ML092090773

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July 28, 2009 Meeting Slides from Entergy Operations(River Bend Station) to Discuss Ri ISI
ML092090773
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 07/28/2009
From:
Entergy Operations
To:
Plant Licensing Branch IV
References
TAC ME1507, TAC ME1508
Download: ML092090773 (27)


Text

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  • RBS Submittal dated June 16, 2009
  • Requested approval date -December 2010
  • RF-16 begins early 2011
  • RI lSI Relief Requests based upon Case N-716 have a common
  • Submittal template based upon Grand pilot submittal dated September 22, RI
  • Used prior submittals as guidance in development of RBS submittal

-GAPs

-Applicable GAPs RI

  • Submittal consists of the following

-Risk Methodology based on Code Case -Risk information

-PRA Model Capability

  • Performed Internal Flooding Analysis in support of submittal RI Reviewed Risk Model for this use in accordance with current guidance Determined Risk Model acceptable for use in RI lSI Applications
  • Assisted by industry-recognized subject -experience with many RI lSI Implemented latest industry guidance
  • Compared with other RI lSI submittals Incorporated lessons learned from RAls River Bend Station
  • IPE approved via Oct. '97 NRC Staff Evaluation
  • Used in support of various risk-informed License Amendment Requests River Bend Station
  • Last Full RBS PRA Revision 4 Sept. 2005
  • Revision 5 update: Scheduled completion

-Dec. 2010 PRA Gap

  • Performed Self-Assessment cons*istent with RG 1.200 R.1 Section 4.1 in late 2008
  • Used industry expertise in Gap
  • Gap: All items where any work required meet RG 1.200 characterized as
  • Self-assessment grading consistent with RG 1.200 Section 2.1 expectations PRA Gap Analysis
  • Gaps to RG 1.200 identified in submittal

-Consistent with RG 1.174 -Consistent with Vogtle Per RG 1.174 section 2.2.6: "There are, however, some applications that, because of the nature of the proposed change, have a limited impact on risk, and this is reflected in the impact on the elements of the risk model. An example is risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI).

In this application, risk significance was used as one criterion for selecting pipe segments to be periodically examined for cracking.

During the staff review it became clear that a high level of emphasis on PRA technical acceptability was not necessary.

Therefore, the staff review of plant-specific RI-ISI typically will include only a limited scope review of PRA technical acceptability. "

Quality

  • N-716 RI lSI less reliant on PRA other RI lSI approaches -Binning before

-PRA one of 5

-Absolute risk

  • N-716 criteria -CDF of 1 E-06, LERF of 1 E-07 -Degradation Mechanisms
  • Self-Assessment performed to identify all work to meet RG 1.200, including Cat. II, for other future risk-informed applications

-Of the 72 Supporting Requirements (SR) with identified gaps, 7 SR's have different requirements for Cat. I vs. Cat. II.

Gap

  • Breakdown of gaps: -40 gaps: Documentation Issues -13 gaps: Need not be met (per EPRI) mostly uncertainty issues, would not Impact RI lSI. -10 gaps: Model refinements potentially needed but not significant for RI lSI
  • 6 gaps (9 items): Model refinements or sensitivity studies. Addressed in Table 2 of submittal.
  • Two cases quantified:
  • Base: EPRI pipe break frequencies
  • Sensitivity (Conservative, used for N-716 screening)
  • Used IFPRA to assess CDF E-06) and LERF E-07) for segments considered conservative due to assumptions

& conservative simplifications due to scope

  • Used PRA to confirm and provide upper limit CCDP/CLERP values in N-716 risk impact assessment Compared risk impact results to guidance of RG1.174
  • Addressed potentially applicable gaps in Table 2 of June 16 submittal

--includes sensitivity studies

  • Entered all gaps into Model Change Request (MCR) database to address in Revision 5 to RBS model Controlled procedurally by common Entergy process
  • Followed established process
  • Determined RBS PRA providing acceptable support / sufficient rigor for N-716 RIISI -Cat. II Internal Flooding PRA -Gaps to ASME Std. addressed, do not impact use for RI lSI

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lSI I nterval

  • Previously extended lSI Interval to RF-15 for examination of 123 welds.
  • Projected exposure for these examinations

-17.83 Rem

  • RBS proposed to perform 73 examinations by startup from RF-15
  • Requested extension of lSI interval from RF-15 until RF-16 for remaining 50 examinations lSI Interval Exposure Projections
  • Based upon current plant conditions, and crediting previous chemical cleaning, use of shielding and system flushing
  • Validated during RWP challenge process for RF-15 lSI Interval Result of Approval
  • Extension results in completion of subject Examination Categories for Second lSI Interval by end of RF-15
  • NOTE: Subject examinations greatly reduced under RI lSI requirements

-123 examinations under conventional lSI program -14 examinations under RI lSI program lSI Interval Extension Examinations Result

  • 43 examinations deferred to RF-16 pending RI lSI approval (not required under RI lSI)
  • 80 examinations performed during
  • No additional actions required when RI lSI submittal approved lSI Interval
  • Low significance for extension based on: -acceptable previous examination history -industry experience for failure probabilities

-proposed RI lSI program indicates 43 welds would not require future examination

  • Excessive radiation exposure without a compensating increase in quality or safety

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