant's nr locaHy Verify T!lirbine Plant Coofing Water Basket Strainer . .1J> -lESS THAN 1.5 PSID
DPI*3-1400

DPI-3-1401 Che¢k A.larrn F Gt5<. GEN RTD HI-Hl TEMP -OFF Check The FoUowiJng i3eneralw AJarms -OFF "

E GEN EXCIT 17 d. lE Ben. r Excilef 65 deg (R.J47 pt ,5 Of 6), vip liIe reatU and Iu.!'\:me l!tW. periOrrn 'J..t'OP-E-O.
REACTOR TRIP 00 SAFETf iNJECTIOIt llli-_ continuing wil!1 this procedure. eL lE neceSi5ary. sIlfJldown the unit a;; directed by Shift Mar;ager using me of liIe fu::>b/ing: , l-GOP-103. POVifER OPERATION TO HOT STANDBY. QB. , 3-ONOP-tOO. FAST LOAD REDUCTION. QB. , Vlanuady trip reacior and main iurb!r,e. !. IF any seal c4 system cooler is wetheating. Jl!§!! perit,rm lhe followmg: t) rurbine has been irippeci. THEI4 with .car£0ii7oxide uscl'lg l-OP-OOO. GAS EVOLUTIONS IN THE MAiN GENERA TOO. 2) WHEN has been from generator. THEN shutdmm seal oil system TURBINE GENERATOR' SEAL OIL SYSTEM. Appendix D Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Time Position BOP 16 BOP 17 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario No.:l Event No.:--L Page ..1... of -+/--Applicant's Actions or B Check The Following f'umpAiillT1ls -OFF
0 514. S.GFP A. MOTOR aRG HI TEMP a ..

l) ti4. SGFP a MOTOR aRG HI TEMP

l) SiS. HDP A MOTOR BRG HI TEMP

I) Si5. HOP Ei MOTOR BRG HI TEMP

D COND PUMP /4, MOTOR HI TEMP

F 61'1. COl'll) PVMP C TEM" Check Temperature Of COnlJronents Sllflpli1!<l1liy Tur'bfne Plant Cooling Water -STABLE OR DECREASING

TUrD""e lube od coolers

Exdter air ooclers 18 Reduce \IN <:tad :as dllrECted by Shill Manager 10 prevent component damage using: ,
POWF..R OPERATION TO HOT STANDBY., Q!! FAST lOAD REDOCTIOft Q!! , MaooaUy lrip reactor am main wrbme. 3) Continue E!lf<<ts normal system lineup. me fObling: a. Verify prope;-5IJpply <lnd rerum valve m affected compOOO!11{s} using 3*oP.OIJ8, TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEM b .IE ocmponem has auioW!<lb; marMaB)' temperarur& rontrd valw.e.wl. COOIIrol bypass valve as necessary 10 mairrtain OOi'ffiill OO"'¢Ol1ent tanperalUres.
~~c. Vern affeded cM1ponenll;sj uSn", 2.-OP-OOO, TURBINE PlANT CaOUNG WATER SYSTEM. d. JE 1J.Jrbine the oil O!i!let.~~
~~incma .. es tc ll'r'eilter ihm i?:,<F, I.l:IaI. establish emergenOji oooling 10 klbl! oil coolers \.i'5ing ATIACHMSIIT~~
1.
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: Page ...L of Position BOP Recognizes I reports failure of FT-3-487 as indicated by: FI-3-487 indication on VPA FCV-3-488 closed in automatic 3B feed I steam flow BOP Takes manual control of US BOP program Step ion failure may oocur in such a manner as to cause a particular loop to deviate from the actual monitored parameter by either a finite nt. Such a deviation may be in a direction such that a reactor ty related trip function may not occur on that instrument loop, even point for the trip function has been reached by the actual parameter. _____________________ 1 Verify instrument loop failure by comparison to adjacent loops and known plant parameters and conditions. 5.2 Verify no off-normal conditions exist on the adjacent channels which are to remain in service. 19 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:, 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event No.: 3 Event
~~Description:~~
3B slg controlling feed flow transmitter FT-3-487 fails high FRV FCV-3-488 to fail closed. Manual 0 erator action is re ireq"to control 3B slg level and avoid a reactor trip. The crew respo ds".per 3-Time Position BOP BOP US ONOP-049.1. .' Applicant's Actions or Step /' 5.3 Verify applicable control transfer which eliminates the failed loop. / /' ' _ .:*i'" Note: transfers controllirg FW f/oVv"cha'Qneltor 3.,/iJ SG to channel IV. Steam flow may also be tran'S(f!rr"bcJ(' /i' S te p " >"\"",. -"<c. " '*">:0"'::;,:____ 5.4 IF a control in manu'aJ"cohtcol due to the failure, THEN verif t C{:jR I fuhsiion is returRed 5.5 Refer to ., ., ... _. ___ . ____ rqble."'h" if .,--\ __ " '\ 'of"" ,ermines T.S. 3..3.:,:1 fU{1'Ction 12 applies. "'\, \ --------------------11 T6p
a.

o. T 2*1Qr;' \i Closv:"* ::
~~g-=r, lev-.:i ;;,;nd :: EM INSTRUMENTATION M1Nl\H)M CHANNELS CHANNELS TO TRIP CIFERA.9U:~~
~~=.tl"';-"" gl?-'1 h:ve*: c-oir-1 stt'fL :;len ",:,.;.;;~~
~~iF':C "2 flow fk:W'~~
f) fh

:'N if: e*c.cr g'er: ;*.,-,jsmatt-1 ir st"""L gel')
>;)r 2 +JOl}S >:::IP bc-th, b",'s'$,:e.s .. roMp R.GP'S:*"" ,l,ow' r; sa:':f<& s1m. go:':) 2,'bvs A,?PUCASLE MOD:=S 1,2 12 .ACTION e -'Nith be nvrnber Cif OPERA8LE charme';s one less thin the Total Nurn,ber of Channels. STARTUP 31"4'0' POWER OPERATION may proce",d until perfonTlance -of the next reo\lired ANALCH3 CH.4N"lEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable oharme! is placed in the tripped ocm:litklnwithin {I hr.;I)rs. 20 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page of Event
~~Description:~~
3B s/g controlling feed flow transmitter FT-3-487 fails high causins:13B> FRV (FCV-3-488 to fail closed). Manual operator action is reqldfredltb control 3B sl level and avoid a reactor tri . The crew res pnds / r 3 Time Position BOP ONOP-049.1. 5.11 IF any other channel has L1iled, THEN failed'channel. --5,11.1 IT plant conditions are such tlla channel may be hipped v{itho perfor11l the follo\\ing:
~~1. Place all bistable Attachment 4,~~
Steam Generator B RefOwgs 5610*T*L1, Sh HI; 6610*T*D-17 Maxpllviation As t,,;other \ .. S Power <: 10%, MAX DEV 7.0 x 10b IbfHR Power!; 50%, MAX DEV 6.0 x 1 Ib!HR ><: Power s: 70%, MAX DEV 4.0)( Ib/HR Yo -< POWii!f 101)%. MAX DEV 3.0 x Il;IlHR ANNUNCIATOR FUNC* TION LOGIC AFFECTED li2 <)n S.iG low (lOC,c) P ',';'ittl 1-'2 !OW' feeo\','<'lIH l'!ow 1b!I"lf <<;I*r11n (lC'N) on sap:>:, S.:G SG B .S TE,\I*,.j
~~. FEED C 3G 8 FEED C~~
De ..... , lR,es 8S-3-48881, 8S-3-48882, and 8S-3-488C need to \\ be 0\ keys and opens protection rack 18 T' s ,tistables BS-3-488B1, BS-3-488B2 & BS-3-488C RO ,,//Checks correct bistable status light energized in response to tripping '\./ bistables (FC488B1). BOP Checks correct annunciators on in response to tripping bistables (C4/2 & C-5/2). ),15 IF JllV Feechxater Control Valve is in l\f<lllUal control due to this failure. THE:\, load eliIWe) should be maintained as steady as possible until all FeechvRter Control Valves are restored to Automatic conh*o!. 21 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: ---.L Page -+/-.. of Time Position BOP BOP ...--------_:. I v/hic:h is rernove,j frOin to cOlnply S,Dec actio.n reqlurelnents (e,g .. uJ-operable prGtectlOn/s 7strurnentatft>n) returned' to service In ,order to dernonstr'3te its t}petabili( perabilit':l/bf eqa!prnent under adrnin/strative controls per Tech Spec 3. O. 6. . thl:/" tlrne,;;;;'must be Jirnited to that required for teDting or to de!1lonstrate G./Jerabiiity --fttherJt5,:eventativ-e or COffective --, rnaintenance fnay be petfbrrned under Tech .Spec 6. '-' mclude an entry III the or LAN Pi" 1 C adtninisttative controls ,d; such as Unit Nan I or INork instrucliof1s. or O-A Bases ContnJl Prograrn, eeh Spec 3.0 6. Other e.ntries., test procecitues eehmca! Specification '\, ,....,------ 22 _____ 1 immeclimelv. THE:\, verify Subsection 5.11 bistable s\vitch that placed in the tripped Equipmellt Clearance Orders Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page _1_ of ..L II 'Ti"""e' I Position BOP RO US Recognizes/reports lowering generator M & CV-3-1608 failed open as evident by: * *
Steam noise present *

