ML091740144
| ML091740144 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/23/2009 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| Download: ML091740144 (455) | |
Text
TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Facility: Turkey Point Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 2009-301 NEW Examiners: Candidates: US RO
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Initial Conditions: Mode 1,60% MOL. 3C charging pump out of service due to packingiJeak~e.
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Turnover: Equipment OOS: 3C charging pump out of service due to packil)gl ge. S*
service in 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br />. Thunderstorms reported in the area \
Maintain 60%
Online risk - green B train protected both units Event Event Type No.
TAHUVBSC ~ 3C RCP ~Jb[9tion alarm at ~1l1i1s::t~ame and 16 mils shaft.
(TS)SRO The cre'eJ'r~s'poRq~ to alarm FfN,~nd\.is directed to 3-0NOP-15 TAHUVBMC ~ 041.1 ad~ r~b<~pe'G"i.~:4.1. In a\x;\~rda!nce with the fold out 2.20000 page, vibr?tio{1leveJ~ warraoj Engin~riri'g evaluation only.
\c. \. -"~">~"-:;;_;;___ '-'::""<<::.:.", '\~_...,,:)f 3A SGFP s~aft\,~he9,Fs'r~airiQgthe:!i36p to place the control
//0,w""s){Vitch to offper\07ADj)JI~211. Tnts",should initiate an automatic
,rurtls),ack to 45~o. T~e"~rew responds per 3-0NOP-OB9. A TFFVP1A ~ T
(~;6§,f(6 'fa,ilur~ of the nl{lbclpk circuit requires the BOP to manually run 2 TFl10101 = T ,/" (I})RO thJ~ u,rit back to \l5o/~i' A failure of automatic rod control will TFU1lRRD = T / C)BOP !?fe~ient control r~\dsf[om inserting when demanded. The RO
'wilitake"FI%lOJd~1 ~'29i.fol and match TavelTref. The US will use
)}f*3~Ot':J,Qe~028~piiaddress the rod control failure. Should a unit
. trip occur,e\fent three will be skipped.
Sequential drop of two control rods. Control Rod HB will blow a tationary coil fuse dropping control rod HB. The crew will ondper 3-0NOP-02B.3. The second rod drop H4 requires o to manually trip the unit. The reactor trip switch on the console and Vertical Panel Bravo (VPB) fails revealing an A TWS condition.
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-0 and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close on Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB.
The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3-EOP-E-1 5 (M)ALL Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.
( (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #1 Event 1 - C RCP vibrations increase to 3.2 mils frame and 16 mils shaft. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.1 Reactor Coolant Pump Off Normal. " ..
f/:'" /./"'"
Event 2 - 3A SGFP shaft shears requiring the BOP to place the control switS,l;:tl0 9ff per O-ADM-211. This should initiate an automatic runback to 45%. The cre~,;f'espo~ps per 3-ONOP-089. A failure of the runback circuit requires the BOp,/to rlJ,a'Ftl\~II~(,~n the unit back to 45%. A failure of automatic rod control will prevent C1"'ontr:61 rodS'{rOtTlj,nserting when demanded. The RO will take manual control and rrla.t.c~'Tave/Tre(hre 't4$ will use of 3-0NOP-028 to address the rod control failun;,?~h9dld a unit trip OCCblL ~v,~nt three will be s k i p p e d . ' " I' \., "'%t
. / , . / t , "',
d/
Event 3 - Sequential drop of two control rods. Control~6'd .Pf~fwill blow.. tionary coil fuse'\,*4.***/'
dropping control rod H8. The crew will respoh,ppe,r; . 3-0NQP::' . The second rod drop H4 requires th~ RO to .manually trip the u~ Th~.~,5'a./, rip switches on the console and VPB fall revealing an ATWS condltloA.., . . J/'
"\_~._ f'Y Event 4 - The crew will respond to the A~~'per",,~-EOP-E-O a'~~~~QP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting iQ S"a.I . ..P~2Kag.f? !ailure (S13~OC>~). Train A safety injection fails to automatically ac\pat~ rettutCi~g'rnaQpal actLt~!io.,,~> CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close \>n ~hase A.:requiringQJanu'aloperation from VPB.
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Event 5 - The crew resp .the SQ1all break\L09A per 3-EOP-E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary nt and'%3- P-ES-1. P~ST LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.
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2
TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Scenario XXIV NRC 1 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-24 (60% MOL)
Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIV_NRC_1.lsn Place simulator in run Start 3B charging pump and secure 3C charging pump
_ _""f l ' fit'"
Trigger lesson steps: ",),f ,/'
CV-6275B failure, Automatic Turt;Ylne/f'Onback fa' actuates TAB1Pos'tI:4p<'f/
RACKOUT, TFL2XBSE =T, TFL2XASE = T;'.JFL:3t:;IA 1 = T, 6 7C = T, TCE6DQ8C = T,
=
TFL3V1 F, TFL 10101 T) = ...*. .
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Place simulator in freeze.
/.y . . .
Place clearance info tag on 3C Charg~
Provide shift turnover checklistS"~>",:~"".>
Select 3A QSPDS to pag~,,2,.t.j,.{SAT) an t.*\9i$~0'S to pag.e.,212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA and at the RC ,/desk to'ttJe Utiliti~ scr~n Fill in blender & SP n boro I ~~dition P~~fSVS at console blender station. Data for each IC may ~;~ffo d in the E(lC;& Shutdowu diuidelines Book in the simulator IIF.
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3
TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Event 1 - C RCP vibration alarm Initiated immediately after shift turnover.
The crew will respond to annunciator alarm F 1/1, Rep motor/shaft hi vib. The annunciator response procedure will direct the crew to check remote and control room indications and perform 3-0NOP-041. 1 for readings above the alarm setpoi The US begins performing 3-0NOP-041. 1 at step 1.
When directed - Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - 3C RCP VIBRATI TAHUVBSC = 15.0, TAHUVBMC = 2.2)
ARP F1/1 step 2a. - Respond as NSO if directed to check vi cable spreading room.
Local indication on Bentley-Nevada re shaft.
The Crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.1 Fold out page item 1 - Respond as E 3C RCP.
4
TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Event 2 - 3A SGFP SHAFT SHEAR WI FAILURES 3A SGFP shaft shears requiring the BOP to place the control switch to off per 0-ADM-211. This should initiate an automatic runback to 45%. The crew responds
. per 3-0NOP-089. A failure of the runback circuit requires the BOP to manually run the unit back to 45%. A failure of automatic rod control will prevent co I rods from inserting when demanded. The RO will take manual control an m h TavelTref The US will use of 3-0NOP-028 to address the rod co ral ilure.
Should a unit trip occur, event three will be skipped.
When directed - Trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - 3A SGFP S FAILURES (actuates TFFVP1A =T, TFL 10101 =T, TFU1 The Crew responds per 3-0NOP-089 turbine runb k Step 5.3 - Respond as Load Dispatcher and Plant G er entry into 3-0NOP-089 for the shaft shear n 3 runback.
Step 5.6 - Respond as SM if called; ac n 100-1002.
Step 5.7 - Respond as Techni ~""'~1r" C, or AOM. Acknowledge failure of Rod Control to operate in
(
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TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Event 3 - Sequential Dropped Rods .
Sequential drop of two control rods. Control Rod HB will blow a stationary coil fuse dropping control rod HB. The crew will respond per 3-0NOP-02B.3. The second rod drop H4 requires the RO to manually trip the unit. The reactor trip switches on the console and VPB fail revealing an A TWS condition.
Following the report to the I&C Supervisor in step 5.2.3.2 above a w en directed - Trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - DROPPED ON ROL ROD H8 (actuates TFLlD41 =T)
The Crew responds per 3-0NOP-028.3 Dropped RCC Step 10- Respond as Reactor Engineering; Acknowledge d If called respond as WCC, or AOM. Acknowledge Following the report to the reactor Engineer, foil p and when directed
- Trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - DROP TROL ROD H4 (actuates TFLlD31 = T) 6
TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Event 4 - ATWS W/3C RCP SEAL FAILURE The crew will respond to the A TWS per 3-EOP-E-O arid 3-EOP-FR-S. 1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close on Phase A requiring manual ope tion from VPB Entered from Event 3 on drop of second control rod or, Event 2 on manual The Crew responds per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1 Response Generation I ATWS 3-EOP-FR-S.1 Step 7.a - May be performed as an early action. Respo direction to open the reactor trip break After a two minute delay, TRIGGER les 3-EOP-E-O Step 17 - Respond as NS ,
in service on unit 3 using 3 0 system. Trigger lesson ste -
of step 4 and to continue tion 7.1.2 complete, PAHM in service g direction to check local stream line 7
TP-2009-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Event 5 - SBLOCA Response The crew responds to the small break LOGA per 3-EOP:'E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Goo/ant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LOGA Goo/down and Oepressuriz ation.
3-EOP-E-1 response Step 4.a - Respond as Chemistry to take periodic activity samples of all SGs Step 4.b - Respond as Chemistry to check DAM1 monitor reading Step 4.c - Respond as Health Physics to take radiation readings on mai te Step 16.b&c - Respond as NSO, Acknowledge direction to unlock an 10 breakers:
Locally unlock and close the
- b. followin breakers
- 30616 for MOV
- 30621 for MOV-3-86 c.
-866A After 3-5 minutes T . \ 1 BREAKER ALIGNMENT. Report et
'~~ihrfl to verify radiation shield doors closed for d charging pump room to survey the Pipe & valve room and Electrical penetration radiation
'str 0 align PASS for sampling the RCS Unit 4 RO, Acknowledge direction to secure U4 EDGs.
as NSO to go to 3A Diesel Generator Engine Control Panel and establish communications with the control room spond as NSO to go to 3B Diesel Generator Engine Control Panel 3C13B and establish communications with the control room 3-EOP-ES-1.2 Step 3.d.1 - Respond as SNPO, acknowledge direction to Proceed to Unit 3 West Electrical Penetration Room and reset group A Backup PRZ Heater lockout relay 8
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:_1_ Event No.:_1_ Page_1_ of ~
Event
Description:
3C RCP vibration alarm at 3.2 mils frame and 16 mils shaft. The crew responds to alarm Flil and is directed to 3-0NOP-041.1 and Tech. Spec. 3.4.1. In accordance with the fold out page, vibration levels warrant Engineeri~g;iP\\
evaluation only. . .. / '
/p Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavio~/jp,j' BOP Recognizes/reports unexpeoted alarm 'CP HI VIB to the unit supervisor (US).
BOP Perform actions of 3-ARP-097.CR fo ~l:l.~ci~Jef*F)
..\....../.../.fY
- 1. Verifies alarm by checking RCP vibratioo reo¢rder R-3-369.
,,ff"""'>""'" ~\\...\'\.
Note: Finds 3C R;P'Cfi.t3:2m.[,!s frame ad* .
t ';'<0-',
\, \c, ',~-- ...",:::, '~,.:,:~,~
2a. Dispatches operato~,to *t{hecK:'Vii::![atiOI1'. the cable spreading room. \, \\ .f" J/""'j"j,jjj'j~ .(
- _ . . . . . . . \ . . \ **. /,)/' ..* / **,,0" .***" ****** /
Note'<Local'f3~NGER i!7'~ic)jti9.Ff*1ights will not be lit. Setpoints at 20
"'lrrS.~fra1t6l,rd .~ mifs on fr{IotGtr.
/'/"~:pl:ports to ,bSl~C RCP S~il;lf;\ibration greater than setpoint at 16
<\. \ . mils and/r,Efqu.!.r:~.s .*~:ONOP- ~..)1 response.
U sl5)i.(eCts./feSe.ollsepe'Y"*s-.QNQ.~" .' 41 . 1
, f CAUTION ain"'N;flt ;)"ries shall NOT be performed wilen there are indications of all Rep I packa fai/llfe 1111ti{ the reactor is shutdown and ReS pressure/temperature is re ced to mhl[;fiize leakage.
- - - - - - - -NOITS* - - - - - - - - - - .
Foldout Pa98 is f"equfted to be monitored throughout 07iS proced'ure.
, Off-nonna/ RC,:P (~or{o'dions that requ:'re $,IJutdoltv't: of a R:CP sh.all be verified by Cfo.s.s-checki.ng ell Ft'CP pararne-ter,s.
I . If e/thsr 3B or 3C RGPs are stopped by the perforrnane-s* of this procedure .. then the associated ReS loop pre:S:J.uriz-r -spray' 'laIve should be closed to preve'.rd b£u::k-floVl through the valve.
~----------------- ______ I 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: 1 Page~of l Event
Description:
3C RCP vibration alarm at 3.2 mils frame and 16 mils shaf The crew res to alarm F1I1 and is directed to J.ONOP-041.1 and Tech. Spec. 3.4.1. I.
accordance with the fold out page, vibration levels warrant Enginee, evaluation only.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Rep viihr@hgD 8s-s~'S§mtnt Crileria J.E. ~no-tor fra:rne 'librate,Ctt ,R-3:6~' fP,nints::r 5,. 10) is fP',,.,-&"ter tt~*"or eqt.:lcf:
C"Jntact Engineering Nl EvakJ8.ls thE condition. . ~:. ,.'
RCF STOFPING CRITERIA IF c:;,ny of the fo ilc;..vif"!~J Rep iir=t:its ,are -reachec, TH EN rn. 3~':Q~Uy tri6:::::t::
EO'" netNo,k.8J1lil step thE 8nscted RCP. -- '.'
..~ OR EC;*UAL TO 23..5<;::;:.
I'D} - GREATER. THAN OR ECtUAL TO -5 r. ,l!:LS
- GREATER THAN OR EGlU.AL TC 20 MILS bash: of 'Dctaining d,ata for si-ar1vp, fDr baf,l3nc1ng 3n ReF', or for shutdown O-perati,ons; 1he Eie-ciJ"ica' (anCB Supoefvist>r ,Dr Component Engi-nE<-er:ing S'upen""=,Df may 3;:.J~hon:ze cc-ntinued R(:*P op&:ra-~JDn::=- 'h'4h
~(el or statDr w:!"'lcling t-en1;perat\;lr- above 'stopping crteri,a noted in FoldQut Ps:ge Ite;-on ,::L Tni-s irlz-atio-"I is required tc, be- obtair..:eo Pr1-0f ~C< starting the Hep.
2
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_1_ Page~of l Event
Description:
3C RCP vibration alarm at 3.2 mils frame and 16 mils shaft. The crew res onds to alarm FlIl and is directed to 3-0NOP-041.1 and Tech. Spec. 3~4.1. I accordance with the fold out page, vibration levels warrant Enginee . g evaluation only.
Time Position Applicant's Action~ *nr .~f=
ROI Foldout - Reviews fold out page.
BOP Note: Item 1, Rep vibration assessm contacting Engineering to evalu not apply.
RO Foldout - Contacts Engineering to eval 1 Checks for proper s
- PI-3-131A - gre te BOP jection f w RO o ~ 6gpm on all RCPs C ckthe RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI FLOW alarm-12 RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI TEMP alarm-ff A1/3 RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER La FLOW alarm-off 3
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_1_ Page -+/-- of l Event
Description:
3C Rep vibration alarm at 3.2 mils frame and 16 mils shaft. The crew res onds to alarm FlIl and is directed to 3-0NOP-041.1 and Tech. Spec. 3.4.1. Ij accordance with the fold out page, vibration levels warrant Engineering evaluation o n l y . ' "
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi BOP 4. Check for proper cooling to RCP pump b~ring\
"".' J/
- RCP bearing temperatures on ~,~D~E)S -less than 210°F
- Number one sealleakoff on."t'RDADS <::. :\
-less 215°F
'--:~, \<.
RO 5. Check VCT temperature on TI-3-rt~ -1,ss t~. a
- \~"_ .,\.,. __::,'.,t'"
- 6. Check RCP standpipe HI level alarms~~ff'
- G2/1 for RCP Aci ""''' ""'+;"
- G2/2 for RCP B
- G2/3 for RCP C\
- 7. Check RCP standpipe'\p I~yel ?~a'~rp,S.2"*6f:t
.A~"'C~ ':--.~'.~_ '_~:;;::.- ~, //(7 _?,-;.-J'; _N':,~:,
./"G3/1 for"RCP A '. /'
"' \\ '\ j/
"j'(;,3/2 foc R(}P B \,\
- G3/3 fC).1 JP C \
-.heck I),ep oi ir'klllk~*fevel alarms - off
,,' . i ' * . , f * ' ' '..**** .. *.. '''''
.\/E32/4f for RCPA the following alarms are off:
H9/1 RCP A MOTOR BEARING HI TEMP H9/2 RCP B MOTOR BEARING HI TEMP
- H9/3 RCP C MOTOR BEARING HI TEMP
- H9/4 RCP MOTOR BEARING COOLING WATER HI TEMP
- H9/6 RCP A/B/C PUMP/MOTOR HI TEMP BOP b. Verify RCP motor bearing and stator temperatures on ERDADS-Stable or decreasing 4
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _1_ Page2 0f ~
Event
Description:
3C RCP vibration alarm at 3.2 mils frame and 16 mils shaft. The crew rysRonds to alarm Fill and is directed to J.ONOP-04 1. 1 and Tech. Spec. 3.4.1;jlh )
accordance with the fOld out page, vibration levels warrant Engin~f1n evaluation only. /'
Time Position RO 10. Check RCP seal bypass valve, CV-3-3, fl' Note: RNO sends ou to ste 12./
.;:,;1' , J/'~i" US 12. Directs SM to evaluate plant m~,~,ioli"".\/i"j' /f"
- a. Check O-ADM-115 Notification Of'PI§l~M~~((
- b. Review TechnicaJ/§, ecification 3.4.'1'f,,?r ~G.(npliance.
-\\;,. "
Note: T.S 3.4.1 is meei\.wl BOP the close of the ONOP r .ew, Trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - 3A SGFP SHAFT 5
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _2_ Page_1_of l Event
Description:
3A SGFP shaft shears requiring the BOP to place the control switch to off per Q ADM-2II. This should initiate an automatic runback to 45%. The crew s nds per 3-0NOP-089. A failure of the runback circuit requires the BOP ally run the unit back to 45%. A failure of automatic rod control will control rods fram inserting when demanded. The RO will take manual ontra nd match Tave/Tref. The US will use of 3-0NOP-028 to address the r Should a unit trip occur, event three will be skipped.
Time Position Note: If a reactor trip is required n continue at EVENT 4 BOP US rify the automatic actions are functioning to stabilize Intain plant conditions or assume manual control:
Main turbine control and Reheat intercept valves modulate closed (VPA)
- Steam dumps arm and open on Tavg/Tref mismatch (console)
- Automatic rod control adjusts core reactivity to match TavglTref (console)
- Main Feedwater control valves respond to maintain programmed level (console)
- Pressurizer level and pressure controllers function to maintain pressurizer level and pressure (console) 6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:_1_ Event No.: 2 ' Page ~ of L Event
Description:
3A SGFP shaft shears requiring the BOP to place the control switch to off per Q ADM-211. This should initiate an automatic runback to 45%. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-089. A failure ofthe run back circuit requires the BOP to IYl'artually run the unit back to 45%. A failure of automatic rod control will pre~nt~.pfitrol rods from inserting when demanded. The RO will take manual w)l.frol}lfid match Tave/Tref. The US will use of 3-0NOP-028 to address the rod oontrol< ilure.
Should a unit trip occur, event three will be skip~d.
Time Position
"'=\
BOP Step 4.1 (lOA) BOP recognizes/reports t9/U ilure of the automatic, run back as evident b y : " ".
- Main turbine control and t/intercePtyal~'~s J'
stable (VPA)
- Main Feedwater control valv tnta,iring ..eO% programmed level (console) f/'
F
- Steam dumps",cl '\/.
f
\. ?"':.
BOP Step 4.1 (lOA) BOP us.es\It),
Note: Approximate/x 3 " '<;
( Note: If the unit is ru' \,'(V~POmt"{;![~!}'governor valves
,f' clos'ecl, a turbin ' nTJ/re~ctor trip signal will occur continue
<<.at** f\lf 4.
\~;
1with rod motion demanded(console) essurizer level and pressure controlielS controlling to
. tain 60% pressurizer level and pressure (console)
. g pump flow decrease in response to increasing
. er level 1 (lOA) RO paces rod control in manual and inserts control rods in a controlled manner to match Tavg/Tref.
Note: O-ADM-211 allows +/- 4°F during transient Note: If the crew is too slow in responding, the US may direct a manual reactor trip based on SG levels, continue at EVENf4.
Note: Control bank D should end up around 110 steps 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_2_ Page ~ of.JL Event
Description:
3A SGFP shaft shears requiring the BOP to place the control switch to off ADM-211. This should initiate an automatic run back to 45%. The cew r per 3-0NOP-089. A failure of the run back circuit requires the BOP m ally run the unit back to 45%. A failure of automatic rod control will ve control rods from inserting when demanded. The RO will take manual ontro nd match Tave/Tref. The US will use of3-0NOP-028 to address the r I fa reo Should a unit trip occur, event three will be skipped.
Time Position Applicant's Actions ROI Step 5.2 Verify the following condi' n BOP
- Steam Generator levels an
- Steam dumps closed
- Tavg matche
- Pressurizer I e BOP nd the Plant General Manager in
-115, notification of plant events
.6 Notify Shift Manager to review the requirements of P~AA-100-1002, failure investigation process(FIP), b determine if a FIP team should be activated If reactor power has changed by greater than or equal to 15 percent, then notify Chemistry department that RCS sampling is required per Technical Specifications table 4.4-4, item 6.b 8
. Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_2_ Page -+/-. of l Event
Description:
3A SGFP shaft shears requiring the BOP to place the control switch to off per Q ADM-211. This should initiate an automatic runback to 45%. Thecrew5~p'~pds per 3-0NOP-089. A failure of the run back circuit requires the BOP t.0"m1:J;Hually run the unit back to 45%. A failure of automatic rod control will p,Fe~e9'tcontrol rods from inserting when demanded. The RO will take manua!,ec)~t:o~and match TavelTref. The US will use of 3-0NOP-028 to address the r d c9Htr0J'
Should a unit trip occur, event three will be skipped.
Time Position US Directs response for the failure of AutQ 028 Reactor Control S stem Malful}etb
- If the Rod Control System is inopera \, uE<~{o Urgent Failure or other cause, the SlJift~4I4.anager shall be"Qotifi~d immediately .
.//" """::"~;,."", -.'\""- -.,
- If a transient occu~~h~r~a r cannot\o~ ~fa.t?ilized by boration
/ dilution or changes i rb'iTlQ.J,oa,,~ Reador sQ'a1i be tripped and a transition made t EOP~It-O, RE:n:1ZQR TRip OR SAFETY INJECTION. \.Fj'~/ ")
'---'-':-'-i",~,."",*._ ,,~
" (~ti~~'/dilu~'~n Ch~~ge~,in or turbine load will effect shutdown
"./ (margin andla . I offset. Ifplant conditions permit, the Shift Manager
. shall be gens ed for metti d~)used to achieve and maintain stable
'\ lant cpndltlons. )'
" /" """~''",.* ,."........ Ai jo'f[ l(ur.~6f RCC(s) torrrove when demanded, (e.g., ROD CONTROL t:!gGI5.f'jT FAILURE), constitutes inoperability of the associated RC<:<<(s):\Jhe requirements of T.S. 3.1.3.1 apply.
'~'"
1 - (I'OA) Place Rod Control Selector switch to the MAN position CAUTION r URGENT FAILURE condition rod motion is blocked. The cause must be corrected before moving rods. Resetting the URGENT FAILURE prior to correcting problem could result in ratcheting the mechanisms when the RESET pushbutton is depressed.
RO Step 5.2.1 - DO NOT increase reactor power without permission from the Reactor Engineering Supervisor and the Shift Manager 9
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _2_ Page .2.. of 2-Event
Description:
3A SGFP shaft shears requiring theBOP to place the control switch to off per G ADM-211. This should initiate an automatic runback to 45%. The crew s nds per 3-0NOP-089. A failure of the run back circuit requires the BOP ally run the unit back to 45%. A failure of automatic rod II:)ntrol will p ntrol rods from inserting when demanded. The RO will take manual nd match Tave/Tref. The US will use of 3-0NOP-028 to address the r Should a unit trip occur, event three will be skipped.
Time Position RO Step 5.2.2 - Manually position the state conditions
- 1. !E the RC control bank will still no state conditions with Tavg equal to US PED CONTROL ROD H8 e held during or at the close of the ONOP.
10
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _3_ Page _1_ of .JL Event
Description:
Sequential drop of two control reds. Control Rod H8 will blow a stationalJ:": coil fuse dropping control rod H8. The crew will respond per JONOP-028.3AH second rod drop H4 requires the RO to manually trip the unit. The re"'PTnr;Fr switches on the console and VPB fail revealing an A TWS c:mditi Time Position Applicant's Actions or B RO Recognizes/reports to US the Dropped Con following indications:
- IRPI for H8 indicating 0.0
- H8 rod bottom light lit
- NIS/RPI ROD DROP ROD S
- N41, N42, N illuminated US system has been installed per TSA 08-002.
tTl indication for ControJ Bank B rods Bl0,
, ility of RPJ indication for control rod B10, P , K2. B6, F14, or question, tile redundant indicating sy.stem may be I lieu of the RPI Indication In question.
refel lees in this procedure to the RPI indication for Control Bank B, other than for
-2, c ,be interpreted as either the console RPJ indication or the redundant indica !/lstaf/ed by TSA 08-002. assuming the indication being referenced he (:ontro/ rod bottom light is a function of the RPf circuit and not RPI indication.
811se of this, the rOO bottom IIglJt will function if using either the Control Bank B RPf ication or the redundant indication system instalied by TSA 08-002.
Misaligned rods are addressed by 3-0NOP-028. 1, RGG Misalignment.
11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page .-£ of L Event
Description:
Sequential drop of two control rods. Control Rod H8 will blow a stationary coil fuse dropping control rod H8. The crew will respond per }ONOP-028.3. The~ye6~~ rod drop H4 requires the RO to manually trip the unit. The reactor trip swi~pfies .on'the console and VPB fail revealing an A TWS condition. .
Time Position
- 1. T.S. :U.1. f* SHUTDOWN MARGlN
- ov
- rec -n Sti'PS 11 '3l'\11 13
- hour'D 'H!/iy AND repe."! ",'_erl12 hours.
- 2. T.S 3.1.::U . GROUP ROD HEIGHT 3.
rawn, appty'Tech Sp!?:: :3<.0,.3.
~ RPis ~o Step c.~xnt:ers. ;1:/I/er'1' 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />,.
1::- \\ithl" guide:;"es of COLR
-§'iI'fc,Dl?r,,::lJ!,_. CCIy:~:\;re RPis ~o S:~;:" COJnt.ers '\!ery 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
- o:vere(i r Step f.
, how'D perform AND required every ""00r 1hereafter whii*e QPTR exceeds. 2%'.
if OP"'-R is* greater :han A2~*%. redll~ pOVler ;?;,%, 'for e\l'erf '1 %. GPTR eoc;:*:eeds -1 !Nfihin 3D' n'l:inute;,
if CiP-R is. grea1er lhen 2~i~. reduce poler 21% fer e~'erl i %. GPTR exc-eeds 1 'Nitfm 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> F:educe 1he NLS trip ';.etoc1nts ihe sane: arnoun1 viith-:,:,tr the n);t -4 !leurs.
12
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_3_ Page~of ~
Event
Description:
Sequential drop oftwo control rods. Control Rod H8 will blow a stationary coil fuse dropping control rod H8. The crew will respond per }ONOP-028.3. Tht?,si~t9nd rod drop H4 requires the RO to manually trip the unit. The reactor trip s}'~l'tfchiysion the console and VPB fail revealing an A TWS c o n d i t i o n . ' / ' ,P Time Position RO Step 1 Check Number Of RCCs DROPPED -
Than One a, Check the followmg r'llore than one rod bottom light CAUTIONS
. ' Do NOT'" the ReS while performing this procedure until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN calculation has been performed using O-OP-028.2, SHUTDOWN MARGIN CALCULA TlON.
"ho NOT increase reactor power while performing this procedure.
Do NOT use control rods for power or temperature adjustments until the cause of the dropped rod is identified and determined not to affect any other rods.
13
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: _3_ Page~of JL Event
Description:
Sequential drop oftwo control rods. Control Rod HS will blow a stationary coil fuse dropping control rod HS. The crew will respondper 3-0NOP-02S.3. The second rod drop H4 requires the RO to manually trip the unit. The reactor trip switches on the console and VPB fail revealing an ATWS condition.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Step 4-Verify Automatic Controls Are Functioning To Stabilize The Unit AND No Transient Is In Progress
- a. TavgiTrehvilhin TF b PZR level/pressure trending to program
- c. S/G level trending to program
~\,.
Note: Turbine will be use RO Step 5-Check,,4cF'O'WilfTf.Q
,,>, '<0-RAOC VVithi, 11inutes, reduce reactor power to less than 50'~'(, using 3-0NOP-100, FAST
,.AX'l'Ah.,FlO% T S. Llt.,ilIT LOAD REDUCTION, while continumgwith FF thIS proced LIre.
% there are no'FD restrictions, see next page for curve
.\. ,\,
HourlyQPTR, Determination Using P .1 0, [j~.J,eRMINATION OF
, T POWER TILT RATIO Until QfTR Results Are Satisfactory OR orfower Is Less Than 50%
'Reactor power is Jess than 50%
Step 7 - Declare the dropped RCC Inoperable BOP Notifies Work Control of the failure of H8 14
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_3_ Page 2 of.JL Event
Description:
Sequential drop of two control rods. Control Rod H8 will blow a stationa oil fuse dropping control rod H8. The crew will respond per }'ONOP-028,}'~'T.
second rod drop H4 requires the RO to manually trip the unit. The' .
switches on the console and VPB fal revealing an ATWS condi,t1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi RAoe LIMITS DEFINED IN eOLR POSITIVE NEGATIVE POWER LlH1TS l.IMfTS 5U 25 Z'sI)()
I 15.0(lO 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 100 PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER CALCULATED RAoe LIMITS POSITIVE NEGATIVE (POWER - INTERCEPT)! SLOPE !'(lWER LIMITS LlMlTS
-~50
~-s JO 55 :n.2 ~18 HI 2104 -26 65 1M -24 70 17.3 <!2
~5 16 ,20 gO 14.2 *13 f----~- 12.4 ,1G 90 ]t).ti -I,:
1---' ,*l2 95 I H.B tuO -10 t~.EniRENC[:PC;M 01,.f)19 Rl!<{. {t 15
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
(
Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _3_ Page ~ of ~
Event
Description:
Sequential drop oftwo control rods. Control Rod H8 will blow a stationary coil fuse dropping control rod H8. The crew will respond per 3-0NOP-028.: y 'fl1, second rod drop H4 requires the RO to manually trip the unit. The refl:ctor)rip switches on the console and VPB fail revealing an A TWS conditi9n: /' ,"
- i"f J" Time Position Applicant's Actions or Sehavi0"r
s"\'.~===
RO Step 8-
,/"f Reduce Reactor Power To Less Than 50 0/.t" Within 1 Hour
- a. Within one hour, reduce r-eactor p less than 50O,{) using 3-0NOP-100, LOAD REDUCTION. vifhile contimrinq this procedure' -
RO Step 9-Check The Following:
group step counters every
( 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />! , ,P!Y 'Nith Technical
- Specification Surveillances 4. 1.3. 1.1 and 4.1.3.6.
Reactor Engineering of Dropped RCC
. NOTE I AifARGlf\l shall f)e -i/eri~;ed v/ithin 'f h'ou( of a D.R-OPPED R-GC and e'le!j' I thereafter 16
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _3_ .Page ~ of ~
Event
Description:
Sequential drop of two control rods. Cmtrol Rod H8 will blow a stationary coil fuse dropping control rod H8. The crew will respond per }ONOP-028.3. The second rod drop H4 requires the RO to manually trip the unit. The react91'trjJ switches on the console and VPB fail revealing an A TWS conditrim./'/ . /
/.p' _:9":'"
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step 11 -
Verify Shutdown Margin Adequate
- a. Check RCS boron concentration Greater than or equal to pre-event value OR Greater than the tv1ini Boron Versus ReS",
Function of Bmnup' the Plant Curve Bo!
Figure 5
- b. Log SHUTDOWN ~'11ARGIN Unitt)J.affafiti~i'Qg
/C' <:''
PJ:D CONTROL ROD H4 eq;rod require~ m'a,nual reactor trip revealing ATWS f \. .)
"'\., Recc,~niZe~!reports to US the Dropped Control Rod H4 based upon the
.d******"". )oJlowir1'§I"indi ations:
\' ~\~"'
\ . IR'PI" i 4 indicating 0.0
'\,,{"
- H4 roCfbottom light lit ylns to step 1 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _3_ Page~of ~
Event
Description:
Sequential drop of two control rods. Control Rod H8 will blow a stationary coil fuse dropping control rod H8. The crew will respond per JONOP-028.3. The second rod drop H4 requires the RO to manually trip the unit. The react t' switches on the console and VPB fail revealing an ATWS condition.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or B RO Check Number Of RCCs DROPPED - More Than One
- a. Check the following More than one rod bottom tight -
OR More Ihan one rod position indicator-AT ZERO b.
- c. Go to 3-EOP-E-O, R Injection RO RO 4 for 3-EOP-E-O and EOP-FR-S. 1 actions be conducted on the transition 18
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _4_ Page _1_ of ~
Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1.
3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA).
Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close on 8 eA requiring manual operation from VPB.
US Directs response per 3-EOP-E-O RO Step 1(lOA) -Verify Reactor Trip
- Rod bottom lights - ON
- Reactor trip and bypass bre
- Rod position indicators - T
- Neutron flux - DECREA Note: verifies reactor is not tripped RO Step 1 RNO - Manuall t
"""FtJN,c,IIO~
L TUS TREES .
'~~"~O*.tC4~~-FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION!
ATWS, Step 1.
erforms a and b subste s.
e: Crew may perform and early action for step 7.a NRO todirect a trip of the reactor locally e: Adverse Containment conditions and SI may occur during 3-EOP-FR-S.1 response, crew should recognize both conditions as they occur 19
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
(
Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:_1_ Event No.:_4_ Page ~ of ~
Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1.
3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA).
Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring mal).l!.l'aJ actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close ol)'Ph~'e A requiring manual operation from VPB.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US CAUTION Reps should not be tripped with reactor p~Itf~~
r - - - - - - - - - - NOLe: - _tf::::" ......:;.J_ -
f+'"
- - - - - - - 1 I ----;r-- .f I Steps! nnei 2 are IAHIiI~IA
_:_----_:- .,\\
RO Step 1(IOA)-
Verify Reactor Trip .r've_. ~~ Perfor \,. ,tpllowing:
't
"'" .~. Manuci'H~ t~*~. reactor. b. IF.
- Rod bottom lights - 0\'\ ~teq~torw'nl N~T trip, THEN
....*, . . . . \ /.
.ensure***conftol rod insertion in*'A'U.t~i;?* Man ua I.
bypas~\Qr
/ff"
- Rea. . ytoFTr:rpatJd
-9P~[)J*'***". \ , /
\ t Y i/Ro.P'*'position 'nd\cators - A:r i" f"/ZERO I \ \
\ '~,~eutron fl. !lE.cB.§~~ING\)
- ., . Not~: i~~ert.~~.(.>. ~t~~1 roasiltJnanual
\\tI/,oif!Lprit~.(1*ariaslt*rFG,",J/ygG/PRA) Failure to insert negative
\'f ref(ttivity by driving rods in manual within one minute (u "f;?ne\Q1inute after they stop moving in automatic) to drive thf1 r~' tor subcritical. FR-S.1, Task G
~~~~------~--~~~~,~
,jep\
2(rp~\-
V.~rifV Turbine Trip i f
- a. ~" turbine stop valves- Perform the following:
./ /CLOSED a.
y/ 4'
~~"
-"*",."i &""J 1) Manually trip the turbine.
- 2) IF turbine will NOT trip, THEN close main steam line isolation and bypass valves.
- 3) Go to Step 3.
Note: critical task - (TG-WOG/PRA) Failure to trip the Turbine prior to com letin FR-S.1, ste 2 20
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Page~of~
Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1.
3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (S CA).
Train A safety injection fails to automatical¥ actuate requiring actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to clos 0 requirin manual 0 eration from VPB.
Time Position Applicant's Action~ n,r I--\ph
- b. Verify Moisture Separator b.
Steam Valves - CLOSED
- MSR Main Steam Supply Stop MOVs
- Reheater Timing Valves
the RWST as follows:
- 1) Hold closed LCV-3-115C control switch.
- 2) Direct an operator to open Breaker 30669 for LCV 115C.
- 3) WHEN 30669 is open, THEN release LCV-3-115C control switch.
- 4) Go to Step 4e.
- d. Open Emergency Boration Valve, d. Perform the following:
MOV-3-350 1) Open Boric Acid To Blender, FCV-3-113A.
21
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: _4_ Page~of~
Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-0 and 3-EOP-FR-S.1.
3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure.,"""",
(SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuatel reg.t1fring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fai~"fo.~6seon Phase A requiring manual operation from V P B . .f " "
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Be 2
. '. /' anual Emergency
'Bora~6n Valve, 3-356, is i!*'~::~::''''''',,,, 6'PI~n,T:~EN close Blender To
\\ ....*, .*..*.*",*** %". Cha~ging\pump, FCV-3-113B.
'%' %, %',6) ~ontinlle ~) Step 4e.
xl"
- e. Open Charging Flow To~egt(en'/ '% /
Hea!.J;')(ChaflQ~r, HCV-3-'t1 \ / ,/
.-'-'--~- ~/
../-~/;:/'Y ",:""¢;-'_"_;;'_:~ ,~ '.;\~, \ _ _,:~ ,<'
f.\:#eri~/I:'oop Afhctfging Isola\on,\ Open Loop C Charging
/ GY-3-310A-OPItN \ Isolation, CV-3-310B .
- . ' *.4g{E~tablish em~;~ge~cy boration'rlo~
Start additional charging
. *1:/-3-110
. i- GREf\;TEFn:kI.AN
/****. ", pumps AND align valves as
'\~I'~~'1.:2~~~*GREATE~'THA.t'*{5 necessary to establish emergency boration flow.
Perform the following:
- a. Verify PRZ PORVs and block valves open.
- b. IF PRZ PORVs and block valves are NOT open, THEN open PRZ PORVs and block valves until PRZ pressure less than 2135 psig.
(
22
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Page2of~
Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1.
3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (S~C~,CA).
Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring r:P'~lnu}i'r actuation. CV-627SB, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to closE?on,ltf1ase A requiring manual operation from VPB. CO (
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Beh BOP Step 6-Verify Containment Ventilation - ISOLATE
.a. Verify Unit 3 containment purge exhaust and suppl fans - OFF
- b. Verify Containment Purge Supply'~p ny purge valve can Exhaust Isolation valves - CLOSED '0 OT be closed, THEN
"",pull fuse(s) for any ope
':'C'*:",,_
\, FJI,Jrge valve( s) from
"'c,,,,,-,,,_
'\benic[1d VPB:
'~;\\: "~
POV-3-2600 "'.~
- XG? for POV-3-2600 POV-3-2601 ff""'."".">>XLAG for POV-3-2601
-'~~d'
- XEQ for POV-3-2602
- XLAH for POV-3-2603
- c. IF neither valve can be closed, THEN locally close Containment Air Bleed to Purge Air Return Line Isolation, MPAS-3-00S.
CAUTION If /il~ SI signal exists or occurs and the reactor is subcritical, proper safeguards
/~(lipment alignment is required to be verified using Attachment 3 of 3-EOP-E-O, J REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, while continuing with this procedure.
Note: CV-3-2819 and CV-3-2826 will be closed by the RO on VPB 23
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_4_ Page~of~
Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-F~.;8~.
3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure/f' . /'
(SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actyafe Ge'quiring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, f;al'fs to'close on Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Beb RO Step 7 - Note: 7.a may have been perlel;m. f~- </f' Check If The Following Trips Have Oq;>t1'rr~9f//,e
<..... '\
- a. Reactor trip a.',.ln ~. MCC
~. foftl.1J\I
'\'"
- 0' 3 3B Reactor Trip Break
- Open 3.A:'~nd'*31?. Reactor Trip ss Break!?rs.\"!
"'\,/1'
/ :..G'R~n .G set generator Ii() utpul'Bl;~~~e rs.
( (:f-"
- Open NB MG set motor input Breakers.
- b. Locally trip turbine at turBine front standard.
Perform the following: 1) Manually open breakers.
- 2) IF breakers do NOT open THEN actuate Emergency Gen Bkr Trip Switch for the affected breaker(s).
- 3) IF breaker position indication is NOT availaBle AND turbine speed is NOT decreasing, THEN direct Field Operator to perform the following:
a) Obtain key 17 from the Shift Manager key locker.
b) Locally trip Mid and East GCBs from the switchyard .
- 8W33
- 8W68 24
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _4_ Page~of~
Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBlO Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring m ua actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close P se A manual 0 eration from VPB.
Time Position Applicant's I NOTE I W,"nm adverse containment conditiOns exist. Gamma RO Step 8-Power range chann
- a. THAN 5%
b.
ction taken to trip reactor, transition tostep 17 may be CAUTION T I vel decreases to less than 10%, maJreup water sources for CST will be s ry to mailllain secondary heat sink.
25
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _4_ Page -.JL of ~
Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1.
3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (S CA).
Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring nu actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to clos ase A requiring manual operation from VPB.
ime Position Applicant's Actions or BOP Step 9 Monitor S/G Levels
- a. Narrow range level in at lea one S/G-w NOT greater an gpm, THEN ma ally start pumps align valves to establish greater than 750 gpm.
- 3) Maintain total feedwater flow greater than 750 gpm until narrow range level gre?ter than 6%
[32%] in at least one S/G.
No e: op should stop feeding 5Gs to keep in band, may require 51 reset and securing one pump.
Verify All Dilution Paths-ISOLATED
- a. Check FR-3-113 - NO a. Perform the following:
PRIMARY WATER
- 1) Close Demin Water To FLOW Blender, FCV-3-114A.
26
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: 4 Page.JL of ~
Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1.
3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (S,CA).
Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring" actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to clos requiring manual operation from VPB.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 2) Loca!}tct~s valy:s:i'
'/~l/water To Chemical f\itJition Tan -359A
,-f---- (/ ",,:__,-,
i\.* P'ri(l1ary \fI£afer. om Chemical
\\Adlii.!i9P1/T ~,rlk 3-272
"'\. ,\,,,,<. -,c*
- MalQual ~f1ution Valve, 3-353A Step RO 11 Check For Read)XitY;~I'r1~~rtl'oflErom Uncontrolled RCS"CoCllddwQ ....
~"{,, . ***'a:**'GtQP any controlled
( ¢~"~""",,,,,~_,~,
'\\
,,-j"
.,/"'-< ".~!i
, ~, rn,*'oldown.
- "iG~J~~pefatu res - 'Q E'q,F,<AS IN G b. Go to Step 15.
,f'( AN l)t-JC~. NTROL[}E\ D\fVlANNER
':R \."\
- An Y.fi>If3 re,'"'S~~C~~AS ING
.I\NUNGQ. NTR o LI]::Ji'MAN N ER
~- /
Manually close valves.
- CLOSED Faulted S/G(s)
Go to Step
- a. Check pressures in all S/Gs a.
15.
- ANY S/G PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR
- ANY S/G COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED Note: RNO transitions to step 15 27
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
(
Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _4_ Page --.1Q.. of ~
Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the A TWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.
3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SB Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring m actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close requiring manual operation from VPB.
ime Position
- These cautions apply to AFW pump operation II
- If two AFW pumps are operating on a sing trai shut down within olle hour of the iflitial sta FEEDWATER SYSTEM, Subsection 6.2.
Step RO 15 F core . temperatures greater than 1200°F and increasing, THEN go to SACRG-1, SEVERE ACCIDENT CONTROL ROOM GUIDELINE INITIAL RESPONSE, Ste 1.
Perform the following:
- 1) Continue to borate.
- 2) IF boration NOT available, THEN allow RCS to heat up.
- 3) Perform actions of other Function Restoration Procedures in effect which do NOT cool down or otherwise add positive reactivity to the core.
- 4) Return to Step 4.
28
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Page~of~
Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1.
3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SI;3!C9~A).
Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring r;r:rany,a1 actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to clos~#'6nJ?nase A requiring manual operation from V P B . , ' / ( \
..../'
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi~f Borariofl should continue during sU/Jseque margin is obtained.
US Step 17 -Return to procedure and ste Note: Transition is made back to J.EO Step BOP 2 Verify Turbine Trf'R
- a. All turbine stop d~ a control valves - .
- b. Manually close valves. IF any valve can NOT be closed, THEN close main steamline isolation and bypass valves.
,ter Timing Valves
-~"
MSR'4:?,urg~ Steam Valves
~'\z_ jtf Check Mid and East GCBs - c. Manually open breakers.
OPEN (Normally 30 second IF breakers do NOT open, delay) THEN actuate EMERGENCY GEN. BKR.
TRIP SWITCH for the affected breaker(s).
29
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Page-1lof~
Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-F RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SB A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring man I CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close on Ph manual operation from VPB.
Time Position Step BOP 3 Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Bu Check the 3A and 3B 4 KV
- a. buses-MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED
- b. Attempt to emergency start the de-energized Unit 3 bus diesel generator
- c. Perform the following:
- 1) IF lockout of 3D 4 KV bus NOT present, THEN perform the following:
a) Verify 3C CCW pump
- BREAKER OPEN.
b) Verify 3C ICW pump
- BREAKER OPEN.
c) Operate bus supply breakers to restore power.
30
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Page ~ of -.lQ...
Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the A TWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1.
3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (S!3r.'O,CA).
Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring/'nLJ~f actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to ciosl?l1ase A requiring manual operation from VPB. " (
=:;==="'7======l1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Beha Step RO 4 Check If SI Is Actuated
(
- SI Annunciators - ANY CJf.J . /
1 BOP Con!jrtGe*ttaCb.m~~tTO Complete The Prompt AG~i'on )/~rifiGattQns WhiI~"Performin This Procedure
'\___ .f:) .,,~:, .._-.-."",,,,,'"
Note: B99"0WUlR,~rform,3-E0t:-E-O attachment 3 while the RO continws in procedure.
,}<lo vtI,,,,,thfl.t/OAs., are ~Q"mplf?te, 3C RCP should be secured, CV3-303C closed, and
~W-3-455"A., la&~d in'rpafTf,{al and closed.
,./'Attathment 3 acti~'ft~ Ii \" ed h~r~, ?1ci to a e23 of event 4 to continue with rocedure "\c" \\, BOP S~$P "\
"', "'\ 1;' Check The Load Centers Close the Load Center supply
0 if issociated With breakers.
"""'" ,i/ /if "The Energized 4 KV Buses -
"",j' ENERGIZED
'\\"'V'\/'
- 3A LC
- 3B LC
- 3C LC
- 3D LC
- 3H LC 31
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _4_ Page~of~ Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (S~.I::t.9~A). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring manu9~'/ actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close.A5,r; 811ase A requiring manual operation from V P B . / p ' <:
,f! ~,
Time Position Applicant's Actions or BehaviQr"" \, BOP Step
- 2. Check If Main Steam lines Should B
- a. Check main steam line isolation and bypass valve ANY OPEN
- b. Check if either main steam isolation signal~a actuated
- High steam f~
low S/G press\lr OR low Tavg 5~ OR
\
Verify n;t1ai steam isol~tio;f;;J c. Push manual Steam line and bt!Sa valves - CC'OS'F!D Isolation push buttons on _f h{;.f/ VPB OR manually close valves. Ste¢'O\.-,.~_
.",f "X\
ve~i~~~,~ater Isolation Pladl3\m;;lrj feedwater pump switches/in STOP IFeedwater control valves -
- b. Manually close valves.
*{CLOSED 11./ Feedwater bypass valves- c. Manually close valves.
_'c. CLOSED
.j' Close feedwater isolation
"\. 4'/~'~ d. Locally close valves.
'~k"" d. MOVs IF standby feedwater is Verify standby feedwater aligned to Unit 3, THEN
- e. pumps - OFF stop standby feedwater
- e. pump(s).
32
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Page.-1.§.. of ~ Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (S CA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to clos re manual operation from VPB. Time Position Applicant's Actions or B BOP Step
- 4. Verify Proper ICW System Operatio Verify ICW pumps - AT
- a. LEAST TWO RUNNING Verify ICW to T8 b.
Exchanger - I 3-50-339 for POV
- 4883 IF both ICW headers are intact, THEN direct c.
operator to tie headers to ether. Perform the following: a.
- 1) Start or stop CCW pumps as necessary to establish ONLY ONE RUNNING CCW PUMP.
- 2) Verify Emergency Containment Coolers - ONLY TWO RUNNING
- 3) Go to Step 5c.
- b. CCW pumps - ONLY TWO b. Start or stop CCW pumps as RUNNING necessary to establish ONLY TWO RUNNING CCW PUMPS.
33
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Page -.1§... of ~ Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SI3f:JSlCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring rpehypl'l actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to clos~6n.P~ase A requiring manual operation from VPB. . (
====11 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Bph::l\lio
'0
- c. CCW headers - TIED c. 1~/~i;)cCW header~\{~
TOGETHER .ifltaot':/THEN direct a field" f"; oloe'rator to tie the headers*'
<:. J,/({ *.* together.
- d. RCP Thermal Barrier CCW "ct *"* . ,IF con, p nt isolation Outlet, MOV-3-626 - OPEN'~ PQa~Ef B. XOT actuated AND CCVv,,Vcfdiation levels are fA,%. *11'Qrm~J . i AND RCP number l'*""'" on'e..~eahJ~ak-off
\ "~ temper§itur(;(. is less than
, , * , , * * **..~.350F,**l\~E". manually o~f;l.*.!Y10\;l£3-626. IF MOV-
\'\ j$ ****s".Q26 qa-n NOT be manually fl' opened, THEN direct operator to open MOV 62610call .
BOP __#1'"
.""., "":":~';";"
.,"'''',:::".:,::"""",,:.:,:: . <<(~);;- Manually start or stop
- a. kemergency conta"tn'ment a. emergency containment cQler~,.- ONLY TWO RUNNING coolers to establish - ONLY
\\, .,\,.
\\. --'<<:-.:;,.;.>>\ "<:'Y';"c TWO RUNNING.
\f~rify e~~rg~ncy containment filt~r fans -',,;t:(f LEAST TWO b. Manually start emergency
. U~NING containment filter fans.
erify 81 Pump Operation At least two high head pumps Manually start high-head
- a. . a. pump(s).
running Manually start RHR
- b. Both RHR pumps running b.
34
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Page --.1L of ~ Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring man actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to close on"Jz requiring manual operation from VPB. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step BOP
- 8. Verify SI Flow
- a. RCS pressure - LESS THAN a.,//;y'o Step 9.
1600 PSIG[2000 PSIG] f.f,ff /Ff ' ,,'
- b. High-head SI pump flow <no ~. Manual pumps AND indicator - CHECK FOR ./\., \ 'al,igr1/tf~ s to establish an FLOW """ in]'!cti9 flowpath.
- c. RCS pressure - LE$c'~J;;jAN C.
"G'Q. to</ tep 9.
250 PSIG[650 PS1;G] ****/.4. --'~'~"-.
- d. RHR pump flow indi~'atc)i -
CHECK FOR FLOW\ ( ,/~'..¢(."~ -, ">=", Note:"yBC?,e.!1,ete'rf(!ines R " jP// qireC;ts'l:Q st 9. ' BOP f/S*Ir;P,/',.J
<:. ~\ Realign §J/Sy t8m . /""
.\ . . */\{~.~i.f1f1~r;lt.t'*3**'hi9b:
8>\ head.,..8'1 pumps - 8:,,/,fperform the following:
\",;{,wC§\~ U NN ING
"""\. -,
- 1) Operate Unit 3 and Unit 4 high-head SI pumps to establish injection to Unit 3 from two high-head SI pumps.
- 2) Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to align Unit 4 high-head SI pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using ATTACHMENT 1 of this procedure.
- 3) Go to Step 10.
- b. Stop both Unit 4 high-head SI pumps AND place in standby Note: BOP should recognize A train SI failure if not already corrected and initiate train A SI aI/owing unit 4 pumps to be secured 35
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _4_ Page~of~ Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure\. (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to aubmatically actuat~.A"e9J)ring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails 6 clese on Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. Time Position
>",",. ~':
Note: Step 10 is a critical step: (WaG) F . 0 close mntalhmel1t isolation valve(s) so that least 0 ation valve in ead~\ . critical phase A penetration (tlo th exists for unisolated*. leakage from the RCS to c9,,(taIp*tTtent theJ).fto\.~tmosphere) prior to the end of the sceh~,rid).(6-0, tas . /' Step BOP "\\~
,j 1O. Verify Containrl\eht* *.,....perform the&"lo~*i.lig:
Isolation Phase"~ \\\:*****,*.,.,~.*.* .* ~..*..*'Mllf'H,'a.,. . !I.y actJah.e%C~.n. . tainment Valve White Light.;; 0"*..",, '>;; . VPB - ALL BRIGH\. '\1\ ,/;l~~~~:~:,b'~~~>~Vf .
'\ \. ~Jl(F,.;;tflY Coflt-a-lpment Isolation
\ ',ytlase A valve is NOT closed,
\ \. THEN manually close valve. IF
\valve(s) can NOT be manually
~Iosed, THEN manually or locally
[Solate affected containment
"'penetration .
."'Note: B.OP's.hould identify CV-3-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation
".,',\,
't.""
\\, not'.f(los~,d and manually close valve on VPB
\'0<\::., .,,:::>
1,1. ~erify SI Valve Amber Lights Manually align valves to
,On VPB - ALL BRIGHT establish proper SI alignment for an injection flowpath.
- 12. Verify SI - RESET Reset SI Step BOP
( 13. Verif Containment Phase A - RESET Reset Phase A 36
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _4_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-F 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fals to automatically act e r: quiring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, f . s t close on Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. Time Position Step BOP
- 14. Reestablish RCP Cooling
- a. Check RCPs - AT LEAST o to step 15.
RUNNING
- b. Open CCW to normal containm cooler valves Stop all RCPs Reps all will be secureq if running
- a. Perform the following:
- 1) IF containment spray NOT initiated, THEN AND manually initiate
- PR-3-6306B containment spray.
- 2) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B-ACTUATED.
- 3) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B valve white lights on VPB -
ALL BRIGHT. 37
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:_1_ Event No.: _4_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBL Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring an actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to clo on hase A requiring manual operation from VPB. Position Step BOP
- 16. Verify Containment an a.
Manually align equipment
- b. for Control Room emergency recirculation.
uld be in service within 30 minutes of a valid SI signal. They should I anner to support decision-making related to hydrogen generation I
-- -- - -- - - I I e Hydrogen Monitors In Service Using
-OP-094, CONTAINMENT POST ACCIDENT MONITORING SYSTEM Note: BOP will call NSO to ali n PAfM Step BOP
- 18. Verify All Four EDGs- EMERGENCY START any RUNNING available EDG NOT running.
38
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:_1_ EventNo.:~ Page~of~ Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure.", 'k. (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automaticallyactuat5ipfequi'ring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fail~f(o <;105e on Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. w' . / Time Position Applicant's Actions or Be Step BOP ft'*; -'"
- 19. Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV B,vs'es./and Load Centers
~/<" ,4 ,'0 if'
,,#P ".)/\.,*
Check the 3A, 3B and <:"_ ,,::i;'f'~"'< ".,,;
- a. 3D 4 KV buses - ALL Pelform te foJ.J6wing:
ENERGIZED '\',<..,//" 1)"'{'Qfornl(fhe Unit Supervisor th'al Atta.chment 3 is corrip.I,~t8vyith the exception of the'a~~energized bus or , Supervisor not to energize the de-energized bus or buses, THEN go to Step 20.
- 3) IF the Unit Supervisor decides to energize 3A, 3B, or 3D bus, THEN perform the following:
a) IF 3A 4 KV bus de-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-0NOP-004.2, LOSS OF 3A 4KV BUS. b) IF 3B 4 KV bus de-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.3, LOSS OF 3B 4KV BUS. c) IF 3D 4 KV bus de-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.5, LOSS OF 3D 4KV BUS. 39
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Page~of~ Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR;&B,,1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failuref" . (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically act~fe~equiring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fSlifs to;:close on Phase A requiring manual operation from V P B . / " ' , Time Position Applicant's Actions or Be~"av'~~"/" Step BOP
- 20. Notify The Unit Supervisor That T VERIFICATIONS Attachment I That Had To Be Taken Note: BOP informs US of completio AY~in A SI actuation, and CV-3-6275B closure
./...."..
Note: BOP should re;ceive'a . .tyrnover frotiJ*t,he*"R..O and continue in the EOP netwo'rk." . . .\ . ,..,
<:: '~,
( ( 40
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Page ~ of ~ Event Description The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR-S.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBL9CA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requiring!,>>1an~~ actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to clos~*bnfPhase A requiring manual operation from VPB. ..,#. . J .~
"?'?"=='<;;=====ll Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi~f/ -,,<;,
Note: US and RO continue in 3-EOP-E-0 at(st~'J6 Step RO 6 ~~:~~ ~~~P~~J~I~~T p~'fform th~ ing:
-'\\~ .J'!" .
'a,,,, Manu.aIIY4.apen valves to
~ta5li~J{two AFW pumps ru*nq. ~. n ~\,..
- b. IF an"I,\FW,.!?ump is tripped, I.HEN dfs(;>atc.q an operator tOlo.<;.~lIy ~et the AFW tu(J)inelri,ps.
- c. IF b~'ff1'units require AFW AND only one AFW pump is available, THEN perform the following:
- 1) Verify all RCPs-TRIPPED
- 2) Establish 270 gpm AFW flow to each unit.
- 3) Use a setpoint of 270 gpm for required AFW flow instead of 345 gpm specified in subsequent Steps and Procedures.
s were started in 3-EOP-FR-S.1 STEP 3 Verify AFW Valve Alignment- Manually align valves to PROPER EMERGENCY establish proper AFW ALIGNMENT ali nment. Note: Steps 6, 7, and 8 are critical steps: (WOG) Failure to establish minimum AFW flow before transitioning out of 60. (E-O, task F). 41
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_4_ Page 24 of ~ Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR,;!,6)<1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure./," . . . (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically act>"g'te.~equiring manual actua~i?n. CV-6275B, SG. B Blowdown isolation, !?ifs t~lose on Phase A requIring manual operation from V P B . ' \ . Time Position RO
~
(
- b. Maintain feed flow to S/G narrow range levels between 15%[32%] and 50%.
42
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ EventNo.:_4_ Page~of~ Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the A TWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-F RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (S 0 ). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actuate requirin m ual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, fails to cl e Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. Time Position Step RO 9 Check RCP Seal Cooling a. Check all RCP thermal barrier alarms- OFF
- A 1/1, RCP THER COOLING WAT
- A 1/2, RCP TH COOLING WATE
(
- c. Go to Step 10.
- d. Reset SI.
efer to ATTACHMENT 2 for component KW load rating Start one charging pump at minimum speed for seal injection
- g. Adjust Charging Flow To Regen Heat Exchanger, HCV-3-121, to maintain ro er seal in'ection flow Note: Ste 9.b transitions to ste 10 43
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Page~of 30 Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the A TWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fals to automatically act e r manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, f . s t Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. Ime Position Step RO 10 Maintain RCS Cold Leg Temperature STABLE AT OR TRENDI
- TO 54rF IF ANY RCP RUNNING LESS THAN 'mit tal feed flow to STABLE IF N 3 m until narrow
- RUNNING ge level greater an 6%[32%] in at least one S/G.
- 3) IF cooldown is due to excessive steam flow, THEN close main steam line isolation and bypass valves.
- b. IF temperature greater than 547°F AND' increasing, THEN perform the following:
- Dump steam to condenser.
OR
- Dump steam using S/G steam dump to atmos here valves.
Note: RCS continues to Coo/down due to S/ flow 44
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _4_ Page ...1L of ~ Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the A TWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-F 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically act manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, f s t Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. Time Position Step RO 11 Check PRZ PORVs, Spray Valves And Excess Letdown Isolated
- a. PORVs - CLOSED a.
Mo' Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-0, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES.
- 2) Go to 3-EOP-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.
IF PRZ pressure less than 2260 psig, THEN manually close
- b. valves. IF valve(s) can NOT be closed, THEN stop RCP(s) as necessary to stop spray flow.
- c. Auxiliary Spray c. Manually close auxiliary spray Valve, CV-3-311 - valve. IF auxiliary spray valve can NOT be closed, THEN close CLOSED Charging Flow to Regen Heat Exchanger, HCV-3-121.
45
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_4_ Page~of~ Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-F 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically act te qUlnng manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, f s t close on Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. Time Position
- d. Excess letdown isolation valves -
CLOSED CV-3-387, Excess Letdown Isolation
- Valve From Cold Leg To Excess Le Heat Excha
- HCV-3-137, c Letdown Flow Controller RO
- a. Go to Step 13.
- b. Go to Step 13.
ead SI Pump - AT LEAST ONE c. Go to Step R NG AND FLOWPATH 13. VERIFIED
- Reps rna be secured based on subcoolin 46
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_4_ Page~of~ Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the ATWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-F~?,8,.1. 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failur~/f/f'} (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically act~te ¢quiring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, t~frs ta:close on Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. ,."/""\.,\.." Time Position Applicant's Actions or Be9a\l~~~\/'/ Step RO 13 Check If S/Gs Are Faulted J,4'"
//
- a. Check pressures in all SGs'/ ff/' ;:ii/Go to Step
"'... ,., / ,/ f 14:
- ANY SG PRESSURE DE2~~A*S'irj.(3/*
IN AN UNCQJ:~.TROLLED MANl;JER
..'\\- ."\\,.,
~.:, . perfsro::!".:he fo II OWj2
' 1T*Mo.nitdt Critical $af Functions using
[ 3-E'OP~F-0 CRI1\I.C SAFETY FU~C!f10N STATUS REES
..I /
\\\," 2}/ES~ to '3-E*Ofl.._....,.,.,\,.,
f '\Y'"
'\" '. .i/* GE'M"ERAT.QR IS. TI ON, Ste
" >i.i/* * ..*...*.. f
""" Not~.: 13J.~ RNO sends you to step 14
"'\
la. Check levels in all S/Gs and secondary a. Go to Step radiation levels: 15.
- ANY SG LEVEL INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR
- Condenser air ejector radiation, R HIGHER THAN NORMAL OR
- SG blowdown radiation, R ( HIGHER THAN NORMAL 47
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_4_ Page~of~ Event
Description:
The crew will respond to the A TWS per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-FR 3C RCP continues to degrade resulting in seal package failure (SBLOCA). Train A safety injection fails to automatically actv9,; quiring manual actuation. CV-6275B, SG B Blowdown isolation, t9l'rls ta/Close on Phase A requiring manual operation from VPB. ..., Time Position Applicant's Actions or OR
- ERDADS SG or seconc;;ia'rYJ;adiation readings - HIGHER ~AN;~NORMAL 1",\,< \\.,
OR
- Local steamline radiation -"'Pi,IGH THAN N9FZ L \,
- b. Perform the foli"lD '~
- 1) Monitor Critic~\."s {ety F~Q;etions i'Rg",3-EOP-F-O, CRIT~.A:' SI)PEJ:A"~F'~~TI9N
( "STAq;~ TREES t,fiii '0"'/
~. *~*1*GO*t,<* 3-~OP-E-3':\~;~:(~ GENERATOR
- TUB~ R I PTURE, ~,te~\1 f '\ ~~
RO Perform the following:
- 1. Monitor Critical Safety
.Containment radiation -
'N,PRMAL Functions using 3-EOP-F-0,
'\.~ ",
Ca,r~nment pressure - CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES. NORMAL
- 2. Go to 3-EOP-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR Containment sump level- SECONDARY COOLANT, NORMAL Step 1.
- LI-3-630BA
- LI-3-630BB Note: RNO transitions to 3-EOP-E-1 Loss of reactor or secondary coolant. A crew brief should be conducted at the transition
( 48
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_5_ Page _1_ of J1L Event
Description:
The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST L Cooldown and Depressurization. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi r- - - --- - - - - -NOTE - - All Foldout page IS required to be monitored mm'lJrrnnm
- 1. ADVERSE CQNIAINMEXI CQNDITIQN:S If eilr!l!f" of ihe ccndicons !iSled be!ow occurs.
Con"linment ilI1:m::Ispl"lE're !e!l1perature 2. 18[1';; W. Conlarnnent r~on ley~ 2. 1.3;.: if} PJhr
~ ccmainment paran"1!?\.ers crop below the ilIboYe
!". oort!ainmen! in~ated doserooe has not exceeded 2.
3. RECIRCULATION :lytlE 8:1 QCKAGE If RHR Il'Jfl1P !low AND aMpS beOO'l"le. erratic OR abnormally low after fi;()\rtutaba, has been e.stablishlro.
!!!.§!11ran~'iol"l to ~P.*ECA*l. 1. lOSS OF mERGENCY COOLANT REClRGULA~tON. Step 1.
CST MAKEUP WATER CRlIER!I\* If CST level decreases 10 *ss ihan HJ%. JlifI'1 add miilkeup to csr u~ 3--Cf'.{l18. t. Condensaie SiOraqe Tank.
- 9. LOSS OF tlFF5tTE POWER OR 5! ON O1l!ER UNIT If 81 has been ~. aJ:ill. eitl"\E'f ofl'site power is Iosi.!JR 51 ~s on lhe olher unit. JlifI'1 reS!ore safequaro-s equ~ ID required cormgurZllion. Rel'Ei to ATTACHMENT 3 fores'SenliaJ Ioa!is.
49
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:_1_ Event No.:_5_ Page ~ of--.1JL Event
Description:
The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3-EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST Cooldown and Depressurization. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Step Monitor Conditions To Determine If Should Be Stopped Go to Step
- a. RCPs - ANY RUNNING 2.
- b. High-head SI pumps - AT LEA Go to Step RUNNING 2.
Go to Step 2. Go to Step 2. BOP Step l (*8. 1( Checlypr ((.'c,.; **.**"'.;,.;,*** ,
- a. IF any SIG is faulted AND
- t)J6 §.LG.,l?RJ;,~S UR. ."'~'. L that SIG has NOT previously been isolated, DJ~C REAS IN G"lf'I.te*At<J*
THEN go to 3-EOP-E-2, ()NCONTROLLED M\ NER FAULTED STEAM
\'%\ GENERATOR COMPLETELY ISOLATION, Step 1.
SURIZED
- a. Maintain total feed flow greater than 345 gpm until narrow range level greater than 6%[32%] in at least one S/G.
( 50
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_5_ Page ~ of-.JJL Event
Description:
The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3-EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LOC Cooldown and Depressurization. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- c. Narrow range level - LESS THAN 50%
Step BOP 4 Monitor Secondary R a.
- d. Go to 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Ste 1.
CAUTION PRZ PORV opens because of high PRZ pressure, it is required to be verified or isolated after pressure decreases to less than the PORV setpoint. 51
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_5_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3-EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LO Cooldown and Depressurization. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step RO 5 Check PRZ PORVs AND Block Valves
- a. Power to block valves - RestoreltQwer to block AVAILABLE valves . /. "'~
i"- -/
- b. PORVs - CLOSED F".I?Rz:. . p*ressure less than
*33~f5sig, THEN
*"ma:Qually close PORVs. IF
"~\ny v~. lve can NOT be clo~~d;\(HEN manually clos6<itsE;ltpck valve.
- c. Block valves - AT L ****"b"~[l~n(bl ock valve OPEN **C;'.*"'",. ynle~~ it was closed to
.p..
i;6!f3te an open PORV. RO RO Phase A and Phase B
"\
'.**"**"**t S ep\ '\"
'x,
~"\;;"\\-- ~"'\\" .'\:\,
8<';./erifY'l~strblfnent Ai r To Cpntainment\ .*
"Verify I~~tr~ment Air qontainment Isolation, CV 4803 - OPEN j
"Verify instrument air pressure, b. Restore instrument air PI-3-1444 - GREATER THAN pressure using O-ONOP-95 PSIG 013, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR, while continuing with this procedure.
52
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:_1_ Event No.:_5_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3EOP-E-1 Loss 9f\", Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LO Cooldown and Depressurization. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi Step BOP 9 Check Power Supply To All Che91(di~sel capacity '\ Charging Pumps - ALIGNED a<;lequ,Fi'fe to run three chargirt TO OFFSITE POWER ,/~urp'P's. IF adequate diesel g.a'pacity is ~.,9"'~vailable, rCiEN sh~c1fnopessential
,.,loaCl~.~efe~)6 A TTACH MENT 3,{or cOrY].ponent KW load ratln "
Step RO 10 Check Chargin~'fl
\
.gharging pU~ll:?S A T".r:'~~g*T*'" ..,~;fform Attachment 4
/~';f' ON*I::\.RUNNING (',if ",f"" a*"l~ establish charging.
",;'" .-'-:--;"""",~,\_ '\,\ ,/f
':",_ ~\ ~t_ '\,
Adjt4st ~peed contfoll~rs as neqss 'ry to estalljis!i'\
- b. 9,esir r ing flo~ tc)
/fifest~lJli~h S *~Fl.atjOn f~/yOndiHons' .,.".....*,/./
r,\, Adjust Charging Flow To G*R.~gen Heat Exchanger,
" *. HC\l-3-121, to maintain
\)9rop~ seal injection flow
( 53
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 c Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _5_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The crew responds to the small creak LOCA per 3-EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LO 'A Cooldown and Depressurization. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO ATTACHMEHT 4 (Page 1 of 1) ESTABUSH CHARGiNG FLOW
- 1. Verify CCW ROIW Alarms To A~I Rep Therm.a:I Barriers* OFF
- A. 1;1, RC;P THERMAL BARR COOLING WA""ER Hi FLOW
!W.
- A 1,'2, Rep THER'MAL BARR COCt.ING
','ATER Hi TEMP
!W.
- A. 113, ReP THERMAL WA "fER LO FLO'i'll If. o~;le pc!\'I'a" is l::lQI aVallable. II:W1
>;heci\ diesel capacity ade.quale ttl run <one chargil1{j PUI1ll. If dlesE" capacity is NOT
~.Iate. THE.'NSheci non*essential bads.
Refer to A 9'ACHMENT 3 lOr component KW load rating.