CV-3-1608 failure, directs local isolation of CV-3-1608 N te: O*ADM*200 provides guidance to use the secondary plant to estore Tave to Tref. Operators shouldperlorm actions necessary to stabilize the unit. 23 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event Page L of L Time Position BOP Consistent with O-AOM-200 section 5.4.3 ui US secondary pant transient:
~~1. Reduces turbine load to match av = Tref 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Relays report from with' I . n valve cl e -~~
v ve leaking by -.. ,* investigate CV-3-1608 "". __ ....,ution tag generated for CV-3-1608 in manual in stabilization of unit, trigger EVENT 5 -EXCITER ER TPCW BLOCKAGE. 24 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:l Page _1_ of l Event
~~Description:~~
Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially blocked r in a high air temperature condition. The crew responds per 3-A Time Position for annunciator E-9/4. The crew manually trips the reactor wh e ter hot gas temperature exceeds 90°C and performs the actions of 0 -E-O. Once the reactor is tripped, the switchyard relays out. fails to automatically load 3B 4kv bus due to a bus faillli,;e. EDG fails to start and can not be manually starte . BOP Recognizes I reports annunciator RO Reads actions for 3-ARP-097.CR for an BOP Performs actions as read by RO 1. Verifies alarm usin r 2. Monitors exciter air t 3. 3-3 AR grid voltage M R=O, maintain grid voltage 232 kV . g 3-0NOP-100 until hot air temp < ir temp> 90°C & no expectation of fast recO\ery reactor trip crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O. 25 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: 2.. Page L of L Event
~~Description:~~
Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially blocke in a high air temperature condition. The crew responds per 3-Time Position RO for annunciator E-9/4. The crew manually trips the reactor en xciter hot gas temperature exceeds 90°C and performs the actions 3-P--0. Once the reactor is tripped, the switchyard relays out. fails to automatically load 3B 4kv bus due to a bu EDG fails to start and can not be manually sta a. I _________ 1
~~MSR Purge Steam VaivEfs C. ChEi'Ck Mid and East GeSs -OPEN {Normally ao secotxt delay) 26 ok Monitor Cri1ica1 Safety Funcfums usil1Q 3-EOP-F..Q, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION S7ATUSTREES.~~
Il. Go to 3-EOP-FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERA TlON! AT'NS. Step' 1. a. Manually Irip!urbine. .!E unable to verity turbine trip, I.!:Lei cloSE! rmlm steamM1e isc!ation 3'nd bypas!o valves .. b Manually close valves. IF any vaht'" eM l:WI be dosed. Il£J!li clOs-e main isolaool'l and valves. c. Melll.tally open breakers, Jf breakers do !iQ! open,.ll!.5!! actuate EMERGENCY GEN. 8KR TRIP SWITCH for the affected brea*er(s) . c Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:l Event No.: l Page of Event
~~Description:~~
Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially blocked r ulting Time Position BOP in a high air temperature condition. The crew responds per 3-A 9. R for annunciator E-914. The crew manually trips the reactor w gas temperature exceeds 90°C and performs the actions of Once the reactor is tripped, the switchyard relays out. D ta but fails to automatically load 3B 4kv bus due to a bus g fail e. EDG fails to start and can not be manually starte 3 Vecrify i"o1.ver To EmergeftOy 4 KV Buses a Cl1eck lhe SA and3B 4 KV buses -MAlNTAiNAT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED 27 c. f'erflNm the followi1"1!):
~~1) IF of :aD 4 KV b'i.<ls NOT PresE!'Ilt~~
!!:!5!! pe'(fofm th;;;;Fowillig: <iI) Verify 3C CCW BREAKER OPEN. bl Verify 3C ICW pump -BREAKER OPEN. c) Op.e'(ate bus stlppl)' ineakers to resmre power. Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 2-Page...+/-. of L Event
~~Description:~~
Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially blocke res lting Time Position RO in a high air temperature condition. The crew responds per 3-7.CR for annunciator E-9/4. The crew manually trips the reactor en xc iter hot gas temperature exceeds 90°C and performs the actions 3-P--0. Once the reactor is tripped, the switchyard relays out. B s fails to automatically load 3B 4kv bus due to a bu ing failure. A EDG fails to start and can not be manually sta 4 Applicant's A Check If S I 15 Actuated , 51 .4rmunos,IYS* ANY ON
Safeguards equipm STARTED , High steam fk>w with low SIG oresswe

014 psig OR low :"avg (543 F) -* ReS subooQling based 00 00l'1< exit TCs* LESS TH.A.N 30<Fl210'FJ

PRZ ievel

CAN NOr BE !'MINT AlNED GREATER THAN 12%{t<Ql%,]
~~b. If. 51 is required,.~~
~~r.t!.5!! manuaHy* actuate 51 ar.d containn)e;-.llsclatioo pha$!l A 8!iQ go to~~
~~5. c. !f 51 is!:!Q! requk"ed.~~
I!::!5!:! perioon the following: 1 j t.ilMilQr Criiical safely FunClions using 3-EOp*F-1J. CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES, 2} Go to 3-EOP-ES<U, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE. Step 1. Note: following verification SI not required, trigger EVENT 6 -3AB11 STUCK CLOSED, then trigger EVENT 6 -LOSS OF SWITCHYARD. Note: crew will transition back to 3-EOP-E-O step 1. 28 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: .2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event Page 2 of Event
~~Description:~~
Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially blocke Ime Position RO BOP in a high air temperature condition. The crew responds per 3-,.."".--1,.-. for annunciator E-9/4. The crew manually trips the reactor gas temperature exceeds 90°C and performs the actions 3-Once the reactor is tripped, the switchyard relays out B G fails to automatically load 3B 4kv bus due to a b EDG fails to start and can not be manually st d. 1 Verify Reactor Trip
~~Roeacoror~~
!no and OPEN iI. Manually trip turbine . .!f.lUnable io verify turbinoe trip, close main steamlline isalatioo and bypass vafves. b. 'Manually dose valves. .!f. any valvoe oan ti&iI be closed. close main s>ieamline isolamn and bypass: valves. c. Manuany open breaker&. If. do !:!Q! open . .rt!E!'! actuate EMERG ENCY GEN. BKR TRiP S\'IlITCH for Ihe aifec1ai breaker(sj. te' all valves were previously verified closed 29 ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: Page of L ,.,\. Event
~~Description:~~
Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially in a high air temperature condition. The crew responds per for annunciator E-9/4. The crew manually trips the ()(citer hot gas temperature exceeds 90°C and performs the actions Once the reactor is tripped, the switchyard relays out.'G sttl[1s'h+!t fails to automatically load 3B 4kv bus due to a bUSliS; mg failure. 3A' Time Position BOP /' EDG fails to start and can not be manually startt 3 Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses a Che*ck lhe 3*.A. a.no -3:3 4 <V bus*;?s -ASJ;<51'l!fr ... l;:t-l ERGIZE D 4 K\/ bu'S is ::. A:ter(tD1 tD ernergency start :h-B 3 bu's diesE'4 gene:rator Perrenn the following:
~~1) IF lockou! of 3D 4 KV bus NOT Presem . .!.!:!.5.!i OerfD[m th;fuiio',,,;ng Zi} \/e-rify 3:C GC\N' BREAKER OPEN. b }~~
ac lC-ltV pump -BREAKER OPEN. c) Opecraie bus selpply bre*akers to start of 3A EDG but EDG has start . 38 EDG running with output brfBker open. E;:rmines neither 4KV bus is energized and transitions to A-O.O Loss of all AC step 1. 30 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: Page _1_ of Event
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0. MOV-3-1405 fails to op with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to SUPR Time Position Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3 P breaker 3AB 11 which has a blown control power fuse a opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the 0 Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 38 EDG to 4kV bus. Transition is made to steam leak. RO Directs performance of _ .. _----* I f)
~~I RO 1 C. Mid and East GCBs -OPEN lNe<mally 30 ..~~
d"lay) 31 _____ 1 ... Manually lrip (urohe. IE ruJbin-e wW!::!QI idp, clOSE! main steoamlin& byp.ass '1&1* ... 90.5. b. Manually etose yal .... es, IF ar=y valVe can .wll be cklsed .. mair 'Steam ;s.ctatiC<'!"'! and bypass vatll*. c. <3:ppC"leimately one, mirnJte has "lapsed. THEN ... erify Mid and E"",t GC8-. -OPEN--1) IE br<>al<ers do !QI op<>n,l!:!§!:!, actu.aw EMERGENCY GEN. BI'R TRIP SWITCH f<>rthe _cted br<!01i<er(s). 2} !E. breaker posi!ion ind@oaaion is!:!Q! .. _",;1_ aw:! !U!<bine $peed is w;u: de-creasi>>g. THEN dIlred Turbi"" Opemtorto the following:: a} Obtam ke-'j 't7trom Shift Manager key
~~0) Lacamy trip Mid and East GeSs from 'tbe swrtch)'srd. " BW33~~
~~swas~~
~~( ( Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event Page L of-.1L Event~~
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to with B AFWP wi.th an oil leak C AF,,!P to suppl¥.i15ott;:l"Units. Manual bus stripping IS performed with the exception of 3B,,:rPCWP /' "' .... Time Position RO BOP breaker 3AB11 which has a control fuse aI}GJ.caJ;), opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus IS repowered via the Sj:30 t);e"'frO(ll uf\lJ 4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EOG to 3f9\.4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due effects of the'steah;) leak. '\..\ .. 3 Check If ReS Is Isolated CLOSED """" '\, ZL !E.,bcih units rEqUire AFW, pEITOm' *. the following.:
~~2) I)se 3; se-q>oir;t of 27"0 g::ptl1 required A.F'N 110w instead of the 345 QP-t?""~~
in st'2PS ll:!:!.Q. P"o.:",dures. n Verity A.F'N pump run!"\ing !E AFW pvrnp .tJ.QI. w!"\n *'1g, .I!:i5.!:! ITt,,"',I'?'!I')' apen st'2;3Xn valv>?S. 2) \leri:fy p n:<per aEgnmerij cf A.FVsI valves . .If aPignrnent NOT proper. I!:i5.!::!. n1anuahy align v.3lves *35 nE-oeSS8I'1' 10 establish proper hnE'Up. 3:, !E., AF{,! *:*an !!!2I be established, I!:i5.!::!. restore .AFW using ,';,UX1LlARY FEEDWATER ,sYST EM t.,,ol..LFUNCTION ',vhAe cCn1inuI'1g Step .5. Note: MOV-3*1405 fails to open. BOP Establishes 270 gpm AFW 32 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:l Event No.: l Page of Event
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to op with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to suppl Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B Time Position breaker 3AB 11 which has a blown control power fuse a c n opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the O' fr Then 3AB 11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to r bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due t leak. ., If an 51 signa! exi.st.s O'n15ure>es!oratrol'l of equipment 0 n the 4K\/ Bu .. d. Verify required safeguards OPERATING
~~e. Check if 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES being FOR INFORMATiON ONt Y pritw \0 entering 3-EOP-ECA-OJJ,lOSS OF ALL AC POWER ___________~~
1 C. Go to Step B. d. Manually starl equipment as. requiired. e, Implemeni FRPsas required, unfess this was diireotty entered from ol.lisme lhe EOP re1Work Note: Step 5.c RNO transitbns to step 6. Attachments 1 and 2 listed next for reference. 33 ( Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:l Page 4_ of {/\. Event
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to Time Position BOP opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the 9 .. BOt,.te"frbql unit 4. Then 3AB 11 is locally opened allowing 3B EOG to 3l.'3AkV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due effects of the'steaMJ leak.> '\ 1 . .IE. lA,4KV :7JS is de-ene. BL3¢tO:!Jt T;;? Bus sA. 3,11.[1[11, is dosed, IIifI:i perfo!Tf\ the fol!owhg: .!E Statio" Blackout are.3ker, .3AD07, . .I.tilli p,-"fcm, followrng: Direct UnA :4 Re->l_dCr Cperator to -open 8laclout lkeakec 4AD-C7 . . J. .IE. iorntake C.:dingWatsr PUf'lP .3l::, 3A005, 2B. for Ccmponert. Cooling 'Na1er Fum; ?C, 3.A,D(}4, C<ln liQl be opened,.JHlJi Fe'2der To 4lf.V 80S 3D. j 1. . .&lIl Suppty From 4KV-8us 3A, 31<.D01. Note: Verifies 3A 4KV bus stripped 34 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page 5_ of Event
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to op with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP tosuppl ot Time Position BOP Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B C P breaker 3AB 11 which has a blown control power fuse an ca n be opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the S fb u't 4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EOG to 3 3 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due t effects of the te leak. 2. ro 4KV Bus 3&.3,1\.000, is .I!::!§!v£fity Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D ... lAS Hr. is open. Bus 3&. *2,1\.000, is dosed., Il;;IUi perloon tile fclkllorl1G: a !E StatlOO Bladwut 3,o!.,OO7, is clO5'!!d, lli5!:i perfufm the fullow:ng: Open Breaker. 3AOO7. Unit 4 Reat:Wr Oper:artcrtoopen Statioo: 4ADDi'. b. \!es#y brwer fnr intake Cooling Water Pwmp 3C,3AQ05, t!> open. c. Vf:rify bfWer lor Comporu;m Cooling Wa1er Pump 3C. 3A004, <5 open. d. Jf breaKer fur 'ntaka Cooiing Water Pump 3C, 3AtJ05. ,!;lB.bre:aker lOr Componem Cooling Wa1efI Pump 3(;, 3AD05, can NOT be opened. THEN Feeder To 4iW &is 30. 3,0\819, AND Suppiy From 4KV-8us 3B, 3AD"'OO:' --Note: 3B 4KV bus not stripped due to breaker 3AB11 closed 35 ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event No.: Page of JiL Event
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to OPyrla9d with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to suppl)(f60tlit/units. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B"A"PqX/P breaker 3AB 11 which has a blown control power fuse not\pe opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the ""tje from 4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due effects of leak. ,4' '\,,'" Time Position BOP 6 BOP 7 Verify The A And B 4KV 8iUS lockout Relays -RESET , b. ReE-Et affected
~~tHesel \:;c,KOJt~~
e','3),. c 1£ fleithercd;o!J'. relay C<ln bE reset. THEN gD 10 SteD 10. '%, N'0:{7: tJ6ca/ly for 3A EDG. "yf stat! 3A diesel frcrn Hoo:r1 Rapid siart b \/i2nfy 3,4, 4KV bus s!ripphg . "'.TTACHMENT 1 -COMPLETED d \-tanwaHy SjH'-;,chronixe -3:A -e:nergency ,",.*,,,1 gJ?I1i.H"lcr to ?,4.?KV bus t.. HI" any load car; NOT be cliscor11ectJ?d '1iD'TI 3A 4KV bws:-TREN go Step 0 . r.:l. Loc<liiy sym:hronizr-311 ema'd*f1oy ci'2',el ge:ne-fa<i.or to bus--using 3-0NOP-023.2, EMERGENCY OiESEl GENER"'.TOR. FAILURE, while oont1nung I'ith StBC' 9. Note: NSO reports failure of the EDG turbocharger 36 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:l Page 7_ of.13L Event
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C APWP to supplx:/l:5otl)/units. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse an;tcan not, be opened from ,!PA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the 4. Then 3AB 11 IS locally opened allowing 3B EDG to bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 effects of leak./fir.I,I Time Position BOP 9 Try To The B .tKV BitS From 38 Emergency Dtese! Gen'!;'r"tor J'!'i-b. IF any bac can NOT be diso:mneo;ecl 1rof)1.38 4KV buS,"1'FlEN go 10 SteD 1 G LozaHy synchronrze 38-:Bmerge-nc:y to -3B 4KV !'f,J,s !Jsiroq 2-{)NOP-,J,n.::, EMERGENCY DIES.EL GE1<ERATOR FAILURE. while conjjnuing with Step 10. I .. i***-.... ***,* ... ,.. 3AB11 breaker preventing completion of bus . \',\stripp "ng, ontinues to step 10. \ \ '?j ! ./ / .f 37 c c Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: l Page of .1L Event
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to op with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP tosuppl ot Time Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B C P breaker 3AB 11 which has a blown control power fuse an can n be opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the S it 4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to r n gize 3 3 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due t effects of the te leak. Position Applicant's BOP 10 a, arm step in effect 2)WH 'ls to file 3A or '38'4RV' ixIs, mw ihe CA1.JIDNS prior to 32 aM go to Sbop E2 to ,peifofm I1!CCYe!y <\COOns. 3) Observe plicrID Step 11 .ElWl oontiiMJe with Step 11. b. Manually as
c.
FRPs as required. unless 'W;is procedure was from ouiside 'the E:OP networi; teo BOP use 3-0NOP-004.2 and 3-0NOP-004.3 to restore ower to the 4KV buses. Both are listed at the end of the cenario for reference. 3-0NOP-004.2 will be the success path via the station blackout tie. e: RO and US continue in 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. Steps completed depend on timing of restoration of power t03A 4KV bus via the SBO tie. They will go to step 32 when power is restored. CAUTION When power is re.smred to 304 oc 3B 4KV bus. leCOvety .should commtfe' by observing CAUTlCINS p1lOC to Step 32' and then perlOrnring Step 32. 38 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event Page JL of Event
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply bQt* /', its. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B TP9W Time Position RO RO breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and c?nn9 e opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO .. ,tf* fro,"",unit
~~4. Then 3AB 11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to~~
&\ .. 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to th ffetts leak. 11 12 P!<lCl: Ntm*R;unnrng, PULL*TO*LOCK Or STOP As Follows !In--1 3* 51 iY0mpS -PTl spray purn;-s -PTL * ::;';;:2 Level* can !:!Q! be m::tnlained t"\lr 17%. [5G%J e WHm CC'N oS ;;;1>;;,,,,,,, to Unit .. High qead 51 pumps. THEN "IIerify \10V . .QB t!pen .8/:l1il start DOS Un;: " High '-\ea**J :31 Pumps *35 required k"<, Go tD Step 12d d. WHEt;' CCW isait,ned to Unit '* High Head SI Pumps. T}fEN place th.e Un;! 4 High hie-ad 81 PuiiiijiSm Statt:lfuy.. Go to Step l3 Note: Determines Pzr level can not be maintained >170/9 starts U4 HHSIP when MOV-3-843A1B opened. 39 "\" Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l EventNo.:l Event
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and Time Position RO ..J RO with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply bg,t its. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and c;af\ n;>(be opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the from"unit
~~4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to reertE§rgjz*"3B&,\3D AkV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the(eff.etts of'l'Q,8 leak.'\,*\~~
~~13 Applicant's LocaHy Close Valves To ISQlate RCP 11 :]' ... 297AN R:CP A -SE,a:: Manua! iSO,,(irm Val,,,,~~
~~3 .. 297C, Rep C $'2' Isc/adon Valve (WOG) to isolate RCP seal injection to the starting \ c1ti([:rging pump. (ECA-O.O, task H) . . 40 '\ \,~~
-31'",5. IE 'iiiJ..,1?5. can WI bi' ",amlally THEN 1o,,;;i1), dDse valoes, CAUTIONS Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-0-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:l Page J...L of J.L Event
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and Position RO with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply b its. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B TP breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and c n opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO e fro unit 4. Then 3AB 11 is locally opened allowing 3B EOG to ree r' e B 3D AkV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to cts of e s am leak. 15 Check If SIGs Are!fQ! Fault*,d Check pre5<5ures in all $1<>5' a) Open AFIN PUlT\O S'!eam supply MOV breaiker on faulted 00(5). b) ClO5" AFW iPUlT\O s'!eam supply I\t()Ii/ 00 SJG(s). 5) SIS bIowdo_ isolatioo
~~CLOSED. 6)~~
~~SIS salT\Oie lines -;SO-JoTEO.~~
~~7) fau\'1oo SlG( s 1 steam dUfffl to atmosphere~~
\laM! closed. IF !i.e WI rftjsed, lliIiei dose. te: Determines CV-3-1608 failed open and local isolation valve losed but leaks by. CAUTION rf CST level to lass man 10%, Wtakel.Jp watw fic.w.JrCK for 'ihe CST 'wilT be rrecessary ro eooooary heat .sink. 41 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page J.L of J.§L Event
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and Time Position RO RO RO with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply be its. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B TP R breaker 3AB 11 which has a blown control power fuse and c n opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO e fro Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to ree rg' B bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to th eff ts of e s am leak. 16 Maintain Intact SfG Levels 3. Narrow fe>tel-GREll< TEfl: THPJ< 5%{32'%] c. Narrow <;;ng;e !evel * -007 to restore A AFWP. Once flow to >345gpm to 3A and 38 CAUTION rep 1 of A IT ACIi\fENT 3 it; to be performed wirhin me tmrt 60 mifRJieSO of.a ross of afJ AC power !Went if both [he 3A 1 and 3A2 biltieJ}' chal!f!*1S .ilfl! inoperable. 24 Check DC Bus Loads il. Direct cperal!:w ro DC bJs klading as nece'Ssary usiOi! ATIACHMENT 3\ I:L Dispa:tci1 per..onnel to periodically mcniD" DC 42 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 6 Page J..L of Event
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and Time Position RO with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply bo its. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B breaker 3AB 11 which has a blown control power fuse and c§lrl"ngiibe opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO .. frorl\.unit
~~4. Then 3AB 11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to~~
\ D 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to th cts of t leak. 25 Check CST Level -GREATER THfd'4 10% all,gable lNDENSP.TE 43 it 'With the' TSC tor 'f' vessE1 hi=,(i'cf V-oi(Rfig IT1Cil occtrr --OtH? zMdz3.Uon sisK" t.,tOT ,t;*. ystoppEd ,tOo ,this ( Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event Page R of jjL Event
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open a.nd with 8 AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply botn"u!9its. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 38 breaker 3A811 which has a blown oontrol power fuse and c9rlnoy6e opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the S80.<<:e fro"'unit
4. Then 3A811 is locally opened allowing 38 EDG to 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to th(effE:cts leak. *'.f" '. Time Position RO ...J 26 .ft,V/ { Applicant's j3ehavior Al11n\act SiGs To tllA} Psig "',,-, , .. /" "J'.f .J Check SiS f;?t"iJ* h?liEds -""'$0" PeitQ{ITl
';'?REl', -ER tN " J ,A,-r LEAST SJG l)., f ... t,::on:::.'! l1l}1xTqUrr, AF\'V , .. p;:il '< le'jlel b (U")P stearr, ';i'Sin-p 3/G s:ean rL.Hnp 10 .,:4.;;1<1&<;; .***** I) "'l;;J32 haas1 (?*ne S/G. 2! je';;'.el than In"l(t least one THEN d,) 3tgps Zeb. 25d and step 27,
1) Con:w SiG s:e.an1 climp :0 3txnc f sphere \ratves to stOp SIG depres$.l;fization.