- a. !E offsiae power ~ ~ available, :wftI oiled<: diesel oapac1!y mquale 10 I'Iln addltlOnilii dl.arging pumps..,
c, AdjuSl: ChiWW~ Flow To Regen Heat E)(chal1{jef, HCV-3-121. to maintalm proper seal injection fiml Notify The thln: SUpel'\'50r That The ESTABUS*I CHARGING FLOW Atiachment
~s Complete Note: RO starts A and/or B charging pump 54
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _5_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3-EOP-E-1 Lossof, Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LO A Cooldown and Depressurization. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavio~,/ Step RO 11
/~/{I"\:~:>
Check If SI Should Be Terminated A"/"
- a. RCS subcooling based on "'8 . ./ 60 to Step 12.
core exit TCs - GREA TER,,/'.f THAN 30°F[Refer to jf
/'
Foldout Page Item 3 ~"
' / \\/,l/f'",'f Adverse Value]
- b. Secondary heat sink '\'S-:. I~either condition
~ati'Sfied, THEN go to
- Total feed:'fi*o~t~'*iI1t.a.£t S S/Gs -GRE TIi~J'~':(!::lAI\J 345 GPM "~"t.
~~<.~"'~,
OR
- li:##i_<~""-:-':"-'-;-;~:'''>:;_v;_,_,,~;;__ /
y
- Narro,,¥ range I \ el 1~.Fat 19t o~e intact giG" GREtAijER THAN\
6 o/lff3 2J1'o ] \ Try to stabilize ReS pressure with normal
- c. PRZ spray. Go to Step 12.
'{~. p'~el?sure - STABLE OR If.:JCR~'ASING PRi)f~'~el - GREATER THAN 17%[50%]
Go to 3-EOP-ES-1.1, SI TERMINATION, Ste 1 12 55
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _5_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The crew responds to the small break LOCA per SEOP-E-1 Lo of Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST C Cooldown and Depressurization. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Step RO 12
- a. Containment spray pumps ANY RUNNING
- b. Check the folio
- Emergency Filter Spray CLOSED lose Containment Spray Isolation valves
- MOV-3-880A
- MOV-3-880B CAUTION High-Head 51 ffow and ReS StJlbcooting are required roo be monitored. If ei~ High-Head Sf Row in~iI'8es or RCS Subcool'ing dec~ in <t11 l.mconrTolled .fMl1fl\e'l; the RHR pumps musr be manually resrarred wsupp}y wwterro me ReS.
56
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_5_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LO~;A. Cooldown and Depressurization. ,,/ Time Position Applicant's Actions or Beha Step RO 13 Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped
- a. Check RCS pressure - £I' IF RH~/flow greater GREATER THAN 250 ",i' than)jOO'~gpm, THEN
[650 PSIG] '\,~,. g9'{o ~p 15.
' ,. /f'/* .
- b. Check RHR flow - LESS THAN 1000 gpm
.j;'f!
- c. Verify SI - RB,S '
\
BOP ,-,....,. ;',.",,"""''~, " 14 Check RCS f>.nd S/G Pre res Observe NOTE prior to Step
* 'J
-..... /' -",;/'" 1 AND return to Step 1.
Ii
'\.,
- Ch~pl(' pressure.Jrt.~11
",. S1'A§,LE.Q.R INCRB;t'1:
'\ \. ' v i "" .,/' """
' \
- Ct.feck RCS pressure -
\ "\, Sr~BLE OR DECREASING
, '\,\'
/Yot'e,,: RC Squre should be stable St~p\
BOP 1$ I~hecklf Diesel Generators l lShould Be Stopped
/'~ a. Check the A and B 4KV
-l' a. Perform the following:
,,;,sF buses - ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER
- 1) Direct System Dispatcher to restore offsite power to Unit 3 startup transformer AND 3C transformer.
57
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_5_ Page --.1Q.. of ~ Event
Description:
The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3-EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST La A Cooldown and Depressurization. II -ri ..... e Position c
- 3) IF neither computer room chiller is running, THEN perform the following:
Refer to ATTACHMENT 3 for component KW load rating. b) Start one train of chilled water.
- 4) Continue with Step 15b.
- b. Stop any unloaded diesel generator and place in standby using 3/4-0P-023, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR Note: EDGs are secure per 3-0P-023 see next page 58
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _5_ Page --.11. of -.1lL Event
Description:
The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LO Cooldown and Depressurization. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 3-0P-023 6.1.2 Procedure Steps
- 1. Direct an operator to go to 3 Control Panel 3C 13A.
- a. Establish communication the Unit 3 Diesel Generator 3.
Diesel Generator Normal StoplNormal Itch in the NORMAL STOP position (spring return to normal).
- a. Verify the DG3B Engine Idling AMBER light is ON.
- b. As 3B Diesel Generator decelerates, verify the DG3B Ready to Start RED light energizes.
59
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: _5_ Page ~ of JlL Event
Description:
The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3-EOP-E-1 Loss"lPf" Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST Lqei\ /) Cooldown and Depressurization. ,/l/'//J/
,0/
Time Position Applicant's Actions or BehavioCfP/' Step \, RO '< 16 Verify Cold Leg Recirculation recirculation ", Capability Ity can NOT be verifi~<;j, go to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1, .
- a. Verify at least one RHR pump - AVAILABLE FOR / SS OF EJ\IIe~GENCY "COOLA~;rH~CIRCULATION, RECIRCULATION '. Sfet' 1piyl",/,i .
\, .. /\",)' ",,/0/
- b. Locally unlock and close the f01\owinsyoreakers
- 30605 foP'1\A'O\l~3-864B ""\\\1',
- 30615 fJ'~ MO '~750'" '~" , '\,
- 30616 for\'~O\ "~""%'~"'" I,. "'>,v:>
dl.":,,,q,,~06 21 fo r M\~ J~t-~19'1"II' 11.",.,/ ~;/
/,.f?
- 30'82, 6 fo r MdV-:t:89
/.l* . /" ..*.".'., **f.. \, (.
/1' J,e. Loc8,jly 4nlock and,cld~e the following breakers
.//6/ ... /" .~1~7Jf& for MOV-\ ~~A
\i" '. \ ' , j l ' / 30 1.:z'otof'1'VlOf;J2A
' \ ' 1 / , / / ** ,j'307*2*6"for'MQ~;Z-863A 30731 for MOV-3-751
',0732 for MOV-3-866A ally Verify Radiation Shield Doors - CLOSED
- Containment spray pump room
- Char in ump room
. calls SNPO to verify doors closed 60
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_5_ Page ~ of J1L Event
Description:
The crew responds to the S11all break LOCA per :>-EOP-E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LOC Cooldown and Depressurization. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step BOP 18 Initiate Evaluation Of Plant Status
- a. Check auxiliary building radiation -
NORMAL
- 1) Check plant vent process radia~.*/
monitor, R-14 "',
,~,
- 2) Check auxiliary building area radiation monitors to identify AND S,e leakage.
- 3) Check spent fuel p,ifS"Ftlf:-;JG-4 " ,
monitor"!." "t'.*, \ '~:'<
~"'"
i" ~)\(f ~bQormal auxiliary
- 4) Direct H.P. to surv~Y. th'Ep i~nOV\(.iD9* builCtiQg ra)diation is due' for abnormal radiation) " < a sig£J.if(cant loss of r coolant outside
- Pip~...~..vQ.l~e rOOm\i'i/'" inment, THEN go to J'~ "\'" -'c. __/_:,Y
./ji2fe~!ricat.,~eh~trati 0 n rQ;? m ~.iF 3-EOP-ECA-1.2, LOCA OUTSIDE
/.1:5<,£.er1fy cont~iinm\ nt hydr;~en\ CONTAINMENT, Step 1.
,f" ,rtlonitors - IN'S RVICE \ \
1/t '- (~ ,.-""",,;)'" '\ \
'\; ci~\~irect S~J'femi H9JlP.t\'S,~/for i.,,\ Sclt)p,ij.rig Q,f.th'e"RC.S ~"""7\' Perform the following:
/ J '.~
b. d:\\{~rifY<f~ergency core ~;oling 1) Verify PASS system
- corneortei~ts - OPERATING has been aligned using 3-
",\RO~.~.RN(\ OP-094, CONTAINMENT POST ACCIDENT Hl~h he~Cl*.:af,~ty injection pumps MONITORING SYSTEM.
~\'RHF pump's' 2) Direct Chemistry to
- i W}liary feedwater system obtain grab samples locally. components ..
,.ntainment spray system
,.Emergency diesel generators fuel Ji supply and starting air supply
,;/
- ICW system
- CCW system
- Emergency containment coolers
- Emergency containment filters 61
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_5_ Page ~ of-.11L Event
Description:
The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LO Cooldown and Depressurization. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step RO 19 Check If RCS Cooldown And Depressurization Is Required
- a. RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 250 PSIG[650 PSIG]
ESSURIZATION, Step 1. US crew brief should be conducted on the transition CAUTIONS
.. If WST level decreases to less than 155,000 gallons, the SI System is required to be aligned for cold leg recirculation using 3-eOP-eS-1.3, TRANSFeR TO C LD LeG ReCIRCULA TlON.
" High*Head SI flow and RCS Subcooling are required to be monitored. If either High*Head SI flow increases or RCS Sub cooling decreases in an uncontrolled manner, the RHR pumps must be manually restarted to supply water to the RCS.
.. CCW System load requirements of 3*0P*030, COMPONeNT COOLING WA TeR SYSTeM, SHALL NOT be exceeded.
62
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.:_5_ Page~of ~ Event
Description:
The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3-EOP-E-1 Loss Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LO Cooldown and Depressurization. II Tie Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior r -----NO~---- US L ------
- 1. 51 TERMtNATl(lN CRITERIA US lEail conditions liMed be!QI'I' occur, Il:IEli~ 10:-;"
- a. RCS S'~ling based on 00I"e exit i Cs - GR ~ER T
- b. Tetal ~ flew to intact SGs - GREATER THAN :3 intact SIG - GREATER THAN 6%[32%;
- c. ReS pres'!i\M'e - GREA" THAN lro::i PSIG[2000 pSi
- d. PRZ fe~ - GRE.A.T 1 2.
3. ed manner OR has col1'pieteiy d!epreli<surized" AND Ifuat E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOU\T1O'N, nefOR arI)1' 3rG has~i radiation, THEN manually NERATOR TUBE RiJPTURE. Step L
,B:ep 1:
Subw!t;:alit;: foIUClaM pm'tr - GREATER THAN 5% Core Cooling: Core exit TCs - GREATER THAN 1200'f . Heal Sink: Nam:rli range !;weI inil'!I BIGs - LESS THAN ~<J32%J AND total feed\~ bI- LESS THAN 345 GPM * - Inlegrity: Cold leg ~E' der.rease - GREATER ~ 100"F IN LAST 00 MINUTES AND any RCS roldi leg temperature - HAS BEI=...N LESS THAN 200°F
- e. Containment C;:;n;!ainment pre55UrI: - GREATER TH.;/l.N 55 PSIG IIDVER5E CONTAliffMEWf CONDITIONS Adverse oorl!ainMent oonditoos are cleifinedi as eik ill oorl!ainmenl al:tnosphere ~I"ilperat>.re greater than Dr equal 10 180'F OR cor1:alnrneni radiaticm levels greater iIlan cr eql.Mlii to 1.3)(10" R,'hr. ~ iIlE<Se wnd,b:ins the !>e1poim values in bracO;els, [l~ are reqUIred 10 be used. !E oontainment ll!mperaiure.
su~~iy falls below iW'F, THEN normal setpo-nl varRS may be U54:cL !E ClOOrtllrnMent radlatcn ievel suttsr~t!y tails be\ow 1.;r1ot' Rlt.r AND esc siaff has determined t?W the in1~ated doSE' to ron,awFnent is le<ss ti'2!n to Rads, THIEN l1erma se!;pOlrn values May be used. 63
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.:_5_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3EOP-E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LOC Cooldown and Depressurization. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step RO 1 Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped
- a. Check RHR pumps - ANY RUNNING BOP Perform'the following:
\Direct System Dispatcher to restore A"zfK\/'bu's'S*,*..***..~ . . \/".Qffsite power to Unit 3 startup transformer AND 3C transformer.
WHEN offsite power has been restored to Unit 3 startup transformer OR 3C transformer, THEN restore offsite power to 4KV buses using 3-0NOP-004.1 , SYSTEM RESTORATION FOLLOWING LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER. Check diesel capacity adequate to run charging pumps. IF adequate diesel capacity is NOT available, THEN shed non-essential loads. Refer to ATTACHMENT 2 for component KW load rating.
- d. Continue with Step 3.
64
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _5_ Page -1L of ~ Event
Description:
The crew responds to the small break LOCAper 3-EOP-E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization. II -rirYIe Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step RO 3 Verify PRZ Backup Group Heater Lockouts - RESET
- a. Verify the A 4KV bus-ENERGIZED
- b. Verify SI - RESET
- c. Place group A PRZ Backup Group Heater control switch in OFF
- d. Direct operato 0 ' "P9't"f<il((!:
'" the following ,
- e. Perform the following:
- 1) Place group B PRZ Backup Group Heater control switch in OFF.
- 2) Direct operator to perform the following:
a) Obtain key 29 from Shift Manager key heck the A and B 4KV bus - locker. BOTH ENERGIZED BY b) Proceed to 3D Load OFFSITE POWER Center Room. f. c) Place PRZ Backup Heater 3B Key Switch to EMERGENCY. Check diesel capacity adequate to energize group A and B PRZ heaters (450 KW 65
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _5_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The crew responds to the small break LOCA per 3EOP-E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant and 3-EOP-ES-1.2 POST LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior f Note: Following direction to the NSO to reset pr~SSUl;i'2~r inform the crew you now have the shift, rflmCjin' in pI not to discuss the scenario. ( 66
NRC XXIV- NRC- SEN- 1 OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO: Field Supv.: Outside SNPO: Admin RCO: ANPO: Unit 3 Unit Supv.: RCO: NPO: PI~"t Status Unit 3 Mode: 1 Power: 60 MWe: 420 Gross Leakrate: .02 RCS Boron Cone: 794 ) erational Concerns: U3 Antici Results of Off oin Focus Area:
I Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 60 % Gross: .02 gpm A 6615921'i\
- ~~~
MWe: 420 Unidentified .01 gpm B Tavg: 561.5°F Charging Pps: .01 gpm C
/~
RCS Pressure: 2251 psig RCS Boron Cone: 794 ppm
~
Abnormal Annunciators: Annunciator: Comp Actions: //// Annunciator: Comp Actions: ,/p//* i , / / F . , , , , , , \. ,,::> Annunciator: .f'... /f' ..///./ ...*.
",,\,,\..\,\\,
Comp Actions: Annunciator: *\".'v/ (~//f Comp Actions:
.:;:'f .;~=:" ..'."'.... ".
Annunciator:
",.\".\,..\\...,
Comp Actions:
'\.,\. \\.\' . '. .".'.'. . "".:;'.. . ' ' . .,..' .,~..." . . \\\,. .","",>>
Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator:
\\ \\\/f/i~,/ifF "'\""',4)'
Comp Actions: L~"~"" Annunciator: \\\ ii) '\ \ Comp Actions: /."/::::f J
~< \\\\,~::)
"pi' Annunciator:
///.l/l Comp Actions: ~\\ , ... ..
",~:***\,*if:~///f/'
Annunciator: ".,.'." .*..***,' . ,. . ,"',.",/.f'* Comp Actions: \*'\'i.*
,/l'* ....*,.,'.,.,' ""\'.." 1.,\",. '\"\"
Current t ' p e e Actiila Stlltemeil'l&: (Diles Not .Include "For Traekin. Only Items" lSA,~O Reaso . nco' "\ \ Entry Da . T.S.A.S I C.llq~\ . 1 i>~/ Reason: Entry Date: " T.S.A.S / Component, Reason : "\, Entry Date: T.S.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: T.S.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: T.S.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date:
Unit 3 Status erator Work Around Status:
TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Facility: Turkey Point Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 2009-301 NEW Examiners: Candidates: US RO Initial Conditions: Mode 1,50% MOL. 3C charging pump out of service due to packing Turnover: Equipment OOS: 3C charging pump out of service due to packi service in 14 hours. Thunder storms are in the area. Maintain 50% Online risk - green B train protected both units Event Event Type* No. (C)RO Unit experiences a loss of 3'P06 dQe to operator inadvertent TCE6DS1C=O (C)BOP operatiop.ofs((l?ply breaker. Cl'~:-V rn.~.,intains control of plant (T.S,C)SRO and ente.rs ~.;;S?NOR.;;.Q03.6 to restQre pqwer LT-3-115'~,aiIS,lov\riFli!,i~trng'a,.~ontinuo~s'~utomatic makeup. The crew r~sp(~nds to/~nn~ncli':11e,(,..~larh1A 4/6 that directs (I)RO 2 TFB1LTLV=T (TS,I)SRO them to 3-0~O~-O~,6*:4})\)1At:J7:U.~CJ)ION OF BORON "QNCENTR~TI'Of'\J C*eJNTROL SYSTEM and Tech Spec
.. "~3.1*:*2,,.1 and 3.'9, .2.Zt//
T~e ~B Intake~odlli,ng Water (ICW) pump experiences a TFKCSMB = T 3 s~ 'ed shaft. TDe crew responds per 3-0NOP-019 and 3-0P-
,.,e1 tart the" q'PY pump.
~------------------------------~I
.,ffPG~.rl19in stea~de safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401
***. (R')R:6" /" require the Cre " to reduce power to below 33% to comply with
('~}I?OP T.S. 3.7.1.1. The crew will be given the OOS information,
,. __ ._,- '-----.'~:,;,
'\\,(TS,R~\R. asked to validate the T.S. call and use 0-ONOP-1 00 to reduce
'~-
"'" *"r,}.Qwer to 30%.
"**t.Ulr 5 to 10% power change, LT 488 S/G B controlling level
\ channel fails high requiring manual control of FC-488 S/G B
"/(I)Bbp feed regulating valve (FRV) per the prompt actions of ots,llSRO annunciator alarm C 6/2, SG B LEVEL DEVIATION. The crew
-}' if refers to 3-0NOP-049.1 Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels.
( 1
TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and (M)ALL turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. The TFP8SWYD =T (C)BOP crew responds per 3-EOP-E-0 and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 3A TFQ5GAFS =T Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fails to start and can not 6 (C)BOP TFQ5B20A = T be started, 3B EDG starts but its output breaker close (C)SRO TFG1B86S = T requiring the crew to use the blackout tie. made to (C)SRO 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 following power restoration. (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
,Fc.;!",
Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #2
<\l;\" 4)~';"- ..."""",,:;}
Event 1 - Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to opera, inacIvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and eni~r~ 3':';ONO,P::'b03.6 to restore power
"... /
Event 2 - LT-3-115 fails low initiating a C9Jltlhl;JQ~~automatiG~*a.~eJ't:'l"The crew responds to annunciator alarm A 4/6 that dir~ct~..,tQe*rh*"tQ. ~-ONOP-02tfQ.;,4, ", ALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION COtJT~Ob. . .~yS"fEif¥1and Tee c 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2.
~,
\ \. -'~b>, < -'<'c.'
Event 3 - The 3B Intake Cooling Water (IC\/\() p\.lmp E?xp~rieQfes a"sn,eared shaft. The crew ( responds per 3-~,tJ,OJ2.;;g,: 9 and 3-GI,t:\J9"{~,$tart th'e'stqpl'aby pump. Event 4 - OOS main ~1e~~/'~ty valves":\RV<:(~OO and RV-1401 require the crew to reduce pspvde~)6'below ; % Jo comply'~itl\T.S. 3.7.1.1. The crew will be given the OOS iQ,f6rrpaiion, asked.. ito yalidate the \.S:\call and use 0-ONOP-1 00 to reduce Power'<tn 3'&\~... o.
~
c' ,. .............
'":' ':\:' ' ' \",g~
\,
'\', *,'..../f.// . . . . . . . . . "c., ** , . , , , . ,1/
Event 5 - After 5 to "hQ%fJowE?fchange, LI:;3~488 S/G B controlling level channel fails high
#"," "retftiirl[lg m~Fl~al ntrol of FC-488 S/G B feed regulating valve (FRV) per the prompt
./' ".* ac1i,Pns'**eiannl}lJc r alarm C 6/2, SG B LEVEL DEVIATION. The crew refers to 3-f/ ONa . 4~\,1 De~f or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels.
\
nt 6 - A lightnin \st~)\e caus spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of \he*pwitchyard. The crew responds per 3-EOP-E-0 and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0
,.,.... 3A Emerge~cypiesel Generator (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG
',starts but its OIJ~put breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout tie.
1\c,~nsitiQ.Fl/\ ade to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 following power restoration. 2
TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Scenario XXIV NRC 2 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-2 (50% MOL) Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIV_NRC_2.lsn Place simulator in run Start 38 charging pump and secure 3C charging pump "r '\~\ Trigger lesson step: SETUP - 3C Charging pump OOSft;~\')f~~TAB1 POSM = n.t-\\J"LIU
. pt" Place simulator in freeze.
Place clearance info tag on 3C Charging Pump sta ",p01tQh
",",//
Provide shift turnover checklists Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT)\f~ . ~B**Q, on VPA and at the RCO desk to the UttJiti~s<cs~(~ Fill in blender & shutdown boron additi;~\;1 car~~*:~t.eo.~.~;I'8'b~,~nder station. Data for each IC may be found in & Shut,O'}Jdelines*BGMJ1( in the simulator I/F.
\- ,~f
'\,
't 3
TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 1 - Loss of 3P06 Initiated immediately after shift turnover. Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters 3-0NOP-003.6 to restore power When directed - Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - LOSS OF 3P06 (actuates After one minute call the control room and report the inadvertent opening of PO due to operator tripping and hitting the breaker. Respond as FSITO, acknowledge direction to perform attachment 1 actions:
- 1. 2 minutes after direction to perform att EVENT 1 - STRIP 3P06.
- 2. After 4 minutes inform control room, energized.
- 3. Trigger lesson step EV RECLOSE3P06BRE K
...'L, ......... KERS 1 THRU 14.
VENT 1 - RECLOSE ed, Trigger lesson step, EVENT 1 - hen complete inform control room all on I ~~';'rrta'l"fd.n,a\! hem verify Pressurizer PORVs are closed essurizer level control selector switch is in position 3. ter v 'fic 'on, Trigger lesson step, EVENT 1 - HOLD IN RELAY LC-4 CX. 0 control room relay LC-460CX is being held in. en ower i estored to 3P06 and direction given to release relays, inform co tr room relay has been released. 4
TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 2 - LT-3-11S FAIL LOW L T-3-115 fails low initiating a continuous automatic makeup. The crew responds to annunciator alarm A 4/6 that directs them to 3-0NOP-046.4, MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL SYSTEM and Tech Spec 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2. When directed - Trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - LT-3-115 FAIL LOW (ac
= T)
The Crew responds per 3-ARP097.CR Step 1.b.2. - Respond as SNPO; acknowledge direction to che the Charging Pump room. After 2-3 minutes rep CVCS VOLUME CONTROL TANK screen. 3-0NOP-046.4, MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONC L SYSTEM Step 41 - Respond as responsible supervisor; ackno Step 42 - Respond as SM and ackn failure 5
TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description ( Event 3 - 38 lew PUMP SHAFT SHEAR The 38 Intake Cooling Water (ICW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019 and 3-0P-019 to start the standby pump. Trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - 38 ICW PUMP SHAFT SHEAR (actuates TFKCS The Crew responds per 3-0NOP-019 Intake Cooling Water Malfunction a,.Jl ARP 14/4 ARP - Respond as NSO to determine total lew flow Respond as ANPO to check requested pump for startin 5.2 ICvV Pump STart (Svstem ill Operation)
).2.1 IniTial Conditions
- 1. All applicable prerequisiTes as listed' At least one oTher IC\V Pump running.
IT rhe ICW Pump reqlllrecl for operaTion That 11ltake bel)'. ~ H:n(,' PrecFlutions'Ll
- '.:.: Procedure Steps /""',."
- i. Inform rhe ,;~-PO (f wlti;:h pl _ 0 be dlecked our r - - - - - - - - ...;\~~",.- - 't
! Tile ",quore Alirs- Cklimef,' motor hilS U/J{.H:9t unci ,,:] IOHifH s{qntOloss 0/)"1.
\
on'~" ori
\~.
Ie-' I I L___ .:.. J TO be sTflrtecl is open (mark the he IC\V Pump that has been checked out at VPA in the Control Room. The pump motor amp" decrease to less than 49 amps. discharge pressure of the pump started is between 11 psig and le8.c, Ilwn speC'iffe(i SilOUkl !love a PWO inlt/area iJut (Ioes not affect pump
- iA am! 38 have packlilQ leaiwff lines O/JservalJle paci(lllQ /eokoff SI101I/(1 lev\! Pwnp 3C doe.:; not hDve i:1 packfnQ Jeakcitf line OlJDervaiJie packmg fea/(off I ::;hOilici i)8 at feast J 20 (Ipr))
Chock IC\:I/ Pump seal p<lCking le~koff followtllg pump start S. \' enfy all log elltrie"pecifiod lJl Sub,eClioIl 2.:; haye been recorded.
- 9. Complete the QA Record Page for this subsection, 6
TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description ( 3-0NOP-019 Step 8b. Respond as NSO, Acknowledge direction to check TPCW supply header temperature, TI-3-1432 less than 110Fand trend. Report back temp. 89F and stable. ( 7
TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 4 - RV-1400 and RV-1401 out of service OOS main steam code safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 require the crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with TS. 3.7.1.1. The crew will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the TS. call and use 0-ONOP-100 to reduce power to 30%. When directed call 4906, inform the control room that you are the Operations pM " er. Engineering has informed you that a review of the "as left" lift settings for tl)~mq'il1 steam code safety valves RV-1400 and RV-1401 are outside the 1% tolerance of th~,/llft ~~.tti' and are now OOS. You have validated their data and you want the crew to cODfrrrY)~ttner.\,ments of Tech. Specs and reduce reactor power to 30% using 3-0NOP-100 af~/2%/min r~~ a'~oon as possible. ) "\\
/ / ' \ ,
,.$'" \,
If asked, the documented "as left" setting for RV-1400 is 1 'jg and RV-1401 is 113d\psi
\\
3-0NOP-100 Step 3 - Respond as system dispatcher; acknowledge TP' .Jc5~d,i,eduction to 30%.
, {t/
Step 7 - If call, respond as SM and acknqwled.ge request to ref'lr td\Q-EPIP-201 01 and O-ADM-115 '. \", ',.\."
'<-\,
( 8
TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 5 - LT-3-488 FAILS HIGH L T-3-488 S/G B controlling level channel fails high requiring manual control of FC-488 S/G B feed regulating valve (FRV) per the prompt actions of annunciator alarm C 6/2, SG B LEVEL DE VIA T/ON. The crew refers to 3-0NOP-049. 1 Deviation or Failure of Safety RelatC7cfc or Reactor Protection Channels. f/ When directed - Trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - LT-3-488 FAIL HIGI'I}(aq~Gates TFF1 MMABH =T ) , / l ' f""
/:" ,i!;{~i" '\\: '\>>.
If a unit trip is required during response to L!-~:48'8 failLrr,~, lll.~ crew will transition to 3-EOP-E-O, continue at E~J:f;JJ6 ',\. The Crew responds per 3-0NOP-049.1, Deviation or Faij Protection Channels. j/ f 9
TP-2009-301 Scenario #2 Event Description ( Event 6 - Loss of all AC A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbinelreactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 38 EDG starts but its output breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout tie to power unit 3. /,fl\ Following 5-10% power reduction Trigger lesson step, EVENT 6 - LOSS OF "~LrAt~actuates TFP8SWYD == T, TF05GAFS == T, TF05B20A == T, TFG1 B86S == T) ,/ ",J _f'l
,f/"
3~EOP-ECA~0.0 , # .
,l'"lf ,,"
\:\. -_L ~\-:-;, '\
Step 7.a - Respond as NSO, Acknowledge direction to locally re,ge~,A;EDG 10ckoiJ(rera~: After 2 minutes TRIGGER lesson step EVENT 6 - 3A ED" CKOUT RESET.' or:): back lockout will not reset. '\, Step 9.d - Respond as NSO, Acknowledge direction t~/r~c" y synchrop' B emergency " \ v, '\ diesel generator to 3B 4KV bus using 3-0Nce-0~2, EM.I2'R9. CY DIESEL GENERATOR F A I L U R E . " " " , /,/.f
","'',/
, Ji
- a. after 10 minutes, notify C~J2~r step 14 and t~,,?f~'()NOP-023.2 that the 3B EDG is running sat anq'Youwou,t~ like permisi5'i'Qn fu,!ocally energize 3B 4KV bus. """ '%,"
- b. following permission, TRI~~\~ les~~I"'>st~r'E'V'ENJ6 A EDG LOCAL OPERATION. After 3 minut'es f~for" "i3AiiQG qi:/tput breaker will not close.
#,;~,< ....-",.,., t /p jj/~ _',c:"_ ** ,,,{p-
/1' /" ";;;;":. It,, \%:f h
' ,::,,//~
Step 11 - Respond as f)lISq,J'Ack.Q0wl~dge dire,tioQfto locally open breaker 30S06 on MCC 3D. Aft* tylinutes T~IGPER less~n Sllep EVENT 6 - OPEN 30806 BREAKER.
) ./ \, \
Step 12.e - Re, s NSO; <;!~kn~yYl~~ge diree iOr1'\to locally open MOV-3-S43A or MOV 'S,~3 After JjY'minutesiffl'ot,cl' ,eo to stop, TRIGGER lesson step EVENT 6
-'M.o:.~:p43~00PE'N.'Re,pgrt vyJJ1'en completed.
'"."f/' ""'",,/
as t\J;>O;';a~knowledge direction to locally close:
'\~\/,- ~\,
Va Va C Seal Injection Manual Isolation Valve
- MOV-3-381, RCP Seal Water Return And Excess Letdown Isolation Valve
- MOV*3-626, RCP Seal Cooling Water Outlet Valve 10
TP-2009-301 Scenaril #2 Event Descriptiln Step 24 - ResPlnd as NSO; acknlwledge directiln tl reduce DC Ilading as using ATTACHMENT 3. 3-0NOP-04.2 J"\ Step 12 - ResPlnd as unit 4 RO, clnfirm 4D 4KV bus Plwered from 4B 4KV bus:.".4B ~KV bus is being Plwered frlm unit 4 . J-- //~"-
¥
,P- /'
/f';/'" <"
\'l~
Step 13 - ResPlnd as unit 4 RO, acknlwledge request tl place all nl'G'nn"ih~'\~aieguards equipment ln 4B 4KV bus in lff lr pull tl Ilck. Replrt bac /r;:,inut~'that\a" nln running safeguards equipment is in stlP lr pull tl Ilck.
"'\
Step 14.b - ResPlnd as unit 4 RO, acknlwledge directiln !"" 4AD07 breaker. After>45 ~.~ TRIGGER lessln step EVENT 6 - CLOSE 4A,,!)Q eplrt 4AD07 breaker cllse~, \.
/'
- (J Step 17 - ResPlnd as NSO, acknlwledge directiln tl ~~a kertargets exist ln 3A 4KV bus breakers. After 4 minutes replrt no\ n 3A 4KV bus breakers.
3-EOP-ECA-O.2 ("
\
Step 7 RNO a.2 - ResPlnd as NSO, ackno\tVI8'c;J e 'r~cti;n tQ perflrm,flttachment 1lf 3-EOP-
\,- \. " ~ .. "'.-. --"
ECA-O.2 tl align unit 4 RWST tl unit'O SI pu,rnp
.....j
\. f' "'"
\ "0" '0,, ".,'".j;';;?"',.""
\. h 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:..2.. Event No.: _1_ Page _1_ of JL Event
Description:
Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters 3-0NO - 3.6 to restore power Time Position Applicant's Actions or B Trigger lesson step, Event 1 - LOSS OF 3P ROI Determines and reports loss of 3P06 ba BOP
- Loss of power to channel 1 i
- S/G A FW control shift to ma
- S/G C FW control in lockup c
- US pi 3P06 e open prior to ti1e {QSS of JPOO, B T or low pressurize.r pfeS$Uf'e.
- - - - - =_ . _ , . - - - - ,_,. - =_ - - __ I NOTES I RED) channel indicffOOnlcontrols are 9ffected by failure of I Endcrsure 1 provides a listing of lost functions" mdlee/ions.. and I controls. I
- - - ~ -~ =- - - - -- - - --,. -,. -~ _ ...
Check If A Rl1_tor Trip H.as Occurred Perform the f¢lk1WiI'1J: a, IF a reactor iiiI' is ~jred. THEN
~nualtlliripthe~ ~~
3-EOP-E:.a REACTOO TR!P OR SAFEW INJECTION. ViI1ile continuing I,i~h this procedure.
- b. IE reaCIonrip is.wn: required. IW;!i go\)OS~2.
Note: Crew should be able to control plant during restoration of l power without the need to trip the unit. Foldout page directs restoration of ower. 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:_1_ Page L of JL Event
Description:
Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters 3-0NO - 3.6 to restore power Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US
- 1. Dispab:.1h an operator to restol1e power ioJiPiJ6 using AIt
- 3. Jf. a ReaClor Trip has OWI$'!'~.llIaf. perfonn It;
- a. C,ose MOV-3--1407
- b. CicseMOV-3-1408
- b. ClO$e MO\J-3-14lJ9 BOP
. place ALL breakers to OFF. including mam panel powered by CS Inverter at 4P06A Vital Instrument AC Selector SWiTCh m [he m.
.d by the CS Inve11er. ~ noufy the Nuclear PlanT SuperVIsor.
CAUTION DO NOT proceed with this procedure if 4P06 is powered by the CS Inverter. IF 4P06 I, ::-lOT powered from CS Inverter. I!!!d! place SPARE lllverter CS ill service 10
,upply 3P06 Viml Instrument AC BU$ load as follow,:
- a. At Vital Instrumem Panel 3P06A III the Cable Spreading Room, place Vital Ul,munellt AC Selector Switch 3POOA to the ALTERNATE stJPPLY STA...'lDBY STATIC INVERTER CS (AC LINE) position.
2
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _1_ Page l of ~ Event
Description:
Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters 3-0NOP:003.6 to restore power Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behav' ATTACHl\IE:\,T 1 (Page 2 of2)
RESTORATTO:\' OF 3P06 VITAL INSTR If System Output Breaker, .CBS. ha~,j overcurrent condition and the amps'I.t:ion.
- ptoom when aU breakers are closed.
III the 3
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.:_1_ Page.£ of JL. Event
Description:
Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters 3-0NOP-003.6 to restore power Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATIACHIHE:\'T 4 (Page 1 of2) PRE&SL'1liZER LEYEL Al\'U PRESSURE (,ONTRO Pressurizer level s/Jould be monitored do during perfotmance of tire following steps to hearers or causing a hi level trip . PCV-3-145 is in AUT II loss of 3PfJ6 shooJd be 1... _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- 1. Perform the foHowing:
11 Le1d01NIl Fmm Regen Heat Exchanger Isolation C\'-3-204 High Pressure Letdown Isolation From Loop B Cold Leg. LCV-3-460
~Vll orifice Isolation valve to e;t.abhsh desired flow.
Comply with the 6-houf Acnon b of Techll1cal Specification 3 A.3. Presstlnzer. e~<;\ln' IS NOT increasing wllh heaters energized. ~ proce'l"d 10 Rack 20 front ~ ve dle power fuse from the front ofPC-444 C&D to dose the Pre~5urizer Spray Valve};, 4
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:_1_ Page ~ of l Event
Description:
Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters 3-0NOP-003.6 to restore power Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATTACHMENT 4 {Page 2 of2)
- 3. !!: the above preferred method of energIzing pre~s
~ succe~sful, ~ JYfoceed as follows:
a. b.
. valves were removed in Section L Step 2. THEN PC-444D in Rack 20. -
.2, PRESSURIZER SYSTa1.
Perform the foRowing:
- a. 1£ ReS solid, THEN petioml the foi!O'Mng 10 prevent Rep damage 8!::!Q.
mainl<ilin RCS pressure:
- 1) Stop AU Reps
- 2) Stop and start charging pumps as necessary to maintain Res pressure.
- b. 1£ RHR coolIng is in service, AND .
MOV-3-750 is closed or stroking closed, l.I;;iD:! stop the oper<ilting RHR pump(s} AND go to 3-0NOP-050, LOSS OF RHR, while contiflUing with this procedure.
- c. IF OMS is in LOW PRESSURE OPS AND PORV-3-456 is required to be open for pressure contrrn, THEN manual action shal! I}e taken to control RCS pressure.
5
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 1 Page ~ of L Event
Description:
Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters 3-0NOP-p03.6 to restore power Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 3 Control Pressurizer Pressure As Follows:
- a. Reduce chargwl<J fl.oW to mirTmum required to maintain Rep seal Injedron using the 38 OR 3C charging pumps in MANUAL spd control
- b. Chec.k Pressurizer PORVs - CLOSED . less than selpcint PORVs. IF anv bedosed~
s hiockvaive. r-'--------- - -. I . I Excess Letdown. I RO ill Verny Dr.,erl to V'iDS, C'/-3-.38'3. is aligned to the VeT (switch to NORMAL)
- 5) Slowly open Excess Letdow'fl Flow Control Valve, HCV-3-137.
(,) CbE.e Excess Letdown Flow Control Valve . I-1CV-3-137. T) Open Excess LTON Stop \/,,1',18, eV-3-3B7
- 8) Open Excess LTON Flow Contro!i-er.
HCV-3-137 AND adjust flow to control Pres.surizer Level 6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-..L Event No.: _1_ Page L of JL Event
Description:
Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters 3-0NOP;~03.6 to restore power ,.f?, Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTIONS Reducing feed flow to less thall steam flow by 6 reactor trip due to low level trip logic on Channell A~~ f
- Steam Generator JA level controls are in MA&J{JAL~ffd JA FW Bypass Valve fails c l o s e d . .. '*,*,*/*
3A Steam Generator Level Recorrier is &~rEN~~GfZED. SteallJ Generator 3C level controls are in AUr~OC1\Y
~'*-
Main Generator load should /)e maintained as §table Control Valves are res tqyefNq, Auromatic control, . "" I
"- .. _---=-- - -';. . '<'-;~ -
"NOTE/"
~
....;;;:',~II!if._. - -
'~~'<-,:":: - . ",."-_.",,,-.--;;;.,---- -:\-:;::.""'-'
I (A'Jtro,{)"S})~:~'};i(~:nfJm }nAf,([O'~'i4 He. L ~:~/'--
.~
,Jti/'- .:;....
, '"""",~
"!l"<<~ - - -
BOP of The Following Plant Parameters - 1£ any reactor trip SBtPOlrJ\ is approached or exceeded, THEN manually trip the reactor 8!iQ pelform 3-EOP-E~8, REACTOR TRIP Tavg OR SAFETY 'INJECTfON.'Nhile continuing
- Reactor power with this procedure.
- Pressurizer Pressure Pressurizer V'V'ater le"isl
- Steall1 Generator V'/.3ter 'Ievel 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:..--L Event No.: 1 Page JL of ~ Event
Description:
Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters 3-0N9P~093.6 to restore p o w e r ' # ' .,f Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi US 7 Check Power Restored To 3POG T be restored to 3POj3 27-'-._ _ p:liccm the actons cal SpBcrfrcations as
~PS.
Note: Ste s 1 thru 7{,rAiil}b~.reviewed unii)~ ~~~r is restored.
\~:;...,:;:~~~:.:; "'"
'0'",
Auto/Manual controller~\sh power has been completely r6tsto
¥ Id e returi1'ed",to ioto until vital
'~"-,~<~~
\ "' ,,:I'J-tAuto station, the AUTO iight should s the tviANUAL light should turn on nanuEI conlrol of tile process IS 8
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:_1_ Page JL of JL Event
Description:
Unit experiences a loss of 3P06 due to operator inadvertent operation of supply breaker. Crew maintains control of plant and enters 3-0NOP-,003.6 to restore power /"\} Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO/ 8 Restore Equrprnent To AUTOMATIC BOP Controls As Follows:
- a. Pressunzer Pressure Control using section 2 of An ACHMENT 4
- b. Steam GeneTator Level control as
- 1) Manuallv control feed i'iow to ret steam generator to required band plant operating mode 2:1 M;cmuafly adjust feed flow to match stean~ flo\!\<'
3) 4) control is NOT available £:lB desired, ltJ.f!:i m.31ntain controls in MANUfl.L
- d. Perform the actions of the appropriate Annunciator R.esponse procedure for the affected alarms.
US 9
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: L Event No.:_2_ ,Page _1_ of l Event
Description:
LT-3-115 fails low initiating a continuous automatic makeup. The crew responds to annunciator alarm A 4/6 that directs them to 3-0NOP-046.4, MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL SYS and Tech Spec 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2. Time Position Applicant's Actions or B Trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - L T 115 FAIL RO Recognizes/reports unexpected alarm unit supervisor (US). BOP Performs actions of 3-ARP097.CR man wet variable leg, I RO Step 1. ical & Volume Control System
- 3) djust LC-3-112 AUTO setpoint potentiometer until demand be 'ns to indicate greater than zero, read the pot setting, en turn to previous setting.
orrective actions:
- a. IF LT-3-115 has failed high, THEN take LCV-3-115A control switch to VCT position.
- b. IF actual HI level, THEN perform the following:
(1) Verify LC-3-112 adjustable setpoint at 37% - 40% AND LCV-3-115A diverts to HUT according to program. (2) Verify LCV-3-115A fully diverts at 86% (reset 76%) 10
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.:_2_ Page ~ of l Event
Description:
LT-3-115 fails low initiating a continuous automatic makeup. The crew responds to annunciator alarm A 4/6 that directs them to 3-0N 0 p::aLf.'6A , MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL SAfSTEM and Tech Spec 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2. /f'" //"y
,y-' ;~\
J! Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi~{
- a. IF LT-3-115 has failed high, THEN tC?J<~~:~V-3-115A co~ifrol switch to VCT p o s i t i o n . , ,/' /",p' ".\,
- b. IF actual HI level, THEN perform tj;lE:{foliowing:
~:,::,/'" ,:::,d'P' /J;;}Y"'\'<:,
(1) Verify LC-3-112 adjustab:l:~setl(oint at 3"&,P/~ -90% AND LCV-3-115A diverts to HUT acco,[din*gto f:?j,6'rfl'.
~\\-- --,.
'<'0;.,
,.:/"
(2) Verify LCV-3-115A fully diverts/at "- 86%, C' (3) Verify propeJchscQing-letdown flo~ b"* level, THBf'J rfo~rtrht~,e following:"'\, i, (1) At 4%, verify cg."J2~rnl>.q!:l~tion sWRP 0 RWST, LCV-3-115B"o ,s AND:lCV-3-1"t*5C cle> s.
\\ -;:~. , ,f s"':" .,:::,/:/'~ "'~:;:''' """"c:;~:,
J~),.\L,~~fy auto ma~e¥ Jat~.,.isgreater~tit:Pf1 charging flow.
""f ii. "V'l
~~,)",\L~rify\suction s~urcli.swaps back to VCT at 11 %.
F LT_3:i~121jpr -115 f~ii d;'.THEN take action using 3-0NOP-046.4, ~A~fUNCTIO I\BORON CONCENTRATION CON1R°ItSYSTEM. ;;
"\;\_. ._/I '
f ,c_._ ' o
**.* ,c ;;;";.,".,,,**,::,,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,.:.,._ .::::::::/P"
' i ' e. R9'fer to,Teci:1.,S ec 3.1 1 and 3.1.2.2.
~d~:'Rq~;rifies based on LT-3-112 indication on ERDADS and
\i~l-3"'.l15 indication on VPA that L T-3-115 has failed low.
'\,,- "\:" ..--.,*.
. MaYipiree,t SNPO to check L T-3-112 local indication
"'_" v~;
-""". --,,-/
to T.S 3.1 .2.1.and 3.1.2.2 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page ~ of l Event
Description:
LT-3-115 fails low initiating a continuous automatic makeup. The crew responds to annunciator alarm A 4/6 that directs them to 30NOP~;0:4614, MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ~;:fS1JzM and Tech Spec 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2. //( (/
\-,
Time Position Applicant's Actions or BehaviGYf 3/4.1.2 80:;;;A nON SYSTEMS FL(l'lV P,l:.,TH - SHLfTOOV'4h! 3 1 :.1 .:"5 a !'*,drnm/\TJ, one of the foliowing boren irJecliclI1 flow paths shai powei,"?O freT" an :')PERASLE ernerger<iy' pO*J.'er
- a. A flow pa.ti'l from, the be(,oaclo sto pump 10 the Rea':.tof Coolant Sy'sle O='ERA.B_E. or o
APPLiCA.81L1TY
'edf)'in::;1 th.:lit the temperature of the rooms con!aiimng 110'11 path
. equal to, 55*F when a flow path from the boric acid taslKS is uSA2d.
r 31 clays by verifying! ina; each valve, {manual. pC'Ne r-operate<i , 01 "wi.omat,*o) at is rot locked. sealed. Gt cd1rerwise secured in position. i.sin iisooneic1 12
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_2_ Page ~ of l Event
Description:
LT-3-115 fails low initiating a continuous automatic makeup. The crew responds to annunciator alarm A 4/6 that directs them to 30NO~.70'4\6,A, MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL S STJ?M and Tech Spec 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2. ,) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Bpn~nllQ F:E';CTI\/ITY CONTROL SYSTEMS
*a The SOUTce path 'from", boric. o3,:,,;d storage ta;n~: via a boric pump s\iotion', and At least one d tile two sOllrce p.ath.
s,uctic,n: ard,
- c. The f.e*OW path from theoh",rging rR1mp re*geT'le*r aiive heat e.~.changer.
( 1. 1% ;14;/\1; at 2QO'Fwithi'l the ne:d 6 hOllrs; restore the boraton
.;w*o stc4age jan~; to OPERA8LE stalus within the next 72 hOllTS witnT! the next 3D hours.
oath OPERABLE or th*e regenerative heart exchanger flow oath resiorE :he requir-ed flow p,,-,ths to OPER.ABLE status ...",ithin 72 hOUTS or
- ':FAHD8Y and borated to a SHUTDO\NN MA:RG!~~ equi'"alent 10 at "east i%
Ih*" next 6 hOllifS: resiO're at ,'east l'1'iO boratonsourcE pams to OPERfI.8LE next 72 hours or be in COLO SHIJTOOVVN within the next 3D hOtlfS hh,r."h'"* s<thlrce pa.thfrcma borloacici s.torage tank and the charg;ing pump discharge regenerative he",! exchanger inoperable . .,liihin 'One rDuf inAbate boration to a MARGIN jo 1% J.klk at 200Fanci;;lo i.o GOLD SHUTCHJWNas soon kn~1,'""'I'. ."".,, 'Of t"',e Deration and press,.irizer Ie veJ cemt"'1o! functions of the 13
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _2_ Page -2.. of l Event
Description:
LT-3-115 fails low initiating a continuous automatic makeup. The crew responds to annunciator alarm A 4/6 that directs them to 3-0NOP- 4, MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL S T and Tech Spec 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2. me Position US Determines T.S. 3.1.2.1 does not apply, and US Directs actions per 3-0NOP-046.4, M CONCENTRATION CONTROL SY Step RO 1 Check Boric Acid OR Primary Water Makeup Flow Rates-ABNORMAL Note: FR-113 and F flow 9.4 gpm an Transitions 'to step 28. on wet variable leg and a common dry reference e if the common dry reference leg fails. ch ging and letdown flow; therefore. a transient determine which level transmitter has failed. _____________ -J ck For VCT Level Transmitter, LT-3-115, Go to Step aili Or Failed High 31.
-115 - ABNORMALLY HIGH
- LI-3-112 - DECREASING DUE TO FULL DIVERT OF LCV-3-115A e: transitions to step 31 Check for LI-3-115 Failing Or Failed Low Go to Step 34.
- LI-3-115 - ABNORMALLY LOW
- LI-3-112 - INCREASING DUE TO AUTO MAKEUP OR STABLE DUE TO LCV-3-115A DIVERTING 14
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I \ Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_2_ Page ~ of l Event
Description:
LT-3-115 fails low initiating a continuous automatic makeup. The crew responds to annunciator alarm A 4/6 that dirocts them to 3-0NOP;.k14'~4, MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL S)fSTlZ'lVl and Tech Spec 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2. i'//"
,.f/'*
4' Time Position CAUTION . .,'; ,/' \,\. '\ With no operator action, LT-3-115 failed low flow could result in overpressurization of ~J\.!~J;'/ WJ.th/~§l~ flow greater than Charg;~~\.. e- ,c' I-------------~~~~-
~:\:"
NOTE****", >.\*.. . .l'
..,,::/'
Failure of L T-3-115 low will result in the fol/owing: '\
"l"''''':'~ ""'\{~
- Annunciator Alarm' 41 ****'!'HliL.r;; LEVEL.
- Auto makeup starts, Ell!!
\, -'-:'"",,~,;,,-:.-,
- LCV-3-115A m o d u l a l i n \ \ { e contfbi:levef at the VCT Level Contrqller. LC-3-112. se i n ' t , , \ ./
/#""#')C~"""'.-<:::,>>::>,,<~:,,,,~,,- '-.c. '\/
, - - - ~ -~, - - - - -,.l...... - - - - - - - - - - - --
RO
\,
US
\,. R'eport AI quipment Failures OR Malfunctions To The Responsible II Sqpervisor t
l~: t!,'forms wee and SM of failure ofL T-3-115
"\ ..*,1"'42 Notify The Nuclear Plant Supervisor To Evaluate Plant "vi Conditions
- a. Refer to O-ONOP-046.3, LOSS OF BORATION FLOW PATHS
- b. Review Technical S ecifications 15
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _2_ Page ~ of l Event
Description:
LT-3-115 fails low initiating a continuous automatic makeup. The crew responds to annunciator alarm A 4/6 that directs them to 3-0NOP;.G2f'6$4, MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL S;e'STIiIVl and Tech Spec 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2. /J'.J ,/ Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi~r ~ec t o.--\___ Step ~\~$ RO I J" 43 Check Repairs To Equipment Complete a ....*............\ain VCTI~fvel*.~~ performing one of e folJ.oWil)g:
- IF dVG;j"'i'evel transmitter E.~ perform manual makeup '~"" nec.~ssary using O-OP-
""" . 046, CVCS'\,.BOR9N C"* ENTRA,ldl'1, CONTROL.
'\,/
(
- IF due to primary water or boric acid flow related problems, THEN repeat Steps 4 Through 26 as necessary to maintain VCT level and proper boron concentration.
- b. WHEN repairs are complete, THEN continue with Step 44.
( 16
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _3_ ,Page _1_ of ~ Event
Description:
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (lCW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - 38 lew SHAFT SHE BOP Identifies I Reports indication of 3B ICW pump' Note: Sheared shaft is identified by th
- 38 ICW pump current dro
- Red indicating lamp lit BOP BOP 3-: P-019, Intake Cooling Water rdinates with the NSO to start the second ICW pump. If m is started using OP, pump start section of OP listed for e next page.'
teo Crew may elect to use 3-0NOP-019 to start second pump. If NOP is use ski to a e3 of 10 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.: _3_ . Page -2.. of ~ Event
Description:
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (lCW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 5.2 ICW PlUUp SImi (System ill Operation) 5.2.1 Initial Conditions I. All applicil hIe prel'equisi tes as listed ill Se 2.
- 3. IF the lew Pmnp required for that intake bay. THEN verify 5.2.2 Procedure Steps 1.
-r----
2, plttllR.,to 1' started is open (mark the been checked out at VPA in the Control Room. or amps decrease to less than 49 amps. Chec~ that the disc arge pressure of the pump started is betwe<!ll 11 psig and 35 pSlg.
------OO~-----------*
less all specified should have 8 PWO initiated, but does not affect pump I W Pumps 3A find 38 have packing leakoff lines. Observable p<1cking leakoff si10uld b at least 20 dpm W Pump 3(; does 1101 11£Ive a packing ieakaff fll?e. Observable ~)[jckif)g leakoff siJOuid /)13 at least 120 dpm. ______________________ 1
.., Check ICW Pump seal packing leakofffollowing pump ~tart .
- 8. Verify all log entries sp<!cified in Sub~ection 2.2 have been recorded.
- 9. Complete the QA Record Page for this subsection.
( 18
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _3_ .Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (ICW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs response per 3-0NOP-019 CAUTIONS Step BOP ( 1 VE?riry'7\II'+Qtake Cooll
"/Wa!er ,!.2b,lmp'\t\larms -
- 1. Have operator check pump(s) f OrF \1 " locally
/,/,'/,/. I 4/1, ICWP,A/B/C
. Determine affected intake cooling MOTOR OVERLOAD
..d,,/f _.,-"-:",-<,,,., -, _____"""_.;_,_" __,_-:\~-- water pump .
" I ~12,_ ;/,.,;:::::;;--IQWfi>"f\/BLC T RIP.?
-'~:,¥s , ":,"~<<';"';:,.";;;;;".<//;' 3. Start standby intake cooling water I:~, ICWP AlBIC pump.
0T,OR BRG HI TEMP
~
- 4. Stop affected intake cooling water pump.
'+
Qheck Traveling Screens - CLEAN Go to 3-0NOP-011, SCREEN WASH SYSTEMII NTAKE MALFUNCTION
- Alarm I 3/3, Traveling Screen HI llP - OFF
- Traveling Screen DP - LESS THAN 7.5 INCHES OF WATER 19
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--.£.. Event No.: _3_ . Page ~ of --.1JL Event
Description:
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (lCW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. The crew res onds er 3-0NOP-019. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 3 Verify Intake Cooling Perform the following: Water Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING started from N dispatch erform the
- 3M 19 for 3A ICW pump.
3AB17 for 3B ICW pump.
- c. IF no intake cooling water pumps can be started, THEN perform the following:
- 1) Maintain component cooling water temperatures using 3-0NOP-030, COMPONENT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTION.
- 2) Remove reactive load from main' generator.
- 3) Shut down components cooled by turbine plant cooling water using 3-ONOP-008, TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTION.
- 4) Return to procedure AND step in effect.
20
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.: _3_ . Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (lCW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step BOP 4 Verify Intake Perform the following: Cooling Water Pumps - TWO RUNNING c) IF unable to reduce total ICW flow through a single ICW Pump to less than 19,000 GPM, THEN reduce Unit Load using 3-GOP-103, POWER OPERATION TO HOT STANDBY, to limit heat input into the TPCW system and throttle ICW flow to the TPCW Heat Exchangers using TPCW HX Outlet Combined ICW Iso Vlv 3-50-401 until total ICW flow is less than 19,000 GPM. d) IF a single ICW Pump has operated at flows greater than 19,000 GPM, THEN refer to 3-0P-019, INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM. Note: BOP starts 3A ICW PP and secures 3B ICW PP 21
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (lCW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior I~---------------- NOTE I An operable intake cooling water header consis supplied by at least one intake cooling water I Step BOP 5 Verify Adequate Intake Cooling Water Header Flow:
- a. Check alarm l~f:lf;'ICyY. 1. Dispat . . . ope{.~tor to investigate HEADER AlB [j ES~."". . ~~for intakeC<<~ling\water system
-OFF 1~~.9ge. \\\'\
'<::,>>,<::~:, '"., dr~,)
""':;'-';/"<<", __ * """<>*t
( ,/,:<"_ J/~ """"~'>>'%, y/IF sta'rtltts . @ti"available intake cooling water pump will NOT
,.:0 qpec~.)nt~'ke Coolin overload an EDG, THEN start
,Water 1'-l'Eja
,/l" ~:J#/:' GREATeR available intake cooling water pump(s) as follows:
/ PSIG,/
'\"\
", /. ./P*I~3:J.6.W.
\",'\/f: l?r~'~~ 16 2 ~ ...."'. '<. / J a) IF offsite power is NOT
'/, ""\\ available AND diesel generator load is greater than 2250 KW, THEN shed smaller loads until diesel generator load is less than 2250 KW.
b) Start available intake cooling water pump(s). c) Restart any loads which were shed to allow intake cooling water pump start. 22
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-.L Event No.: _3_ . Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (lCW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 3. IF leakage is foul)d;fTbl1iN ~'erform the following:' . ..,..,
intake c water pumps
'an ign V<;lJ necessary to es1~bli'~t:t,arl .,. ". . t one operable intaK ..'~ water header.
Step BOP 6 Verify Intake Cooli~ ... ~~'IT(}J: the fO~Id\IVi~9~"\ Water Header Press LESS THAN OR Ed\1p\,
~~':pisRatc p~ra~r16 investigate
<'focilnta'k,El cooijPlg water system
( T o g>5~J2~.",1 SG '\\
*.,I:l'fockag e :'",.Jf
..,. '<'~'" '\, h/ ""
PI-;?",1619 _f/'- \..
~J!5I-3-1620 ~. IF blockage is found, THEN align
/ \ valves and start intake cooling
\+water pumps as necessary to establish at least one operable intake cooling water header.
CAUTIONS
)" PO - .4882", or POV-3-4883 must be locally opened using the hi}[Jdwhel,. ther) the Technical Specification 72-hour action statement for\m inoper;fj.iffe lew header is required to be entered.
Verify proper intake cooling water lineup to turbine plant cooling water heat exchangers:
- a. Check Safety Injection on Unit 3- terminated
- b. Verify both ICW to TPCW Heat Exchanger valves- open
- POV 4882
- POV-3-4883
( 23
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _3_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (lCW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTIONS .,,# J{/' If not corrected promptly, reduced intake cog~i';~,.vf~ter flo 0 th~ Turbine Plant Cooling Water Heat Exchange,rs mjflY result in da.age' to vital plant equipment. I' , \ ; , _d"; BP Step 8
\</,4/ J:<<>
§i,)
"', ""'" " .f / ........
Verify Cooling To Turbine Plant ", Di're"et operator to locally Cooling Water Heat Exchangers: )~rfort;!l the following:
"""'.c. "c_.
- a. Check alarm I 5/4"rpC~!j1 1. IF: as not reduced TEMP/LO PRESS':, 0 '.," '~i, d u g h ICW Pump
"""'". flow, IlljEN)open TPCW .
- b. Locally check Turbir"~ PI!ant / " " " OutlelCombined ICW Cooling Water Supply,\Helder sola n Valve 3-50-401 Temp~r9Jure, TI-3-143'2 -I+E,~5i/!/ a 'Ie/c'essary to mal'ntal'n TH~fXj'1'1 0'0')=,,< \,,/,/,/
ii/,."'. .\\ j Turbine Plant Cooling
<;,/(os;afly che<;:(k li:urbine P I , Water Supply Header p/9ooling Wa" r ~upply He 1. er\ Temperature less than Temperatu , J'I-3-1432 - S\TA~LE 110°F AND maintaining
OR DEC SINe3', .;} required minimum ICW
\, f"f lY
,.J' flow through the CCW v,\, "".}'
"<~~ HXs.
- 2. Verify proper heat exchan er ali nment.
CAUTIONS
'yf rlpt corrected promptly, reduced intake cooling water flow to the r;ol1[lponent Cooling Water Heat Exchangers may result in damage to
}Vitq1 plant equipment.
/" .<,
Verify Cooling To Component Direct operator to locally Cooling Water Heat Exchangers perform the following:
- a. Check alarm H 8/5, CCW HX 1. Verify proper heat OUTLET HI TEMP - OFF exchanger alignment.
( 24
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (lCW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- b. Check Component Cooling Water /",
Supply Header Temperatures - LESS 2. IF bask'et ine, THAN 120°F d iffl?f,~~ialr press ure,i,~
~f~a!~r than 1.5 psid,'\
- TI-3-607A
'///'. '. IjEN refer to 3-0P-01 ~'~,
- TI-3-607B /' ,~ection 7.0, for '",
"," 4// backwas' instructions '
{: :'~: '
',', /
- c. Check Component Cooling Water,\\..\" /
Supply Header Temperatures - ' \ , . / ' STABLE OR DECREASING
- TI-3-607A (/:~:::'"" "'".',!,~
\j.
' \ '::"""e,~~"""",_, , . ~"*:,,~~,,;:,,:,-,,/,,,
"" ""'~
C~:~::::k:t strainer' ~\reOld;.re;;:~s
- d. THAN 1.5 PSID
( .¥,-,!::"#i""":""~'<;:~':,,,~ \\o;-,f"'- ":p,,f- '<%~",:::f'
*PI-3-140D\
?,~j .,'.
PI-3-1 .1
- dPI-3-14,e)2
- dPI)4940
~:,. ,f",;:::,::iX~.~,:~,,*:,:=<:,<~; _q",_
Step /'
"<::.~~~~_ 'l.
O'f\Liairtt",in Cooling For Turbine Perform the following: rra[lt OQoling Water Heat
- 1. Remove reactive load Excn~nge~f3:
from main generator. Chect<i'/alarm I 5/4, TPCW HI TEMP/LO PRESS-OFF Locally check Turbine Plant 2. Decrease turbine load as Cooling Water Supply Header necessary to maintain Temperature, TI-3-1432 - LESS Turbine Plant Cooling THAN 110°F Water Supply Header Temperature less than
- c. Locally check Turbine Plant 110°F.
Cooling Water Supply Header Temperature, TI-3-1432 - STABLE OR DECREASING 25
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.: _3_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The 3B Intake Cooling Water (lCW) pump experiences a sheared shaft. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-019. Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step RO 11 Maintain Cooling continuing with this procedure.
- TI-3-607A
- TI-3-607B Verify Current Plant Alignment Meets Technical Specification Requirements Step US 13 Return To Procedure AND Step In Effect 26
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _4_ Page _1_ of -.JL Event
Description:
OOS main steam code safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 require the crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. 3.7.1.1. Th~ crew will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the T.S. call '#d':)lse O-ONOP-I 00 to reduce power to 30%. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi0f,..*
\\., 04>>~' .<:\,., "\\
US Receives call from the Operations ManagerdE;.t.e*r~ines both R\A1,~O and RV-1401 are associated with the 3A S/~"'refers to T.S. "\"i 3.7.1.1.b
.ilf ' ,.,ifl ;.
Note: determines with 2 code sa,efie; OS on ol)e s.~G, a power reduction to < 33% is required. T.i~. 3;*'l~1. 1 inC;J(/df7t:1 next for reference. 'i*.,,\... f**/ .i"#'/'/
* , \ \ , . / ***
-if 3.7. U All main steam line Code safety valves associated with e rh."generator shall be OPERABLE with 11ft settings as specified In Table 3 :.)~' .*.***. """",
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2, a ACTION: With (3) reactor coolant loops and iQq.,.~.nd :;~;jth one or more main steam line Code safety valves inoperable, and
<~""-- /-
- a. ,), with a positiv perature co;~i~~'~t, operation may continue provided ur'S.,either the ino s) are restored to OPERABLE status or the Power Range igh Trip Setpoint to the maximum allowable percent of RATED THERMAL IER IIsted'tn Taqle 3.7-1; oth in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in OT SHUTDOWN wilhm the followi oderator Temperature Coefficient: or in Mode 3, with a per~ture Coefficient. operation may continue provided that.
*fgl are restored to OPERABLE status or reactor power is
'um allowable percent of RATED THERMAL POWER listed in T STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN TABLE 3.7-1
\,\\", MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER LEVEL WITH
\JNOPERA.BUi*hEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES DURING THREE LOOP OPERATION
'\ !:
MA:XIMliM NUMBER OF INOPERABLE 1 . $AFETY VALVES ON ANY MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER LEVEL OP,ERATING STEAM GENERATOR (PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER) oj' 53 2 33 3 14 27
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:_4_ Page ~ of l Event
Description:
OOS main steam code safety valves, RV -1400 and RV -1401 require the crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. 3.7.1.1. The crew will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the T.S. calta:6d:vse 4'*- J" O-ONOP-l 00 to reduce power to 3 0 % . '
;I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi9j/'
TABLE 3.7-2 VALVE NUMBER Loop A Loop BLoop C
- 1. RV1400 RV1405 RV1410 16
- 2. RV1401 16
- 3. RV1402 16
- 4. RV1403 16
( -The lift s at nominal operating temperature and pre,
/
/'
f,t are within +/-'I% of the lift setting value listed in Table 3.7-2. ontrol Room Personnel Using Attachment 3
,,"a.re: ~*'2.%;;n(n rate should be used as directed by the Operations
'\ Malta.,ge~>,. 9 gallons per % shoLJd be used for the boron
'\ calcutatfun to determine 180 gallons required at a rate of 18
'gallons per minute. The remainder of attachment 3 will be "reviewed with the crew. Attachment 3 included next for
.l reference.
28
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: L Event No.:_4_ Page ~ of.JL Event
Description:
OOS main steam code safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 require the crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. 3.7.1.1. will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the T.S. c O-ONOP-IOO to reduce power to 30%. e Position Applicant's Actions or ATTAClL'IE~T 3 (Page 1 of 1) FAST LOAD REDCCTION T.S 3.7.1.1.b
- 1. Reason for load reduction __________________________ ~~--~~L--
- 2. Target power level 30 % Power Time to Shutdown from 100%
Load Reduction Rate MWimin Load Reduction Rate ')/Oimill 1 %! min Ex lected Tavg/Tref j, T 1°F 3. I* mpletely withdrawn and I t (use a value between 9 and 18 rl'B,.joa,d'f,iduction from full power). i _~_ minutes = ~ gallonsiminute. ter and Contingency Actions ted' T band. not to exceed +/-1 OF of expected. slow ramp to restore ballel. 8/ . ROD BANK LO Ll\UT alarms. the load reduction shall be slowed.
- 6. iteria - :'vhumaL reactor and turbine trip:
- Tflve 6 OF :> Tref
- Rod Insertion Limits (RIL) are exceeded
- 7. Review' required actions from other procedures cUlTently in effect (example. stop Rep).
- 8. Questions or crew input?
- 9. End of Brief
( 29
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.:_4_ Page ~ of l Event
Description:
OOS main steam code safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 require the crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. 3.7.1.1. will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the T.S. c O-ONOP-IOO to reduce power to 30%. Time Position Applicant's Actions or B Step RO 2 Begin Boration
- a. Set the Boric Acid Totalizer value determined using Attachment 3
- b. Set FC-3-113A, ric Acid Flow Controller. 0 a p of 8.0 e determined amount of nder by performing the ned amount using l11.l1ueric keypad. 180 Press COUNT A.
Press LI:NHT 1 and verify desired am01.Ult was properly entered. (7) Press COUNT A. 30
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-.L Event No.: _4_ Page 2.. of l Event
Description:
OOS main steam code safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 require the crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. 3.7.1.1. crew will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the .S. all and use O-ONOP-l 00 to reduce power to 30%. Time Position Step BOP 3 Notify The Following
- System Dispatcher
- Plant ersonnel usin Step ROI BOP 4 Reduce Unit Load
- a. Check for borati (reducing Tavg
- d. Stop or slow power reduction to control temperature. If necessary, place control rods in manual and maintain Tavg within the expected Tavg/Tref ~T of Attachment 3.
fter a 5 to 10 % reduction in load go event5 eJ:l 5 Monitor Annunciator B 8/1, ROD Perform the following: BANK LO LIMIT - RESET a. Slow load reduction until alarm is reset.
- b. Re-evaluate boration amount and rate and make adjustments as necessary.
31
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _4_ age~ofl Event
Description:
OOS main steam code safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 require the crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. 3.7.1.1. The crew will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the T.S. call and use - OP-100 to reduce power to 30%. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Beh Step US 6 Notify The Shift Manager To Refer To
- 0-EPIP-20101, DUTIES OF
- 0-ADM-115, NOTIFICATI r--------
I I Axial ffux difference is allow entering O-OP-059. 9, Operati
-----.1 ROI BOP
- a. IF directed by the Unit Supervisor, THEN increase charging flow as follows:
- 1) Throttle open TCV-144, NRHX Temp Control Valve, bypass valve 3-834 to raise flow to approximately 600 gpm.
- 2) Start an additional charging pump.
- 3) Place an additional letdown orifice in service .
. Verify load reduction rate and b. Stop or slow power reduction auto rod control is maintaining to control temperature. If the expected TavglTref baT necessary, place control identified in Attachment 3 rods in manual and maintain Tavg within the expected TavglTref baT of Attachment 3.
32
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.: _4_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
OOS main steam code safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 requirethe crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. 3.7.1.1.,l'h~):rew will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the T.S. .lfi'!'can _ al4'd use j,l~ O-ONOP-IOO to reduce power to 3 0 % . / / \,/ Time Position Applicant's Actions or Beh~t Step j/ RO .:/'--'- pi'-" 8 Ener ize Pressurizer Backu He9l't~r~/'# Note: step 9 does not apply, onlycl{,e/16ed pump ning.
.,\
~-",-,
P-' - - - - - - - - - - - ~ --~'-~...... - I NOTE',,,\\.*,\,,,V" I Boration should be slopped above the target power IEN!'~l to pr~jY'
--------.-....-------- -j- Y'>:",,,---
-_\
..:\
Step RO '\ 10 \. Go to Step Monitor Turbin~\L~d Wi rh, 10*~~Ot...:r:~rg 11. Power Level StoJ;? tI1,~ bo~a{[o!)/a ollows:>
.....""".. q.'..~j.... \\. '\/.,/,./,./J'
./ ' 9~..Pt?lc~'*the Reacft?r M9i'~up Selector Switch to
/ ..fI*,i' ,/,,#'//AUTO,'" '\
/J" ,j" b. Se~iFC !3-113A, Bdric~cid Flow Controller pot setting as desired \ ~.
", \. 4.t(/~lace"lne"Hc.SMaJ<~;ij Control Switch to START N~ite,;, Sh~~/d place reactor makeup switch in STOP due to L T-3-115 fai/ute, Target Load - LESS THAN 450 Mwe Check Station Service Loads WHEN directed by the Unit Supplied From The Startup Supervisor, THEN transfer Transformer station service from the Auxiliary Transformers to the Startup Transformer using Attachment 2.