d. BiG pressures to \?SS Ulan i psig., II;iI;l:i ranually 071tfDi S(G b') rr*.am:3*'"'
~~3:':3 3<:; 180 Ccntn'"\"e \\'\:h~~
~~27. "">. <'\ " Note:\Critica/'iask: (WOG/PRA)~~
~~While depressurizing the SG(s) at /naximum rate, fails to meet any of the following limiting ,tonditions:~~
1) SG depressurization is initiated within 100 /minutes of sao initiation, 2) SG depressurization not J'. ,v f commenced until 6% NR level is established and is stopped if at least one SG can't be maintained above 6%, 2) SG pressure is not decreased below 80 psig, 3) RCS cold leg temperatures do not decrease less than 320 F, and 4) the reactor doesn't restart as indicated by a positive SUR on the NIS that causes the plant to heat up. (ECA-O.O, Task G 44 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:l Page of..11L Event
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and II Tirne Position RO RO RO with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply ba its. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B TP breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and c n opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO e fro Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to ree rg B bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to th eff ts of leak. 27 Check Reactor Subcmical
intsrn'lect!l>,e ri!flgE d1anne!s -ZERO OR NEGA7VE STARTUP RATE __ =-__ =-__ \ __ \111 I I l:>*pre....:;urizaOOri of I, _ to Pf:rmiI. I

I1l\3nual
~~,'oading fJi Verify Cooiainment And Comol Room V'eni:if:a>tioo lsof,atioo~~
a. Unit:3 comaiment purge e:o:t\3'Jst anti supply fans -OFF b. Verify Control Room WfIl:ilalion staJills Oi!flel -PR.()?ER EMERGENCY REC'ROJLtI.T'ON ALIGNMENT 45 Perlorm me iI. Manually ac."1MI1e oontainml!i:l'i isola'lion phase"'-b. !E any COii"AairJment isolation phase P. valve is WI c!osed. mEtimanuaHI' closevM*e . .IE. valvefs) can WI be manually cIcsed. :nIEfi rr_aiIIij or locally isdate affecled oontainment penelram.
~~i:I. Slop fan's, b. Manually align equipmem for CC#\trol Room 1 ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:l Page of JJL Event~~
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply ll!1its. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and c§lrf ngrjbe opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via theSBO Jie frorh unit 4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to &,3D 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the. effects ofllqe Time Position RO '\RO leak.\'/ "" 31 <,' Applicant's Acti0lJ)ii'brj3'ehavior Check Con,t2iinm*lt Pressure -HAS REMAJNIED lESS THAN 20 PSlG *

.. ft3D,z.B " Pet;gHT, the "\ ','\, * ">,,J *. .... '9, \/eritt:. phase b* J!.:"Li, /,/ o. iscJabon phase 5 "lave white'lights ohV""B -AU 2'\:0*;..;-:-, j[ any iseiar.km phase E < " .." '-" lIahle is. N01\pbsed>THEN rnanuaHy "" *.,close liaVe:1F be ,I'" dcSE.d Dr icc..,,"y ,So "'' )f ./ d. Reset dontiljfli'i".",,1 spray 'Signal. iONS fGrioo r/tro*ugho;,'t aO Df ,he EOPs. FWptimp;ifare,Q,P!,!(njng 9;>" singfe rr .. fn one of rile pumps needs ro be , down wiznin one hou['&fIlle iniriai s[.,,, s.ign .. r using .J-OP-07S, AUXfUARY Subsecrion 6.2. >1c
rrarns are oJ'}e'-ati'ng and 01>e of che AFV{ pumps has be-en Dperaring

..nrb . fi'Ow of .'es-5 than W gpm. [Ile* pump sJ1o!;'lld beshu( down wirhin ., one hbtJr or.*operadng ar less .han 60 gpm usIng ;f-OP-C7S:, AUXIUARY 'fEEDW.4T-fR SYSTEM, Subsection 6 .. 2. <'h .}_, Check CQt:". Exit TCs " LESS THAN 120U*F !f cere e .. temperillures greater than 1200°F AND *"creasing

.J::!:i.ei 9c t:, SACRG-: -S='iERE ACCiDENT CONTROL GUiDELINE INiTIAL RESPONSE.
~~St;;pl. *-**--/-------L..---/--------------------------------II 46 ( Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-0-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: 6 Page 1L of Event~~
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply boj1"l"'U9is. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and ca,r< n?t"be opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the
4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EOG to 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to theteffe'tts onne steam ""\. .{,:-" "\.. '\,., Time Position BOP leak.' f' \.\. 33 J Ched( 3p. arod 35 -WI!
-,AT LEAST ONE FR:OM THE 3*ft;. OR 3-8.* EDG LLnftrli)<V tWJS is being 1,4"i* BlackoVi Tie e.r:w. E\.,',6!14 IIKV bus is energized perkIn-! :be fO,'Pt:('SYJ1';S'_S by $81t-,t19 S/G to atlj;1os;phere valve . ., IT .. l1nfain SIG pres'SmEs by ;tG sphere N) b. Ccrdru:e-to centre'" ReS anj rrcnito! plant status.: Stabilize SSG Pressures
~~a. S>E': SiS steam c)l.m1p 10 atncs!*"e,"e~~
~~."aIve ccnircners, .tel ma.intalft S/Q~~
~~-.5TA.BLE 47 1 ) 1.0-:;;1 acticns:~~
4KV bus res:tcra.ttof'l 41 RCP se-31

DC pcwel supply 2) lE beric ac/d tank rcom' tempe:ra.lure less than 55<F, THEN ccnsl);t TSG st.lrf bone acid Ci'" drainag>p.:
of the tanks*, 3) Jf fuel pit ievei aA3fm is or*i'. lH!;li ",iii;;te makevp te the spem ph 1 F\.iEL Pi" \;,rP.1 G* ... ,*)L+1G I EM MIILFUNCTON .. 4\ Locally perfom, O-ONOP-026.J DC EQUPMENT AND Ir1VERTER ROOM SUP>='Lt:MENTAL COOLING. 5) Dbsef'J-e CAI-J"T:ON to .step 15 8WJ. r .. lurn ;.0 Step 15. ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event Page JJL of Event
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply bOJh' units. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B TPyWP,,,/' breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and cgn'ngYbe opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO,tre frortLunit
4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the::effects of the Time Position BOP leak.'\, .,J '." \, Applicant's CAUTIONS", :; ""'->. /;,//' *',w.P,*
Sready STare loading on each U!llr 3' 9e'neraroT shall NOr exceed 2500 KW. Load rransie.nrn; up w 275fJ il(W are acO!!praLl,'e when srarong addirj('rhil eqtfipmeJR" " /', '*'c.