( 33
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _4_ Page -.JL of JL Event
Description:
OOS main steam code safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 requirethe crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. 3.7.1.1./7nt8;:Few will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the T.S. c'n '!J¥d use O-ONOP-IOO to reduce power to 30%. f Time Position BOP Step 13 Check Auxiliary Steam ~o}f'- directed by the Unit Supplied From Another Unit "J' ~,u ervisor, lJ;E;:N align
~,uxiliary sts;asupply from
" "i" II", art'Q!her)tlfl' ing Attachment
'\~,--. ",.. , ",/
I
~----~--------~-~-------, ,
" NOTES "i,.
"\ I I* Boration should be stoP1?ed?rget power level toprev$(lt excessive boration.
or at 2: 25% power if the unit 'it line., "<1, I. Remaining procedure stepls sh riate fOI:1h.e int~nded power level. . I L _______ ..\_ _',:::::: _____ J ( BOP ,,*~';!-~,'" C"Xx___
--"\<\\:,
(-
\". /-
t+t'lU~" LO,~d Reduot,~on(
- a. Verify Turtpine load le.,ss \han - 450 MWE l.i'\,'
- S;9'" oJi1i~,b~§lter drai pgmp
\, b. Y~rif'y,"+urbjDe than - 400 MWE
"'<,~~",<:"f:::/ .",f; ----:~'~'>><<:'>>l~
1)vPlace the Feedwa er Pump Turbine Runback Defeat switch "to DEFEAT
-'-~~,,% X_"'_ ';;;\>\;,
2'J\Sto'RJhe SGFP with recirculation valves open
\\\ -"~~\"l
- 3) Plap~J'SGFP recirculation valves control switch in the CLO'SED/AUTO position Verify Turbine load less than - 300 MWE
- Stop the remaining heater drain pump
- d. Verify Turbine load less than - 275 MWE
- Stop one Condensate Pump
- e. Verify Turbine load less than - 200 MWE
- Place the running SGFP recirculation valves control switch in the OPEN osition Note: may secure 3A heater drain pump and 38 condensate pump 34
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:_4_ Page ~ of l Event
Description:
OOS main steam code safety valves, RV-1400 and RV-1401 require the crew to reduce power to below 33% to comply with T.S. 3.7.1.( J!l{e rew will be given the OOS information, asked to validate the T.S. c {'all( use O-ONOP-IOO to reduce power to 30%. Time Position Applicant's Actions or B
- f. Verify Turbine load less than - 150
( 35
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _5_ Page _1_ of ..l Event
Description:
L T-3-488 S/G B controlling level channel fails high requiring manual
* ""P",
control ofFC-488 S/G B feed regulatmg valve (FRV) per the proU1pt"> actions of annunciator alarm C 6/2, SG B LEVEL DEVIATI9M."' J;Jl.e crew refers to 3-0NOP-049.1 Deviation or Failure of Safety'Related or Reactor Protection Channels ;.1 \\, Time Position Applicant's Actions or Beh Trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - LT-3-488 ~~I{ J;Jl H BOP Recognizes and reports the failure of. t:'f3/488 to US
~;:::/' ,l'P Note: BOP determines failure bai'bf! JpQn th"., 0;,
indications: '\,' >\',f"/# ,/,;f
"'" 1
- L 1)'/: 88 pegged high"pn'V~A
'/ >\~::::::::;:, "\
- S~iq.tion ala//n\.C\;,?
_,_/....v0";X'~::~:,.">.'x:B _/'/; '0'<<:::,,<,._
". -'\. \C. \_
f unit trip dr;curs du 'ng,attempt to restore SG B level transitiOn to EVENT l I
.I BOP 'al control of FC-488 to control SG B
~ mke manual control of leYel ~ retnm ch<:'cklllg the following:
!eYel LI-4S6 or LI-488 vs kVe'J program from controlling first stage pre>>
(VPA)
."n.e"',','", actions IF alarm is due to instrument failule, THE;'\" refer [0 3-0:\fOP-049, L DeviahoJl or Fadme ef SaflO!" RlOlated 01' Reacrer Prote'ction Chamle-Is Directs turbine load reduction stopped and response per 3-0NOP-049.1 36
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _5_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
L T-3-488 S/G B controlling level channel fails high requiring manual control ofFC-488 S/G B feed regulating valve (FRV) per the pro~pt > p:\:- actions of annunciator alarm C 6/2, SG B LEVEL DEVIATI01)llfh}i)"crew refers to 3-0NOP-049.1 Deviation or Failure of Safety Relatetro~/Reactor Protection Channels ,f'" Tim Position Applicant's Actions or Behav' e I.... -------------- NOTES .
- Momentary spiking of a channel thai quickly r imminent channel failure. The bislables for . a c nnel shou/d./6e tripped position as soon as possible. with a maxlrr;umde/ay lirry,e'6f for further investigation by I&C. '>"'/'"
- Instrumentation failure may occur in such a mann'eK. as instrumentation loop to devia! the actual monitored or extreme amount. Sucl may be in a direc protection or safety related ot occur on thaf"if]
though the se/point for the tr; u by the a"
- - - I Step BOP 5.1 Verif /ih~t;'~~9'rlt loop fail re 1:5 . mparison to adjacent loops and k rJA:>t§Titrqarclr eters an(:l C<<hditions.
? ~
g/ /' p ,/
§i>1ep{(
BOP "5,,2 \7',[ify nopff:no 'st on the adjacent channels which are 0 remain ir
"~'St~ P '> ""
LJ ,;~,',*** " **** ,J '~\<;> "', ""\'::""':' :':~
*"~.,.3 ~.~rify a'IQpli~a~le control transfer switches are in the position which ehQ'lina+/-es ui 'Ie<t, loop.
Of transfers 38 SG L VL CaNT XFER switch to chan 11/ L T-486. t
);l~ control function was placed in manual control due to the failure, lJrfEN verify the control function is returned to automatic.
i;..;_, .;/ Step US 5.5 Refer to Technical Specifications 3/4.3, Instrumentation, AND verify the minimum channels operable. 37
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-.L Event No.: _5_ Page ~ of --L Event
Description:
LT-3-488 S/O B controlling level channel fails high requiring manuaJ control ofFC-488 S/O B feed regulating valve (FRV) per the pr t) actions of annunciator alarm C 6/2, SO B LEVEL DEVIA TIO .. ,'W /' e crew refers to 3-0NOP-049.1 Deviation or Failure of Saf~tt'Rti!ated or Reactor Protection Channels Time Position US FUNCTIONh UNIT 11
- 12. 1.2 Feech\3ter Flow Mismatch BOP IF any . Fe~~water COh\rol\Valve is in Manual control due to this fail~. Fe, naEMlogd~~VV:~~. Should be maintained as steady as e.ossigleuJJlil~11 FeetlwQter Control Valves are restored to
"\jfAutEimatic co"nftb+:.",,,.,,.//
*'~.16 .te a Plant Work Order AND notif the I&C Supervisor.
I~-~~--~~----~rl-~~~-
\fo". "
ot~: WheqS/C3 B FRV returned to automatic and T.S. referenced,
\..Event &.can be tri ered.
38
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _6_ Page _1_ of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Ge ra r (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it ut t breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ( Time Position Applicant's Actions or B US Directs response per 3-EOP-E-O RO Step 1(lOA) -Verify Reactor Trip
- Rod bottom lights - ON
- Reactor trip and bypass b
- Rod position indicators - AT
- Neutron flu -~EASING
,,'"\""t:~",
BOP Step 2 (IOA)Verify Turbine ",'
'~
a Manually trip turbine. IF unable to verify turbine trip, THEN close main AFW steamline isolation and Start bypass valves. time b Manually close valves. IF any valve can NOT be closed, THEN close main steamline isolation and bypass valves.
. Check Mid and East GCBs - c Manually open breakers. IF OPEN (Normally 30 second breakers do NOT open, delay) THEN actuate EMERGENCY GEN. BKR.
TRIP SWITCH for the affected breaker(s). 39
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: --.L Event No.:_6_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/re(lctor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Gep{f"\ r (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it§tOtit t breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ~i.e~1' Time Position Step BOP 3 (IOA)Verify Power To Emergency 4 Check the 3A and 3B 4 KV
- a. buses- performJJ;(6"f~llowing:
MAINTAIN AT LEAST '.
/"
../f
/".J' ONE ENERGIZED '\"" "",,-.,. "",","'// ,i'//'~;'
"1 )At~~mpt to emergency
\\~ta' y Unit 3 ffit:.ai e diesel ge"
'< ***~) IF n A nor 3B 4
.......~\{ . Qus energized,
/ . ******,::[HE!';J"go to3-EOP-
,// E-C;;t\-~O.O, LOSS ALL AC p/ POWER, Ste 1.
Emerge~cy:lstart wm"qe'}:msuccessfuIA and B EDGs are lockedlwtl ,./'" '; transitiod..to Y:-EOP-ECA-O.O
~-, '-,
*./ ' .:,00'0'.'" """"_;;;;"'_;~'':~::
US (v or;1se,p.~L3-E c)P:E '=0.0
--------------------. NOTE I
- 2 are IMMEDIATE ACTION steps.
\,.
T;~es are required to be monitored for information only. FRPs shall NOT
'§d.
--------------- ______ 1
-Verify Reactor Trip
- Rod bottom lights - ON
- Reactor trip and bypass breakers -OPEN
- Rod position indicators - AT ZERO
- Neutron flux - DECREASING 40
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_6_ .Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but its t t breaker fails to close re uirin the crew to use the blackout ti ime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step BOP 2 Verify Turbine Trip
- a. All turbine stop a.
valves - CLOSED
- b. Verify Moisture b.
Separator Reheater Steam Valves - CLOSED
- MSR Main Ste Supply Stop MOVs
- 1) IF breakers do NOT open, THEN actuate EMERGENCY GEN. BKR. TRIP SWITCH for the affected breaker(s).
- 2) IF breaker position indication is NOT available AND turbine speed is NOT decreasing, THEN direct Turbine Operator to perform the following:
a) Obtain key 17 from Shift Manager key locker. b) Locally trip Mid and East GCBs from the switchyard.
- 8W33
- 8W68 Note: MSIVs may be closed in step 2.b.
41
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _6_ Page -...1.. of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/re<.l-~tor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel G)J:ler~>9r (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but itoutpttt breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ti Time Position Step RO 3 Check If RCS Is Isolated
- a. PRZ PORVs - CLOSED
- b. Letdown isolation valves - plliGally close valves.
CLOSED C,",~,. '\,
"'\\-
"\
- c. Excess letdo~n\;ts,plano'f'l .. c. ~nua{ly close valves.
valves - CLO\>ED" *. , ' "
- CV-3-.387, E;\~~'\ . Let Isolation Valve\Frd
. **"i~'~t,'f;;,Q Excess'h..et
///,/"'I'teqt EXchanger \
/,/' "'\1"
//
- HCY' 37, ExceS$
Let.ao Flow Contrpll Check"A.l?W pumps - AT a. IF both units require AFW, TWO RUNNING THEN perform the following:
- 1) Establish 270 gpm flow to each unit.
- 2) Use a setpoint of 270 gpm for required AFW flow instead of the 345 gpm specified in subsequent steps AND rocedures.
( 42
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _6_ Page 2. of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Ge (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but its breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ti Time Position Applicant's Actions or
- b. Verify total AFW flow -
GREATER THAN 345GPM V ify proper alignment A valves. IF ali me t NOT proper, THE ma uallyalign es necessary to ta 'sh proper lineup.
- 3) IF AFW can NOT be established, THEN restore AFW using 3-ONOP-075, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, while continuing with Step 5.
- (TC-PRA) Failure to trip AFW pump B or C ithin 6 minutes of initial startfollowing a loss of main edwater when both pumps are running on AFW train 2. Also ritical in other applied scenarios when one hour limit is exceeded CAUTIONS
- If SI has been reset or SI actuation occurs on the other unit, safeguards equipment needs to be restored to the required configuration.
" If an SI signal exists or is actuated during this procedure, it must be reset to ensure restoratIon of a power source and to ensure controlled loading of equipment on the 4KV Bus.
43
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.: _6_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard 3A Emergency Diesel Ge ra r (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but its ut breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ti . Time Position Applicant's Actions or NOTES Attachment 5 prol/ides a reference for Ern I _ If a Sequencer failure has occurred an SI breaker may not ciose unless SI loS resel. L.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Step BOP 5 a. b.
- c. Go to Step 6.
- d. Manually start equipment as required.
- e. Implement FRPs as required, unless this procedure was directly entered from outside the EOP network.
Return to procedure AND step in effect Note: BOP uses attachments 1 and 2 to verify bus stripping then transitions to step 6 from 5.c RNO. Attachments 1 and 2 listed next. 44
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: 6 Page ~ of -.1L Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/re,!ctor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel G~)l~~~)or (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it~/6~t,pUt breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ~ie:' . Time Position BOP lE 3A 4KV Bus is de-energized AND 3D 4KV B Blackout Tie Permlssi."e Blue light '5 ON AND 4. lE 3;1\ 4KV Bus i3 de-energized AND 3D 4KV Bus is P"rmlssive Blue L":Jht i'3 mT THEN venfy the following 3AA22. 3A 4KV bUB THEN venty Feeder To 4K\i Bus 30.3/1./'\17. is open. Blackout Breaker., 3A,D07. Reactor Op6'(al0[ to open Station Blackout Breaker. 4.4D07.
\/"nry breaker for Intake Cooling "<Vater Pump 3C. 3ADOS. is open.
V"riry breaker for Component Cooling VVater Pump 3C. 3AD04. is open. lE breaker for Intake Cooling "Nater PtJlllp 3C. 3AD05. OR breake c for Component Cooling 'Water Puml 3C. 3AD04. C,l!lliQI he opened, THEN open Feeder To 4KV BliS 2,0, 3AA17. AND Supply Frtlm 4K\-'-Bus 3."" 3.11DOI
~Iojdy Unit :3 Reactor Operator that 3A 4KV bus stripping is complete.
Note: BOP will perlorm the verifications of step 2 and 3 then notify RO 3A 4KV bus stripping is complete. ( 45
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _6_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 38 EDG starts but its ou breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout tie. Time Position Applicant's Actions or B BOP A TT AC HMENT 2 {page 10i1) 1 !E 3B 4KV Bus is de-energized.8.l':i.Q. 3D 4KV BllS i Blackout Tie Pem1issive Blue Itght is ON A!:iQ.
- 2. !E 3B 4KV Bus is de-energized AND 3D 4KV Bus i Permissive Blue Light is OFF, I.!:!§;! venfy the followin
, is closed, ~ pariom1 the fol1Qwing:
Unit 4. Reactor Operator to open Station Blackout Breaker, 4ADO? Intake Cooling Water Pump 3C, 3ADD5. is open.
!E breaker for Intake Coohng Water Pump 3C. 3AD05, Q.8..breaker lor Component Cooling Water Pump 3C. 3AD05. can!iQI be opened. ~ open Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D. 3AB19, 81:!!:lSupply From 4.KV-Bus 3B, 3AD06. .
Notify Unit 3 Reactor Operator thai 38 4KV hus stripping is complete. Note: BOP will perform the verifications of step; 1 and 3 then notify RO 3A 4KV bus stripping is complete. 46
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:2 Event No.:_6_ Page -.JL of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/re9-ctor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Gert~r?i$or (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but ~!~/6utput breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout t~.e:/ ('/ _.,.)- .- .. ,' Time Position Applicant's Actions or BehC!.yi~(*.,Jf"/ BOP Step 6 Verify The A And B 4KV Bus Lockout Relays - RESET
\ .\ ...,.......
Note: 38 EDG lockout '. elciy is re~~'
.' A
( BOP Step 7 .. < Perform the following:
- a. Locally reset affected emergency diesel start failure relay by depressing the alarm reset pushbutton.
- b. Reset affected emergency diesel lockout relay.
- c. IF neither lockout relay can be reset, THEN go to Step 10 .
. 3A EDG lockout relay will not reset, NSO will be set to attempt local reset but will not reset.
( 47
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:2 Event No.:_6_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbinelrea~tor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel GeDef~t§>r (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but itscfutpyr( breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ti~l/f //"
,oo'\h<
Time Position BOP Step 8 Try To Reenergize The A 4KV BU9.' Generator
- a. Manually start 3A emergency diesel generator from Control Room OR
- c'B,§J2,id start
",.f" ""'" '6'f!\
- Norm!al start
/ ,:
V~yify 3,4"4KV'!:lU9, b. IF any load can NOT be 5" srri p) ning,*,fr,001
,'F""'_, ,
'" , "'','~,:>
/
disconnected from 3A 4KV
~/ A 1frACHMENi '1'",/ bus, THEN go to Step 9.
~'OMPLETED
'\<., -'-~"'"
- c. "\\:ye?1'f~ SI - RESET M~tl!;laljw synchronize 3A d. Locally synchronize 3A emergency diesel emergency diesel generator to 3A 4KV bus generator to 3A 4KV bus using 3-0NOP-023.2, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE, while continuing with Step 9.
Note: B.a RNO transitions to step 9. 48
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.: _6_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine!r~0~.ctor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel G(,1.n'erajior (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it~AS'~tpt1t breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout !i.et' <./ Time Position Step BOP 9 Try To Reenergize The B 4KV Generator
- a. Manually start 3B emergency diesel generator from Control Room
- Emergenc,% st
\
OR
- Rapid start
- b. IF any load can NOT be disconnected from 3B 4KV bus, THEN go to Step 10.
C':\,{jfy SI - RESET M~..lty synchronize 3B d. Locally synchronize 3B emef;~ncy diesel emergency diesel generator to 3B 4KV bus generator to 3B 4KV bus using 3-0NOP-023.2, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE, while continuing with Step 10. Note: 38 EDG breaker will not close from the conso/eand operator will be sent to the EDG to trylocal/y. Operator will report back breaker will not close local/yafter 13 minutes. 49
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:_6_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/re[l.ctor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Dieseleh~~ator (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but)t" breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackoul./tie. Time Position Step BOP 10 Check If AC Power Has Been Restored
.+f:
- a. Check the 3A and 3B 4KV buses - AT LEAST ONE "":.
ENERGIZED
'. ~ store AC power
*.using the following
%Pf,,~cel:l~res:
- 3-b~oP.::;004.2, LOSS .
F 3A'4~~ BUS
"",.!.~~-UI.NOP-004.3, LOSS o 3B 4KV BUS
- 2) WHEN power is restored to the 3A or 3B 4KV bus, THEN observe the CAUTIONS prior to Step 32 and go to Step 32 to perform recovery actions.
- 3) Observe CAUTION prior to Step 11 AND continue with Step 11.
Verify required safeguards b. Manually start equipment equipment - OPERATING as required.
- c. Check if 3-EOP-F-O, c. Implement FRPs as CRITICAL SAFETY required, unless this FUNCTION STATUS TREES procedure was directly being monitored FOR entered from outside the INFORMATION ONLY prior EOP network.
to entering 3-EOP-ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER
- d. Return to procedure AND step in effect 50
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.: _6_ Page ~ of 40 Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Ge r (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it ut t breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout f . Time Position Applicant's Actions or B BOP Continues per 3-0NOP-04.2 Verify 3A 4KV bus stripping using ATTACHMENT 1
- b. Check 3A 4KV bus - b. Observe CAUTION prior to AUTOMATICALLY Step 2 AND go to Step 2.
REENERGIZED
- c. Return to procedure and step in effect Note: attachment 1 completed earlier 51
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-.L Event No.: _6_ Page -.l1.. of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Ge r or CEDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it ut t breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout f . Time Position BOP Step 2 Check 3A 4KV Bus Lockout Relay - RESET es out relay.
- b. IF 3B 4KV bus is energized, THEN perform the following:
- 1) Determine and correct cause of 3A 4KV bus lockout relay actuation.
- 2) WHEN cause of 3A 4KV bus lockout relay actuation is determined and corrected, THEN reset lockout relay.
- c. WHEN 3A 4KV bus lockout relay is reset; THEN observe CAUTION prior to Step 3 AND 0 to Ste 3.
CAUTION If an SI signal exists or is actuated while performing this procedure, it is required to be reset to ensure restoration of a power source and to ensure controlled loading of equipment on the 4KV bus. 52
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: _6_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Gener~$or (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but i~;~/~!9ut breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ti': .i' Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi6( r=~==== Step BOP 3 Verif SI Reset Step BOP 4 Check 3A Emerghen",y ,...."" Lockout \ Relay - RESET is energized, o determine and corr . cause of 3A Emergency Diesel Lockout Relay actuation.
- b. Locally reset 3A Emergency Diesel Start Failure Relay.
- c. IF the 3A and 3B 4KV buses are both deenergized, THEN reset 3A Emergency Diesel Lockout Relay.
- d. IF 3A Emergency Diesel Lockout Relay can NOT be reset, THEN observe NOTE prior to Step 6 AND go to Step 6 .
. local relay and lockout reset already attempted will not reset transition to step 6.
*~-----------------------I NOTE
- I Vel/~v'lnQ tim! SI is reset lJr.lOr 10 closil1Q Startup Transformer LiUS supply breakers stlOuici I I i)eft) to ensure tile (Jl8akers wi/.I close.
- ________________________ 1 53
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _6_ Page ~ of 40 Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/re5l:ctor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Dieselge'n~)ator (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts bu~,its 01l'tPut breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout*tl~. / // Time Position Step BOP 6 Try To Reenergize 3A 4KV Bus From
- a. Check Unit 3 Startup Transformer Potential White Light on VPA - ON
- b. Check Unit 3 Startup Transformer Lockout Relay - ('
RESET
- 1) "
I'){to *\~.~tore offsite poVlle.{ to 'bJ~n it 3 Sta rtu p ransfo{I)1I'Elr using 3-
);i-
/"". 0 *Oli-092.3, STARTUP
"*T*~&*f\JSFORMER MALFUNCTION.
- 2) Observe CAUTION and NOTE prior to Step 7 AND go to Step 7.
.. . ~6~JSy . ~US'f'/
v .fo;TTACHlV'IEN:CJ/":' c. WHEN bus stripping is complete, THEN go to Step CQ~PLETE'" 6d. d.\eril}z . SI - RESET X\. I d. Reset SI.
"a:ctup Transformer SA 4KV Bus 3AA05 f/Close Startup Transformer f. Locally close breaker.
jl 3A 4KV Bus Supply, 3AA05
- g. Place Startup Transformer Sync To 3A 4KV Bus 3AA05 to OFF AND remove handle
- h. Check 3A 4KV bus- h. Observe CAUTION and ENERGIZED NOTE prior to Step 7 AND go to Step 7.
- i. Go to Step 16 54
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:.l Event No.: _6_ Page --.1L of 40 Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/rei;lctor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel G~ne~~)or (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it~"output breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout.~~e': p'/' Time Position I ItVhl?J1 Unit :3 startup rra'nsforrn-r is 3Y'afta.ble, tes~ored Lislng .3-0-P-C'04.1', SYSTE.hJ RESTO~P"ATt{:h\l
- PO\/VER. "--~,."'~"">
.'{::;"\~,,;~ ";;;.-,;;~."~-.,,,,-,..
Step BOP 7 Try To Reenergize3A~t<V B~'~;7 Fro~. .~,~.i!,4 Startup Tvar\~f~f.m~r,/'
.,/f/'C.~.U'hl\",4 Startu\, \#, . /,,/,;1 a. Observe CAUTION and
// . ansfOF~.,., el1.1.potentiaftr . . f\te NOTE prior to Step 8 LI ht on VPJt, - ON \" \ AND 0 to Ste 8.
,#'."" ......... "..........#\.'
or:,/BlacNout l1e"bii:l,\S,. . ~]?1 be used only 11lrren both the 3A and 3B 4KV ar;!f'tle.energized. ' .
~f-
,;V' DUS,cS are DC'In d'eene:rglzfHi becac~use- *.cffsit:e pO'l'lf!r and tlnil 3
{3eneratora *are {VtJT aV'aiiabt! {J,o~'ve{* ne<ed.s to be' rezt-ored to at le:a.st
- ti1e.s's 4i<'/ bvoea lfldh.in .,.,0 r:ninuiE'S to satisfy station b}acK'o.ut re*qtn'rernenls.
- critical task: (TC-SBO Analysis) Failure to restore power to 4KV bus from the opposite unit via the SBO within 10 minutes after reading the caution in 3-0NOP-004.2.
55
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:.-L Event No.: _6_ Page -.11L of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/r~~.ctor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel G~.!f{i~a;or (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it,~/6utptit breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout !it(' 41'/
,li' \,
Time Position BOP Step 8 Determine If Station Blackout Ti Line May Be Used
- Check 3B 4KV bus - , if the Shift A/'
DEENERGIZED ,ger wants to
'\ < en~[gize 3A 4KV bus from Check 4A and4J? 4KV buses
\~C 4:KV bus using
* - AT LEAST16NE'** **....
ENERGIZEO\ AlIA(:)tjMENT 2, while
\ corillJ;tuin*~. .with this
.proce2lu[~:iContinue
/",. eff~ t6 reenergize 3A
( ,j!' **,*'Z\.~~/tSus from the following:
- 3A Emergency Diesel using Steps 4 and 5.
OR
- Unit 3 Startup Transformer using Step 6.
OR
- Unit 4 Startup Transformer using Step 7.
- c. WHEN 3A 4KV bus is energized, THEN go to Ste 16.
Check 3D 4KV Bus Lockout Perform the following: Relay - RESET
- a. Reset 3D 4KV bus lockout relay.
- b. IF 3D 4KV bus lockout relay can NOT be reset, THEN go to Step 15.
56
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-.L Event No.:_6_ Page ~ of 40 Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor ~:\-, trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel G<;ll~r\ r (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but i~~/6ut t breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ~!ie: ",,/ _f' Time Position Step BOP /f" J 10 Check 3D 4KV Bus - ALiGNED/Pe~c5rm the following: TO 3A 4KV BUS ,/' ,i'" /
- Supply From 4KV Bus 3A, . <~. Ope r To 4KV Bus
~'s!ej\
3AD01 - CLOSED
- Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D, Supply From 4KV
"". 'h 3AA 17 - CLo.~~I9. B~ 3B",,3AD06
":\,,- \\"
- c. Clos9""Sup{(ly From 4KV
* ...~~s 3A~!),PO 1
/i/lb.":{lo~*e:F'eeder To 4KV Bus 3[5""~17 j
\. e. IF 3D 4KV bus can NOT
\, be aligned to 3A 4KV bus,
\ THEN 0 to Step 15.
ertf)("Station Blackout Perform the following: a. i~jve Blue Light For Open the following breakers: StaftCln 81 qckout Breaker, 3AD07!c:/d N
- 3AA02, Auxiliary Transformer 3A 4KV Bus Supply
- 3AA05, Startup Transformer 3A 4KV Bus Supply
- 3AA20, 3A Emergency Diesel To 3A 4KV Bus
- 3AA22, 3A 4KV Bus Emergency Tie To Unit 4
{ Startup Transformer \ 57
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _6_ . Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but its oytPu1,.* breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout tie. f' Time Position
- All 10. , akers on 3A and 3t::A.-,
1~\I ,~ es
~
,f
)J:f IF>station
,.* f" blackout permissive fian NOT bi.sfied, THEN
\, "\.p to Ste .,'
--------11 BOP Step 12 Check 4D 4KV Bu "
Perfo?n:;l the . *following: ENERGIZED " '\
'\, ' ic..,
"a,.Reques~Vnit'4; RO to ,
ree~E?~giz~4\9/4KV bus using f4.;:. S?Nbfl,,~04.5, LOSS OF 4D ( 4K\J*'Bkj.S*.
- b. IF 4D 4KV bus can NOT be energized, THEN go to Step 15.
tMion bf~:;I:~'tit"'Cff6i;iOl) exisfs,. fO'?6il'1g 0,'1 each Unit '" Emergency
...ratar shall .be' limited ta 3695 Kit!'.
44;'<11 bas supplying powe'i'" to the' 40 4KV bus is energized by an EOG n Blac({cHt Breaker 4A007 is ,,~!osed. non-I'l.mning safe-guards the bus supplying pO>l"er snouJd be plii'lced in PUL.L- TO-LOCK or t <ltlltost<ltrt and possibte o'lerioa.d of the FOG. 4KV bus is being powered from unit 4 58
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-.L Event No.: _6_ . Page.2L of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but its breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout tie. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behaviop;f _4' BOP Step 13 Check 4KV Bus Supplying Power To 4D 4KV Bus-ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE/' a¥ft only onefl;Jnit 4 4KV bus is POWER ( f'," energiz~.cV'A~:D from an
'I::DG~,7H~J>4perform one of
',< fh~,/f611 q).Alr~g :
- j. /'
-'\,1.) C~ck that the Unit 4 RO
\/;}as'Gompleted Step 2 of
" \,
AttacHl1Jent 2 of 4-EOP-
'\"
ES-0,,1.
'6'R
( that Unit 4 RO has completed Step 3 of Attachment 2 of 4-0NOP-004.
- b. IF the Unit 4 RO has not completed one of the above, THEN wait until complete AND go to Step 14.
- c. Have the Unit 4 RO place non-running safeguards equipment in PULL-TO-LOCK or STOP on the Unit 4 4KV bus supplying the 4D 4KV Bus.
- d. IF loads can NOT be reduced, THEN go to Step 15.
CAUTION If offsite power to the Unit 4 4KV bus supplying power to the 4D 4KV Bus is lost after Station Blackout Breaker 4AD07 is closed, the associated EDG output breaker will NOT close until 4AD07 has been opened. 59
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.:_6_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but its ou ut breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout tie. Position Applicant's Actions or Beh BOP Step 14 Try To Re-energize 3A 4KV Bus Line Close Station Black Go to Step
- a. 3AD07 using keylock 1.5.
Number 82) b. BOP Step 15 Time bus restored CAUTION Is is the t bus restored following a loss of offsite power, Load Centers shall energized as directed in the applicable Emergency Operating Procedures or in OP*004, LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER. Locally verify no breaker targets exist on 3A 4KV bus breakers 60
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: L Event No.: _6_ Page ~ of A!L Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel G er or (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it out t breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout II -ril"Y'\e Position Step US 18
- a. Go to procedure in effe to Centers 61
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.:_6_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Ge er or (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it ut t breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout f . ime Position Note: US continues in 3*EOP*ECA*0.0, the 3A 4KV bus, Transition will recovery actions. Step RO 11 (
- mer~l~Y .....co a' ent coolers - STOP
/o'"~'m~rgettQy ~~ainment filter fans - STOP AND OPEN Breaker 30~6E",' Emergency Containment Filter Fan 3B, on MCC 3D e: 'RO places all listed pumps and coolers / fans in pull to lock.
Directs NSO to open breaker 30806 on MCC3D. ( 62
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.:_6_ Page ~ of 40 Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but' 0 breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackou Time Position RO Step 12 Check Status Of Unit 4 High Head SI Pumps
- a. Check CCW supply for Un High Head SI Pumps -
ALIGNED TO UNIT 3 WHEN CCW is aligned to Unit 4 High Head SI Pumps, THEN place the Unit 4 High Head SI OR Pumps in Standby. Go to Step 13. S cooling based on ess than 30°F [210°F] OR
- PRZ Level - can NOT be maintained greater than 17%
[50%]
- e. WHEN CCW is aligned to Unit 4 High Head SI pumps, THEN verify MOV-3-843A OR MOV 8438 open AND start the Unit 4 High Head SI Pumps as required 63
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _6_ Page -.1.1.. of 40 Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but its 0l.ltP~~) breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout tie.(/ I Time Position Applicant's Actions or 8ehavi Note: CCW to unit 4 SI pumps is alignedto./.tl** Note: MOV-3-843A and MOV-3-843B w loss. Opening requires local ~.6': RO Directs NSO to locally open MOV-3::~i~ RO Step ,.~ 13 Locally Close V;rrves.. To Isolate RCP\.Se1il~
',( _' "" '''''''''''''--_' "_', """""0",), ~\\:::,::_
- 3-297A, RCP AS'ei~t.t,:,i~CtiQ..Q Manuallsplatien Valve
'\'., ~,~,;;,,,,,,,-,,-,--.-----. ""%,-"-"-,,,,.,- ':'" ,'\--. ~**-';;\
- 3-297B, RCP Bsea('ilnjecti~p ~'ahU~II~~lati()f1 Valve
- 3-297C, RCP C
,;~p_':':-<;'''~:;_;_'";__.",,,,_
~~ial*li,:,je9.ti<:>9lManu~~*1~91at~on Valve
\ ~\ _//~" ._,;.':/:"" '*':":'::,,~1e
.'/M~\(~3~~~, RCP S~af'Wa*ter Return And Excess Letdown f ........ JS'olaliQn ~~IVe'\ ("
i' \ i \ \
/". MOV-3:~2q; RCP Sea'~ C6plin Water Outlet Valve
.*CIi~~k SIG Status Manually close valves. IF
'~":'~~\~teamline isolation valves can NOT be manually closed, THEN locally close 8F\pj;}-ypass valves -
valves. CLOSED
- b. Main feedwater control and bypass valves - CLOSED
- c. SIG blowdown isolation valves - CLOSED CAUTIONS A faufted or ruptured S/G that is isolated shall remain isolated.
Steam supply to the AFW pumps must be maimained from at leasl one intact SIG. 64
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.:_6_ Page ~ of..1Q... Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard 3A Emergency Diesel Ge er (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it ut t breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout t' Time Position Applicant's Actions or B RO Step 15 Check If S/Gs Are NOT Faulted
- a. Check pressures in all S/Gs
- a. Maintain maximum AFW flow until narrow range level greater than
- b. Control AFW flow to maintain 6%[32%] in at least one narrow range level between S/G.
15%[32%] and 50%
- c. Narrow range level - LESS c. Stop feed flow to any S/G THAN 50% with narrow range level greater than 50%. IF narrow range level in any S/G continues to increase in an uncontrolled manner, THEN go to Step 19.
65
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _6_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/re~ctor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel G9f~;~r (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but~/b~!¥,ut breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ti*e. t" J/' '>\"\~_
- !i~"'"-
Time Position Applicant's Actions or BehqYi6~:".l' . f RO Step /" ,;!;/ / / / ) ' 17 Check If S/G Tubes Are NOTc.R'u~}kf(ed Go to Step f?- ffF' 19.
- Condenser air ejector radiatiori, R-15 -/ § NORMAL '. /J' p/
\'c. .i?
- S/G blowdo?,.r diation, R *f':.i<:<,,~rvl~.L
- ERDADS o~Jo~l., A "
NORMAL 1; 0' RO Ste p,f1'S,/,""'"
/ ' -f- _fr/ '\
/.,d~)lstep 24. ,)
\\~te '6f IJ.*riA CHMENT3is'feqtJir~d to be performed within the first 60 minutes of a l'Oss of a.lt"AC power event if both the 3A 1 and 3A2 battery chargers are inoperable.
">>'\..,,~. ""\.
*****',l;'
Cneck DC Bus Loads
- a. Direct operator to reduce DC bus loading as necessary using ATTACHMENT 3.
- b. Dispatch personnel to periodically monitor Note: Attachment 3 listed next for reference. Only step 3 currently applies. No communication will be given back during scenario.
66
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.: _6_ Page .IL of 40 Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Ge (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it ut breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout f . Time Position ATTACHMENT 3 (Page Iocr::)
!f. 3A 1 battery charger and 3A2 battery charger are
- a. Go to 12!iV DC Bus :?IDG1.
is jn Standby .. It!5!::!. place Breaker :3DG1-48. Feed to 3A Si.:Wo In~er. in OFF.
!f. AS hw' .EF is in 5Ioodb)'.. ~ piace Breaker 3001-54. Feed to AS Stetic kwerter. in OFF.
ihe fu1iawing breakers on Pane'; Df' 312 in lhe OFF posi!ioo; DP 312. Brea1!er 4. AC 0\\' DC Feed to LP 39. fO\\' the Unit:3 Spent Fuel Pit area li9il1iing. 2} DP 312. BrellAer 6. AC (IT DC Feed to LP37, flN Unit:3 Coolainment li9hling. 67
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.:_6_ Page ~ of 40 Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard 3A Emergency Diesel Ge (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it ut breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout f . Time Position Applicant's Actionc:: nr K,l'>h:: ATTACHMENT 3 (Page ZO'f21
- 2. If 381 Nltery charger and 382 battsry ct",arger
- a. GO' to 125V DC Sus 3D2*3.
4. Add makeup to the CST from any available source using 3-OP-018.1, CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK, OR consult with the TSC for available methods for filling CST. CAUTIONS I; SIG pressures shall NOT be dec~s"d to I"..s than 80 psig to prevent ifljectkm of accumulator nitrogen i.n-to the RCR II SiG ThilITOW range level is required toO be maintained greater than 6%[32%J in at least one fnta<!t StG.. If level o.an NOT be maintained, S/G depressuril'iftion is required to beS'topped unfflle"E'l is restored in at teast one SIG. 68
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-0-2
"\.
Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_6_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/re~~tor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel G~pl;~£or (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it§, .,o'Utpitlt breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout tj,e:' <",.', Time Position I . 3/G.s it'!'e reqUire'a to be depre$.$urize.d ::t,t n
- tODS.
I
- rna'Y OCctN' due I RO Step 26
- 1) Maintain maximum AFW flow until narrow range level greater than 6%[32%] in at least one S/G.
- 2) WHEN narrow range level greater than 6%[32%] in at least one S/G, THEN do Steps 26b, 26c, 26d and 26e.
Continue with Step 27. Manually dump steam at rate using S/G steam dump to atmosphere valves
- c. Check RCS cold leg c. Perform the following:
temperatures - GREATER
- 1) Control S/G steam THAN 350°F dump to atmosphere valves to stop S/G depressurization.
( 69
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _6_ Page...1Q.. of 40 Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard 3A Emergency Diesel tor (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but' 0 ut breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackou Time Position
- d. Check S/G pressures - LESS THAN 180 PSIG
~
Step RO 27 Con~/G steam dump to atmosphere valves to stop S/G depressurization and allow RCS to heat up.
-----~TE----------~
rur.i;,am:m of SlGs wili relJ%..lit in SI aclttaticm. SI fa l'fi~ to beresel to permit II ffJiidil'rg of equipment 0.1"1 4KV buses,
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ______ 1 Check SI Signal Status
- a. SI - HAS BEEN a. WHEN SI actuated, ACTUATED THEN do Steps 28b, 29, 30 and 31. Continue with
- b. Verify SI- RESET Step 32.
70
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: -.2.... Event No.:_6_ Page ~ of 40 Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor
~/,\
trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Geperatpr jP' . ./ (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it~~u~Pl1f breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout tiJir( .f,i*
./{f~/- '\
Time Position RO Step 29 Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve White Lights VPB - ALL BRIGHT IF ~ny containment
. olati,on phase A valve is QT dqsed, THEN martqally'<;lose valve. IF .
valve(~'~9ah NOT be
. Ll,£lIlY closed, THEN
*'rn.lotl'ally or locally isolate affected containment enetration.
RO a.tJ'nit 3 containment purge a. Manually stop fans.
. . . ~>\.haust and supply fans -
'**\,.. OF'!';
- b. V . (};entrol Room b. Manually align venation status panel - equipment for Control PROPER EMERGENCY Room emergency RECIRCULATION recirculation.
ALIGNMENT 71
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.: _6_ Page -.R of 40 Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss ofthe switchyard 3A Emergency Diesel ne tor (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but' so breaker fails to close re uirin the crew to use the blackou Position Applicant's Ar.tj*,.In!':: nrRAI,:: RO Step 31 Check Containment Pressure
- HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 20 PSIG
- PR-3-6306A a.
PR-3-6306B
. Verify con inm t isolation phase
'~yalve whit igh on VPB - ALL R~ ,
~~ent isolation phase alve i~closed, THEN anually close valve. IF valve(s) can NOT be manually closed THEN manually or locally isolate the affected containment penetration.
are operating Of! iii single train" one of the pumps needs to be OfN? nour of the initial start signal tlsing j-OP-075, AUXILIARY TEM. S,tfbsE'~tion 6.2,
" I two AFW trains are OfJ'f!l"iiI'til1g and one of tI'fe AFW pump!; has been openting
*tn an a,'erage flow of les6 than 60 gpm, file pump should be' 6hut OOwn within eootIF of operating iii le6.5 thiifl 60 gpm IJsing J*QP-075, AUXILIARY EDWA TER SYSTEM, Subseciion 6.2.
Check Core Exit TCs - IF core exit temperatures greater LESS THAN 1200°F than 1200°F AND increasing, THEN go to SACRG-1, SEVERE ACCIDENT CONTROL ROOM GUIDELINE INITIAL RESPONSE, Step 1. 72
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: _6_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/re~~tor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel G~)if~ra~or (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but its.,6~tpdt breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout !;~e( ,./ Time Position BOP Step 33 Check If 4KV Bus Power Is Restored '->
- a. Check 3A and 3B 4KV IF t~JY~n~rgized Unit 3 buses - AT LEAST ONE )<!J bVlis being fed from ENERGIZED FROM THE ", e tion Blackout Tie 3A OR 3B ED~ .* "AN NLY ONE Unit 4
\'~""
"0'0':;>,.<:,,,,-,.
?'V"",,,,,,,< 4'K \5 is energized ANl:9. . from,an EDG, THEN
.... perforl'l;) th~ifollowing:
'~""~~~".",._,~,._ *':;:,,_~/4
" fj"St;lbilize S/G
""""ipressures by setting S/G steam dump to atmosphere valve controllers to maintain S/G pressures stable OR by manually controlling S/G steam dump to atmosphere valves to maintain stable S/G pressure.
- 2) Go to Attachment 4 of this procedure.
Continue to control RCS conditions and monitor plant status:
- b. Check 3A and 3B 4KV b. 1) Check status of local buses - AT LEAST ONE actions:
- 4KV bus ENERGIZED power restoration
- RCP seal isolation
- DC power supply 73
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.:_6_ Page 34 of 40 Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Ge r (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it ut t breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout f Time Position
- 4) Locally perform 0-ONOP-025.3, DC EQUIPMENT AND INVERTER ROOM SUPPLEMENTAL COOLING.
- 5) Observe CAUTION prior to Step 15 AND return to Ste 15.
Stabilize S/G Pressures
- a. Set S/G steam dump to a. Manually control S/G atmosphere valve controllers to steam dump to maintain S/G pressures - atmosphere valve(s) to STABLE maintain stable S/G ressure.
74
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:_6_ Page ~ of 40 Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Ge r (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but its ut breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ti Time Position Applicant's Actions or
, Steady state roiifding on each Unit 3 Em exceed 2500 KW. Load transients up 10 additional equipment
,. Steady state (oiifding 0.11 .each Unit 4 E yell exceed 2874 KW. Lo.ad transients up to 31 additional equipment BOP Step 35 Verify The Folio 'ng Buses Manually close load control center breakers to energize 480 volt load centers.
oom Air Conditioners ne AUXiliary Building Exhaust Fan Spent Fuel Pit Exhaust Fan Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Water Pump
- i. Radiation Monitors Unit 3 SFP SPING
- Plant Vent SPING
- SJAE SPING 75
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.: _6_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel Ge r or (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it ut t breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout f . ime Position Applicant's Actio,,>:> 'U' L.}t;;' , RO Step 36 Select Recovery Procedure
- a. Verify SI NOT required OF ALL AC POWER RECOVERY 1
CAUTION ther offsite power is lost or 51 actuation occurs on the other unit, ay be required to restore safeguards equipment to the required
-------~-OO~-----------*
SF status trees are required to be monitored for information only. FRPs shall NOT be II LP~m.::e~p: t:C::I~O:' ~e~. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I RO Step 1 Verify SI reset 76
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.: _6_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard 3A Emergency Diesel n ator (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but' so breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackou Time Position Applicant's Actions or Dt::lldVII RO Step 2 Check RWST Level - GREATER THAN 155,000 GALLONS
- c. Go to Step 3.
RO Manually align valves to establish proper SI ali nment. Thermal Barrier CCW Isolation Status
- a. Observe CAUTION prior to Step 5 AND go to Step 5.
RCP Thermal b. Manually isolate CCW from RCP thermal Barrier CCW barriers: Outlet, MOV
- Close RCP Thermal barrier CCW Outlet, 626 - CLOSED MOV-3-626.
OR
- Locally close CCW return manual isolation valve outside containment, 3-736.
77
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:---.L Event No.: _6_ Page...l1L of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/re5l;ctor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel G~H~r~~r (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it,,§-:o~~ breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout ti.e(" {i/' ,,'f'- Time Position CAUTION Steady state loading on each Unit 3 emergengf~;~§";*enerator shall NOT exceed 2500 KW. Load transients up to 2750 Kw.are agceptable when ing additional equipment. <'\ \., BOP Step 5 Manually Load I ke 'C)GQling Water P~~s
""" "~
4 Energized Buses
-'~~"*,-;,-.--.. '\-.
a. water pumps j""
- b. /" /*}ifemfyt~CW To T ;r,H"~~// b.**""*~*arrr;;IIY close valve(s). IF
!;xcbang~r - ISOL*, TE .' valve(s) can NOT be
/ \ \ closed, THEN locally close 1 the following valve(s):
3-50-319 for POV 4882
- 3-50-339 for POV 4883
-_. .F ChecK intake cooling water c. IF both intake cooling headers - TIED TOGETHER water headers are intact, THEN direct operator to tie headers to ether.
t>l6te: starts A and C ICW pumps f/ CAUTION CCW System load requirements of 3*0NOP*030. COMPONENT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTION, SHALL NOT be exceeded. 78
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _6_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/re~.ctor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel GSn'f' . . . r (EDG) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it,.~/DU~ t breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout .~,ie:* <./ Time Position RO Step 6 Manually Load Component Cooling Water Pumps On Energized Buses
- a. CCW Heat Exchangers-THREE IN SERVICE
, . p r stop CCW PUtTIRS as.,necessary to establ'ish O:NL Y ONE 1-'("14.1:\.1 1\.1 IN*~fCCW P UM P.
,rl:~. ,-",-, , . i
,J 2').I!..0'hly two CCW Heat Exchangers are in service and MOV-3-749A and MOV-3-749B are open, two CCW Pumps are required to be maintained in PULL-TO-LOCK
- 3) Go to Step 6c.
- b. Start or stop CCW pumps as necessary to establish ONLY TWO RUNNING CCWPUMPS.
9: Check CCW headers - TIED c. IF both CCW headers .are ITOGETHER intact, THEN direct operator to tie headers to ether. Note: Starts A and C CCW pumps 79
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: _6_ Page 40 of ~ Event
Description:
A lightning strike causes a spurious generator lockout and turbine/reactor trip followed by a loss of the switchyard. 3A Emergency Diesel G91 r (ED G) fails to start and can not be started, 3B EDG starts but it~'out breaker fails to close requiring the crew to use the blackout !ie':f ,// f- '>"\~>
. ,\
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavio£;"J'/
=======
RO Step 7 Realign SI System
;/1' f '
- a. Verify Unit 3 high-head SI ,/ PerforljA,lhEj.:loliowing:
pumps - TWO RUNNING \,., . . '<.,\.,,////"'/.
"'", 1) Qperate Unit 3 and Unit
"" 4'hjgh-head SI pumps
'!.p es,tpblish injection to UhiJ 3frpm two high-heaCl\?I/pumps.
~"-'/-
DI ~ct Unit 4 RCO to
. n Unit 4 high-head SI pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using ATTACHMENT 1 of this procedure.
- 3) Go to Step 8.
't:!ote,: Ca;;"~()te§tablish 2 HHSI pumps from unit3, directs
\, l\attachituynt 1 to be completed 1
"f Take shift from crew to end scenario 80
NRC XXIV NRC SEN 2 OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT ( ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO: Field Supv.: Outside SNPO: Admin RCO: ANPO: Unit 3 Unit Supv.: Unit Supv.: RCO: RCO: NPO: Plant Status Unit 3 Mode: Power: 50 MWe: 334 Gross Leakrate: .02 RCS Boron Cone: 831
)perational Concerns :.,,~.&"'.w""
Maintaining 50% at System request/S'chedule<:I . !o return 3C charging pump is out of serviy((f?:,):pfepal'l'&. D'~e back Thunderstorms are in the area" f . \ Focus Area: Maintain 50%
I ( Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 50 Gross: .02 A 6614 pi'\" MWe: 334 Unidentified .01 B 6631)/ if> Tavg: 558.2 Charging Pps: .01 C E?,620,,/
~/;,
RCS Pressure: 2251 RCS Boron Cone: 831 Abnormal Annunciators: ,.,;f"/,"\,/iP* "\\", 7/
'ii"",
Annunciator:
"'<""" ('ii/\.
Comp Actions: Annunciator:
"'\,,", ~,>
Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator:
-(:, 7/
"<"" *"v f
.""",;,J""
Comp Actions:
.r;///';::::"""'~'"'"
Annunciator: \"'/',\"'\'".*. ,,,,,, .. Comp Actions:
\~V Annunciator:
Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: "".* ii"'*"""""'*'"", d//'/'::::~'/Y"'"""'\""""\', Annunciator: Comp Actions: \"\1 \\\ ";::
</<~
Annunciator: Comp Actions: ii,/,li/i',
"""""'""", \\\, /)"
Annunciator: Comp Actions:
\'\.,\.""\~\'i"/,,/:}~,,,,f'/ """"""",,,,\,,,,, """,."",,/,:,;,:,;\"
,/,/'
'~""\'\ ', ..,' ' ' \,,,. "\\,,\
Current l{ch$llec Acti"Oll St'hiemeifts: (BJ)es Not Include "For Trackin2 Only Items" T.S.A.S~of)!pSnent: ReasoIT'l.,. ti.
.\\,\ \ii. \,'\.,>
Entry D~~e~"~" l"S'A'S/,~~O~, i*
>///
Reason: Entry Date: i llil )" T.S.A.S / Component, Reason:* Entry Date: T.S.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: T.S.A.S / Component: Reason: ( Entry Date: T.S.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date:
Unit 3 Status ment: 13 train protected both units ( .)nline risk is green Upcoming Reactivit U Evolutions or Com General InfO~4J1abQn, Remarks, ijihdpperator Work Around Status: Aux. steam supp.ly aligned from.Jtfnit . ~! Condenser inleak'age O.~cfm;/ .
-'" ,./
'A
TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Facility: Turkey Point Scenario No.: 3 OpTest No.: 2009-301 mod Examiners: Candidates: US RO BOP Initial Conditions: Mode 1, 100% MOL Turnover: Equipment OOS: 3C charging pump out of service due to packing leaka hours. Thunder storms are in the area. Maintain 100% On line risk is green B train protected Event Event Type* No. TFH1TV59 =T (I)SRO I RO
.TVFCLK1 =
2 0.020000 3 TFS1MAML = T 4 Tr . A and B AFW fail to auto start 1
TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #3 Event 1 - LT-3-459 fails low isolating letdown, deenergizing pressurizer heaters, and driving 38 charging pump to full speed. The crew responds per the ARPs and 3-0 P- 41.6 Pressurizer level control malfunction. Event 2 - The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphe condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014 a stabilize condenser vacuum. Event 3 - Following the load reduction, PT-3-447 fails 10 insertion. The crew will respond per per 3-A and then 3-0NOP-049.1 to address the faile 2
TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Scenario XXIV NRC 3 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup Restore IC-1 (Mode 1 MOL) Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIV_NRC_3.lsn ..'\:
"'\
Place simulator in run '<8<, Start 38 charging pump and secure 3C charging pump
\.
"\. :;;'\
Trigger lesson step: SETUP - 3C Charging pump, . Remov~g'3,~ charging purftp",/'
~rom service, blocks AFV:'( a start'fandJaiis POV-4882 as IS. (Actuates TAB1POSM =RACK'Q ABI)Jl270,;=/O, TABM291 =0, TABM290
= 0, TFKC882A = T, TFF5AFAF = T:'Q;fF5AFBF,)"'T)
Place simulator in freeze. -~;1_
",~,
" ' \
'\\"'"
( 3
TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description ( Event 1 - LT-3-4S9 FAIL LOW Initiated immediately after shift turnover. L T-3-459 fails low isolating letdown, deenergizing pressurizer heaters, and driving 38 charging pump to full speed. The crew responds per the ARPs and 3-0NOP-041.6 Pressurizer level control malfunction. When directed - Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - LT-3-459 FAIL LOW (Actuates TFH1TV59 = T) If called - Respond as AOM or wee, Acknowledge LT-3-459 f* 4
TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description ( Event 2 - LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphere resulting in lowering condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014 and reduces unit load to stabilize condenser vacuum. When directed, Trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - LOSS OF CONDENSE (actuates TVFCLK1 =.020000) The Crew responds per 3-0NOP-014 Main Condenser Loss of VacuIJ 3-0NOP-014
/)<':-'
Step 4.1 - Respond as Turbine Operator, Acknowledge direC!j.0**:r~ce the steam jet"aiE~~etor (SlAE) hogging jet in service. Wait one minutepJh~n/. ig?er .les~on step, EVEN~ t'"" PLACE SJAE IN SERVICE. Inform controJ.*too.lTi hoggmg] n serVIce after 3 .' ( . minutes. Step 5.1 - Respond as Turbine Operator, Acknowledge dir~Ctiori"{6 045. No action required. after 3 m'ifi!lte
":~
3-0NOP-100 Step 3 - Respond as System Dispatcher, condenser vac~'rfr~""""" efer to 0-EPIP-201 01 and 0-ADM-115. 5
TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description ( Event 3 - PT-3-447 FAIL LOW Following the load reduction, PT-3-447 fails low resulting in continuous control rod insertion. The crew will respond per per 3-ARP097.CR to place rod control in manual and then 3-0NOP-049. 1 to address the failed channel. When directed - Trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - PT-3-447 FAIL LOW,,~'6tuq.ts TFS1 M A M L = T ) / , f ' ' ' (~' f"/:~" . .::,/jf If called - Respond as AOM or wee, Acknowledge PT-3-447 fali,t~lre. 6
TP-2009-301 Scenario #3 Event Description ( Event 4 - 3C S/G FAULT I RUPTURE 3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV-4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The crew will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and transition to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate the faulted steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addressed per 3-EOF;;:{i,~3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. J/f.f:} i/ ji"
,j/ /4 When directed - Trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - 3C S/G FAULT I f~kfpT~RE (actuates TVSBVL 15 = 0.2600, TVHHSGC = 3.0000) "\"
3-EOP-E-O attachment 3 Step 17 - acknowledge direction to place PAHM in servic~i'
- Trigger lesson step, PLACE PAHM IN §.e'R)It E
- After 5 minutes inform CR steps 7.1. // ,Q'ugh 3 are complete
- Request CR continue with step 7.1 '\,
- Acknowledge direction to complete,I,ine'tlp after 911/1~1.2.4 is completed
- After 5 minutes report to CR that PAPi~ is\tgf teo 3-EOP-FR-S.1 '"\~, ~l\,\,~.,.
Step 3.3 RNO - Acknowledge directiQ,p t~~ ,,~~ SS-3-O'06.~nClI.~?en AF SS-3-O'O'7. After 5 minutes, Trigger's' tep;'Al..IGN TRAlN 1,AFW. Report to CR when completed. "\'\c ,dff Step 3.f - Acknowledge qJreetiQ,Q, to open, ' -,t 5 bres(/3DO'1-27 and verify valve closed 1ge~IIY'F,~fter\? minute\, T~i!fger
",. ..f/:' "" \, \" %
lesson step, OPEN MOV-3-1405 BRE E;,R: Inforil;1 CF when oompleted. J Step 6.a/b - R~Sp<r~ as ChE3FT4i~~:tY"b~~~nowi~dgy direction to take periodic activity saFlJple~ of aJliIS/G.~and tOche{;k;~am 1 readings. c ;/ L"~~<<' '" o"'~ ~ ,."",
"-:--'~'\\., ~"<:,..:I,,.1/'* .. /:it# -'c' c"':::::~~~f/ ,:,,:
Ste~§,,"*=*He~J?ond'a~, He~lth Physics, Acknowledge direction to take radiation
/ re'i:I9Jngs&[l '. in steam lines.
'*::. %\'\. -""t
........;,~, .
2.a - Respond"iPs Radiation Protection, Acknowledge direction to take radiation
. readiry9s,bn main steam lines.
"\"', -:\~". ._< ,,_.,,/ _II Step 2:,. p -',,~sp6 "s Chemistry, Acknowledge direction to sample steam lines for
""acli \; <,,,.
Ity
"" ""if'
""~J'"
Step 5.b RNO - Respond as NSO, Acknowledge direction to use 3-EOP-E-3 attachment 5 to align aux. steam supply from unit 4. After 5 minutes, Report to CR attachment 5 alignment complete. No action required. 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_1_ Page_1_of ~ Event
Description:
LT-3-459 fails low isolating letdown, deenergizing pressurizer heaters, and driving 3B charging pump to full speed. The crew responds per ~~lA:~Ps and 3-0NOP-041.6 Pressurizer level control malfunction. "' ' Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Tri er lesson step EVENT 1 - LT-3-4S9 FAIL LOVY RO Recognizes the failure of LT-3-459 based and informs the US:
- Alarm A 9/3, Pzr control hi/loV\{
- Alarm A 9/4, Pzr low Ivl htr &f~ &
\,
- Alarm A 8/4, Pzr 10-10 level ale'
- Alarm A 6/6, Seal wtr inj fltr hii'1 P
/"""""
- Alarm G 1/2, G'ngpum}l,Qi speed
"\ \~:::'::'~'i<:'::: _ ' , "";:~""-'
- Alarm B 3/1, pi'{t h' ter"contr'fa,Q '""
off
'. '~-<: "l~; 't
\. --.;;";<-".,-~., '::.\~::".{'
- CV-3-200A, letd~ p valve';"Qosure'
'\ /.?'''', . """:
- C\(.:.3::j60, Hi press"w "isolaliotlLiclosure
,,_;/;jf'-: -.-y,-<:~",\_.;_ _ '\,_
.;If'Pressurizer heaters'secure
,,/ /';,. /:::~+*:--- . ----"\-\,. '~" \t t:
//'. /LI-3-45 P4r level ro~ectjon/control channel, pe ed low BOP / s./A 9/3 and A\9/4"direct response for failed level ep::::0zt.~.*),.,2,?,:r le.\(~r control malfunction.
'"~---:;.'
se er~eNQB,,'C541.6
- - - - - - NOTES - - - - - - - -- -- --I r Level t,,1aifunctioh is a result of a failure of the 3-459CX or 3-460CX
. ted by a loss of letdown flow with a loss of Pressurizer Heaters with no I of Level Transmitters 3-459A, 3-460, 3-461), use 3-ONOP-003.6 or 3-460CX failure. OR 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 4, for 3-459CX ance for establishing Letdown flow and Pressurizer Heaters, on relays 3-459CX or 3-460CX are used to restore Letdown flow and comply with Tech Spec Action Statement 3.4.3 Action b.
the manual control of Heaters from the Electrical penetration room is used, comply with Tech Spec Action Statement 3.4.3 Action a.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ______ 1 5.1 Check pressurizer level indicators L~3-459A, LI-3-460 AND LI 461, 5.1.1 IF one level indicator deviates significantly from the others, THEN place CHANNEL SELECT PRESSURIZER LEVEL
( CONTROL switch in a position that will NOT include the defective channel. 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _1_ Page~of ~ Event
Description:
LT-3-459 fails low isolating letdown, deenergizing pressurizer heaters, and driving 3B charging pump to full speed. The crew responds per t and 3-0NOP-041.6 Pressurizer level control malfunction. Position Applicant's Actions or Behavio Note: RO will select channel 2 or3 to remo RO Step 5.2.1 5-'5 5("':'1 575 Tu"~ *t' 2
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _1_ Page2- of ~ Event
Description:
LT-3-459 fails low isolating letdown, deenergizing pressurizer heaters, and driving 3B charging pump to full speed. The crew responds per th and 3-0NOP-041.6 Pressurizer level control malfunction. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavio RO Step 5.4 IF LR-3-459 is selected to a defective CHANNEL SELECT PRESSURIZ L another position. Note: LR-3-459 is selected to an RO Step 5.5.1 10 Isol Vlv from Loop B Cold Leg eturn Lower Pressure Letdown Control Valve, PC\l3-145 t utomatic. contro alfunction caused pressurizer heaters to deenergize, EN restore PRZ heaters to automatic operation or take manual ntrol. 5.8 Maintain pressurizer level to be consistent with programmed level as indicated in Enclosure 1. US Step 5.9 Perform actions required by 3-0NOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION CHANNELS. 3
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.: _1_ Page --1. of l Event
Description:
LT-3-459 fails low isolating letdown, deenergizing pressurizer heaters, and driving 3B charging pump to full speed. The crew responds per th and 3-0NOP-041.6 Pressurizer level control malfunction. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Dt::llld\l'11. US Directs the actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 I NOTES
- Momentary spiking of a channel that quick! t imminent channel failure. The bistable for t tripped position as soon as possible. with ma' for further investigation by lee, BOP n exist on the adjacent channels plicable control transfer switches are in the position
. ates the failed loop.
F a control function was placed in manual control due to the Ilure, THEN verif the control function is returned to automatic. Note: LC-459G will stay in manual until Pzr level is restored to Step US 5.5 Refer to Technical Specifications 3/4.3, Instrumentation, AND verify the minimum channels operable. 4
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.:_1_ Page20f L Event
Description:
L T-3-459 fails low isolating letdown, deenergizing pressurizer heaters, and driving 3B charging pump to full speed. The crew responds per and 3-0NOP-041.6 Pressurizer level control malfunction. Time Position TOTAL NO FUNCTIONAL UNIT (lFCHANNELS
'l. Manuai Reacior Trip L P'mver R.~nge, Neutron Fiu::.:'
- a. High SelpDin~ , ?
- b. Low Setpeint 1##,2
- 3. ~ntermooi3te Raf;ge, Neutron Flux 1##,2 4, Source- Range. Neutron Frux
- a. Startup 2#
h-. 8hutdovm"'~ 3,4,5
- c. SI-rutdown 3" 4~. 5'"
~ O ....elie-P1oerature .:1T 13 7,
1,2 2 13 2hoop 2floop 2hoop 2il-oop channels one less tllan the Total nurn]}er of channel's, TUP andior PO\<VER ()PER4,IION may proceed provided the inqperahlH channel is in tile tripped cOllclition 'Nilhin 6 r,oo[s, For su!;sequen! required DiGITAL NEt o PER",TIONAl TESTS the inoperabloe ch,annei may ;)8 place(\ in i)~)Jass tatusf.;;;;[ LIP to 4 h,ours
'\. '\
functional unit # 9, action 13 6 hrs. to tri bistables Take appropriate actions as specified in Technical Specifications. CAUTION Tl7e failed channel bistable(s) is required to be placed in the tripped mode within 6 hours of the failure determination, except if other channel bistable(s) are in the tripped or test position and would result in an undesired Engineered Safety Features actuation or Reactor Trip actuatiol), The overall effect of a failure of this type is a reduction of instrumentation redundancy and, therefore, a possible reduction In plant protection. 5
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_1_ Page~of~ Event
Description:
LT-3-459 fails low isolating letdown, de energizing pressurizer heaters, and driving 3B charging pump to full speed. The crew responds per thO' " , r 1-\, and 3-0NOP-041.6 Pressurizer level control malfunction. Time Position Applicant's Actions or ~Qlh!:l\/if BOP Step 5.11 IF any other channel has failed, T trip bistables for the failed chan 5.11.1 IF plant conditions a su associated with the f . ed without an undesired R perform the following: Ref Owgs 5G10-T-l1. Sh 18; 5610-T.O.15 FUNC-LOGIC AFFECTED TION 2J:~ (:ha~mel pre.Sosl..Hizer hlgh le....e! p (92%). wiVl p.i' a.11!sfled causing rMctor tn s' nal c C - CONTROL RELATED P - RX PROTECTION RELATED S '_ SAFETY INJEcTION RELATED "re' :P~fl Qf the Eagle 21 'System. Annunciator J 7:4. EAGLE 21 TROUBLE i.~ expectoeod when the apphcable d in the tnpp-eod pO'ii~tion. 6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: _2_ Page _1_ of -.lL Event
Description:
The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphere resulting in lowering condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014 reduces unit load to stabilize condenser vacuum. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior/ ,.;I..'"
"".J''
Tri er lesson step EVENT 2 - LOSS OF CONDENSJ~R+,VACUUM BOP Determines condenser vacuum lowering
- Main condenser vaCL\
US Directs response per 3-QNOP-014
'\". , . . . . . ,,"'
\.
~';6hU..yI. .~ N
":i~:~~"'. ~""""
Hot water may be emitte'4 fr2lfJ1 the""5jLencer't;ilq~lng the I for personnel . injury. \*t.. """;;,.****** .. ".h
-\ \ >f
( BOP 19 Jet Valve. 3-30-043.
.' _SteanL2:1p~.ly*to Hogging Jet Valve. 3-30-44, to obtain 250 to 260 Ig l3-PI-l:J97) hogglil.~.Jet supply pressure.
,./~#P
<:~J' (pen the Condenser Air Removal to Hogging Jet Valve, 3-30-010.
...,.ll\\ - -NOTES - -- - - - -- - - - - -.
EoI' the re inder of this procedure, the mosl conservative of the following three i1dicalions of Main Condenser vacuum should be used to determine the appropriate I actions:
~/-3-1612 and PI-3-1406 on VPA iitJDPSA105-3 on ERDADSIWTime DDPSA 105-3 on WTime indicates Main Condenser bac/{pressure. To determine I vacuum from backpressure: I L _~: ~on::..ns:r :u~m:::.o~n~- ~D:A ~5~ __ _ ______ 1 BOP Step 5.1 Close Ho in Jet Drain, 3-30-045 BOP Step 5.2 IF only one set of SJAEs is in service. THE~ place the standby set in service using
( Attachment I. Note: all SJAEs are in service. 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.: _2_ Page .2. of JL Event
Description:
The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphere resulting in lowering condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014 reduces unit load to stabilize condenser vacuum. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi BOP Step 5.3 IF vacuum can NOT be maintained by th reduce turbine load as necessary usin 300 :134 4ifJ
.LOAD-MW rects response per 3-0NOP-1 00 Brief Control Room Personnel Using Attachment 3 Attachment 3 included next for reference.
8
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.: _2_ Page~of ~ Event
Description:
The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphere resultin lowering condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014 reduces unit load to stabilize condenser vacuum. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US ATI.UHlIE~"T J (Page 1 of 1) TIme to, Sl!utdoWllfnm l~ no mil!! 7M\Vfm1m 3. 9
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _2_ Page...1. of ~ Event
Description:
The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphere resultillg in lowering condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-O~;~~§i reduces unit load to stabilize condenser vacuum...//' / if "j'# Time Position RO Step 2 Begin Boration boration is not required, THEN go to Step 3
- a. Set the Boric Acid determined using Attachment
- b. Set FC-3-113A,J2.pric Acid Flow Controller to al"ot"setting of 8.0
\" ,~" '~O"'>'
- c. Place the Readtor~a Switch to BORAltE' ""'0
- d. Place the RCS M e~p Cq,rftrq);,*, ..,..,.,*****
( SWttcR*.tp START \,i,i ,f " " " " , ) ' / No te:;Step' '2, ,'~oric aci tot;jlizer is set as follows: _J"' .{,;~' /~f/J'-
. tel\ the determined amount of
< lder by perft)nning the
, wl amount using numeric keypad. 180 Press ENT.
Press COlJNT A. Press LIl\!fIT 1 and verify desired amount was properly entered. (7) Press COUNT A. ( 10
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2- Event No.:_2_ Page .Q. of JL Event
Description:
The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphere resulting in lowering condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014 reduces unit load to stabilize condenser vacuum. Time Position BOP Step 3 Notify The Following
- System Dispatcher
- Plant personnel using the P e BOP Step 4 Reduce Unit Loa
- a. Check for borat (reducing Tavg)
(
- d. Stop or slow power reduction to control temperature. If necessary, place control rods in manual and maintain Tavg within the expected TavglTref t::.. T of Attachment 3.
p Monitor Annunciator B 8/1, Perform the following: ROD BANK LO LIMIT - a. Slow load reduction until alarm RESET is reset.
- b. Re-evaluate boration amount and rate and make adjustments as necessary.
11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _2_ Page~of ~ Event
Description:
The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphere resulting in lowering condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-Ol reduces unit load to stabilize condenser vacuum. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavio
/,Ji\i;" \\
US Step
/" ) ~
6 Notify The Shift Manager To Refer To lhE}J!C;lIowing Procedur~
/ / '\
- 0-EPIP-20101, DUTIES Ol?'E'M,J?RGENCY~RDINATOR
- 0-ADM-115, NOTIFICATIO
> "J"." ./"
Note: Respond as SM to refer to proced¥s ifflfrected
"""c.>
..... - - - - - - -."~'<-""~,,,,~
"",NOTE
- - - ----:~~\:::~ i, I ~ I I Axial flux difference is aI/owed reduction without ,
~ _______
entering O-OP-059.9, Operation
~::,_'\~
t \ _ ~~
~:: ../,::.,
_-~q_
",'!i'/' 'o".",,/~~,_
- "':;;-;~ ________ J
----CO;'?/;
I Space. Step RO/ BOP 7 9l1e<;j<,'PlanJ Re,sponse \
,-:iY- F "\
/J/ 3~l"Check pr~ss~rizer level, , a. IF directed by the Unit f '" ' followin~fpr "ram '\ \ Supervisor, THEN increase charging flow as follows:
- 1) Throttle open TCV-144, NRHX Temp Control Valve, bypass valve 3-834 to raise flow to approximately 600 gpm.
- 2) Start an additional charging pump.
- 3) Place an additional letdown orifice in Verify load reduction rate and b. service.
auto rod control is maintaining Stop or slow power the expected Tavg/Tref b" T reduction to control identified in Attachment 3 temperature. If necessary, place control rods in manual and maintain Tavg within the expected Tavg/Tref b"T of Attachment 3. 12
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.:_2_ Pagelof L Event
Description:
The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphere resulting in lowering condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014 reduces unit load to stabilize condenser vacuum. e Position Applicant's Actions or B Step RO 8 BOP Step 9 Verify Turbine Load Less Tha 570 MWE RO Go to Step 11. e RCS Makeup Control Switch to START Check Target Load - LESS THAN 450 Mwe Check Station Service Loads WHEN directed by the Unit Supplied From The Startup Supervisor, THEN transfer Transformer station service from the Auxiliary Transformers to the Startup Transformer using Attachment 2. 13
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _2_ Page JLof L Event
Description:
The unit develops a south condenser shell leak to atmosphere resulting in lowering condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014 n reduces unit load to stabilize condenser vacuum. Time Position BOP Step 13 Check Auxiliary Steam Supplied From Another Unit I. Remaining procedure st L _____ _ _ ____ J Step BOP 14 atelL~!(jmp Turbine Runback Defeat switch Stop the SGFP with recirculation valves open P ce SGFP recirculation valves control switch in the o D/AUTO position rbine load less than - 300 MWE
- Stop the remaining heater drain pump
- d. Verify Turbine load less than - 275 MWE
- Stop one Condensate Pump
- e. Verify Turbine load less than - 200 MWE
- Place the running SGFP recirculation valves control switch in the OPEN position Note: Following load reduction and stable vacuum trigger next event 14
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-L Event No.:_3_ Page 1_ of L Event
Description:
Following the load reduction, PT-3-447 fails low resulting in continuous control rod insertion. The crew will respond per per 3-ARP097.C place rod control in manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1 toaddres channel. Time Position Tri er RO RO identifies the failure of PT-3-447 base
- Alarms C 7/1, 7/2, 7/3 Hi steam RO
------------.I TES kly returns to normal may be a precursor of I for that channel should be placed in the a maximum delay time of 6 hours, to allow
- - - - - - - - - - - ______ 1 rify instrument loop failure by comparison to adjacent loops nd known plant parameters and conditions.
tep 5.2 Verify no off-normal conditions exist on the adjacent channels which are to remain in service. Step BOP 5.3 Verify applicable control transfer switches are in the position which eliminates the failed loop. 15
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: --L Event No.: _3_ Page.1.. of L Event
Description:
Following the load reduction, PT-3-447 fails low resulting in continuous control rod insertion. The crew will respond per per 3-ARP097.C place rod control in manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1 to address,-",u\~ -'P'U channel. ime Position Note: RO selects PT-3-446 as controllin Step BOP 5.4 IF a control function was placed' failure, THEN verif the control Step US F(;'lCTIONAl JNI'C ACTIO'i 1.2 6 2# 3- 7 2: 7 l 7
! t.2 ll1W>..l!I<el' 1 lICRililer 11 Vbreilile< 2 l!mf_, 11 2 \2 810 2 :!.~ &', S' 9 2 1.2 e 2 'F .:£~
.:::~
9
#' ' .._ 7_'4 -;. wnr ~ man the MtirnlJ11 ~tiI'1it:er of Cranf\'l~ OPEfl'AEU, wltrln 1holE ~ by oo~nt;tm rJ;!he ~ pem1~ a[1rr~r '~~) ~a1 tJ'te mte1cu ~ In ~
requ!rett <<ate fl)f the ~ ~t cmJijllloo. Cf ~ Spedflcm 5,,[1.3,
- -- - - -- -- - - -- - - -- -- - - -- -. !!QIS I If lee determine.s a Test Sequence ProCB8f30r for an Eagle-21 Channel has failed, then I I that associated Eag/e-21 Channel may remain in service if Attachment 6 .'13 performed once per 4 .hours, (Reference Safety EWliuaiioll JPN-PTN~SEJS-95-0(J 1)
I
~----------------- ______ I 16
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--.L Event No.: _3_ Page 2.. of L Event
Description:
Following the load reduction, PT-3-447 fails low resulting in continuous control rod insertion. The crew will respond per per 3-ARP097.C place rod control in manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1 to addres channel. II Tiirne Position Applicant's Actions or B BOP Step 5.11.1 IF plant conditions are such t associated with the failed undesired RPS or ESF a following: R.f Dwg' 5.1O-T.O-18A.18B.12A,12B &17; 5010-T-ll, Sh 17.21 & 22A FUNC-ANNUNClA TOR LOGIC AFFECTED TION p-1. 1/2 k.rt;.ine first slage pres~~e > 10% pao.ver!o aiiow at PO".,;af tnps (P*lO .al'So p ;!In inptlt to omable B't power trips) 212 turbirnl first stage pressL::f'& "100/,;- and
.314 ;\.f.r;I($1" ronge cr.aollals <: 10% blocks at
..... ar if. $,
2r2 dumneb :0 70% turbine power, ai,ows Load l1<n11 p \o~d I1m'l nH1bac~ for N1StRPI roo drop PC4~7E2 si nal (Runwci<; or. ROd Oro D&I&"1OO l..OOPAHI SGA 1/2 th;;Ulr'l~S on 2i3 SfGs nigh 'Ste<lm fkNi STM FLOif' C 7/1 STEAMLiNE S :;. program with 2/3 loYi Tnvg (543~F) Of FC475 HI FLOW 213 kr..... SfG ress:.Ire f614 s" cOOP B HI 5GB In channels on 213 S!Gs hfgh s.team trow STM flOW .712 STEAMLINE S :;. program wi~h 2!31ow T3't'g (543"'F) or FC46!, HI FLOW 213 lOW SiG rSSlJrE! 614 sk LOOP CHI SGC 1f.2 channels on 213 $tGs high ~1l-am Iklw STM FLOW C 7/3 STEAMUNE S ;:. progmm with 21'3 low Tavg (543"f) Of FC49£i HI FLOW 2:(3 ~ SfG sstlre i614 s' \ C _CONTROL RELATED P - RX PROTECTION RELATED S _SI\fETY INJECTION RELATED te: Following T.S and bistable identification, continue with next event. 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.:_4_ Page~of .lL Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The ill respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and s' on to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate t fa ed steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse per -E -E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Tri er lesson step, EVENT 4 - 3C S/G F US RO Step 1(lOA) -Verify Reactor Trip BOP
- a. Manually trip turbine. IF unable to verify turbine trip, Start THEN close main time steam line isolation and for bypass valves.
RCP
- b. Manually close valves. IF any valve can NOT be closed, THEN close main steamline isolation and bypass valves.
- c. Check Mid and East GCBs - c. Manually open breakers.
OPEN (Normally 30 second IF breakers do NOT open, delay) THEN actuate EMERGENCY GEN. BKR. TRIP SWITCH for the affected breaker(s). Note: MSR main steam su valves closed b BOP 18
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_4_ Page .£ of .lL Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The cr ill respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and tr<>Kf",itim 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate the ul generator. The steam generator rupture will be addressed er -E Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Time Position Step BOP 3 Verify Power To Emergency 4 K
- a. Check the 3A and 3B 4 KV buses - MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE E ERGIZED
( KV bus is energized, THEN go to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O, LOSS ALL AC POWER, Step 1.
- b. Attempt to emergency start the de-energized Unit 3 bus diesel generator.
- c. Perform the following:
- 1) IF lockout of 3D 4 KV bus NOT present, THEN perform the following:
a) Verify 3C CCW pump - BREAKER OPEN. b) Verify 3C ICW pump
- BREAKER OPEN.
c) Operate bus supply breakers to restore power. 19
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_4_ Page~of 2L Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The c ill respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and tr sit' n to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate the aul Cl steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addressed er -E -E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. ime Position RO Step 4 Check If Slls Actuated
- SI Annunciators - ANY us - - *,1 US ove '"am, THEN noonal setp:wrus can . n be uSlCd OOlie rale haS"Mi""e.x~ iC,l'R.ad.,
ditions lis-led below OOOlJ1 *. I!::WIi trip all RePs:
".limps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNiNG AIm 51 FLO'NPATH VERW'IEIl.
LESS THAN 2S'F!65'Fj llW:/.1rip all RePs.. SiG p!'!!59J!1e decrea'Sing in .m unoomrolled manne, OR any S1G eompl~ depres5'~. THEN following f1"iiIY bE! perfoonel: - -- Maintain low Redwater !low ~e, til"", 345 gpO> lIntl r , _ range iiwel in at 1Nst one SiG is qte03S !han e%{3-2%1. iWale AFW IIow to jaul~d SiG(s/. S!labilize Res hot leg terrperalure usng S1s3m Wrnps when faulted SIG has blown Min to lass ihan 10% wide range. RUPTURED sm ISOLATIOO CRITER!A IF """i SfG lev~ mw=i1SES in an ,,,,controlled mamer 'OR mt SIG hal> abnonnai nKif;alion. AND narrow ranq '<2'\1,,1 in affilc1ed ::,'Gis) .. greOh'er 1han IilY.rl2~ lli5t:! feed IIow "'31' bE! stoppe:!"'iC"~ S.jGf5~
- 50. AFW SYSTEM OPERATION CRJTERIA
" Jf !.'iQ AFW pumps are ~r3!ir", 00 a single train. Jl!a1.one of the pumps shall be ;hut down within om! hour 01 ~ initialsta!1 sign~1
- b. IF 1WC API/v trilins are o;>>er.1!i"Q <Ii1!'r.t 00<: allhe AFW pumps ha.s l>eEn operatin9 at tow flow of 1l1:) gp!'"! <;If tess lor one haur, lli5t:! !hal AFW pump shail be shut down S. CST MAKEUP WATER CRjJEEfA Jf CST:evei de---.reases to )sse than 1{)';'** .II;!I;tt 3>+/-i makeup to CST using 3-OP-1l1E.1, CONOENSA TE STORAGE TANK.
20
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_4_ Page 4_ of .1L-Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV-4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The cr ill respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and tr si n to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate the aul a steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addressed er -E -E-3, Steam Generator Tube Ru ture. Time Position Applicant's /l.r-tinnC! nr R, Note: Actions per the fold out page the following: RO Stop ..J time BOP Start ..J time for
* ""H'ic:l~'8it Justed to zero to isolate flow to 3C AFW S/G.
HIC-1401 Band HIC-1457B adjusted to establish
>345 pm total flow.
not identified as ruptured initially feed flow may be stablished until identified as ruptured. Cr ic I task: (WOG) Failure to establish minimum AFW flow before transitioning out of E-O. (E-O, task F). abilizes RCS hot leg temp. using steam dumps when 3C wide range level is less than 10%. Continue With Attachment 3 To Complete The Prompt Action Verifications While Performing This Procedure Note: Attachment 3 listed at end of scenario. 21
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_4_ Page5_of~ Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV-4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The fGre~}will j' respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and' s.iJii'6n to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate th ult~d steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse~/p~r, . ~-E*~P-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. " Time Position Applicant's Actions or B Step RO 6 Check AFW Pumps - AT
~ 'Prfform the !s'11Q,yving:
LEAST TWO RUNNING ,,;>
/\~., lVta.flu;il*fi'; p'p~n valves to
*e~ta*lJ'ii~.h/tWo AFW pumps run(1ing.,
- b. IF an\AF ump is tripped,
., ,. !H EN di's,p an operator to'/IQ~. ~ Ily' the AFW
/tll..~?i n'e*t1:~s.
/ **.**, .i'
- c. IF bot~units require AFW
, (v AND only one AFW pump is available, THEN perform the
't following:
'., \
\. 1) Verify all RCPs-TRIPPED
- 2) Establish 270 gpm AFW flow to each unit.
- 3) Use a setpoint of 270 gpm for required AFW flow instead of 345 gpm specified in subsequent Steps and Procedures.
er 3-EOP-E-0 foldout a e Verify AFW Valve Alignment- Manually align valves to PROPER EMERGENCY establish proper AFW ALIGNMENT ali nment. Note: Steps 6, 7, and 8 are critical steps: (WOG) Failure to establish minimum AFW flow before transitioning out of 50. (E-O, task F). 22
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _4_ Page6_of~ Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and t ns' 'on to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate t a ed steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse per 3- P-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Time Position Step RO 8 Verify Proper AFW Flow
~
- a. Check narrow range level in at least one SIG -
GREATER THAN 6%[32%]
'" 1) ~ri AFW flow greater
,,' than 34 . pm.
"~VF AF fl less than 3~' HEN manually
( rt mps AND THEN man ally start pumps AND align valves to establish greater than 345 gpm flow.
- 3) IF total feed flow from all sources greater than 345 gpm can NOT be established, THEN perform the following:
a) Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES. b) Go to 3-EOP-FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK, Step 1.
- b. Maintain feed flow to SIG narrow range levels between 15%[32%] and 50%.
23
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_4_ Page7_of~ Event
Description:
3C SIG experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The e will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Stearn Generator Isolation to isolate generator. The stearn generator rupture will be address Stearn Generator Tube Rupture. Time Position Step RO 9 Check RCP Seal Cooling a. Check all RCP thermal barrier alarms- OFF
- A 1/1, RCP TH COOLING WA
- c. Go to Step 10.
- d. Reset SI.
Refer to ATTACHMENT 2 for component KW load rating Start one charging pump at minimum speed for seal injection
- g. Adjust Charging Flow To Regen Heat Exchanger, HCV-3-121, to maintain ro er seal in'ection flow Note: Ste 9.b transitions to ste 10 24
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _4_ Page 8_of ~ Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The y will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and tr,{hs~ibn to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate t4.e***falllt{d steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse9/pe~.",~-E~,P-E-3, Stearn Generator Tube R u p t u r e . / ' / ' / ; / / \ \ \ *'f"., Time Position Step RO 10 Maintain RCS Cold Leg Temperature of'* STABLE AT OR TRENDIN IF",temlilerature'is
- TO 54rF IF ANY RCP .\.ecr~asing, THEN RUNNING +,periQrm the following:
\\,\.\
1J\\ Stop dumping steam .
*,~ ';\-**'0::
LESS THAN ?) LI'h:1itt9tal feed flow to STABLE IF NO *"'** . ".,,~45\*~fpm until narrow
- RUNNING r.~ge level greater
( han 6%[32%] in at least one S/G.
- 3) IF cooldown is due to excessive steam flow, THEN close main steam line isolation and bypass valves.
- b. IF temperature greater than 54rF AND increasing, THEN perform the following:
- Dump steam to condenser.
OR
- Dump steam using S/G steam dump to atmosphere valves.
Note: RCS continues to Coo/down due to S/ flow 25
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 3-. Event No.: _4_ Page 9_ of ...fL Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The e will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate t fa generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse Steam Generator Tube Ru ture. Position Applicant's Actions or Step RO 11 Check PRZ PORVs, Spray Valves And Excess Letdown Isolated
- a. PORVs - CLOSED a.
- 2) Go to 3-EOP-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.
IF PRZ pressure less than 2260 psig, THEN manually close
- b. valves. IF valve(s) can NOT be closed, THEN stop RCP(s) as necessary to stop spray flow.
Auxiliary Spray c. Manually close auxiliary spraj Valve, CV-3-311 - valve. IF auxiliary spray valve can NOT be closed, THEN close CLOSED Charging Flow to Regen Heat Exchanger, HCV-3-121. 26
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: _4_ Page 10_of ~ Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFWfails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The cI'e~;,will ,,~,/ <-",.- respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and p-ansjxion to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate the"1aqlfed .,/" ...,'\. steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresst;d/peJ:,.~-E~p-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Time Position Applicant's Actions or
- d. Excess letdown isolation valves -
CLOSED CV-3-387, Excess Letdown Isolation Valve From CgJe Leg
- To Excess Lelddw.
Heat Exchar"~e
- HCV-3-137, E%c Letdown Flow\,
Controller _"z,.i" '-'" C'~~__'<<,>", RO /$t:9" ~
,I I
\~
i\~2 Chec;k'If ~CPs Shoul
/' "'"'"'''''''''''''''''''''''''
C3/'C h,~ck;"RQes -
//f "-h%,,,""o
- a. Go to Step 13.
"b.tsj1eck RCS subcooling - LESS THAN b. Go to Step
'\\", 25"'~[65°Fl 13.
"\::., "\\~"
- c. High-~ead SI Pump - AT LEAST ONE c. Go to Step RUf'(NING AND FLOWPATH 13.
VERIFIED
- d. Stop all RCPs
( 27
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--L Event No.:_4_ Page 11_ of.lL Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The crew will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and transit'on to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate the faul,"<>,rt ,,- generator. The steam generator rupture will be addressed per 0 - -3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Time Position Applicant's Actions or B RO Step 13 Check If S/Gs Are Faulted
- a. Check pressures in all SGs a. Go to Step 14.
- ANY SG PRESSURE AN UNCONTROLLED M OR itionsto 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response Thermal Shock Condition.
CAUTION Check RCS Pressure - IF RHR Flow greater than GREATER THAN 250 PSIG[650 1000 gpm, THEN return to PSIG] procedure AND step in effect. CAUTIONS
- Low range flow indication is NOT available when using main feedwater instrumentation and an alternate source of feedwater. Changes ill ReS temperature and SIG levell11<~Y be used to control feedw8ter flow.
" If the AFW pumps are lhe only available source of reed flow, the steam supply to the AFW pumps needs to be maintained from at lea.sf one S/G.
28
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_4_ Page 12_of ~ Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The cr'Will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and tr .. (to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate the f: te team generator. The steam generator rupture will be addressed r 3-E -E-3, Steam Generator Tube Ru ture. .
~~====~~~===91 me Position Applicant's A"ti,...nC!1"\1" .J:{,
I
-------------- NOTE I
I !f Reps aro NOT running and Steps 19 through G ERATOR I I TUBE RUPTURE, are in effect, this procedure sha I Step 2 Check RCS Cold L Temperatures -STAUlLL-"'J'h;' INCREASING steam dump to re valves - CLOSED.
- b. Verify steam dump to condenser valves - CLOSED.
- c. IF RHR system in service, THEN stop any cooldown from RHR system.
- d. Control feed flow to non-faulted S/G(s) to stop RCS cooldown.
Maintain total feed flow greater than 345 gpm until narrow range level greater than 6%[32%] in at least one non-faulted S/G. NOTE faulted S/G is any S:lG that is depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or is completely I depressurized.
- L _______________________ J 29
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-..l..- Event No.: _4_ Page 13_ of 2L Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW.r~ils to auto actuate and POV-4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. Thee"w;;will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and!r Ibn to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate th,ei[a steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse "l-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Time Position BOP 3 Minimize Coofdo'l>"fl From Faulted SlG~s:1
- a. C,heck Si<3s - ~>NY FAULTED
- o. Check ReS oold le9 ternperatUrE:5 -
DEGREA.3ING
,:;. 'Verify mair s1e.EHr~!ire isolat>on and bYP3:'S.'S
'y"*ah/es dos-eo fClf e~ f1ed :S'/G
(
- A.FSG-3-00S
.,. A.FS-'s- 3-007 GIGs - -,!.N' SiG NOT FAULTED g.. IF at! SIGs f.,iUhed, THEN control f"ed fl"',,"' at 25 glOm to each So. AND go to Step 4.
- n. Control feed fiDw at 26 gprn to any fal/ted StG(S) r~eede.d: for ReS t~rn-oe:f'ature- control Isdate fe'2'd'Nater to aP faulted SlG(S:i NOT needed for ReS ternpera'ture contrcf ate: Directs NSO to close AFSS-3-006 and open AFSS-007 to I train 1 AFW from 38 S/G.
BOP Note: Places HIC-1458A and HIC-14588 in manual closed to isolate feed to 3C S/G . 30
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _4_ Page 14_ of R.. Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The c ill respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and t 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate th generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse Steam Generator Tube Ru ture. Time Position RO 4 Chec~; P'RZ ?ORV Block Valves i\ Po\VE;4' to block valVe'S - AVAILABLE
- b. Siock valves -AT LEAST ONElJPEN 5
RO
- b. VErify.at least one PR.l PORV open.
WHEN pressure l;ass!han 400 psi". THEN verif)'a!! PRZ PORVs closed Oir isolrued. Gonlinue 'with Step 6.
- d. Verify.at ie.asi one PRZ PORV open.
WHEN prer.sure less ihan 2335 ps~. THEN 'laity a!! PRZ PORVs closed C! isolated. Cornir.ue with Step a.
- e. Manuaily close PDRV. 1£ any vallie can NOT be closed, THEN manually dos-e ill> bklck vaive.
Che-ck High-Head 51 Pumps -ANY Go to Step 13. RUNNING Che-ck tf 51 ShOllld Be Terminated Ge tc Step 27.
- ReS wbooolin.g baseod 00 core exit res -
G REATER THAN BO"'FI26D"F]
- RVlMS (QSPDS} plooum iru:lication -
GREATER THAN 0% US Note: transitions to ste 27 31
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _4_ Page 15_of ~ Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and t 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate th a ed steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse per -E Steam Generator Tube Ru ture. Time Position Applicant's Actio RO 27 Check. If An Rep Shoufd Be starte<l
* ,Am Reps - STOPPED US Note: transitions to s US 32 ease RGS presSUI'E! UI".t1! the ReS temperatwe soak has been compieted
- 5) ReS cooldown is permilhed after 1 how so.ak has beel"! completed t!) Maintain ReS pressure AND cold leg temperalwes wkthin ine Iii,-"i!s of FIGURE j
- 7) Maima'n coot,;liy....n rate .n ReS ccld Jegs less ihan 51YF '" any eO-min'ute Deri.:>d during subs'equel"!t recovery ac,tions US 33 Return To Prooedtrre AND Step In Effect
(~ 32
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _4_ Page 16_of ~ Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate t fa generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse pe Steam Generator Tube Rupture. II Ti,-ne Position US I Res hot leg tempera/ure sho
- blown down to less than 10% S BOP Manually dose valves.
- a. IE all SIG pressures decreasing in an uncontrolled manner. THEN go to 3-EOP-ECA-2.1. UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS. Step t.
- a. Search for initiatmg break:
- ANY SiG PRESSURE DECREASING
- Main Steam lines IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER
- Main Feedlines OR
- Other secondary piping
- ANY SIG COMPLETELY Goto Step 5 DEPRESSURIZED CAUTI'ON If the AfW pumps are tIle only available source of feed flow, a steam supply to tile AfW pumps must be maintained from at least one SlG.
33
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_4_ Page 17_of ~ Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. Thee will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and tFa'~S 'on to
/' ./
3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Stearn Generator Isolation to isolate t!+e"lau+/-t'ed stearn generator. The stearn generator rupture will be addressc;9/pe;."2-E~p-E-3, 4' " Stearn Generator Tube Rupture. . i'//'" Time Position Applicant's Actions or BOP 4 Iso!at~ FiHJlie<i SIGis) n"J~',. ,.,.,.. . "*. "'P,'I'C sttpplJ' eres':-* ,
'de stearn frl:m pUflpS.
AFVv' p\.d"!lpS. brifn.g C~~<[Gs-oonn<=t
.. .~.Fs.s--3*,G4D§
.. AFSS-.3-D07 P::,ace stearn dunp to a,tmll;\SptePE controllerl~ M,ll,NUAL AND C*,:ise the st';;:,::;m dl.lrrp to allnosphem \Silve . .!.E st;;:am durer, to "tmo5phere can NOT be dosed THEN iocally iscJte s*te"m c\rmp :0 Jtmosl;hefe vaive
\lerify SiC-; ;j;,'oV'/th:r-.'m ":50Ia110n v-alves-CLOSED ote: Completes isolation of 3C S/G
( 34
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_4_ Page 18_ of ~ Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and t on to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate th qked steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresSe,9'pe~J' _'r, P-E-3, Steam Generator Tube R u p t u r e , ' ' Time Position Applicant's Actions or BOP 5 Ch~k CST Level* GREATER THAN 10'% BOP 6 Check SiX>n03;f'j' Radiatioo
~. Drect Nucl~."r Chemistr;' to ;"":e pericdic ac1i'~'~ iy s.a.rnp~s cf aH BIGs.
- b. erect Nucl~",r Chemistry to check e,4M 1 mort1or reading
(-. US l - _..
*r" ****"""".",,..**"'......
~- .....,,- -
NOirES
- .. - - _.. -- . I
.~'*H'; wi~jl be neces..sarv for sarnp/inq during V";'is procedure, I
- _ .. ..:. - - .'-'_ - _ .. - - _ .. - - _.1 Conditions To Determine If Reps Should Be Stopped
- a. Reps - .ANY RUNNiNG a. Go to Step 2.
- b. High-head SI pumps- .AT LEAST ONE b. Go to Step 2.
RUNNING
- c. Res subcooling - LESS THp,N 25°F[65 CF] c. Go to Step 2.
l-i Controlled plant cooldoWTl - !iQI d. Go to Step 2. INITIATED
- e. Stop all Reps 35
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _4_ Page 19_of ~ Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The c w ill respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and t nsi' n to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate th au d steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse er -E -E-3, Steam Generator Tube Ru ture. Time Position Applicant's Actions or BOP Identify Ruptured SfG(s) iii. Direct Radiation Protection to take radial' readings 011 main steam lines 8!:ill. blowdown lines
- b. Direct Chemistry to sample the steam lines for acti vity 3C SIG as ru tured and Faulted CAUTIONS
- f the AFW pumps are the only available source of fee<iwater fl'ow, the steam supply Co the AFW pumps must be maintained from al/east one SIG.
- At least aile SIG must be maintained available for ReS coo/down.
( 36
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.:_4_ Page 20_of ~ Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW,f~ils to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The,!?'fe<<>will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection andltt'n~(~n to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate tije(fallited steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be address /f -E'QP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Time Position BOP 3 Control Ruptured SIG(s) Steam Dump To Atmosphere V.alve
- a. .A,djust ruptured 8/(3(3) steam dump atmDsphere controller setpoint to 1060
- b. Check ruptured SiG(s) steam dump to atlllDsphere - CLOSED
- 3) lE steam dump to atmosphere can liQl be closed, I.I:l.f.li locally close affected steam durn p to atmosphere isolation v'live:
}*I 0-001 for SfG A 3* 10-002 for SIG 8 3*10-003 for SIG C
- a. Reset SI.
- b. Reset AMSA.C.
Verify supply aligned to both t'3H15 of c. Reposition AF'vV stearn supply cross-
.AF~V pumps from intact S/G(s) co-nne-ct vah'es to pro\qde stearn frorn intact SiG(s) to all ,A,F"W pumps.
Mamtain steam fiow to AFV'v' pLrmps
">'Nhile repO'~Htioniflg cross-connect valves.
AFSS*3-006 AFSS*3*007
- d. Close .A,FW pW'np steam supply 1-.'!C)\/ 011 ruptured SiGfs) e Dispatch an operator to perform the follO'.... ing I i Open AFVI pump stearn -suppiy MOil breaker on ruptured SlG{s}
- 2) Verify .AFV...* pump steam stlppl,!, \10V en ruptured SiG(s) . CLOSED 37
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-0-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_4_ Page21_of ~ Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The ~9r~'" will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and ~tran on to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate tlJ,e'falJ,Med steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse ,/p -~ P-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Time Position Applicant's Actions BOP 5 Isolate Miscellaneous Flowpnths From Ruptured S/(;'(s)
- a. Verify blowdownlsolation valve(s}
ruptured SiG(s) - CLOSED m~~il*g'rPlre1~* NSO to use 1it1r'D[T1 u/JIt 4. BOP isolated within the first Veri ~Sl<,j)Blowdown Sample Stop Valves - CLOSEB MOV-3-!427 MO'l-3-'1425 MO'l-3-'~425 CAUTION If any ruptured SIG is also faulted and is NOT needed for ReS coo/down, feed flow to that S/G is required to be maintained isolated during su/)sequent recove.ry actions. 38
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _4_ Page 22_ of .1.L Event
Description:
3C S/G experiences a major fault and rupture in containment. AFW fails to auto actuate and POV -4882, TPCW isolation, fails to close. The9rl~will respond per 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and~s.jitfOn to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation to isolate t1fre/fa"4lt~d steam generator. The steam generator rupture will be addresse'pe~""",3-E'QP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. ." ' Time Position Applicant's Actions or B (f'~bDr
~#~'=============
BOP 8 Control Ruptured SfG(s) level
- a. Narrow range level- GREATER THAN 6% [32<?hl b.. Stop feed flow to BOP 9 Verily Ruptured SlG(s) - until each ruptured SIG(s)
INTACTSIGs at least one intact S/G(s) to
..J ReS cooldown.
!E any ruptured SiG(s) can NOT be isolated from at least one intact SIG, !.!:!I!i go to 3-EOP-ECA-3.1 SGTR Vv'lTH LOSS OF REACTOR COOlft,NT-SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED. Step 1.
\\t:!,o'te~srli~91'faSkJ,,(rr~GT, ilure to isolate feed and steam for a
"\\ fifulft:jd SG rior to Tra17sitionin from 52. (E-2, Task A)
Go to 3-EOP-EC,t>.-3.1, SGTR 'WITH lOSS OF RE,ACTOR COOLANT-SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED, Step 1. now have the shift, remain in place and not to discuss the scenario. 39
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4att.3 Page1_of_1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions ime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step 1 Check The Load Centers Associated With The Energized 4 KV Buses-ENERGIZED
- 3A LC
- 3B LC
- 3C LC
- 3D LC
- 3H LC BOP Step 2.
- b. Go to Step 3.
- Hi- containment pressure 20 PSIG Verify main steam isolation c. Push manual Steam line and bypass valves - CLOSED Isolation push buttons on VPB OR manually close valves.
40
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 2_ of ~ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions ime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step
- 3. Verify Feedwater Isolation Place main feedwater pump
- a. switches in STOP Feedwater control valves-
- b. CLOSED Feedwater bypass valves-
- c. CLOSED d.
IF sta b edwater is
~li9l:led t nit 3, THEN e.
top t~dby feedwater pu~). BOP
- a. Start ICW pump(s) to establish at least two running.
Manually close valve(s). IF valve(s) can NOT be
- b. closed, THEN locally close the following valves:
- POV-3-4882 - CLOSED 3-50-319 for POV 4882
- 3-50-339 for POV POV-3-4883 - CLOSED
- 4883 IF both ICW headers are Check ICW headers - TIED intact, THEN direct
- c. c.
TOGETHER operator to tie headers to ether. Note: BOP closes POV-3-4BB2 41
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 3_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step
- 5. Verify Proper CCW System Operation
.;t ...,. .,.
- a. CCW Heat Exchangers - Perforp;r(th~::tfollowing:
a. THREE IN SERVICE .*/ ,.*1"
),*{~tat{or stop CCW pumps as
<<' ,. J)'ecessary t blish ONLY Q.NE RU CCW PUMP.
2),'!e'?i<fy/' . rgency C*o.(ltainrtfent Coolers - ONLY
,l'~' *. , TvVC:A R . . NING
{'" "'--"><'<<:'""" .,".
\ '\:.............. .~) Go to St.~p'eq
- b. CCW pumps - ONL ~\.TWO~**b*:> St~?tor.$.ts?P'CQVV pumps as RUNNING\. '\ ./l *.Ift!*ces.l?ary l'gestablish ONLY
\-, \i'"*t1/TWO R:t1N'NING CCW PUMPS.
- TIED \ (c. IF both CCW headers are intact,
\ THEN direct a field operator to
~,
tie the headers together. RCP)K~'r *arrier*.......... \\jJtf: IF containment isolation phase B _*~"~6*/)P<IP*.E. .O K~Het;.MQ.~:3-62~.;:,i'
. . I'll "' ".. ,
NOT actuated AND CCW
-~~.~,,~
radiation levels are normal, AND RCP number one seal leak-off temperature is less than 235°F, THEN manually open MOV 626. IF MOV-3-626 can NOT be manually opened, THEN direct operator to open MOV-3-626 locall . Containment Cooling Manually start or stop
- a. Check emergency containment a. emergency containment coolers - ONLY TWO RUNNING coolers to establish - ONLY TWO RUNNING.
- b. Verify emergency containment filter fans - AT LEAST TWO b. Manually start emergency RUNNING containment filter fans.
42
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 4_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step
- 7. Verify SI Pump Operation At least two high head pumps
- a. .
running
- b. Both RHR pumps running Step BOP
- 8. Verify SI Flow
- a. RCS pressure - LESS THAN a.
1600 PSIG[2000 P
- b. High-head SI pum indicator - CHECK FLOW
- a. Perform the following:
- 1) Operate Unit 3 and Unit 4 high-head SI pumps to establish injection to Unit 3 from two high-head SI pumps.
- 2) Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to align Unit 4 high-head SI pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using ATTACHMENT 1 of this procedure.
- 3) Go to Step 10.
- b. Stop both Unit 4 high-head SI
( pumps AND place in standb 43
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 5_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step
- 10. Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve White Lights On VPB -
ALL BRIGHT BOP Step a gn valves to establish proper SI alignment for an injection flowpath. Reset SI
',}>'f "I"\r1'Ic"'inment Phase A - RESET Reset Phase A N 'te: BOP is required to go back to the contanment isolation racks and rest the six phase A lockout relays, (three lockout relays on each rack) 44
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 6_ of ~ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step
- 14. Reestablish RCP Cooling
- a. Check RCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING
- b. Open CCW to normal contai valves MOV-3-1417 Reset and start c.
coolers BOP Step
- a. Perform the following:
- 1) IF containment spray NOT initiated, THEN manually initiate containment spray.
- 2) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B-ACTUATED.
- 3) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B valve white lights on VPB - ALL BRIGHT.
- 4) IF any Containment Isolation Phase B valve did NOT close, THEN manually or locally isolate affected containment penetration.
- 5) Stop all RCPs.
45
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2.- Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 7_ of_1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step
- 16. Verify Containment and Control Room Ventilati Unit 3 containment purge
- a. exhaust and supply fans -
OFF Verify Control Room ventilation status panel -
- b. PROPER EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION ALIGNMENT "
BOP e ice Using
'-T~~.,~ST YSTEM s listed be/ow.
46
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2-- Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 8_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior I~------------------ NOTE Hydrogen lAunitar..; ~ hi' in SE'J'lfice Iffi/hin 30 m!Du 7.1.1 Initial Conmti;am,
- 1. luI "ppJic"bl~ prEf.eql.1isites 7.1.2 P;rrn;edm;e ~
.- _ .. _ .. - - _i - -NOTES - -
Sa~.l.e. SYSletU to FARM Headel: hol<lOOll Valve 2A{6 mm) PACV Vmt aDd Sample 5ystetUtc FARz\*! Header I~tioo. Valve (RR), P*.!llii,,1-3 -002B (5 tum,;) od; A_....D open PACVS hot \'1..... Penet 53, IDl-3-3, in D'Oll:t cfthe 'Cuit 3
. --Spray Pump. Room (An Akej' 1:> required for tbi~ lock.)
Unloc.k .~"1) open PACVS Iso! \'11i Pellet 16, HV-3-1, located: in !he lk."'llih AWl: Btcliiillway, (An A key B reqtrind:fur this lock.) 47
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 9_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 4. REqr!;!SI the Reactor Oper;uDTprfcl!l1 dIe following:
- l. Verif..: the fbl1o'NmE tl11lctLQU -;eieC!OI
)U1.aJ}'zeJ." huels are L; the S.'V.iPLE p (2) QR ,S2 d
~ roof near the 0\7it '3 0Dntainment !
________ :__ 1
'h, fr*:)Ul .,VHT Pp Bad;. ;"IPAS-3-004 EMERGENCY START any available EDG NOT runnin 48
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 10_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step BOP
- 19. Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses and 0 Check the 3A, 3B and
- a. 3D 4 KV buses - ALL a.
ENERGIZED
'~, 2) IF the nit upervisor
~cides t t energize the' de~iz bus or buses, c ~~to Step 20.
- 3) IF the Unit Supervisor decides to energize 3A, 3B, or 3D bus, THEN perform the following:
a) IF 3A 4 KV bus de-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-0NOP-004.2, LOSS OF 3A 4KV BUS. b) IF 3B 4 KV bus de-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.3, LOSS OF 3B 4KV BUS. c) IF 3D 4 KV bus de-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.5, LOSS OF 3D 4KV BUS. 49
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 11_ of_1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions II -rime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step BOP
- 20. Notify The Unit Supervisor That The PROMP' VERIFICATIONS Attachment Is Complet That Had To Be Taken Note: BOP informs US of completion 4882 was required.
Note: BOP should receive a turno the EOP network. 50
NRC XXIV- NRC - SEN- 3 OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT ( ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO: Field SUpv.: Outside SNPO: Admin RCO: ANPO: Unit 3 Unit SUpv.: RCO: NPO: Plant Status Unit 3 Mode: Power: 100% MWe: 760 Gross Leakrate: .02 gpm RCS Boron Cone: 670 ppm Jperational Concerns: 3C charging pump out of service Thunderstorms reported in the U3 Antici ated LCO Focus Area: Maintain 100% (
.1 Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 100% Gross: ,02 gpm A 6615 g,s" MWe: 760 Unidentified ,01 gpm B 664,~*/*gallf Tavg: 574,2°F Charging Pps: ,01 gpm C §.827 gal
/~/,:,
RCS Pressure: 2250 psig RCS Boron Cone: 670 ppm
.. ~'\.,
Abnormal Annunciators: ;l"'\,... \.;l' . "\c Annunciator: Comp Actions: j .... ,j/~/"j//i' "\\\ .. \. \"\\*..\ Annunciator: Comp Actions: {:/ /,
'\\\\;.::;>
~vfL Annunciator:
Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: (,r ;:::"'~"' .........,,'\\'\~ Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions:
.\;\\\\'.....'. "" . .~...'.'.,~ . . . . . ., . \\.\,:>1
( Annunciator:
\'v,j/*:~~/f/'*~\'''';'\j'::;>
Comp Actions: / / **,/i.'........." ...." *.,,\.. Annunciator:
'\\\,
<H)
Comp Actions:
\\/~)
Annunciator: Comp Actions: ,,// . Annunciator: **\\.. . .\.~***'*\......fj'**://Ji/ ...***'*'****' ** . *,** ..*...*"' *. ,.. ,*....*,. ",/1*>' Comp Actions:
. cur~;.,Acti~it1lte::~: (Do:s Not Include "For Trackine Only Items" TSA.S Reaso .
","1. \ ,'\ '0 Entry Da r.S.A.s~:~.~\"
Reason: Entry Date:",\., )J
~/
TS.A.S / Component,,, R e a s o n : \. . Entry Date: TS.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: TS.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: TS.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date:
Unit 3 Status ment: '3 train protected both units Jnline risk is green !:J1?_~.5?-,!!!ng ECOs to Han and lor Releas~,;. . , ,. Evolutions or Com erator Work Around Status:
TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Facility: Turkey Point Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: 2009-301 mod Examiners: Candidates: US RO BOP Initial Conditions: Mode 1, 100% BOL Turnover: Equipment OOS: 3C charging pump out of service due to service in 14 hours. Thunderstorms are in the area. paCking)E$'~g{"s~~\~~ed
-,;/ / / '\ \\.
return to
,.,~,,,~~,/-,, '\~".
Maintain 100% On line risk is green B train rotected Event Event Type* No. 3B CCW pump trips due to break~*F.Jailur~:;,3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, was TFK1A611 = T (C)RO inadvertentl}lfcjQ~:d following 3-0SP~Q30.ts\..CCW pump auto start test, TFK1S611 = T (TS,C)SRO preventing'§n autost~rt of 3A or 3B C()V::; puh;Jps. A CCW pump is started per 3-0NC)f- m1JoQt(nt Cooling Watr;r M function.
----------~------41 3Ast~a gener el to increase. 3A S/G TFS1MWEH = (I)BOP 78 is m ual to return 3A S/G level to 2 T (TS,I)SRO t<J*sVX~p c~ptrolling channels and return 3A
'*:,<~:,,,,, ,.::f
. The crew responds to annunciator A 1/5, RCP TVHNL1A =
3 .00101 e directed to 3-0NOP-041.1 , Reactor Coolant eal continues to degrade requiring a unit shutdown.
-ONOP-041.1 to shutdown the unit.
3.a A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are blocked requiring a anual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the console fails requiring the rator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main steam isolation valve fails to atically close requiring manual operation to terminate the steam leak. 3-EOP-E-0 is entered for the reactor trip response with a transition to 3-EOP-ES-1.1 to terminate safety injection. 3B ICW pump breaker fails, 3A ICW pump fails to auto start, and 3A SI pump fails to auto start requiring operator action. (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #4 Event 1 - 38 CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.5, CCW pump auto start test, pr enting an auto start of 3A or 38 CCW pumps. A CCW pump is started per 3-0N0I;,.: Component Cooling Water Malfunction. f"/ / ' J'/" pr' Event 2 - FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increa. ~e. 3A S~,G feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return 3Aigt7G.Je!ve~tol:>{ogram. 3-ONOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling channels and retutQ~;(YFRVfe,au\q~atic control. f"\\
~
,.,' "",.. \,
-,,~/::" '\~:\, - \\",~
Event 3 - 3A RCP #1 seal degrades. The crew responds to.a'nn~ciator A 1/5, RCP sea'~I~a~ hi flow and are directed to 3-0NOP-041.1, Rea t661ant Pum Off-normal. 3a"1t.1 ) seal continues to degrade requiring a unit sh '-\§/ Event 3.a 0NOP-1 00 is used per 3-0NOP-041.1 to s ,.n.Jne lJ
':r,,' f" Event 4 - A steam line break occurs on th?/c.Q,!11mon header to'{~eh!F turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. ACltorralie.,trips are blockeqreCl{Jiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from th~C'()\hsql~fa*HS.(~~Uiring tfl~op'e,(ator to trip the unit from VP8. 38 main steam isolaN.pn*'Yalve*f<al!~ foautpmati~ly~fose requiring manual operation to terminate the steam 1*~aR\ s.,) . . . . . . ,**".",.. ,,,,,,f
'i; _ - _____ j/r J""--' ,,' ---->
Event 4.a EOP-E-0 is~rttere'd**f'6). ( the reador . ,/ r~ponse with transition to 3-EOP-ES-1.1 to terminate)?a'f:!),(,irtjeEtiof\ 38 ICW\pu~.p breaker fails, 3A ICW pump fails to auto start, and. ~:A ~t'pump f 'Is fp auto staV r~uiring operator action. i
~(/
l~ .,..\. ,. '.,,.~\. )
,;.,:,-,--,~x:~~, >._'*" ....
' .. :~,,-,
/,,;-'
2
TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Scenario XXIV NRC 4 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup Restore IC-11 (Mode 1 BOL) Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIV_NRC_4.lsn
/,,)""'\\
Place simulator in run .4'/ / fi'f< Start 3B charging pump and secure 3C charging purpp/f' / '
.P,.//,/".,/,Y'/\".,.
Trigger lesson step: SETUP - 3C C~arging pum(il\,oa~ ... Rem. 9\1e~;,3C charging p~mp from service, blocks CCW"aul~,~stClJJts,tcnls 3A SI PP as IS. (Actuates TAB1POSM =RACKOUT:\TABM270 70' TABM291 =0, TABM290 =0, TFK1 A611 =T, TFK1 S611 =T, TFM2~.AS = l' )
}"'"". "'i,")'"
Trigger lesson step: SETUP - SIIC~'iM~IV,:r:J~,IP FAILURfi'"RsQ'l0ves 3A SI and 3A ICW pumps\,aUlo;;~tartsy,Ql?cks auf"G,tor trip, blocks 3B
~~A~~~('r~~SE~~~~T~~~~2~,~~~~ ~':;FL2XBSE" T
( Place simulator in freeze." .,-Jff":' ",/-><<;.,,-%,
;0,*.
\,. . . ."cliff"/1'"/,;f
"'I;f/"
", '*"i" ... 'i'i., i",j Place clearance info. iF Provide shift tur,PI'()'~ef'ichecklist$1 ii,... , , / \
Select 3A QSPD~ iag~/'z'1J,,(,S,6:Oand'3&9 PDS to page z1z (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA and at the'HCO/{ieskto the UtiMi,es.S'c;reens.
,,,,;:"i:~""-'-";;;;:;';'-"~4 ""'it;:\_ c,<' ~.1'* ,,~
Fil.14rr"hl~nge;r'&'*s{lutd~V!(n**bQron addition placards at console blender station. Data for
~acb/tCmay"~ fob{ld in"l,be ~~C & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator IIF.
f" /f//* i "ii",""", 'i,\,
'\ i,., J' I }
'/,'
3
TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Event 1 - 38 CCW PUMP TRIP Initiated immediately after shift turnover. 38 CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.5, CCW pump auto start test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 38 CCW pumps. A CCW pump is started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water alfunction.
,"ii" ii'-
When directed - Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 - 38 CCW PUMP TRII} 4/ (Actuates TFK 1B 13T = T) ,:~#/ l 4/ "\, 3-0NOP- 0 3 0 / " " ' \ , '\
<,',p/,/I \" '\\,\
Step 34.d. - Respond as NSO, Acknowledge direction to v~{yiPy\ICCW flowtd'QCtI~..(heat ex~~angers using FI-3-1407, 1408, and 1409. Aft~/2 I)lr~utes report to ~. ~ fI'~yv verified on all CCW heat exchangers. IF asked6w~irhdlcate as follows: 'I,
,;l;:
- FI-3-1407 329 gpm '"
- FI-3-1408 297 gpm
- FI-3-1409 324 gpm "', ....,.\"'. ./,/
"<\" f Step 45.a - Respond as NSO, Acknowl~9ge direction t~'~rif1:'FCW flow from charging pumps on FI-3-660, After 2 mir;l{*th3s%'report
\ '%
to CR flo~. on"E;1-3-660 verified.
,~
Step 53 - Respond as NSO, Acknowledee n tcJve,rJfy C . . w from seal water heat exchanger on FI-3-618. Afte\ 2 re'p£>rflo"~B f'w on FI-3-618
""~,,~. .?
verified. Step 54 - Respond ~.s"I~.~*;"'A<\k~'\ wledge ,ire; tion to verify CCW flow from spent fuel pool heat~xc~,,~f1ger on ~I- 622. Aft" inutes report to CR flow on FI-3-622 verified ... /f" j " , ; '
<:~;" '\\ j Step 55 - ResPO"Qas.,~Jy1';/~9kilowled9.,e~ir~.9' Ion to check 0-EPIP-20101 and tech.
satisfi'e,d. \, iii';; " ',o, .
.:"c."'*"'.*,;.;.
4
TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description ( Event 2 - FT-3-474, 3A SIG Steam Flow Fail High FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increase. 3A S/G feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return 3A S/G level to program. 3-0NOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling channels and return 3A FRV to automatic control. When directed - Trigger lesson step EVENT 2 FT-3-474 FAIL HIGH A"O' ") (Actuates TFS1 MWEH =T) ~f' 3-0NOP-049.1 ( 5
TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Event 3 - 3A Rep #1 SEAL FAILURE 3A RCP #1 seal degrades. The crew responds to annunciator A 115,' RCP sealleakoff hi flow and are directed to 3-0NOP-041. 1, Reactor Coolant Pump Off-normal. 3a #1 seal continues to degrade requiring a unit shutdown. When directed - Trigger lesson step EVENT 3, 3A Rep #1 SEAL FAILU (Actuates TVHNL 1A =.00101) 3-0NOP-041.1 Step 1 - Respond as NSO, acknowledge direction to check local sea seal injection. Flows aprox. 8 gpm. 3-0NOP-100 Step 3 - Respond as System Dispatcher, acknowledg Step 6 - Respond as SM, Acknowledge direction to refer If called respond as chemistry to take sam If called respond as FS/NSO to align aux te' onse back required. 6
TP-2009-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Event 4 - STEAM BREAK DOWNSTREAM MSIV A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbineiesulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are blocked requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the console fails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VP8. 38 main steam isolation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual operation to terminate :p/,%pteam leak. 3-EOP-E-O is entered for the reactor trip response with a transition to 3-E0/1i..ES,r':tf.1 to terminate safety injection. 38 ICW pump breaker fails, 3A ICW pump fails to a,l,Jto sjffrt, and 3A SI pump fails to auto start requiring operator action. ,fl
'" /'
//'" "\
When directed - Trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - STEAM BRE /\NNST'-.<><\ MSIV (actuates TVSBVL 10 =0.25000) 3-EOP-E-O Step 19.a - Respond as Chemistry, Acknowledge di~", samples of all S/Gs /,,\ >
""'", ,/",/
Step 19.b - Respond as Radiation Protection, AcknO~Jed§,~/.dfreJ3t'lon to take radiation readings on main steam lines. '" i/
,P"', '\,
"/,. "":::.'-~-"-,~<<" -'<:,
3-EOP-E-O attachment 3 \ " ' ' 1 ; > , , , ' ' 4 , , , . ' \ , ".", Step 9.a RNO - Respond as unit 4 ROt a~Kho~I~Ctge",girection"t;~ a\~ign unit 4 high-head SI pump suction to unit 3 ~W\,T u'SiR9 atiaCfi~ent 1',\9f3-EOP-E-O.
\ ~\ .,/"" ""<';""'<'l,.
( Step 14a. - Respond as/I;jP';"'a~~nowled~~ dl'~}1cti'~ to surv Y'II~S lines. Report back after 10 ""fn9.te~" alh{'team lirt~s q.t;'6ackground readings. j'/'/' \\\: "\\'\ Step 17 - acknoYf~e directi~,fl tg place P~~M\in service per 3-0P-094
* <!ri ~er less~,plst~'p".e.~.~:E P~~IVIIN SERVICE
- Att~r~. \mi~"vte~..1!1fQL.~,"?R' stet;~l7.1.2.1 through 3 are complete
- Reql,Jest,~R"cbntinue with, step 7.1.2.4 of'" ,,0'" "~'.~..ck",nd\4(,le,d"",ae d"", irection to complete lineup after step 7.1.2.4 is completed
;/ /" Aft~r 5 rrn,nut&.,~ report to CR that PAHM is in service.
,../l' ",1/- '"t ':~::::.<_ ,.::" .
.//,PS,,*E'OP-E-O attac m'~\1t 5 ' "
,\,\, ~t~p 3 - Respond ~.~ N'pO, co l~m 3A SFP cooling pump running.
I
~'tep ~~,,- Respond\~S)~SO,
", I','
acknowledge direction to shutdown MSRs using 3-0P-
"'\\ "I, 07~l( ~,id perform 3-0SP-089 main turbine valves operability test.
'\':::\~\ ."'\;"',\, ___ __,--p/::.J---- ,:/{,i~;--
3-EOP-E~-1 :~//f Step 16.d ~{~'$spond as NSO, Acknowledge direction to reset group A backup pzr heater lockout relay in the unit 3 west electrical penetration room. After 2 minutes Trigger lesson step, RESET GP A BACKUP HEATERS, inform CR when complete. 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:_1_ Page _1_ of ~ Event
Description:
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.5, CCW pump aut9,stal;t test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 3B CCW pumps. A CC~,p'u9Jpis started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water MalfuJ)e'tiOli(
,,;,,4' "
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi
._",,"" 2~
Tri er lesson step, EVENT 1 - 38 CCW Pq,MP ",RIP RO RO recognizes and reports the loss Of~Bl~J&vV pump as evident by th'e,. following:,.*""*"",f/ '\
- Annunciator alarms<)\,,1/~7'\1;:l 7/3,./ 7/5, H 9/5, X 3/6 ""'"..'" ""./.P' Pump Trip
- 3B CCW pump amps .,\,
- 3B ca<lv £~e'al<~[.i.~dication\
- FaiIUre'Qf'SA"or"4CC'C'W,pumps'ls\st
- on low pressure\, *it.
'\ ....,>
"+" .'. ".".'
\~,_:_. \\., .,.if~'" ./'~,_,:.:, YO~:;:""<::'::
RO May start,~!1Q"!~er CCW p~imp\.a~,/a* ~f,kfCjenf'op~r~t6r action per Q.ADM-211 anpiOS diTec{ion or wei,! f6fdjr.eCtion in 3-0t'JOP-030. Start RO t.pperator action to manually
~oses on high flow ARP guidance will be used to Water Malfunction CA.UTIOt~
/
jt' any Rep Dil3ffng J&f!lp&raWH! 3!1f1Uncfaror alarm acruamE,:l),~'D f11; associaTed
/,moror Milrtflg J&mp'llJ'3UA"e IS grwf9trtla'l1 1$5"f;. TflfJ rtl&r&oi'Ct'Oral1d smp :n'1&
a1'!'itic~ooRCPs. __ .' _., - - _ .* - - - .:_ - - . : '_ _i ' _ * ._ _ -_:~. I NOTE I FolrJotlf psg? ~P;Ot~\~C1 be J1iOll~tQf:eO proceaUre, I
~----------------- ______ I
( US Reviews the followin 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _1_ Page -.£ of ~ Event
Description:
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.5, CCW pump autOlSl[ar;[ test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 3B CCW pumps. A CC\\l started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water Malfu tio. Time Position us A MZl:l;ral;ylrip the rei!1:to," t~nf'lrei'l,ilJr B. Isolate letdll'Wll Ml.d ~:l!s.; J~!l, D.
},
e mupE'1~ ~llllillD{!.aWr i\W:w. Ktuzne~ .~'IlD It: ai,QOl/tl!d mwor b~
- er :1lMt 1115~F. D!m trip re.actw aud m('fp~!fec1E<l RePs.
- 1l1l!:l! CC\l: S,'stl!Ill Hlir has been fl!t!<OO'l!d sball be w,rnm ,be op>>.Jlltizig dons Qf 3-0P*030 mmmllr:zed a, follow,: [Commitment - Step D.2J
- "-: (CW P\lm,Ps (wbe~ N= ll;Jmbe~ Qf CC\'r Hlt, atigue;i to CCW) '. .
All CC \\' H&;Uliernce whei RHR IDSE'!'I,;X'e .2& Wltlt ooJy 2 (:CW H1!~ !ill .enne!!. plac.e 2 CCW P<lmrFi :0 ili.lU-!l}-Lodt
- !viammum of 5 out trf 6 CCW Em !..Mds.
2
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 1 Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-7010, PC-3-611 isolatj,9n, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.5, CCW pump aut.sY'§tii)t test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 3B CCW pumps. A CC)Y/~U9lP is started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water Malfu,pctio~:' jl' \h Time Position BOP 1 Ver1ty Pow;ar T., 4'KVBua3D
- a. Malrt,<3,!n 4KvaidS JiG i?n~zed -
P.J.lGNED TO AN E:.NEJ'I.G\ZED 4KV ,5US RO 2 Varity compCtmmt In; S6ft'lce
..J Start cprtf~~"Y'T;;k"!'( ~~-PRA) ~:~il~;e to start CCW pump (s) within 5
.ff f ri'/ mJnutes after a~to~tart failure. Can be accomplished J i63"ONOP-030.: \
.".- po " .... , .. ,.
/'
. if one was not started earlier.
- a. I;F CCYiJ f'lc,w to Reps cal'! ,NOT .~.
i'leaIilE1' A estatHI&ne:l,lHlEN m<tnu;;.II~' t1p ;'1e reilj:j:.y A.ND "em#\! reacror tip uSing; ttle me;?t,!ol2'.f5 EDP NBI\\%Jf$;..I\:,WD ttJ1!l'!5tCP all FI:CPs E!!.!2. pErllJrrn me :c%:ov.mg: Iso:',,'!: l.et'joi...n anil Exoe:ss llilolttn 2.. .If. any o!1argtrlg. pump iEi nJrt1il1g THEN (;pera1e at r1aXir7Jlr $pEeiJ UiniF .I:.HachlrJ1!rt IS eorn~~e*tetl
~ Dts?"3u:t~ an ,:tp=f3t~)r t.o e¥..3tHiE--h
{'1ler':;.ilencv Cc.::i!l:l'1l W;iofBf to dEs!re>;j crargli'lg pump ueih; Ntacl-rnE,"L 1, 3
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _1_ Page -+/-. of ~ Event
Description:
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.S, CCW pump auto/sf~ test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 3B CCW pumps. A CC~fP~,p/is started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water Malfu~etiol}I" "j/ -"
"J'/" _~.f' Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavid~\.,/*
===========
US
- Tn' II * ~!::-_(i Of tt;,E Spproidff":;3,!'E-,t)f 25% ,';,,v,;,,'v.:,o I ~ tf a eyes;5 Ue ~~'3'jVE- zet{f',er;" ,,~H e unNJ As*
*~
I LV1l: !l:aY-Ci? I I I ot! Si:alie lOWi I belote' Lr-,~l:~G'1J.~ ca'TI:e;!: I . L.-____, f'" ___ ,.1 RO 4 Open OJmponentIN,,};ef surge Tank MakEJl),. *"I."**,.r,',,,,;. asne-";:E;sary 7; ",:ld -fli:l$.eup
;-:- Jf Comp:;r,ent ':Cf)~tjg "*I*ate! Surge Tank l~,..El can ,W;!Itre l11ahI3Ir~.
~ pel1:Xl11 ttle t;oj;ow;n~:
c:, Slop aN RCPs.
,~: Perfci;1n3-EOp*E-G, RE~CTCXR TRiP OR S.AFE1YINJ5::::110N.
AttMer>iJnt~lUl!1g WW'l lfii61::m:NJ6d1me, 3* s:)OS-PlE' ,\iOTE.8 :prot 10: S1:ep 5) ano gCf
- 'c: S:-tP ;9" 1,1 componl?nt COOllrtg¥i&i&r liill'lders SIl!iJ,uMj 86 T!a d Tog;I?IfI&r
- b. Cn:ecN. ~r fJ1tl -has iD*ee'rl j'CdSt M') an~ CC.VIl C, iF "!\,)wln ooth cew 'lec,3:JETS Is !NlTma/,
reader . THE1!l >;?) to BI~ ::4. F'0-B13A for ~it:""jt:r A F -.)*6 j J*;5f1:1' hE;;;!.lr B Note: CCW headers are tie to ether, RNO a 4
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: _1_ Page 2.. of --.1JL Event
Description:
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.S, CCW pump aut test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 3B CCW pumps. A CCW started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water Malf'upclio Time Position RO VIlr11'j' COmpOr&.ifit cooling walEir F-rom Unit 4 . NOT REQVIRED
- b. \/e:ify CC~~)9 pur~~OG - A - L::";!..:?T RLNNlhi:;
2} S tep c.crnpone~D1ts c:c<.<cj:l?J by cornp:::fv.rt OO:::Vlng )!tater as ll!?<::e:.:.ary lcst3t:HtreCC4Tlpooen! oJcHng willer IBmperatur!
.3) IF arM roITiPCn2111.DCQ{ed ur oom~:.:Cne,i OJ(4!rq walfr mu:st DE' cpeor.J!fd MiD Eta-tHE CCCi1p:merrt rocHng wafer IBmperal.u"e '1:.3[1 Lim CE' mairt~3lnE'*d**.D;;iWoowr,'.e NOTE prior lc :3<tep3F.. "nc go to StEp 36,
'.UTtON Prior To- !J.tiiP 43 .And Go To Si~o 4:J CAUTION CO!11jtMJfl&lHCOoHng 'l\<'cteFw all,.. cOIDpcm&nr ffcE O&i?J1 foST iWld can nOT tJ&
r&SJor&(f, rJla'f. COlTlpcm<fR st:dff lJ'1a ma;'Jff.a'meo m pifJJ*ro-LocK or orr 1'0 pr6'W91lf 9qUJpmllm 11am39&. 5
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _1_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.S, CCW pump aU~9'§'t~tt test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 3B CCW pumps. A CC~'~~ is started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water MalfuJ1ttio;r~~ A ~\_ Time Position RO 43 '1'.[.rffy >cooopc.ruePlt Cooling Vlet&r Ie BeIng
$U!jlp!tiid "le. The FouCI'tllngcol!11pOH1Jrrts
- H}J!,H1E3i:l 51 ~fJmpll
- RHR purrips
. '. 3f1'e~lEd COfl1jllxlerl:!> :"1
-';;RlJH""To-~OC.'~ or Cft,
", AFFECTED In SlJOsequEnt
-PLA,CE A;:':FECTEO
,,_,:::X"*'~' <:::~",<<<,.__ '4ENTS IN eTA.'IOE'( in Jfi- '-<',\\ 5\Jt~e;jL'm :s:epE
.1/""'- ._ ,_="";::,':i;"""';",,,~,, __;__ "'\_" \!\ {~:"V N,fi>1e:)6w floW; a/~rms for components cleared when a CCW pump
.f j was st ed;'
RO 6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--+/-.- Event No.:_1_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.5, CCW pump aut test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 3B CCW pumps. A CCW6~QiIP :"p-- -":# is started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water Mal flqlCti o{I:' Time Position ROJ 45 BOP
;::{:}fr;PCflEr-_~ {):)cdrq p'Jrt:'5. :=1-;-5EO -
- t. G'lECl; charglng;:U11FS' AT :.E.A.ST RUNNING
,~ Maml.ah rrMrtm' 6Eiii fflie'cHor RO 46
;:, Close R;::;P Tt,ermaI5arne,- celli C'Jliet M-G\l*;;'~625 4 h~!L~t ci13rglngn:::w :ina' CrargmQl Flo"li
- 0 R.eger~ H:e.at Exchanger, HC\/*]:,..12'1, 11>> mairt.'Ill thermal OMrier !JP gr~atH tl1;;11 n ?ncne:e. 01 !N:ater
<11- 'ilEfiDl rea.ctor - TRIPPED
'v'arll'y 'RCP TMGf"1Ua1 Samar CC'i'V outlet, ,MjUsttl1ar~Wlg mow and CMMglngF'kJw to Mmt*;}~2G - QP',EN REgen HE'alaoc:han'~r. HCV-;;;-12t, 10 mainlatl t/"srm,,§ oiuller OP qreater than G ifH::<f!E'S af '.'iM?f -
Note: If MOV-3-626 has closed on hi flow from pump start; ARP may have been used to reopen, if not, it will be opened here. 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _1_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.5, CCW pump aut t test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 3B CCW pumps. A CCW; u started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water Malfi Time Position Applicant's Actions or B RO 49
- a. [~rKlfl'T'<3loontal!lmem ~,
RL'NNING
- b. Estabflsl'1 oormal OO:lt1hT'61t cooi'i'ig 1,1 Verrtt compor$!1t OOCilng Glerro r<lm1aJ 00l'lta!~1'!t cooler:<< -
AVAllJI8lE b.. IJ;eI'!'r:lrm lie '!tl~g:: 1! Vert!'y nrun clr~.
- 2~ Go to &ell' 51 ,
ChijrlCk II!' leWO'N1'lI Or ~s; Ul:cIown SilWlUlt:I 6& PIae9d ~ iel'VilC1l
- a. ~'l1 plImpi - AT LEAST ONE RUN NI I\fB
~. Lel00M1 52B. EX.cB$.E.~* IN SERV1CE PR!OR TO COt.l!PONE~<iT COOlING WATER\tA::'FUNCTION Note: normal letdown still in service, RNO to step 53 applies.
8
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:_1_ Page ~ of J..L Event
Description:
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701 G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.S, CCW pump autq/s't~, test, preventing an auto start of 3A or 3B CCW pumps. A CC'Y/(u~Pis started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water MalfUl;Jctio:Q:;'" /'.,' '-, Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavid" .-;2>"'\ BOP 53 LOc-.lil], Verl~j' oOffiilommt GDoFflg ',Vater FNyw Flii)lTlll4illill'j'ater Heal E:.X:tIOOgllW, FI,.3;*J2;1 e BOP 54
/~ ~. \
Notf)l calls NSO for local readi,( US Verlfy app\!C3bie Tsct:nlCa! spe:;!i'1ca':iol' t" ;P*srform 3W!!cab;fs TeCnntmlJ
;-In:ng Gcn;O-Uln-rr-E.1~r cperaUan t' :S;aE~I'1(;;aiikln catrecJjve a cfians '
fSftED
~\, -""\;;. .'\\
te.;, calls'$hiff;;Manager refers to tech. specs to determine T.S. 3~*1'(.2*~ction 81applies until 38 CCW pump breaker is racked out. T.~. r~ference below. f t 1 1 9
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:.-..1.... Event No.: _1_ Page --.1Q. of JJL Event
Description:
3B CCW pump trips due to breaker failure, 3-701G, PC-3-611 isolation, was inadvertently closed following 3-0SP-030.5, CCW pump aut t test, preventing an auto start of3A or 3B CCW pumps. ACCW started per 3-0NOP-030, Component Cooling Water Malfu tio. Time Position US F!..ANT SYSTEMS a. I'.Wl two CCV'l pum~ OPERAflLE bUt Mt ll'OO1
~. ~l1lm mdepeooenl poMr Sl.lppl1e6 b::I OPERASLE BY 'A1ll"m It-e !,;ext 6 nOUfs and ln COLD S/iL!TOOf\IN OP';v.eLE. res"e 1m he$. eXchlrgEfs 10 He)"" 51' ANOO'1' wtnln !he nm Iii I'OOr'!. an.:! ln COLD Pen'arrn !til:.~:
ilL ~llooral system Gpef'3iF..!I'liS
~E'. ~~!he &ystem!J~
.3-{)p.iJ3iJ. COMPONENT COOONG WATER SYSTEllit II. J! oo~i:lMefrt 000lI1l9 'Ila1Ef 1& being supplied WjUrffit 4, .l!:I.eI!i.piJI:)E OO1h U!ll~ In ootd eJW~ illS SO!lf'1 as p:1ESItie.
Note; US exits 3-0NOP-030, no other procedures in effect. 10
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_2_ Page _1_ of ~ Event
Description:
FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increase. 3A S/O feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return 3A level to program. 3-0NOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling c return 3A FRV to automatic control. Time Position Trigger lesson step, EVENT 2 - FT-3-474 F _ BOP BOP Obtains US concurrenc per guidance of ARP. RO ce for manuel FRV 0 eration
~"">f>:'*:"<1iIl1ill1ill=::':'>>'I
. zation of*3A"st~ evel, then enters 3-0NOP-049.1 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:_2_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increase. 3A S/G feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return 3A,~1~!. level to program. 3-0NOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling clJa'hnc;,ls"and return 3A FRV to automatic control. ,/,f j. (
./ \lc'~!;
// 0,,4//
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Beha\(id~.. "' / RO 3**"t.RF. 0.97. CR YELle?;,\, i)n*!lJr;; ica i; act au; to fllnltr i::"dl:'Iti<<:..:nn;;:N"iu':li!migllili! &z iW-,.;iwat;:: o:rm..nll. din IF 1ib:m~;; Mi to iU,!nln:J;o;lll fwur'i, mIN :9f9r to 3,C{!:.;1I)P'(49LD.,:iat:::Z;'iJl hib.l:;
~S:d~t:<r B;.,ql ~l;d or' 5-,.Q:!,ctot:' :Pn'lricn~D {:.biici:&l.1~,
<J.q.U;t=a~,o;: l.q~:.-;2 C-o.u:t:d. ),.:talfi:lr~::tio:~
l:l.J"::-:,I.:::,,,ut rJii*:zQ F~d:r}/l,:it w ~;t.'!,w.l~ b::,w'?J.k RInFI:">~CE'j:
. fPl C::;mrc.*l S7tilll :l!.a.Ill";31ll J6l(.:: *D-l:, 19B T:;::b; :;ip;;,: S';c-u,o:c '3 ,'.J .:1 12
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 2 Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increase. 3A S/G feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return 3A level to program. 3-0NOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling return 3A FRV to automatic control. Time Position BOP 5.0 s,UBsrO!,]NT ACnQ~S
- 5) ,\7 e::fr i1btnut;~rJ ,]Oi>:: f~i111r~ by pHamaTtHltl:::i:olldmo'us .
Note: determines FT-3-474 failed'~i BOP
"\ h~ ~'" '~""~,
Note: after the BOP hlJ~ $(abillzec:l3A'~/Glev ". . . m flow channel 475 is se!ected. ~e~[ew.tyii~r,pl~.!!,;elec~/~0~d flow channel 4~,~. JQ.i!!~gn bot~ c~nt~o,!.lmfJ,ehanne/s'.!9ithe yellow chann~1.
"Pne tranSf~r sWltch~s on JJ1e console are used to accomplish fer*~ "\.
BOP wl)en l(J.lteL.is r~store program automatic control will be
*(lst9l'ed. . .,~ ..............".,.,,"'//'.
,W
~fer \'" T'?:.r..n:ical SpeCfl.C?lti.Ol1S J;43 . I:nSti'1l1ni!ll1ati*,x!l,;\NIJ the InlIDUl'am (h~f'el;;(rRerll)D;;~.
. T.S."t{!bl'el3-1 function 12 action 6 I and table 3.3-2 functions act'iclpf 15 and function 4.d apply. Tables show below.
13
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-+/-- Event No.:_2_ Page ~ of-1L Event
Description:
FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increase. 3A S/G feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return 3A level to program. 3-0NOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling c return 3A FRV to automatic control. II Tirne Position US FUNCTIONAL UNr:
~ 1. Sfe>1J1l Ge~r VJaler L'!!/a-j,.J.J'if'oL-::w
~ 2. !:~s.31!I Gena'ator Water Le"\~i2i LOW Cooalde11 VIt.l1 S'leJro' F _ w Flow Mismalcll
( 12 11 2<biJ& Z 11 l 12
!J'f' i:11i1l!'l!'ll>_1S one Jess iran ~ TOI!al Nurrtler r:A ~annEls, TIJ 11i:)N rI'i&f prooaed untill' p!?~ *fK100 nell AMLOG CH.t.;NNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided 1:h!! I!'qler..b~ Channe! l&
tr"Il? ~Ij cootJItl*on Wl'!11J!1 6 fQUl'S s 6 hours to tri bistables 14
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: --+/-- Event No.: _2_ Page 2 of -.JL Event
Description:
FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increase. 3A S/O feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return 3A. ~fO') level to program. 3-0NOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling C~,f;ttfu~.l$and return 3A FRV to automatic c o n t r o l . , . / ' / ' <"/'
,,I' "\
=~===ll Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavidk\i US r SC.e*3rl une fiiY,'i.<**Hi;r v~I"CIO\?"1 wtm
- 3t-e-3.i:1 Ge1EntO'r pr'Ss~re*-lCfj\
Jr "T"m;--3)W 15 2, *3,.:1 ~7
- 2. :<. ~ 14 V,~ltj the r.umber '~f QPER.i4ELEcttJnrels ore 1~'6 tilil'11 ttle Tolal Number::J C/,allreis, r\.lY ~f'lXeer.! until pertJrmance of 'tiE' next i'tquirelt .M4Jl.LOO CH';f,iMEL "MAL TEST or TRYP .ACTJ.ATING DEVICE OPSRATIONAL TEST fYU,';dalt 1he cll1*anneY Is placed An tine tnpped o:mditiOn W'11!1ln 6 tIOiJl'Ii.
'rft:l,-rOI~tn.r"t:l..:" 6 hours to tri bistables 15
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: _2_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increase. 3A S/O feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return 3A level to program. 3-0NOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling "H.<UllJlV¥O return 3A FRV to automatic control. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavid'" US TOTAL '0. Fl.;:.,~cnOk"'i.. ur.JiT Of CK>'>NNEL0 4 Ste~m Uf-e l50: ..Ur>::r- *':Ccr.~i:"Ii.ieoj"l Q D1f'Z<n1 Un? flJN;*~H;:gr 2, ,:~ Ct'!rdc:.eont \t;lll-j
;Jt~Jm l?en-e-TJXor Prfi:..';.,l)f!2-Low
\ 2, 3" 1-1:'
- or Ta-"lIfo*Lz,w 1*:'
22
~. :2 it.'1\'
JPe>";31lng s,12a:-tl ge::)~f-3tJY
!l;1th Ire rl.!:rnbero/::;'PER.I\BLE cl',annelscne le~s tnan Ire Tola! Number zr Criannel,.
Ilon r'>3Y !,n:x:~u drrJ pE<rCf111anCe of tel'" 'I2:1t Faqulrec .~NJl.LC{:;. GHI\NNEL tAnC~~4AL. '7EST or T:;;XP A.CTUATHMG GEV:fC£: OFE;;'A.TtONAi.. 'TEST p-:"O'dt1EC1 t1e {e'C~a'l118' is placed m !11 ti!ipE<!i ccnd!tlon witNr 6 I'oun.. No,te:\petermines 6 hours to tri bistables ( 16
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _2_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increase. 3A S/G feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return 3A~(a~\ level to program. 3-0NOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling chSl'rtrieJs"and return 3A FRV to automatic c o n t r o l . , . / / "." ./
>fii'i Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavid~,.//.
'\
US 5 'ical SJ:%Kifi(ittj~ll~ .. US t all rec\,u:red t;:;cabl115 ai,0daled W:1:.1 tbe iai1ed
; J.lI nndf:!sired RPS(lc! ESF JC:ti.mioc., !..!!!1!
rovided as reference 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_2_ Page ~ of L Event
Description:
FT-3-474 Fails high causing 3A steam generator level to increase. 3A S/G feed regulating valve FCV-3-478 is placed in manual to return 3J\,. sfq*) level to program. 3-0NOP-049.1 is used to swap controlling c 4 n{,l,iSand return 3A FRV to automatic control. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behayi6~. US F-3-414 St.liim G~leratO{ A Main Steam Lin:f:/#tow M~,x: ,~vi~ti:on A,s, CQrnp ..lre*d to other Cha~ne':s. RACK a-mrA6LE BlST.t.BLE Ho, No fUMCnON 18
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_3_ Page _1_ of l Event
Description:
3A RCP #1 seal degrades. The crew responds to annunciator A 1/5'I1~P sealleakoffhi flow and are directed to 3-0NOP-041.1, Reactor Cp6iatit Pump Off-normal. 3a # 1 seal continues to degrade requiring alJnit,sf shutdown .f f (~/
,J!
,,,t
. l" j Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavid'F,,/""/
~==~~~
Trigger lesson step, EVENT 3 - 3A Rep #1 5
/f f" \.,
RO Reports failure of 3A RCP #1 seal a\d~mined)1//Y .
. "",\. '\r" f' ,.,"'*"
- Annunciator alarm A 1l§\.~CR:Se~J.fleak-off Hi flow FR-3-15 A flow indicating"S,8 g~,rn for 3A RCP
"\,\,
BOP Refers to ARP A 1/5 19
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:_3_ Page -.£ of l Event
Description:
3A RCP #1 seal degrades. The crew responds to annunciator A 115, ~CP sealleakoff hi flow and are directed to 3-0NOP-041.1, Reactor c06t~t if ;,/ Pump Off-normal. 3a #1 seal continues to degrade requiring alJrfit / . shutdown,// f Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behaxior\jl BOP 5:.[r ATTACHMsn;-1 "'" Page:; of 5~ ""
- ?a:uai A DEncES 55: 3 M~{~JQ.4*7 ,. Sb 3. ;::~..'CS - :~ei)j ,\V;n:e:' !!1J~Cl:C:!!' ttl Rep Ted) Sp~t 3,*4.4 i..t.:* -44.1.2. :;-_'4 4 tJ US Directs response per 3-0NOP-041.1 Reactor Coolant Pump Off-Normal 20
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_3_ Page ~ of..L . Event
Description:
3A RCP #1 seal degrades. The crew responds to annunciator A 1/5, RCP sealleakoffhi flow and are directed to 3-0NOP-041.1, Reactor C~ t Pump Off-normal. 3a #1 seal continues to degrade requiring a it shutdown Time Position US C4:WJ~mmam M~ shan NOT b$. ~ seal p.iCltage r.t!l1UI'"e utmr :cne ~ f~ S
~!O mrn~fea/raga I I I
I ~ I j I, I ~ I I I I
-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ *_ _ _ _ 1 US 21
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _3_ Page --.1.. of l Event
Description:
3A RCP #1 seal degrades. The crew responds to annunciator A 1I5,~CP sealleakoff hi flow and are direct~d to 3-0NOP-041.1, ~eactor ),<&bl~~t Pump Off-normal. 3a #1 seal contmues to degrade reqUIrIng ~/lJfl1~,/' shutdown. .,. t' Time Position US
"-. Rep :HOPPIHG CRITERIA IF anycr ~h~ fcHcwngRCP HTJt~are rear.:t"Rf.l .!J!:!§:! man' r1:;p !lehto"); ~ $o~'Jp 11112 afi'ec;::leo RCP ty,JfSi-S or ootawd1g oal,a 10' ~tz'rtiJ:p, ~;Of tiHarCfng -~n fV:P.: :cr ret'"" i:if*:Jlt>:gvn operaVO?1S; 1;'1 e~<?ctri:cZ
*,rD;? supev\"orcr COn)::mEr: Erglneertrg SupePd!<Of Tayau:no1zE conllruedRCF opera:ul .. wttr*
, \e'",,1 or Et3tCf v"tlll1rt,) IF.CrpeJailire at-oi;? stoppng orlena ntted I, FolttoJt page Item 2. 1N..
z;;.tlon i5 ri:qu.'fed leoe <Jttalne<J Vlor Ie Blartlng 111E' FtCF ermine foldout pa e does not a pi for con:litions 22
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _3_ Page 2 of L Event
Description:
3A RCP #1 seal degrades. The crew responds to annunciator A 1/5, RCP sealleakoff hi flow and are directed to 3-0NOP-041.1, Reactor C Pump Off-normal. 3a #1 seal continues to degrade requiring a shutdown. Time Position Applicant's Actions or B RO 1
- Rep 3A Trlef1T\31 Barrier tiP, Pl*~i
- GREATER ""HAN ZERO !I'K:H
.. RCP 32, TrlEfilT~ Barrter !i? . Pl*
- GREATER ""'HANZER:O !I'K:H RO RO 23
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _3_ Page ~ of l Event
Description:
3A RCP #1 seal degrades. The crew responds to annunciator A 1/5, RCP sealleakoffhi flow and are directed to 3-0NOP-041.1, Reactor C I t Pump Off-normal. 3a #1 seal continues to degrade requiring a it shutdown Time Position RO 1> -t ................. +. . .. N("15t:)f.i,! Lank Rnl.r~ I,(;PM) 3 2 2:250 2e;oo not within enclosure at any
;IRE ffl LEVEl C!Ja!m ~ ~titI;'l fJf' C\51JPffll'fl:m,' _ me nlJl7ll:lSr i\!iIo *
---- ..- ..- - - - - - - -- -- ...I Ch£M:ik RCP N~r OM S4J1ld L.e~- Go to $Iep 21 (Iff' F4l.YN[e~. FR-3-fSl4A- GREATER T~
UIPPER UMU OF ENClO~URE 1 Ch6<CII Rep Sea! Byps8a VIItV9 CV-:!-3G7 - ~ ttle r~ng: CLO,sED iI! MMlu;#fY ciOEe CV":3.sG7 b Chect for IXIrrEiSpoodflg de:CRiDe III
!~ill ba'Ilief:!.P C. PerflJl'm ~ mea Of ail RaP pa~W:~l1le causeaf~
ie;ak(#t now tI Request. t\I~a~frcm tre SY.'lt!nl Englrn!'e'f ~ Opera'llcri< SUper.iGloo 24
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.:_3_ Page ~ of l Event
Description:
3A RCP #1 seal degrades. The crew responds to annunciator A 1/5, ~CP sealleakoffhi flow and are directed to 3-0NOP-041.1, Reactor C9 \ Pump Off-normal. 3a #1 seal continues to degrade requiring a J.lliit shutdown ,_ 1/---' Time Position Applicant's Actions or BehaYid~:~j//f' RO 18 Che,,,~ AI! Rep Number One $eall&5'K-OM" fj,yiW!!; On FR-~,-154A - LESS THAiN ~ Gt=tM D'* !11.e;;'fcEcllS1 RCo un-1M
- he cause 01 tile '!il!JJ Ill3JI\E1ctlcn nJS t>en dllS'm&1d A.t:!D CW",~l{L RO j i CQ!l1nli!l)~ w11: sn,k:iCllln uSing 3-()N{:\O~-l:D, FAST LOAD R,E.DUCTKH{
2:. ~t1;i1xr6' Inppi:'j, lliW1rlp t're :-eacto-r
}, ~ the reactcfiS lrtpped, THEN S1Cp3J'i'i:'~led RGP;].).
C, Be~1n prepar"(!O'rlS to s:nl.t;Cbwn AJ,msrop aftEcte:l Rep l1ilng ::.GCP-'Kn, POWeR Cpe"'.}<.TIC\;N T(>,'10TSTANOBY c Caruel Plant Man3§iSmen: t,oT nv1t;er gtbjan::e Note: Determines 3A RCP seal leak-off flow greater than 5.5 gpm and 3-0NOP100, fast load reduction is required.3A RCP is required to be tri ped after the reactor is tripped. US Transitions to 3-0NOP-1 00, Fast Load Reduction 25
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--+/-- Event No.: ~ Page _1_ of ..1.- Event
Description:
3-0NOP-l 00 is used per 3-0NOP-041.1 to shutdown the unit. II Til'YIe Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US US
- 1. Re!Hoo f.:tr load fe:klCti(lO _ _ _ _ _ _ _~--:...,__-+-+--
ll@mim 01 il'a.ral!l1!ten ~cl Cml!iDg~&y Aniol!;!i ref :~e>:w:I-"!. T *~i1wi. not to ;;o.:i'ed :J ~F j)f e:q:.ected, s:ww ramp m restore ball,t Sl. ROD BA:"K LO L.slIT alarms:. the load reootooo ~1J be 51owed. US Will determine load reduction and boration rate. Then conduct brief. 9 allons/% should be used to determine 900 al re uired 26
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page.-£ of L Event
Description:
3-0NOP-l 00 is used per 3-0NOP-041.1 to shutdown the unit. II Tit"ne Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO El$gln BOIrai1oo
- a. Se1lhe Bollt "dO Totalizer to value
~dU!it!1gA1~lT"!elltJ tl set FC-3-1 131<,. flQl"I!;; Mt1 Fkwl ~ to a pc< HtI.b;j << 3D C. Place 100 ~r Millellp Se1el:Ior SWb 00
~TE BOP 3 ~Iry TJi'lafClI~Ft1}
* ~m~l1er ROI 4 BOP
( t1 soop Of SknII ~ reoot'llOO 10 OO!1!rol IEmperal!.we. If na~.jl!ace oolltrtt fMi in manual am malntai'l TiAlg YItlhb1tne e~ TilttgiTrefl1Tr:1 Al~me!1t .3. RO Perform the* ~ng: it S!oW'ltJ\iI:I red\ictlon Ull4II ala m1 Is fEHt. t;, FIia-evailtatel:t~ amoont aoo rale and mat'! ad.lu~ i6llle~.
.. D-EP1?-2l?1l?t, OOTIES OF EMERGENCY COORr'..#iNATOR
- il-ADMf*j i 5, NOTIFjCA~ OF ?I.AN!
EVENTS
... - - - _. - -. - -, - -t1J~ - - - - - - - _. - - .' '1 I -- I I ,AtXAai fIllX ~-e Is a.'R:i!t-tSC !l./ exc..eeo ttle T~t e-ano Wr!r1J rtfE? . iOaO rerf~ wttoout I erilrerf1i{J OwOP-{1£1.~. ~et:ltJo;'! Vilittt!!l U,e Axli!!.! F.VX D-tiT'elMce OperatJorr&l Space.
~-----------------------~
27
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
3-0NOP-l 00 is used per 3-0NOP-041.1 to shutdown the unit. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 7 CI1EC~ Plant R..apC'DSI? 3, (,;h:~ci flf'E~:stHiZ':Ef ~s\{e~ !il;r'JVlh'1!i progflfP ¢, O. iJi'3J:l r-e:\ti.h:~lt~p, raie anC auto FJG
;,. fn31r:ta1li1g1he e:q:~cled T3llg%TrS' aTlttenllned In Al1ammert3 RO 8 BOP 9 BOP IE ':'"'ar-g:et LO;3::r is <3REATER. Trl,A/"4 451} \1Vi2<
THieN prfocrn !re fl::ficNIIng
- a. h6aintatl re2!"Jor :PC{.VE't a't D(" befO:~l It>e largEI "laue u-s'ng:
F.i'~ra\k)n'(jII:jUon Corrtll)i R.oo 3';iIIJ£tcl1ems TIH1>ihe h:""j ad}llstrnents D. Maintain '"3"£1 \iMltdn +/- j "1" rI. -ret
- c. M::!lnt;a!n PrjS*Su.1Zil[ I;eVE} on pro;lf,3ID c hlalni:aln PreS1!*...F!Zef fTe:&Sure on ¥nJ9'~ll.
e t4amtat1 Sf;; :~e\l:'e:!;; Of! pn;)~raf1l. 28
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page -+/-. of ~ Event
Description:
3-0NOP-IOO is used per 3-0NOP-041.1 to shutdown the unit. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 12 Cl'laeJo: S:lntlon S&rVlce 1..000~!Ii~l:I From TIl& &tup TraMfOmler Note: transfers loads BOP I I n aux steam usin att. 1 er event 4. 29
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_4_ Page _1_ of_1_ Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are ~t~~ requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the cq,j;Ls~ls:rfails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main s,~e~m,~'olation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper~16nJq"t~~~nate the steam leak. ",/ f '/ ""\" \, J
<: ~\.",j;.f"'/' --;'\,. ,- "" ",
Time Position ior Trigger lesson step, EVENT 4 - STEAM BR RO/ Operators determine a reactor trip sho~l BOP of:
- Steam, n .
Auto
- Steam fto Trip Failure US RO
,~- "'""
"'Trjps tl1~ r~a~tor from vertical panel B
\,
ct~ 3-EOP-E-O immediate operator actions to be performed.
~----------------------, ~ .
( 30
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:~ Page _1_ of.lL Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbin,\}fe~)llting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are blockeq"l'q",;!,irfng a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the console faUs'reqtiiring the / "> operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main steam isola!ion )[alve{ails to automatically close requiring manual operation to ter93inateJthe"s~eainleak.
"'" J" -',.. \".
Time Position RO 1 Verify Reactor Trip //tti;~~a"y
<: 2;"",ler :han trip !:"'9Jtl1'\.JE. rea;;;;;o! pCl'iBr is '0"" [::>
o.:,~'m;pi:e'"11ed;aterar~ povier
...J \.[$ Wll s:aqle'cr dede:asintJ, I,W;J1 J:~:Of'l1 ih~ fulloi~g: / .,
'\>~ '\;, j' .;1 P,,"'CICf trip 31'0 bypass treakBcs -
OPEN \'..a.~1;nitgr*:Critcai Saf?lY Functions US<llg Reactor '. 3-EQt'-F-G*. CR. ~ CAL SA::-ETY Tripped '. '~J,NCTJi21N S7A TUS TREES.
'\ .v '~"'~/, \
Critical Task: (TC-PRA) F'flil~,!=e"t?friianQ,~lIy"'tl"ip the reactor within one mjRotlteif'automatic 'tri~bsigllal fails to ttip the reactor. BOP
- a. ~t1anualfy :rip turbi":e--. IF lJf1able ~o 'i-E-pfj
~urt,;ne :":;C'. THEN OiY5.e n1:itn siear:1Ene 6oJa1icn (~;~.~ss: ')l:a~ves..
- b. \ilanu,,,Hy' do~e valvEs, IF an~ valvi? can NOT b.. c'OSed, THEN ,cTose .'!lain
.j.f' st;,;rPlh"";.F- iSA:;,,'a~!~ bypass v,;;ve:s"
;\,~ MS,q ~Aain St¢.n"! Supply Step MOVs
""""to ",
..~ >"'R'eC<<a(er T*11in2 Var,.;;,;
"". "o,.
.~<... t~~.2>';?t,,::lurg S';eaf"1 \/a '\'es
- c. c~':2k..r:lr~* ,;,".) Ea.: GC3s - ()::E"j Mamraiiy (1:';;0 br"<3~er:; If break",rs de I N,y*rylaiiy ;':: s1!,yJrd delay; NOT DOS", THEN ac:uate "!'\IERGEI'.CY
~. 8r:'::;:,~:3WiTC..,. 'tV tC1,= "f,'!Kti:':i
" f Y
,<"J"Nqtb: BOP closes MSR main steam supply stop MOVs Critical Task: Failure to isolaB faulted S/G following automatic steam line isolation Note: 3B MSIV fails to close on automatic isolation signal
( 31
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page...£ of ~ Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are blocked ,7 .f" requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the co.!1sol~,,fails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main s!e~inilolation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual operatiDn.J"--to.,-;\, t~tminate
. ::/? "'\
the steam l e a k . . ( / . .J'r'v \\\ \\.
'-<';,::\,(#' ?~:", '~:;;,
Time Position BOP 3 Verify POWl?f To Emergenc~' '* KV Buses a Chied; the 2A. and :38 4 KV buses - MA.INT,t.,IN AT LEAST GkiE ENE.RGIZED
- b. ern,:rtlelr,w start :he dies,,' ger,er;;;lcr.
I) IF k,d(ou{ ,:,f 3D 4K'V' bus NOT
'iNesent. !.t!!ili. pE'riorm the fdlowng:
c)C>j>srate bus supply breakers te,
~<5t;::re p:?Fler.
Safeguards. equipMent - A.,.FC ST~;-R~~E.O
-----------------------, f:tQlf I FCLOGtlT F<tge shall' be mOflirorr:d fef the remain:;!!?! of Ihis proor:dure.
US Reviews foldout pa e 32
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page ~ of .-lL Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are b!pcK¥ requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the co. p'solS;rlails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main st%a~.is~lation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper"~tr6~}Q\te~inate the steam leak. .. / if \.. It
<'\oj/r"/'\;' "
Time Position US
- t. flDVi=BSE CONTAINMENT COijDIOONS lE eili1r >,f the c:fr,j:iions listecd below r;.::;C'Jr. THEN u Containn~~pt atNl:IJsr;:k::re t.en'f!<E';",a:1ure 2: 1:80>:'F 2.
lied manner Q!l any SiG colT1Jieteiy depresSlJr:;:ed, It!§:!.
\'" RUPTvRED SIG ISOLATION. CRITERlA
""~lE 3,-r1V e~3-<r; le\N?: increase-s in ,:,n v-~>::of'itrcHed n"13rV1-Er OR -"3'f",!; StG- has at.nonn*;;!: rad~,a1ion, AND nJfTO'\,\~
,In affcectedSIG{sjs 9",ater Ulan ;;;%{32~It!§:!. teed fha may d. stoppej"1C"afrech:;Q
\ ....
\, "'AN SYSTEM OFERJ'ITION CRITERIA
' +-r.' lE:\*;&*~F"t**,.p.ump5 are cp"rat!Pi2 en a single train, ItlffLcne of th1? purr;ps shall be shut dCftn
\,. ~ witn:in "DNsthoUf of ~;~ inltal St3f1 -si,gnai
})r. IF t~~iC: ,A,'pi-V tr*;ins -'are- ':-9'~rabn_@ 381'\-(1: one, of ihe ,AF';; ptunps has t~.En opeTatn.~- .at kYf.lJ fittt'1' ()f 1m *gpm or Jes fo, one ,"cur. I!i5t! lila: AP:\"~ I'Klmp %.311 he shu1 down a.1 gAT MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA j' llE CST -:'~J-e~ -'d-E-tJ-ea~<:s tc :-ss than 10%,.I.IJf.bl aid tnak,J?up tD CST -using 3*0P.~CqS, 1, CONDENSATE
,l' STORA.GE Tt..NK
".S~cures 3A Rep due to #1 seal failure f
U'S. . /;!' 5 Continue Wiih At1acorrMmt 3 10 Comp~ete The Pm,mpt Actioo 'iJerifi,cattctIlliS Whil< Perionrninlfj Thi's Procedure Note: US directs BOP to perform attachment 3. Attachment 3 steps on a e 53. 33
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page ~ of 2L-Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are bL~)'ck~d requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the CO,lTS'oly,/fails f f' requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main steam,;solation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper'!;r6'ntQ t~'rtpinate the steam leak. ,[//0, / / " " \ . , \.
'*.r"
~'\f'
1, Time Position RO 6 Check APo'( Pumps. - AT LEAST T'iV'O RUNNING
;0 establish two I9ped.lJ;!fti
~D \1)C311~' reset the 1>;f'!/4 AND Qnly*,oni:
Se. THH; perfurm TRiPPED
- Use" s"lpoil1i.of 270gp1'1 for f"qIJI11edft.FW flew instesj Qf 345gptnspecifiec in subsequent Steps ,3r't(1 Proc
- edures RO Manually ali>!" vai'<'es to .. 5tabiisr, proper Ar'Y\'
ah~):i'1)erit
;3. P-~orm, ~he f::doviting:
.) PPi\1' few great~rtl18n flpm.
- 2) .IE ,!i,FIN n,w lessrtlan345 gpm.
THFN m3ihiaJly start pumps arw. a{;\l.r val'lli':s 1*1) eSlabiishgrea1er lhan 34:gpnflcw.
- 3) lE 1ctal i:<?;1 f,bw fr,:t'11 .at- S.ryJrcE:5
@"".ater \1\311 345 gpm o*m J::WI. be Est3blis;i1ed. THEN perfc'nn th."
1Dllo<'ling; - -
;,j ,~~kmrt.cr Critc~! Saf:B1Y F;;nc:tions
'Join? 3-EOP-F-D~ CmTICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREEK I*j Go to 3-ECP*FR-H .1.
RE~3P~JoNSE TO LOSS OF SECCNDA.::;:Y HEtiT S'NK Steop 1. b M{3:'-ll-t;;1fri r,<Eoj fON ~o S/vG narn:ft<'l (:;ai--'1ge 1<>,,.,,'5 between j 5%[:2%] and 51)%.. 34
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ---+/-- Event No.:~ Page 2- of.2.L Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are ~IJ)'~k~;i requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the cq}l~(' ~ils requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main sJeh~<.i olation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper
- f ! ",
the steam leak. Time Position RO 9 Check Rep SfiaJ Cooling a: C';"!otCK all RCP th,err'1-.:."11 !naniEf z;it~rrns nEil barrier is 10Sl, OFF
- 1>. '11, RCP THERM}'.L BARR C--::iCL;NG ~il\\,A-EJR H1 FLCfi/V b
-,n, Reset SJ.
"';; FIG'."I TQ Regen Heal C',:/~,3,- 121, te r"1aint-3. 1"1
, inje:non kytl 35
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-+/-- Event No.: ~ Page ~ of 22-Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are blJJCkep requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the c9JY'!sr fails c requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main ~te'a:m<isolation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual operqt{' tehpinate the steam leak. . "'\ Time Position RO 10 Maintain ReS CQld Ll?g Tempemturi!' STABLE AT.QB -F-H:.NGNG TOS4r ANY;:;:CP RUNNNG LESS THAN 547'F RCPRUNNING Dump- *5.t~atrn usi~& SlG 5te,am durnp to atr<~cs,[dn8re vah;-e's> RO
- a. .If PR2 pressure jess lhan 73;.%5 psg\
lllfl1 manually dose POR'v's. .If an,. PRZ PORV"can NOT be okJsed. THEN IT"mually oose I~~:k laive. ! 6100'; val..,e 0,,,,1 Wl be closed . .It!El:l.oerform
!he fcllow*ng n Mcni~or Ctb:.al Salet}' ;:; un:{Q!'**S lIsing 3-EC1"-F<1. eRe-CAL SAFETY FUNCTIGiN STATUS TREES 2:1. Go toO 3-EOP-E.-'!, LOSS Of REAC-OR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step t,
- b. IF P'P.z *znessure"ss 1han22eG PSi!;).
"rntEN manu;;;!!y dose val....es.IF val,.,eis)
"an NOT be cbsed. I.ll6isb;)pRCP(s) as- fH?teSsary to' stc;r~ -spray fO,~l.
c, .A,t::rJiary Sp""ay \r-3j!/e, C\L;;;..3<tt-- _ M"iluall,. d.cs!! amiNal,)' sVay valve.. !E CLOSED au,~mafY sp-ay V~./ble :can.!!Q!. it~ dcs-e,j-_ lllfl1 elese Charging Flow 'co q"ge", H'~at Ex:char~;te~~, :HC';lw3*12-1. ( 36
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-+/-- Event No.: ~ Page ~ of .1.f.- Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are b~0(!k~n requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the cgJ'fs'olp/fails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main s0te'~m.. isolation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper"I'o~J te~inate the steam l e a k . , . , : ! i/O ""
----"'\"\//:/.
Time Position d.. Exc-ess ieidc\\in lsoiat>:)n 'iaI..'e'S - CLOSED CV-.3-*3-87", Excess Letd:rit"ifl !sc,,:~a:t~on
\/aSv:e Frotn :C{)~d L.eg To iExc:eS'5 LB'jdovm Heal f-':.;t~rc'!"!1l*!;;'r HCV'..3-137, 80ntrciier RO 12
( 2i. GO' to Step. 14.
;G PRESSURE DECRE':',SING
- JNGC¢iTRCtLED !¢i~J.Jr1ER
.Q:B.
- PoNY SG CCilIlPLETEL Y DEP.RESSURlZE£l b.. P!:;iorr:1 ihe roHowing; Monitor Critical Sa.ii!:1Y Functicns.
asing 3-EOP-F-C. CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION S-ATUS TREES 2;* Gc lC .3~EOP~,~=~2, F,l;;UL -ED S-EAf,,1
<3E:NE,R.A,rCH is--{;'LATION. S:te,p 1 37
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:~ Page ~ of.1L Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are bi requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the c9R requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main s,te'am valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper ../' JQ t the steam leak. Time Position RO 14 Check If SI'Gi Tub'E'5 Are Ruptured a -Che:k ietl,,-='_::S in ail S{3s and se,c':n(ia!"~ r,:1_:::j-3,~~on leVB'lS:
\. ~
NClTB; Directs HP to take local steamline radiation surve s Check If Res Is Inta,~t Perform the follov<1ng: Monitor Crib:a! SafelY F"ilOlioilS llS<T1g
;~EOP-F..;:, CRF:GAL SlIFET(
b Corrk,inlT&ll prEssure - NORMAL FUNCTION ST,Il,TUS TREES,
- 2. -3>:< to. 3**EOP--*1., LOSS OF RE~,CTOi~
OR SECONDARY COOLANT. Step 38
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:-+/-- EventNo.:~ Page~of~ Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are bJ requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the c requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper the steam leak. Time Position RO 16 THAN 345
- d. Trj;' tD s:abihze Res pre's,s,t.V'e- \Vl:h nOfm/:i_
PRZ spray, Go- to SleD 17. Mo~itor al Safety FuneHons Using 3-EOP-F-O *. CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES Ch<.>ck S!G Lew:ls a Narrow 1.3r,;'" 'E"Jel- GREATER 'HAN 3. rl;:~akf*..a1"1: tQ't:al i~,8C felll great~r than 6% 345 gprn until r;arrcttl range \evel greater than -t6<';. in at ie*ast one S/G. b ContrC'i feed fto"v to 8.1aint.,in r,:;:fJ"CNV L3:nge ~F,iel be~V-teen 1_5~,~~ ~rfd 50%.
'..- S*~o:p feed- f;:Vl to any SlG l,,*1th narrow
'.?inge ie'llel greater!;h."n. 50%.. !.f. nam::w
!,~81ge, ;e'!lel ::11*3irW SiG ';.onbnu:es [!;)
tncre<lise an IJnocGlroller! Iwan,~*,;r. II:ll:il:/. ( go tc:-3jEC~F-E.-3-,~ STEA10 G,EN:E,.~.~.70H TUBE RUP,URE, Slep 1 39
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ EventNo.:~ Page~of~ Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are b!9e'k'¥ requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the c9.RS'o!. $¥'fails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main ~lteamtSolation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper .ibn)Q t~inate the steam l e a k . ' ... Time Position RO Check SeCOndalf'j' Radiation
" Dire:>: fu\.idear ChErni!;lrY-lc 13k,. pefk:>ti'~
acfJirly 5;.atnp}e"s, of .sJ: StGs b Direct Ra.d\...';tHon ?'rotech-ofl to :i3ke
- '"ac::atbn read~r~g!: CE~, n-::-ain s~,5n1Iini?S RO 20 RO Reset S Insuur~em Air Gontairm"*ni GV-3-2BOJ - O?Et'4
- b. Ve'ify instnm1ent ax pressure, "'\-3-1444 - b. Restcremsirument 3lf pressJre uSJng GRE?,TER THto,N 95 PSIG O-OHOP-Oi3. LOSS OF IN'STRUMENT AIR, while continuing wilh lhi!; proc>:dure.
CAUTION If ReS pre55ure decre*3se.s in an trnoomroJld manner to less ;rJl<iiJl 2srf ,D6ig[6S{) psigJ,m<lJllf<l! <lcuon wiiJ be reqairedoo resrarr me RI-tR pttmpsiilfter rhey flavebeen secured. 40
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page -11. of ~ Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are b ck requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the c sol ails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main SVO" ....u'. valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper the steam leak. Position RO 25 Monitor ReS Pressure To CMc~ If RHR Pumps Sho'illd BI! Stopped!
- 1) PresS\Jre* GREATER THAN zoo PSIG[a50 PSIG; b
RO Perform the follomng:;
- a. Chect diescl capacity ~~e lo run iiit
!east C~ charging pt.W11p.
- b. IF d~1 >llZlpilioity is NOT~,
Tf.!EN shed oonessentlilll loads- ReiEr to
'i\'i"TACHN"Bfi :: for oom~ KW load rating.
- a. Perform Attachmenl 4 to estaO'fush cl1argir.g .
.4criUS1 spee,d ClO111ro11ers as tt'!'CessMy to tstabii5h desTed charging l"low
- c. ./;.I1,U5t Chargil'!{1 Flow To Regen He..~
8:d1anger, HCV-3-12'1. to maintain prq:;er seal 4ljection ilO'W ote: attachment 4 used to establish char, in 41
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: ~ Page --.:!1... of ~ Event
Description:
A stearn line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are b!obkej:l requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the c9Jis~I~'fails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main §te~mA-§olation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual operj,tfbn t"Q t~~inate the stearn leak. <,/ J ..**/ \ \ \ \
'\v** ..\:<
Time Position Applicant's Actions o~/E3~t1av'ior RO ESTABLISH C1+ARG~~ Frtr~
" t.. /
1 Verifoj' CCW Flow To ,/l,1I RCP Thermal !t'G:CjNf~~v t Barriers pe';;~~F" .
- a. V~'>'Y*. S'a~'l<;:lJm :e:npeml'.Jl1? for ~ach PC:: to. be le~.s. :h;n 236 F.
~, '
~~. JE seaJ r~lu[l :er1p~rat~",re fer E-sch Rep 8m! .*.** i ess than 2J3,e F lI1Et1 go :0 S~ 2.
A *i/2. Rep THERMAL
'ti4.-ER H TE',jp _ .IE~~;;~
- _it"hI'...rr..*.fa.",r.:;
.:?;,,;!:. :\>1 <' L _ '""f"?'>>;
011: --,
-'-~'V ...
- r. ~
/"'"qcaiiv lsofl'te*. :;eal '1*. <:clicf! ~o *:;.ifectec
( / RCF'<:: . .' mVling chargir>& purrps.
- 7.4. fer RCPA 3-:;073 fot RCP 6
- d. ~ seal injection is is!) aied io eacio; arreCle;! Rep. lJ:[I;l:l. ge to 2iep :2 If offs.\t~ POI";;:, is NOT a'iilJ!able. THEN ct'ieck cli.:;s~ ~"ao;'ly adequate tc-:::::;:;;11~
charging p'Jmp. Jfdie~;;:* wpaeity is NOT
;;idiKhA3>:e. THEN shed non-essential .cads.
Refer to A ":'tA.CHMENT :2 11)r component KV\'
\!)a¢ ratng Start Olle Cr:a~ing Pump
'{
'" }:
ReS M,lI1(-up Control Switch in STOP
- la1 ackhional ch&~9' ~J punps jf ne8r~~<;
,t.~:;*J~lsl speed contn:dlers as iJ~<:;e5sary :Ci e-st,3:' sh d~s?~~: ;::harging '10ij'ri
- c. ."'i1iust Chargir)g un To = R""2"'~
E:~c/"..;/'ger H*C:'.J~3-*;2*t, 1C n~\airr.ain Hea\ pr**::>~>.er sJ::al r;i~:;1icn flow
- d. V~rif1 r;har~ling pwn::;* St.H::ticll .a'J'~o tran~fer= to ~W3T
- 8. il401ify The Unit Super.. icsorThat The ESTABLISH CHARGING FLOW Attaohment j~ Compt.et-(
42
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ EventNo.:~ Page~of~ Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine ,p" resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are bJ0ck~d requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the c)sol~/tails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main §.(,j'solation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual operSJ,tlbn.J{) t~f the steam leak. <"/,.;/4' .
"*,,,,/i .J~
Time Position Applicant's Actions ~~~e~or RO 28 Check If Diesel Generat,ofs She-ukl Be Stop~ a Che::k ,:he A and B4f{V r<1sS-
- t:.NERGtZED 8'{ OFF SiTE PO~/VEH 31 Check ~:ih'2-sel C&pB?':it)E' adequate to (Un one computer room chiller; J.E. diese{ capadiy is.l::l.Ql adequa{e.* .Il::IE.rished non"e'S.51??l:1bd foads, Refet to An,I..,CHlvlENT 2 for component KVIi \",,4' r3l.ing.
n)' unfoa,;je-b diese; ge:net,rnor and
- r,-dby us
- ng ;':4-0P-023,
- y DJ;ESEL GENERAT();q
" .f Dire~'ts/1.Jso to re are to secure EDGs usin J.OP-023 Perform .A.rracnrnmt 5 to .AligTh PIa",,!
Equipment NOTE: Loops back to step 10 to meet SI termination criteria. Attachment 5 listed next for reference. 43
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-0-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ EventNo.:~ Page~of~ Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are blocked requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the cons91~t't4ils requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main steam'lsQ;la.tion valve fails to automatically close requiring manual operatiojY{S t~~inate the steam leak. f' < Time Position Applicant's Actions or BE?H~VJGr RO ATIACHMEIiiT 5 /"p ,~./ (P"pe 1 .:.f 2.}/;:."'#/'/
/ W ,,< \.
ALIGN P'LAtH EQUIPMENT ,/;'
" ,,/f
- 1. Verify the- 3A ofK" bus* ENERGIZED *'Peiorh\ihe Je:1(~\W19"
~~"',?;a1tf~e ".yl~~genr.y bearing oil zump.
D. ~;3.tfiny 5f~ DC ak see ba::-k:,JZf sea} td z$".vnp, ~'~.
'\ \::', ....
Verify At Le-ast One AlZl;ill~ry E\tilding'*h .% Exhaus.t Fan - ON '\') '.
\. .' .,/ //J"'.'0 '" """)
Cheok'sPl1'.nt Fui!1Pit ocroling\- ori~ PUf~? ,/ S:art SP~itd;.uil'1*6k PUl"'lP using 0X;Ef{A TIN(j***.., \ \/ ,I/' 3--3P-G33, Sp~r'H FUEL COOUNG
. ", .,/ SYSTEM Pe:forrr the foliN'Iing i:l. ~ bearing oii ~<,,551jreeSS ihan 9 p51g. ~ veM~1 a'Jxjji"rj'" i? pW'1P -
RJI**;NNG,
- b. *8onhnue witt: Step 6, dt~'(k Be;;'ring am Lift Pump* RUNt41NG Pe-ionr the fuliowing
- a. ~ tU':b**'1 speed 'Jeere.?!ses t::; less
-'\.
- han eee fP!11. ~ verify ~m; bearing oil
-.f it pump - RU1NIN8.
O. Continue \Nit:~ Step '7 > Turbtne . ON TURNING GEAR Pceiorn... ihe fuliowing: i:l. ~ ;u:iv:rJ1e speed decr~es to zero, THEN plao.:' t.Jrbine en tvming g1:3ff using
- !>;JP.Qs7.:. TU.:;;;a.iN~ -lJRNING GEAR D. 8cntinue wit" 51ep 8.
44
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:~ .Page --.1Q.. of 2L Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are blocked requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the cons e 'ls requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main stea valve fails to automatically close requiring manual operatio to the steam leak. Time Position Applicant'~ A('ti('n~ nr R
- 8. Verify ~t1?r FiE'ld Breaker - OPEN 9.
10. 11. Notify The UllR Supervisor Thiil: The AUGiN PlANT EQUIPMHlAUachmem 1'5 Complete 45
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine "\ resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are bl0',r" ,.*4' requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the C9J1SO!" ails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main~Jeamt!solation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper 'onJQ te'ftt:linate the steam leak. ' ,\\, ' \ '\
"\". \
Time Position RO 10 Mainta:in RCS CDld Leg Ternpefatufi'! STAE;LE AT.QB. TRENC\NG TO 547> ~ eas~r~;:,~ I..llat ANY RCP RUN~HNG g:
- b. lE. 1 tire great1 tnan:47'F .&Wl f"~reasing. ~ p.;;dbrm the fdlcwlng:
Du rrp sCO\:irtl
~o >3tr'1csph'E't
- l. E pp,z pl~S5l.lre lESS 1hi.~n Z3J5 psIg-,
.ll:if11 {nanu.aJy close P.OHVs~ If. any PRZ PORV can NOT be ckl5ed.lliEN manually dDse iiS'5'Cd valv", if' hiccA valve cam liQI be dosed, .I!:idfpelfcrm the fuilowling
- 1) Moniror Crbcai Sa§ety Funct':ns using: .3--<EOP~F~,~ CRJTH::AL SAFETY Fl,JNCTION ST,I'.;T*US -:-PEES.
- 2) Go:o 3-EOP-E-l. LOSS OF REACTOR OR 2;ECCIND.4,R"{
COOLANT. Step 1, b, If PRZ ;:r,;:ssure tess than 22:f+/-;O -P'sJ.g
'mEN manlJaHy clOSE llah",s. IF vaJ\"'i'S) can NOT be ciosed,.I.tiSi 'St<:qRCP(s) as ne;;essil'y to stc*p spray fCNI.
- c. A,vx;iiary-3pray 't/Jhr~, C\l~:5 ..31 t - , Manually case ,'luxF;;;ry sj:i~ay .... arve !E.
CLOSED auwHarj spray 'lr3{-Ve c.an !QI bE' dcs:ec!,
.ll:if11 dose Charging FIOYI1D Regel H,at Exchang"<', HC\l-3~ 121.
46
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: ~ Page -.1L of ~ Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are blpek'b}l requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the co 's~lS>'{~ils requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main s m.~solation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual opera te~inate the steam l e a k . " Time Position Applicant's Actions d E:xoess ;,,:ldDwn isciatcf1 vai'il>Ss - CL()SED C\t.. 3-387 , Excess Letdcr-wn !SC/:r3:,t}On
\/Bi~tre F r~;:jtn C:o id L.e-g ToE xceS'S LEldDwn Heat ExchaJ1!~I8" HCV-3-137, Exc' 80ntrdier R012 G PR-E:3S\)RE DECREASiNG UNCCfP"R<}lLED bAA;NN'=R
.QB.
- toNY 8,3 C:)MPLETELY DEP :~ES.SUR;::ZEO b >='"rfwr11he Tollowtng:
t ',Monitor CritIcal Saf,,1y Functions
'~sing 3-EOP-F-D . CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES Lj GO'lD *3,..,EOP'..*!E .. 2, F,A)JLTED STEAr~1 GEt$ER.ATOR ISQl~TICIN. Step 1 47
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page ~ of .1.L Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are bl, requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the cS.lIs'ol,y<t'ails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main sJ,eam{iSolation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper ;;'* '. inate the steam leak. Time Position RO 14 Check If Sit} TuboesAre Ruptured a Che::k 10:::,.,2"$ in all SiGs and ",,,c,,',,,<!I"'d r*"dat;:>n le'l1s: Directs HP to take local steamline radiation surve s Chec~; If Re*s Is Inta,~t Monitor Crit,;;al 3a.fety F'JnC1.icns llsng
-;:,-EOP-F-fJ, CRi"7--:~G.AL Slt\FETY b Containm:::m pressure* NORMAL FUNCTION STATUS TREES,
- c. Con1.ainiTf~71 sunpevel
- NORMAL 2. 3<:* lo .3,-E~OP'~E--*f., LOSS OF REA}:::"!"'OR CR 3EO:>NDARY CO'OLANT, Stepi, 48
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:....1.... Event No.: ~ Page ~ of 2L Event
Description:
A stearn line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are b!JJc'k~p requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the cgnso~SlF1ails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main ~te'{m,,~olation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper~ti6~ t~rIl(inate the stearn leak. f ' Time Position Applicant's Actio RO 16 Check If 51 Should Be Terminated
;.;' ReS SUbc<'Dl:-Lng -ba-sed en ,ccre e:t.ft -'-C's.*.
GRE4TER TH;>,N 3trF
- o. Trl to s.:abihz:e RCS* ptrSSurE' \vth ncrr:;.a:
PRZ -;,rn/)'. Go 10 Step 17. Dt,ct~:;c}{'ew brief and transition is made to 3-EOP-ES-1.1 SI ( 49
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ EventNo.:~ Page~ofR Event
Description:
A stearn line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are b CK requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the c sol ails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main "V'" ...UJW. valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper the steam leak. Time Position r------------, I I I I US 1. 2. UOOVAUJE 2: 210"F
- US reviews foldout a e l
50
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: ~ Page -2.1. of ~ Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are b!,o'C~~d r /' requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the cgusolJyfails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main ste~Il1(i'solation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper,}vfon,tp tettpinate the steam l e a k . / ' ,/'~\\\
\,,,,,./,.#'"
Time Position Applicant's Actions or/8'~~a\l'ior RO 1 BOP 2 R$se~ CO'ntJ JrlO'8r4 !sofa~lon P!u,sa A Ana PI';J1S$ B 3 Vilrl1'/lrrstrumar,l Air 'T,\yCQ!l'!illl1rrrant BOP ,3 'J"tI,!!"jsirJr'!-2~t .fi.r:::~e ~'~Enl +6Q,!allcr C~/-3-2~,03 - CFE~~\ \ "". ""~
..;-,;":' ",:.(.ii""~---"*:"'~, ""
RO f 4{ #' "Zh&;::~ EatabllSMG, 11 Ci1arglll~ Flow Has El~,11
, ffc ,~
f,
,/" .1. * ./J.,-: LEAO- Ct\e
\
1~ J.E:. C'C\~V U'Nl Ie R.CF(E,~ tnetnl1~ Cafl'8r 1S 'coR THEN OC3Iit* \E.O:3i&
&E:aJ IrtEV;)or, to ;:;:':'scl'i1 RG.::>;Si Cf'Xlre sta:t'ng (;1'.arg1ng pilmrE.
3-297~rOf Rep A
;-297B rer RGP 5
- -297C ftir RC~? C
.2) .!E cti'st" !);:tN-2f'S NOT a\\3!i<!hlf'.
THEN CflE:ck Ci;S; ~..apa7~~
~l..l3t*le .1.;'"' cra;gng piir*{)i . .iE aC~~\t3t;HE& (:,:,.,a,<4ly is!'i9!
i'!,,;,J13!:li? .I.!im"r;d fCl1l-Essert131
~:lao:.. Re:fE't" '/J ,A.n:AI*:t-)lE~rT .3 fCf
- Gr-i\>Jn~rt r.:iN :03:.1 ,-a:n'1 4\ .I.E:. O'l2"gf11g r:,YN can,W.ll. t establ':s*flE::.I. ~ m;:;lr:3In 01" 81 Cl'TiP "-.or Res 1'l*/sr:CI1' c:;r:ro; Js~nCf. .3-:)t'i°:)O.wG47 ~ ~*:Jz.$ ~:)f 1
C'iARGING FLCii'IIN MOO=:3 i T"iROUGM .:. &mn.gn 6I.!o~i?queril
&:.eps of t11s ofiOcejtre.
51
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ EventNo.:~ PageRof~ Event
Description:
A steam line break occurs on the common header to the HP turbine resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. Automatic trips are bJpck5P requiring a manual reactor trip. Manual reactor trip from the cOM'sol~vfails requiring the operator to trip the unit from VPB. 3B main~tefm~s'~lation valve fails to automatically close requiring manual oper"ationJQ,tel'tpinate the steam leak. . ',.
" '~"
")-<<..
.0"",' ,;>./<
Time Position Applicant's Actions ocS"el)aVior
~================
") S':3f: ;;Xitlli!Z:f!31 D:"lai"gfng P'Ji'rl='S as re-::;eE~ry !;C. st.3IJilr.i1 QaEit"ej crargJilg IlI:Wlf 21 ,";:!.¥J&i Cf'i.ar.~I!'lg: pLnlpSPE~ ccniro'*ere 1:0 'E'SCcf'i:::Hs'1 Cle&t'ej~t ~I"g ,':trcti())?~:
~! A(jPJEl C/"arging ~i'J\'}\-C' E:~i:.1\3roef. H::\!-,3, i i prC?ft!f sea' !r"1.)e<:;lt~r 1;0
( RO RO sDto..'lQH;lQ bal;;,j 01 cere ex;; -Cs
- a. \{anJa'ly elEJrt,s1 p:Jr';pe IQ resioee TE':~ THAN )0' F :FtelEr!xl FclCQul. $U:;CQJI!fl;t AND go;:; 3-E(',;::\*=:*1, Z A:he-tE" \lj!Le] ':.0:3$ Ctf HE';CTC~~ OR &=GC~KDAfr'o(
CC<::<.".I\1\7 step 1 t* Conln:!1 crargng i'io'W :{H1Ji reta!n P=<.z
;eliel. if P,RZ !E'tei car' NOT 02 tn31rrane:J. THEN rnaru311f 'Sielfi 81 p:.1npe to fEdore PF:l 1'!/ef <1<1:j ge to 3~*EOP-E-1. LDDS r;).;:" *~.EA*GTOR. O~
DEC~~r*;::.A,R.Y' (>:>Ci....4/.JT, Gte,?" 1 Take shift from Crew followin verification 52
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 1_ of_1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step 1 Check The Load Centers Associated With The Energized 4 KV Buses-ENERGIZED
- 3A LC
- 3B LC
- 3C LC
- 3D LC
- 3H LC BOP Step
./....,. .." .*.",,,,,.,, ~ .. ..
- 2. Che~.~..J.L Main Stea~,!in .~ 9, Bel'soJRtEil.,ef '>.'<:<;,l' a /"C!:l~.~.k**;:n~Jn steamlire\/ji'/ a. Go to Step 3.
,f,j-solatiop a~d bypass"valves -
. ANY OrE~" , \
)
- b. Chey'/if .ij.th.§x.Ql~in st~.a~: b. Go to Step 3.
iS9tation signal has*'8GtLl.ated
--', _<, ___,//::,,'ir'" ."4::::::~::"#)"':"":"";~:"'":~"::;k_"":,_-":,,;,,,,,_c,"""""""."._ . ', ___ ,_ ,{,{iii
~ * ,~lgh steam flow'witll either
*I~.w S/G pressure 614 psig OR low Tavg 543 F "o~
\, ',OR
- Hi-'~'H~'~ntainment pressure 20 PSIG Verify main steam isolation c. Push manual Steamline and bypass valves - CLOSED Isolation push buttons on VPB OR manually close valves.
53
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 2_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step
- 3. Verify Feedwater Isolation Place main feedwater pump
- a. switches in STOP Feedwater control valves-b"l Manuallyefose valves.
- b. CLOSED /' .",
Feedwater bypass valves-
- c. CLOSED Close feedwateC/iso[ation
- d. MOVs ""*0." d. CbQally**close v ';z, valves.
'\",;;"", <".,
'i, " IF staitdbyfeedwater is Verify standby fe~dv\tater "a'lig[led toJ1nit 3, THEN
- e. pumps - OFF "*, ..,stop"stsmdby feedwater "ii-,f' k'#~. p'iJrnp(s).
BOP Start ICW pump(s) to establish at least two running. Manually close valve(s). IF valve(s) can NOT be
- b. closed, THEN locally close the following valves:
- POV-3-4882 - CLOSED 3-50-319 for POV 4882 3-50-339 for POV POV-3-4883 - CLOSED
- 4883 IF both ICW headers are Check ICW headers - TIED intact, THEN direct
- c. c.
TOGETHER operator to tie headers to ether. Note: BOP starts 3A lew PP, 3B fails to start if attem ted 54
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-TestNo.: 2009-301 ScenarioNo.:~ Event No.: 4att.3 Page3_of_1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step
- 5. Verify Proper CCW System Operation
- a. CCW Heat Exchangers -
a. THREE IN SERVICE
- b. CCW pumps - ONL RUNNING IF both CCW headers are intact, THEN direct a field operator to tie the headers together.
IF containment isolation phase B NOT actuated AND CCW radiation levels are normal, AND RCP number one seal leak-off temperature is less than 235°F, THEN manually open MOV 626. IF MOV-3-626 can NOT be manually opened, THEN direct operator to open MOV-3-626 locall .
. erify Containment Cooling Manually start or stop
- a. Check emergency containment a. emergency containment coolers - ONLY TWO RUNNING coolers to establish - ONLY TWO RUNNING.
- b. Verify emergency containment filter fans - AT LEAST TWO b. Manually start emergency RUNNING containment filter fans.
55
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:--.1.... Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 4_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step
- 7. Verify SI Pump Operation At least two high head pumps
- a. .
running
- b. Both RHR pumps running Step BOP
- 8. Verify SI Flow
- a. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1600 PSIG[2000 ~"",
- b. High-head SI pum fl '"
indicator - CHECK FLOW
- a. Perform the following:
- 1) Operate Unit 3 and Unit 4 high-head SI pumps to establish injection to Unit 3 from two high-head SI pumps.
- 2) Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to align Unit 4 high-head SI pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using ATTACHMENT 1 of this procedure.
- 3) Go to Step 10.
Note: 3A SI PP fails to star( BOP stops one of the unit 4 SI pumps. 56
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 5_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step
- 10. Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve
- a. Manually..,; .~ Containment White Lights On VPB -
IsolatiQ.Pl/Ph.a~e A. ALL BRIGHT /.:f'
/1/,/ ...
- b. 1~~ny/~ontainmelJt*ls51lation Phase A'v;,eIV'e'ls NOT s,~d, THEN mantu,flIlY'C(lo.? .;' x:/e. IF valve(s) can NOT ee\~anuAflllY closed, THEN manually'~r Id~flily isolate affected containment,pel1E;ltration.
BOP Step "*"i, A PManuaIJY1~i1gn valves to
, establish proper SI alignment for an injection flowpath.
Reset SI BOP is required to go back to the containment isolation acks and rest the six phase A lockout relays, (three lockout relays on each rack) 57
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 6_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step
- 14. Reestablish RCP Cooling
- a. Check RCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING
- b. Open CCW to normal contai valves MOV-3-1417 MOV-3-1 Reset and start
- c. Stop all RCPs coolers BOP Step
- a. Perform the following:
- 1) IF containment spray NOT initiated, THEN manually initiate containment spray.
- 2) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B-ACTUATED.
- 3) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B valve white lights on VPB - ALL BRIGHT.
- 4) IF any Containment Isolation Phase B valve did NOT close, THEN manually or locally isolate affected containment penetration.
- 5) Sto all RCPs.
58
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:---+/-- Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 7_ of_1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step
- 16. Verify Containment and Control Room Ventilati Unit 3 containment purge
- a. exhaust and supply fans -
OFF l"/Y \.~'>
./,-:-, /.4 Verify Control Room /' ,/f ventilation status panel - ~'hu?lIy align equipment
- b. PROPER EMERGENCY or !2'ontrol Room RECIRCULATION n(~rgency recirculation.
ALIGNMENT .P""""""
-""~,
":::. ~?-- -- -.~\.:.:\\~ -- -- - ',<= . ."fF I Hydrogen Monitors should be i es Df~:al.idSI signal, They should I I be available i~ ~timely manner , :el'7 d to hydrogen generation
<<::04>'
I in containment"', .*,. I /' I
/j/'- ...""",,,.,,_ * "'\t<,. '\ ,.",if '
...... ~j"'/-- ."~. . ~",.-
!". --r-' - - ~~ ~t'- - - - - - - - - - - - - *
> 1 \ \
BOP
) . J \ , \.
Place HY9ib9~J\llQnitors In\?e~ice Using
-OP-9§'~,99.~TAINM*EN::r".!)?e)ST C16E~T*MONITG*2.j.NG4SYSTEM
. OP:.~i11 call NSO to ali n PAfM. 3-0P-094 ste s listed below.
59
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 8_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
'. i
-.'~.,...,.
r!oT'E -
'?-tydro;gven !iionrrOfS s)~<iikf b.e in servioe wfthin 30 minu!5$'of a :~ttd 5! ::~'Y(at
_ _ _ . - _ _ _. ~ _ ~ _ ~,.;f'~ f ~.;,," I.>"_ . __ _
. / /
7.U [nitia: Ccmmtwl1.s / / ,/
- 1. d.n appltcabJe prereq1ll~nes L't"te,d mS2ctwn ;. Ii JX~J:;,atl;~d,
.. . " ' . ' / ' /f', _"I< "\ 4' 0 ,... "t*
'\\>>>. "'~:\<::..">" ",J'~" i NDTES
'\,."",\
~.--..,.:
'\
'i"",J/
,/"
,f
-::'<,. 0,,,,,=.,,<> ",;,,~
,?,..... r'" -"" , ...,...f< ;';"<'\ '" '"' ....,."'oJ. ,~'<
l;:?Ut~S ,D,.!iS-,:.-...'t-(.tl~,. 4~ ':'Jt1~,,:. ,J-vC~.~ !/:~~tlEd
.J; 3-001.04, and ,JwD02o'<at't? in the f00r outsIde' the 1..1",': J s;;vnpf~':~~<'~::".""'h' ,."."."."..*. ,.. '\.., '\',\,.,
Fu,N rrav;:.! for ~t.5'h~e.5 rs Pl'o't:oiq?-;j {ltJJ~{;;7tfle;s.is afvj'>;$J~c4~,\:1 not !)e E'(~~¥,(n?dbr da'lf1?g? to reach .fDd ?~;Sefl1b{;E:S rr:.;i'\C:;Uf\ "'"' "'-';; ' """c~~'~'> o\wJ'JP'" L
--------~~ -~~~~-~~--
,.1",,,. hemo',',," the +/-1odt G:i,?
- t:e f::'lIlr,,;Lyg'l*::.h:e: m:llg the reach:'od:
}Y , 'r~Oc,t~ci ir- ~'\~.:l j u~lj-u?v j p' " ' ;...~' U"_ ** '\. '.,
'Po~t A':Cld.e'~1 S~tmg Sy"tem Return LIDe ho~ati011. Vai,te, JfASS-H)(13 1 t~"\. Ff\t1ll""'\
. \. -_:..>j It!: Analyzer 3AX}l.1tL~hoJ. PAITh1.-3-0GIA (5 turm)
'::"tt;'JUt'l!l'~;e:rJB "'.",
dltiet1'Jol,
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Pft.h:JM-3-0(llB (6 tuL-m) Ie Sy?,tem to P,AJ1M He2:der r:oLa:icm. Vah-"
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", PACV V~::t ,md Sample Sy:;tem to PJ!iJ111 Header
(:(F...}: P.0.\I4~vfw3-C(j~B (5 'hlr1~) I~olalioll V3lY!? t;ulock .\..'1) open PAC'v'S L,z,[\l.';P!?llet ~3. R".t-:?-:< ill from of ,he 'Cui.: 3 Co)ltai:::ment Spl'ay Pl.l.n:.p Room. (.:Jut A t.~y i:. req1.11re<:l for till:' lock.;
-,,~ --"
t':nlod, A.D open PAn:;; :>0: v],: Peuet 16, }:""I;.].1. :ocati?<d i::S". !lJ.."'I]6
.:'.\lX :aidg '::31h,:;>.y. (."-...n A by i~ 1 equiJed :'01 this tock ,}
60
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 9_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 4. Requli!st the R.eactor OperMO'rperbm !he following:
ii. Verify the tbllco.\olng ftlllCtioo selector switc: Analyzer P;me!s iI!e in 1M SA],!PLE (1) QR81 (2) QR&2 {;:. d. 5. j..!P.A.S- 3-004 EMERGENCY START any available EDG NOT runnin 61
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 10_ of ~ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step BOP
- 19. Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses an Check the 3A, 3B and
- a. 3D 4 KV buses - ALL a.
ENERGIZED
- 3) IF the Unit Supervisor decides to energize 3A, 3B, or 3D bus, THEN perform the following:
a) IF 3A 4 KV bus de-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-0NOP-004.2, LOSS OF 3A 4KV BUS. b) IF 3B 4 KV bus de-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3:" ONOP-004.3, LOSS OF 3B 4KV BUS. c) IF 3D 4 KV bus de-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.5, LOSS OF 3D 4KV BUS. 62
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 11_ of_1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step J / ".
- 20. Notify The Unit Supervisor That The PROMP{CAGfION\\ . . "
VERIFICATIONS Attachment Is Complet~'AQa'Note AnyActjon~~, That Had To Be Taken /f' //Y " ( 63
NRC XXIV - NRC- SEN- 4 OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO: Field Supv.: Outside SNPO: Admin RCO: ANPO: Unit 3 Unit Supv.: RCO: NPO: Plant Status Unit 3 Mode: Power: 100% MWe: 760 Gross Leakrate: .02 gpm RCS Boron Cone: 1300 ppm
)perational Concerns: ........ ". ."~.'%
3C charging pump out of service du *,to packlri.'g. leakage.
<<,<,.~",,,:<.,,, "\, _c, in 14 hours. Thunderstorms reported in the area.
U3 Antici Focus Area: Maintain 100%
J Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 100% Gross: .02 gpm A 6615 g,S", MWe: 760 Unidentified .01 gpm B 664,t'gal,'" Tavg: 574.2°F Charging Pps: .01 gpm C 9,627 gal
~,y~'"
RCS Pressure: 2250 psig RCS Boron Cone: 1300 ppm Abnormal Annunciators: Annunciator:
'/"'/;;~",;#//,/f '\\\/ "';'\;;\\,
,//,/" 7'i Comp Actions:
Annunciator: Comp Actions: '\\\;\,:>" Annunciator:
""\\\,,\\\'\\;
Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions:
";\\\,';"/<:<
Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: ('. ,:" ", ""~
' \ \\';";";;;;;"';:,',";"',;"",,+,;;,
Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: //"';""""";;;<';;\\;
"\\ \,,/,(;/:::,,/1// ";;;""";"<c~";;)");
\\ ~\
Annunciator: f;/",i:,':,;/"';;;;'"' '\ Comp Actions: ')
<~./ J Annunciator:
Comp Actions: __ \) Annunciator: "';,,/// """""";""""""""""""/,;;;' Comp Actions: ;;;;"",
,//i#'
""\;, \\,;, ""'\
Current y'ch/gpec ActiiJn si~;temelh;s:(B,oes Not Include "For Trackin!! Onlv Items"
~~:,~~(~",nl Entry Dare,:
\
\ "',>
TSAS/~ Ji// IV/ Reason: jill Entry Date: TS.A.S/Compon,dl Reason: Entry Date: 1/"" T.S.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: T.S.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: T.S.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date:
Unit 3 Status ment: 8 train protected both units
.)nline risk is green U ~----~~~------------------------------------~---4~----~~~--------------------~
( Upcomin ECOs to Han and lor Relea~J~,~",~ Evolutions or Com Generallnfdr:matiQn, Remarks, ~hd 0 erator Work Around Status: Aux, steam sUPpJy alt9,ned from :Jtfnit}' Condenser inleakage O"~cfm./p >>'/
""""", '\',.,,p/ ,,.Iff f
\!"'-"" .)/'"
(
TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description Facility: Turkey Point Scenario No.: 5 OpTest No.: 2009-301 MOD Examiners: Candidates: us
-------------------- RO
--------------~~--
BOP Initial Conditions: Mode 1, 100% MOL. 3C charging pump out of service due to packing lea Turnover: Equipment OOS: 3C charging pump out of service due to packing Ie service in 14 hours. Thunder storms are in the area. Maintain 1000% Online risk - green B train protected both units Event Event Type* No. TFH1TV60 =*1 (I)RO (C)RO
~~~CB~~~~ (TS,I,C)SRO
.00005 TVHPBOTL=
2 0.0006 akage verified greater than tech. specs is used to shutdown the unit. 01 ",LUQ"a 10% a reduction, offsite power is lost. The turJ2tQe failsl'O"'MJ r manually trip preventing a reactor trip 3 rom tLt~J2 he reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip requires the MSIVs to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start requiring manual operation. e ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to initiate. Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. 1
TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #5 Event 1 - LT-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm RCS leak begins concurrent with the LT-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 3-0NOP-041.6, but disc er that LCV-3-460 will not reopen. Excess letdown is placed in service and ch in flow reduced. Tech Specs are consulted, 3-0NOP-049.1 used to remove e f ed channel. 3-0NOP-041.3 may also be referenced for the RCS lea Event 2 - A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess let Ac in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakage veri 9-'9reater an ch. specs and 3-0NOP-100 is used to shutdown the unit. Event 4 - The RCS leak increases requiring safety injection initiation of SI and phase A is re . ed. 2
TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description Scenario XXIV NRC 5 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup Reset to IC-1 (100% MOL) Open & execute lesson file SRO_XXIV_NRC_5.lsn Place simulator in run Start 3B charging pump and secure 3C charging pump Trigger lesson step: SETUP - MAIN TURBINE TRIP Trigger lesson step: SETUP - SI FAIL Place simulator in freeze. Place clearance info tag on 3C Chargin Provide shift turnover Select 3A QSPD PDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA and at e 3
TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description Event 1 - LT-3-460 FAIL LOW - LCV-3-460 FAIL CLOSE Initiated immediately after shift turnover. L T-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm RCS leak begins concurrent with the L T-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 3-0NOP-041.6, but discover that LCV-3-460 will not reopen. Excess letdown is placed in service and charging flow reduced. Tech Spec;/6(e consulted, 3-0NOP-049.1 used to remove the failed channel. 3-0NOP-041.3 may'als@'be referenced for the RCS leak. #" /
/
Trigger lesson step Event 1 - LT-3-460 FAIL LOW - LCV-3-460 F'AIL,CLt':9?E (actuates TFH1TV60 = -1, TFBVC01 = -1, TVHPBOTL = 0.0005) .r' '/"" . The Crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.6 Pressurizer Level COr;JttotJVialfunction ifrld ARP097.CR ./\\. j',f y.f"'"
/
3-0P-047 CVCS- charging and letdown t ,.//*"'" (p <. {//' Step 2 - Respond as NSO; acknowledge direction to cfl~ck ~.CW flgw o(JFI-3-624 between 200 and 238 gpm. Report back in two minutes,"&,19 ' 9I::gl1# ./
~l, ~C If called respond as I&C, acknowledge dir~et'iQ,rlto check 460CX,. relays energized. Report back after five minutes that the relays '~rehenergi~ed. " .**.
\. \"""-"l.,.", """"", ""',.;", 'O<: '.~
'% \. 'l~~::.: "',,~, '"
t '\ '~;Y" ~"~::,,"<<-,.,
'\.!,~,
( 4
TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description Event 2 - 30 GPM PZR SURGE LINE LEAK A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is placed in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakage verified greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-100 is used to shutdown the unit. 3-0NOP-041.3 Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage
#4'"
Step 13 - Respond as SM, acknowledge direction to refer to EPIP-201SJ/ ./'
./ ./ ".~,
Step 14 - Respond as Health Physics, acknowledge direction to cc;~dtl,9J1ocal radi~tioh.,~urveys and post radiation areas as required. ./ ') "', ".
'/"'~./;" '#"./~'<< ,
If called respond as AOM, acknowledge unit 3 shutdown P?f"'3-0NOP-100 in progress .
./ ./R
<</ #
3-0NOP-100 Fast Load Reduction <e' <' . .' ">
~\'\ "\" . / " . f " /
Step 3 - Respond as system dispatcher; acknowledge TP"tI!lit)p,Q~iJlg/off line due to ReS
. ./
leakage. '"\'\", {'
'+"""'=-""~h' '>. ~t.<\
~. ""'''%. ""'\'" ",
Step 7 - If call, respond as SM and acknQwl~dge'request to refer'tQ~, 0-'EPIP-201 01 and O-ADM-
~"
115 \ '%""" ..*.** , ", '\.
\ .*,,%
'\ \,. . ... " " " ' " ....* ",.'
If called respond as NSO, acknowledge dire*~tio~ to alIgn ~. u¥.steEfm**LJ~sing attachment 1 of 3-
.f~
( ONOP-100. No actiQJLcequired. F' ,.,~*. /
\ * */ p
'\.,
1i 5
TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description Event 3 and 4 - OPEN SWYD GeBs - TRIP U41 300 GPM LEAK Following a 10% load reduction, offsite power is lost. The turbine fails to auto or manually trip preventing a reactor trip from turbine trip. The reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip requires the MSIVs to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start fj uiring . manual operation. The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to to* itiate. Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. When directed - Trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - OPEN SWY~p~as (actuates TCE2Eon =-1, TCE2E07T =-1, TFP8SWYD =-1, TVH(/ - O. The Crew responds per 3-EOP-E-O and 3-EOP-E-1 3-EOP-E-1 Step 4 - Respond as Chemistry; acknowledge direction t check DAM1 monitor reading. No response re ire Step 4 - Respond as Health Physics; ac{a~direction to t e r iation readings on main
~~d~eadings t b kground.
steam lines. After 10 minutes e , Step 15.a.1 - Respond as System Dispatch r, ckn power. No response required ge~eq to store the switchyard
/~"' .
Step 15.a.3.b - Respo as IJflf ,ackno ed direction to start one train of chilled water. Report fter tw mi utes that tr in of chilled water is running. Step 16 - Resp d 3-E wledge direction to take surveys in the pipe and valve and hemistry; acknowledge direction to align PASS for sampling the RCS. 6
TP-2009-301 Scenario #5 Event Description 3-EOP-E-O Step 14.a ~ Respond as Health Physics; acknowledge previous direction to take radiation readings on main steamlines. After 10 minutes from last request, report adiation readings at background. j'/ /l
.;t/'f ,/
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 J {(
<:/ii'" "_,'
Step 17 - Respond as NSO, Acknowledge direction to place HydrogeDfug,f;;)f(d\r~ i~'\s,~rvice on unit 3 using 3-0P-094, containment post accident mo 'g syst~'I1:1. t'r:~,gger lesson step - EVENT 4 - ALIGN PAHM FOR S~J~"15\\,"
,l",/i'i,\,"\,,\.,
- 1. After 5 minutes report Section ~/~".2i?teps 1-3 are complete,r~,que~,t operator perform step 4 / / ' \ , ) , , / '\',
- 2. Acknowledge completion Qfste,~:f'4 and to C9f'1tfl)Ue "
- 3. After 2 minutes report sectioQ 7~1",2 completE?",/PAHM in service
'\ /l' I'"
-"t~, -.,--.,,"/--
7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: _1_ Page _1_ of JL Event
Description:
LT-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm ReS leak b,egins concurrent with the LT-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 3-0NOP'~} ,;f ,0 041.6, but discover that Lev 460 will not reopen. Excess le~g'owp"is placed in service and charging flow reduced. Tech Specs a~.e/;on~tllted, 3-ONOP-049.1 used to remove the failed channel. 3-0NOP':011',~ rtlayalso be referenced for the Res leak. /",/ \,\\ '"
~4"-;"
Time Position Applicant's Actions or ~ena~lor
/i;;f/ . .,;",'
Tri er, EVENT 1- LT-3-460 FAIL LOW- LCV-:3::46.0"FAIL CLOSE RO Determines LT-3-460 failed low by.U*{; f{)l1~Wing:
\,. "~'\
- Alarm A 8/4, Pzr Io-Id'ievel*"pler!..,
-', J 1',>'
- Alarm A 9/4, Pzr low Ivl I1t(, off ~Aetdown . secured
- AlarmH~'3'/1'j,ezr heater co~tKJa~'Qff
- LT 4~O\{tdj"~~~h"'~"~"" .
t \. ~',<", "~'<<:~
. ~
- Letdowr1"isojation, 'f>~r htrs'bft,
\ p
( BOP Refers to ARPs '\ .//
~,),,4"" ... "q....... ""-", ", "\, ,~ .. '" /5 Notf1,~:/3-A,Be7097\pR A 9/4.be/().w. 2-3 gpm leak may not be detected
//,plor to 30 eVine. leak.
1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:l Event No.:_1_ Page -.£ of ~ Event
Description:
LT-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm RCS leak ",._,.." ..~ concurrent with the LT-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 3 041.6, but discover that LCV-3-460 will not reopen. Excess placed in service and charging flow reduced. Tech Specs ONOP-049.1 used to remove the failed channel. 3-0N be referenced for the RCS leak. Time Position BOP ( US Directs response per 3-0NOP-041.6, Pressurizer level control malfunction. 2
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 1 Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
L T-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm RCS leak b,.~gins concurrent with the LT-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 3-0~OP~; 041.6, but discover that LCV-3-460 wiIl not reopen. Excess letdowl}.i~ placed in service and charging flow reduced. Tech Specs ar~Jc~n~u{ted, 3-ONOP-049.1 used to remove the failed channel. 3-0NOf"04J+~ may also be referenced for the RCS leak. . Time Position Applicant's Actions or BJM~'~,tor
,.J" .,,/
I--------------~-~-- NOTES'i'" /# A~/ I
.. t{ PreE~LtnzEr t~VE'f 11'~o?~i~'Ct~Dl'i
/"
Ni* :; f'.eS4:1l ct 13"fafture ot Lt;~
,'.*"\.,
seCt:' or 2'~~OCX re.t3VS ,'as {n~'}~*a~V C'l i0;3;,5 01 .~~ta*cv.. n a ffOt4' "l/trt~Q' Joss eff '" .:{'iiB3re,~5 vtfrt? no
- Jrt
- :JF(E)"'~r ~3it!ir Of "LEvel P"a>,'15fp/tt,;rs 5.. '4;.sii:\4, ~:~~460, J-cJl10P-(.t13,O I Attaci;msnl 4, tor J.46~CX ':;{,,,i':e, QR 3-D."t'OP-iXO 9 .t, f~"ir 3*4S:;'::;X
- taSLY'E= 25 grJ/d;(~8:~ to}' ~9!'::il:IS5()!r.g LErdov,,?l ffO'fi8:~,,:f1 ,Ptie$5lii1~a?f ,~reis .
I .. if me b!Jt:O~. Gi'7 fJ'Sy:S *34S;lCX 'Or PfE;jStNlZEf He3te('~~ >=<"/)r[)f!lf-AW~~ "'feel"! 1-4'6~C)( are '~~~~ t((~~;;tcL~e SPi?:: ..!.~;rtC1! L'fitf:JPI/i ;ffOw ?l1ij sr~~m=fjl~'.~~14~.3 ~at::!k~tt b
*. if tti.:e f:13f1'£Jd1 i:Of:t/O,i c~~_.He t;'i%irr*:1'i:~~ ='~ect(t:,a~ O{t:;
"\"
(()~ }s OS,E*f}, (omo~y I v:{tlJ TEef; Spec' .*4:::ri:?ti S~~\tE .' A ':" d>,~St.,,;i -, I- - - - - * - - "::;;'~::~ ":';~~~ - ~~f:;' - - - - RO S1
-," . , '4 '!".::, ... ,** '...-.,.;iI C!1EC. ?_,,,c'nZ.I ,e"E_
1 . .,., *. ' . ,
.ud._
..... _:\
"" <~ ~{/""'I+,.-;,-+('rf",A:."\D lI-;,....,_~ .*.
~~'<\ ?' ' "'~~::'~',%,<-,/f'
< ~
L..,_--o1.
- 5. :,~:/"'~"'Ir"'c.t.~ le ..'~: ill::iiCJ; l~";;:~;9r;:l::Ji.fica.1l1!Y 'f~~~! thE ot.') ..:;, TEES plm
/", ". ,"LI::,J;,':.~,tE.L. SELEC7 ~l...E"iSl;JF.:ZER LFyEI. Co;'~TROL>Ki;c:j~c~:tioll
,>' . /' thJS "~lLl ~{\)T lllClu.de Cil\. d..fiS;;nye dllJrme:.
~ "
lace 460.
/,' l:'"",***""
RO "re" **d:i*;>J If ./7'1;l
" ~-},'CF:_"1.!;"V le"",'1 :104""'11;'" .;
~ "7' ~ 1~"~ ',- -~\.. ~:~~'
L\ G.*..,,"'U.>1P '...t** ' TRO
~::t'%.¢';JD1-"¢.<j'level perE:rlt::fu<.?.:f;;:Js
- f,'If ir:.::iividJ.lilZ ::r..l,r~inE:J'Jmo. COlEtrO:Jen m 110: fcl;"Wlal!: LC-3*45~G, THEN
'~,{e il.lcii:I,':r.km] I.JL:t".o:::\G Pl:)f? COSTRO:"'LB5 -in MAr*;'FAl~
ufa;jntai:l progr?!El!l!ed Le':i'l peT E'r:.dD,l:r: :, -
- 1l.; pm::p is not a.'01e ,0 ll.1i't::ll1i'1:!1 p:ogfO::t:Jl.leC level pel' Encio,',Ir J.
Ol:-?~~ _Pli!1::p*~ <lE l1;:,:-es~nry' to ::*~;:or~ ?::ogr?l::rm:ed ~~r=i per EI::;:i,~st.re } A:l~r pr')grn:n:ued len~: :'lJS )e~ nmo:Bd. :J ,rol,1;lewworing of l'if:eceil dUJ'ging ml::t:.'t' " ie,ire*j. [ll~ refP.1 ,0 3*CP*047. eVes. . GtJlr::m:a; Jlltj Lercowll. lwi'J:e,;JDolir:.g Gmo.e. - - RO 3
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:_1_ Page ~ of.JL Event
Description:
L T-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm RCS leak ~~gins concurrent with the LT-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 3-0ij.eJP=:941.6, but discover that LCV-3-460 will not reopen. Excess letdown i,$fplaP{d in service and charging flow reduced. Tech Specs are consult~fi(3-<;j)~OP-049.1 used to remove the failed channel. 3-0NOP-041.3t.rfl~ so\'b,e referenced for the RCS leak.. ('., Time Position Applicant's Actions o!>'B~DeVior
~l .-/
/;7 RO
).. Thrintl :",qy,.. Pr,.viJr LTD); oll~(" PCV-3-J+:iilry to p:revent L7D}l J~lh:fval.v .. fmm 1ifjiu~.xim$tIiJy 50 per
' l:-v. -.,\." /i'
- ,5,1 ri(~_?l1l1liily ,:oo1roi Lc~w :;ltr~ss"U.re L:em:1:~.-;a. 'C~li;rotf ve~ P-C~i -J-14.5, t~) limit pTS'l'.lr"sr!:1:..
\', -"\.. {f 55J
( Note: Lv3'::466'JiViII not 0 '~n RO RO Sl1r!Zer heater> to deenergire,. IliL:l restore PRZ e manllal con:rcl.
;:onSiWi'll!Wlth programmed level iH lnclica:eci ill recllUred by 3-0}'"OP-049J, DEVI/UlON OR FiULURE OF SAFEr:{
F.'"".CT()R"PROTECTION CH.A.L\,}:ELS.. 4
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: _1_ Page 2- of -.JL Event
Description:
LT-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm ReS leak begins concurrent with the LT-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 3-0lj6p 041.6, but discover that Lev-3-460 will not reopen. Excess Ie d'6v IS placed in service and charging flow reduced. Tech Specs ar co Ited,3-ONOP-049.1 used to remove the failed channel. 3-0NO -04 3 also be referenced for the Res leak. Time Position mioo.tes have wsed. THEN dose E:tce'S CV-3-137. ' -
. CV 337 A!iD o1.wmre Conta'i.omem Sump
-304 m~y have "thed.
I ly open. E%CeS5 LE1dI)Vt'l1 Fw,w C1l(!l.~rtiBer. HCV-3-B7. altOWiug the 1({hliuger tc Wi'!rmup.
- 9. Moolto:r heai ac!w:iger outle1 teQwa1:UI'e .at E:SC.t>li Ltim :m Tem.t!
IodiCA1o:r. r I - J - l 3 9 . * - lO. u::. VCT Divert toHoLd-11P 11;. LCV-3-115A. reaches the 100 p~,:eflt diVErt PCCiitiou (Red llgl1! O~. Greil.llm! OfF) OR if dmmi to direCT waft.!!rro the RCDT. tHEN atizll BYJar>> Lttfu D:h.'ert"$1~rDS, OI-3-3S9, io the ReDT (S'l1mch~R"il 5
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: _1_ Page ~ of JL Event
Description:
L T-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm ReS leak begins concurrent with the L T-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 3-0ij 041.6, but discover that LeV 460 will not reopen. Excess le!sIbwp<IS placed in service and charging flow reduced. Tech Specs aryicon~tilted, 3-ONOP-049.1 used to remove the failed channel. 3-0NO" )\,2 rrla¥ also be referenced for the ReS leak. Time Position Applicant's Actions or US Directs the actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 I..... ----------- NO j/ ,
- Momentary spiking of a channel that quickly 'Y be a precursor of imminent channel failure, The bistables for Id be placed in the tripped position as soon as possible, v\lith a maxi e of 6 hours, to aI/ow for further investigation by C, I
- Instrumentation failure\ m cause a particular I instrumentation loop to'qevi 4: by either a finite or extreme amount, Such vlatipn maf"bii.,in a di Ch, that a reactor I, protection or safety relat' nCliortma¥ not occur, en that mylrOment loop, even I though the setpoint for the tion haJ;b'e ,', 'by,tb,~ actual parameter, 1
,\-",/,?",.;: - _~.,,,. - - - - - - I BOP BOP
/n"o off-normarc'of'lditions exist on the adjacent channels c'lQ '\..are to remain in service.
-'~\
'\
\~.3 \(erify a'p.t2U;?able control transfer switches are in the position
',; w~ich elimi'nates the failed loop.
i I
"\ ,-loter LR-3-459 is in an alternate channel, erformed earlier
\,'t\.,BO'\",P'/ Ste'p
'\'<1.'--
Y
.::if"
"'\\. ,/ 5.4 IF a control function was placed in manual control due to the "jf/' failure, THEN verif the control function is returned to automatic.
Note: LC-459G may be in manual until Pzr level is restored to ro ram Step US 5.5 Refer to Technical Specifications 3/4.3, Instrumentation, AND verif the minimum channels operable. 6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:_1_ Page ~ of..L Event
Description:
LT-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm ReS leak ~egins concurrent with the LT-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 3-o~6p~) 041.6, but discover that LeV 460 will not reopen. Excess l~fr.cJb~¥t/l; placed in service and charging flow reduced. Tech Specs ar.!;}*60n~lllted, 3-ONOP-049.1 used to remove the failed channel. 3-0Nqp:(1).,.3 Itt<l;yalso be referenced for the ReS leak. / ,,'\. '.
=="'o;====ll Time Position Applicant's Actions or ~.~rl~;)nr T.ABLE 3.3-1 j{P ,<,l~
US ~;" .1F RE."'cTOR TRIP SYSTEr,,;W'KsTF:!)!i!l~NT,,..TION FUNC, IONAl UNiT TOTAL NO. <<'CH:'ELS OF CH.ANNELS \,"\. TO TRIP APPLICABLE MODES
'" '\:t 2
2
\J'h. 1,2 3"',.4\ 5'"
- 2. PU<'iter Range, Neutron Flu~
- a. High S-etpDfnt 1.2 2
- b. low Setpcint 1##,2 2
.3. intermediate Range, Neutron Rux
- 4. SourcB Range. :l\te:'utm-n: Ffux
- 3. Startup 4
- h. S:hLJtdown"'~ 5 c SI',urdown 9 1,2 2 'I, ?_
13 I 13 1,2 2 13 21001' 2ftoop 21100p If!oop number of OPERABLE c11annels one less than the Toml numiJer of channels, ami/or PO'NER OPERII riO r'irnay proceed proy,ided the inoperable channel is tripped conciitioo within 6 hours. For subsequent required DIGITAL OPER::',TIONAL TESTS the inoperable channel may l)e placed in bypass status for up to 4 0AJUrs. functional unit # 9, action 13 6 hrs. to tri bistables Take appropriate actions as specified in Technical Specifications. CAUTION The failed channel bistable(s) is required to be placed in the tripped mode within 6 hours of the failure determination, except if other channel bistable(s) are in tl1e tripped or test position and would result in an undesired Engineered Safety Features actuation or Reactor Trip actuation. Tl1e overall effect of a failure of this type is a reduction of instrumentation redundancy and, tl1erefore, a possible reduction in plant protection. 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: _1_ Page ~ of JL Event
Description:
LT-3-460 fails low causing letdown isolation. A 2-3 gpm RCS leak begins concurrent with the LT-3-460 failure. Operators respond per 3-o~6p::.} 041.6, but discover that LCV-3-460 will not reopen. Excess le1,d6~¥l/fs placed in service and charging flow reduced. Tech Specs ar¥/con.sllhed, 3-ONOP-049.1 used to remove the failed channel. 3-0NO ,::::0 3 rl1<lyalso be referenced for the RCS l e a k . \ \ Time Position Applicant's Actions or B.{:.7nav):Or .,,- /'i y
,:/""
BOP Step .~" __,'f it ~::/;- 5.11 IF any other channel has faiJed, lfiEN perfor 'l~e following to trip bistables for the failed cn$3nrfeJ. 5.11.1 IF plant conditions are*~*~~*thGlt'.ie~*~ired bistables associated with the failed CR~nne!fh1ay be tripped withoutCjpy*uQ.~:sired RPS or~.s* tuation, THEN perforni;th
-t.
fo/TOw.tQg: - ~:,:";,,-;'%:,,
- 1. Place~lIi 'bJeswitefl~S forth +ed loop in test position\~si\g Att'ae~men*t
- 2. Verify b.i~\a8Its.Jri~: g corresponding II . \FJZ' B jilt.
I~------r-------~----~~------~~~~-T ~~----------------------------~I L BISTABU: UET LE'-lEL DE\lIAnot~ LOGIC AFfECTED 2'3 cr,,arn-el ~~,m'Jn;:;;;f t:"91 )eve: P ,'S27c!-_ '/dtl'", ;:::*7 s;:;:S':e<<1 (;'x,l&hg
- "1: .. E'<iE:L r;::m;;,:;riro!i r.;,;l
~6i4 ;'Z:i=L C
- ..C-L.O LE'le::~ ALERT C * :CO:J<ffR,Z,L RELI!. TED P
- RX PROTECTION REL4 TED S - SAfETY l'NJ:ECT!!OH :RELATED identification of bistables, continue toevent 2.
8
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _2_ Page _1_ of JL Event
Description:
A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is IJH."'V",", in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakage greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-l 00 is used to shutdown Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavio Tri Note: G 5/3 CV sump alarm will alert leak RO orts alarm G 5/3 containment BOP 3t-t-t-t-4 HHHH-+-+-+"""",, om VPA, R*6J,DS.i\ ,,::.d K-630:SEI;;;b:iud It.;, Reo:
~ i
).,_ D':C~'E:.s~I~.7:E F..E.~(:TOR {'OOL~:t,.NT S"-fS7.E.1&,f lEiilL!GE. d),D 1acl-_'ii ~,'i ci:..:"Q-:t;4.
R..4'w ,*o!;Ch Sp.. : 34.6.1 RCS lo;;:ik~g~. b::HZ"~'nt lU2ilfritcti,~:tL-, RrYERE7"CE.:':
. T"d:, Sp;,,: 34.*t6.1 US Directs rcc>,,,nnse er 3-0NOP-041.3 ReS s Note: excess letdown be secured if in service.
9
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _2_ Page -.2. of .JL Event
Description:
A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is £laced in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakageve~i'ij.ed greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-l 00 is used to shutdown..#'the /.llliti1. f f
# J' Time Position RO 1
- 11. t/iaJ~tarl R{:S Jr',ellot 1'1& i:ilr>;;t;:;<lby t'je U,ll S.,lCer;1::,;:;r
- Mal1tam crderi'J b-Jr<lro- ;;)PEt"t;O'l~'
moos OR
/"",
- b. str: a6jlii:)r'<1' ':'l1 r>~SFs3ry to 'TW*
( RO
'maintained
.~ .#'.
, \. *:t ~l">JTl "Tr<? F,oh::hvn~
\". \."
DSr,eTl!~e 'leG .eaK fill.' uBlnO In' aprt;p1a!e lea~. ,.31ep~v~Ei&i;'
'\"<0 ~ '<';';;"..,r, . <l.. ~ * ...,. ~;:;;
~ ,\.~~~d:.;;:; S':"~1~1T~~H.R'; ~E
':;"'J..cULATIO~
, i)*o.S:P.Q4 L2. ~EAGTG.,,)
CO()U01T SYSTEM *VL3IJ.i1,~ U::"'¥
~,,~4SPECT;oN Ah,.:} lEA1<
EVAWA1iQ*~
- 2) A.::Er~l:o ICenrl'j t'1e roun;~ t:t ti're 1'2>.'<\
- I'F 'ar.;:;o~ Is r',-r;1 tr",~ Ri- "-
Si'S.~IT'i -THEN PiO!10l7i An.A~CH~jE~fT 1 ( 10
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:_2_ Page ~ of JL Event
Description:
A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is Rlaced in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakage 1 ed greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-l 00 is used to shutdown 't. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior: ~~~~ BOP '11 Check for ~a4 IMicmrorU!, 01' ReS Leakage
- a. Vertl'?R STABLE OR: CCREASING tl. Vei'1fy R-j 2 - STAB 2},~cm~t~~
Dl&¢~vawea C.V-3-2a21 0JrItl CV-3-2B22. Sf Pel'foorl 3-0/Iii0P-J)5'"
;:v.DIOACThI'E EFFLUENT
~EASE, WlIJiE! cortilruing \\I'lli'! thIS prooeClUre .
t:. ::>erfoon .3-O!i0P-057. RAOlOAC71VE EFF1..i..':JiT RELEASE. willie OOftIrfJ!ng
"!lhlt4s~.
Q. '::>el'ti>'m 3-0NOP-iJ712. STEAM GENER.ATOR TU&E LEAKAGE. 'I#lt.\! OOI1I.m!lingiMlI'i 1Ns prooeiU'e.
<e. \tem'y ReS te CCOlp:olleni Cooir.g '1\'_r e, ~m 3-ON!.Y::<.()67, RAOlOAC17iJE OOUI".dary - !t..!TI'ICT EffWarT RELEASE. Vfi1~e oorsrumg wltl1 fils procer.llJRt
- R*lfA .sTABLE .QIi DECREASlNG
- R-lfBSTABLE OR DECREASING 11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: 2 Page ~ of L Event
Description:
A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is placed in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakage ye:ified greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-l 00 is used to ShutdOW/k:,~Pi( Time Position Applicant's Actions or Beha US 12 Detarrrilne If RGS Laetaga Wlihln Unllfs Of Technlca! Spe>1:lncmt'i.l1!ll!
- tn tAOOE' ,3 *.D:iEli'
~ tc~ iJl)k) s-r-iJtC1:tvl'n 5, Hot 6t.lrtd~r"O US as o.:P"Cl11Edt1 Tatil? 3.4-1 up to "' maxJr,ur11Jf:5 <;PM at a 'Rl?s,ctor ()Doant syOotem "C{ 22~,5 ,: 2J 9~ll fn::m any ReaclcrCODiant $)'&ter'l PnENLl1e ise'iatlcn Vak\i'! ~cm~(j 3a~L-'
*~~*Jlltl Jry PRESSURE 5-oUNG:A~~Y LEA..r;:ASE, Of ~Nm'r; ptJ11a!),,*tc--s?;):~njary '!ezaagp. un! wiftNn I trot, bE *n a: !~as: HOT STII.'iDBY w.1trm 6 "'OlJfS an::! In CDLD SHUTDOWN wtthm thefcdc'lllnq m~~ -
,"Ill', ,.;ny ReJC~~. " (:>Joant S}lieT V"",.. r:3. b101. 21 !~a,agE "rea. !&" .than a/'Iy one. 01 ire. .::Iel:?..e !lrrJt<.",
~:c-c:hJ(J:ng pr~r1arY*>J'ii'C'::;-fTjJ)'Y IE:_J.';3£R. :=tRES;JURE &:-;i.Jr*JDAF.Y LE,A,KA;:3E, and i::al-a:~e frnr"j I
R~.-3CtO~ CC{,iam *:'"I.t:.~*;:n pP?~.;1J'-'*e lSCi~,WJr \-/cJ\'*~:.,. r'E':@j;,J,e 1li? ~i3:~,~7.f;p: fiH-1D ;JkHrJ/11frrH.s wJf.ttn
;:l rll)JfS Dr c:< tl id le.-J51 ,(:.1' -STl'.NJ5Y wHrHr- 1r>e: next 6 :1:U-'~* .af)j ir C/)LD ::c-1UTt:;iY'J.NN N!t,l" U-'i;' rOi;owmg ,yJJ rouf".
Wllh Jry Reactor Coolano; SyS1:811 Pre!5Sv'-e t;Ei)}a'Ucn \l:Mv j:eaKa'Q' l~re3>ter ~t!an ,;;licnll~*d by 3.4.f 2,12 atove op&"Mllon ruy canlJrue pro"Kled
'tVt-'1ln 4. nOJl'S tt'Z! at lea.& t~l-D' 'i7ive's V) eacr rrgr** pressurE ~lr;e. -ha\~~ng a non~
flJnr:lJolul '/,31.\i'!3r. *3r,j ,'B'11a't; In l,t,aJ f',)itiEo ':;Jri'!:':EpCf)j!ng rot'le Is)13t~ ')Onj~lDr I.e., manual ,'Jives JE'Jall be io:;(M 11 :n12 c:t.)*sEd posrtlcr. rnator;;peralet1 ',a',16& srahtle p(3ced Ir the tiD's&:! posmcn 3rtj paM"; ~up~1IES G~nergIZe!Ji PedcN. appliCati'e
.AC7ICN stZi?Ement fo; IttE a1fe::ted JE"IOotl'l.an::!
( \ 12
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:_2_ Page -2 of.JL Event
Description:
A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is placed in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakageyert&ed greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-I 00 is used to shutdown the ua-it.
/' /"/
/'
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavio}f/ US 1 BTIM Cc.ntrol Rc.e:m Pal"a(}J1I1&.i U;s:lng Attllof1rrent S US Lo!~t: R,E(kKti.0!:l it.:UE ~,¢. miu \r~t Iti2"'-"", 2 ~,~'~'<~." 1 3l~~ >:£1:1 1 ~.'~ :' o:n. E:';y':fe,:\ :n'E ':r~: ..l. T \ +";: ,f":;';';: 1""'" 2 'F 1 ~F ( J. l~;;i)ffi'..+(ft'nah~h~"'" _ _ ~~~.. '}'\lZif;;~/fff .~~, ,,,,,j!' J""
,,/......
- f.-l
,,/IIIiiiiiif"'~"',::~_ ~:~ -
"\ t
- - ~
":\
---,.q'O ~n
~
.;f'/ /f~I"'" S~;t;t*=S~J :}o~. :.: s;; g.:n'v:iS D~' % !>;'.<\'~! (:0/1[1';;; !jeff! (0"r'O,~~!I;i 'htrr:Ct?,i:r"" ,3t'<J
/,~" &f*.**
/' 03v;:j\!aoie, :.tt s ;;t?: % ',"r'irr' <lei tc~rt:jf>,"1;()
f71::wer1e:r/ (05,l? a V,;{L~T? .eeLlit'S; ~'d.1D 1"e
'\\~ I if .W,~~(e (! ,.>,,~~:~;~~.~:.~~tl'; !Jt,~,"j,:~>~ ';0\) t;;A:;C:I:;r, ::'C'Tl f:ii} ;;cw'f!
'<>"'\ t it ~?e't{1jir ~~E~'=~~::~~( P.\3Y* P1a:1g.e'~~c~fartCC dJ OS5P'~:1' C:it",~f!g rl1e ic~d ~'B)l.tt:tiD', I
',., ~,' 7' t: - * ~*""'i~ . :O:. ,"" * - .' - - - * - . - - - -
- B~=J71{':J (u,..: ___ 10t:l1 glJJ(XIE _ _ _ :.ru::u:e, = ___ gailo!:,.:.ni:::ll:e
?1n::,'!So!:!:'O':'?J.J:'.l::le:e::; ?lld:::'I)::l7.i:u,,"J:<Y Actio:::,
.. ,~ ;~l.*g.~ref ::E'; 2.}~':~:u:i. ~~:"; ~%:::~c1 ~l;;: ci e~~~t~d, ,l&lN rtl::lp m ~stc:", In,u;i.
~\ !! .-\U!lUl:i;;H. ..0, ., :,Uc.; 3.4._,.1>. LC' L~).1L ,!>M:t:lS, tie jo~d r.:dllC:!Otl ,[:In )10 :;"y\\-:i
_, _ 0 ,\, f/". , zOP z-o) :r~tl"I:lO':: C'Ir.e,:~ - ).i7!!:"UJJ ri!ltcC'J ~:Jd n;rlrH':~ Toy:
- rril'i.~~ '<, ~;78 :F
- Ta1;e t 'F Tr~:
l R~hew :~:;.'~r.Jed tU:::'Jcll;; fJ;)5l oti,"H~:- Pl\)C.::rl.~jrE*s .:.'un~n~i.r Ul ef:ect (e'X-lmple., stop Rep) Note: 900 gal BA required, rate picked will determine flow rate. Foldout a e next if covered. 13
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: _2_ Page ~ of -.JL Event
Description:
A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is placed in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakagei~~~ed greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-l 00 is used to shutdown u,J!it. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi US FOLDOliT PAGE L J-EClP-E-O Transition CrftTia lEary of l11e foJowing \;f1iiiS are reached. THE'
?~EOP-E-D, REA,C-OR TR1P C?: S.AFETY a ReS T,,"'g - {3REATER TH,t.N 578 ¢F PI.:,,): 11'>: Reaotor ~lal:>:lp Gel';;;tor SViltoll to B(>~ATE.
- l ~~?,~e RCD ~l"Ki?LP Oilrtrol D#Atct"i io
~ %i*'<\J~
3:¥'6b?--fT* :J"fep'a":}eme::t PlCi1i personnel L6!rg 1I',e P';lEl:iCC<Q;l ( 14
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 2 Page ~ of..JL Event
Description:
A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is l?,laced in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakageyeri51ed greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-l 00 is used to shutdown}ne lj)1it.
,/
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior:.'#' .*J? BOP 4 Art,Jsl FC.. 3-i j 31'. Eo1c Act:; "{(YS CC\'1!J\JF~f "o/' to nb:.a!n :te Ail~'0:il'1""nt3 :t~*ste-j nr.".~ mI.;: " /' P
/"<:;.
"/
-,fl ,,2*
*'C, /' /
\\, /i /'
s~p o.iA;\:Ui ~9'ker f,;d.Jcllofi 10 ':>In!:rci le~*petral)J(ei1f 'lECe"";";"'lry, plac,," c,Jrt:o;
". {X'" in f1)!l't1!J31 an:! rnam't;:'1$l -3';9 A11hn lhe e.~cte<1'~;rJ\~r:"re1 J."'" d .~Ha-.jlr~~1t 3.
\" ', ....
RO 5 PerforM :t:\4\fPk)W;~:
'3'0' .,. Sbw jc:ad~"h;:dw:;;~'n uf1~i alarm ls r'set R~;;8~~.;;/*uatE t::lat!o~ atncunt a~d :a:e *ar,;j
,"/- .':' "-'NN*~*<:-~V. .,\, .f;'""'"
US 6 'Notif~'. The Shitt r.tanag~r T ~,R~fl?r r,..('The Fp1fc;~;iri't1'froc\dmes \ .* C-E"':P.. ;::JV . :lCTIES CF\:r.,lE~,GENCV
\
IJFIC)I,TION 0\ P';7NT
'.;.:;~.~.~.,., ~
,**joTE - - - - - - - - - - *. ,
I I*
\, 'A. ',,-
A(ial{?w: difference /8 alh:Jw.,d to e.q:;eed the Target Band during/he load r",:iverien With-OW
, e!1leririg~.. 0p..t;{59 9, ODl:'ratiori 'vtitl,jl"l [he A,<iaJ FillX Differerrce Gperatt.:.nal Space .
-'t,*.
_'~ _->.;.\~
..I
\.. < '~""" ,~,/
\ Ch!ck Pbi'hJ'Resp,mse
'\
~. It Check or~ssLd'i;!E<!' !e-v1:1 fcdo~il19 ptogram a. IE. dire>:;,ed b*y ,hi! Unit Svper.<isor, THEN ircre*ase ch~fg;ng fAlW as fc~lIows:
1;' Threnl" open TCI/.. 144. "lRHX T:emp Comrol Vat'!'?:, oypass valve 3--e34 to raise ~c'w to ;,oprotmlately e,iJO mxrL
- 2) Stan an addtiDrai charging pump.
3;' F" ace an addiiinr,ai letdoWfl orifi,:,e h SEd'vice.
\/eri)' load "edl.;ctiDr "-a:e :::trd auto roo b. StOI:' elf slow PO\'IlE1 re{h,,~cbon to control oorirol i s t~.ainta; 'ling :he exp~::.tEd T,~vgiTr~f ter",pE-ratl..lrE', 5 neceS5.ar.:/', pi;li::;.e onnt"o1
.iT 'dE'mii,*c l '1 AtaC'1f'~r t 3 ro.ds h ma~lUal and rna'n:afn Tsv>g 'Ii~titin fue e~ P8ctec T .a v g,'T re~ j. T :::f ,t..tt.achrrv:nt 3.
( 15
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _2_ Page ~ of JL Event
Description:
A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is placed in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakagejv~;i'~ed greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-I 00 is used to shutdown/,,'V.t1fe uJ1:it . :i-Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavio,.~// RO 8 Energize Pres*stlrizer Bac,kup Heaters BOP 9 Verify Turhine Load less Than 570 MWE
-Open the SGFP recircu~:.zdjon valves for ihe feed\iatBr pur:;p to b-e stopped I
I Boraric-r sJ,ouid' be stopp-e-d I BOP 10 J£ Ta'get Ulad is* GREA.TER THAN 450 Mwe, THEN perform t~e bllow,ng: a, rvlaJ!rt::.ir fe,act-Of' pow*ar.J:~ -or oe!'0w the target 'i,t~ILi>? usin!;1: Conjrol Rod adj'ustments Tvrbine bad adjustments
- b. Maintair, Tevg within +/- t 'F c.f Tref.
- c. Maintain P"es5vri::er lev;?, en progr*am.
- d. Maintain Pressurizer pores5ure on prog:oram.
- e. Maintain SO Lev,~s on p'rogl.EH11<.
- f. Refer to other CHOPs in effec.!.
- g. Go 10 prooedllre and step in efiect 12 Che.)k Station Service l03ds Suppli'd From WHEN directed by the Unci Sup'Nisoc THEN The Startup Tr"nsformer tr.3,rlsfe*' statlc2n sEf\i'ic.e' from tbE ,A..trdkary Trans:forrn-ers 10 :Ive Startup Tr.ansforr:er us.ing Att~'chm-erit 2.
Note: Attachment 2 may be used to swap station loads Attachment 2 next. 16
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: _2_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
A 30 gpm pressurizer surge line leak occurs after excess letdown is placed in service. 3-0NOP-041.3 is entered to address the leak. Leakage jed greater than tech. specs and 3-0NOP-100 is used to shutdown 'It. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi ROJ BOP
,f' /
- - --w
~~---------~~-~---
I TD doz.' 4;<',/ .btlS .':)upply brea-k-ers: -NOlliE: 1~'c I I
- tli'e syrr;-hroscope' mu.atbe on: ~d '12 CJci'ock +/. 2
- I. {ncOttvl1'g- Ei-,*,d running 1:< I Close START-tip
( :-.
. 3ABn2. to TIUP.
WHEN directed by the Unit Supervisor, THEN
.!i:qg.n Eh...lxih-:1('Y 'S'l.e*,ar:" 'Sup'oly from ar*-{dhet *'. Jr:t G"5-::n9 Ag-;,.~c:hment 1.
""'", . '::\:'"._ __:.-::/./ ____ ,::::,o::<<':::":"::"'*:k,:;~::~~
Nqte~"Aux,lsteam su"lie.d.1l'om unit 3 from turnover brief.
" f Note's"Afte( 5 to 10% load reduction tri er next event.
\~"c
'\,>~ ~')
-,\. ,~/i,l 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _3_ Page _1_ of ~ Event
Description:
Following a 10% load reduction, offsite power is lost. The turbine fails to auto or manually trip preventing a reactor trip from turbine trip. 1'j:1'{~'{;.; reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip re.~{fir~~,the MSIV s to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start re~fiiringmanual If '\; operation.,f Time Position Tri er, EVENT 3 - OPEN SWYD GCB~
#' ,J ROJ Recognize and report the loss of o~~si*te 96wer base on:
d-BOP
- Numerous alarms a)~.~~i*at\,ed
I, t,.,
- Units 3 and 4 start-up vdRlge" Ii
- Switc9/1a'rcj~~ltage indicati
- Prima).¥ r'e;s,~~;'seto",.,!5?ss of loa US Directs the.~eactor and tJk,bi~e t~iPP'~~9;/rmrne.QJ~t*~::Operator actions a 3-EOP-E:;JJ*tcj'6~'**p,erformed \ \"/f,f' ',,'
M;;WIIJ;aNy trip reacior, 1f. reG!ctDr PQ~I(',T is greJ'tH ,han 5% OR imarmedi:aie ral'ige oeN"ex 15l:LQl.st3bie or d;;re.;3sing, .L!:IEl:I. perform tha fcrllc.wir{r
- a. Moniter Crllk:*al Safety Functions usiG<J 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL SAFET","
!pdh:.atOfS:. - AT ZERO FUh!CTION STATlJS TREES.
- :JECREASING b -Gcdo 3-EOF-FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO "4LiCLEAR POWER GENERA.TIONi
;',T'lv'S, Step 1.
ed from the console
. 300 gpm pressurizer surge line leak is initiated automatically with the loss of off site power.
18
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.:_3_ Page ~ of JL Event
Description:
Following a 10% load reduction, offsite power is lost. The turbine fails to auto or manually trip preventing a reactor trip from turbine trip. Tpe f " reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip reqtiir~,"s.,the MSIV s to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start rCJluiril;,g'manual operation. 1"" " Time Position Applicant's Actions or BOP 2 Verify Turbine Trip
..J o V&"rf~.,' fv1c'sb..lfB S:epa;.atty RehestEf St':am **ial\'~5 - CL:J!':;ED
..0. C '1E-ck ~~'~id .and E 3S~ 9...,.'Aa*1u~IVf*t'PEr b~aker5, If brea~;Ers do
( -.: Norm,; Hy :;:; secor\J
/
, NOT op2n. THEN actuat2 EMERGENCY GEtflh<F: TRIP SWITCH for til': a"fecf.d break,er(s)
"?,/ . . .:-." ! -; \. "\
'/N,9(6: Tu~~inelfays to trip mtJ(l'!af,ly; MSIVs and bypass valves are
~".. vertf/~d c/CJsed~.J'{!SR ma.m steam supply stop valves are
" " " " ' " '. d'
\, c/o§;ed . .~>".
'\""'f)..( f'j~0*
. Critlbal {ask: (WOG) Failure to manually trip the turbine prior to
'\. completing immediate operator actions.
'\"
19
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _3_ Page ~ of JL Event
Description:
Following a 10% load reduction, offsite power is lost. The turbine fails to auto or manually trip preventing a reactor trip from turbine trip. Th~/,,\ reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip requjr~ t.Ire MSIV s to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start reqt9I'i~gAllanual operation. ;f < Time Position BOP 3 Verify P'OWl?f T <) Emerge n;cy 4 KV Buses it C:f'tE"ok the 3*A a:nd -3B 4 p(\l bus;?s - MAiNTA! hi AT LE.AST ONE EN!:::RC"ZE;!5
~ C-he'ck the 2*.A. ano V-A}NTAfN 8-<OTH a} \le,rify 3-C C.CVt/ plH1"KO'-
BREA.KER OPEN. b) \/erifyaC IC-Vil pump-BREAKER OPEN.
-e,) OpeTsle bvs .'Clpply bre*akefs to re"s.tore ootter.
started 20
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_3_ Page ~ of JL Event
Description:
Following a 10% load reduction, offsite power is lost. The turbine fails to auto or manually trip preventing a reactor trip from turbine trip. T reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip res:ttlir~.~ he MSIV s* to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start re}ltlirillg fl;- v~, manual operatIOn. ~Jy' Time Position Applicant's Actions or RO 4 Check 1f S I Is Actuated
- 3,;rfeg~hl,dOS. e=quiprne-nt - AI}T()
STI-,PTED (' flnw v,,~lth low S/(3
- ,=. 14 pOSJg 2!i 10
T*avG'} {543 iF} RCSsubrocling I?ased on co-re Exil
-res ~ LESS THAN 3{FF1Z-10~FJ
- PRZ level* CAN !:iQ! BE M.AINTAlNED GREATER THAN 12:'%{50:'%]
b IF SI is reQuired . THEN m<>nvatly actuate Si ar:d c-on'!ainn"je~a6c)") phas,-e A. 1l1i!2. go to Step :;
~. !.E SI is !iQ!fequke<:l. !!lli!:!perfOl"m the
~~IIO',"'ing :
1:; Viof';itc5f Crhica! 5,3ratv FUf'lc:th:ms usj;r,.g 2:-EOP~;~-D. CR~iT!CAL ~S,A.F~TY' FUNCT~ON STATUS TREES, 2} Go t;) 3-EOP-ES-:U. REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE. Step 1. Note: Depending on timing, conditions for 51 may not be pesent when first checked. Transition will be made to 3EOP-ES-O.1. Within a few minutes transition back to 3-EOP-E-O STEP 1 will be made for initiation of safety injection. Automatic 51 is blocked requiring manual actuation. The first few steps of
£5-0.1 are included.
21
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No,:~ Event No,:_3_ Page 2- of ~ Event
Description:
Following a 10% load reduction, offsite power is lost. The turbine fails to auto or manually trip preventing a reactor trip from turbine trip. Tpt!( '\ reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip require~'ihe MSIV s to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start r~.!1Uiril1l~f manual
/" \;
operation. /' "
"'\co Time Position Applicant's Actions or B~,Ii'avlj)r US Directs response per 3-EOP-ES-O.1 C A Yill: Q<N p',
\\, "\~A J"',",' ..,1" If SI actuation occurs during this procedure,. 3,EOP~~~O, FjEA C fJ21ti fRiP OR SAFEfY fNJECflOfJ, is reqaired to be p",rforrned starfirr9\at Stli'fY1. /#"
'~, ;/
, ~>>"", '-">.'. " '.,
* - - - - - - 1'-; -~**N:OTE - -~..:~
'\"'.-, ~ ." 't, I FokJout page .E3 reqaire,g tc ~Be'%mvfif:ofea;tht:Q!Jghowyt
" "'.' ~,_ e v,<><
bl~~'~roce~~\Te
-----4~--~--~~-~~ \" \- " , / , 9 .f ,.~:." ,0,,*.. ,;. ,'<
FO\,POOT FQ,I~ PR£iEEDIJRE ES.\). '1 **/
\. \,,7 /f~
//
\
hSifd befow CoC:C;'JrS. 'f1:iEN ~tu3te S L aCilJate r:oniaip,;ne:l'~ ~SCit3tion p.,a~. A . .3.nd flO io 3~EOP-EwC, . 1}6~;:~ !.~ ::1q ,S~,~ETY i~0JE;~T~'(:,t*~, .Step 1
~ R-'; SU} <d$sectbr>$'~r~. e:~m T::::s~ :..~SS -HA,h 30Z,F
'. **'\{~~e!/.e'ATrNtrrSS),t~l:=,:'i~d*~;:E:rER THAN j 2%
<*." EMERf3tNCY BOR,4TIGN CRITERJA
if Qr:e Q;f the: for QvA'IQ ccmdi:ions exists, TH EN -=-ml?rg~ncy OC" ~ie JSiriQ ,!,~ONOP-04e,' E~.1 ERGENCv B::1P.A TidN. :'Irt*l ten>" In atlo""l or;teria an? -;;;;;-
Ytf,X1Y RiS.~. Cc,~ Leg t£.mperatllre cecre-as.Es to less tha1 52c;F b c jw~ ~:)r rii~ cor,troi; fOOS !!QI. fully inse*rt,gd.
~"\ "\..
CST MAKE\?( ~I.ATER CRITERIA IF CST leve' d~iYE.as.!?S 10 jess than ;0>%, THEN a>dd rakeup to CST *us}ng 3-0P-018.1, C*ONDENSATE STO,P<>~Gc TAJ>\J;--t --
I ED PAnt
SUMMARY
I ;;;ny conditie.n lislec below O~CU1'S, THEN go ttl 3-EOP-F-O, CRITiCAL SAFETY FU'KTIOH STATUS ii'F~EES, S:eo 1: --
;) Subcrrticam:r t'~ud"Eaj" POW!?; ~ GREATER TH *.;rt. f*%
b CO"Eo- CocHr'fr Core e'~it Tes ~ GREATER TH,;..t<J12CiJIl'j:::
- c. H~a~ Si'ik: r'J"vrow ra*!")g.e le'le' j., 8,J S,'Gs ~ LESS TH,'; ~,~ ,:i%
AND ,otal f ...dw.3'"" fi,;)w - LESS THAN 340 GPM I",gnt{: Celd I'?g. ,.. mr-:,?catwe O'ecrea!ie . GREATER Fl.'>'N lDO'F 11-; L,c,ST 60 .\HNUTES £l.!:!!l.<1ry ReS, '.:,.o!'d lEg t-9r'.oeral\,m? - HAS; 8EE!",J lE.~<S Tl-A,:...*i 29':I~F e Cc*n~a:n\'"<£ort: Cornainnl?:"""{t press-ure - GREA-E~ T'~.A\1 e'5 PSIG Note: transition will be made back to J.EOP-E-O step 1 based on ressurizer level < 12%. 22
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:_3_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
Following a 10% load reduction, offsite power is lost. The turbine fajls to ~j--t, auto or manually trip preventing a reactor trip from turbine trip. T ~. , reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip r~, MSIV s to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start r~.quiri ,f'" operation. Time Position Applicant's Actions or BOP 1 Check Power Availahle to BOTH UNIT 3 llliQ. UNlT 4 BOP 2 Check AFW Pumps* AT lEAST TWO RUI'mlNG 270 gpm for req.uirea ead of the 345gpm SLlbse1:luent s.;eps and ( RO Eme::rgep<-:;y :bC>'fat~ lor unccmroUe'd cc,:)loC'('vn vs/ng 3-0'N,:]pw{)45. 1.
"MERGE"'leY FORA,TION 'thE",
CO!'"Jti;""Ali:ng w,t, ~hi!i proCeClH"i?
, 1E. tempe-attife. k~'S,s than :~47r.*F ~
tej'1". p"r",t~It" is d"cr"asmg, TH EN [3<:£'>iop,,-~:, :h, ro-No'/l;ng: -- b) \"ev'fy SiG bkfw'a.<:)wn lsctation v ..i:fv*es cl:ose~t c} fF c-o-cfLdQW1'~ 'ContinuE-'s, THEN
~~n1fl:::~j t~~1;3-:i f~ed eow. ~~p t.otal feed -flew 9re3:t~r t.h.an
- 45 gpm I.H,N flar-t~W r'::U"l'ge le'vel greatr$f th.3<;n iJ% \'1 31 le3-S-~
one S/G. C1 [F c-oo!C-O!Il' oOnbr1'...!Es- due t:)
;;;'C:2'SSlV stea:m 1"'-0'11, THEN cios*e rr\~in ~-te..u('fline' i-~l"\
03_nd byp_r1ss. '.;aJvE5
- 2) !E. tempe:rat:"irE' greater t"1an eA7;'F AND tempEfSiu.re is i:nareas~ng.
THEN p'1'riorm tbe foMo'IAng: Dump stsm tls.irv;,! SJG sieam dump b atlw,sphere v,ai'""s, 23
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.:_3_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
Following a 10% load reduction, offsite power is lost. The turbine fails to
."."\
auto or manually trip preventing a reactor trip from turbine trip. The ') reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip re¢fre::;v(he MSIV s to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start r~Qri1ri~~"'manual operation./ . Time Position Applicant's Actions or B~h'avi;or "" BOP 4 Check Feedcw.at.;,r Status a Ch;;'OK ReS a'.'era*;!e ternper.3:ures - WHEN :emtr~;ittwe less l'"oJn 554'F, LESS n"c.,r*~ ES4'F THEN ~p"Step)i;,'4b, 4c, 4d. and 4e. Con~jpf6~ w~.-;!f*Step 5," [ ./'
¥'
/>'
A/:;
,_". V'rT~' n12ir fE?d\vat~fl,~'"\' '::'Qr*tfc~ .... a!vE-s - r~,lar a~yl' clos*ce va(Iies.
- LOSEO AN:: IN rv(o"N,J:.!l;L.
- I \Jeri,)' fee~b.,."t:*
CLO':;*EC: (
- e. Est3blish greater th,m 2':5 gpm feed floW! to he SiG:. 'rom one 0' the fc{ ,o'll*ng:
." Feech.\~at~r Sjlsten1; on fe~ch.vater byoas.s valves Rods - FULLY fNSERTED fF 1'11'0 cr "1ore o:c.ntrol mds N CIT fully
~ertE'd . .D:l.5.t:1 eme-rger'~y ~~e- for 'stuctt; comrQ! reds liE-:;ng 3-0NOP~CW.6, 10 EMEPGENCY 50RA7H:IN. while- oontmArg
\f.,:i,h tr'ds prccetL..Jre.
Verify Chargil1g -IN SERVICE 3., \/er,fy VeT lTI.i1keup s.et for au;o/*il.31i,~ centf':>!.
- b. SL;r: at least C"le on.:;-g:ng pump.
- c. A,dj.d5t Chargir\:.J Flow Tt, R-egen Heat Exchanger, HCV-3-121, and ci1argin!;l P,Ir"P speed to est.ab1ish desi-ed f;ow.
- d. fF ohar" ir.g fiow' C.?,I" NOT be
~jal}iished, lllli!:!. s;:;t";;n-e 31 1);Ji'l',C f~)r RC2., ~!)yen~or'l CCi'it1"O' dsir"~g 2-0NOP-D47,1, LOSS OF ALL CHARGiNG FLOIN iN MODE:? 1-4.
while cDl"tinving .....llh ihis prcced..rre. 24
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_3_ Page.JL of L Event
Description:
Following a 10% load reduction, offsite power is lost. The turbine fa'ls to auto or manually trip preventing a reactor trip from turbine trip. 11:1 reactor is tripped manually. The failure of the turbine to trip r~,'1/'; MSIV ~ to be closed. The A and B EDGs fail to auto start l)'itliri operatIOn.' Time Position RO 7 Check PRZ Lev.. 1 - GREATER THAN 15%
. grea.ter than 15%.
and 9. Contir',ue with US
- ., :- .. - - - NOTE - - ., - .. - .,; - .. - .., I
---- I Steps f thrcH.f:9h 4 ,are 1/J//'AED.fATE ACTJON' steps.
- - - - - - - - - - - - ______ 1 Ma.!1vaHy trip reac-tor.. 1E r:eaJ::tor pO'lfr is greatN(h"m 5'% OR kHl?rmedia!f.! rang .. powe.r
- Rod bottom fights - Or*' is !:l.QI st!,b,f.! or ;,,,,;asirig, I.I:I.E.!:l. perfom'j the foI!lO'.... ir}a:
Read.:<r ~rip and bypass b'f.!akers - OPEN a. Monitor Cnteal SafetY' :=vni~tor~ '.Ising 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL S.AFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES. o GQ tQ 3-EOP-FR-S. j, RESPO"'ISE TO NUCLEAR PO'WER GENERA.TION} p,TWS. Step 1. Note: Containment temperature will reach adverse containment setpoint during this event. 25
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.:_4_ Page _1_ of ~ Event
Description:
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. /c'; ,p Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 2 Verif~' Turbine Trip Z1 AI! ~lP'b:ne stop Cif ",ssod&t;ed ;-:>ontroi a
\'aj'~'es - GLD:3ED o 'v'e-dfy tiJ1o;sur-f? S,eparatO';" Rehe:,:;-ter St2am Valves - ClO/3ED BOP 3 a, Perform the following:
1} A~ter1pt to E',mergenc*}, sla-1 any Unit 3
.ziv3,JJabhe. :di:esel uen:erator.
2} IF n.edher 3A net 3B 4 KV bus is
;;;,ergized, ~ go to 3-*EOP-EC.A:-Q ,0, LOSS .ALL AC POVifER, Step 1.
- t. A'l!*em--D1 t:t e:.rnergenC':t start tr' de*-e-ne*;g..:zed Unli: :3 bus- dies-e*i gienefaior 3D 4 h'V bus ~ner'9ized - " Perk "11 th" foll':iwing:
,AN ENERGIZED" I{,v BUS
- 1) Jf. Ioclwllt (;If 3D " KV bus J:!Ql prese,nt, l!:!.lli perform the;ollowil1Y z"i \/edfy a-c -c,.cvv purnp -
BREA.I(ER OPEH. b:: \/erify;JoG JG\l'V p>"'imp - BREAKER OPEN. C,; Opera:" bus selppl), b,e-akeTs to restcJre pc<~"".~r. started earlier 26
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: _4_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The Res leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto il)itiate. Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. ,f' \, Time Positio Applicant's Actions or Behavior n RO 4 C hec~; If 5 J ls Actu ated
~
<5afugu,:-.,"os. f?q~wdprne'1t - ;"UTO Auto SI 3T"'HED Signal
'}\ , hg'l'~t'2';;"'" line dff"rental "t!r;?ssc.:,... - 100 ps"d
"'\', "~;t
.~
'~~<:')~\'fth 10\\l SlG 4:1:;'9 QB. low Res* *s ...dJv;Jcdil1g based on co~e exit SI and ..... Cs - L~SS THAN ~D~F~210;;FJ Phase A
PRZ I*",'ei - CAN !:illI. 8E lVlAl'FAINED GREATER THAN initiated *12.:;-b[eiCH~] b, IF SI is reQui'ej, THEN m';;'luaiiy aClU,;;;t~ S1 af'~d con't2Inrn'e~atio:J pr.as*B A. 8!::ill: go to St=p 5,
- c. 1£ 31 IS!:!QI f~qllkeo. I.!iS!i perform tile following:
1:: \/\onitor C.rt:ic..?<t SafEtv Ft..Jn;:,:kms usjr~g 3-ECP*F-D. CR'~TIC.t.,L SAFETY
=Lt<CrC<f'1 STATUS TREES.
~': :30 to 3-EOP-ES-J. '" ,~EACTOR
-PIP RESPON:3E. Step 1,
/t:Jot~: Critical task: (TCWOGIPRAj Failure to manually safety inject
./'
/Y and actuate Phase A within 1 minute if an 51 actuation setpoint is exceeded following a LOCA and automatic 51 actuation fails to occur.
r-
~
---- - I I
- - -- --- -- -~ ..- -- - - ~--- -.
27
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: _4_ Page ~ of JJL Event
Description:
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior us EOI DOUT FOR PROCEDURE E*g ADVERSE CONTA1NMENT CONornONS 1f :th~r of th oonditions tlsted beioN >oc:C;I,.;*r, .II:if.t::! use a C{).ntai:nrn'_nt .strn'cs:phe.rE- tEmpemjure-::: 180-:;;: c.ontmnrnen1. n~d:;ation lev-e*,is 2.. 1~3,x1d'!.* Rlh:r
'VVHEN ,:~*::;r"t,sir:Tj~nt paf.8mete:!"s drop betow the -
If. :h*B TSC det-ermiroes th~,t ~::orrtajnmiS-'1't :integra.te'>
- 2. Rep TRIP CB1TERJA
-8 !E beth ccn<iiiions l:isted:
o bek~'i ooctlf, I.!:!lli kip ad
-1} H;gb-head SI p\.J~c\DS -AT LEAST ONE R;UNNJ~NG 2-; RC-S 5UDC-tKlhng - :,~e;'-s"Ti4~4N,;¢5I)F[e5"FJ
- o. 1£ phase 8ac("3tea lillJi:iEP all flt;'P,~,
( 8-"lfl"2r OR any SP3 h.;;s .abnorTA-al r:=tdkT1ion, AND r,a),TOW [3'2%1, .Il:I.W. feed f!G\\' may -be 's-topp8dfua-ff~cted Conlim.H? With Attachment 3 To COlnp'iete The PHl'mpt Action Verifications* While Performing This Procedure
. BOP will perform attachment 3 while the US and RO continue in 3-EOP-E-O. Attachment 3 actions included at the end of lesson uide.
28
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: _4_ Page -..1. of J1L Event
Description:
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto in.!tiate. Manual initiation of S1 and phase A is required. /"' i"\... Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 6 Check AFIN Pumps* AT lEAST TWO RUNNING RO 7 '~1;:H,)Wh;.Hy align valves to est.wli:sh p~oper ,AFVV aFi;l~,ment RO r; 'Verifol AF\N Hew grea-ter than 345 g.,Oln. C', IF ;:'PN 'ilow ie,s than 3 6 5 gpm, nfENrrk~nu"'Hy slart pumps AND _ali;gr_ valv's to 'Es-tabksh gr-e,a:~,an 345 gpm"low.
- 3) IF ;otai feedflovf/ kern *ali souroes greater than 345 glOm c;;m !:iQI be Established . I.!:llili. perform the foilo\virtg:
.3} Monitor Criiical Safety FunctiPf1s.
"sing :3-ECP-F-C. CRITICAL Si',FETY FUNCTION STATUS
"'"REES.
OJ Go to 3-EOP-FR-H. 1. SECONDAR\' HEAT SINi<. Step 1.
- 0" %1aintain fe*ed f,lo:w to SiG narrO'I'l range Ioevels betNeen 1{ 5%[32%1 and 50%.
Note: narrow range levels <32%(adverse conditions) Verifies AFW flow >345 m. 29
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Page.2. of ~ Event
Description:
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto iI1itiate. Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. /' '\ Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 9 Chec.:RCP :!ie*",! Cooting
- a. ene-ok al! RCP thermal barrier a"itlrms - a, OFF
,A,1!1, Rep THER\lAL B,t;.RR C:)OLlHG VV.ATER}-H FL-:;)\~I
,. ;',1(2, RSP Ti-IER\1AL BARR CO-:)llhG \l1/,L.TE.R Hi TE.MP 0, Go to *S:t:o 1*J C'1EC~k aE Rep SEaFf':li'm
,are h:s'S tt-:ar ~2*5 F
- d. -v'Edfy Si* RESET e .!.E. orsilE power '5.!:!.Q.l ava!labJ;;,~'
( ,;;h;:of>S!,~:s>~1 ca oacity 3 j"/' oni: oh~,i'g\rg p.lInp, JF ad d § ',';jJ:;,flphy is fW:l av.,iI~'e. ~ sh%B
,,",/-:i" // h:l'1es.'s~r:t.al ~ads, 't. \;
,,4 "" R-efe ~ to '~f T'"':'".4t HfvlEh T 2 fer b'DJ11{)~'len~
//'i <'bi i03d!.3itn £l ,,\.
l l \. Start ~ff"e ctyi'rg ir<g pump ?a~ !'"ninirq:.*H'f1 \ sp~~6 for s~$;rjFre'6'li:'b-r 1, Af
'>', "'~"""'" ';""~>;' '. l
~V~l<O-W 19. ~.ege.~Fe.~i
~geL HCV-3-t2f. !6"fl'1<3ht.a}'l'"J
,.~;oper seal il'jEDf;or, flow 9.,b transitions taste 10 IF tempB.ri!<~u:re is d~c:p:.~-="ng, THEN
*rfOinl he follmving --
_ESE, TkA.h 54?:;: AND ST,48LE IF h~) .2} Lh-*'!:it 1()tal feBc flow m 345 'JP-!"(l w;tl Rep RCNNit*;G -- namY~\' r 3!nge 1~'i<'E-; gre~1tef ~h.:,r 5%[32%; l!) at le~~st Of"JE S.'(3. 3;- IF <::o;:;:kJown ~$ due 1-':1 :i.C~5S.jvE StEa*"'\"dio~~. THEN dC'Sore: mal" stE-a"'l."'jfir"e i5~ ar-d byo.$ss
,*alves.
o I*F ~6mp-er.ature g:re-,a;ter :han 547 4 'F AND
- 'c.fe.asing, !!
- f1t! priorm the following:
Dump ste.an1 usmg SH3 st.eam dumr-:.< to a:rn!)sp"le-re valves. 30
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: ~ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. ' Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 11 Cl>eck PRZ PORVs, Spray Valves And Exc",ss Letdol'm Isolated A., " a !i'~RZ pfuS5dfE' !e-ss iJ"jan 2335 psrg'}'
'\,
/,/THEt:r!h"nuaFy 'OloS", PORVs 1E Jny**' .*
" P§:Z' POR\' can .!iQIoe ciose'd It!..5!i ~'"
j'/'/' ",nfJ;nu~~Ly <;~cse Its ~Iock vJt!\!.:. iF b;<ock ', f ; /.... valve can. NOT,OI!?Y,;csed, TH dfperform *
~/ ..f the ~ollowrnfl j/' "\
.***, ',.;f /'
'\.. \ **.**\~) Mcpr.br C~~~' Saf"ty ;:Ounoti!ms
'\ yslng 3;.EDP-F-C', CRITIC.4'_ SAFETY
'dFUr;~9~"ION STATUS TREES.
'~/.
',::!~", Go t"t3-E(}P-E-1, lOSS OF "I3~'~:7~~~R~; SECONDAR:Y Cl..h.. ~""f~r ",. er 1.
" b "
!E °RZ p~s;,Jr~\e.,?s lhan 2250 psig,
. *THEN !113nd:3F~' c,;Cse ,;ai.,es lF nh'd) carr 'NOT be -cbsed,lt!..5!i stopRep/51 nej:~S::;'Bf'l ~o s10p spray flow r%'1atJ;~~:ir<~yr::lD-se au)::ih*arf Spf~;.y v:';~*~je. If a>db3rf spray vll'l'.'t can!iQ! be closed, l.t!.lli close Crarghg Flow' tD R'.'tgen '-i;;.at Exchanger, HCV-3*121
. /"iltf!: If'~X.F~'s!i letdown was placed in service earlier and not
\ \ secui"ed, it, will be secured here.
Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped a Go to ~2tep 13,
- b. Ch'.'tck RCSsAIi:<ccQling - LESS ThAN I), Go to Sl'.'tp13, 26'F[tl6'Fi
~. Hign-I-;;;ad 31 Pump - AT LEAS"" ONE RUNNING ~ FLO'N;"'A.TH '*/EI~j;;:IED
*:1 SiOP all Reps Note: All Reps secured
( 31
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _4_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto ig,!tiate. Manual initiation of S1 and phase A is r e q u i r e d . ' Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 13
,.:I,NY SG PRESSURE DECREASING
.Q.B.
,II,NY S(; C:OMPLETEL '{
o EPRESSUR IZEO o Perform :he following: i} 2. RO 14
,4,DS -8<3 C: ~ccndary tsdiatio-r,
,gs - HIGHER :"l.AN NORMAL
- .... c*cal ste?mhne :radi.at~.ct. . - H:iGHER THAN NORMAe..
-1) k'tcrdiot Crkic.al S~fety F""mc!;ol1~S usin9 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL S.l.,FETY FUNcrlON S.TATUS TREES
- 2 j Go to 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERIHOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1 Note: No faulted or ruptured S/Gs
( 32
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2- Event No.: _4_ Page ~ of .11L Event
Description:
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. \ Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 15 C l1e,ck If RG.S fs Intact
- a. Gcntaknnent r,ad~ation ~. N:)RMAL
- L! e 3083 Note: Based on containment conditions, thj~erew will monitor critical safety fu"ctiqns and transiito[l to~EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secqn~a.rY6oQ/ant, step f,,'*\,
'\",
US Directs response per 3-~QP\E-1
.- /J~"",._ -";.... - -
\'
'\
-\-tl?J"'rt;' - - - - - - - - - - - I
* ,.+/ ' , J / " ' v " e , \ \,? I
~J~I'/ .<l"*/* FOJd.,."Jr., pa,j:. is r.:erluired r;\i(,e .!'~~nitored tnrc1tlqhovt this proc~dJ.J(,;:
/ yf ~ ,<<" __ _ _ . /. . . . i __ * "';;:0, .... _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ **
'\, \\, ,/' ,,l,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, , \, ,>
.f
( 33
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:_4_ Page 2 of-.1L Event
Description:
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US FOLDOUT FOR PROCEDIJRE E*' 1 ADVERSE CONTAINMENT COND!HONS 1£ i?i1h'er of ~he cot)(FticrIS !is-~d b:<?10"~\'" CCCfJr5" ll:I.fl::L u.~e ad...'*!?r:;e CG'1t~lwH-.:~.:erd ,,;,:tmc-soh-erf' tem-,~..:tfa'tvre 2: '18{FF
.QB COrjt~):nM<?nt raC\31i:Df1 !~v<$.2 i .3:< 1O!':\ Rlhr
~ o::l1~tair(mem o<,,!'a:"1~re~e-.r'S dlDP below !h~ ,ElbJ~
1E. c(')ntair-nlerrr. ~fl:~gr,ate.j dose, rate ha's. f:.jC~ !?X,C"-:t?'
- 2. Rep TRW GRITERIA
- a. I,F an cr.mditions li-s,t.ed D-ekl'w- OOCilr, THEN tp0
- 1) H9h-h~"d 31 pumps- ,t., T LEASi"ONE R'UNN 2:~ ReS sl/bccokng - LES.S THA.N 2:5"F[65(>F]
- 3) Conironed. Res: ct)oidmvn-::5. NOT in p-mgf"E'SS C. !E. phase: S <..~ct!;;)ate-d.; TH~.~ ~~.i~ .aU' .lRCP-s
- 3. III TERMINATiON ('RIIER!JfP ">"
!.E. air c~:lr!clitjo*ns ksted be'b";;' COG a
i"'i')arHl*er .QB. ha-s l;>:Ol'llp!etely depressurlzE->j, Ati.Q. that FAULTED STEAM GENER; TOR ~SOL.A.TIG\~'~, ere-,aSES ,:fl a-n V1COn1rOn.ec :nann<?r ~ any SiG !"las abnornu! rad'iabon,.Il:;U;H rnenuJ:.lIy necessa~/ ~nd g>ts t,o 3-~E<)P-E-3, STEA~'1 GE~\".jERATOR TUSE RUPTURE, :Step 1
..t~J:SE-S :0 h?5S than \55. DOD ga{~cl""s,!!iS!:! ';10 to 3-EOP-E S-1. 3. TR.t.,f'*J;SFEH TO -C,GtD TIOn. Step 1.
RHR pu,~;;t:t_,_/'l'V,FAND ar;-:.p.s bewrne 'uraL:-:; OR abnor,,;,-ally iON ,;:I~-e-r r'6rcula1io~: has. tr~-en e-stahFshoed, EN tn3nsi~h)db 3:EOP.-ECA.1.'1 L-OSS OF EM"EFGEh{~Y C.ooLANT REC-IRCULAT-?Ot-t -Ste-p 1. LOSS OF 9FFS!TE POWER PH S1 ON OTHER UNII IF 8-1 -n.-3,:. beEn res>:::'t, AND either offsite- power Ls bst OR. C~!: Jct-ustes: en the ather und. THEN rest-ere-
~fE:guaf">:ls E---Zjl../p:rnert ~I;Hed co:nnguf.a~ion< Refer toT.np/::;Hr. .1ENT '-3 for e--swnt\at ba.d-*.- -
34
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _4_ Page ~ of --.1JL Event
Description:
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 1 Monitor Conditions To Determine> If RCPs Shou Id Be Stoppe>d
- 3. RCPs - ,,'.NY FUNNING o High-head 31 plwnps - .A T LEAS"'" ON E RUNNI"lG
- c. Res SU;Dcoci;ng - LESS T'"Lt;N BOP 2 suited AND that SiG has l been~~Bi~ '.Il:iEti, g.o c2,. FAULTED STEAM oJ. Mair1,!1;jr iCltt1~ feed l)l:)IN gre'.3tE?" t;:"iiH'1 341: gll"'-' ,mtil narr'O'N ran'Je 1'9,<e>1 gfe-2~t.;r ~h-ar, '5~6[32%} in at I*,. ~s-t
. c**ne SiG C Si):)p fe_~d f*ol/( to: 8:ny S/G Wi.trl :nam:~w range le'vsl 9p2-B1er than 5D'%, . .!E narr'C'~\'
rrange tevs 'in any SiG continql?s 10 increase \,'1 an unccntrolle>d msrne'L
~-90 to 3-EQ-pwE~3, STEA'\l GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.
- a. Dire>ct N uci",l;{ Ch"n1Jsky to t",ke periodic
-ac\lvi1Y sarnphes of an SiGs D. Direct Nudea, Ch'Bn1i!iky to che>ck DAM '1 t"f'!'io::niioT readir\g
':'. Direct Health Physics 10 take radi.aiion readings or rna~~n ste'amLines
- d. Seoo~-~dary' r-adiaiion - NOHAAA.L N'EAH dGo to 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GEhlEFA,TOR ROUTINE OPERATION VAUJE ""U8E RUPTURE. Step 1.
35
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:_4_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION If allY PRZ PORVopl?ns because of high P'RZ prBS'Sure dosed or i'Solated after pre6sure deecrea6es to leiS6 RO 5 Che,~k PRZ PORVs ~ 8'lo,"'~' Valves b P{)R\/s - Cl.OSED C. "lalve un!es's- ;'1 iJj"_?/S lCPi$(ll.2te:;;a,'l open POR\!. RO 6 BOP BOP
- b. R-e-s!-ore- f:nSkl.lme*n~ ak press};:.~re Jsing (J-ONOP-013, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR whde contimdng with ihis procedure.
Check diesel *~api3dt'i adeqUi31e ie:, run three t,harginq pumps. J.E adeqvate diesel cap;sei:y
's !:!Q! ,3vailaibl'e. !!!.5!:! shed ronessen,ti.:;J leads. Refer to ATTACHMENT 3 f'Or
,;:.Qrtlponem 1<"i.N lo-ad raiing.
- a. Charging pumps - AT lEASTCIN E a PE-no-'fm A:tta'-chfn,er,t 4 to esia:bFiEh RUNNiNG oflargmg o Ad}I.Jst speed cO'rJtrofiets as r~cessary' to establish desired charging flow to establish Sl Termhnabor ,oordiiions C. ,.!;d;lUS: Cr",Iii);ng F\'Ow' T.:> Reb-len He",!
E:<ch*arrger, HC\L3--t2 t, to l'1"!::slntsir'l pmper sE'al inject.on fiow 36
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_4_ Page R of ~ Event
Description:
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto i9~tiate. Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. " / /",Ji.
,j/
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Note: attachment 4 will be used to start char iii ATTACHMENT -4 fPage 1*:;f 1'1 /' ESTABLISH CHARGING F~£}'W f
- 1. Verify CC"'~Barriers Therm.al flow Alarms To All Rep /1>~>(;>8>~~;'~ow to RCPj.~'*1he'r1;:;aj
- O f F e , e < ; , i o n T ' . me folioi/,jft:Q' tGrf£f is I:.,t.
> "" ,<;~
,a. 'I;fe(yfy s A 1;1. RCP THERM.AL 8;!.RR COOLING WP,-:ER H FL01/\' RC?'.t~
- b. ')[ seal r'=il(j~ tenperatvre fur iEach F:CP a:t.Il '5 'ess tha~?35 F> Il::i!fl:i go to St!!? 2.
A 112, Rep THERMAL~AR~~;;;00:"ING '\ <, W':',-:ER He TEMP ' . . ~> lE seal'l'~um~F1perai:Jre is 2: 236 F,
'" THEN lo~.:y ;~taJe seal injec1ion 10 a:t.Il "%, aff~c1ed RCR,(s/! b~E slarJng .~haf9if1g
*""l.hi.i11PS - ..:
A i;3, W.A -ER LO '=L:)'"" 7971!. f;;;}</~CP A
>*';'*'* ...*3_t';. ".",< "
(
- o. ~ seal injeC":ion is is'D31ecil0 eaCf'l afee:.< R:'::P, Il::l.Et:l.go to 21ep:1 Jf. offs:e PC,V£f is WI <lv.lilacJe .II:l.El:t ehec~ diesel C;l':>3City adequiite to ".!.;", one charging p'JnlO, If die5E coapacily is NOT a'o~:\f3,te, THEt(sI,;?o non-essential 'cads.
", Ref?? tc ,4,~T.':;,C:HMENT 3 fiDr component hVI'
""'\,
\o:N ratmg.
"\'\,
~rt O~.fh'Hging Pump PlacE' R{::S !I~;H;~up' CQntrol Switch in STOP
\,. "'\ "\\\..,
Ettahli5h D~iF4d Ch.1rging F!ow J St3rl acdi:b'hl" charging 1:4..1'1"1'5 f fl~,t:ded a. lE ofi~i~ power 10 NOT available, ~ and o:tsrt-e p:!fIer availabli: <:he.t:k dies-s.~ capao~y aOe=tp.Ja1e to run 31;J;j'itiork¥ 01';3(9in9 ;:tvmps.. Adjus.: Chargrg Flcw T,:, REgen '-lea! E;.,:hanger, HCV-3-121, t? Main\a, n proper sea injection Fe>.'1 d Veri~" c:nargY"l,g PUf1P ':;uc~ion aUD:> t'r',fers ~o R.WS-
- 6. Notify The Unit Supervis4)rThat The ESTABLISH CHARGING FLOW A'!lachment Is Gomp&ete 37
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page -.1l. of ~ Event
Description:
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 11 Check If SI Should Be Terminated a ReS s!Jbo:~<ng ba~5ed cn -core exH -Cs - 3. GREA,~~R Tl-LAJJ 3C'F'R~fer :0 FodC'J( F:,i;? lten*3 A.:j'ierse Value-1
~ Total 'feed now to- ~n1ac1 *:3/8s -
- 3RE!..-'t:F TH;'.N 34:5 GPM
- c. Res pre:sS!twe-section, transitions to ste 12.
38
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: _4_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 12 Che<::k IfCoota'inment Spray Should! B'i! Stopp~ J CCont<ljnrr~m spray !1YJmps - ANY RUNN1NG 3,:'. EC;:- Spray S.\/-3~2!?G6, 29D5 ( CAUTION Res Subcoofing' are reqajred ro be moniTored. If eir~r High-Cht'Ck If RHR Pumps Sh*ouJo:l8e Stowed
<I. ;::hetk R:CS pressure - GREATER THAN Ci. JE RHR Flow greater1han 1000 gprn.
250 PSIG :650 PSG] I.!:!$.! go 1D Step 15.
- c. \leidy Sl - RESET Note: RHR 39
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_4_ Page ~ of-.1L Event
Description:
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ROI 14 Check ReS And S{G PrE'ssures BOP ::h~c); pressure in a.) SfG5- - STABLE.QB. iNGR:t:,ii.oSiNG GheckRCS pressure - STABLE 2B DECREA,SING BOP 15 Check If Diesel Generators Should Be Slopped
- a. Check 71!!' A and 8 41<V buses -
ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE Pt:l'iV'ER 2<, .IE neither ,~ornputH room *ell iller;
~Cinnmg .. .I!:!..§! perform tllefcllo\Yllg
;;) Check dies,;:", .c;;pac,ty adei;jlJale i.o n.m on" train of *chiII ed water for conpubef room !.E ;;dequate o'e.el (:"'{I.:;;dly is NOT av",il3dne.
THIENi sh",d non*~",ial loads.
~to ,t.,TT.I\'CHMENT 3 for
'ocrpcnent V:W bad [ahng, hi Stan one tr,:;;n of chilled water.
loaded dies Qene'f,110r and by usiln@ 3/4:0P -023, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERA TOR: Directs U4 RO to start chilled water 40
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: ~ Page ~ of JJL Event
Description:
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 16 Verify Coid Leg Recinrulatron Capabffiit.y if" Verify at ~ast one RHR p:ump - AVAiLP.BlE FOR RECiRCULATION b.. Locally urkdl: arn:l ciose 1he iollowing
~s
.3OI'JJ5 for MOV-3-ee4B
- 30015 for MOV-3-750
" 300 1i3for MOV-3-8e2S
- 30021 for MOV-3-st~S
- 300213 for MO\l-3-Be*:lB
- c. LQ.:aily i.ldJX:k. and I:wwilers BOP 41
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.:_4_ Page~of ~ Event
Description:
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US 18 initiate Evaluation Of PI.Iin! Status
.3, Check aUXiarj building radiaten - a.
NORM.!.,L
"', Check plant ve11i prooeS5 raQ;,,;don 1)crtilcr R-' 4
.;: :'::heck au:c.3ijl building area r;;k:;
'11.xdcrs
. a si-gnificant 10'5-5 of 1'1'. outside o::n,iainI1'"Em,
(;;) 3-EOP-ECA-1.2. LOCA
- 4) CONTAINMENT, Step 1.
b has bee" align;:d CCiNTt..INMENT
,ACCIDENT MONC;-ORiNG
- 2) Direct Chel1'"istry to obtain grab samples',>~aH~'
d, Mlanua!l~' align compon;:nts to en~'Jre availability of EfTl8;i;\en'~lX<re 00011119 corrtpO'nei"'l;1sh sysler-, t~~"t)er~~<~y cCilt.atrrnent co'oiers Ernerg'e'"!<:Y ccn:,a~nM:ent 'filters. 42
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ EventNo.:~ Page~of~ Event
Description:
The ReS leak increases requiring safety injection that fails to auto initiate. Manual initiation of SI and phase A is required. / " Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 19 Ch~ck If Res Cooldow& And l)epr~ss.urizatkm 15 Required
,J ReS pr'Ss*t}tc~ - GF:E.A,TER -H.~,\l 2£0 a. Perfu;yf!;,,-e f9a6w,",,?
Greco "?,GI 1/~ F,.HR"i~urp fir,,,, gre31,o:r :han
"?
,,~ / If£l1J gpm. ~go 10 3:ep 20, "y" ,/' ;(i HHR pun-p j\q.\{I~~ :h;r Of eClJal
~ to iJDC gpm.~go:i>
'" 3-EOF'-E'sc1.2"T LOCA
"'COOL b, :3D lC 2,<E:J "'-=3-1.2. H:JST tOCA
- OOLDOW~~ AND DEPRESSIJI'(IZII,00N.
'~'/"
US Transitions to 3-EOP-~'S~~:'2",RQ~tLOCA CoolddW,n~R.d Depressurization, step \ \, '. '. '" / f
\
\
( ,
.4,{/,j: ,,/,'1' .,;~i.,.:::":.,<;,.,.,.,,,,\"\ \\, \.,'
Inform tfle,fcrew you pave th~ stJift, remain in place.
, / > " \
, ,j/ \'
y ,- \
,<i.~."
( 43
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: i Event No.: 4att.3 Page1_of_1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavio BOP Step 1 Check The Load Centers Associated With The Energized 4 KV Buses - ENERGIZED
- 3A LC
- 312 LC
- 3C LC
- 3D LC
- 3H LC BOP
(
- b. Go to Step 3.
- Hi- containment pressure 20 PSIG Verify main steam isolation c. Push manual Steamline and bypass valves - CLOSED Isolation push buttons on VPB OR manually close valves.
44
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 2_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step
- 3. Verify Feedwater Isolation Place main feedwater pump
- a. switches in STOP /{"
tr~" Feedwater control valves-by '/Manually*.e1os,e valves.
- b. CLOSED "'>" .}' ,4,f}
,(~'
'\ ,*
"~~"> #' ;;.""
Feedwater bypass valves-
'e.... 'M&lrluaJly close valves.
- c. CLOSED '"~,
Close feedwatet:.AsQLEltion*
. "" d. LO<<ally.c.*I.ose valves.
- d. MOVs . .' ' ' ' ,
.**. "~ *..~...... IF st~n<;!b;*f~edwater is Verify standby fe'edw,pter"afigIled thJ::fnit 3, THEN
- e. pumps - OFF /***~....~topst~ndby feedwater
(
- e. pump'(s).
""\
BOP StE?P/' \ ....;. f/4.)!~rifY Proper lew syste~.O~~ration 4" I ' \ \ a\. Verify,/fCw:.purnps,-::.AT '\ /' a. Start ICW pump(s) to
\ '" L~Sr, TWO RUNNI]'\J(9,' establish at least two
/S' running.
'<:\ "\:>c Manually close valve(s). IF
' \."'%-. \<. valve(s) can NOT be Verify I~W to TPCW Heat closed, THEN locally close b.
Excflang~f - ISOLATED the following valves:
- POV-3-4882 - CLOSED 3-50-319 for POV 4882 3-50-339 for POV POV-3-4883 - CLOSED
- 4883 IF both ICW headers are Check ICW headers - TIED intact, THEN direct
- c. c.
TOGETHER operator to tie headers to ether. 45
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 3_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step
- 5. Verify Proper CCW System Operation
- a. CCW Heat Exchangers - PerforI)l1~'ci7following:
THREE IN SERVICE a. /#/"'#,///',J
;1 staft or stop CCW pumps as s/' filscessary t blish ONLY
.~'/ C>I::JE RUt)j, CCW PUMP.
'2)N~hf¥/l~ rgency .
C~tainment Coolers - ONLY TWC\R NING
- b. CCW pumps -
RUNNING
,'- .+~'.
~'4/c.f.C;W"ti'eCl. d. e~ - TIED IF both CCW headers are intact,
..;.p:
F,I :;POGETHI1R po/' 1' THEN direct a field operator to
.;fe";>
/"'/ _oi .,j/
., tie the headers together.
\, '~;, RCP TJi~ rni'~r'Barri IF containment isolation phase B
\'\..\ccvxlOu,tlet'*MOV-3-62 NOT actuated AND CCW
.::>*6P£?N ' ."""' ' ',. ",".,
4' radiation levels are normal, AND RCP number one seal leak-off
\, \,., temperature is less than 235°F, THEN manually open MOV 626. IF MOV-3-626 can NOT be manually opened, THEN direct operator to open MOV-3-626 locall .
Containment Cooling Manually start or stop
- a. Check emergency containment a. emergency containment coolers - ONLY TWO RUNNING coolers to establish - ONLY TWO RUNNING.
- b. Verify emergency containment
( filter fans - AT LEAST TWO b. Manually start emergency RUNNING containment filter fans. 46
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 4_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step
- 7. Verify 81 Pump Operation At least two high head pumps
- a. .
running
- b. Both RHR pumps running Step BOP
- 8. Verify SI Flow
- a. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1600 PSIG[2000 P
- b. High-head SI pum indicator - CHEC,Ar.rI. ....,".
FLOW ( BOP
- a. Perform the following:
- 1) Operate Unit 3 and Unit 4 high-head SI pumps to establish injection to Unit 3 from two high-head SI pumps.
- 2) Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to align Unit 4 high-head SI pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using ATTACHMENT 1 of this procedure.
- 3) Go to Step 10.
47
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:2. Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 5_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step
- 10. Verify Containment Perform the follo+,V!(in
,/' '\,
Isolation Phase A Valve
- a. Manually gctugie Containment White Lights On VPB -
Iso Iati (~yV'P ~,Fi*§'e A. ALL BRIGHT
,'l~tI/'" ./f/"{'
- b. 1~,fanyZontainme ation Phase Av~lv~.t~ NOTI ' THEN mariti~IIY'cJp~V9J e. IF valve(s) can NOT bs\ma'f\ugJIY closed, THEN manuallY'QE 10" IIy isolate affected containmenl.*.p tration.
BOP Step
-\
- 11. Veri!~SJ\/alve Am bet:. I ,/lK.1~~'L:rau¥:;j:i~n valves to qrlVPB':)~l,"~ B RIG H, . establish"proper SI alignment
{I for an injection flowpath. BOP Reset SI Reset Phase A
\,
Nq'te:"/30P _,~ f is required to go back to the contairment isolation
.l' /racks and rest the six phase A lockout relays, (three lockout
/ relays on each rack) 48
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4 att. 3 Page 6_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step
- 14. Reestablish RCP Cooling
- a. Check RCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING MOV-3-1417 MOV-3-14~8",,,,
,/ <:~"",
", '\"
\.. %:~. "~'i:. ~"'1;\ ,~~.
Reset and start ;\;oJ1Iial~onf~~rtl:nent '\, c.\\Stop all RCPs
- c. coolers " "\, 0' BOP Step '".'
( '''':'''
- 15. Morlit6r Cont<8inment pr,ess.tlre J"
'\ .'. ,::(7' h~'~"
TJo'Ve,rifyG,ont'ainment Spray ,NOT
/*ReJ:rtlired "j ., \
;/ / " i. "
,,/ a. ontainment/pr~ssure - HAS, \
EMAIN5D LE!8S,,:J:IdAN 20'PStG a. Perform the following: t<<' .;.:., .... 0-. ~~"','** "" \. >
' .'\{}' I?'R-3f63'06A",
~
i 1) IF containment spray NOT initiated, THEN AND manually initiate
;\PR'~3,"6306B containment spray.
~. '"'
- 2) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B-ACTUATED.
- 3) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B valve white lights on VPB - ALL BRIGHT.
- 4) IF any Containment Isolation Phase B valve did NOT close, THEN manually or locally isolate affected containment penetration.
- 5) Stop all RCPs.
49
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2- Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 7_ of .1.L Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Step
- 16. Verify Containment and Control Room Ventilati Unit 3 containment purge
- a. exhaust and supply fans -
OFF Verify Control Room ventilation status panel -
- b. PROPER EMERGENCY RECIRCULATIO ALIGNMENT
- -- -- -- -t-'"~
I I Hydrogen Monitors should be lid SI signal. They should I I ~e avail~ble in a timely manner d to hydrogen generation I In contat~1nt~' I I BOP ill call NSO to ali n PAfM. 3-0P-094 ste s listed be/ow. 50
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 8_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior I~------------------ -NOTE Hydrogen hfom'tcrs S!oukI. be in .5eJ'l.'ice within 30 min
'--=--,._--------=.
7.1.1 initial Concll bort';
- 1. .4..11 applicable pm-.equisites 7.1.2 Prcc:eIDiQJi! ~_
. - - - - - - --, - NOTES--
Sa~le SY.'rtelU to FAHM Headel' holarioo. Valve 2A{i6MUZ) PACV Vl!ut and SaqJ.e System to FARM Header Isoliltlon. V;;h1! (RR), P.4HM-3-OO2B (5 turns) ock :\..'\'D open PACVS hoi VIv Penet 53, HV-3-3, in front of the Gmt 3
. em Spl7lY Pump Room. (..l\n A key is required for t.hi; lockJ clock .-\,;'\11) op.U PAC'I/'S Isol \1" Peuet 16. HV-3-1, WC<rtM in. the OOlih Au:" Btd.gEillway.. (An A key is req~ fort.his iock-1 51
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:..2-.- Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 9_ of _1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
-I. M'J.ues: the Re"cter Opera:or periorm dle fc,llowiug
- a. ";/e:r:ifr the .f6]J01:llU:,Z ftlll:ti,ou ;.ebectol A..'1..'l]j'z.er hue!: are i.:; me S...IJ;.1PLE C) QR?:
(.~) QR £1
- b. Phce the ;:'Oun'e:. switch:"
c,
.J'
- d. Depm;:; tbe A.L:L'l\I re;et bt~o.-r:.. f/
'\.,.,~<:, ~- j
'5 .i'-!,the ~.e~ onuiflB cl:te. Unit 3 BA EY,!,p R:<;{O!ll, re~5'\:e peo!~ cap .'L,\'1) .dose
'}d'rr ,;Ii ;;."t'" _,Tn.u:ter Pump D1::d1..,rge to '\Rae: 'i" aste ---rfW;di::l~.
MPAS*t)O 1 ,)."'f tl1mj.* ~ "\,
, ,. '. \',%.. o,~.:'~:""'%' . .."
."\.r the. ',\}ot" pyap9tatol ;: e'l!4J:':ltl:!\l~ R~on;".~ ttre R..'lci'W,l:r.e qldg. CJoY.~ Am:
Bldg KHT 1:,,:,'\to F',\;c*,;*,,-.,te B'~~*. ,.* TI.:, 1/j'l,........ "'." r- .. - - - - - ... - - "!'"" ""'. "!'"" - , - -;J-'-w~- .. 7 - - - I I"""""~ \ N~T:.,,/// ."",,,,,.-.~/. I f'=:l\\.>#;:~;q 'jlah1?z<~~~to~a!Bd on the< *.~,tJK-,i'f Bw$din'iJ roof near !'he ___ .~ _1: __________ i Th.e Un"t*3 conta;nmellt L::\r':',,_"*:'::'_~
,/ ~ L ) , '" ' \. \
/f' ,/.//' 6. P!?t1'Zlnlf:1~~ f;:,1l01J::Ug: \ '\
<"" <,.\ .} ,//f:\;~~~lr;J~e~~~l'e:l:l~}\~>'l'" from W:n Pp Ba~k. :VlPAS*}-!JC-I
",' /bcr~~e'hcL~JY Z..iPA~ to F'.u-ge Air ?-.m, MJ'AS*3*(;{!5.
"\
DilteTi:n:e Completed:
\"" ~ \.,. "'"
\. 18\.Verify'~" P~.~r EDGs- EMERGENCY START any
\8UN~NING 0 \'<' /J"" available EDG NOT runnin 52
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4 att.3 Page 10_ of ~ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step BOP
- 19. Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses an
'\,
Check the 3A, 3B and
- a. 3D 4 KV buses - ALL a.
ENERGIZED
- 3) IF the Unit Supervisor decides to energize 3A, 3B, or 3D bus, THEN perform the following:
a) IF 3A 4 KV bus de-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-0NOP-004.2, LOSS OF 3A 4KV BUS. b) IF 3B 4 KV bus de-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.3, LOSS OF 3B 4KV BUS. c) IF 3D 4 KV bus de-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.5, LOSS OF 3D 4KV BUS. 53
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 4att.3 Page11_of_1_1_ Event
Description:
3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Step BOP
- 20. Notify The Unit Supervisor That The PROMPt. f},CTION\"'\,
VERIFICATIONS Attachment Is CompleteAQd'Note AnyAations'" That Had To Be Taken §+ //" ~, -' ~\>. Note: BOP informs US of completiOt;r6fCJti~chment 3.
..,y,.' c Note: BOP should receive a turnf.J~el';l:~m the /!,J a'nd continue in the EOP network. ~\,'",CY/
V", "'>,. ( ( 54
NRC XXIV- NRC - SEN- 5 OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO: Field Supv.: Outside SNPO: Admin RCO: ANPO: Unit 3 Unit Supv.: Unit Supv.: RCO: RCO:
--------~------------~
NPO: Plant Status Unit 3 f;lnit 4 Mode: Power: 100 100 MWe: 760 758 Gross Leakrate: .03 Gross'", .03 Leakrate:",\ RCS Boron Cone: 670 2,00
)
")perational Concerns: JC charging pump - OOS due to area. Focus Area: Maintain 100%
I Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator Mode: .1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 100 Gross: .03 A 6615 /!/\, MWe: 760 Unidentified .01 B 664;;" /,3 Tavg: 574.2 Charging Pps: .02 C 96'27 L"( RCS Pressure: 2250 ..p./.f,F:: <,.\ t--R_C_S_B_o_ro_n_c_o_n_c_:_ _6_7_0_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~""':-",/./"f"\,., **\ ** , """"\', Abnormal Annunciators: ",/,,', .""t, ~\"." Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Comp Actions: Annu_nciato_r: t--- ~----_\~~\\~"'~,\',>"".f>f')'\' \ \.,:::r""""",,,,"",.,.,// Annunciator: Comp Actions:L~'=::'~ tl'lvf ,/ \.,\., Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: f"/' t---Com_pActio_ns:+---'\~""'\\\'\'\\~'\\ .'\ . """"""" ....... ,',.,"'" . ,)',* )) Ann un ciator : ,.,.,. . .,,,'/ Comp Actions: T.S.A.S Reason: / Cd~pon"eQt:
\,'\, / . . ,. /,l Entry Date:'\.
TS.A.S / Component\\ Reason: ' I> ~> I Entry Date: 1\" T.S.A.S / Component: W Reason: Entry Date: TS.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date: TS.A.S / Component: Reason: Entry Date:
Unit 3 Status ment: u erator Work Around Status:
Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-O-1 Facility: Turkey Point Scenario No.: 6 Op Test No.: 2009-301 MOD Examiners: Candidates: US
----------------------- RO
----------------------- BOP Initial Conditions: Mode 2,4% power, MOL. Turbine rolling at 1800 RPM ready to sync generato 0 load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 30% f a flu Turnover: Equipment OOS: None significant Place unit on line and increase power per 3-GOP-301 beginning Event Event Type*
No. (N) ALL 1a TFFXOILB =T (TS) SRO 2 VKD001X = 1.0/ (C) SRO/BOP 2 min ramp TFK3B11S = T 3 TFF1M86H = T 4 TFS1MREH =T TFSW13A=T 5 ain generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially blocked resulting in a igh air temperature condition. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for ann ciator E-9/4. The crew manually trips the reactor when exciter hot gas p ture exceeds 90°C and performs the actions of 3-EOP-E-0. Once the re t ripped, the switchyard relays out. 3B EDG starts but fails to auto cally load 3B 4kv bus due to a bus stripping failure. 3A EDG fails to start and can not be manually started. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply both units. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B TPCWP breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and can not be opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to reenergize 3B &3D 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak. K30P11BR = F 6a The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 since PZR level < 17[50]% or SI actuated due to the effects of the steam leak. (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description ( Turkey Point 2009-301 Scenario #6 Event 1 - Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2 Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 30% for a flux map. Event 1a - Once feed regulating valves are placed in automatic, an NSO calls i AFWP governor has an oil leak. Event 2 - 3A (running) TPCWP bearing failure. Failure of 38 (standby) C 0 omatically start following trip of running pump. The crew responds per 3-0NOP- 08 nd ma ual starts the 38 TPCWP. Event 5 - Main generator exciter air cooler temperature condition. The crew responds manually trips the reactor when exciter hot g s t m actions of 3-EOP-E-0. On ~e r ctor is trip e , fails to automatically 10 bus ue to a u can not be manually 2
TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description ( Scenario XXIV NRC 6 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup Restore IC-20 (4% MOL, Ready to sync generator to grid) Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps: SETUP - 3B TPCWP AUTO START FAIL (actuates TFK3B11S = SETUP - 3A EDG START FAIL (actuates TFQ5GAFS = T) SETUP - 3B 4KV BUS STRIPPING FAIL (actuates TFQ6X~ f SETUP - B AFWP GOV OIL LEAK (actuates TFFXOILB l,,;f) SETUP - MOV-3-1405 FAILS TO OPEN (actuatesTJ;1=XM 5=T) Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled ~. '", 9,'
~\
Acknowledge any alarms and place sill)u,Jetor in freeze.\\\,
/" "<<<<:'-""'/8': :";" '" ~'~'\
Provide shift turnover checklists & co~¥ d:'S"':Q0}3,"3Q,~,com~'~ p to step 5.52.2 The crew is to place the unit on line and inck~a~e paw,~r to'So.?{o for ~>map.
\~:, \:-. ':::;> ---""'+""",..,.,-,-- '
Select 3A QSPDS to page?11 (SAT) an~\3~g~P'9sfiO'f%~Jl~"~12 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA and at the RCOf~sK1o",the Utilities
.J'!" ,\-", '-:t sGree;rfA ",(,-'"
W"''''''' \ ,,/' Fill in blender & shy n boro'n aqdition plapal,{!s at console blender station. Data for each IC may be}6u/ in the EO:C Shutdow{l a,uidelines Book in the simulator IIF.
<' <""i* F
'\
This scenario r~qilit:.es th~'us~", o. a s rrQ9il'fJfOperator for SGWLC. He will turn
\,
over and leave wlJ~enep(f~,4are Tn"autQ!!!~,!ii~
.f'
- j!~~\
"~~
3
TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description Event 1/1a - Place unit on line I B AFWP out of service Initiated by crew based on shift turnover. The crew performs 3-GOP-301 beginning at step 5.52.2 to synchronize generator to grid, increase power and swap s/g level control to main feed reg valves cont 'ng in
. automatic. Note that a surrogate operator will be required to maintain SG Respond if asked as SM that auto synchronization is to be used for generator on line. (Step 5.54 is n/a)
Respond as System if notified of placing Unit 3 on the grid (135 MWe). If asked aboutVARS, request 100 MVAR 0 at Respond as Chemistry when notified to sample for Respond as NSO when notified to commence purgl ~ Respond as NSO if directed to complet 3-0P-072 secti service. After 7-10 min. report compl Respond as NSO if directed to perform per 3-0P-072.1. ( Once feed regulati laced i a tomatic, call in as a turbine bldg. NSO and report that t nor has n illeak (oil leak entered at setup). lrected to perform local actions to initiate MSR tube bundle purge Respond as SO if directed to check Bently-Nevada for turbine vibration alarm. Reset expected turbine eccentricity alarm. Click on Schema~ TURBINES~ TURBOVISORY
~LOA~ TCUFRST - TURBINE BENTLY-NEVADA ALARM RESET ~ TRUE then INSERT.
4
TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description Respond as SM if asked about transferring main turbine load from the governor to the load limit. Direct crew to wait until after power reaches 30% power before doing this. Respond as NSO if directed to check PSS voltmeter inside the voltage regulator cabinet. Report back that meter reads zero volts. Respond if asked as Chemistry to verify SGs are within 0-NCOP-002 .lj I ~f' s chemistry request power be held at or below 30% until SG chemistl)lfveriff d within limits. As Reactor Engineering, request power be held at 30% untjJ/ffbJ.x ap comp
,fl")
/ .rP' Respond as SM/FS if asked to verify 3-0SP-089 step/7i~1.,~/'Completed during tur startup. Report that this surveillance requirement rT)et sjttlsfactorily
.4l """ .c""
'~'\", '*"%<<
Respond as FS/NSO if asked about status of hydrog .~n'\ges ~. eport that it is in service. \\,. '\,./' /
.,\.<, j}
* . I'>,.. . \\ "'\,.
Respond as FS/NSO if asked to begitfl'plaC1\:lQ MSRs in se""<ice'
\. ~- '::'<~">>::~~~l:~ V<,
Power should be stabilized at 30%, T~i~f]:l;\ 554':"§,,;:f'&rur/Jin 7"225 MWe.
'\ \ '
5
TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description ( Event 2 - 3A TPCWP bearing failure Once steam dumps have been realigned for normal at power operation (or as directed by lead examiner), trigger lesson step EVENT 2 - 3A TPCWP BEARING FAILURE (actuates TVKD001X = 1.0 on 2 min ramp). Annunciators 1-5/1, 5/2 & 5/4 all alarm when 3A TPCWP trips. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-008. The BOP will need to start 38 TPCWP manually since the aljt6 sian function was failed at startup. ,F //
. ;/w <
'\
Respond as NSO if directed to locally check 3A TPCWP. Report)~*ac~*~t the inboard motor bearing is smoking and very hot. If directed to do post-staCtctlecks CQ 3B, TPCWP, report back that the pump is running normally. ../4/*"\~/ "\ ""'\0 y
/", ,ii/ * "
Respond as NSO when directed to locally check TPC)A{sWPly temp (TI-3-1432)\\, "\""
<110°F and stable/decreasing. Click on Schema~.00~rOI0N SER)J"lCES~ TURBIN'!::)
PLANT COOLlNG~ TPCW HEAT EXCHANGER5.t~1:~port T~e(v\{lupply header " temperature at top of page. '-",f
.,~,\~, ,j'f';;:'
'., ,'/
Respond as NSO when directed to loc~U.Kyerify TPCW iJa~k~to~trainer ~p. From TPCW HEAT EXCHANGERS system mimicpa~~,clic~on FROM*lGW*\I?UMPS.~report ~p's on basket strainers downstream of POW-~B82 &'4883,. \,
* .~, '\ "'j. -''<~ ,~.,v.. ~~
Respond as NSO when directed to check ternper~tu~~'QIGorhf3qnents cooled by TPCW. ( After 8-10 min., report all Jemp,~ratures sf~bl~./# / ? % " , < . / / "
/" "\"\~ \ Vi ..f f
,(;'- :.::':~:~;' '\-:. \ .. :~/
When requested ~,$"OpC, aft~r 8-;10 min r~c~ out breaker 3AA 11 by triggering lesson step E~.~"':.P'~ RACK OUT BKR 3A~ 1 ~\~actuates TAK3A11 P = RACKOUT (3)).
\.. f' 6
TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description ( Event 3 - FT 487 fails high Trigger lesson step EVENT 3 - FT-3-487 FAILS HIGH (actuatesTF1M87H = T). This causes FT-3-487 to fail high which causes FCV-3-488 to fail closed. To avoid automatic reactor trip on 38 slg low level, the operator must take manual control of FCV-3-488 and restore feed flow and return slg level back to program. The .~ responds per 3-0NOP-049. 1 and takes FT-3-487 out of service. 38 slg Ie ."ntrol is returned to automatic using FT-3-486 for contro/. Respond as WCC if directed to initiate a PWO and contact I&C. directed to generate an ECO for the bistables tripped per 3-0N 4~,_ 4" -',. Respond as FS/NSO if directed to reset the AMSAC TRQt:JSJeE'alarm (0-7/6) ~\Jh AMSAC panel in the Cable Spreading Room. After 2-4*/nliQ<,;l"'trigger lesson step ~ 3 - RESET AMSAC TROUBLE (actuates TCL4RST = T): . .r{eg.drt when c plete.
,J'
/\.
' \.0.,
-\\.
7
TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description Event 4 - PT-3-1608 fails high I CV-3-1608 fails open After FT-3-487 bistables tripped & 38 SG level control returned to automatic, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 - PT-3-1608 FAILS HIGH I CV-3-1608 FAILS OPEN (actuates TFS1 MREH = T & TFSW49D=0.1 then TFSW13A = T 5 sec later). CV-3-1608 fails open and increases steam flow. Without operator action, p6wfjJf will eventually stabilize at 34-35%. Consistent with O-ADM-200 sect. 5.4.3 f(iJf aB~condary plant transient, manual turbine load is reduced to return reactor pO~f)f to J'P%. pI ,A' \-<~, If crew is slow to take action, call as reactor engineering and asl{~p{ pow~r is, so far over the 30% hold which was supposed to be in progress. /r",'\,// '\.
},>:>0"/' j./T" \~\ '\'"
Respond as NSO if directed to close the air isolation ~e)lhd bleed air off the 'b~<3\~\." 1608 operator. This will have no effect. Report steaJ:F(cqA1inues to ~pme out of the ,,,;.,. silencer with the greatest noise/vibration on CV-3(160(. .' /' ) ' "
'" ""'% tJ (>"
'<\,.. \,~" .,// <1'-/{'
Once power is stabilized at 30%, CV-3-1608 can be.~!o~rYJg6Iated. When directed as NSO, wait 2-4 min then trigger lesson step EVENT'4 - LOCALLY ISOLATE CV .>>'-;; . ><:'"" \., 1608 (actuates TASBV003 = 0.0 on 1 min ramp)."'VVhe.Q,.S2omplete, rep<
'\ 'i.......... .. . . "'. '\. J/"
'\ /;/ "'\.""" ""1-
\ ~ ~
( ,/' J~'/ ( 8
TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description Event 5 - Exciter air cooler TPCW blockage I Reactor trip After FT-3-487 failure crew brief, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 - EXCITER AIR COOLER TPCW BLOCKAGE (actuates TVUJINF = 0.98, TVUJINFB = 0.98, TVUJINFC = 0.98 & TVUJINFD = 0.98 all on 1 min ramp). This will cause exciter air temperature to increase. The crew responds per 3,;A~P-097.CR for annunciator E-9/4. When exciter hot gas temperature reache9'*~O.':fl, the crew manually trips the reactor and 3-EOP-E-O immediate actions ar~.lfff7rfplfned. 9
TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description Events 6 - Loss of all AC power After the immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O are completed, trigger lesson steps EVENT 6 - 3A811 STUCK CLOSED (actuates TFK3B11S = T) , then EVENT 6 - LOSS OF SWITCHYARD (actuates TFP8SWYD =T, K30P11 BG =F, K30P11 BR =F, TCE2Eon =T & TCE2E07T =T). f\,
~ '\.
This causes a loss of AC power from the startup transformer. 38 EOG stqris pdt fails to automatically load 38 4kv bus due to a bus stripping failure. 3A EOG f,?:lfs t()*~tart and can not be manually started. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.0:'" MOV-3-1405 failure to open (entered at setup) with 8 AFWP OO,Sf(frotTf"ftven{ 1) requires C AFWP to supply both units. .~" ", ,/ '. ""\
" ,~
./'% .,'
Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of}I!3' 7}?6Wp breaker 3AVi311'\. which has a blown breaker trip circuit control power fl{se gAd can not be opened );.'Qm', VPA. Prior to closure of the S80 tie from unit 4, 3AB(11)Slocally ope.ned allowing j'P3., } EOG to reenergize 38 & 3D 4kV bus. Transition i~,maf.le to 3-EoP-ECA-O. 1or 3-EOP~" ECA-O.2 depending on plant conditions at that time.""" J J /.,
"\'<2 ':'<<>" :I
'~'" . J' Respond as NSO if directed to locally trip 3B1 & 3B2 CWp br~akers 3AB16 & 3AB18.
Trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - TRIP3AB1.Q, AND 3A818"(~ct~~tl(S TCK4CC = F then TCK 4DC
= F 1 min later). Report when complete., \",,,""'~',,,,,\\ \,
'\ .\\.,. . ' ' ' "'"", "'" """",,,., " . ,\,., \'> .
If called as NSO to investigate breaker 31\8;11, reR$Jrttrafthe.breat<er is closed, the blue & white lights are on while the red 8:\green Ji§h~s"ar~{)ff (io<1icative of a blown trip circuit fuse - reference 131Kf'I::WQ 5613-E~~7 's~e,~ 1B). "'*."f
" "-";-,. ':; /'
-/ ...* ;<) _J+....;i*""":<<:--<<.u,\, '\ '\ 'i" ':
Respond as NSO Wa§ked to loqall~ reset 3!\.. EG>G start failure relay by pressing alarm reset pushbuttqr1:' f3,eport back,tha/the 3A EDG twbocharger suffered catastrophic failure with cOr1sid~rable damage.toEblG,exhc\us,F piping.
"" "~. . ",,,,,t' ...."..,,<< **.. , ..... . """ "".,,;;,f Respon9asNsoir'vsk){dt(lcheCk~hicf1'tln'ffCcw is supplying U4 HHSIPs. Report that,kl4C'CVV~is,.?uppl)£jng'l.J4 HHSIPs.
/ 'i/" ,,/f' "'"" "\'" '. '\ '\."\,,\.
/Refopond as NSQ,if a,;:;ked'tQ loe~IIy open MOV-3-843A or B. After 2-4 min., trigger
<' ~:ither lesson step\FV~NT 6\.,.,t(JCALLY OPEN MOV -843A (actuates TFMVV01 0 = T) or
"" EVENT 6 - LOCAL~Y OPEN MOV-8438 (actuates TFMW020 = T). Report when complete .
.,~ '" t
\,
R~!?p6n9 as NSO if!as,~ed to locally isolate RCP seals by closing 3-297AlBIC, MOV 381'&"M'o.~-3-6~~ 1ilgger lesson step EVENT 6 - LOCALLY ISOLATE RCP SEALS (actuates ;,cAHN~7fr'~ 0 ..9~ TAHN97B =0.0 after 1 min delay, TAHN97C =0.0 after 2 min delay, TFBVC60 =T after 3 min delay &'1FK\162f}C = T after 4 min delay). Report when complete.
'\. ,,'
\'
Respond as NSO if directed to open AFSS-3-007 to restore train 2 steam flow to C AFWP. After 1-3 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - OPEN AFSS-3-007 (actuates TAFF07
= 1.0 on 30 sec ramp). Report when complete.
( 10
TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description Respond as NSO if directed to deenergize and close MOV-3-1405. After 1-3 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - DEENERGIZE MOV-1405 (actuates TCF5MA27 =F). Respond as NSO if asked about status of steam from the 3C SG AOV CV-3-160B. Report that steam is still coming out of the silencer on the unit 3 main steam tform. Respond as U4 RO when status of U4 4kV buses is requested. Report at A & 4B 4kV buses are both on their respective EOGs and 40 4kV bus is ali ed t 4B 4kV bus. Respond as U4 RO when requested to place 4B 4kV bus non-r T-L or OFF. Trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - 48 4KV ESF L =T, TCE2E20T =T & TCE2E27T =T). If 4B HHSIP is not running ri er lesson step - 48 HHSIP PTL (actuates TFM2D4BS =T & V80H30 =T). Afte -3 in., report complete. Respond as U4 RO when requested to close 4A CLOSE 4AD07 (actuates TCE2E33C = T). Respond as U4 RO when asked about B EOG loading. lic POWER & SYNC~EMERGENCY 01 SEC report MW reading under breaker 4A 1. After 3A 4kV bus energized from the SB e s~2 35 of 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 call as NSO and tell cr w~ hat 3AB11 's o ne ~~. Trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - LOCALLY EN 3 Respond as U4 11
TP-2009-301 Scenario #6 Event Description ( Event 6a - Loss of all AC power recovery This event entered when 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 completed. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA 0.2 since 51 is required (based on PZR level <17%) due to the leak on 3C 5G ADV CV-3-1608. Respond as NSO if directed to check if MOV-3-1426 & 1427 are closed. fo1'te(./1-3 min., report that these valves are closed. Note that it is not required to clos~. AtqV:3-6386 since MOV-3-381 is closed in the same l i n e . / ' / . . "\
./,.*/# . 4'/*****\**\\...\\
Respond as NSO when directed to place PAHMS in service on'~~iY~. Aft~*~\\~-~g. minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 - PLACE U3 PAHM jl~>SERVICE (~Ct\,/at~) ..\ TAC2V02A = 1.0, TAC2V02B = 1.0, TAAAV21 =1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TA .f 0.0). Report whe', complete. ( 12
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 1 Page _1_ of ~ Event
Description:
Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2. InCl:ease load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold lfoNebat 30 °1/0 for a fl ux map. './",/.ff Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi Note: Following a turn over brief, the cre at step 5.52.2. 5,52.2 us
----------- NOTe$ ..... -
V'\Ihen reactor pOF/er is gre.ater than 5 percentr ~; Gornrnunication bettveen ' plant startup ROs I7llipf'i reactor and turbine p0ltv'er posfHon. I
'\
'\
AmlWlcfator B 4/4. TA VG! r.;; t~~!l1aif)gell;f(~,~tor The afar, ,,.:-.f"_ __________ _
'-- /j~.,:,,~,,;:~,' - ;'~ - - '
RO Ll' C;.eill1nence n'll' lCI~ilse to behveen 5 and 7 percent by dilution i 4' ,Aisl11g o-op-elf.:! (jjoncentration Control. OR by 'iYlthdrmyillg
<,/ control rod§/ \
'<Co_ ,:.' t:--r1--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---11
***'I:!.~te<A9i1'~tj,on,w.il!~~'S't;r.f ito increase power. QOP-046 steps
'\'\ for.,1Jilytion Iisted"'feX't,fclr reference.
\.
~
,p~-
,~:,./"/
1
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-0-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_1_ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2.I,r1*b~~.ase load lace the feed re ulatin valves in automatic and holdl " ower at 30% for a flux map. Time Position IN]TI~~LS RO ~ i'E?-';:: 5.3 ~ 5.3.1 5.3.2 uncerraintks,
- When less rhrn 1% RW'u<nJcm
*.,cfr!ll1i~-i1Jc(fJa;tion $/1 nfe'ffii'IlrS a re flO!
f J' challenged','";,,
- 1. lIlu? .6Eietmlllatioll.. of prinlllv "7!.teJ" qtk..iutitr m*a:v* be made lTv mine the lesnhs of the d.w to 'd;,v a;:!i,,j,tie$ a-i'xl>:!Jrted 'with mm~l" temper-a.7Jre: adj'U-;i-ttuen~:$ *ctu<e to ;:h.mge,s, i.~ reactl""..1:t;l (ie.~ x,enO-lli
~zcuie~t aft!;r" load chang,,),.Q.& ,::m~ OfS'2'~tio~ III of the Plant ClUye book tOl lzcger Chatl:;'.!" ',t.e" load ch.,ag~").
- 2. Deten:nin~ the apprc,XUllElE qU>iiutity of pmnary ',YIter required to ch.mge leaci1:iry by the nemed :nuo,mt b If le.,,,. thau 1",;, powel~, THL', mdepel,deuily 1:en:}' the
*a'ppr~O}ur..ca:e rr-t-:tr'"n:t): OI prl:.'<lllry yr;.':;tel l)2q\ured ro clilnge leas6.1ty by the necsu-ed =l;nt
( 2
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.:_1_ Page ~ of J.L Event
Description:
Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2;.;n~~~ase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hOlclpower at 30% for a flux map. .. ." _{t" Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi()(
~~======~p=~~1 I}{lTIA:'..S.
RO .u.:D. VEx';- c. (1) (2) (3) ( s~vitctJ pos.ition to' ,minirn;1z8 the in1.psp;;t 60 tbe k7 the VCT and ensl<ViTIg ,RC<3 h:vdrog'£orf I D!LUT£ {Fia FCV*.l'~1'13B} is re,con~lnended only tvn-e.n ra'pJd }0iA1 clt~nge c< rod II rnol.'l?f1:i'nl requfre.s -co:mp~n~,~-fion or- tlnen ~;.mmea¥ate, reactivity confro{ is tfe.S\Pi?d. ____________________ 1
- 3. PLKe ili> Reactor klal;e1lp Selector S\vitch in Dll.UTE or
..:lJ.TDILt'TE.
- 4. PeJ+/-atm the foTicwiug:
- a. T1J:ru the ReS Iv1?.kellp COlln'Ol Switch to STA.'r{T.
- b. Verify Ked START li:g.ht i" energized.
- c. II. theF,;;l'~t~J.Ma1:e;1p ;:>eiectsr. ?;:vitch is lJITJJTE AJ\D FC",'**H4B. Blena,,! to V(1l valye d'Lle to flow. clevizuon. ~ place FCV***l HE switch MOPEN*.
d. 3
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:. 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event No.: 1 Page -+/-- of ~ Event
Description:
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavi~r .¢/'
""po/"
INITl'A,SS RO rxn VEVJ:: 5. 6. RCS, Mo1eup (onn*,::<l 51.\'::c1 to SHun. CAUTIONS U,',tl> differ significanrly fr<Dm expected vallles,. the Shift .Miinager shall lInfler dikl1icn cfthe ReS is permissibJe; h<Dwever.Giire shoukl be (Ire excessfIe reduooon in ReS boron oonGenml'lion does nOl oocur.
- VlhiJe\iCr Leyel Controner LC-'-112A. is in i\MNU.4L. continuous monitoring of lie r levells required.
- b. }.<lallullly driYe the ru,maud on vcr Level C(mndl"'J.
LC-<-112.'\.,lo zen).
- c. Place VCT LB':eJ (outrone), LC-"-l12"~",, to AVrO.
4
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: .2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:_1_ Page 2 of--.1L Event
Description:
e Position Applicant's Actions or 5.3.2 (C om'd; RO B. 14. a;. AutomiJti',c .~ is set to !he IlllYA tl!a!n¢ RCS _ .allan pel' Section. ill of lne Plant CUI'."\! Bock thefol~:
;;. Bolic.&.1:id Flow C-troller. FC-~-i BA M:!ll
- b. Primary\1iMer .!l.uto Setpoint. mC-'**114
- 17. V~ruy Wt Pr:ilmJy ~}i,1.aler Flow Cootttl~. FC-"*1l4A. 1S iuAUIO.
- 18. E:!l.>W'l! log n1:Iles specified til Subs<<tion 2.2 are re<:orcled.
- 19. Complete the QA Re..."Ol-G Page i'm' tbi.s :mbseelioIl.
- - - - -- - - - -!iQI.S -- - - - -- - - - - - -.
Changes to blowdown flow should be minimized dUflng main generator loading to 40 Ml-Ve. I If blowdown flow is needed to control SG level or ReS temperature, then blowdown flow I L mey be adjusted accordingly. I BOP 2. IF blo\vdown flow is establishecl* ..;;;;.;;;=;;;;;..;. THE.N maintain stahle. ( 5
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _1_ Page~of~ Event
Description:
Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold g,O"w~r at 30% for a flux map. g/" J
./. ...
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior.//~/.,\\**. Ahgn the SDYA C0I10'011(:"r5 a., £0110\\,.,: BOP a. b. A difference of approxnnaf~y 2(( psi .5/~9'f1{d .!~pf"(j$eJ(.~s staggered setting. ( .......... \. \ )/./ .... ,
~Pt(".'.~.,.D.TA... '~qlrc/);}er. setftn~ n??t:{.'tH:~./lta:rtisted N1 .smaH"A~increrne!1ts as rrecessar)' to
."J:"fhaj(1t{tin~.~t~,arn "fl\~<v frorn a1/ tf1{ee 8~~tJ1 getle rator.s, J:"': yrJ1& Gteatn g\nerdto ,';,
r with the !O\/EH" t
- ~~tDoint
~ ,
hid: .require additional fe-ed f}O~1.'.
--~-*---~~--------
f' . . . . ' staggered tG:1JlISI tht' setpoil1t for SDTA controller in manual to 1000 pSlg. e", Use. the SDTA coutl'oller in manual to make mmor adju,>unenh to
\T,n:g:~s Uece%ary,
.....1.
T:he following :step may be pedormed as SOrA controllers are adjusted ar,d steam dens/afar leveis are siabdized
)1 /_,'
~~---------------------
s"<3e /)r5~t3
'\C",,' ..,,:/
Perform the foHowing in preparation for &ynchronizing the main generator;
, ,v
- 1. Verify that the :\tlain Exciter DC Regulator Control is in the full lower positlon (approximatel): 10 percent Oll DC Regulator Control Inchcator}.
---- NOTE The generatot leads bac}~up distance relay is susceptible to vibratio.n t:\i{th the generator field circu/t breaker open and rnay cause a generator /oci<out and subsequent turbinE trip.
I To prevent th,s occurrence., the paddle IS removea' fforn tl"?/s relay cii.}f,ing the A~;a(n Turbine Lt:1::n~ i:st:i!e~n:' I:'o:n:.:e ~e:at:~' C~C~I:7A: ____ _ 6
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: _1_ Page ~ of ~ t***. Event
Description:
Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hOldFpowEir at 30% for a flux map. ff I (/
/,p '"\"
Time Position r--------------?~-----~~l NOTE /' "' ~\ "
/./ '\1, The generator leads bac!wlJ distance relay is I3UIjiC~pti9i1{to 'libra/Ion wdh the generator"l !"".
fleid CI(Gwt breaker open and may cause a geli,l?iCato~)6clwul and sub§,equent turbme trip, '. [ "i I ~o ocevent Ih"s occ;irrence, the padd!e,"s re!T;6ve~fAJm ,thIS relay ~'fJfinfF,lhe Main Turbine 1 [\.f L :::1tartup and rs Jf!.sraUed prior to closing rile gfN2;rator/ efa i CffCUJt 9reaker:/' I
- - - - - - - - - - - ~:- ~,. - ,:L d"'!.. - - - - -
BOP r - - - - - -.;.,"+ "'::;".::,: \'~OTES""
. ~ ~. '' - :;..." -"~ - - - - -
"\., ' " '<>>.' ' ><:;., "'\
t "'<:>>~ , "~<;;,~ ""',"
" Annunciator E 8/2, Gal FletO Forf,giNGi'\~:OL T RE:~,VMmNG, may come ill and clear, \: ., j>
( ,.~,.,,#;"":::''''' 0":,, \, \ __,,/"
,,,f""'"
j/
./J'," ""0><.""",,,,,,
* )Altlsn the e.xc?~f field break~r (5 'clog/;lJ, the exc#er arnps and generator voflage may
",/ V8f)'?b'f.'is'/!t!d,.pn g'eI,eralor conditio ~ . e . cold from a refueling outage 0, reiatively hot
/ (r6m a SNO\ if 9XGiter amp,a or 9 , [DtOT voltage are not within Ihe specified band,
'I"'" J""Systert1 Eng:,1een~g shall be co/}tacte:g for fLather gUidance.
<</ / ~" ___ *.~,,{"_.;L .
___ ~ !:\ ____________ ,
", '-so . '\ ,,/ .Y;""""":::::"'l';""""":~'-"l', .:. . \.;/
BOP I'" 3 ",<:JoseJlit" t"XCHer fidd Greit4te{,,~ld vent\! response on Control Room or local 1 \, e~Sfter fier~rali1illC'terkh~nveelY~eatel
./ . ,,,.. ,,/
than 0 and 90 amps. BOP Verify exciter field atl1meT<:>r responds \\'irll each adjustment Verify <'Ill three generator ,:oltmeters are indicating <:>qual yalues. 1 \*,\ /' j , ,/" CAUTION
"\" /' y' Generator operation greater than 23,100 volts may damage the genera10r windings.
""'",,,If Exciter field current is limited to 135 amps at no-load to ellsure acceptable gellerator voltage.
BOP 6. RaIse generator yoltagf until yoltage i" between 21.5 KV and 22.5 KV 011 all three phil'SfS ,....*lib exciter field <Imps be1:\veen 100 amps and 130 amps on the generator 1;oltmeter" and exciter field ammeter. (The Control Room or local exciter field al1ulleter may be used) 7
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: _1_ Page .JL of -.1.L Event
Description:
Time Position Applicant's Actionc::. {)Ir K~ BOP 7. Place the Voltage Regulator Control Swity r - - - - - - - - - -NOTE -/J""" --~ The requlato" rmsrrwtcl:meter ma'/ O$cIlLorf~" a,1;;(/~:~ the due to rnin'or spe-ed CJlar.'ges. . <<( <~:_'
'\, \,.
BOP 8. Slov"ll' adiust the AC regulaTOr regulator mismatch 111eter. BOP 9. trot $vi/itch in
.,<<:,::~<<.,,,,
BOP 10 Place the Generator 'tiiltZ;lll gEa';:,t.,. Bus the .~vrAl\-UAL pos.irion. ""~~""'" '--'"'';"''''
,fff';' ,_;(""'-<;~';",,_ """"
BOP ing,./'the,. "Gel1~ratQr Q6vemor Speed Changer ( 11
.~ rudicator i's r~ti:ftUlg slmvly in the FAST t/' \. _f/
JnteC!loIL " '\
'.~
,e
,- ,.:;:;;1"--
BOP ; . ;::('" Jt;;ij,ust the ..~C gulator set the mcommg voltage equal to the
',/nl1ul1ng Yo1t}1ge.{
. IF RO 'YH~ reactor p 5 and 7 percent, THEN wrify the following le)B'rS'ttre'stahi,e or ludi II very "lo\v rate of change:
4 " " ' ' ' ' " " , , , , , .. / Tayg (549" to SSIT) "
'NoTEs ---------.
sync,'ironizrng is inoperable or undesimb{e the Shift Manager rnay authorize the
-of l\4anuai Synchronizing lvlode-.
.Auto A'fade. the turbine speed and generator volla~78 are automatically adjosted, fj.... hich rnay require sel1era! rrunutes to s-atis.~/ the system logic.
llf the auto sync1c:rOl)izlng' push.button is 179)6 for greater than '10 seconds. the auio-syncilro"lIzing logic wii! be disabled bef'Jre a second auto-synchrOnizing altern,ot I at bf'ea-ker closure is ir!itiated. L..
-----------------~--------------------------------------------------------------------------~I
( 8
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: 1 Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 553 Perform auto ,y'nchronization as foI10\V5: (";\J.'A if maml1ll mode 5.53.1 Place the Gen SynchfOl1izmg East Bus COlll.roi to 5.53.2 Verifv East Bm Breaker white light abov positi'on, mdicating synchronized cOl1diti 5.53.3 Veniv the Ina.dvertent light above the syndi.roscope is LIT.
\.. ..f /
~, - .... j,/...... - - - - -
.,.,,// y'
-~~, .;/J"fi
.if Ea-st Bus Breaker fails to close, . ;1;J Systetns ()oeratio-ns needs to .be notilled prior to the\..lv1id' Bus' Breaker,. -since
,:::aiig~n}erd of' if)! Sy,ptems OperatoJiPower voorOit"tator evaluate tfJe\,Ngh illlesilo.uld be iso/a ted .be.fore Glosin 9 z ii'dh th piant to expedite.
'/-
y\,\/-",- seconds, the reverse BOP 11 o'clock position. depress and hold the er indicatlng lights to verify breaker closure load is less then IOM\V",. THEN increase load to y[\Ve nS111g the Generator Governor Speed
"\
.. ';~Ghroscope in the OFF position.
- vfatch the flag Oll the East BllS Generator GCB Control S\vitch by taking the
,.,,,,itch to CLOSE V erify' the Inadvertent Protection Scheme Armed amber light above the s),uclu-oscope is OFF.
- 6. Verit")* Generator .tunps are within :2 pe-[cent on all three phases.
--------------------- NOTES To prev*snt excessrve ciJar"!ges in ..-3/G pressure and level the SDTA '~n:lh~es should be checked to venfy that the):- are responding prior to each addi:tl'ona.i load step.
# }ncreas{na n7.f],it) ,Generator load shaH be .coo{clina.te-d with the operator Gon-troNing' stearn gerJetator levels 9
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: _1_ Page --.1Q. of -.1L Event
Description:
Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold gcfwe): at 30% for a flux m a p . ' "," f Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 5.55 Perform the following to iucfea~e mrbine load: RO / BOP
- _________ ....:.v _ . .L NOTE
~
./
t~", >'"
,J
}.=:i,~.
~..j)o
/'
1\,./: The, fnrnw'nry Iv I . ""~{ '-'fen i1:' DeriOtmed
~..,. '(w' ,.) * . .. , .* 'l b v it-ie OO~:h... tor*~ to,.r,1tro.i.lilf.G:./ steS'rn
,~q,'t x"- ,of q,enerato(
_ leve!s and orestiures. \, ~~L BOP 5.55.2 IT the Steam DU'lllP"'to.",Atmosphere (SDJA)";yalve& are being used. THE:\" perform the\fo gSteP5 until all SD'T~ :,:alves are closed and the T3yg - Tref delt.:; T lS*1>Y1t. tband'pt:9::'lded by the{,J S.>
\. '" "-('" .....***.'*, ':\'.'
- 1. Verify the SDTA'\eol~oller~~ltl,utom~tl<<"iI,f::dosl)lg ';11e SDTA ,.'alves: as
;;team is df1'lv,**u off to tli'1. turbiuiJ;!' /<"". . *.*,"
; " ./ 4'
(
....f 2./ *Sro\vl\~* ..dos,e the si):rA\v{i~'eA~ l11anual;~'~O'~1ance steam flow with the
/' $QJA ~"alve5 in atltomati<< and make minor adjnstme-nt, to Ta"g,
"'asl1t~cess~r'y \ /
iri .;1".'
,1""' - - -
/'
+~ l - ~arEs.* .
~:';;:'~;;;'
\"+\11 :':"" 'vlihen tI}Ji!/s~Tl~:~,;'\,.;7J'a7{fOpeI.§,!~'~iJ,J)r~periY. tl7ere sl,ou,'d be a balance between the
, \. '\~DT/J/t/ah:.r;J3'*cfO's;;t;J.g."'?/'d rnain tli:',j:'1 steanj usage vlith /ittle pert1.ltbatton in n1Clin I """ sfti{et1r) h>?tije.r pre-ssure"'"a:;;')trfNzL creased.
'~" If.
".,i"*""**'*'*
>>"1:{ie ,CJ-f';,TA *~/a/ve:s can be verified to be closfng by abserv,i,ng rne/n stearn header
,./),........,,"".. '" "'" prlE!~~,:urt:?r~cc'y<er as the rnain generator is }oaded,
... ",I
- The ~[;;rl' 'c?!mt'OJier set/,'ngs may be ad/us ted In ISmail increments as necessary to I*),' f", '{TIall7tain ~,,~~')itenerator levels.
t.
""c,<:~ ~; }t;~shoufd ,not be necessary to close the S[)TA j/alve in rnanual as a pre--ernpilv'- action
'\~, 1 l'tr~len the lna,;n generator OUflJut breaker is closed.
" 11
"'\<< \ ~-j----------
'**'i. -"""S-,Q-P---t'-if.-37.'--,,-jD"~'--b-8-e-n-'-e-n-la-j-n-s-te-a-l-:n-.-l-le-a-c-le-.l-*-p-r-e-s-sl-lf-e-\-,,-'h-i-le-*-l-o-a-c-h-n-g-.-th-e-n-la-j-n-g-e-n-e:-.r-a-to-l-*-t-o-----jl
~"'d)/ // maintain a balance between the SDTA valves dosing and the steam bemg
-,' used to increase- load.
BOP 4. ",lIE?\, "team generator levels and pressure'> stabilizI;" follO\ving a load mereage, ~ notify the operator comwUmg: the main gl;"ne:rator to mereage load by 5 to 10 MWe. BOP S. Continue monltormg and controlling in thl;" steps above until Step 6 belmv 1S completed. 10
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:_1_Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold p6WE;); at 30% for a flux m a p ' f ' / .",c/"
/
Time Position r The SDT.A valvBs should be closed by BOP 6. \VHE::'\" the SDIA \'alve"in ant'.: vah-e In ll1alllli"\l is clo<,ed and Tavg. BOP 7 iI. (1) (2)
- b. aI,"e.. t .. Y-3-16G7. is CLOSED.
A,tl11diipllere ValYe, CV-3-1608. is CLOSED. e following to align the steam dump to condenser for AUTO: Steam Dump to Condenser Control switch in the ON position. l\'iomentarily place the :VIocle Selector switch to RESET Place the Mode Sel.ector Switch to AUTO. CAUTIONS
- Communication betweell the Reactor Operators on the control board is critical during plant startup. ROs mtlst inform each other of imponam parameter changes such as reactor and turbine power, S/G leve/stand changes in blowdown flow.
,. Intermediate Range to Power Range overlap is required prior to blocking tile fl1termediate Range Trip alld the Power Range LO Range Trip.
,. Block of the Intermediate Range Trip and tfle Power Range to Range Trip is required prior to increasing power greater than 20 percent.
11
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: 1 Page..J1.. of ~ Event
Description:
Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.2. Incr:ease load lace the feed re ulatin valves in automatic and hold welt at 30% for a flux map. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior/ R) 55? Perform the following to slowly increase reactor power: 5.57.1 "\VHE-" $i(T levels are stable. THE-" conrYIl I!lCrellSe chin/lOll using O-OP-046, CVcs-::-.aplon.JsonCeIltfaTjol1 withdrawing control rods. ///"[4'/
//
5.57.2 :v[onitor and adjust SiG levels it),AesP91'l'iie to ri.ing rei;reib;; power and turbine load. ... <; /s
\, /
RO 5SS ~Reactor Power level is greater than 'f'lJi}Jer~'~I:~t, THE'~ orm the foHowing: 5.58.1 Verify PO\VER ABOv'E P-IO ,Iatns li;h **:~~'\.i<t ON.
\"
5.58.2 Verify AT Po\\1?R"fRiPS
~ " -------~/,;"'.
BLOCKED stahght on,JlPA goes Off. 5.58.3 Pres;, A;\D holA,fo Push to Block pll\h 5..58.4 Verify' 25% INTE OCKED ,latus lIght on VPA is ON.
.!.ll:.t'1.1:ustrv Lab that RCS sampling is reqmred by Technical Specification 3A.8, ete Section 5.0 of 3-0p-On. ::Vlain Steam System.
e Feedwater Pump Turbme Runback switch on 3C01 is in DEFEAT. 5'40.3 Commence purging the ?vISR tube blU1dle~ using 3-0p-On. L MOisture Separator I Reheater<;. tel,', beBOPcompleted. may direct field actions of J.OP-072 and 3-0P-072.1 to CAUTION Prior to opening the feedwarer isolation MOVs, evaluate for leak-by, ( 12
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:l Event No.:_1__Page ~ of--.1L Event
Description:
II TnYle Position 5.61 WBElIi ~wer is between 10 and 20%, TBElIi sta BOP following to place the FRVs ill antoma.tic:-- 5.61.1 En'3ul'e open the Feedwater Isolation val F\V I ..ol Sun Geu 3A, MOV " I I . al the discretion ' I
------_.I SUR 'IS to automatic as follows:
ve is being automatically controlled. tef control valves are ill AUTO: 7-3-498 Verify the F\VBypass Valves are CLOSED:
.. FCV-3-479
.. FCV-3-489
.. FCV-3-499 EVENT 1a: Once feed regulating valves are placed in automatic, call in as a turbine bldg.
NSO and report that the B AFWP governor has an oil leak (oil leak entered at setup). 13
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:~ Page _1_ of _1_ Event
Description:
Once feed re ulatin valves are laced in automatic that the B AFWP governor has an oil leak. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Relays report from NSO of oil leak on B AFWP US Declares B AFWP out of service Determines TS 3.7.1.2 action statem
- Verify two operable indepen
- Fix B AFWP in 30 days Directs wee to have M Ie 3.7-3 and associated t auxiliary feedwater trains inoperable, either restore the within 72 hours, or place the affected unit(s) in at least o s* and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
er 'ains inoperable, within 2 hours either restore both trains one train to an OPERABLE status and follow ACTION
, If neither train can be restored to an OPERABLE status of both standby feed-water pumps and place the affected
) in at least HO Y within the next 6 hours' and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the ing 6 hours. Otherwise, initiate corrective action to restore at leas! one auxiliary feedwoler o an OPERABLE status as soon as possible and follow ACTION statement 1 above for the o ,r train.
gle aUXiliary (eedwater pump inoperable, within 4 110urs, verify OPERABILITY of two t auxil11lfY (eedwaler trains, or (ollow ACTION statements 1 or 2 above as applicable, alion of the OPERABILITY o( two independent auxiliary (eerJwater tralns. restore the auxilimy feedwater pump to an OPERABLE status within 30 days, Of place the operating unit(s) in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 Ilours' and in HOT SHUTDOWN WRhin the following 6 hours. The provisions of Specification 3.0A are not applicable during tim 30 day period for the inoperable aUXiliary feedwaler pump. Note: following T.S. reference, trigger event 2- 3A TPCWP BEARING FAILURE. 14
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:. 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:-.L Page_1_of ~ Time Position RO Recognizes/reports annunciator 1-5/1, 5/2 US Directs response per 3-0NOP-008
- Mcm.itoring Main G changed due to the frydrogen feilkag~ is gradient increases. (R I
------ - I
- a. Determin>e a:ffe¢tec lurtine p;arrt coolmg water pump.
D. Check if standby turbine piant cooling water pump ....do-slanec. !E standby turbine plant cooling water pump did ootauto-start a!:m offsite pow& is available. ~ start slallldi:ly turbine pian! oooiling Wi3iter pump. c.. StO!P affecled turbine plan! cooling water pwnp. V~rify Turbine Plant .cooling! Waler Pumps - Perform d~e loMowing: AT LEAST ONE RUNNING
- a. .I.E. cifsite power is available. ~
start one t1Jrain>e plant oooling watEr P"..Imp.
- b. If nertnef rural"" piant cooling Wa1<lr pump c.>n be started, !!:!§!.:! manually tnp reactor ~main turbine.
BOP 3 Check Turbine Pbnt Cooling Wa~r l+eac!\!l'T !£. TPCV"r head& press'..Ife is less Ih<lfl PrE'Ssure 75 psig. ~ start a second TPCW pump.
- 151'4. TPCW HI TEMPILC PRESS!!Q.I UT 15
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.:. 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:..L PageLof~ Time Position 4 Choeck Proper intake C<Xlling Waler Lineup BOP To Turbine Plant Cooling Water Heat Ex:cnangers
- a. Check Safely Injeclioo 0'1 Unit 3 -
TERMINATED b Check both rcw To ,PCW Heat E~cnMGer vailies - OPEN
- POI/-3-4B82
- POV-3-4B83 POV-3-4882 POJ-3-4883
- 3) .IE. neither I'CW To TPCW Heal E)(chang~ valve oan be opened.
~ l'I1.11ooaMy trip reactor .8W:L main turbine.
- a. Go 10 Step 12.
rator to klcaily l'I1oni1or lurbiil'le water s.ufge tank le'JeiJ Check Cooling To Turbine Plant CooI!ing DirEd operalDr to loca!1y ~ lhe Waia Heiit Exchan9fli!<<"s IOlkming: Check alarm I :ii4 *. TPCW HI TEMPflO 1. Open ,PCW Hx CanDled lew Oullei' PRESS-OFF \laiNe, 3-50-401 a~ necessary to maintain Turbine Plant Cooling VI'atel' b Locally cl1ecl! Turbine Plant Cooling Water &!wI)' Keader Te~>:e lesslhain
&wi)' ~ T~ature. T!-3-1432- 110<F.
LESS n-V~N 11 (}~F
- 2. Vedy prop!!!' hs<ai excl!anger
- o. Locally checl! Turbine Plam Cooling Willier ~~.
Sl!pIlly HeOOer Te!'rll'EfatiJrE'. TI-3-1432-STABLE OR DECREASIWG 3. start all ~e ICW Pwnps using
- 'l-OP-019, 1t.'TAKE COOLIOO WATER SYSTEM 16
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:l Event No.:~ PageLof~ n Applicant's Action~ nr KAn~ 13 locaHy Verify T!lirbine Plant Coofing Water BOP Basket Strainer ..1J> -lESS THAN 1.5 PSID
- DPI*3-1400
- DPI-3-1401 BOP 14 Che¢k A.larrn F Gt5<. GEN RTD HI-Hl TEMP -
OFF BOP 15 Check The FoUowiJng i3eneralw AJarms - OFF "
- E ~i;'4. GEN EXCIT TE!~",
- d. lE Ben. r Excilef ~a1ure r~s 65 deg (R.J47 pt ,5 Of 6),
~ vip liIe reatU and Iu.!'\:me l!tW.
periOrrn 'J..t'OP-E-O. REACTOR TRIP 00 SAFETf iNJECTIOIt llli-_ continuing wil!1 this procedure. eL lE neceSi5ary. ~ sIlfJldown the unit a;; directed by Shift Mar;ager using me of liIe fu::>b/ing:
, l-GOP-103. POVifER OPERATION TO HOT STANDBY.
QB.
, 3-ONOP-tOO. FAST LOAD REDUCTION.
QB.
, Vlanuady trip reacior and main iurb!r,e.
!. IF any seal c4 system cooler is wetheating. Jl!§!! perit,rm lhe followmg:
t) ~1TIain rurbine has been irippeci. THEI4 pu~ ~at"! with .car£0ii7oxide uscl'lg l-OP-OOO. GAS EVOLUTIONS IN THE MAiN GENERATOO.
- 2) WHEN ~n has been ~
from generator. THEN shutdmm seal oil system ~3-0P"7.1. TURBINE GENERATOR' SEAL OIL SYSTEM. 17
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:l Event No.:--L Page ..1... of -+/-- Time Position Applicant's Actions or B BOP 16 Check The Following f'umpAiillT1ls -OFF
- 0 514. S.GFP A. MOTOR aRG HI TEMP a..
- l) ti4. SGFP a MOTOR aRG HI TEMP
- l) SiS. HDP A MOTOR BRG HI TEMP
- I) Si5. HOP Ei MOTOR BRG HI TEMP
- D ~3. COND PUMP /4, MOTOR ~ HI TEMP
- F 61'1. COl'll) PVMP C TEM" BOP 17 Reduce \IN <:tad :as dllrECted by Shill Manager 10 prevent component damage using:
, ~OP*103, POWF..R OPERATION TO HOT STANDBY.,
Q!!
'3.-~P-1OO, FAST lOAD REDOCTIOft Q!!
, MaooaUy lrip reactor am main wrbme.
- 3) Continue E!lf<<ts 1o~. normal system lineup.
Check Temperature Of COnlJronents ~ me fObling: Sllflpli1!<l1liy Tur'bfne Plant Cooling Water - STABLE OR DECREASING a. Verify prope;- 5IJpply <lnd rerum valve
~em m affected compOOO!11{s}
using 3*oP.OIJ8, TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEM b .IE affe~ ocmponem has auioW!<lb; te~a\lJre ~ol,!:!!5!::!. marMaB)'
~ale temperarur& rontrd valw.e.wl.
t",",~alW'e COOIIrol bypass valve as necessary 10 mairrtain OOi'ffiill OO"'¢Ol1ent tanperalUres.
- TUrD""e lube od coolers c. Vern affeded cM1ponenll;sj uSn",
2.-OP-OOO, TURBINE PlANT CaOUNG WATER SYSTEM.
- Exdter air ooclers
- d. JE 1J.Jrbine the oil ~ O!i!let.
te~arure incma..es tc ll'r'eilter ihm i?:,<F, I.l:IaI. establish emergenOji oooling 10 l'~ klbl! oil coolers \.i'5ing ATIACHMSIIT 1. 18
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: ~ Page ...L of ~ Position BOP Recognizes I reports failure of FT-3-487 as indicated by: FI-3-487 indication on VPA FCV-3-488 closed in automatic 3B feed I steam flow BOP Takes manual control of program US ion failure may oocur in such a manner as to cause a particular loop to deviate from the actual monitored parameter by either a finite nt. Such a deviation may be in a direction such that a reactor ty related trip function may not occur on that instrument loop, even point for the trip function has been reached by the actual parameter. _____________________ 1 Verify instrument loop failure by comparison to adjacent loops and known plant parameters and conditions. Step BOP 5.2 Verify no off-normal conditions exist on the adjacent channels which are to remain in service. 19
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.:, 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event No.: 3 PageLof~
-"4/'~\
Event
Description:
3B slg controlling feed flow transmitter FT-3-487 fails high causiD£.{3~> FRV FCV-3-488 to fail closed. Manual 0 erator action is re ireq"to control 3B slg level and avoid a reactor trip. The crew respo ds".per 3-ONOP-049.1. .' Time Position Applicant's Actions or Step BOP /' 5.3 Verify applicable control transfer "swi~ which eliminates the failed loop. / /'
' '\~<" _.:*i'" of"~
Note: transfers controllirg FW f/oVv"cha'Qneltor 3.,/iJ SG to channel IV. Steam flow may also be tran'S(f!rr"bcJ(' /i' BOP S te p " >"\"",. -"<c.
';:'~'<-'<'<:"'"""::""" " '*">:0"'::;,:____ .~\~
5.4 IF a control funct'bn\~as'pIEl~ed in manu'aJ"cohtcol due to the failure, THEN verif t C{:jR I fuhsiion is returRed f~automatic. US 5.5 Refer to Technical;peQjficatiprrs;3fik.~)
., .,..._.___. ____~_t__-v-erify !b~,rnioj,,~um chani\~ls\o,' rqble."'h" if .,--\__" '\ 'of""
,ermines T.S. 3..3.:,:1 fU{1'Ction 12 applies.
"'\, \ --------------------11 EM INSTRUMENTATION M1Nl\H)M CHANNELS CHANNELS A,?PUCASLE TO TRIP CIFERA.9U: MOD:=S
- s,~m. g-=r, :=.tl"';-"" gl?-'1 1 stt'fL :;len 1,2 lev-.:i ;;,;nd h:ve*: c-oir- ",:,.;.;; iF':C
- .s~n;.ifeed- "2 st,,"~:Jfeed-
'N""t~r flow ~ stn~:_{fe-,=,j* 'Na~G-f fk:W' m~s;r>ak-,~ ;f) 'lI~ter fh::'N "('ii5rn-".:I~ch if:
e*c.cr 'S~rtl, g'er: ;*.,-,jsmatt-1 ir ::;-"am~ st"""L gel') s~nle ~tf'>'. >;)r 2 st~..". stm./fe-~ci-Wi,;l~ef
,l,ow' m:~~ma1ch r; sa:':f<& s1m.
go:':)
+JOl}S >:::IP 2,'bvs 12 bc-th, b",'s'$,:e.s
.. roMp R.GP'S:*""
""'~Ir:oir:.-e T6p P~Tl
- a. ,t..~it!)sbr-' P~*:essl.ife
- o. T ~lr¢ir'E 2*1Qr;' \i a~,;'- Closv:"
.ACTION e- 'Nith be nvrnber Cif OPERA8LE charme';s one less thin the Total Nurn,ber of Channels.
STARTUP 31"4'0' POWER OPERATION may proce",d until perfonTlance -of the next reo\lired ANALCH3 CH.4N"lEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable oharme! is placed in the tripped ocm:litklnwithin {I hr.;I)rs. 20
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
3B s/g controlling feed flow transmitter FT-3-487 fails high causins:13B> FRV (FCV-3-488 to fail closed). Manual operator action is reqldfredltb control 3B sl level and avoid a reactor tri . The crew res pnds / r 3 ONOP-049.1. Time Position 5.11 IF any other channel has L1iled, THEN failed'channel. -- 5,11.1 IT plant conditions are such tlla channel may be hipped v{itho perfor11l the follo\\ing:
- 1. Place all bistable ~\,itches Attachment 4, F*3-4S7.,,0"""""~, Steam Generator B RefOwgs 5610*T*L1, Sh HI; 6610*T*D-17 Maxpllviation As corii'p~rect S Power <: 10%, MAX DEV 7.0 x 10b IbfHR t,,;other \. ~ Power!; 50%, MAX DEV 6.0 x 1 O~ Ib!HR
!~ ><: Power s: 70%, MAX DEV 4.0)( 10~ Ib/HR Yo -< POWii!f ~ 101)%. MAX DEV 3.0 x 10~ Il;IlHR FUNC*
ANNUNCIATOR LOGIC AFFECTED TION li2 ch<l~:nei~ <)n S.iG low le';~1 (lOC,c) P ',';'ittl 1-'2 !OW' feeo\','<'lIH l'!ow 166~.QC'C 1b!I"lf <<;Ir11n (lC'N) on sap:>:, S.:G SG B .S TE,\I*,.j :. FEED C 3G 8 FEED STEA!;.~ C "t'dt~: De . . , lR,es 8S-3-48881, 8S-3-48882, and 8S-3-488C need to
~\ \\ be trJlll?~f1.
BOP 0\ ai~s keys and opens protection rack 18 T' s ,tistables BS-3-488B1, BS-3-488B2 & BS-3-488C RO ,,//Checks correct bistable status light energized in response to tripping
'\./ bistables (FC488B1).
Checks correct annunciators on in response to tripping bistables (C4/2
& C-5/2).
BOP ),15 IF JllV Feechxater Control Valve is in l\f<lllUal control due to this failure. THE:\, load eliIWe) should be maintained as steady as possible until all FeechvRter Control Valves are ( restored to Automatic conh*o!. 21
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: ---.L Page -+/-.. of ~ Time Position I Equjl~l!nent v/hic:h is rernove,j frOin to cOlnply _v;:iJ;1Y"'\rec.l~ S,Dec actio.n reqlurelnents (e,g .. uJ-operable prGtectlOn/s 7strurnentatft>n) n)~y t~e returned' to service In ,order to dernonstr'3te its t}petabili( perabilit':l/bf ot~"re-r eqa!prnent under adrnin/strative controls per Tech Spec 3. O. 6. . thl:/" tlrne,;;;;'must be Jirnited to that required for teDting - or to de!1lonstrate G./Jerabiiity- --fttherJt5,:eventativ-e
",~ , or COffective rnaintenance fnay be petfbrrned under Tech .Spec 6. '-'
mclude an entry III the or LAN Pi" 1 C eeh Spec 3.0 6. Other adtninisttative controls ,d; such as Unit Nan e.ntries., test procecitues I or INork instrucliof1s. or O-A eehmca! Specification Bases ContnJl Prograrn, '\,
,....,------ _____ 1 BOP immeclimelv. THE:\, verify Subsection 5.11 BOP bistable s\vitch that w~s placed in the tripped Equipmellt Clearance Orders 22
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page _1_ of ..L II 'Ti"""e' I Position Recognizes/reports lowering generator M BOP
& CV-3-1608 failed open as evident by:
- Steam noise present RO US CV-3-1608 failure, directs local isolation of CV-3-1608 N te: O*ADM*200 provides guidance to use the secondary plant to estore Tave to Tref. Operators shouldperlorm actions necessary to stabilize the unit.
23
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:~ Page L of L Time Position BOP Consistent with O-AOM-200 section 5.4.3 ui secondary pant transient:
- 1. Reduces turbine load to match av =Tref 2.
3. 4. 5.
- 6. Relays report from with' I . n valve cl e US - '1"6B8"is~tio v ve leaking by ave"I'1IeGtlijQ~~aintenance investigate CV-3-1608
"". __ ....,ution tag generated for CV-3-1608 in manual in stabilization ofunit, trigger EVENT 5 - EXCITER ER TPCW BLOCKAGE.
24
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:l Page _1_ of l Event
Description:
Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially blocked r in a high air temperature condition. The crew responds per 3-A for annunciator E-9/4. The crew manually trips the reactor wh e ter hot gas temperature exceeds 90°C and performs the actions of 0 -E-O. Once the reactor is tripped, the switchyard relays out. ~E~a fails to automatically load 3B 4kv bus due to a bus st~rg faillli,;e. EDG fails to start and can not be manually starte . Time Position BOP Recognizes I reports annunciator RO Reads actions for 3-ARP-097.CR for an BOP Performs actions con£t~ as read by RO
- 1. Verifies alarm usin r 3-3 ~~)
~taining ~
- 2. Monitors exciter air t
- 3. AR grid voltage M R=O, maintain grid voltage ~ 232 kV
. g 3-0NOP-100 until hot air temp <
ir temp> 90°C & no expectation of fast recO\ery reactor trip crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O. 25
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: 2.. Page L of L Event
Description:
Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially blocke in a high air temperature condition. The crew responds per 3-for annunciator E-9/4. The crew manually trips the reactor en xciter hot gas temperature exceeds 90°C and performs the actions 3- P- -0. Once the reactor is tripped, the switchyard relays out. fails to automatically load 3B 4kv bus due to a bu EDG fails to start and can not be manually sta a. Time Position I_________ ,...*ii~- RO 1 ok Monitor Cri1ica1 Safety Funcfums usil1Q 3-EOP-F..Q, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION S7ATUSTREES. Il. Go to 3-EOP-FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATlON! AT'NS. Step' 1.
- a. Manually Irip!urbine. .!E unable to verity turbine trip, I.!:Lei cloSE! rmlm steamM1e isc!ation 3'nd bypas!o valves..
b Manually close valves. IF any vaht'" eM l:WI be dosed. Il£J!li clOs-e main
~teamline isolaool'l and by?a~s valves.
- MSR Purge Steam VaivEfs C. ChEi'Ck Mid and East GeSs - OPEN c. Melll.tally open breakers, Jf breakers do
{Normally ao secotxt delay) !iQ! open,.ll!.5!! actuate EMERGENCY GEN. 8KR TRIP SWITCH for the affected brea*er(s) . 26
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:l Event No.: l Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially blocked r ulting in a high air temperature condition. The crew responds per 3-A 9. R for annunciator E-914. The crew manually trips the reactor w gas temperature exceeds 90°C and performs the actions of Once the reactor is tripped, the switchyard relays out. ~ D ta but fails to automatically load 3B 4kv bus due to a bus st~~' g fail e. EDG fails to start and can not be manually starte Time Position BOP 3 Vecrify i"o1.ver To EmergeftOy 4 KV Buses a Cl1eck lhe SA and3B 4 KV buses - MAlNTAiNAT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED c c. f'erflNm the followi1"1!):
- 1) IF tocko~11 of :aD 4 KV b'i.<ls NOT PresE!'Ilt !!:!5!! pe'(fofm th;;;;Fowillig:
<iI) Verify 3C CCW puma-BREAKER OPEN.
bl Verify 3C ICW pump - BREAKER OPEN. c) Op.e'(ate bus stlppl)' ineakers to resmre power. 27
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 2- Page...+/-. of L Event
Description:
Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially blocke res lting in a high air temperature condition. The crew responds per 3- 7.CR for annunciator E-9/4. The crew manually trips the reactor en xc iter hot gas temperature exceeds 90°C and performs the actions 3- P- -0. Once the reactor is tripped, the switchyard relays out. B s fails to automatically load 3B 4kv bus due to a bu ing failure. A EDG fails to start and can not be manually sta Time Position Applicant's A 4 Check If S I 15 Actuated RO
, 51 .4rmunos,IYS* ANY ON
- Safeguards equipm STARTED
, High steam fk>w with low SIG oresswe
- 014 psig OR low
- "avg (543 F) -
- ReS subooQling based 00 00l'1< exit TCs* LESS TH.A.N 30<Fl210'FJ
- PRZ ievel
- CAN NOr BE
!'MINTAlNED GREATER THAN 12%{t<Ql%,]
- b. If. 51 is required,. r.t!.5!! manuaHy* actuate 51 ar.d containn)e;-.llsclatioo pha$!l A 8!iQ go to St~p 5.
- c. !f 51 is!:!Q! requk"ed. I!::!5!:! perioon the following:
1j t.ilMilQr Criiical safely FunClions using 3-EOp*F-1J. CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES, 2} Go to 3-EOP-ES<U, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE. Step 1. Note: following verification SI not required, trigger EVENT 6 - 3AB11 STUCK CLOSED, then trigger EVENT 6 - LOSS OF SWITCHYARD. Note: crew will transition back to 3-EOP-E-O step 1. 28
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: .2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:~ Page 2 of ~ Event
Description:
Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially blocke in a high air temperature condition. The crew responds per 3-,.."".--1,.-. for annunciator E-9/4. The crew manually trips the reactor gas temperature exceeds 90°C and performs the actions 3-Once the reactor is tripped, the switchyard relays out B G fails to automatically load 3B 4kv bus due to a b EDG fails to start and can not be manually st d. Ime Position RO 1 Verify Reactor Trip
- Roeacoror !no and OPEN BOP iI. Manually trip turbine . .!f.lUnable io verify turbinoe trip, ~ close main steamlline isalatioo and bypass vafves.
- b. 'Manually dose valves. .!f. any valvoe oan ti&iI be closed. ~ close main s>ieamline isolamn and bypass: valves.
- c. Manuany open breaker&. If. brea~ers do
!:!Q! open . .rt!E!'! actuate EMERG ENCY GEN. BKR TRiP S\'IlITCH for Ihe aifec1ai breaker(sj.
te' all valves were previously verified closed 29
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: ~ Page ~ of L
,.,\.
Event
Description:
Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially block~i9't~~p1ting in a high air temperature condition. The crew responds per 3-i)RP-9'~7.CR for annunciator E-9/4. The crew manually trips the reactor~en ()(citer hot gas temperature exceeds 90°C and performs the actions "-pQP~E:O. Once the reactor is tripped, the switchyard relays o u t . ' G sttl[1s'h+!t fails to automatically load 3B 4kv bus due to a bUSliS; /' mg failure. 3A' EDG fails to start and can not be manually startt Time Position BOP 3 Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses a Che*ck lhe 3*.A. a.no -3:3 4 <V bus*;?s - ASJ;<51'l!fr...l;:t-l ERGIZE D 4 K\/ bu'S is
- . A:ter(tD1 tD ernergency start :h-B dE'-eflerg'::~z:ed Un~t 3 bu's diesE'4 gene:rator
~. Perrenn the following:
- 1) IF lockou! of 3D 4 KV bus NOT Presem . .!.!:!.5.!i OerfD[m th;fuiio',,,;ng Zi} \/e-rify 3:C GC\N' pum~p*
BREAKER OPEN. b} \lerf~l ac lC-ltV pump - BREAKER OPEN. c) Opecraie bus selpply bre*akers to f;J9te:\Atte;;p<;?{~mergency start of 3A EDG but EDG has start
. ~ailure. 38 EDG running with output brfBker open.
E;:rmines neither 4KV bus is energized and transitions to 3-EOP-A-O.O Loss of all AC step 1. ( 30
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: ~ Page _1_ of ~ Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0. MOV-3-1405 fails to op with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to SUPR Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3 P breaker 3AB 11 which has a blown control power fuse a opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the 0 Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 38 EDG to 4kV bus. Transition is made to ~EOP-ECA-0.2 steam leak. Time Position RO Directs performance of ~EOP-ECA-O. I f) I _____ 1 RO 1
... Manually lrip (urohe. IE ruJbin-e wW!::!QI idp, ~ clOSE! main steoamlin& isok~mn a~d byp.ass '1&1*...90.5.
- b. Manually etose yal .... es, IF ar=y valVe can
.wll be cklsed . ~ ;ro:~ mair 'Steam
;s.ctatiC<'!"'! and bypass vatll*.
C. Mid and East GCBs - OPEN c. ~ <3:ppC"leimately one, mirnJte has lNe<mally 30 ..e~",,,,,ls d"lay) "lapsed. THEN ...erify Mid and E"",t GC8-.
-OPEN--
- 1) IE br<>al<ers do !QI op<>n,l!:!§!:!,
actu.aw EMERGENCY GEN. BI'R TRIP SWITCH f<>rthe _cted br<!01i<er(s). 2} !E. breaker posi!ion ind@oaaion is!:!Q!
.. _",;1_ aw:! !U!<bine $peed is w;u:
de-creasi>>g. THEN dIlred Turbi"" Opemtorto ~rm the following:: a} Obtam ke-'j 't7trom Shift Manager key ioc:k~f.
- 0) Lacamy trip Mid and East GeSs from 'tbe swrtch)'srd.
" BW33
- swas 31
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.:~ Page L of-.1L Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to opE?pf'a~:d with B AFWP C?O~ wi.th an oil leak r~quires C AF,,!P to suppl¥.i15ott;:l"Units. Manual bus stripping IS performed with the exception of 3B,,:rPCWP breaker 3AB11 which has a blo~n control po~er fuse aI}GJ.caJ;), ndt\?~
/' "'....
opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus IS repowered via the Sj:30 t);e"'frO(ll uf\lJ 4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EOG to n#~n~lgize 3B\~ 3f9\.4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due effects of the'steah;) leak. ' \ . . \.
'\,
Time Position RO 3 Check If ReS Is Isolated
~.
CLOSED ( BOP ZL !E.,bcih units rEqUire AFW, ~ pEITOm'*. the following.:
- 2) I)se 3; se-q>oir;t of 27"0 g::ptl1 ~o:r required A.F'N 110w instead of the 345 QP-t?"" s-pe<c:~:f?ed. in '5.vbseq'~Je;nt st'2PS ll:!:!.Q. P"o.:",dures.
n Verity A.F'N pump run!"\ing !E AFW pvrnp .tJ.QI. w!"\n *'1g, .I!:i5.!:! ITt,,"',I'?'!I')' apen st'2;3Xn supp'i~' valv>?S.
- 2) \leri:fy p n:<per aEgnmerij cf A.FVsI valves . .If aPignrnent NOT proper.
I!:i5.!::!. n1anuahy align v.3lves *35 nE-oeSS8I'1' 10 establish proper hnE'Up. 3:, !E., AF{,! *:*an !!!2I be established, I!:i5.!::!. restore .AFW using 3-0>~ap*~07'5, ,';,UX1LlARY FEEDWATER ,sYST EM t.,,ol..LFUNCTION ',vhAe cCn1inuI'1g wi~h Step .5. Note: MOV-3*1405 fails to open. BOP Establishes 270 gpm AFW 32
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:l Event No.: l Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to op with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to suppl Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B breaker 3AB 11 which has a blown control power fuse a c n opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the O' fr Then 3AB 11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to r bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due t leak. Time Position
., If an 51 signa! exi.st.s O'n15ure>es!oratrol'l of equipment 0 n the 4K\/ Bu..
___________ 1 C. Go to Step B.
- d. Verify required safeguards equipment- d. Manually starl equipment as. requiired.
OPERATING
- e. Check if 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL SAFETY e, Implemeni FRPsas required, unfess this FUNCTION STATUS TREES being pro~l.Ire was diireotty entered from mtHlijCW'~ FOR INFORMATiON ONt Y ol.lisme lhe EOP re1Work pritw \0 entering 3-EOP-ECA-OJJ,lOSS OF ALL AC POWER Note: Step 5.c RNO transitbns to step 6. Attachments 1 and 2 listed next for reference.
33
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:l Page 4_ of ~ {/\. Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to oP5?(fa~ with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supp~y:A50\laftlnits.
~r:~~:~ ~~sB~t~i~~~;h i~~::o~I~!~ ~~t~t:~lep~~:r:~~~ ~~~%~~~~e opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the 9. BOt,.te"frbql unit 4.
Then 3AB 11 is locally opened allowing 3B EOG to re(el1~rgize 3~~ 3l.'3AkV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due effects of the'steaMJ l e a k . > '\ Time Position BOP
- 1. .IE. lA,4KV :7JS is de-ene.
BL3¢tO:!Jt T;;? P.!?rmissi~lE' Bus sA. 3,11.[1[11, is dosed, IIifI:i perfo!Tf\ the fol!owhg:
.!E Statio" Blackout are.3ker, .3AD07, i~. dos.~d . .I.tilli p,-"fcm, t~.E' followrng:
Direct UnA :4 Re->l_dCr Cperator to -open Sta~iori 8laclout lkeakec 4AD-C7 .
.J. .IE. brea~;er iorntake C.:dingWatsr PUf'lP .3l::, 3A005, 2B. br~;;iker for Ccmponert. Cooling 'Na1er Fum;
?C, 3.A,D(}4, C<ln liQl be opened,.JHlJi ,~*ei". Fe'2der To 4lf.V 80S 3D. ':"';'~ j 1.. .&lIl Suppty From 4KV-8us 3A, 31<.D01.
Note: Verifies 3A 4KV bus stripped 34
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page 5_ of ~ Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to op with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP tosuppl ot Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B C P breaker 3AB 11 which has a blown control power fuse an ca n be opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the S fb ~fr u't 4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EOG to re~~gize 3 3 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due t effects of the te leak. Time Position BOP 2. ro 4KV Bus 3&.3,1\.000, is ~ .I!::!§!v£fity Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D ...lAS Hr. is open. 4~, Bus 3&. *2,1\.000, is dosed., Il;;IUi perloon tile fclkllorl1G: a !E StatlOO Bladwut ~er, 3,o!.,OO7, is clO5'!!d, lli5!:i perfufm the fullow:ng: Open S~on 8t~kou: Breaker. 3AOO7.
~t Unit 4 Reat:Wr Oper:artcrtoopen Statioo: BlaclI;ou!~ker, 4ADDi'.
- b. \!es#y brwer fnr intake Cooling Water Pwmp 3C,3AQ05, t!> open.
- c. Vf:rify bfWer lor Comporu;m Cooling Wa1er Pump 3C. 3A004, <5 open.
- d. Jf breaKer fur 'ntaka Cooiing Water Pump 3C, 3AtJ05. ,!;lB.bre:aker lOr Componem Cooling Wa1efI Pump 3(;, 3AD05, can NOT be opened. THEN ~ Feeder To 4iW &is 30. 3,0\819, AND Suppiy From 4KV-8us 3B, 3AD"'OO:' - -
Note: 3B 4KV bus not stripped due to breaker 3AB11 closed 35
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.: ~ Page ~ of JiL Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to OPyrla9d with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to suppl)(f60tlit/units. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B"A"PqX/P breaker 3AB 11 which has a blown control power fuse aQiFc~,Q not\pe opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the ~BD ""tje from u~t 4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG t~r!en~gize 3~~, j)\,~kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due 0f~ effects of the"'G"tea~\ leak. ,4'
~ ,
'\,,'"
Time Position BOP 6 Verify The A And B 4KV 8iUS lockout Relays - RESET BOP 7 (
- b. ReE-Et affected errer9'~~f}lJy :tHesel \:;c,KOJt
e','3),.
c 1£ fleithercd;o!J'. relay C<ln bE reset. THEN gD 10 SteD 10.
'%, N'0:{7: direr;tlst~ft"'failtJ.retes tJ6ca/ly for 3A EDG.
"~-+------\-\-4'c------c----c "yf
~~~gl~:;~~~:E~;'~~~'Fr~m stat! 3A emergel1c~' diesel frcrn C:"O:~_'1rol Hoo:r1 Rapid siart b \/i2nfy 3,4, 4KV bus s!ripphg f:~c,Wj) t.. HI" any load car; NOT be cliscor11ectJ?d
."'.TTACHMENT 1 - COMPLETED '1iD'TI 3A 4KV bws:-TREN go ~:. Step 0.
d \-tanwaHy SjH'-;,chronixe -3:A -e:nergency r.:l. Loc<liiy sym:hronizr- 311 ema'df1oy ci'2',el
,",.*,,,1 gJ?I1i.H"lcr to ?,4.?KV bus ge:ne-fa<i.or to 3.~ 4~(V bus- -using 3-0NOP-023.2, EMERGENCY OiESEl GENER"'.TOR. FAILURE, while oont1nung I'ith StBC' 9.
Note: NSO reports failure of the ~ EDG turbocharger 36
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:l Page 7_ of.13L Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to OP~J1"~'~ with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C APWP to supplx:/l:5otl)/units. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B/,::rP~~P breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse an;tcan not, be opened from ,!PA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the ~I3'O )e"1rQ,~ ~t 4. Then 3AB 11 IS locally opened allowing 3B EDG to re~.nSlfglze 38\~ 3~t4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 duej,P"l~ effects of the~ea' leak./fir.I,I
,/~;- J'!'i-Time Position BOP 9 Try To ReeThl!fgiz;~ The B .tKV BitS From 38 Emergency Dtese! Gen'!;'r"tor
- b. IF any bac can NOT be diso:mneo;ecl 1rof)1.38 4KV buS,"1'FlEN go 10 SteD 1G LozaHy synchronrze 38- :Bmerge-nc:y dies'::-
q~f'!,er:.ator to -3B 4KV !'f,J,s !Jsiroq 2-{)NOP-,J,n.::, EMERGENCY DIES.EL GE1<ERATOR FAILURE. while conjjnuing with Step 10. I . i***-.. .***,*...,.. 1*\'*AlPte:<'d~t~).~ines 3AB11 breaker preventing completion of bus
. \',\stripp "ng, ontinues to step 10.
\\
'?j
./
/
.f 37
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 c Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: l Page ~ of .1L Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to op with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP tosuppl ot Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B C P breaker 3AB 11 which has a blown control power fuse an can n be opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the S it 4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to r n gize 3 3 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due t effects of the te leak. Time Position Applicant's BOP 10 a, c 2)WH 'ls re~
'38'4RV' ixIs, mw ~ ihe to file 3A or CA1.JIDNS prior to ~p 32 aM go to Sbop E2 to ,peifofm I1!CCYe!y <\COOns.
- 3) Observe C~ plicrID Step 11
.ElWl oontiiMJe with Step 11.
- b. Manually start'~em as ~i""d.
- c. fmp~!l'lent FRPs as required. unless 'W;is procedure was ~tiy ent~ from ouiside 'the E:OP networi; dur~ arm step in effect teo BOP use 3-0NOP-004.2 and 3-0NOP-004.3 to restore ower to the 4KV buses. Both are listed at the end of the cenario for reference. 3-0NOP-004.2 will be the success path via the station blackout tie.
e: RO and US continue in 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. Steps completed depend on timing of restoration of power t03A 4KV bus via the SBO tie. They will go to step 32 when power is restored. CAUTION When power is re.smred to 304 oc 3B 4KV bus. leCOvety ~ .should commtfe' by observing CAUTlCINS p1lOC to Step 32' and then perlOrnring Step 32. 38
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event No.:~ Page JL of ~ Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply bQt* /', its. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B TP9W breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and c?nn9 e opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO. ,tf fro,"",unit 4. Then 3AB 11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to ree~rgt¢!e\~B &\ .~D 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to th ffetts ofttq.~ st~~m leak. ~,,'\
"\"
Time Position RO 11 P!<lCl: Ntm*R;unnrng, Eq~ipm<!!'ntSwit{)hes PULL*TO*LOCK Or STOP As Follows
~ !In--1 3* h,gr~~,r~'3d 51 iY0mpS - PTl
~ Cc,,'"l:t;..~.ir;r"1ent spray purn;-s - PTL 12 RO k"<, Go tD Step 12d
- d. WHEt;' CCW isait,ned to Unit High '*
Head SI Pumps. T}fEN place th.e Un;! 4 High hie-ad 81 PuiiiijiSm Statt:lfuy.. Go to Step l3
* ::;';;:2 Level* can !:!Q! be m::tnlained gi~a~e-r t"\lr 17%. [5G%J e WHm CC'N oS ;;;1>;;,,,,,,, to Unit .. High qead 51 pumps. THEN "IIerify
\10V ~3-S4,3,,4..QB MOV~3-S438 t!pen
.8/:l1il start DOS Un;: " High '-\ea**J :31 Pumps
*35 required Note: Determines Pzr level can not be maintained >170/9 starts U4 HHSIP when MOV-3-843A1B opened.
39
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l EventNo.:l Page~of~ Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply bg,t its. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B T~#(6'W:l/ breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and c;af\ n;>(be opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBq/~ from"unit 4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to reertE§rgjz"3B&,\3D AkV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the(eff.etts of'l'Q,8 st~am l e a k . ' \ , * \ Time Position Applicant's RO 13 LocaHy Close Valves To ISQlate RCP
..J 11 :]'... 297AN R:CP A -SE,a:: b~ecticn Manua!
iSO,,(irm Val,,,,
- 3..297C, Rep C $'2' Isc/adon Valve (WOG) l\ail~re to isolate RCP seal injection to the starting \ c1ti([:rging pump. (ECA-O.O, task H) .
.~,
'\ \,
RO ManuaIl1*:ics~ -31'",5. IE 'iiiJ..,1?5. can WI bi'
",amlally :1c~d, THEN 1o,,;;i1), dDse valoes, CAUTIONS 40
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-0-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:l Page J...L of J.L Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply b its. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B TP breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and c n opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO e fro unit 4. Then 3AB 11 is locally opened allowing 3B EOG to ree r' e B 3D AkV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to th~' cts of e s am leak. Position RO 15 Check If SIGs Are!fQ! Fault,d a~ Check pre5<5ures in all $1<>5' a) Open AFIN PUlT\O S'!eam supply MOV breaiker on faulted 00(5). b) ClO5" AFW iPUlT\O s'!eam supply I\t()Ii/ 00 f~ SJG(s).
- 5) ~ify SIS bIowdo_ isolatioo 'l~
- CLOSED.
- 6) ~ify SIS salT\Oie lines - ;SO-JoTEO.
- 7) ~ify fau\'1oo SlG( s 1steam dUfffl to atmosphere \laM! closed. IF !i.e WI rftjsed, lliIiei man~ dose.
te: Determines CV-3-1608 failed open and local isolation valve losed but leaks by. CAUTION rf CST level decre~t!6 to lass man 10%, Wtakel.Jp watw fic.w.JrCK for 'ihe CST 'wilT be rrecessary ro ~n eooooary heat .sink. 41
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page J.L of J.§L Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply be its. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B TP R breaker 3AB 11 which has a blown control power fuse and c n opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO e fro Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to ree rg' B bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to th eff ts of e s am leak. Time Position RO 16 Maintain Intact SfG Levels
- 3. Narrow r~ fe>tel- GREll<TEfl: THPJ<
5%{32'%]
- c. Narrow <;;ng;e !evel *
-007 to restore A AFWP. Once flow to >345gpm to 3A and 38 RO CAUTION rep 1 of A ITACIi\fENT 3 it; re~ to be performed wirhin me tmrt 60 mifRJieSO of.a ross of afJ AC power !Went if both [he 3A 1 and 3A2 biltieJ}' chal!f!*1S .ilfl! inoperable.
RO 24 Check DC Bus Loads il. Direct cperal!:w ro r~ DC bJs klading as nece'Ssary usiOi! ATIACHMENT 3\ I:L Dispa:tci1 per..onnel to periodically mcniD" DC powersllpp!yvol~ 42
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 6 Page J..L of ~ Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply bo its. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B TP~>WPf breaker 3AB 11 which has a blown control power fuse and c§lrl"ngiibe opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO . ,.tf~ frorl\.unit 4. Then 3AB 11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to reepergi~e"~"B \ D 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to th cts of t leak. Time Position
-~~"
RO 25 Check CST Level - GREATER THfd'4 10% ~I1Y all,gable lNDENSP.TE it 'With the' TSC tor
'f' vessE1 t~Dpe.r hi=,(i'cf V-oi(Rfig IT1Cil occtrr --OtH?
zMdz3.Uon sisK" t.,tOT ,t;. ystoppEd ,tOo ,c~fEtv*e.nt ,this 43
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.:~ Page R of j j L Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open a.nd with 8 AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply botn"u!9its. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 38 TPOW~* breaker 3A811 which has a blown oontrol power fuse and c9rlnoy6e opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the S80.<<:e fro"'unit 4. Then 3A811 is locally opened allowing 38 EDG to reen~{rgiPe"{3B &~D 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to th(effE:cts ot't~ st~am leak. *'.f" \~ '.
"">. <'\
Time Position Applicant's Actio~.s/6r j3ehavior
.ft,V/ { "
RO 26 1)epr~ssurize Al11n\act SiGs To tllA} Psig
, ../" "J'.f
.J Check SiS narrO~'t f;?t"iJ h?liEds - ""'$0" PeitQ{ITl th~JcnC\,'ti~;~~,
...J ';'?REl', -ER 7~1}'JJ e'%~32:~*] tN ~" " J
,A,-r LEAST ON~ SJG l)., f. .t,::on:::.'! l1l}1xTqUrr, AF\'V f~:¥v ,..p;:il
'< {1~,f:.D'\>'::.1,~ge le'jlel g'"e~t~r, t>'3~
I) "'l;;J32 '~~Ul~~; haas1 (?*ne S/G. 2! I;llJirl-of~I7C~\;\r~~nge je';;'.el great~r than E'<%?32~'oJ In"l(t least one ~:;/G. THEN d,) 3tgps Zeb. 2fj~ 25d and
~-ont/~l;~"~~[f~ step 27,
'~'\*.j~'
b ~~k=tnuaHy' (U")P stearr, ( ';i'Sin-p 3/G s:ean rL.Hnp 10
.,:4.;;1<1&<;; .*****
- 1) Con:w SiG s:e.an1 climp :0 3txncf sphere \ratves to stOp SIG depres$.l;fization.
- d. ~ BiG pressures decreaS<&~ to \?SS Ulan i ~':' psig., II;iI;l:i ranually 071tfDi S(G S;:~3l'il <:;~Jmp b') atm~sphe.re ~)
rr*.am:3*'"' 3:':3 pr'SSSf'~c5 3<:; 180 PS~. Ccntn'"\"e \\'\:h St~-;, 27. Note:\Critica/'iask: (WOG/PRA) While depressurizing the SG(s) at
/naximum rate, fails to meet any of the following limiting
,tonditions: 1) SG depressurization is initiated within 100
/minutes of sao initiation, 2) SG depressurization not J'.
,v f commenced until 6% NR level is established and is stopped if at least one SG can't be maintained above 6%, 2) SG pressure is not decreased below 80 psig, 3) RCS cold leg temperatures do not decrease less than 320 F, and 4) the reactor doesn't restart as indicated by a positive SUR on the NIS that causes the plant to heat up. (ECA-O.O, Task G 44
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:l Page ~ of..11L Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply ba its. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B TP breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and c n opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO e fro Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to ree rg B bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to th eff ts of leak. II Tirne Position RO 27 Check Reactor Subcmical
- intsrn'lect!l>,e ri!flgE d1anne!s - ZERO OR NEGA7VE STARTUP RATE
__ =- __ ~ =- __ \ __\111 I I, I l:>pre....:;urizaOOri of S/G~ _ fe~ to Pf:rmiI. I
- I1l\3nual ,'oading fJi ~1TiMi. 1 RO RO Perlorm me fuIlO\\inQ~
iI. Manually ac."1MI1e oontainml!i:l'i isola'lion phase"'-
- b. !E any COii"AairJment isolation phase P.
valve is WI c!osed. mEtimanuaHI' closevM*e. .IE. valvefs) can WI be manually cIcsed. :nIEfi rr_aiIIij or locally isdate affecled oontainment penelram. Verify Cooiainment And Comol Room V'eni:if:a>tioo lsof,atioo
- a. Unit:3 comaiment purge e:o:t\3'Jst anti i:I. r.tmuall~* Slop fan's, supply fans - OFF
- b. Verify Control Room WfIl:ilalion staJills b. Manually align equipmem for CC#\trol Oi!flel - PR.()?ER EMERGENCY Room e~Cj{ ~ireulat1Jl:U).
REC'ROJLtI.T'ON ALIGNMENT 45
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:l Page ~ of JJL Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply ~.~~tf ll!1its. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B TPyvv~/ breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and c§lrf ngrjbe opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via theSBO Jie frorh unit 4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to reenergi~~\~B &,3D 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the. effects ofllqe s~am l e a k . \ ' / "" Time Position Applicant's Acti0lJ)ii'brj3'ehavior RO 31 Check Con,t2iinmlt Pressure - HAS " Pe't;gHT, the follo,\j~\I/ REMAJNIED lESS THAN 20 PSlG "\ ','\, * ">,,J *.,~' ....
'9, \/eritt:. CC01,.tnrlefl~.tS0.a;fCm phase b*
* =*9'~2,-63-Ce,.J!.. ,,\t,CT~ J!.:"Li, /,/
* ;;*~w:;' .. ft3D,z.B
- o. \l#r~j c:Q:,'l;iaii~~'lent iscJabon phase 5 "lave white'lights ohV""B - AU 2'\:0*;..;-:-,
~. j[ any o:4ttaim~~*nt. iseiar.km phase E
< " .." '-" lIahle is. N01\pbsed>THEN rnanuaHy
"" *.,close liaVe:1F Iti\le{~NOT be
'IT~mplly dcSE.d\~~~;';pi1anllally' Dr icc..,,"y i5ola~e"t~. affec~~itah1)ent
/**~r"'lrat,"n..
,So "'' )f
./ d. Reset dontiljfli'i".",,1 spray 'Signal.
iONS fGrioo r/tro*ugho;,'t aO Df ,he EOPs.
;>'<"':"'~ ,I'"
FWptimp;ifare,Q,P!,!(njng 9;>" singfe rr.. fn one of rile pumps needs ro be
, down wiznin one hou['&fIlle iniriai s[.,,, s.ign.. r using .J-OP-07S, AUXfUARY
".~EED~'ATER SYSTE~. Subsecrion 6.2.
>1c
- If"~:o rrarns are oJ'}e'-ati'ng and 01>e of che AFV{ pumps has be-en Dperaring
*..nrb . fi'Ow of .'es-5 than W gpm. [Ile* pump sJ1o!;'lld beshu( down wirhin
., one hbtJr or.*operadng ar less .han 60 gpm usIng ;f-OP-C7S:, AUXIUARY
'fEEDW.4T-fR SYSTEM, Subsection 6. 2.
<'h .}_,
'\RO Check CQt:". Exit TCs " LESS THAN 120U*F !f cere e.. i~ temperillures greater than 1200°F AND *"creasing* .J::!:i.ei 9c t:, SACRG-:
-S='iERE ACCiDENT CONTROL RJ8{'{~
GUiDELINE INiTIAL RESPONSE. St;;pl.
*-**--/-------L..---/--------------------------------II
( 46
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-0-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: 6 Page 1L of ~ Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply boj1"l"'U9is. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B TPD'W~i'/ breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and ca,r< n?t"be opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SB9./tj'~fro~.\unit 4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EOG to ree,p::!Fgi9'e"~,~ &/~D 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to theteffe'tts ""\. .{,:-" onne steam
"\.. '\,.,
l e a k . ' f' \.\. Time Position BOP 33 J Ched( 3p. arod 35 -WI! blJ~es - ene!tfl~':~ LLnftrli)<V tWJS is being
,AT LEAST ONE E~JER3:Z,,=D 1,4"i* St~s!i5n BlackoVi Tie e.r:w.
FR:OM THE 3*ft;. OR 3-8.* EDG E\.,',6!14 IIKV bus is energized
;j~tEDG.1!:lE!:! perkIn-! :be fO,'Pt:('SYJ1';S'_S by $81t-,t19 S/G to atlj;1os;phere valve
,.,~..,t.m)!",,<t.., IT..l1nfain SIG pres'SmEs by ;tG sphere '~~~hfes N)
- b. Ccrdru:e- to centre'" ReS c-ord~,iiDn5, anj rrcnito! plant status.:
- 1) Ghec~sta:usof 1.0-:;;1 acticns:
- 4KV bus p-c'~*fer res:tcra.ttof'l 41 RCP se-31 isda.t;c~:
- DC pcwel supply
- 2) lE beric ac/d s:tor-a~&~ tank rcom' tempe:ra.lure less than 55<F, THEN ccnsl);t TSG st.lrf fo>~ p'fESi.b~~ bone acid .conoen~.filjjon r':edlli~icn Ci'"
drainag>p.: of the h:~nc a.c~d s-~or;)-9'e tanks*,
- 3) Jf s-p.E'0.:~ fuel pit lo\'~ ievei aA3fm is or*i'.
lH!;li ",iii;;te makevp te the spem n~~i ph ~'!i~2::~~!N,?:.~<~Q.J.3, 1,~,:~"Et¥, F\.iEL Pi" \;,rP.1 G*...,*)L+1G ~., I EM MIILFUNCTON.. 4\ Locally perfom, O-ONOP-026.J DC EQUPMENT AND Ir1VERTER ROOM SUP>='Lt:MENTAL COOLING.
- 5) Dbsef'J-e CAI-J"T:ON :;:,,;~:or to .step 15 8WJ. r..lurn ;.0 Step 15.
Stabilize SSG Pressures
- a. S>E': SiS steam c)l.m1p 10 atncs!*"e,"e *."aIve ccnircners, .tel ma.intalft S/Q presS;l.n~E*S -
.5TA.BLE 47
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:~ Page JJL of ~ Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply bOJh' units. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B TPyWP,,,/' breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and cgn'ngYbe opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO,tre frortLunit 4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to reepergl?e\~B &*~D 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the::effects of the st~am l e a k . ' \ , .,J '." \, Time Position Applicant's Action~'br~ehavior CAUTIONS",
- ""'->. /;,//' ,~d
*',w.P,*
- Sready STare loading on each U!llr 3' Erner~nc)"!li~tel' 9e'neraroT shall NOr exceed 2500 KW. Load rransie.nrn; up w 275fJ il(W are acO!!praLl,'e when srarong addirj('rhil e q t f i p m e J R " "
/', '*'c.
- Sready HaTe ({Jading I'm e:3';I1'Ul~!r 4 Emergency DJ'reset Ge~*"aror shaD NOr I?)"ceed 2874 KW. Load t~T!'S.i.t:'nrn; Upcro 3161 KW are aoeep't3hie when sra(1.ing
.3o\dirjonaf equipmenI ; <,\, " .*,.,...... 'co,,;
- BOP 35
(
"" Manually close !Dad cor:rci cert.er t4"'akerS to Energiz<E 4S~1 \'D*' "~:~l~J Genters.
* 'C;011puter Room Chiller
'\t 8~ery Rccrr Air CorIC1ioners -
,\,
.~. ,If!:: l6E .:3Cem(1 E16F !4D625) g, Spent F'Jel ;: 1 ::'¥.ha;.;st F311 Plant Vern .? PiNG 3J.':'.:: S*PIN3 48
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:~ Page JJL of JJL Event
Description:
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O. MOV-3-1405 fails to open ~.nd with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply bO,th ulj)its. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B T~9W~//f breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and cgrfng,t"be opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowere::l via the SBO. tt frorf1\unit 4. Then 3AB1. ~ is ~ocally opened allowing 3B EDG to re~gerg,~*"~.B &\~D 4kV bus. Transition IS made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to thE(\efl~cts of th.e s am leak. "'c/' '\, Time Position US 36 49
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: --=2..=;..00.=....;9,---3.=....;0,---,1_ Scenario No.: _6_ Event No.: ~ Page _1_ of_6_ Event
Description:
The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 since PZR level < 17[50] % or SI actuated due to the effects of the steam leak. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs performance of actions per 3-EOP-ECA-O. CAUTION If SI is feeSef and eitrN?f offsHe pO,,"ieT is lo.st (l'r
.manual ,'dkm rHaJl be reql.Jin:d to restore Gonfiguril'tiQn.
I RO 1 Verify 51 - RESET RO 2 ( !E cold leg recirculation has previollsly been ast3biisbed. IJ;il;.!:J. verifyccJd leg rec1rculabon lineup'. Ref.,f to 3-EOP-ES-L3,. TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECiRCULATION.
- b. !Ecoid leg r.,Dirculaticn has !::!.QI. beer est2I:Aished,.I.l:1.f.Ji go to 3-EOP-ES-1.3.
TRiI,NSFER TO COLD LEG RECiRCUL,4TiON. c Go to Step 3 Manu.;i:Hy ~:(~,'gn \r.a~v'5's to esta.bFsh pre'p!?", S*; angnment erma1 Ba'rrier CCW fs,olation a Obsene CAUTIC1N pri,:>r tD Step 5 .AND go t):> step 6. b, Rep Thermal Barrier CCW Outlet. '0. ManuaLly 'schlie CCW from HCP th*efrna' MO*V-*3...{526- .- Gto'S.ED b~~rr-jers: Close Rep Th-ermal bathe.r CCVV Outlet, MO\"-2-62e. Locady clcs.e 'CC'~'V te':vrn. manual isolation "-':.>I,,,e out'S1de oontail"l'ment. 3-7~<eL 50
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: --=2..::..00;:..;:9,--3;:;..;0::.....:1:.-.. Scenario No.: _6_ Event No.: 6a Page~of_6_ Event
Description:
The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 since PZR level < 17[50] % or SI actuated due to the effects of the steam leak. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CAUTION Steady state' loading on each Unit 3enlergencJI" diese 25;Q("I r<w. Load tranSients up to 2750 KWare ac:{,>~1a
./'"
eql.lipment~
;1" BOP 5 Mamlalty L03dlntake CI),cding \II/ate! PIlt;nps
.on EI1,ergized Buses \,
-=-0\/-3--4.882
* ~O\/-3-4S83 1.E:kJl1i!h,,,;ril",ke cockng watef he.3,ders are irtac ciir.:'c* :opera'tor to tj,~
h.aader:; t.og:ether.
-OJO. COMPONENT COOLf/IG WATER 1:} S-tart 01 stop- CCV/ pumps .3S necessary to esL"IbHsr CIi'**jLY* ONE RUNNING CCW FUklP.
2';\ If Gnly two C:CVV,Heat Exchar~fler-s ate
!P s-E'fvic-'E' and \10V-3-74;9.A. and MO\i-3-74G-8 are open . tlr~'c< CC:-'/"i Punlps are requiP8c to :be' ma;:nt.aine.d
,noULL-TO-LOCK
- 1) St~rt Of stop CGVV PV!1lp'S. *as necE:s;s,afl' to
.stab-hsh Of\lL"{ TVVCJ RUl<ilJfhiG CC~f~1 PUMP'S,
- c. .LE both CCV!J- be-ao\ers are 'niac't I..t:I.el dked opecraiorto, tie heade1!'S together.
~~~+-~~~~~~'----------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I 51
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event No.: ~ Page~of_6_ Event
Description:
The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-EOP-ECA-O.2 since PZR level < 17[50] % or SI actuated due 10 the effects of the steam leak. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 7 Realign SI System
- a 'Verif:l Unit 3 h\gh:'~be.,31d 51 pUf}~pS ~- TVVO -,)
RUNNING Note: starts 3A and i', RO 8
- .. - -~ .. _-
.t:!Qll.
.. - _ .. - - - - - - I
.. ------~ _ _ ,_ _ I Dkect Of-H?rator To P'I;;I~e H'ydn:>ger1 MC>!1r!ofs In 5eP/i'ce Using 3-0P-OS4, CONTAINMENT POST ACCIDENT r,K}NTWRING SYSTEM CAUTiON If CST level decreases fio JeGs Ulan 1&%, mak'lfpIII'ilter SOVT,::es for CST wiH be necess,~ry to maintain a secOlldary heat sink 52
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 6 Event No.: --.2L Page --+/-- of _6_ Event
Description:
The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 since PZR level < 17[50] % or SI actuated due to the effects of the steam leak. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 10 Ma intain Intact SiG Lev<ls
*Jt NarrO'N ra-ng<e level - G:REATE'R THAN a 5%[32%;
.t"."'lFI1Unws - AT LEAST ONE
(
- c. S!OP rei:cf flO\v to any- $/<::3 Mth narrow range level greater than e.O%,
Perform th<.foIhDW'ing:: RO Ii., \.f,a:nu.an,i' 3:'ctuate ccnta;.i;nrnerd
;;s:oka~ion p,hftS,e A..
0, If. any coma"mI1'.ent H;,'olabon phase A val\'e is !iQ! dosed.l.!:!.§!:!. manuailly
~:AOS;20 VahlE' . .if. vaive~s} can HQIbe manuai!y dc)sed THEN manval1y or ioeallv iSQlate affe~:ontamt1",er.t penetta1i.or.
Verify Contair1lrnertl And Controi Room VentUation isol.3tion a lind 2 ':)ontairme{1t purge exhaust and s;~ppiy l.:lns
- OFF b VeriThi Ccmrol ROCf7v1; ,rertiik~tion s1at...Js o. k1a,nuaUy akgr q'tlfpmen: for Centred wn~-PROPEREMERGENCY Room emergency red.rctlla~ion REe IHGUL.ATIONA.UGNhtEJH 53
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: -=2-=..00=9::....:-3=0,---,1_ Scenario No.: _6_ Event No.: ~ Page~of~ Event
Description:
The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-EOP-ECA-O.2 since PZR level < 17[50] % or SI actuated due to the effects of the steam leak. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO 13 Verif~' C,oJ'ntainment Spray NOT Required
- a. Contahl11ent pre.ssure - HAS REMAINED a.
LESS THAN ::0 PStG ccntaklrneri spray ""8h.~e-~\~ eme1gellcy align '(lent !.E .\.
!::I.QL.Il:;f,fJ:l. rrar"aily aJig.n ViPll?(~Yo".
as nece5Ea~. !.E v.alve(s) can t:!.QI '\ be ,.,-,anl;}ll!'1 j,ji~ned. ~ locallY
&{
align o:y,iith'et. ~ ~,
,,~!1~vajjyf~ad one Contain men:
*Spra:t"'P',,mp.
#/
Ve-{ify co~tahmerl isolat~cn Dh","~.se B val\ie(sj cLDsed.!E!iQ.I- ~
. dose val\*e(s}. I.E. valve(s)
-be rranualiv aligned. THEN
~~ale{s.').* --
RO 14 A:.I.i9'JCq!!J~a inm",n t S pra y\~,um!Y\s ~Iit'~h e,%f 1> P:ac-,;: Dne cO'1tamJ";!.,'i'rt spray pl..rr!V h st.,mdbf*
- 2) t"la.irrtair* on-e Dcrltai"nrnent sp~ay pump ir PUlL-"'O-LOCY.
3:, GD te Step 15. tJ. / PI.Jic.e both Ccrjta~""Il1;;eri SP"-,3Y P J1nqs ir
-~.TANDBY'
\'
' ' -. ~
a R0fi;;,s;,t",';njectian isoiaTen valves Dvtside a Lc"~a 'II' akl!H? vaiwes be.lore 5tarl1g! oonlainmenl- CLOSED chargin9 plimp.
----------------------- NOTE
~.-----.-------------.-.
54
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: _6_ Event No.: 6a Pagelof_6_ Event
Description:
The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-EOP-ECA-O.2 since PZR level < 17[50]% or SI actuated due to the effects of the steam leak. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US 16 Go T'O 3-iEOP-E-1" LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1 ,.J"'**,
<*"" )
/'$ "
Note: scenario is terminated upon ~,ctmRletion of J.EOP-ECA-O:'2.
/ y ",
( 55
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:~ Page _1_ of JJL Event
Description:
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Uses 3-0NOP-004.2 to restore power to the 3A 4K\t.(t5LS/f '\. ,of" CAUTlQN The CCW System load requirements of 3*0P*030. C SYSTEM,shaU noC be exceeded.
~- .. - - -- .. - - - .. ~ Ncr~'S-I . g f).*'Ol*lOP'*'1D5, COt-iT-Rot ,ROC'tA- EVACU.
- t"lO T be 1.iS-eO, I . l'f EJ11ergenc'.v op:erating p - ~~!?dLN'i.t~ are {VO T in
- using 3-0NOP~'J04, to; SfTE PDWER I .
I ( 56
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:~ Page L of ~ Event
Description:
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4 using 3-0NOp*:004.2
,?,
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 1 Verify Bus Stripping On 3A 4KV Bus
,3 Veri')' 3A 4h:V bu!> s!rippil"\g I::;,:ng ATTACdMENT 1 ';',,<
/1:'_ **F: """\,
0, C heok 3A 4KV bus - AIJTOM,!\ TilCALlY b,,,/bt.sgl'i/e CAUTiON pr'cr to 51ep 1\f\ND REENERGiZED /' g9"~c Step .2, "\,
.,~;;'
Note: attachment 1 completed eai"l{er CAUTION Em>?rgencjI [lfes>?! GenemtQt.s'/;'h.qtfkl NOT be nm tlnl*(}a~d fon;nore thalJ 4,5 hot/l"S.
~ ,
---"---------.~.- --.-------~-------------1'?!~-"+_\.-...'-.."",'~-~~~------"---'\,-----------11
\ .~,.
BOP 2 Cne-ck 3A 4KV 8us Loc~oLlt'~i'la;:'~*R~SET ( t>. !E 38 4KV bus i~ energiz:o, IJ::lW oe rform the follc..wing: 1'; D-ete-nn1 ne and en "rect C"31...l.se 'Of 3A 4V,\/ bus lockout 1"eiay aciuCi-uon.
~.! ~ oa,Jse of 3A, 41-<,/ bus loo~out P? :ay 3,:.t>Jati:on is oet.arnl' ne-d a nlj
{)Qn:c~ed, :r.w;.ti rese, 10'::"'0(;'1 r-el;:;y.
"!..-. ~ 3A 41<\/ bu'; *:oc*kou~ reLay is reset.
!!::!.5.!i Qbserv-e CAUTiON pr'or to SlE'P 3 8!::I.D. go to St.:p :!<.
CAUTION
"\
{fantSI <signal exi<sts or i.s ac.rtlafed whO\? perfomling this pro.ceduf'e, i't is reqtlii"ed to p.e re:set tQ ensure restcJ"atiofl of a pcwer souroe and to ename oontroffed loading of ieqvijm1ent on the 4KV Inls . y' ~
/
------~--~~*,-.----~u~--~.~---------------------------*-----------------------------------------~I BOR.,/f" /3 Verify 51 Reset Res--et s~
'\.
CAVII*ON The affected EOG may Auto-Start when tfle loc/fo.ut ReJay is reset in Step 4. ( 57
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:l Page~of~ Event
Description:
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4 using 3-0NOP-004.2 j/'\
""f Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 4 Check 3.A EmErgency Diesel Lockout Relay - RESET Perf~fm thE fobq~Il~'f;g:
",/
,,,/~
energizec. ~ ?i\'i ~c d correct 03use of3:-- ." Dies!! lookeu!. Rela/\ "". D
):60a,'1' 'esEt 3A Emerge'1cy DiEsel Staci'",
~
Fai'uri! Pelay. .***. '%. J
/' .
- c. IE :be 3.:",a.;(0 38A~::\I buses are Dot')
\'" de'Ef"lBwCZ'f'd, rfiEN ri!set 3A. E01erllerH~y
\1i!i:~r'LD:y~Y .
.:i\'IE 3.A.l:~BrllBnoy Diesel LockoUl ReAay
"'b;;,r N,j,T be reset, THEN ooser.'e NOTE pr,<Jl'!o~tBp " "",n---
'}~~, v~go to- ~.. ~;e:p v."
\", '\0 Steady state icadingol'l transIEnts tiP to 2750 ,,<'W are 58
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page ~ of ~ Event
Description:
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4 using 3-0NOP;p04.2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 5 Try To Re*energiH* 3A 4KV Bus From 3A EnlerY!lncy Diesel Generato'f
,1 Manually starr. 3A EmBrge-ncy Diese -3 Generator fpJM1 Contn)1 Rocto b 'Veri,)' 3A 4K\/ bus ing is complete. .ItfW
.t>.TTACHMEHT 1 -
c. Ivoni:ze 3ft.. En,,,*ergency Diesel 13 103ft. 4KV bus ucsmg 3-0NOP-Ct23.2. EMERGENCY o:IESEL GH~ER"",TOR FAILURE. e Perfc*rm the following: n Shut down 3A Emengency Diese!
-Ger,eralDf using 2*,..OP---G23.
Et\4ERGENC'{ DfESEL GENERATOR 2'} Obse'1ve hlOrE pr~;cr to ,S~e1P e .8!:!Q.
*::;orlinue "liih Step e.
-..,-NOTE - .. ---~-----
'r;","J thar 51' is re-sef prior to cloclng' Sfartup Trar.-slorlll¢':i bus supply breaJ(ers $'hc.ufd C Ensor' the bre:,a~:erz !;viN c..kJ.sE'.
59
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No,: 2009-301 Scenario No,: ~ EventNo,:~ Page~of~ Event
Description:
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4 using 3-0NOP:004.2
-;f "\~
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 6 Try To Reenergize 3A 41<'1 Bus From Unit 3-Startup Transformer
- a. Check Urd:: S;iutup Tr;;fls'ormer Poterba! 'lv'hite Li@riem VPA - ON 41/
D, Check Un~~t :3 St.3ttup Transformer Lockout P,e'rfc;fm the followil'!g:
/,>'
R.elay - REDE'" c,/:'
'1} 'T~:I to re§~o~{ c:rsite pO!ltE'r to Unit 3 S~i:f<"tl.tp..rrar)~ormer uz,:ng:
'3-:q:~"rop-q¢*..3, STAR"TVP
-,gAt";SFORMER MAlFdNCnON.
""" / / '
2; :JQ5~:'le CAUr{)N "r,d ;'-lOTE [:.riO' t( S1ep 7 .81:J.Q. go to Step -; .
- c. (), ~ b),% stripping is ':complete.ll:!f.I:i
;'0 1b\~~eo 84;!.
PLace Sta1:"lp ;ra~sfc~r\nE<" 3j!., 4r{'./ Sus. 3A,';G5 to 6f~ ( &,,,,."-"""':':<<',~.,-><-. t/ Clo,,,,, Stgnl() Trarsi'orr'2t3,';
\,
3,t.J\,~,e
\. \\-
3A 4~<\/ bLi.~:':E'~~~'E'RG44i~t;v,f h. Observe CAUTlON ana NOTE prior to
"'''., / S:ep ., .81:J.Q. go to Siep -;,
~h<<:~j',j" CAUTION L'padillg Oil the opposite< unit .stilrtup transformex sh aU NOT exceed sao amp'",
i"~-~---------.------------
. HQIf
- f 1. /l1\:nen Unit:] .ctartu:o rra!1S":J:T11r}$ .aeadabJe, o!fz{te pc,wEr to ~h.'? JA 4}(\/ bu's should be "i' ~ restC::l'-e<i U':ll1g 3-0F'<J04.1'. SYSrE/~6 RESTOF?ATtOl FOLL-DiVING LO.SS OF OF,FSfTE J
-./
1/". FOVVER.
" "'>\,<;/"/
/
..... ______________________ 1 60
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 (~ Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.:l Page.Q.... of J..L Event
Description:
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4 using :>ONOP-004.2 me Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 7 Try To Re1!nerqiz 3A 4KV Bus From Unit 4 Startup Trarrsfofmer
- a. Check Unit 4 Startup Transfol'mer Potential Whim Lighi 00 VPA - ON
- b. Check Unit 4 Startup Transfol'mer Lockout Relay _. RESET c.
d.
- f. Localiy close breaker.
- g. ObSeNe CAUTION ano NOTE pqiodo Slep 8 At:!Q. go to Sltep a.
CAUTION Tie Une may be used only whim bofh the 3A and sa 4KV d.
-~ - - - - --N'oTE-- - - - - - - --.'"
3A and 38 <IlKV Iwses acre both deenergized tte~ offsite pGWer ;md Unit 31 rg~ncr Die:&ei Generatom a:re NOT avaiJai:lIe, pcwer needs to be restered to at {e;ast e of these 4KV ttwe-.s- wfihin 10 mirrutes to s-atfsfy ru'atioo bJackO'Ut J'E?quirements. Start 10 min -- -- -- -- ---- -- -- -- -- --~. clock Critical task: (TC-SBO Analysis) Failure to restore power to 4KV bus from the opposite unit via the SBO within 10 minutes after reading the caution in 3-0NOP-004.2.13-0NOP-004.3 61
Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: l Page L of ~ Event
Description:
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4 using 3-0NOP:004.2 ",f '-i-\
" 4' Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 8 Determine If Stat!;OFl Blackcllt Tie Line May Be Use;:!
Ch~ck 32.4&<'/ OW'S. - DEENERGHZED Check 4.1'1 ard 48 41<\1 buses - .4 T LEAST CINE ENERGIZED
~~It'~i~" 4*x:V bus is. energiz.Ed,. ~
go 10 Step 16. BOP
- a. R.eset 3D 4i<\f bus hockout rElay.
- b. .i.E. 3D 4KV bus lockout tEla)' can WI. be reset, .I!:!.5! gc te" Step 1 e.
Pe?rio'm the? following: Ope-*n S-upply' Fron1 4FV 8-i~lS 3 B. 3,A,OCe 4Y;V Bus 3D. 3.tA' 7 - c. Glose S'dpply ;:ro11:41<\1 Bus 2A 3AD01
,j, G*losee Fe:eder To 4XV 8lJ:~ 3D, 3AA 17
- e. IE 3D 4 <{V' bv~ C<iin J:l.lll: be aligned to 3."" 4KV btls, .ll:!§!:! go to Sje?P 15 te: realigns 3D 4KV bus to 3A 4KV bus per RNO steps.
62
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ( Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:~ Page JL of ~ Event
Description:
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4 using 3-0NOP:;,004.2 /J"- ""0
~,:/f'-
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 11 Verify 'Station Blackout Permissive Blue Light For Station Blackout Sre3ker, 3AD07
-ON
- ~ penn~$'Shl-e ca-r! .!:iQ.!
N go to Step t5 BOP 12 bus using 4~Ot<iOP~D04,,5, LOSE. OF 4041<'.1 BUS. b IF 4D 4¥..'>/ bus can NOT be eI1ergllzed. THEN 'go to S,eo '15-,-
""'""',..... ':::"'~J';;ot",;..:..~:....:.:~
'station bJachot1t c';:;;,Htion exists. I*oading 011 ei/ch Unit 4 Emergency 13hall be IimHed to 3095 Kill.
V bus SLi'pf-lIyfng power to the 40 4,1(\/ bus is energized by ,l/1 EOG Blackout Brellher 4AOQ7 is dosed, non-rullning .safeguards DOS St1ppi'l,ing p'O>lter should be placed in PULL- TO-LOCI'( or auto.stllIT and possible o'verio,n:i 0 f the EDG. ( 63
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.:~ Page JL of ~ Event
Description:
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4 using 3-0NOP-004.2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 13 Cho?ck 4KV Bus Supplying Power To 40 4KV Bus* ENER.G1ZEO BY OFFSITE POWER NO~f'!/~1:"R{)l;/aG,~s non i~nni(fg safeguards equipment in pull to IQck f'<' \ ' ; \ \ (AU lION
'<<lJ;bhlvi'n9 power to the 40 4KV 8m; i6 lost after j 6e& the associ"ted EOG (WtpHt breaker wiN eel, 0.. Dlre-ct Unit.4 RO "t:: dOSe ,Staiion Blackcut BrEaker 4.A.DC7 U-E::~nG kel'loDK switch f~(e\, Number 8,2)
VeTify 3A ,¢KV 8.,15 - ENERGIZED Bus energi Note: BOP should inform US that 3A 4KV bus is energized via the zed station blackout tie. 64
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:~ Event No.:~ Page ~ of..1L Event
Description:
3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4 using 3-0NOP-004.2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 16 Verif~' 51 - RESET CAUTION If this is the fires! hus Ff!'storea foHowing a loss of 0 b,e I";;.energizffd as directffd ill the appli'cable Emer
]*ONOP-004. LOSS OF OFFSlTE POWER BOP 17 Loc.ally Verify N'O Brea,kef Targets Exist 3A 4KV Bus Breakers BOP 18 V~rif,. ;lA,4KV Bus Is Energi,z:ed EL Go to pf*ocedure *in Centers 65
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: l Page _1_ of L Event
Description:
3B 4kV bus is repowered via the 3B Emergency Diesel following opening of breaker 3AB11 per 3-0NOP-004.3 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Uses 3-0NOP-004.3 to restore power to the 3B 4 CAUTiON The CCW System kJad requirel'l1E'1lis of 3-OP-03Il S '(STEM, ;r;hafloot be exceeded. I I # I I I . ¥then JB 4KV Bus is I' lost 3B Emergency Df!? BJ~8~ 3.4D07. BOP 1 ote: 38 EDG output breaker will not close automatically due to 38 sequencer being inoperable. 66
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: l Page L of L Event
Description:
3B 4kV bus is repowered via the 3B Emergency Diesel following opening of breaker 3AB11 per 3 - 0 N O P - 0 0 4 . 3 / , " ' Y \ , Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior AITACHMENT 1
;Page 1 of 1) 38 4iKV BU S SmlPPllllG IE 38 ;!KV !:kiS 'S de-energized AND 30 4KV Sus is ali!;pet t,)
B;;dcut T \2 Permissi~" E;k;: light i5 ON AND Station IF 35 4K\/ B\JS is de-e:ner-oized ANI) 3D 4~~V Sus is N P~nYli5.s've Blue '--?~h'1 '$ C;=F THEN '!,nEri~o( ~be fo-':,:)
.3:A.:B22._ 38 4.K\I B;'tlS Tie To 3A. G'{ 3C 4~KV-3]!"BO£ .. Stlt;tup Tra!'!-sfo'1Tier 38 4:k\t Bus S-';J\~pty 3..A,8()2. Au:dk;;ry TransfcJTne'" 38 Bus Supply 3,,:"21 n" Hater Draml Pump- '3;2-3,~.821 ,. C*,:nd:e-nsaie .,
( lE. hrea'~er for ::,ntak'E' CC1Jling V\'!-ater Pu~mp 3C, -3.-~.D05, OR bre3:~;ef rO'f C>:xl1pon~rr. C:ooHr~g VV,32ter P"I11P 1C.l~f.X4, can NOTb,,' opened, THEN open Feeder!,) 4KV 8us 30.3/\819, AND SUi;:?!)' FfDm 4f(V 8m 3E, 3AD05. f O'i'rects NSO to open 3AB11, 3B TPCWP breaker locally.
,,~
Note: NSO will call to inform US breaker is being opened following restoration of 3A 4KV bus via the SBO tie. Following 3AB11 breaker opening the 3B EDG breaker will be closed manually. ( 67
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: l Page .L of L Event
Description:
3B 4kV bus is repowered via the 3B Emergency Diesel following opening of breaker 3AB11 per 3-0NOP-004.3 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 2 BOP Resei.SIl. Perform the followng:
- a. 1E 8A. 4KV bus is energized. THEN wI to determine ~ rorrec.i eal.l!ie of 3B Efrmrgi!!'lC)' Diesel LoCiWul Relay acwat~.,
- b. w...a!!y reset 313 E~ Diesel Start Fail~ Reia}'.
- c. IF the 3.4 ;ind 3B 4i<V buses are both
~ergized. THEN reset 3BErnergelWj Diesell.ockwt R.etay.
- d. 1E3B Ermergency Diesel LookOOl: ~\atf
'Zan NOT be resa, THEN ~e NOTE Fqlo~ep 6AHO go to Step e.
CAUTION 68
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page ~ of L Event
Description:
3B 4kV bus is repowered via the 3B Emergency Diesel following ops:ning of breaker 3AB11 per 3-0NOP-004.3 ./ """ Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
----;-:---=~---,-
NOTES I I I 5 BOP WHENl bus slq;<pin'ij1 is ccmp",:le, THEN GO toSlep eD.
\i:fJrify Sl - RESET.
- d. LccaH'y' s~TIchroniz:e 38 Emergency C~re:5el G:a1eratCJ.:r tc 3B 4K'd b1JS UStr1:g1 3<JNOP-02:32. Et-.i1ER:t::3EN%CY D!ESEL GENERATOR FJ'.IUJRE.
e". Pmorm the f{)~k:wJing:
',' Sh!Jt Ij:0\\\1 .38 Em~r~;;;enc~t Diesel Generator -using 3-C~?..-c-23" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR.
- 2) Observe NOTE ~'O<~iOt 1c Step e A-tiU co-ntinue wi'th S'iep e
. 38 EDG will be manually synchronized to the bus Verify S! - RESET BOP 16 Local I:,' Verify No Break,!!,f TaPilieis Exist On ]£ an'l 35 4KV bus break:? target is in, THEt4 DO NO~ the assodated C8mPOlieni 3B 4"1i Bas Breaker t3:f9'-t is. deteri'"nined
_**_------------------------------------------11 Note: dispatches NSO to check breaker targets 69
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: 6 Page 2..- of L Event
Description:
3B 4kV bus is repowered via the 3B Emergency Diesel following op,~ning of breaker 3AB11 per 3-0NOP-004.3 / .
~-./~
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 17 R'~nergize Load Center $8 b Che~k Load (eoNer 33* ENERGIZED 18 BOP 1'~ Localry pt:~:ce the $e.qje;n~:?e.f XS-l key
'5~"rt-d1 to the OFF :D<:?5ivCfl
';;} ,.A.ttanol t,o CICSB 3D -L"a.d Ce.nt~l"
!keaki" .3Aj'j*14
- b. Periorm 1he folbl'iilng:
LeGally veri~" 3D Fee*c Fro .." 38 4KV Bus 8reakel", 30410 - CLOSED.
- 2) iF 3D Lead Center can NOT be re,mergized. THEN consult wib lhe ShdtManilgert.:l detennb" if3D L::>?)j Center should be !f£nergiz"c from oppasi:~e ~ra~n SCfiJV<JE< usi'l.:;' 3. 4)P-*('C;6:.*
4BO \lOLT SVJl'TGHGEAH SYSTEM:, Check 3ft Load Ce-/11er- ALIGNED TO AN Manuaiiy align 3H Load Center te an ENERGIZED LQAD CENTER eregzE'd lead CE'nier. CAUTION Thle CCW SY'srem J020ls requrre!ll<l1ts of 3,,{}P*Q30, COlilPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM. sha:f1 nor be exc-eeded.
-N:d'TE -
if any G"CT'rlpG\'1Ent PCWEIEd from .S' oeenetifPzEo m::ttcy conrroi' center mU5[ be starl?d, trye I affected motor centro" <:center r:'2d:; to be reer;erg~;zeo cr:;'V"fg 3-0P~OOT 480 VOLT J;,fOTOR I G'C)i~*lTR-C4_ GEl~'<iTE-R.
~ '
70
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: l Page ~ of l Event
Description:
3B 4kV bus is repowered via the 3B Emergency Diesel following opening of breaker 3AB11 per 3-0NOP-004.3 ~, Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 20 Restart COI'llt:Hmmts Supplied Sy 38 4KV Sus ,As Direcie1:l 8)1 The Shift Manager 0.;, ocal!y p~3De ihe s.eq"en0er X8-1 ~ey sw"leh :0 lhe OFF c'::<sit-cn
;/,"'>-
,1I,1temp! t.t{,lo5e$;ffe::tB:J b'eaker.
If
- E Res ~::LjJ' Heat R!nOlfaJ PJ fnp
},.:I, Energency ';:'£jl't;l,inn'en: F:.er =al'1
- ' ~"1':<:- "'~<<:,:.., ..
3.3 Er'1ergeno,' (A)r;,,'t~~nrr.*en~"'F<;~~.r ;: Jif';
- f 3D MCC al)gpeo~'3a,pus, '4,.""
<;. "",'~ "c,
.3A Er'1ergenc'l Ct;ntaihp'!:en: C~j'J;sr~
\, ,
ri'fn~ (:oc',e:f /' ( 3B'*~us:~./~'
\/' ,,;,.'
/
'lVat;;c)'unp q~,,~ ,f'-
Clwtk If ,A,dditiona! Load;4*0n,'is 4KV Sus S~Uld Be Started
'..3 ~~Ck 38 4K.V blJ5 - EN::S:GiZ::J BY
'\, UHIT~~ 3T11,RTUP TRftNSFORNiER b ~:art ~r",conen:5 suppiiee by 36 'VI) b. SequE1cer 'failure rf:;~y ha.ve OOJl.*.H*Tec~
b'JS 'Zii>ljfrec~ed by :1'1" Silin ~,~,?n"'?;;' pert,::TIT. the fcbiowirrJ:
.3'3 ~ Ciro~ .':~t~in~ ',itfl'ater ~!Jfnp
- 1) Loc..3.1iy plaCi? 111e sequenter X.5-' ,;e},
switoh IQ thE OFF pos :ion.
- 2) At:enlpt te. dose affected breakii:l'S.
3 t>,uxiiiarl 8uii!:!i!1!;, Ex"'aust Fan {J A. fan "s1C( rtinning)
- c. !>loufy CherlHslry to 'IE'C"f<f prQperoperaiicn of ,he plan: SP: \JG units 71
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: ~ Event No.: ~ Page l of L Event
Description:
3B 4kV bus is repowered via the 3B Emergency Diesel following opening of breaker 3AB11 per 3-0NOP-004.3 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP 22 Check SWion Bbckoot Breaker. 3A007 - OPEN 72
NRC XXIV- NRC- SEN- 6 OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO: Field Supv.: Outside SNPO: Admin RCO: ANPO: Unit 3 Unit Supv.: Unit Supv.: RCO: RCO: NPO: Plant Status Unit 3 Mode: 2 Power: 4 100 MWe: 0 756 Gross Leakrate: .02 .02 RCS Boron Cone: 1140 286 o erational Concerns: RO assigned to control steam generator levels while . U3 Antici none none Turbine rolling at 1800 RPM ready to sync generator to grid. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 30% for a flux map. 3-GOP-301 in progress at step 5.52.2.
Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator Mode: 2 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 4 Gross: .02 A 6614 MWe: o Unidentified .01 B 6631 Tavg: 549.5 Charging Pps: .01 C 6621,(,\" RCS Pressure: 2250 RCS Boron Cone: 1140 Abnormal Annunciators: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: - Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Current Tech Spec'*etiQn StaftJJllent~: (Does Not Include "For Tracking Only Items"
~~S;~~~,~,\~o~,~~nent:'\\ \\\/f/
Entry Dat~:\!". ' I
~::t:o~ne' . //
T.S.A.S / Component:
~~~~--------------------------------------------------------------~
,,//
Reason: Entry Date: T.S.A.S I Component: Reason: Entry Date:
. T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason: I Entry Date:
Unit 3 Status ment:
~ train protected both units )nline risk is green J:Jpcomin ECOs to Han and lor Releasg;,"
Evolutions or Com
'--'-~~~'-'-'-=~::...:cL-'-"r_"~~-'--'--7F_'-'-=-=-=--'--~~;;:-",z_-------------------__I
\ ,/
General Info'r:~afl<?n, Remarks, ~dbperator Work Around Status:}}