Sready HaTe ({Jading I'm 4 Emergency DJ'reset shaD NOr I?)"ceed 2874 KW. Load Upcro 3161 KW are aoeep't3hie when sra(1.ing
~~.3o\dirjonaf equipmenI~~
~~<,\, " .* ,.,......~~
~~'co,,;~~
~~35 * 'C;011puter Room Chiller '\t Rccrr Air CorIC1ioners~~
-,\, ,If!:: l6E .:3Cem(1 E16F !4D625) g, Spent F'Jel ;: 1 ::'¥.ha;.;st F311 Plant Vern .? PiNG 3J.':'.:: S*PIN3 48 "" Manually close !Dad cor:rci cert.er t4"*'akerS to Energiz<E \'D*' Genters. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event Page JJL of JJL Event
~~Description:~~
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply bO,th ulj)its. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and cgrfng,t"be opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowere::l via the SBO .. tt* frorf1\unit
~~4. Then 3AB1. is opened allowing 3B EDG to 4kV bus. Transition IS made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to of th.e s am leak. "'c/' '\, Time Position US 36 49~~
~~( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: --=2..=;..00.=....;9,---3.=....;0,---,1_ Scenario No.: _6_ Event No.: Page _1_ of_6_ Event~~
~~Description:~~
The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 since PZR level < 17[50] % or SI actuated due to the effects of the steam leak. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs performance of actions per 3-EOP-ECA-O. I RO 1 RO 2 CAUTION If SI is feeSef and eitrN?f offsHe pO,,"ieT is lo.st (l'r .manual ,'dkm rHaJl be reql.Jin:d to restore Gonfiguril'tiQn. Verify 51 -RESET erma1 Ba'rrier CCW fs,olation b, Rep Thermal Barrier CCW Outlet. MO*V-*3 ... {526-.-Gto'S.ED 50 !E cold leg recirculation has previollsly been ast3biisbed. IJ;il;.!:J. verifyccJd leg rec1rculabon lineup'. Ref.,f to 3-EOP-ES-L3,. TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECiRCULATION.
~~b. !Ecoid leg r.,Dirculaticn has !::!.QI. beer est2I:Aished,.I.l:1.f.Ji go to 3-EOP-ES-1.3.~~
TRiI,NSFER TO COLD LEG RECiRCUL,4TiON. c Go to Step 3 Manu.;i:Hy to esta.bFsh pre'p!?", S*; angnment a Obsene CAUTIC1N pri,:>r tD Step 5 .AND go t):> step 6. '0. ManuaLly 'schlie CCW from HCP th*efrna' Close Rep Th-ermal bathe.r CCVV Outlet, MO\"-2-62e. Locady clcs.e te':vrn. manual isolation "-':.>I,,,e out'S1de oontail"l'ment. Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: --=2..::..00;:..;:9,--3;:;..;0::.....:1:.-.. Scenario No.: _6_ Event No.: 6a Event
~~Description:~~
Time Position BOP The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 since PZR level < 17[50] % or SI actuated due to the effects of the steam leak. 5 Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION Steady state' loading on each Unit 3enlergencJI" diese 25;Q("I r<w. Load tranSients up to 2750 KWare ./'"
~~1" Mamlalty L03dlntake CI),cding~~
~~\II/ate! PIlt;nps .on EI1,ergized Buses \, -=-0\/-3--4.882~~
1.E:kJl1i!h,,,;ril",ke cockng watef he.3,ders are irtac ciir.:'c*
~~opera'tor to h.aader:;~~
t.og:ether. -OJO .. COMPONENT COOLf/IG WATER 1:} S-tart 01 stop-CCV/ pumps .3S necessary to esL"IbHsr CIi'**jLY* ONE RUNNING CCW FUklP. 2';\ If Gnly two C:CVV,Heat ate !P s-E'fvic-'E' and \10V-3-74;9.A. and MO\i-3-74G-8 are open .. CC:-'/"i Punlps are requiP8c to :be' ma;:nt.aine.d ,noULL-TO-LOCK 1) Of stop CGVV PV!1lp'S.
~~as necE:s;s,afl' to *.stab-hsh Of\lL"{ TVVCJ RUl<ilJfhiG PUMP'S, c. .LE both CCV!J-be-ao\ers are 'niac't I..t:I.el dked opecraiorto, tie heade1!'S together.~~
~~51 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event No.: Event~~
~~Description:~~
Time Position RO The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-EOP-ECA-O.2 since PZR level < 17[50] % or SI actuated due 10 the effects of the steam leak. Applicant's Actions or Behavior 7 Realign SI System :a 'Verif:l Unit 3 51 TVVO RUNNING Note: starts 3A and i', -,) RO 8 -_ .. -.. _ .. --_ .. -----.t:!Qll. -I .. __ , __ I Dkect Of-H?rator To H'ydn:>ger1 MC>!1r!ofs In 5eP/i'ce Using 3-0P-OS4, CONTAINMENT POST ACCIDENT r,K}NTWRING SYSTEM CAUTiON If CST level decreases fio JeGs Ulan 1&%, mak*'lfpIII'ilter SOVT,::es for CST wiH be to maintain a secOlldary heat sink 52 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event No.: --.2L Page --+/--of _6_ Event
~~Description:~~
Time Position BOP RO The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 since PZR level < 17[50] % or SI actuated due to the effects of the steam leak. 10 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Ma intain Intact SiG Lev*<ls *Jt NarrO'N ra-ng<e level -G:REATE'R THAN a 5%[32%; Verify Contair1lrnertl And Controi Room VentUation isol.3tion a lind 2 ':)ontairme{1t purge exhaust and l.:lns
~~OFF b VeriThi Ccmrol ROCf7v1; s1at ... Js REe IHGUL.ATIONA.UGNhtEJH 53 .t"."'lFI1Unws~~
-AT LEAST ONE c. S!OP rei:cf flO\v to any-$/<::3 Mth narrow range level greater than e.O%, Perform th*<.foIhDW'ing:: Ii., \.f,a:nu.an,i' 3:'ctuate ccnta;.i;nrnerd p,hftS,e A.. 0, If. any coma"mI1'.ent H;,'olabon phase A val\'e is !iQ! dosed.l.!:!.§!:!. manuailly VahlE' . .if. can HQIbe manuai!y dc)sed THEN manval1y or ioeallv iSQlate penetta1i.or.
~~o. k1a,nuaUy akgr *q'tlfpmen:~~
~~for Centred Room emergency Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: -=2-=..00=9::....:-3=0,---,1_ Scenario No.: _6_ Event No.: Event~~
~~Description:~~
Time Position RO RO The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-EOP-ECA-O.2 since PZR level < 17[50] % or SI actuated due to the effects of the steam leak. 13 14 Applicant's Actions or Behavior C,oJ'ntainment Spray NOT Required a. Contahl11ent pre.ssure -HAS REMAINED a. LESS THAN ::0 PStG i nm",n t S pra e,%f " '. tJ. / PI.Jic.e both SP"-,3Y P J1nqs ir \' '-. a R0fi;;,s;,t",';njectian isoiaTen valves Dvtside oonlainmenl-CLOSED ccntaklrneri spray eme1gellcy align '(lent !.E .\. !::I.QL.Il:;f,fJ:l. rrar"aily aJig.n as !.E v.alve(s) can t:!.QI '\ be ,.,-,anl;}ll!'1 locallY align o:y,iith'et. &{ one Contain men: *Spra:t"'P',,mp.
~~/ Ve-{ify B val\ie(sj cLDsed.!E!iQ.I-. dose val\*e(s}.~~
I.E. valve(s) -be rranualiv aligned. THEN --1> P:ac-,;: Dne cO'1tamJ";!.,'i'rt spray pl..rr!V h st.,mdbf*
2) t"la.irrtair*
on-e Dcrltai"nrnent pump ir PUlL-"'O-LOCY. 3:, GD te Step 15. a 'II' akl!H? vaiwes be.lore 5tarl1g! chargin9 plimp. ----------------------- NOTE 54 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _6_ Event No.: 6a Pagelof_6_ Event
~~Description:~~
The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-EOP-ECA-O.2 since PZR level < 17[50]% or SI actuated due to the effects of the steam leak. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US 16 Go T'O 3-iEOP-E-1" LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1 ,.J"' ** , <*"" ) /'$ " Note: scenario is terminated upon of J.EOP-ECA-O:'2. / y ", ( 55 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event Page _1_ of JJL Event
~~Description:~~
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Uses 3-0NOP-004.2 to restore power to the 3A 4K\t.(t5LS/f '\. ,of" CAUTlQN The CCW System load requirements of 3*0P*030. C SYSTEM,shaU noC be exceeded. .. ----.. ---.. I . g f).*'Ol*lOP'*'1D5, COt-iT-Rot ,ROC'tA-EVACU.
~~t"lO T be 1.iS-eO, I . l'f EJ11ergenc'.v op:erating p -~~
~~are {VO T in~~
using to; SfTE PDWER I .

I ( 56
~~( ( Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event Page L of Event~~
~~Description:~~
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4 using 3-0NOp*:004.2 ,?, Time Position BOP 1 ;; Applicant's Actions or Behavior Verify Bus Stripping On 3A 4KV Bus ,3 Veri')' 3A 4h:V bu!> s!rippil"\g I::;,:ng ATTACdMENT 1 0, C heok 3A 4KV bus -AIJTOM,!\ TilCALlY REENERGiZED ';',,< /1:'_ ** F: """\, b,,,/bt.sgl'i/e CAUTiON pr'cr to 51ep 1\f\ND /' Step .2, "\, Note: attachment 1 completed eai"l{er CAUTION Em>?rgencjI [lfes>?! GenemtQt.s'/;'h.qtfkl NOT be nm fon;nore thalJ 4,5 hot/l"S. , BOP 2 \ Cne-ck 3A 4KV 8us < <<:'" t>. !E 38 4KV bus energiz:o, IJ::lW oe rform the follc .. wing: 1'; D-ete-nn1 ne and en "rect C"31...l.se 'Of 3A 4V,\/ bus lockout 1"eiay aciuCi-uon. oa,Jse of 3A, 41-<,/ bus P? :ay 3,:.t>Jati:on is oet.arnl' ne-d a nlj
~~r.w;.ti rese, 10'::"'0(;'1 r-el;:;y.~~
"!..-. 3A 41<\/ bu'; reLay is reset. !!::!.5.!i Qbserv-e CAUTiON pr'or to SlE'P 3 8!::I.D. go to St.:p :!<. CAUTION "\ {fantSI <signal exi<sts or i.s ac.rtlafed whO\? perfomling this pro.ceduf'e, i't is reqtlii"ed to p.e re:set tQ ensure restcJ"atiofl of a pcwer souroe and to ename oontroffed loading of ieqvijm1ent on the 4KV Inls .. y' / BOR.,/f" /3 Verify 51 Reset Res--et '\. CAVII*ON The affected EOG may Auto-Start when tfle loc/fo.ut ReJay is reset in Step 4. 57 ( Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:l Event
~~Description:~~
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4 using 3-0NOP-004.2 j/'\ ""f Time Position BOP 4 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Check 3.A EmErgency Diesel Lockout Relay -RESET Steady state icadingol'l transIEnts tiP to 2750 ,,<'W are 58 thE ",/ , energizec. ?i\'i d correct 03use of3:--." Dies!! lookeu!. Rela/\ "". -"""""'" . D ):60a,'1' 'esEt 3A Emerge'1cy DiEsel Staci'", J Fai'uri! Pelay. .***. '%. /' " . c. IE :be 3.:",a.;(0 buses are Dot') \'" de'Ef"lBwCZ'f'd, rfiEN ri!set 3A. . . :i\'IE Diesel LockoUl ReAay "'b;;,r N,j,T be reset, THEN ooser.'e NOTE " "",n---to " -
v. \", '\0 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page of Event
~~Description:~~
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4 using 3-0NOP;p04.2 Time Position BOP 5 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Try To Re*energiH* 3A 4KV Bus From 3A EnlerY!lncy Diesel Generato'f ,1 Manually starr. 3A EmBrge-ncy Diese -3 Generator fpJM1 Contn)1 Rocto b 'Veri,)' 3A 4K\/ bus .t>.TTACHMEHT 1 -c. ing is complete . .ItfW Ivoni:ze 3ft.. En,,,*ergency Diesel 13 103ft. 4KV bus ucsmg 3-0NOP-Ct23.2. EMERGENCY o:IESEL FAILURE. e Perfc*rm the following: n Shut down 3A Emengency Diese! -Ger,eralDf using 2*,..OP---G23. Et\4ERGENC'{ DfESEL GENERATOR 2'} Obse'1ve hlOrE to e .8!:!Q. *::;orlinue "liih Step e. -..,--.. NOTE 'r;","J thar 51' is re-sef prior to cloclng' Sfartup Trar.-slorlll¢':i bus supply breaJ(ers $'hc.ufd C Ensor*' the !;viN c .. kJ.sE'. 59 ( Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No,: 2009-301 Scenario No,: Event
~~Description:~~
~~3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4 using 3-0NOP:004.2 Time Position BOP 6 -;f Applicant's Actions or Behavior Try To Reenergize 3A 41<'1 Bus From Unit 3-Startup Transformer~~
a. Check Urd:: S;iutup Tr;;fls'ormer Poterba! 'lv'hite Li@riem VPA -ON D, Check

3 St.3ttup Transformer Lockout R.elay -REDE'" c. PLace Sta1:"lp 3j!., 4r{'./ Sus. 3A,';G5 to
\, t/ Clo,,,,, Stgnl() Trarsi'orr'2t3,'; \. \\-3A "'''., / CAUTION 41/ P,e'rfc;fm the followil'!g: /,>' c,/:' '1} to c:rsite pO!ltE'r to Unit 3 .. uz,:ng: . .3, STAR"TVP -,gAt";SFORMER MAlFdNCnON. """ // ' 2; CAUr{)N "r,d ;'-lOTE [:.riO' t( S1ep 7 .81:J.Q. go to Step -; . "'. " (), b),% stripping is ':complete.ll:!f.I:i
'0 84;!. h. Observe CAUTlON ana NOTE prior to S

ep ., .81:J.Q. go to Siep -;, L'padillg Oil the opposite<
unit .stilrtup transformex sh aU NOT exceed sao amp'", i" .. HQIf :f 1 .. /l1\:nen Unit:] .ctartu:o rra!1S":J:T11*r}$ .aeadabJe, o!fz{te pc,wEr to JA 4}(\/ bu's should be "i' restC::l'-e<i U':ll1g 3-0F'<J04.1'. RESTOF?ATtOl J-./ FOLL-DiVING LO.SS OF OF,FSfTE 1/". FOVVER. " / "'>\,<;/"/ ..... ______________________ 1 60 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:l Page.Q.... of J..L Event
~~Description:~~
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4 using :>ONOP-004.2 me Start 10 min clock Position BOP 7 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Try To Re1!nerqiz* 3A 4KV Bus From Unit 4 Startup Trarrsfofmer
a. Check Unit 4 Startup Transfol'mer Potential Whim Lighi 00 VPA -ON b. Check Unit 4 Startup Transfol'mer Lockout Relay _. RESET c. d. CAUTION f. Localiy close breaker. g. ObSeNe CAUTION ano NOTE pqiodo Slep 8 At:!Q. go to Sltep a. Tie Une may be used only whim bofh the 3A and sa 4KV d. ------N'oTE----------.'" 3A and 38 <IlKV Iwses acre both deenergized offsite pGWer ;md Unit 31 Die:&ei Generatom a:re NOT avaiJai:lIe, pcwer needs to be restered to at {e;ast e of these 4KV ttwe-.s-wfihin 10 mirrutes to s-atfsfy ru'atioo bJackO'Ut J'E?quirements.

Critical task: (TC-SBO Analysis) Failure to restore power to 4KV bus from the opposite unit via the SBO within 10 minutes after reading the caution in 3-0NOP-004.2.13-0NOP-004.3 61 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: l Page L of Event
~~Description:~~
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4 using 3-0NOP:004.2 ",f '-i-\ " Time Position BOP 8 BOP 4' Applicant's Actions or Behavior Determine If Stat!;OFl Blackcllt Tie Line May Be Use;:! 32.4&<'/ OW'S. -DEENERGHZED Check 4.1'1 ard 48 41<\1 buses -.4 T LEAST CINE ENERGIZED 4Y;V Bus 3D. 3.tA' 7 - 4*x:V bus is. energiz.Ed,. go 10 Step 16. a. R.eset 3D 4i<\f bus hockout rElay. b. .i.E. 3D 4KV bus lockout tEla)' can WI. be reset, .I!:!.5! gc te" Step 1 e. Pe?rio'm the? following: Ope-*n S-upply' Fron1 4FV 3 B. 3,A,OCe c. Glose S'dpply ;:ro11:41<\1 Bus 2A 3AD01 ,j, G*losee Fe:eder To 4XV 3D, 3AA 17 e. IE 3D 4 <{V' C<iin J:l.lll: be aligned to 3."" 4KV btls, .ll:!§!:! go to Sje?P 15 te: realigns 3D 4KV bus to 3A 4KV bus per RNO steps. 62 ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event Page JL of Event
~~Description:~~
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4 using 3-0NOP:;,004.2 /J"-""0 Time Position BOP 11 BOP 12 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Verify 'Station Blackout Permissive Blue Light For Station Blackout Sre3ker, 3AD07 -ON ., ca-r! .!:iQ.! N go to Step t5 ""'""',..... bus using LOSE. OF 4041<'.1 BUS. b IF 4D 4¥..'>/ bus can NOT be eI1ergllzed. THEN 'go to S,eo '15-,-'station bJachot1t c';:;;,Htion exists. I*oading 011 ei/ch Unit 4 Emergency 13hall be IimHed to 3095 Kill. V bus SLi'pf-lIyfng power to the 40 4,1(\/ bus is energized by ,l/1 EOG Blackout Brellher 4AOQ7 is dosed, non-rullning .safeguards DOS St1ppi'l,ing p'O>lter should be placed in PULL-TO-LOCI'( or auto.stllIT and possible o'verio,n:i 0 f the EDG. 63 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event Page JL of Event
~~Description:~~
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4 using 3-0NOP-004.2 Time Bus energi zed Position BOP 13 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Cho?ck 4KV Bus Supplying Power To 40 4KV Bus* ENER.G1ZEO BY OFFSITE POWER non safeguards equipment in pull to IQck f'<' \ ';\\ (AU lION '<<lJ;bhlvi'n 9 power to the 40 4KV 8m; i6 lost after j 6e& the associ"ted EOG (WtpHt breaker wiN eel, 0.. Dlre-ct Unit.4 RO "t:: dOSe ,Staiion Blackcut BrEaker 4.A.DC7 kel'loDK switch Number 8,2) VeTify 3A ,¢KV 8.,15 -ENERGIZED Note: BOP should inform US that 3A 4KV bus is energized via the station blackout tie. 64 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario Event Page of..1L Event
~~Description:~~
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4 using 3-0NOP-004.2 Time Position BOP BOP BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior 16 51 -RESET CAUTION If this is the fires! hus Ff!'storea foHowing a loss of 0 b,e I";;.energizffd as directffd ill the appli'cable Emer ]*ONOP-004. LOSS OF OFFSlTE POWER 17 Loc.ally Verify N'O Brea,kef Targets Exist 3A 4KV Bus Breakers 18
lA,4KV Bus Is Energi,z

ed EL Go to pf*ocedure
~~in Centers 65 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: l Page _1_ of L Event~~
~~Description:~~
3B 4kV bus is repowered via the 3B Emergency Diesel following opening Time of breaker 3AB11 per 3-0NOP-004.3 Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Uses 3-0NOP-004.3 to restore power to the 3B 4 CAUTiON The CCW System kJad requirel'l1E'1lis of 3-OP-03Il S '(STEM, ;r;hafloot be exceeded. I # I . BOP 1 ¥then JB 4KV Bus is lost 3B Emergency Df!? 3.4D07. I I I I ' ote: 38 EDG output breaker will not close automatically due to 38 sequencer being inoperable. 66 ( ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: l Page L of L Event
~~Description:~~
3B 4kV bus is repowered via the 3B Emergency Diesel following opening of breaker 3AB11 per 3-0NOP-004.3/,"'Y\, Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior A ITACHMENT 1 ;Page 1 of 1) 38 4iKV BU S SmlPPllllG IE 38 ;!KV !:kiS 'S de-energized AND 30 4KV Sus is ali!;pet t,) B;;dcut T \2 E;k;: light i5 ON AND Station IF 35 4K\/ B\JS is de-e:ner-oized ANI) 3D Sus is N Blue '$ C;=F THEN fo-':,:) .3:A.:B22._ 38 4.K\I B;'tlS Tie To 3A. G'{ 3C 3]!"BO£ .. Stlt;tup Tra!'!-sfo'1Tier 38 4:k\t Bus 3..A,8()2. Au:dk;;ry TransfcJTne'" 38 Bus Supply 3,,:"21 n" H*ater Draml Pump-'3;2- ,. C*,:nd:e-nsaie ., lE. for ::,ntak'E' CC1Jling V\'!-ater 3C, OR rO'f VV,32ter P"I11P can NOTb,,' opened, THEN open Feeder!,) 4KV 8us 30.3/\819, AND SUi;:?!)' FfDm 4f(V 8m 3E, 3AD05. f O'i'rects NSO to open 3AB11, 3B TPCWP breaker locally. Note: NSO will call to inform US breaker is being opened following restoration of 3A 4KV bus via the SBO tie. Following 3AB11 breaker opening the 3B EDG breaker will be closed manually. 67 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: l Page .L of L Event
~~Description:~~
~~3B 4kV bus is repowered via the 3B Emergency Diesel following opening Time Position BOP BOP of breaker 3AB11 per 3-0NOP-004.3 2 Applicant's Actions or Behavior 68 Resei.SIl. Perform the followng:~~
~~a. 1E 8A. 4KV bus is energized.~~
~~THEN wI to determine rorrec.i eal.l!ie of 3B Efrmrgi!!'lC)' Diesel LoCiWul Relay~~
~~b. w...a!!y reset 313 Diesel Start Reia}'. c. IF the 3.4 ;ind 3B 4i<V buses are both THEN reset 3BErnergelWj Diesell.ockwt R.etay. d. 1E3B Ermergency Diesel LookOOl:~~
~~'Zan NOT be resa, THEN NOTE 6AHO go to Step e. CAUTION Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page of L Event~~
~~Description:~~
3B 4kV bus is repowered via the 3B Emergency Diesel following ops:ning Time Position BOP BOP of breaker 3AB11 per 3-0NOP-004.3 ./ """ I I I -5 16 Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTES WHENl bus slq;<pin'ij1 is ccmp",:le, THEN GO toSlep eD. \i:fJrify Sl -RESET. d. LccaH'y' 38 Emergency G:a1eratCJ.:r tc 3B 4K'd b1JS UStr1:g1 3<JNOP-02:32. Et-.i1ER:t::3EN%CY D!ESEL GENERATOR FJ'.IUJRE. e". Pmorm the ',' Sh!Jt Ij:0\\\1 .38 Diesel Generator -using EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR.
2) Observe NOTE 1c Step e A-tiU co-ntinue wi'th S'iep e . 38 EDG will be manually synchronized to the bus Verify S! -RESET Local I:,' Verify No Break,!!,f TaPilieis Exist On 3B 4"1i Bas Breaker ]£ an'l 35 4KV bus break:? target is in, THEt4 DO the assodated C8mPOlieni t3:f9'*-t is. deteri'"nined
_**_------------------------------------------11 Note: dispatches NSO to check breaker targets 69 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 6 Page 2..-of L Event
~~Description:~~
3B 4kV bus is repowered via the 3B Emergency Diesel following of breaker 3AB11 per 3-0NOP-004.3 / . Time Position BOP BOP 17 18 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Load Center $8 b Load (eoNer 33* ENERGIZED Check 3ft Load Ce-/11er-ALIGNED TO AN ENERGIZED LQAD CENTER Localry the XS-l key to the OFF :D<:?5ivCfl ';;} ,.A.ttanol t,o CICSB 3D -L"a.d !keaki" .3Aj'j*14
~~b. Periorm 1he folbl'iilng:~~
LeGally 3D Fee*c Fro .. " 38 4KV Bus 8reakel", 30410 -CLOSED. 2) iF 3D Lead Center can NOT be re,mergized. THEN consult wib lhe ShdtManilgert.:l detennb" if3D L::>?)j Center should be !f*£nergiz"c from SCfiJV<JE< usi'l.:;' 3 .. 4)P-*('C;6: .* 4BO \lOL T SVJl'TGHGEAH SYSTEM:, Manuaiiy align 3H Load Center te an eregzE'd lead CE'nier. CAUTION Thle CCW SY'srem J020ls requrre!ll*<l1ts of 3,,{}P*Q30, COlilPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM. sha:f1 nor be exc-eeded. -N:d'TE -if any G"CT'rlpG\'1Ent PCWEIEd from .S' oeenetifPzEo m::ttcy conrroi' center mU5[ be starl?d, trye I affected motor centro" <:center r:'2*d:; to be cr:;'V"fg 480 VOLT J;,fOTOR I _:.." -, -, .* ' :_' 70 ( Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: l Page of l Event
~~Description:~~
3B 4kV bus is repowered via the 3B Emergency Diesel following opening of breaker 3AB11 per 3-0NOP-004.3 Time Position BOP 20 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Restart COI'llt:Hmmts Supplied Sy 38 4KV Sus ,As Direcie1:l 8)1 The Shift Manager :: E Res Heat R*!nOlfaJ P J fnp },.:I, Energency ';:'£jl't;l,inn'en: F:.er =al'1 : ' .. 3.3 Er'1ergeno,'
Jif';

f 3D MCC
'4,."" <;. "c, .3A Er'1ergenc'l Ct;ntaihp'!:en: \, , (:oc',e:f /' / \/' ,,;,.' 'lVat;;c)'unp ,f'-Clwtk If ,A,dditiona! Load;4*0n ,'is 4KV Sus Be Started '..3 38 4K.V blJ5 -EN::S:GiZ::J BY '\, 3T11,RTUP TRftNSFORNiER b suppiiee by 36 'VI) b'JS by :1'1" Silin .3'3 ',itfl'ater 3 t>,uxiiiarl 8uii!:!i!1!;, Ex"'aust Fan {J A. fan "s1C( rtinning)
c. !>loufy CherlHslry to 'IE'C"f<f prQperoperaiicn of ,he plan: SP: \JG units 71 0.;, ocal!y ihe s.eq"en0er X8-1 sw"leh :0 lhe OFF c'::<sit-cn

/,"'>-,1I,1temp!
~~t.t{,lo5e$;ffe::tB:J b'eaker. If b. SequE1cer 'failure ha.ve OOJl. *. pert,::TIT. the fcbiowirrJ:~~
~~1) Loc..3.1iy plaCi? 111e sequenter X.5-' ,;e}, switoh IQ thE OFF pos :ion. 2) At:enlpt te. dose affected breakii:l'S.~~
~~Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page l of L Event~~
~~Description:~~
3B 4kV bus is repowered via the 3B Emergency Diesel following opening Time Position BOP of breaker 3AB11 per 3-0NOP-004.3 22 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Check SWion Bbckoot Breaker. 3A007 -OPEN 72 NRC XXIV NRC SEN 6 ---OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO: Field Supv.: Outside SNPO: Admin RCO: ANPO: Unit 3 Unit Supv.: Unit Supv.: RCO: RCO: NPO: Plant Status Unit 3 Mode: 2 Power: 4 100 MWe: 0 756 Gross Leakrate: .02 .02 RCS Boron Cone: 1140 286 o erational Concerns: RO assigned to control steam generator levels while . U3 Antici none none Turbine rolling at 1800 RPM ready to sync generator to grid. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 30% for a flux map. 3-GOP-301 in progress at step 5.52.2. Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator Mode: 2 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 4 Gross: .02 A 6614 MWe: o Unidentified .01 B 6631 Tavg: 549.5 Charging Pps: .01 C 6621,(,\" RCS Pressure: 2250 RCS Boron Cone: 1140 Abnormal Annunciators: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: -Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Current Tech Spec'*etiQn (Does Not Include "For Tracking Only Items" \\\/f/ Entry 'I . // T.S.A.S / Component: ,,// Reason: Entry Date: T.S.A.S I Component: Reason: Entry Date: . T.S.A.S I Component: Reason: I Entry Date: train protected both units )nline risk is green J:Jpcomin ment: ECOs to Han and lor Releasg;," Unit 3 Status Evolutions or Com \ ,/ General
~~Remarks, Work Around Status:}}~~

ML091740144

Text

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description: