ML17275A514

Engineering Evaluation of Unit 2 Sacrificial Shield Wall.

ML17275A514
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Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	08/01/1980
From:	WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
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80 g8 05080 ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF THE WNP-2 SACRIFICIAL SHIELD WALL CONTENTS I.INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

A.B.C.D.E.Purpose Findings and General Conclusions Supply System Corrective Actions Supply System Open Items Refer ences II.BACKGROUND A.SSW Licensing History and Design Summary 1.Licensing History 2.SSW Design Summary B.SSW Concern History C.Evaluation Approach D.References I I I.RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION A.Introduction B.SSW Load Conditions 1.Introduction 2.Load Conditions 3.Conservatisms Present In Annulus Pressurization Load Definition 4.Conclusions 5.References C.SSW Weld Quality 1.Introduction 2.Leckenby Visual Inspection 3.Leckenby Ultrasonic Testing 4.Site Construction Contractor Visual and Magnetic Particle (MT)Examinations 5.Burns and Roe Visual Inspection 6.Task Force MT Examination 7.Task Force UT Examination 8.Pipe Whip Restraint UT 9.Leckenby SSW Weld Map Design Review 10.Conclusions 11.References D.Structural Assessment 1.Introduction 2.Methodology 3.Definition of Material Properties 4.Definition of Operating Temperature 5.Evaluation of Sacrificial Shield Wall Structural Integrity 6.Conclusions 7.References IV.CONCLUSIONS APPENDIX A-Itemized SSW Concerns: 1-6, 11, 15-20, and 22-28 APPENDIX B-SSW Load Analysis Refinements ATTACHMENT 1-The Welding Institute Report No.LD 22526 ATTACHMENT 2-Scope of Task Force Review ATTACHMENT 3-Letter, D.Burns (WPPSS)to A.A.Willoughby (WI), G02-80-152, July 15, 1980 ATTACHMENT 4-Concern No.1 Additional Information ATTACHMENT 5-SSW Drawings TABLES III.C.1 Sacrificial Shield Wall Design Bases Leckenby Electroslag Weld Visual Inspection Defect History III.C.2 Leckenby Electroslag Weld Defect Characterization III.C.3 III.C.4 Leckenby FCAW and SMAW Visual Inspection Defect History Si te Construction Contractor Vi sual Defect Characterization III.C.5 Site Construction Contractor MT Data Summary III.C.6 Site Contractor MT Data Defect Characterization III.C.7 Burns and Roe Visual Inspection Data'II.C.S Burns and Roe Visual Inspection (Defect Characterization)

SSW Defect Identification Summary Based on Visual Inspection III.C.10 PWR Defect Information Summary of Weld guality Known and Postulated Defects I I I.0.1 Temperature Margin Above NDT Required to Produce Crack Arrest III.D.4 Critical Flaw Depth to Thickness Ratios for Plastic.Collapse Assuming Long Surface Breaking Defects Upper Bound NDT Values for Those Materials for which Adequate Data was Available Assumed Upper Bound NDT Values for Materials for which Insufficient Data was Available III.D.5 Summary of Worst Case Defects in Weldments

FIGURES II.1 Reactor Building Drywel 1 III.B.1 RPV/SSW Annular Space III.C.1 Electroslag Welds I I I.0.1 PWS (PHR)28-3 Support Location III.D.2 PHS (PHR)2-1 Support Location INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

A.Purpose The purposes of this report are: o To present the Supply System investigation findings and engineering assessment of the WNP-2 sacrificial shield wall (SSW)based on documentation and fabrication nonconformances, and o To update previous licensing documents on the loads and design of the SSW to document the adequacy of the as-built condition.

This report includes a presentation of the SSW review scope, design loads, weld quality and structural assessment considering the as-built condition.

The investigation extended substantially beyond the original NRC Region V itemized concerns discussed in Reference I.l.As such, those concerns are addressed in the Appendix, attached to the main body of this report.The SSW was a Post-Construction permit item (refer to Reference I.2).This report supplements previous submittals (refer to References I.3, I.4 and I.5)to the NRC which discussed the loads, fabrication procedures, and erection methods used during the design and fabrication of the SSW.The references have been reviewed and approved by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (refer to References I.6 and I.7).From a licensing standpoint, this report focuses on analytical refinements used to calculate the design loads on the SSW which were used in conjunction with the engineering assessment of the as-built SSW.B.Findings and General Conclusions Two major design nonconformances were identified which would prevent the SSW from performing its required functions during normal and postulated accident conditions.

o The horizontal rings in the SSW, located above and below the interface at elevation 541'-5", are not welded together in accordance with the design requirements.

As a result, the horizontal shear loads cannot be properly transmitted between the two rings.(Refer to Concern No.1 for details.)o Concrete voids and shim gaps in the SSW have compromised the radiation shielding properties of the SSW.(Refer to Concern No.2 for details.)

As a consequence of these nonconformances, two specific corrective actions had been identified by October, 1979: o A partial penetration groove weld was proposed to accommodate the shear loads, and o A comprehensive shielding repair program was being prepared to correct the shielding properties of the SSW to a condition equal to or better than the original shielding design requirements.

Information and results from the recent Supply System investigation and engineering assessment have established that subsequent to the above corrective actions, the SSW will be capable of performing its design functions.

The findings and conclusions reached to support.this statement are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.

The materials selected for use in the SSW are acceptable.

The mechanical strength proper ties for ASTM A36 and A588 provide substantial margin considering the design str esses.The selected weld filler metals were correct for the flux cored arc and shielded metal arc processes and for the use of electroslag welding with A36 material.The electrode (EN12K)used in conjunction with the A588 material and electroslag welds is acceptable considering the design stresses are less than 505 of yield.Ultrasonic testing (UT)performed by the SSW fabricator, Leckenby, and recent UT performed for the Supply System provide confidence that the A36 material has few laminations.

The UT, the procedures implemented while making attachments to the SSM, the'design loads and the multiple load paths inherent in the SSW provide assurance that the SSW material will not experience failure initiating from lamellar tearing, laminations or low, short transverse ductility.

The application of heat straightening to A36 material during fabrication of the SSW did not degrade the material properties.

l'ndi~ations are that the steel temperature did not reach 1200 F and A36 material properties are not damaged by short-term temperature applications in this range.The application of cold forming during fabrication of the SSM did not degrade the material properties of interest in the original design.This report, however, does consider the potential for brittle fracture which is related to the fracture toughness of steels.This property may be degraded by cold work, depending on the amount of induced strain.Tests are being performed to determine the cold forming impact on the SSM materials; however, based on information provided bZ a consultant used during this investigation (the Melding institute), there is confidence that the resultant change in toughness will be acceptable.

The assembly sequence was acceptable based on the following:

o Minimal distortion was encountered during the fabrication of the SSW, The dimensional tolerances did not, cause fabrication difficulties, and o The SSW defect history does not indicate problems with high reaction stresses in members (residual stresses not due to localized welding stresses).

Results from recent inspections established that the quality of the SSW welds is acceptable, that Leckenby did perform the visual inspections required by the Design Specification, and that the results from the in-process, visual inspections performed by Leckenby established an adequate repair program.Recently performed UT verified that the electroslag welds are acceptable (1 potential defect in 73 welds).Magnetic particle (MT)examinations performed for the Supply System found no cracks or lack of fusion defects, and a visual inspection performed by Burns and Roe (the Architect Engineer)found primarily minor defects in 125 of the accessible welds.The significant defects identified by Burns and Roe are discussed below.The recent1y performed inspections did, however, identify defects requiring specific consideration.

Incomplete penetration (IP)was found by UT in the root of welds made with the flux cored arc and shielded metal arc processes.

The IP was generically evaluated by Burns and Roe to be structurally acceptable based on a conservative static analysis using accident loads.Undersized fillet welds identified during the visual examination have been evaluated with respect to plastic collapse (weld overload)and found acceptable.

Irregularities in documentation potentially affecting the SSW weld quality, e.g., welding procedures, welder and inspector qualifications, and nondestructive examination (NDE)reports, provide implications that specific type defects may remain in the SSW even though not identified by the recently performed NDE.In addition, while making attachments to the SSW, some cracks and crack-like defects were identified and repaired by site construction contractors.

Recognizing that the majority of welds in the SSW are not accessible and that the defects located by the site contractors were primarily found by MT (a'more sensi-tive inspection than the visual required during fabrication),

caused the Supply System to perform a bounding defect assessment which enveloped both known and postulated defects.This analysis considered failure by fracture and plastic collapse.The design stresses used in this analysis are based on design, loads which have been revised with respect to previously submitted reports (Reference I.5).The revised load analysis includes refinements in (a)calculations of pressure in the annulus between the reactor pressure vessel and the SSW, (b)calculations of the effect of seismic loads on the SSW,~~~~~c)structural modeling to include a dynamic analysis, and d)cal cul ations of the pipe whi p reaction loads.The analysis conclusions are: o Failure by plastic collapse will not occur based on the low probability (C.1'A)of occurrence of critical size defects and the existence of multiple load paths, and o Failure by fracture for most structural materials will got occul.due to the SSW operating temperature

(>100 F)being sufficiently above the material nil-ductility transition temperatures (NDT)providing crack arrest conditions.

Insufficient data exists to ensure that the A588 material will be in the crack arrest condition.(It should be noted that the A588 material is only in the top channel of the top'ring and constitutes less than 5$of the SSW structural material.)

As a result, NDT testing is being performed on A588 material used in the SSW.If the resultant NDT plus temperature margin for the A588 material exceeds the SSW operating temperature, additional NDE will be performed to identify defects susceptible to fracture and to determine their size.Repair of unacceptable defects, if any, would then ensure that failure of the SSW by fracture will not occur.C.Supply System Corrective Actions A partial penetration weld substitution for the incomplete plug welds has been proposed to accommodate the shear load transfer between ring 3 and ring 4 of the SSW (pending removal of the Stop Work Order).A comprehensive shielding repair program has been prepared to identify and correct deficiencies in the shielding properties of the SSW (pending removal of the Stop Work Order).

Additional visual inspections and nondestructive examinations have been performed to determine the weld quality of the SSW.Additional material testing has been performed to confirm data available in welding and materials literature

.(NDT properties of E7028 electrode).

And, A bounding defect structural assessment has been performed to evaluate the risk of failure of the SSW by fracture and plastic collapse, considering known and postulated defects.D;Supply System Open Items Electroslag welding procedure qualifications are beigg reperformed to confirm the mechanical properties of related welds in the SSW.A588 material is being removed from the SSW to determine its NDT properties and thereby finalize the disposition of the A588 structural assessment.

A36 material is being cold formed and tested to confirm the assumed small shift in the NDT due to cold work.The Welding Institute will submit their final report with consideration of Supply System comments, new information, and the results of the material testin'g.And, A three-dimensional, finite element dynamic analysis is bein9 performed to confirm the design loads used in the assessments within this report.The results from the above open items will be submitted at their completion to the NRC in an addendum to this report.It should be reemphas ized that only one open item, the NDT testing for the A588 material, is considered to have a potential for further engineering corrective action, and that action has been identified.

E.References I.l Letter, G02-80-28, D.L.Renberger to R.H.Engelken, dated February 1, 1980.I.2 NRC letter, W.R.Butler to J.J.Stein, transmitting minutes of October 17-18, 1973 meeting on post-construction permit items, meeting agenda item 10, dated November 20, 1973.I I.3 SSW report, WPPSS-74-2-R2, transmitted by GC2-74-41, J.J.Stein to A.Giambusso, dated March 21, 1974.I.4 SSM report supplement, WPPSS-74-2-R2-A, transmitted by G02-75-37, J.J.Stein to A.Giambusso, dated February 11, 1975.I.5 SSM report supplement, MPPSS-74-2-R2-8, transmitted by G02-75-240, N.0.Strand to A.Giambusso, dated August 19, 1975.I..6 NRC letter, R.C.DeYoung to J.J.Stein, dated August 13, 1975.I.7 NRC letter, R.C.DeYoung to J.J.Stein, dated October 15, 1975.

II.BACKGROUND A.SSW Licensing History and Design Summary 1.Licensing History Significant review has already been conducted by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)on the WNP-2 Sacrificial Shield Wall.The depth and scope of this review was extensive and will be summarized here.o Pre-Construction Permit (CP)guestion 12.19 (Reference II.1)on the PSAR from the NRC on January 20, 1972, requested the Supply System to evaluate results of pipe breaks between the reactor vessel and the SSW (annulus pressurization

-AP).The Supply System responded that the SSW will be designed to accommoda'te AP and that the results of the analysis and design description would be provided before construction of the SSW.o Safety Evaluation Report (SER)-CP Section 10.3.5 (Reference II.2)of the SER-CP confirmed the above and identified the SSW as a post-construction permit item, allowing the CP to be granted with the SSW design being an open item.The CP was granted in March, 1973.o Post-CP On October 17-18, 1973, in Washington, D.C., a meeting was held with the then AEC to discuss post-construction permit items.The SSW was added to the agenda.The meeting notes (Reference II.3)committed the Supply System to providing the required information by March, 1974.On March 21, 1974, the Supply System transmitted report WPf'SS-74-2-R2 with the information (Reference II.4).The report provided fundamental information on the SSW description, loads, fabrication, erection, welding techniques, tolerances, special features (reflective insulation), and protective coatings.The NRC responded on July 8, 1974 with a request for more detailed information (Reference II.5).Basically, the Structural Engineering Branch (SEB)requested a commitment to the then current NRC structural criteria for structures like the SSW and additional information in accordance with the Standard Format.The Containment Systems Branch (CSB)requested additional details and justifications relative to calculations and models.

The Supply System responded with part of the requested information on February ll, 1975 (Reference II.6).The SSW at the time was becoming a critical, construction schedule item and information was provided to promote gaining a release of the hold on construction of the SSW base.On Hay 15, 1975, the NRC responded with additional concerns (Reference II.7).Primarily, in verifying the Supply System (Burns and Roe)AP calculations, the NRC using RELAP 3 obtained higher results by about 10-30Ã.The NRC noted that RELAP contained a 1.4 facto'r in it to account for uncertainties.

On June 26, 1975, the Supply System submitted analyses of loads on the SSW base using RELAP 3 in an effort to gain a partial release on the construction hold to permit base construction to progress (Reference II.8).The analyses included the 1.4 factor and concluded the base was acceptable.

On August 13, 1975, the NRC stated construction of the pedestal (SSW base)could proceed based on the submitted information (Reference II.9).The information was found to be acceptable.

The only open item remaining was the RELAP results for the SSW above the base.On August 19, 1975, the Supply System submitted the RELAP information for the SSW above the base and updated the previously submitted information to reflect the revised results (Reference II.10).On October 15, 1975, based on acceptance of the submitted information, the NRC released the hold on-the wall (Reference II.ll).Operating License The FSAR was submitted in March, 1978.The design and assessment of the SSW is presented in FSAR Sections 3.8.3.1.1, 3.8.3.1.2, 3.8.3.2.2, 3.8.3.3.5, 3.8.3.4.1, 3.8.3.4.2, and 6.2.1.2.For the most part, these sections reference the previously submitted reports.2.SSW Design Summary Due to the extensive past NRC review and the documentation already submitted on the SSW, only key information will be summarized here.Appropriate references to previously sub-mitted documents will be made for further detail.It should be noted that the information given here has been previously approved by the NRC.The balance of this report provides supplemental information and changes in the previously submitted and approved documentation to demonstrate the acceptability of the as-built SSW.o SSW Description and Function In summary, the SSW is a cylindrical, double-walled steel shell, filled with concrete to form a structure surrounding the reactor pressure vessel (RPV).The SSW is approximately 2 feet thick, 30 feet in outside diameter and 48 feet high.It is anchored to the reactor support pedestal and forms an annulus with the RPV which is open to the drywell at the top.Refer to Figure II.l.The SSW is classified as a Seismic Cate-gory I, guality Class 1 structure.

The SSW performs radiation shielding and structural support functions.

It minimizes radiation levels in the drywell as a result of radiation emanating from the RPV.Specifically, the shielding functions are: To reduce neutron activation of material and equipment inside containment, To minimize radiation damage to equipment, To provide supplemental biological shielding for the reactor building during plant operation, and To provide biological shielding for personnel inside the containment during plant shutdown.I As a support structure it serves: To support one end of a radial beam system which in turn supports mechanical and electrical equipment, To support the RPV in conjunction with the pedestal, stabilizer trusses and containment vessel, and To support piping systems, e.g., NS, RFW and RRC by hanger attachments and minimize pipe whip effects by supporting pipe whip restraints.

Nore complete details are provided in Section I of Reference II.4.

o SSW Design Bases The design bases of the SSW are summarized in Table II.l.For more complete information refer to Section I.A.2 and Section II of Reference II.4, the response to questions 1 and 2 (pages 22,'3)from the Structural Engineering Branch (SEB)in Refer ence II.6, and the further revisions and additions to SEB questions 1 and 2 (pages 15, 16)in Reference II.10.o SSW Construction The requirements for the timely erection of the SSW, prior to the installation of the reactor pressure vessel, forms the underlying basis for the installation procedures established for the SSW.The entire SSW could not be constructed in place prior to the instal-lation of the RPV because of nozzle interferences between the wall and the RPV.The SSW was designed to allow construction of a built-in-place lower portion and also to facilitate shop fabrication of an upper portion in three 120 degree segments to permit final assembly after the RPV was installed.

Basically, the SSM consists of a series of circular, horizontal members built up of thick plates to form box beams (Cl)or channels (U), vertical members such as columns made of rolled wide flanges or built-up box sections and skin plates welded to these members.For more detail, refer to Sections I.A.l, III, IV, V, YI, and VII of Reference II.4 and the drawings in Attachment 5 to this report.B.SSW Concern History On September 8, 1978, a concrete void was located in the SSW top ring.This item was reported to NRC Region V as a potential 10CFR50.55(e) condition; later determined to not be reportable.

This item was documented in the Supply System Evaluation Report No.78-8.In November, 1978, the 215 Contractor stated he would not issue a certificate of conformance for the SSM fabricated by the sub-contractor, Leckenby, because of defects found by nondestructive examination while making attachments to the SSW.The 215 Contractor recommended a detailed review be performed by Burns and Roe of the documents and work performed by Leckenby.

Review was initiated by Burns and Roe Engineering and the WNP-2 guality Assurance organization and continued through February, 1980.During this period the plug weld and concrete/shim gap void deficiencies were identified and corrective action recommended (refer to Concern Nos.1 and 2 for details).Additionally, during June, 1979, NRC Region Y brought to the Supply System's attention allegations concerning SSW weld quality, concrete voids and material conditions.

Due to conclusions reached during the Supply System and Burns and Roe ongoing reviews and further allegations received over the next several months, the Supply System issued a Stop Work Order on the SSW on November 21, 1979.During December, 1979, and January, 1980, NRC concerns were formalized and initially responded to by Reference II.12.These concerns were discussed with the NRC in Bethesda on February 6, 1980.In order to properly assess the general concern for weld quality in the SSW, an in-depth, broad-scoped review was determined to be necessary by the Supply System.C.Evaluation Approach The Supply Syste'm established a Task Force in February, 1980, to assume responsibility for review of.the SSW as a whole in addition to the documented concerns.The Task Force was composed of Engi-neering and guality Assurance personnel, solely dedicated to a review of the SSW with the following goals: o Review the SSW documentation for compliance to AWS Code, guality Assurance and Design Specification requirements, identify the nonconforming items and their implications for the as-built condition of the SSW, o In conjunction with the documentation reviews, perform weld inspections and testing, as necessary, to determine the SSW as-built condition with respect to AWS Code requirements, Design Specification requirements, and to define the known and postulated defects and material conditions, and o Assessthe SSW in consideration of the above findings to (1)determine the SSW capabilities with respect to performing its design fgnqtions during operation, and (2)identify any necessary rep'airs.LaJ (a)Evaluation of the SSW radiation shielding properties was performed by Burns and Roe and is addresssed in Concern No.2.The basic investigation approach used by the Task Force consisted of the following:

o Review and evaluate the welding procedures, welder qualifications, weld filler metal controls, nondestructive examination procedures, and inspector qualifications to identify documentation implications for the SSW weld quality, o Review and evaluate documentation containing weld and base material defect/repair information to provide insight to related trends and relationships which might affect the quality of the SSW, o Perform additional visual and nondestructive examination to establish the weld quality of the SSW and confirm or deny implications from the documentation reviews.o Evaluate processes used on the SSW during fabrication for affect on weld and material quality, o Review and evaluate the material traceability system and material test reports to assist in establishing the material condition of the SSW, and o Assess the as-built structural integrity of the SSW to perform its required functions considering the materials and processes used, the postulated accident loads on the SSW, and the known and postulated defects in the SSW.A detailed itemization of the areas reviewed and assessed is presented in Attachment 2 to this report.D.References II.2 II.3 II.4 NRC Question 12.19, Amendment No.12, WNP-2 PSAR.Section 10.3.5, 115, WNP-2 SER-CP.Letter, W.R.Butler (NRC)to J.J.Stein (WPPSS),"Meeting Summary October 17-18, 1973 with WPPSS, discussions of outstanding post-construction permit items", November 20, 1973.Letter, J.J.Stein (WPPSS)to A.Giambusso (NRC),"Transmittal of Report WPPSS-74-2-R2, Sacrificial Shie]d Wall", GC2-74-41, March 21, 1974.Letter W.R.Butler (NRC)to J.J.Stein (WPPSS), Request for Additional Information, July 8, 1974.Letter, J.J.Stein (WPPSS)to A.Giambusso (NRC),"Response to Questions Sacrificial Shield Wall Design", G02-75-37, February 11, 1975.

II.7 Letter, W.R.Butler (NRC)to J.J.Stein (WPPSS), Request for Additional Information, May 15, 1975.II.8 Letter, N.0.Strand (WPPSS)to A.Giambusso (NRC),"Response to guestions Sacrificial Shield Wall Design", G02-75-181, June'6, 1975.II.9 Letter, R.C.DeYoung (NRC)to J.J.Stein (WPPSS), August 13, 1975.I I.lo Letter, N.0.Strand (WPPSS)to A.Giambusso (NRC),"Response to Request for Additional Information, Sacrificial Shield Wall Design", G02-75-240, August 19, 1975.II.11 Letter, R.C.DeYoung (NRC)to J.J.Stein (WPPSS), October 15, 1975.II.12 Letter, G02-80-28, D.L.Renberger (WPPSS)to R.H.Engelken (NRC), February 1, 1980.

TABLE I I.1 SACRIFICIAL SHIELD WALL DESIGN BASES 1.The following codes, specifications and standards were used in the fabrication and erection of the SSW: o ACI Codes-ACI 301, 304, 305, 306, 308, 318 and 614.o AISC Manual of Steel Construction including all speci-fications contained therein.o AWS Structural Welding Code (AWS Dl.l-Rev.1-73).o ANSI N45.2-1971.

2.The design of the SSW considered a normal or operating condition, an emergency condition which includes seismic loads, and an accident condition which also includes loads associated with a postulated pipe rupture.The elastic working stress method of Part I, AISC, 1969, was used in the design of the SSW.The load combinations in accordance with NRC Standard Review Plan 3.8.3 which controlled the design of SSW were: o 1.6S z D+L+P+Y+E, and a r o 1.7S~D+L+P+Y+E'.a r Where, 1.6S and 1.7S approximate yield D=dead load L=live load P=annulus pressurization a Yr=pipe whip load E=operating basis earthquake E'safe shutdown earthquake 3.The primary materials used in the fabrication of the SSW were: o ASTM A36 for structural steel with exception to the top ring beam made of ASTM A588, and o Concrete with 4000 psi minimum compressive strength.4.Welding of the SSW was performed in accordance with AWS 01.1-72 and Section 17D of the WNP-2 215 Contract.

5.The dimensional tolerances for the SSW were the following:

o Circularity tolerance+0.90 inch maximum, o Plumb tolerance+0.90 inch maximum at elevation 567'-73;", and o Ring beam level tolerance+0.25 inch maximum at elevation 567'-4~>".

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I I I.RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION A: Introduction In'order to assess the as-built structural integrity of the SSW, three elements are required: o The design loads must be defined and their stresses cal-culated, o The weld and base material defects and mechanical proper-ties must be known, and o A structural assessment considering the above is required to be performed in a manner that envelopes known and postulated defects for the various failure modes.The following subsection presents the load conditions for the SSW.Details of the load analysis refinements, assumptions and methodology are provided in Appendix B to this report.Subsection III.C discusses the defect and repair history of the welds and material in the SSW and through evaluations and results from recent inspections establishes the as-built weld quality of the SSW.The design stress levels and material properties in the SSW are used in conjunction with the known and postulated defects to demonstrate that failure will not occur due to brittle fracture or plastic collapse.This bounding structural assessment is presented in subsection III.D.

III.B SSW Load Conditions 1.Introduction In order to provide a more realistic, but conservative stress environment to assess the adequacy of the-as-built SSW, the design loads and resultant stresses have been recalculated.

Results reported in this subsection reflect refinements in loads and analysis techniques made subse-quent to submittal of Reference III.B.l.The incorporated revisions to the analysis include: o Refinements in the calculations of pressure within the reactor pressure vessel (RPV)to SSW annulus for the'feedwater line break, o Refinements in the calculations of the effect of seismic loads on the SSM, o Refinements in the structural modelling (development of a dynamic model)to better characterize the effect of dynamic loads'acting upon the SSW, and o Refinements in the pipe break reaction loads to in-corporate the as-built location of., the pipe whip re-straints (PWR)and to include more realistic gaps between the pipe and the PWR.Detailed explanations of these refinements are contained in Appendix B to this report.These refinements from pre-viously submitted analyses (References III.B.1, III;B.2 and III.B.3)are reflected in the results reported in subsection III.B.R.Subsection III.B.3 discusses the conservatisms in-herent in the calculations and subsection III.B.4 discusses the conclusions and additional confirmatory work that is being performed.

Based on the results-(less than 505 of the NRC acceptable stress)of the recent evaluation, it is concluded that sub-stantiall margins exist with respect to the NRC acceptable stress levels to compensate for known and postulated defects in the SSW under postulated accident conditions.

The only refinement in this subsection that was applied to the structural assessment.

of the partial penetration weld at elevation 541'-5" (refer to Concern No.1)was the use of the finite element seismic analysis.Refer to Attachment 4 and Appendix 8 for further details.

2.Load Conditions o Normal Load Conditions Calculations of normal loads in the SSW remain unaltered from previous submittals.

Under normal operating conditions, stress levels in the SSW are quite low.Using allowable stresses based on the elastic working stress method in Part 1 of the AISC design specification, stresses in the controlling columns reach about 25%of allowable (where allowable is about 2/3 of yield).For the controlling beams, stress levels reach about 15%of allowable.

o Normal Plus Seismic Load Conditions If seismic events occur during operation, the SSW stress levels still remain low.The stresses are due to dead (D), live (L), operating basis earthquake (E), and safe shutdown earthquake (E')loads.The applicable load combinations and section strengths were determined per NRC Standard Review-Plan (SRP)3.8.3 as presented below: SRP Comb.2: 1.0S'-D+L+E (a)SRP Comb.3: 1.6S~D+L+E'a)(a}S is the required section strength based on the elastic working stress method.SRP combination 2 provides acceptable stress levels of about 2/3 of yield;SRP combination 3 provides acceptable stress levels of about yield.These stresses are not realized for any load combinations required.The analysis methodology with respect to seismic events was the same as previously reported (References III.B.l, III.B.2 and III.B.3)except for the refinements documented in Appendix B.The ana'lysis considered various controlling members in the SSW and the above load combinations.

The resultant stress was the maximum normal stress on a member section.It occurs in one corner of the section due to axial force and biaxial bending.For the controlling members, the critical maximum stress levels are associated with Combination 2 and have been found to be equal to or less than 37%of the acceptable stress (for Combination 2 the acceptable stress and Code allowable stress are the same}.

o Accident Load Conditions The limiting design loads for the SSW result from postulated accident conditions.

The SSW has been designed to accommodate normal loads, earthquake loads, and annulus pressure (P)and associated pipe reaction loads (Y)which would result from a postulated loss-of-coo[ant accident due to a break at a reactor nozzle within the boundary of the wall.Two analyses have been performed for this postulated accident loading condition, a static analysi's and a simplified dynamic analysis.The dynamic analysis was performed to more accurately assess the available design margins in the SSW which in turn are used in the structural assessment provided in subsection II I.D.As discussed in previous reports (Reference III.B.l), the loads are combined per NRC Standard Review P1an (SRP)3.8.3.Load combinations 5 and 6 were found to control design.These combinations are stated below with their acceptable stress levels and the significant load.terms.SRP Comb.5: 1.6S~M+L+P

+Y+E (b)a r SRP Comb.6: 1.7S~D+L+P

+Y+Q, (b)(b}NRC acceptable stress levels of 1.6S and 1.7S correspond approximately to yield;these stresses, based on the static or simplified dynamic analyses, are not realized for any load combinations required.The static and simplified dynamic analyses are summarized below: The static analysis uses equivalent static loads for dynamic loads.Ring beams and columns are included in the structural model as members of a space frame and skin plates are joined to the frame at the nodes as plane stress finite elements.Analysis models and methods used are the same as described in Reference III.B.l.Results reported herein include refinements made subsequent to issue of Reference III.B.1 in load definitions for seismic, pipe reaction, and annulus pressurization loads(refer to Appendix 8).

In general, for the upper portion of the wall, the design is controlled by a load combination which includes a postulated feedwater line pipe break.For the lower portion of the wall, the load combination which includes a postulated recirculation line break controls the design.For local areas of the wall which receive reactions due to drywell pipe breaks, these pipe breaks control in certain cases.Results are based on calculated maximum normal stress on the member section.PrimariIy this results from a summation of stresses due to the axial force and biaxial bending.Hence, only a corner or a limited portion of the member is subjected to the maximum calculated stress.For controlling members, the maximum stress levels have been found to be equal to or less than 65K of the acceptable stress levels for combinations 5 and 6.For certain members where the load combination is dominated by the pipe break reaction load, stress levels were found to be about 755 of the acceptable stress level.Sim lified D namic Anal sis Two considerations not taken into account in the static analysis are as follows: o Pressures in different nodes within the SSW annulus.reach their peak value at different times and for short durations, necessitating dynamic modelling to properly characterize the SSW loads and load history.In the static analysis this phasing of peak pressures cannot be accounted for.Conservative assumptions of concurrent peaks are therefore used in the static ana lys i s.o The advantage that the concrete within the SSW provides in reducing calculated stress in structural members is neglected in the static analysis.In reality, the concrete fill increases the stiffness of the SSW and reduces displacements under load.To provide proper perspective of the SSW structural capa-bility, a simplified dynamic analysis has been performed accounting for the two items above.This analysis demon-strates the reductions in calculated stress as a result of dynamic analysis.The static analysis identified the recirculation pump suction line break as the limiting break with respect to the highest design stresses on the SSW.This simplified dynamic analysis was performed using this break.The commercially available computer program ANSYS was used to calculate the structural re-sponse of the SSW to annulus pressurization and pipe re-action loads.The SSW was represented by axisymmetric thin shell elements.The openings in the SSW were not modelled, but were considered in the calculation of shell properties.

Displacements calculated using this dynamic mo'del were used as input to the more refined, three-dimensional model of the SSW given in Reference.III.B.l.Additional details of the analysis and model are contained in Appendix B.For the majority of members the maximum stress based on load combinations 5 and 6 were found to be less than 37K of the acceptable stress level.For columns between elevation 534'nd 540', where the stress is dominated by seismic, dead and live loads obtained from the previous static analysis, the maximum stress is calculated to be about 485 of the acceptable stress level.Similar stresses or less will result from calcu-.lations including the other pipe breaks.Accordingly, the maximum stress, including localized pipe break reaction 1oads, in the SSW is less than 501 of the NRC acceptable stress level based on results of this dynamic analysis.Conservatisms Present In Annulus Pressurization Load Definition Under postulated accident loading conditions, one of the principal SSW loads is due to an assumed pressurization of the annulus between the SSW and the RPV.The results of the simplified dynamic analysis were based on conservatively defined annulus pressurization loads.The major conservati'sms introduced in the development of these loads is discussed here in order to provide a clearer perspective on the nature of more realistic loads which might be expected due to annulus pressurization, versus design basis loads used for structural design.Figure III.B.l illustrates the relative locations of the sacrificial shield wall, RPV, and RPV insulation.

Between the RPV and.the RPV insulation is-a nominal 5;" annular space;between the RPV insulation and the sacrificial shield wall is a nominal Q" annular space.Because of questions related to'the movement of the insulation during the event, conservative assumptions were made.The design basis calculation has been performed assuming only 44" of the total annular space is available to receive fluid (Reference III.B.1).This limited volume assumed in design basis calculations substantially increases the design basis loads as compared.to the more realistic situations Burns and Roe has performed calculations to quantify the importance of this assumption and has deter-mined-that with the total annular space available (less insulation thickness), the annulus pressurization loads on the SSW would be reduced to approximately 35K of the design basis annulus pressurization (AP)load.This assumption may be unique to the WNP-2 analysis of the AP loading and is a primary reason for installation of flow dividers on WNP-2 to limit to 1/16 the break flow that enters the annulus between the SSW and RPV.A second major conservatism introduced in the design basis calculations is the assumption that the circumferential pipe break opens fully and full flow begins instantaneously.

Realistically, full flow from the severed pipes could not be realized until the severed pipe ends, separate to a distance equal to one-half (4)the pipe diameter.Severance of a pipe and the subsequent movement actually occurs in finite time.As reported by Messrs.J.B.Mahoney, et al, (Reference.III.B.4), the opening and separation time to achieve full blowdown would be expected to be in the 10 to 100 millisecond range.Burns and Roe calculations have shown that the annulus pressurization loads on the SSW due to the postulated recirculation line break would be reduced to between 75K and 10%of the design basis loads for break opening times from 10 to 100 milliseconds.

A third major conservatism relates to the calculation of the pressure transient within the SSW annulus.This calculation was accomplished using the RELAP computer program (Reference III.B.5).As stated in subsection II.A.l, the NRC requested (Reference III.B.6)that the pressures calculated be increased by a factor of 1.4 to account for uncertainties in the fluid dynamic phenomena.

Without the inclusion of this factor, SSW loads due to annulus pressurization would be reduced to about 70$of the current design basis loads.Considered together, these three conservatisms provide insight to the actual annulus pressurization loads which might be expected.The cumulative effects are such that, realistically, net annulus pressurization loads would be reduced to less than 205 of the current design basis annulus pressurization loads.Conclusions Results of work done in 1974 and 1975 which was approved by the NRC (Reference III.B.1, III.B.2 and III.B.3)indicated that some portions of the SSW were acceptable with respect to loading, but near yield stress under certain design basis load conditions.

The analytical assumptions and methodology used to calculate the loads were very conservative.

As identified in Appendix B, certain refinements were made in the analyses to better-assess the design margins available.

The results of the static analysis reduced the calculated stress for the controlling members to 755 of the NRC acceptable stress level.

Known conservatisms in the static analysis indicated a dynamic analysis would provide further reduction in the calculated stress.As a result, a simplified dynamic analysis was then undertaken on the limiting break (recirculation line).The resultant stress for the controlling members was 48K of the NRC acceptable stress level.This work is sufficient to conclude that the design basis loads on the SSW result in stresses approxi-mately one half that of the NRC acceptable stress level.This margin is sufficient to assure the adequacy of the as-built SSW as discussed in subsection III.D.As followup and further confirmation of the design basis loads on the SSW, a three-dimensional, finite element dynamic analysis is being performed.

The results and details of this work will be:submitted in an addendum to this report.5.References II I.B.1 I I I.B.2 III.B.3 I I I.B.4 III.B.5 III.B.6 SSW report supplement, WPPSS-74-2-R2-B, transmitted by G02-75-240, N.0.Strand to A.Giambusso, dated August 19, 1975.SSW report, WPPSS-74-2-R2, transmitted by GC2-74-41, J.J.Stein to A.Giambusso, dated March 21, 1974.SSW report supplement, WPPSS-74-2-R2-A, transmitted by G02-75-37, dated February ll, 1975.PVP-40, 1980 Symposium on Effects of Piping Restraints on Piping Integrity to be presented to ASME conference, San Francisco, California','August 12-15, 1980, (to be held)."Behavior of Primary Pipe Whip Supports and Secondary Operational Supports During a Postulated Pipe Break", by J.B.Mahoney, Z.Studnicka, M.Ramchandani.

RELAP3-A Computer Program for Reactor Blowdown Analysis, IN-1321 (June 1970, by W.H.Rettig, et al.).Letter W.R.Butler to J.J.Stein, Transmitting Request for Additional Information, dated May 15, 1975 (GI2-75-75}.

=..BLOWQFF PANEL.57ABKlXEPi:....

'I~SOT.OF REFUELIHG BBLLOW 5EAL EI.&82-'i SACR II=IC I AL 5HIBI.D WAlL (SSW)R EFLE.CTI V E l45U I ATION)8'a..OPERATING COHO)T ION COLO P05ITION REFLBCTI V E-IN5 ULAT I OH g RKCIRC.OuTLET,, gott, B.,555'4~4, BLOWOFF PAhlEI)I I 3g 56lRT I I'-5")y t'HOT)~EL.SS EL.5 7'-4-" f4PV REFLE.t" 7lv F Iv&uI.A V lax I.'2 IP'e I,R.55W (TO'j;TH@.II4NER g REACTCIR PRESSIIRE SXIN k.)i VESSEL (ZF'V)WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NO 2 RPV/SEW AhlhlULAFI SPACE PXGURE I II.B.,1 III.C SSW Weld equality 1.Introduction The initial causes for concern about the weld quality of the sacrificial shield wall (SSW)were: o Irregularities observed in Leckenby quality affecting documentation, o Weld and base material defects (including cracks and crack-like indications) discovered during site construction contractor magnetic particle examinations of SSW attachment locations, o Visual observation of SSW weld defects not within AWS Dl.l visual inspection acceptance criteria (the governing welding code), and o Numerous defects had been identified by UT in electroslag welds on pipe whip restraints (PWR)previously fabricated by Leckenby under a separate contract.During the beginning stages of the Task Force review, additional concerns associated with the SSW weld quality were identified.

These concerns were as follows: o Review of the Leckenby records indicated that Leckenby experienced difficulty with the electroslag welding process.Specifically, both cracks and lack of fusion were detected by visual inspection and repaired, and o The visual inspection required by specification may not have identified all the cracks or planar lack of fusion defects, and as such, these type defects may exist in the SSW.The Task addition findings Appendix the weld Force reviewed and evaluated each of the above, items in to many others (refer to Attachment 2).The weld quality are presented in this subsection and in the Concerns in A.The bounding structural assessment in consideration of quality of the SSW is presented in subsection III.D.Various types of documentation have a potential for affecting weld quality.These include, e.g., welder qualifications, welding procedure qualifications, inspector qualifications, and fabrication drawings.Concern Nos.5, 22 and 23 address the above qualifications.

This subsection discusses a design review of the Leckenby weld maps.To resolve the concerns based on previously identified defects and postulated defects, additional inspections were performed.

Burns and Roe performed a visual inspection of the accessible, exterior SSW welds.In addition, the Task Force requested the baseline inservice inspection contractor to perform a number of magnetic particle (MT)and ultrasonic testing (UT)examinations of accessible welds on the SSW.

The as-built weld quality of the SSW was determined by the following:

o An evaluation of the potential for and nature of defects in the SSW due to nonconformances in documentation, An evaluation of the potential for and nature of defects in the SSW based on the weld fabrication history and known defects identified and repaired by site construction contractors since the completion of fabrication, and By performing additional visual inspections and nondestructive examinations.

In turn, the inspection results and projections for potential defects were evaluated in consideration of the design loads.These evaluations, refer to subsections III.C.7 and III.D, conclude that the weld quality of the SSW is acceptable.

Details in support of defining the weld quality of the SSW are provided in the remainder of this subsection.

2.Leckenby Visual Inspection In order to gain perspective on the weld quality of the SSW, knowledge of the weld defect and repair history must be known.This information can then be integrated with results from recent inspections and evaluations of procedures affecting weld quality to establish the as-built quality of SSW welds.Visual inspection of the SSW welds by Leckenby was documented on the Leckenby weld maps.Weld defects were reported on shop Incomplete/

Rejection Tags, Field Inspection Reports and noted in the remar ks column of the shop weld maps.The defects recorded by Leckenby were repaired.Repair verification consists of: o Recent ultrasonic testing of welds recorded as repaired found no defects, and o No previously recorded defects documented by Leckenby were reidentified during the recent visual inspection.

As mentioned earlier, and substantiated by the high weld rejection rate during fabrication, the electroslag weld defect history was originally cause for concern.The electroslag weld defects recorded and repaired during fabrication by Leckenby are presented in Table III.C.l.There are 1273 electroslag welds in the SSW.A total of 388 electroslag welds had recorded defects for a defect percentage of 30.55.Table III.C.2 includes information.

relative to the characterization of the defects.As can be seen from the tables, lack of fusion-(LOF)and undercut comprise the majority of weld defects.The typical LOF defect has been described by former Leckenby employees in two ways:

o An accumulation of slag trapped at the weld to base material interface at the corners, and o As a sharp, planar defect at the same location.Reliance in the latter description is questionable due to the source's recall of the subject defect (refer to References III.C.1 and III.C.2).Based on conversations with fabrication companies experienced in electroslag welding (refer to References III.C.3 and III.C.4), the'lack of fusion defects typically observed are due to slag entrapment (excess flux)in the corner and improper placement of the consumable guide tube.The latter does not allow full penetration of the weld to the corners which results in a rounded weld profile and a sharp re-entrant angle with the base material.Neither of these type defects are equivalent to the-planar lack of fusion defect.In addition, these defects can be visually identified upon copper shoe removal.Electroslag welds were performed using temporary copper shoes and/or permanent steel backing.A large number of electroslag weld defects identified and repaired by Leckenby are due to the influence of the copper shoes.The thermal conductivity of the copper shoe creates a chilling effect at the base metal/copper shoe interface.

As a result, lack of fusion associated with slag entrapment and guide tube placement has a greater tendency to occur at the corners of the weld joint.Similar problems are not associated with the steel backing since the chilling effect is substantially reduced.The defects associated with the copper shoes were identified upon shoe removal and repaired.Based upon comments in the defect related Leckenby documentation, it is clear that Leckenby was"experiencing difficulty with the electroslag process, but relied upon inspection and repair as the resolution..In the event that large excesses of flux exist during welding with steel backing, slag entrapment may occur in the weld.The steel backing was used for welding joints with subsequent inac-cessibility to the backside of the joint.Based on review of the Leckenby weld maps, steel backing was used on less than 10%of the electroslag welds.Subsection III.C.7 discusses recent UT performed on electroslag welds.Seventeen of these welds had steel backing, confirmed by UT depth readings.None of the 17 welds contained defects based on the UT examinations.

In a few cases, depth information was also provided for electroslag weld defects in the documentation.

It is believed that since the depth data were very few in number and more severe than what is typically experienced,-that this information represents the exception rather than the rule.For example, one electroslag weld LOF defect was excavated to approximately I/2 inch.One crack defect

~

was described as about 14 inch deep, and several underfill defects were noted.as 1/2 inch deep.A review of the minimum length values in Table III.C.2 points out that Leckenby was observant'of and conscientious about small defects.Since only'visual inspection was required, excluding lamellar tearing UT, it is concluded that for electroslag welds only subsurface defects or very small surface defects would not have been detected and repaired by Leckenby.Based on the extensive documented repair of these welds and the good results from UT performed in May and June, 1980 (refer to III.C.7, one potential defect in 73 welds), it has been concluded that the quality of the electroslag welds in the SSW is acceptable.

Flux cored arc welding (FCAW)and shielded metal arc welding (SMAW)surface defects were likewise recorded and repaired during fabrication.

Table III.C.3 presents FCAW and SMAW defect data.As indicated, cracks or crack-like defects were very few in number.Undercut comprised by far the majority of defects and was most likely due to welder technique.

3.Leckenby Ultrasonic Testing The 215 Contract specification required ultrasonic testing (UT)of electroslag weld (ESW)tee-joints for lamellar tearing per ASTM A435-74.The Leckenby lamellar tearing UT, however, was performed prior to this contract modification requirement.

This UT was primarily performed due to concern for lamellar tearing at tee-joints where buttering, an original preventive measure, had not been used.The UT was performed per Leckenby guality Control Procedure (gCP)-8.0.The defect repair criteria in gCP-8.0 is substantially more stringent than the specification and ASTM A435 three-inch-diameter circle criteria.gCP-8.0 defect acceptance criteria in part states: No linear type discontinuities are allowed if the signal amplitude exceeds the reference level and the discontinuities have lengths which exceed: 1/4 inch for T up to 3/4 inch, 1/3T for T from 3/4 to 2>4 inch, and 3/4 inch for T over 24 inch.(a)T is the thickness of the thinner portion.The Leckenby UT sampling may be represented as follows: o ESW tee-joints o ESW tee-joints o FCAW tee-joints, and 81 straight beam 2 angle beam 48 straight beam o Other SMAW and FCAW joints 58 angle beam In addition, the number of lamellar tearing UT examinations performed by Leckenby exceeded the specification requirements and no indications of lamellar tearing were found.SSW UT performed by Leckenby, associated with defect repair and'adial beam attachment site evaluation, is discussed in detail in Concern No.5.This UT was not required by AWS Dl.l,or the specification.

Site Construction Contractor Visual and Magnetic Particle (MT)Examinations Other reported defects which created concern for the SSW weld quality were found during site construction contractor visual and MT examinations.

The examination requirement for the fabrication of the SSW was visual.However, due to past lamellar tearing experienced while making attachments to the containment vessel, MT inspection of SSW attachment areas was required.The MT examinations used the'prod DC method.Magnetic particle ,examination was an upgrading of the original SSW inspection requirements.

Defect information associated with SSW visual inspections performed by site construction contractors is presented in Tab'ie III.C.4.The MT results"are presented in Table III.C.5.The 11.6%MT rejection rate (726 total examinations) is not considered abnormal for a structure requiring only visual inspection during fabrication (excluding lamellar tearing UT).Characterization data for SSW defects found by this MT is presented in Table III.C.6.The available defect information in many cases lacks good definition with respect to type, size and location.Defects found by site construction contractor visual inspection and MT have been repaired with the exception of those remaining on open nonconformance reports.It is recognized that the detection of these SSW defects creates concern for the quality of inaccessible welds, one contributing factor being the lack of definitive information.

This negative factor is overcome, however, when considering the results of the recently performed visual inspection and nondestructive examinations (refer to later subsections), the Leckenby defect repair history, and the structural assessment presented in subsection III.D which envelops all known and postulated defects.Burns-and Roe Visual Inspection From December, 1979, through April, 1980, a detailed, documented visual inspection was performed by Burns and Roe of SSW exterior accessible welds.Over 905 of the accessible welds were made using the FCAW and SMAW processes.

The inspection was performed to AWS Dl.1 requirements.

The identified defects, primarily associated with weld 6.profile, have not been repaired to date, but are acceptable for service as discussed below.Table III.C.7 presents the visual inspection results.Defects in 12K of the welds are indicative of a lack of attention to some detail or in some cases the judgement of inspection personnel, but not gross negligence in Leckenby's visual inspection.

Also, the Burns and Roe inspection results makes a comparatively positive statement about the Leckenby inspector and welder performance.

The 1170 evaluated welds were almost equally distributed to shop and field work.Based on review of the visual inspection results with respect to the Leckenby inspectors and welders, no specific trends or relationships were established.

This indicates that no gross ineffectiveness can be attributed to specific Leckenby inspectors or welders.Table III.C.S characterizes defects found during the recent visual inspection.

Information on less significant defects, e.g., porosity;overlap, craters, excess reinforcement, and arc strikes, is available, but not included in this table.Based on the design margins available in the SSW (refer to design stress levels in subsection III.B), the only defects found in this inspection which are structurally significant are undersized fillet welds.These defects were analyzed for plastic collapse in subsection III.D and found acceptable.

Table III.C.9 provides an overall defect summary by welding process based on Leckenby and Burns and Roe visual inspections.

Task Force MT Examination Magnetic particle examination was performed on five FCAW and eighteen StOW fillet welds.The MT was performed for two reasons: to obtain general fillet weld condition information to assist in the SSW evaluation and to provide information relative to undersized fillet welds for Concern No.11.The MT examinations used the yoke AC method.The weld surfaces required further preparation in order to use the prod DC method;timing and the immediate labor situation precluded fillet weld surface preparation.

The 23 MT examinations found no cracks or lack of fusion.7.Task Force UT Examination As discussed earlier, additional UT was performed at the request of the Task Force to determine the SSW weld quality.In total, 90 welds were examined by UT.Specifically, o 73 electr slag owelds (ESW)were examined per AW(fl.l (69 were acceptable, 3 had questj8~able discontinuities

, and 1 was recorded as rejectable

), o 9 tee-joints were examined for lamellar tearing (7 FCAW double-bevel welds and 2 ESW joints, no lamellar tearing was observed),

o 2 FCAW single-bevel welds were examined per AWS Dl.l in conjunction with the plastic collapse assessment, (both welds were reported to have incomplete penetration), and o 6 SHAW welds were.examined per AWS Dl.1 for general information about the SHAW process (2 welds were acceptable with no indications, 3 welds were acceptable with minor indications, and 1 weld was rejectable)., Notes: (a)Reflector location strongly indicates associated with backside geometry of the welds.(b)Categorized as'large reflector.

Design drawing weld thickness indicates the reflector should be in a fused steel backing shoe which was not specified by design.This specific weld is not structurally significant, in that the other immediate welds had the design function to handle the local loads.UT of the 73 accessible electroslag welds was performed in January, Hay and June, 1980.An L-wave examination was performed of each general weld area (6 inches each side of the weld)to locate interfering reflectors prior to performing the 70 angle beam examination.

No lamellar tearing was observed in any of the 27 joints of type A (refer to Figure III.C.1)', and laminations were only located'in the vicinity of one of the 73 welds.The welds of the 9 tee-joints examined for lamellar tearing indicated incomplete penetration (IP)in 6 of the 7 FCAW double-bevel welds (refer to Figure 27.1 in Concern No.27).The IP, located in the root, was determined to be a maximum of 5/32 inch in the through-thickness dimension (considerably less in the majority of cases)by comparison to a specially made test block.The UT indications and reject associated with the SHAW single bevel welds were also characterized as incomplete penetration in the root.The structural impact of the IP has been assessed as acceptable (References III.C.5 and III.C.6).Since the IP appeared to not be unique, a number of FCAW and SHAW welds in the SSW were identified which were limiting in terms of design stress for the generic evaluation.

The design stress for welds used to join the component plates making up the structural members is shear.The welds between structural members transmit both normal stresses which are due to axial force and bending moments, and shear stress.The minimum design margin in consideration of the defined IP, 5/32 inch, for all FCAW and SHAW welds was determined to be 1.25.For this particular case, the minimum design margin is, defined as the ratio of the capacity tensile stress of the weld to the design normal stress.

In determining the design margin, the conservative static analysis discussed in subsection III.B was used.The use of dynamic analysis or consideration of plastic collapse would have produced greater margins.To ensure the IP indications were not cracking in the heat-affected zone of the outer skin plate, UT examinations were performed to accurately measure the distance from the front of the skin plate to the indication.

No indications were found at distances less than the thickness of the skin plate.Aside from the exceptions noted above, the UT results have been acceptable.

The electroslag weld UT results confirm the effec-tiveness of the Leckenby inspection and repair program on electroslag welds.Additionally, the UT increases confidence in the performance of the Leckenby welders and inspectors, and no conflicting results were found relative to the previous lamellar tearing UT performed by Leckenby.Pipe Whip Restraint UT It is known that the ongoing electroslag weld UT of Leckenby fab-ricated pipe whip restraints (PWR)has a high reject rate, 625 based on data available through April 30, 1980.Review of differences in materials, welders, or welding procedures, has provided no insight to explain the difference'ith respect to the SSW UT results.The PWR electroslag weld defects recently identified are recorded as"shrink" and lack of fusion.The"shrink" defect has been excavated and repaired on several PWR's and was found to be cracks in the center of the weld.These cracks are typically caused by operating at an abnormally high amperage level when using consumable guide tubes.This creates a bad weld form factor causing horizontal grain growth and the resultant crack in the center of the weld.No PWR recorded lack of fusion defect has been excavated to date;hence, a description of this type defect does not currently exist.However, based on discussions in subsection III.C.2, an internal weld, planar lack of fusion defect is not expected to be present.The use of a high amperage level to increase deposition rates is a means avail-able to expedite production.

The pipe whip restraints

{PWR)were fabricated in a different Leckenby shop than the SSW.Differences in shop foreman, production emphasis, attitudes and/or supervision competency may explain the SSW/PWR UT results.Refer to Table III.C.10 for PWR defect information.

Leckenby SSW Weld Map Design Review Burns and Roe performed a review of 166 Leckenby weld maps.All SSW structural members and associated welds illustrated on the contract drawings were shown and documented on the Leckenby drawings.Six design related concerns were identified in the detailed review of 20 Leckenby weld maps, but none have proven to be structurally significant.(Refer to Concern No.26 for details.)10.Conclusions a~b.Based on a complete review of the weld related Leckenby quality records and the recently performed visual inspection and nondestructive examinations, it is concluded that Leckenby performed the visual inspections on the SSW required by the specification and repaired the identified defects.The recently performed UT results verified that the inspection and repair of the SSW electroslag welds by Leckenby was" adequate followup action on this problem process, even though Leckenby did not assess and correct their electroslag fabrication difficulties.

c~d.e.Leckenby records indicate that they performed more UT for lamellar tearing on the SSW than was required by specification.

The examinations recorded no lamellar tearing or unacceptable indications.

The UT defect repair criteria was more restrictive than what the specification required.The recently performed UT provided no results to indicate that Leckenby overlooked lamellar tearing or laminations.

The Burns and Roe visual inspection of the SSW only identified defects in 12%of the accessible welds.These defects, with exception to undersized and convex fillet welds, affect only a short part of the individual weld lengths.The defects are mainly associated with weld profile and workmanship.

Host of these defects and their projections to inaccessible welds will not be detrimental to the performance of the SSW.Included are porosity, undercut, crater fill, arc strikes, and postulated slag inclusions.

This conclusion is based upon the limited extent of the defects, the design loads based on the conservative static analysis in subsection III.B, and their minor significance for structures which do not experience cyclic loading.The undersized fillet welds were evaluated for plastic collapse in subsection III.D and found acceptable for service considering the design loads and projected occurrence of critical defects of this type.The visually identified defects by site construction contractors were few in number.The HT they performed resulted in a 11.6%rejection rate, not considered abnormal-for a structure fabricated with only visual inspection required (excepting the lamellar tearing UT).With exception to defects on open nonconformance reports, these defects have been repaired.

9~The recently performed MT on undersized fillet welds found no cracks or lack of fusion.These results in conjunction with the Burns and Roe visual inspection provide confidence in the general soundness of the fillet welds and the low probability for cracking of those that are undersized.

The recently performed UT identified root defects, characterized as incomplete penetration, in welds associated with the FCAW and SMAW processes.

These defects were analyzed in a generic manner and found acceptable (refer to subsection III.C.7).In addition, this UT did not identify the type of defects anticipated due to unqualified welding procedures (refer to Concern No.23).Preliminary review of the initial concerns for weld quality raised the possibility of existing cracks and lack of fusion defects throughout the SSW.Careful examination of each concern, together with the findings of the Burns and Roe visual inspection and additional MT and UT establish that this is not the case.In general, as discussed above, the weld quality was found to be acceptable.

Based on the Task Force investigati'on, it is concluded that there is not a major problem with the as-built weld quality of the SSW.By extrapolation of the previous site construction contractors'isual and MT findings, it could be postulated that there are cracks and crack-like defects present in the SSW.In addition, it is recognized that defects similar to those recorded and repaired could be assumed to exist in the inaccessible welds of the SSW.An assessment of the structural significance of known and postulated defects in the SSW (refer to Table III.C.11 for a general summary)is presented in subsection III.D.This assessment-considers the potential for failure by both brittle fracture and plastic collapse (weld overload)and concludes that the as-bui 1 t SSW wi 1 1 perform its design func)j~ns under normal, seismic, and postulated accident conditions.(a)This subsection and its conclusions is addressing the general SSW weld quality, not the elevation 541'-5" plug weld issue.The partial penetration weld discussed in Concern No.1 is required and is separate from the above statements.

11.References III.C.1 IOM, F-80-2735 III.C.2 Telecon, D.C.Timmins to Eugene B.Hamilton, 5-27-80 III.C.3 IOM, F-80-3024 (Boeing Corporation)

III.C.4 Telecon, D.C.Timmins to Ray'eid, 6-27-80 (Newport, News Shipbuilding)

III.C.5 Burns and Roe Technical Memorandum No.1182, 6-12-80 III.C.6 Burns and Roe Technical Memorandum No.1186, 7-15-80 TABLE III.C.1 LECKENBY ELECTROSLAG WELD VISUAL INSPECTION DEFECT HISTORY Incom lete Re'ection Ta Data Defect T e-Cracks LOF Undercut Porosity Underfill Not Welded Out()Miscellaneous No.Recorded 2 195 114 28 23 66 26 Field Ins ection Re ort Data Defect T e Cracks LOF Undercut Underfill No.Recorded 12 19 9 3 Total Electrosla Weld Defect Data Defect T e Cr acks LOF Undercut Porosity Underfill.Not Welded Out Miscellaneous No.Recorded 14 214 123 28 26 66 26 Defect Percent X)(b)1.1 16.8 9.7 2.2 2.0 5.2 2.0 (a)Miscellaneous consists of burnthrough,-washouts, blowouts and restarts.(b)Number of specific defects in total electroslag weld population (1273).0 NOTE: One base material crack was recorded and repaired.One base material pin hole was recorded and repaired.

TABLE III.C.2 LECKENBY ELECTROSLAG MELO OEFECT CHARACTERIZATION Oefect Type Cracks()LOF Undercut Underfill Porosi ty Min.1 2 3/4 Length (in.)Max.9 39 24 24 19 Avg.2.6 6.9 8.2 9.1 5.7 Sample Size 14 202 50 14 20 (a)One 2j;inch long crack was recorded as being 14 inch deep.Review of the fabrication drawings revealed the crack was through the weld, 1>4 inch thick by design.~(b)Sample size is smaller than the defect number recorded in Table III.C.1 due to the lack of descriptive infor-mation on all recorded defects.(c)The maximum dimension of the area affected by the poro-si ty.

TABLE III.C.3 LECKENBY FCAW AND SHAH VISUAL INSPECTION DEFECT HISTORY Incom lete/Re'ection Ta and Field Ins ection Re ort Data Defect T e Cracks Crater Fill Linear Indications

()Excess Reinforcement No.Recorded 7 (5 SMAW, 2 FCAW)1 2 1 Defect T e Undercut Undepjze Rol 1 Low(c)Sho Weld Ma Data No.Recorded'(d)389 7 8 (a)Associated with vent plug welds.(b)Not defined, assumed related to contour.(c)Not defined, assumed as underfill or concavity.(d)The defects were distributed as follows: FCAW-366, SMAW-42.

TABLE I'II.C.4 SITE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTOR VISUAL DEFECT CHARACTERIZATION DEFECT TYPE LENGTH in.)REMARKS Crack Crack Crack Crack LOF=LOF LOF LOF LOF Undercut Undercut Undercut Porosity Sl ag 11/16 cB cBis and displacements are required.Also large amounts of energy are absorbed.The sacrificial shield wall is a redundant structure in that loads are transmitted through many members in parallel.The displacements which can be applied to a specific weld joint are limited by those permitted by parallel joints.In view of these considerations, the large size of defects required to cause collapse in a given joint and the low probability of occur rence of such a defect, it is felt that the potential for plastic collapse of the sacrificial shield wall.is negligible.

Initially there was some specific concern over the potential for plastic collapse adjacent to, and underneath, pipe whip restraint attachments.

It was felt that in these localized areas some members might be fracture critical with little redundancy.

These concerns are discussed in the Welding Institute report.However, more close examination has shown that in most instances the pipe whip restraints are welded to several members and that multiple load paths are present as in the bulk of the SSW.Figure III.D.1 illustrates this condition.

Those cases where small pipe whip restraints were welded to only a small number of members were also reviewed, as an example (see Figure III.D.2).Sample nondestructive exam-ination of these areas were performed-and the welds surrounding the attachments were reviewed against the Burns and Roe visual evaluation data.No defects approaching the critical size for plastic collapse were observed for these attachments.

Thus, it is considered that no reasonable risk of plastic collapse exists.for these structures.

6.Conclusions a 0 b.c~For most structural materials used in the SSW it is concluded that there is adequate margin above the maximum NDT to provide crack arrest conditions at the minimum normal SSW operating temperature, the primary exception being for A588 material.For the electroslag weld joints, the assumed upper bound values of NDT are based upon available literature data.Additional data from procedure qualification weldments will be generated for confirmation due to the existing small data base.Available data indicates that crack arrest conditions may not be provided for A588 Grades 8 and H under normal operating conditions, if worst case material is in the SSW.Additional data from specific heats used in the SSW is required to characterize their toughness.

This data is currently being obtained.d.Crack propagation in the heat-affected zones of welds other than electroslag welds is highly unlikely because of the profile of the heat-affected zone, the small size of this region and the tendency of longitudinal residual stresses to drive cracks into the base material.e.The risk of plastic collapse in the SSW is remote because of the very low probability of occurrence of defects of critical size and the existence of multiple load paths in the structure.

f.The cold bending of the A36 and A588'lates may have increased the NDT temperatures from those assumed for as-rolled olate.Data from the Welding Institute indicates the shift should be small.Testing is being performed to confirm this assumption.

7.

References:

III.D.1 III.D.2 III.D.3 III.D.4 I I I.D.5 III.D.6 Letter D.Burns to A.A.Willoughby (with attachments) 4/12/80.W.S.Pellini"Principles of Structural Integrity Technology" published by the Office of Naval Research.C.E.Hartbower"Reliability of the AASHTO Temperature Shift in Material Toughness Testing".Structural Engineering Series No.7, Federal Highway Administration, August 1979.J.D~Harrison and R.E.Dolby"The Safety of Steam Generator Support Structures for North Anna Units 1 and 2.Welding Institute Report LD 22055 (1976).'.P.

Snaider, J.M.Hodge, H.A.Levin and J.J.Zudans"Potential for Low Fracture Toughness and Lamellar Tearing on PWR Steam Generator and Reactor Coolant Pump Supports" Nureg Report 0577 (1979)(Issued for comments.)

Letter D.G.Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, Office Of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, for USNRC, to all pending operating licensees and construction permit applicants, all licensees of plants under construction, May 20, 1980.III.D.7 Burns and Roe Technical Memorandum No.1180~5/15/80.III.D.8 Burns and Roe memorandum,V.F.

Rubano to R.E.Snaith,3/24/80,"Minimum Temperature of Sacrificial Shield Wall".III.D.9 L.E.Steele, J.R.Hawthorne and R.A.Gray, Jr., ASTM STP 426,'ASTM, 1967, pp.346-370.III.D.10 C.Z.Serpan, Nuclear Engineering and Design, Vo>.33, 1975, pp.19-29.

TABLE III.D.1 TEMPERATURE MARGIN ABOVE NDT RE UIRED TO PRODUCE CRACK ARREST Material Thickness Applied Stress 5 of ield 2" 3 I I 0.25 10(a)25 40 0.5 30 45 60 0.75 45 60 75 1.0 60 75, 90 TABLE III.D.2 CRITICAL FLAW DEPTH TO THICKNESS RATIOS FOR PLASTIC COLLAPSE ASSUMING LONG SURFACE BREAKING DEFECTS Material Design g Stress Flow Static Loadin a/t Tension Bendin 6 Flow D namic Loadin Tension Bendin A36 18 47 0.62 0.50 77 0.77 0.61 A588 25 60 0.58 0.48 99 0.75 0.59 E7018/A36 E7028/A36 E70T-G/A36 E70T-1/A36 EM12K/A36 18 18 18 18 18 66 66 66 66 56.5 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.68 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.54 109 109 109 109 93 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.64 E7018/A588 E7028/A588 E70T-G/A588 E70T-1/A588 EM12K/A588 25 25 25 25 25 66 66 66 66 58-74 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.57-0.66 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.47-0.53 109 109 109 109 96-122 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.74-0.80 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.59-0.63 A7018/A36/A588 E70T-1/A36/A588 EM12K/A36/A588 25 25 18 66 66 56.5 0.62 0.62 0.68 0.50 0.50 0.54 109 109 93 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.61 0.61 0.64 a-flaw depth t-materi al thi ckness TABLE III.D.3 UPPER BOUND NDT VALUES FOR THOSE MATERIALS FOR WHICH ADEQUATE DATA WAS AVAILABLE Material U er Bound NDT F.Mar in Above NDT at 100 F A36 Plate A36 Rolled Sections Lincoln LH70 Weld Metal (E7018)Lincoln NR-203M (E70T-G).Chemetron 111 AC (E70T-1)Lincoln LH3800 (E7028)*Note (1)Maximum Thickness+40+54-12+40+32+30 60 46*Note 1 112 60 68 70 of Rolled Sections is one inch.TABLE III.D.4 ASSUMED UPPER BOUND NDT VALUES FOR MATERIALS FOR WHICH INSUFFICIENT DATA WAS AVAILABLE Material.U er Bound NDT F Mar in Above NDT at 100 F Electroslag Weld Metal (EM12K/A36)

Electroslag Weld Metal (EM12K/A588)

ESW HAZ-A36 ESW HAZ-A588 ASTM A588 Plate (Grades B 8 H)+20+20+20+20+80 80 80 80 80 20 TABLE III.D.5

SUMMARY

OF WORST CASE DEFECTS IN WELDMENTS~Re ion Parent Plate Defect T e Ar c Strike Lamellar Tears Largest Reported Length x Width x Depth Inches 3/8 x 3/8 x 1/32 None Potential Failure Mode F P, (F)We)d Metal Crack Undercut Undersized Fillet Overlap Underfill Excess Reinforcement Porosity Crater Fill Incomplete Penetration Slag Inclusions Heat Affected Zone H-cracking Liquation Cracks Fusion Boundary Lack of Fusion None None 8xOxO 39 x 0 x 0 (ESW)13 x 0 x 1/8 8xOx3/32 24 x 0 x 0 (ESW)26 x 0 x 1/4 ()3 x 0 x 1/8 4 x 0 x 1/8 24 x 0 x 0 (ESW)72 x 0 x 1/4 8 x 0 (boundary area)19 x 1 (boundary area, ESW)1 x 1/2 x 3/8 48 x 1/8 x 5/32 (subsurface) 14xOx0 F, (P)F P, F P, F P (P)(P)P, F F=Fracture, P=Plastic collapse, ()-signifies lower probability (a)'Depth in the..thru-thickness direction.(b)0-signifies dimension unknown.(c)One 24 inch long crack extended through the 14 inch thick electroslag weld.No other such occurrences have been identified in the documentation.(d)Worst case based upon percentage reduction in area from original weld size.(e)Estimated from fit-up requirement.(f)Available information from industry sources indicates a maximum depth for this type of corner lack of fusion of 1/2".

FIGURE 111.0.1 El.567'-4>~" I Az.270 7).TT'J I)tl)I Tt II II 1 I I i I.i i~I ll II I c't li Il ll II, II I I I l g t j I)L II I)ii.Jf I I~l)I lI RFW Penetration Area II t lI Il II I')l l II I4 ll lt II g I~I I I II I I I I I l Q)I))I IC I(Jlq p PWS(PWR)28-3 Support Location El 556 5~4 FIGURE III.D.2 Az.240 I I'I I (I I[s~~I.HPCSPenetration

.'Area~~0 0 ,r, e 0 PWS(PWR)2-1 Support.t.ocation l El 556'5)."

IV.CONCLUSIONS A.B.As discussed in subsection III.C, the general weld quality of the sacrificial shield wall is acceptable.

The SSW is not un-typical of a structure welded to AWS 01.1 with visual inspect-ion being the only method of weld examination.

However, based on the fact that visual inspection does not identify subsurface defects and that defects have been found by visual inspections and nondestructive examinations subse-quent to erection of the SSW, it is concluded that various defects, both known and postulated, exist in the SSW.(It should be noted that the known and postulated defects envelop potential defects associated with nonconformances in documen-tation.)For normal operation and postulated seismic conditions, the stresses are low, 17 and 27K of the yield stress, respectively.

With these stresses the potential'or failure of the SSW in consideration of the known and postulated defects by brittle fracture or plastic collapse is negligible.

No other failure modes are relevant to this assessment.

C.D.During postulated accident conditions, the maximum stresses are less than 50Ãof the yield stress (refer to subsection III.B).When considering the known and postulated defects in the SSW, it is concluded that the SSW operating temperature provides adequate margin above the nil-ducti 1.ity transition tempe'rature (NDT)of the SSW materials (with exception to A588)to ensure that failure by unstable brittle fracture will not occur (refer to subsection III.D).Testing is being performed to determine the NDT for A588 mater-ial in the SSW.Final disposition of the top channel of ring 6 in the SSW is pending these test results.Under postulated accident conditions, less than 1%of the welds in the SSW are projected to have defects that approximate the critical defect size for plastic collapse.Specifically, this applies to undersized fillet welds found on the outside of the SSW.In consideration that the majority of welds internal to the SSW are butt welds, the projection is very conservative.

In addition, the principal structural welds are primarily butt welds, and multiple, parallel load paths exist in the SSW which would prevent large displacements of individual members (refer to subsection III.D).Thus, it-is concluded with reasonable assurance that failure of the SSW by plastic collapse will not occur.

~i~i E.A partial penetration groove weld has been proposed to correct the plug weld deficiencies at elevation 541'-5" (refer to Con-cern No.1 and Attachment 4 for details).The welding proced-ure for the partial penetration weld has been qualified per AWS D1.1.In addition, this weld has been structurally analyzed and found acceptable with a design margin in excess of 2.0.For details on'the joint preparation, inspections, welding and structural analyses, refer to additional information in Attach-ment 4.Concern No.2 discusses the shim gap shielding repair program.This program is implemented after the joint preparation, but prior to the welding of the partial penetration weld.F.Based on the results of the Task Force investigation, it is concluded that construction may proceed on the SSW at this time including the incorporation of the necessary.repairs (refer to Concern Nos.1 and 2).The top channel of ring 6 of the SSW, fabricated with A588 mat-erial, should remain on construction hold pending completion of the A588 NDT testing.'f the NDT results conclude that the A588 material is not susceptible to brittle fracture during op-eration, the top channel of ring 6 may be released from con-struction hold.If the NDT results do not ensure that the AS88 material will be in the crack arrest condition, nondestructive examinations will be performed to identify and characterize defects, if any, in the A588 weldments which may initiate fracture.Repair of such defects will then be performed.

APPENDIX A ITEMIZED SSW CONCERNS Concerns relative to documentation nonconformances have been technicall evaluated by the Task Force for their influence on t e capability of the as-built SSW to perform its design functions.

The specific conclusions reached in some of the enclosed concerns are not a statement with respect to the im-portance of the Code, procedure or quality requirements.

No intent is made to downgrade their significance or to relieve the Supply System of responsibility for the nonconformances.

Note: The itemized concerns not addressed in this Appendix (refer to G02-80-28) are either not applicable to the SSW or carry no additional implications from the pipe whip restraints that are not already discussed herein.

CONCERN NO.1 Ring 3 and ring 4 of the SSW are not welded together as structurally required and as shown on the applicable design drawings.Numerous plug welds were made to shims between the rings (El.541'-5"), rather than welding the rings together.As a result, design calculated horizontal shear loads under postulated loading conditions cannot be properly transmitted between rings 3 and 4.BACKGROUND Based on allegations received by NRC Revion V on the use of shims, drawing reviews and SSM field inspection,.

it was determined that shims between rings 3 and 4 did prevent the required joining of the rings by plug welds.Leckenby Company was requested to provide the"as-built" size and location of the installed shims.The pre-fabricated shims located at the columns showed discontinuities where plug welds were to be installed.

Pilot drilling through the shim packs (horizontally) showed no plug welds between the shims, indicating the shims were not coped in the plug weld areas.To confirm the use of plug welds, a compartment immediately above El.541'-5" was opened and the concrete removed to inspect the plug welds from ring 4.Although plug welds were found, UT of the welds indicated ring 4 was indeed welded to the shims, not ring 3.CONCERN RESOLUTION The load transfer resolution is to provide.a partial penetration groove weld around the SSM circumference at El.541'-5" to join ring 3 to ring 4.The weld has 24 sections, each section located between the column splice plates.From the load transfer/design viewpoint, a minimum overall weld depth of 2 inches;corresponding to an effective weld throat of 1-7/8 inches, is maintained throughout the weld sections.This corrective measure was selected for the following reasons:~This type weld can be easily designed with sufficient strength,~The methods used in preparation for the weld and the actual welding conform with normal welding practices, and~The in-place weld contributes to and reinforces the measures adopted under Concern No.2 to prevent radiation streaming at the El.541'-5" ring interface.

Details of the welding procedure qualifications, joint preparation, inspect-ions, implementing instructions and structural analyses are provided in Attachment

4.

Page 1 of 11 CONCERN NO.2 Voids in the concrete have been identified in the SSW.The voids recently identified may affect the previously accepted corrective action plan, due to the potential increase in magnitude of the void problem.This plan may involve use of the operating plant to confirm adequate shielding and/or detect additional voids.Shim gap voids also exist between rings 3 and 4 of the SSW (refer to Concern No.1).'ACKGROUND I.A 100%inspection, survey reveals the existence of forty (40)gaps between shims at elevation 541'-5".This concern is documented by this survey and on NCR-215-5688.

II.A concrete void was discovered in an upper SSW compartment (315)0 while chasing a linear indication on the outside of the wall.This void was documented via NCR-215-3698.

Two more concrete voids were discovered at the upper corners of a compartment located above elevation 541'-5" (P=0-15)after removal of a skin plate to inspect for plug welds.This concern is documented on NCR-215-4884.Discovery of these voids makes locations of similar geometry and fill procedure suspect.III.Shielding Design Aspects of the Sacrificial Shield Wall A.Function The sacrificial shield wall (SSW)is designed to shield el,ectrical and mechani.cal.components, some of which are safety-related, from excess operational radiation which may impair their design functions.

It shields personnel in the drywell during shutdown and minimizes neutron activiation of material and equipment in the drywell.In addition, the SSW'rovides supplemental-biological shielding for the reactor building during plant operation.

These shielding functions are independent of any structural considerations.

~l~i~~

Page 2 of ll B.Design Concept The SSW design concept is based on General Electric criteria and consists of two feet of ordinary concrete between steel skin plates in addition to an outer two inches of steel shielding plate in the active core region.C.Method of Shielding Analysis The analytical method consisted of using the NRN one-dimensional removal-diffusion computer code to calculate the neutron flux distribution from the core through the vessel, sacrificial shield and biological walls.Calculated thermal neutron flux distributions were used to generate capture sources, in addition to prompt fission and fission product gamma rays, and were Calculated with the'gAD point-kernel computer code.Confirmation of the SSW shield design was done with the ANISN one-dimensional discrete-ordinates computer code,'n a PB SB mode, using the CASK coupled neutron-gamma ray cross section data set.This analytical approach is the current standard design tool for transport calculations of this problem type.This design method is currently being benchmarked by various organiz~tions, including ANS, EPRI and the NRC.The ANISN results confirm the shielding adequacy of the SSW, and, indeed, show that the original NRN results were conse'rvative.

'.Comparisons With Other Results Calculated dose rates in the drywell are similar'to those experienced at other operating BWR plants and to calculated results reported by SAI/EPRI, S8W, and GE.Thus, the SSW shield design is adequate to shield the safety-related components from radiation during the design plant life.

Page 3 of ll CONCERN RESOLUTION The following outline presents the resolution, implementation and verification program to be implemented to resolve the two (2)afore-mentioned concerns.I.Gaps Between Shims at the 541'-5" Elevation of the SSW.A.Examination 1.Survey at the 541'-5" elevation was performed on December 14, 1979 through December 18, 1979.2.Location of all gaps, outline dimensions, depth of gaps, and adjacent shim penetration were all documented during this survey.3.100K inspection from 0 to 360 was performed.

B.Concerns 1.Forty (40)gaps between shims have been located and documented.

2.The gaps vary in area and radial penetration.

Twenty-five (25)gaps extend the full radial thickness of the SSW.The largest gap area is 5/8" x 2-1/2".3.The 541'-5" elevation is 2-1/2" above the bottom of the active core zone.4..The gaps represent potential radiation windows.

Page 4 of ll C.Resolution l.Back dam all gaps where required.2.Apply BISCO NS-1 product (high density)into gap.3.Allow to cure.4.Examine gap for proper fill.5.Insert thin sheet of insulatory material.6.Insert backing ring (for weld).(a)7.Make 2" circumferential weld.8.Back-up verification with Startup radiation scan program.D.Prototype Testing and Verification of Methodology 1.Construct channels which simulate detected gaps.2.Perform steps C.l through C.4 above.3.Develop procedure until fill is consistently verified.4.Prototype testing was successfully completed at the WNP-2 site on May 29, 1980.5.Construct mock-up (with four gaps)that simulate wall configuration for 2" circumferential weld.(a)Refer to Concern No.1 PEDs Page 5 of 11 6.Fill gaps with BISCO NS-1 (high density).7.Install insulatory and backing ring materials.

8.Perform 2" circumferential weld.9.Cut cross sections'f mock-up.10.gualify shield material for heat input.'l.Mockup testing was successfully completed at the WNP-2 site on May 29, 1980.E.Implementation l.All work shall'e performed after the 541'-5" elevation is arc-gouged and prepared for the 2" circumferential weld 2.The 215 Contractor shall perform the following:

a.Vacuum clean all gaps.b.Position man at nearest porthole to gap to observe inner gap.'.Back dam gaps where required.d.Apply BISCO NS-1 (high density)into gap as per approved final procedure based on prototype methodology.

e.Insert insulatory material (for larger-type gaps).f.Cut out and insert backing ring (A36-steel) to fit outline of the gap.(a)Refer to Concern No.1 PEDs.

~,

Page 6 of 11 3.Make 2" circumferential weld.4.Back-up verification with startup radiation scan program.F.Back-Up Verification:

Startup Radiation Scan Program 1.Purpose a.Insure adequacy of fix program b.Insure dose at location of safety-related components does not exceed design criteria.2.Primary Detector Locations a.Shim gap (Elevation 541'-5")b.Locations of detected voids: c.Random sampling in drywell (especially active core region)in areas of sensitive equipment.

3.Program (primary emphasis)a.Measure total dose rate (neutron-gamma ray).II.Concrete Yoids in SSM A.Concerns 1."Suspect" void location is based on compartment geometry and concrete fill procedure (see Figures 4, 5 and 6 for illustration of the three Categories (I, II and III).a Refer to Concern Ho.1 PEDs.

Page 7 of 11 2.Skin plate removed at 541'-5" elevation (0-15)resulted in the discovery of concrete voids in the upper corners of this compartment (Category I).Another void was discovered at elevation 567'nd azimuth 315 which is in.a Category III type compartment.

3.Possible existence of concrete voids in SSW compartments based on numbers 1 and 2 above.4.The active core region from 539'o 552's of primary concern because of the flux reduction beyond this region.5.Voids in the active core zone (539'552')represent radiation windows.B.Examination 1.One hundred percent (1005)inspection of"suspect" void locations for the 24 compartments (Category I)above 541'-5" elevation shall be performed.

The reason for this is that these compartments were filled from the sides (rather than from the top), and because the existence of concrete voids at this location (elevation 544'-5")produces the most severe (mid-active core region)consequence.

2.One hundred percent (100K)inspection of Category III type compartments in the active core region shall be performed.

3.Random sampling inspection of other Category II arid III type compartments shall be made.Sampling shall be expanded as required to achieve statistical level of confidence.

Page 8 of 11 C.Resolution 1.Determine if concrete void exists at suspect location by either drilling 3/4" 9 hole and boroscoping or by using the pulse echo method developed by Portland Cement Association.

2.Based on number one (1)above, voids shall be filled by either pumping the shield material through a 1/2" 9 fill hole with a minimum 1/4" 9 vent at the top of the void location or by flowing{by gravity)the shield material through a 3/4" 5 hole at the top of the void location.3.1/4", 1/2", or 3/4" 9 holes shall either be plug welded or threaded and capped closed.4.Above methodology shall be developed and verified through prototype testing.5.Shield material shall be BISCO NS1 (high density)or Owner approved equivalent.

0.Prototype Testing l.Identify six (6)compartments at the 541'-5" elevation (high suspect-Category I)that are accessible and where the skin plates can readily be removed.2.Choose two (2)of the six (6)skin plate/compartments.

a~Utilize pulse echo method (microseismic technique) to look for voids at upper corners of the compartment (high suspect).

Page 9 of ll b.Drill 3/4" 5 holes and boroscope to look for voids at upper corners of the compartment.

c.Based on b above, drill 1/2"-9 hole at most extreme distance from first ho',e that will still hit the void.d.Remove skin plates.e.Verify pulse echo technique and interpretation, drill technique and boroscopic interpretation, and location of 1/2" 9 hole with respect to actual void location.f.Develop procedure until exploration and drill technique is consistently verified.3.For the remaining four (4)skin plate/compartments perform alternate'fill'echniques as follows.a.Perform steps 2.a and 2.b above.b.For half the voids discovered, flow (by gravity)the shield material, through the 3/4" 9 hole at the top of the void location.c.Perform step 2.c above for the remaining void locations.

d.Pump shield material through 1/2" 9 fill hole and vent air out through 3/4" top hole for the remaining void locations.

e.Allow shield material to cure.f.Remove skin plates.g.Develop procedure until'fill" is consistently acceptable.

Page 10 of 11 4.Note that if the six (6)compartments chosen do not provide enough voids as a data base for acceptance, then a mock-up compartment will be constructed off-site that will depict the Category I type compartment voids discovered and documented via NCR-215-4884.

Prototype testing will then continue using this mock-up.E.Implementation 1.The 215 Contractor shall perform the following work.a.Contractor shall explore for voids all suspect void locations commited to in II.B.This exploration shall be by an owner approved procedure based on prototype testing.b.The exploration program shall document thoroughly all major voids found in the SSM.(b)c.For all voids discovered, the contractor shall fill all voids per an owner approved procedure based on the prototype testing.2.Back-up verification with startup radiation scan program.F.Startup Radiation Scan Program The scan program previsouly described will be used to provide confirmatory data.ii d i ii i d if large voids are found as a result of this exploratory drilling.

Page 11 of ll DISCUSSION The resolution to the shim gap concern provides for 1004 inspection and shielding repair of all gaps found at the 541'-5" elevation.

The shielding material used shall be BISCO NS=l (high density)which has the proper shielding, cohesion, adhesion, expansion, consistency and thermal properties which will insure a proper fill and has been confirmed by prototype testing.The prototype testing insures verification of methodology and of repair.The radiation scan program supplements that verification and provides confirmatory evidence of shielding adequacy.Prototype testing was successfully completed on May 29, 1980.The resolution of the concrete void concern provides for 100/inspection and shielding repair of all highly"suspect" voids based on geometry and fill procedure (Category III in active core region and all Category I).All other locations will be random sampled and repaired as necessary.

Sampling will be expanded if a statistical level of acceptance cannot be obtained.Exploration technique (drilling or pulse echo)and fill procedure (pressure grouting)will be verified through prototype testing.The radiation scan program supplements this verification while insuring shielding adequacy.It should be noted that all work will be performed to approved procedures and shall be thoroughly documented.

Full restoration of gaps and voids with material of greater shielding effectiveness than the original shield material (concrete) insures the shielding.adequacy of the SSH.

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CONCERN NO.3 Numerous deficiencies in weld quality have been identified on the SSW.The defects were identified in welds which were supposedly inspected and accepted.Defects include cracks, undercut, overlap and slag (indicating inspections could not have been properly performed).

BACKGROUND On June 6, 1979, an allegation concerning the quality of welding on the SSW was made to NRC Region V.It was alleged that"very few welds meet the acceptance criteria by visual examination".

This allegation was noted as being substantiated by the NRC Region V Report No.50-397/79-12 (Ref: NRC letter to WPPSS dated August 1, 1979).The NRC Inspector identified slag and other weld defects not in compliance with AWS Dl.l.As a result of the conclusions reached during reviews by Burns and Roe and the Supply System and the NRC Region V itemized concerns on the SSW, it was determined that an in-depth document review and engineering assessment was necessary.

A Task Force was formed in February, 1980, to perform this overall assessment.

The response to the individual concerns and the preceding main body of this report are the results of that assessment.

'CONCERN RESOLUTION Refer to the main body of this report.

~'

CONCERN NO.4 Leckenby NDE records associated with the SSW contain'photocopied inspector's signatures on PT and UT reports.BACKGROUND A review of all Leckenby SSW, beam attachment and pipe whip support girder NDE reports (46 UT, 30 PT)found 15 UT reports and 26 PT reports with photocopied signatures.

Of the 15 UT reports, ll were associated with the SSW and had a single signature by Gene Hamilton.These reports were associated with examinaton for lamellar tearing for 83 electroslag weld tee-joints.

No lamellar tearing was recorded in these reports.The other four UT reports were associated with the pipe whip support'PWS) girders, 3 contained weld rejections and one was acceptable.

The 26 PT reports with photocopied signatures were associated with material defects.Gene Hamilton's photocopied signature was again noted.The portions of these reports photocopied were stated to be common practice by Leckenby (refer to sworn statement of Gene Hamilton, Exhibit A)to expedite report processing.

CONCERN RESOLUTION The concerns associated with the PT and UT reports with photocopied signatures are: o The examina'tions may not have been performed, or o The examinations may have been performed, by unqualified inspectors, o From which both of the above imply that defects may be in the SSW as,a result of inadequate inspections being performed.

In May and June, 1980, UT for lamellar tearing and/or laminations was performed.on 9 welded tee-joints previously examined by Hamilton.No lamellar tearing or laminations were observed.In addition, during UT of 73 electroslag welds, no lamellar tearing was observed in susceptible joints and laminations were only detected in the vicinity of one weld.The lginations were found by the straight-beam scan prior to performing the 70 angle beam examination.

To address the general concern of lamellar tearing, an assessment was made of the potential for failure by lamellar tears, laminations or low short transverse ductility.

This assessment, presented in Concern No.27, concluded that such failure will not occur.

Three photocopied PWS girder UT reports recorded rejections for defects in electroslag welds.The identification of defects, repair and sub-sequent acceptance by UT establish that these examinations were perfor'med.

As discussed in Concern No.5, the inspector that performed these exami-nations (E.B.Hamilton)did not have the proper documentation on file to support his Level II UT qualification.

Implications for defects in the PWS girders from the improper qualifications are the subject of a separate review and do not directly affect the weld qualityof the SSW.The UT reports with photocopied inspector signatures have been evaluated to have no structural significance for the SSW.This conclusion is based on the following:

o Four of the subject UT reports are not associated with the SSW, o UT performed for the Task Force on joints previously examined by.Hamilton found no lamellar tearing or laminations, o UT of 73 electroslag welds found no lamellar tearing and lami-nations located only near one weld, o Concern No.27 concludes that failure due to lamellar tearing, laminations, or low short transverse ductility will not occur, and o The structural assessment in subsection III.D of this report envelops known and postulated defects.The 26 PT reports with photocopied signatures are primarily associated with material defects which do not require surface examination during repair per AWS Ol.l, e.g., laminations, blow-outs, gouges, slag inclusions, and minor material flaws.Four of the defects, however, are associated with surface cracks in base material, which by Code requires the assess-ment of the extent of the crack by a positive means.All defect repair instructions included excavation by grinding and/or air arc gouging to sound metal prior to repair welding.As a result, defects remaining in the SSW which may be associated with improperly performed PT are few in number and small in size.The PT reports with photocopied inspector signatures have been evaluated to have no structural significance for the SSW based on the following:

o The majority of defects were minor in nature and did not require surface examination.

o The defects were excavated by grinding and/or air arc gouging prior to repair, and o The structural assessment in subsection III.D of this report envelops known and postulated defects.

~,

This conclusion for the subject PT reports also resolves concern for defect implications in consideration of the lack of documentation to support Hamilton's Level II PT qualifications.

The 3 additional PT reports reviewed did not have photocopied signatures and were associated with the pipe whip support girders.No further review or action is planned for this concern item.(Refer to Concern No.5 for related information.)

'

Exhibit A December 7, 1979 Seattle Nashine-on Page 1 of 2 I, Eugene B.Hamilton, volunta"ily make th following statement to Dennis P.Haist, Reactor Enspector, and Cwen C.Shackleton, Jr., Investigator for the U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

No threats, promises or duress were made to me to make this'statement.

1 give du.s statement on my own free will.E understand t!mt t¹s statenent might be used in a legal proceeding and will become part of a public record.I am 34 years old.-I am employed as a Chief Er~ector for the Leckenby Company, 274S 11th 8'I, Seattle, Nas&agton.

I served my iron workers apprenticeship at, Pacific Car and Foundry, Seattle, Nashington zrcm 1964 through 1968.I began inspection worM in 19?0.I quali ied as a Level EI in Ultrasonic Testing and i~hgnetic Particle Testing.In 1973 I came to work for Leckenby.I am qualified as a Level IE in Ultrasonic Testing,<fagnetic Particle Testing and Penetrant Testing zor Leckenby.In Ifarch 1977 I>>~designated as a Level II in Ultrasonic, i~hgnetic Particle an" Penetrant Testing.Conce~g Leckenoy s activities in fabricating the Sacrificial Shield Nail (Subcontract from Bovee and Crail)and on the Pipe bnip Restraints (Contract 90)for the Nashington PA~lie Power Supply System's ibuc3.ear Project No., I recall'he following inzormation:

1.Neld traceability records, as shown on the fabrication drawirgs, were used in the Leckenby shop by me as>>orking doaments to record part numbers, weld prccehue nM~er, electrode identification; welder number, inspector amber, eye of'~ection and remarks for original welding, original nondestructive exanunations, repair welding and subsequent nondes~ictive examizmtions.

Neld trace-ability records are sometines referred to as weld maps.2..I believe the information on the weld map~t bears my inspection number 5 is accurate.3.I occasionally prepared nondestructive exaa~tion records by completing generic portions of nondestructive exandzation reports, signing my name, mincing photostatic copies of the incomplete report forn, and later completing the report for each specific part ex~~ed.I used tMs procedure to save tme in ccrroletmg the mz~tion reports..4.nondestructive examinations were ccwleted by me as sho>>n on eac.".nondestructive examination report that bears my sip~we, whethe" original or photostatic copy.

Exhibit A Decenber 7, 1979 Page 2 of 2 Concerning Leckenby activities on the Sacrificial Shield 4'all, I recall the following information:

1.Heat and mechanical means (jacks and come-a-longs) were used to correct distortion of all three segments of ring beam number 3 and ring segment 2A of ring beam 2.2.3.To the best of my knowledge, no procedure was used to control the application of heat'o correct distortion of ring beam number 3 and ring segment~M of ring beam 2.I performed longitudinal and shear wave ultrasonic examinations to Ab'S requirements to determine the extent of a base Saterial crack at approximately elevation S41 feet, azimuth 233.Eugene B.Hamilton Subscribed and ssoro to before me this~day oz D ce...'oe" 19.9.s r Owen C.Shackleton, Jr.Investigator, RV,&C Witness:~i/PP=Dennis P.Hadst Reactor Inspector, RV, NRC CONCERN NO.5 Nondestructive examination (NDE)records cannot be located for one individual who performed ultrasonic testing (UT)on the SSW.BACKGROUND All known and available Leckenby NDE reports associated with the SSW'ave been reviewed and inspectors identified.

Mr.C.Baldinger, associated with the specific concern as stated, is no longer employed by Leckenby and his qualification papers are not available.

Mr.Bald-inger performed UT of 3 SMAW weld procedure test coupons, of which none required UT for qualification.

The specified tensile and bend tests were performed and were acceptable.

In addition, Mr.Baldinger per-formed UT of a test coupon associated with the qualification of FCAW welding procedures.

These procedures are normally prequalified by AWS Dl.l.However, Burns and Roe exempted the prequalification in order to confirm the A588 weldment mechanical properties.

The test coupon was radiographed per Code.An unacceptable indication was re-ported which upon excavation was determined to be localized slag entrap-ment.The test coupon was repaired, and Mr.Baldinger subsequently found the repair area acceptable by UT.The coupon was then tested for its mechanical properties and found satisfactory.

It is'recognized that the repaired test coupon should not have been used for the pro-cedure qualification per AWS Dl.l.The remaining Leckenby NDE was performed by Messrs.Hoenstine and Hamilton.Mr.Hoenstine only performed UT for lamellar tearing on two SSW weld joints recorded on one UT report.Review of his records indi-cate that documentation is lacking to support his level II UT qualifi-cation at Leckenby.Mr.Hamilton performed the majority of NDE on the SSW.As in Hoenstine's case, Hamilton also lacks the documentation to support his Level II PT and UT qualifications at Leckenby.CONCERN RESOLUTION The FCAW procedure qualifications associated with UT by Mr.Baldinger went beyond the AWS Dl.l requirements to verify the mechanical properties, not the soundness of the weld.The test coupon was radiographed and found acceptable with exception to the localized slag entrapment.

The UT performed by Mr.Baldinger was in support of the repair, not to meet the qualification NDE requirements.

In consideration of the radiography results and the acceptable mechanical test results, it is concluded that the UT performed by Mr.Baldinger has not affected the quality of related FCAW welds in the SSW.With respect to Mr.Hoenstine, as discussed in Concern No.16, lamellar tearing was examined for on a sampling basis.The UT reported by Mr.Hamilton for lamellar tearing exceeded the specification requirements.

The lack of documentation to support Hoenstine's single UT report has been evaluated to have no structural significance based on the same rea-sons as discussed in Concern No.4 relative to lamellar tearing UT.

The remainder of this concern addresses UT performed by Mr.Hamilton.The discussion is separated into paragraphs based on different UT categories, e.g., lameIlar tearing UT, non-Code required UT, etc.UT for lamellar tearing performed by Hamilton was recorded on 20 UT reports.The concern associated with Hamilton's improper Level II inspector quali-fications is that defects may be in the SSW as a result of inadequate inspections.

For similar reasons as discussed in Concern No.4, the defect implications associated with the UT performed by Hamilton to identify lamellar tearing have been evaluated to have no structural significance.

Hamilton performed 12 UT examinations on the SSW post-repair of defects or fabrication

'deficiencies.

These defects/deficiencies, with exception to the door laminations, were not originally identified by UT, nor was UT directed by other documents; therefore, the followup UT was not required by AWS 01.1 or specification.

The items examined were: o 2 electroslag weld lack of fill repairs, o 3 mislocated hole repairs (filled by plug weld or equivalent), o 1-6 inch lack of fusion repair in an electroslag weld, o I plate edge lamination repair, o Various lamination repairs in two pipe penetration doors, o I base material crack repair (dye penetrant exam was performed), and o 1-3 inch FCAW weld crack repair.A dye penetrant exam should have been performed on the latter crack.However, the r epair direction did call for air arc gouging the defect to sound metal.Recently performed UT confirmed the repair to be acceptable.

In addition, Hamilton performed UT on the SSW at radial beam attachment sites based on directi8n from Burns and Roe.Hamilton's repair acceptance UT of the crack at 233 AZ.(refer to Concern No.18)was also confirmed by a separate Northwest Industrial X-Ray, Inc.UT examinatjon.

Hamilton also identified a weld defect (slag entrapment) at the 306 Az.location.He subsequently accepted the repair by UT while being observed by a Burns and Roe gA engineer that was qualified to Level III UT.Eight UT examinations.

were performed by Hamilton on the pipe whip support (PWS)girders;3 were rejectable and 5 were acceptable.

The 3 rejects were reinspected after repair by UT and found acceptable (included within the 5 previously mentioned).

The defect related.UT performed by Hamilton has been evaluated to have no structural significance for the SSW based on one or more of the following:

o The component examined is not part of the SSW, or is not a load bearing member, e.g., the PWS girders and the penetration doors, respectively, o Confirmation of Hamilton's UT is available by alternate examinations or verification by a qualified witness, o The repairs which were examined did not require UT and the defects were excavated.

by grinding and/or air arc gouging, and/or o The bounding defect structural assessment in subsection III.O envelops known and postulated defects.Similarly, for the reasons discussed in Concern No.4, Hamilton's improper Level II PT qualification has been evaluated to have no structural significance for the SSW.=No further action is necessary for this concern.

CONCERN NO.6 No procedures were generated or records maintained on forming of the curved plates in the SSW.BACKGROUND There are no requirements for procedures or records on forming of curved plates in the specification.

Leckenby subcontracted the work to Seattle Boiler Works.Leckenby has provided a statement that to cold form A36 material is common industry practice.Additionally, Leckenby has responded to a series of questions posed by the Task Force as noted in Reference l.CONCERN RESOLUTION 10CFR50 and the Supply System guality Assurance program require that special processes be controlled and accomplished using qualified procedures which are in accordance with applicable codes and other controlling requirements and criteria.There is no clear definition of a special process.However, it is usually taken to include operations which affect the quality of the item.The quality of the item is defined by the specification a'nd the applicable codes.In the case of cold forming the specification does not address this process, nor does AWS Dl.l.The AISC Manual of Steel Construction provides tables of acceptable radii for cold bending of structural steels.Very tight radii (4 x thickness) are listed for A36 up to 2 inches thick.The ASME Code requires the qualification of cold forming procedures where impact testing is specified and where the cold strain exceeds 0.5%.The implication is that the major quality controlling parameter affected by cold bending is the toughness of the material.However, no fracture toughness requirements were specified in the design of the SSW.The other quality affecting parameters which could be affected are: o Strength, o Ductility, o Integrity (freedom from detrimental defects), and o Dimensional tolerances.

For the strains used on the SSW (about 0.85), the effect on strength and ductility is not significant.

For structural steels there is no significant probability of creating defects by cold bending to these strain levels.The materials are tough and ductile at room temperature and at the, strain rates used for bending.Dimensional tolerances could be affected by bending.However, these are controlled by specification and design drawings.In addition, as evidenced by visual observation and the

fabrication history, difficulty with the dimensional tolerances was not encountered with exception to tolerance stack-up as discussed in Concern No.17.It is concluded that cold forming can be considered to be a special process under some circumstances.

However, in the context of the original design of the SSW, cold forming was not a process which affected the quality of the structure to any significant extent.Based on discussions with Leckenby, it is understood that their subcontractor did not experience any problems during forming, and no material was subjected'to repeated forming.These conclusions are based upon the following information provided by Leckenby: o No plates were subject to repeated forming such as might occur if a plate was formed to too tight a radius, o=Pinch rolls were used which provide good control of the process, o No heating was used, o No problems were encountered, and o The forming radius was large relative to typical forming radii for heat exchangers, piping, and pressure vessels.Thus, it is felt that no engineering concern exists with respect to the acceptability of the SSW under the original design and fabrication criteria.However, the evaluation of the as-built structural integrity of the SSW is taking into account the potential for brittle fracture in the structure.

To do this the lower bound fracture toughness of th'e steels must be characterized.

Most available data is developed from as-rolled or heat treated material.It is known that cold work can degrade the toughness of structural steels.This can be reflected by an upward shift in the nil-ductility transition temperature,(NOT).

To quantify this shift, the effect of cold bending on the NOT temperature of A36 plate is being measured.The tests will reproduce the maximum strains used in the SSW.Also A588 material will be removed from the SSW and the NDT temperature measured.This material will be in the as-bent condition.

The results of these tests will be presented in an addendum to this report.Based on information discussed in paragraph 4.5.1 of the interim Welding Institute report (Attachment I), the resultant shift in the NDT is expected to be acceptable.

References:

(1)Letter WNP2WBG-215-F-80-1452, Task Force trip report, item 3, 5/7/80 CONCERN NO.11 Approximately 90 typical joint configurations specified on design drawings for the pipe whip restraints(PWR) use fillets which are smaller than the minimum fillet weld size specified in the applicable code.Undersize fillets on the SSW may also be smaller than the minimum size specified in the applicable code.BACKGROUND During an NRC Region V Site Inspection, NRC Personnel noted that speci-fied PWR fillet weld sizes were undersized with respect to the minimum size fillet weld required by the AISC Specification for the design, fabrication and erection of structural steel buildings.

At the request of the NRC, a review of over 50 structural steel drawings were made, particularly those-involving pipe, whip restraints, wetwell supports and supporting steel.A total of 90 individual weld callouts did not meet the requirements of minimum size welds specified in the 1969 Edition of the AISC Specification.

A rationale by the Engineer of acceptinq these welds based on the required structural strength providing the quality of the welds were acceptable, was suggested to the NRC.The main concern of the NRC expressed*is that the inspection phase done by this same contractor (Leckenby) is now one of the main issues at stake.While the SSW was not addressed in the initial concern (see Reference (1}), a review of data included in Reference (2)reveals that some fillets have actual sizes which, in addition to being undersized from a structural standpoint, are undersized when compared to minimum fillet size requirements contained in References (3)and (4).A sampling of welds revealed one weld where the specified fillet size is less than the minimum size required by References (3)and (4).~~CONCERN RESOL'UTION As noted in Reference (1), the primary concern behind the minimum fillet size requirement is the possibility of cracking caused by too rapid cooling rates resultant from low heat inputs and the quench effects of heavy structural members.Twenty-nine undersized fillets (identified in Burns and Roe visual inspection) from a sampling of weld maps were identified.

Base metal thicknesses were determined.

Utilizing the actual fillet size and the base metal thicknesses, twenty-one (21)fillets noted in Reference (6)were identified as being below the minimum size required by References (3)and (4)(structural consider-ations aside j.One fillet of the twenty-one had a~secified size below the code minimum.The remaining eight met the minimum requirement.

No cracking was noted on these or-any other undersize fillets identified during the Burns and Roe.reinspe'ction.

Additionally, NT was performed on 23 undersized fillet welds.No cracking or lack of fusion was found.The existence of undersize fillets is still a consideration in regards to the structural load bearing capabilities of the SSW.This situation is addt essed in subsection III.D of the report.While the sampling reveals some fillets that, in addition to being undersized from a structural standpoint, are undersize with respect to Reference (3)and (4)requirements, it is felt that the intent of the code with respect to weld cracking is met.That is, welds have been inspected and,found to be free of cracks.The possible concern ar ising from the implications of Concern ll on the SSW has been adequately resolved by subsequent reinspections.

No further action is planned for this concern.Re erences: f (1)Letter: G02-80-28.

D.L.Renberger (WPPSS)to R.H.Engelken (NRC), dated February 1, 1980.(2)ION:-F-80-1665, N.E.Hunter to D.C.Timmins, dated April 16, 1980.{3)AISC"Nanual of Steel Construction", Seventh Edition (includes"Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Building").(4)AWS Dl.1-72,"Structural Welding Code".(5J AWS D1.2-77,"Commentary on Structural Welding Code".(6J Nemo, N.E.Hunter to D.C.Timmins,"Undersize Fillets", dated June 5, 1980.It should be noted that Reference (5)indicates that"where Tab'1e 4.2 stipulates the mandatory preheat, for thickness over 3/4 in.(19mm), then fillet size limitations do not apply".While the statement in the Commentary pertains to a subsequent revision of the AWS Structural Welding Code and does not override the requirements of the applicable revision, it is indicative of the intent of the Code.Under this criteria,.

none of the identified fillets would be undersize with respect to the Reference (3)and (4)minimum fillet size requirement.

CONCERN NO.15 Interviews with Leckenby personnel established that SSW segments 2A, 3A, 3B, and 3C were heat straightened without the benefit of controlling procedures or maintenance of quality records.Heat straightening (application of heat and mechanical force)was applied to correct weld distortion.

BACKGROUND The specification did not require procedures or records for heat straight-ening.Discoloration of the SSW was cited as evidence of the application of heat.Leckenby admits that heat straightening was used to correct weld distortion in SSW segments.No procedure was available to control this operation and no records were kept.Reference (1)was supplied by Leckenby to address the acceptability of heat straightening.

CONCERN RESOLUTION The general discussion of the definition and control of special processes presented in Concern No.6 also applies to heat straightening.

In this case the governing code (AWS D1.1)clearly indicates that heat straightening is a process that requires careful supervision.

Leckenby did not have a procedure to meet these requirements'.

No records were kept and measurements of the maximum temperature were not reported.However, the information presented by Leckenby does suggest that they did comply with the intent of the Code.This conclusion is based on the following information provided by Leckenby (Reference 2).o The segments did not reach a dull r8d color (para.3.7.3 of AWS D1.1 states that this is reached at 1200 F).o Heat was applied by rosebud torches which tend to prevent localized overheating.

o No hammer blows or similar applications of force were used.o Heating was used in conjunction with mechanical.

forces-this would reduce the amount of heatin'g required.Thus, there is no reason to suspect that the heat straightening methods used were in any way unusual.However, a procedure should have been specified and used.furthermore, there is no reason to suspect that the heat straightening applied by Leckenby-has reduced the quality of the structure.

AWS D1.1 includes the use of many materials from, as rolled carbon-manganese steels like A36, through normalized steels to quenched and tempered low alloy steels with yield strengths up to 100 ksi.The affect of flame straightening will be different depending on the alloy type and is much more likely to be detrimental to the.higher yield steels.In these steels the specified properties are much more critically dependent on heat treatment and microstructure.

A36 plate is suppli~d in the hot rolled condition with a typical finishing temperature of 1600 F.The high finishing temperature coupled with the relatively thick section and sparse alloy content, tends to produce a coarse microstructure consisting of upper transformation products, primarily proeutectoid ferrite and pearlite.In this condition, the application of heat within the limits specified in Reference (3)would not be expected to have any detrimental effects on material properties.

In fact, as noted in Reference (1), the heating combined with the resultant plastic flow can result in slightly improved notch toughness and yield strength.Even heating substantially in excess of Reference (3)guidelines would not be expected to significantly degrade properties.

Subcritical temperatures (below approximately 1340 F)would be expected to alter microstructure and therefore properties, only if those temperatures were reached and held for long periods of time (one or more hours).This circumstance is well outside the scope of heat straightening operations used by Leckenby.If the lower critical temperature was exceeded, partial transformation to austenite would occur.Upon cooling, the microstructure would be restored to essentially its original condition prior to heat straightening.

In this case, the possibility of improved properties due to grain refinement does exist.The probability of formation of microstructures which would produce cracking or low toughness (e.g., high carbon martensite) is insignificant.

The hardenability of carbon manganese steels is low compared with the high yield strength materials and the thermal cycle produced by flame straightening is less detrimental than that produced by welding.It is, therefore, concluded that heat straightening as applied by Leckenby did not degrade the material properties, and as such the process did not affect the quality of the SSW to any significant extent.No further review or action is planned for this concern item.

References:

(1)Article,"Primary Concepts for Flame Bending", by R.E.Holt, AWS Weldin Journal, June, 1971 (2)Memo WNP2WBG-215-F-80-1452, Task Force Trip Report, Item 4, dated 5/7/80 (3)AWS Structural Welding Code AWS Dl.1-72 CONCERN NO.16 The 215 Contractor (WBG)quality review of the Leckenby documentation did not include verification that all required UT examinations were performed, as required by specification and a Leckenby procedure.

BACKGROUND The 215 Contract, Section 5B, paragraph 5.4 required ultrasonic testing (UT)of electroslag welded tee-joints in the SSW for lamellar tearing.The UT sampling requirements included six weld joints for every 16-25 electroslag welds.If no indications of lamellar tearing were observed after 24 ultrasonic examinations, the UT requirement was reduced to examination of two tee-joints for each additional 100 electroslag welds performed.

There are 1273 electroslag welds in the SSW.This translates to 48 required ultrasonic examinations of welded tee-joints assuming all 1273 are tee-joints, which is not the case but conservative, and knowing that no lamellar tearing was found.The welded tee-joints were to be examined by straight beam UT per ASTM A435-74.The Leckenby lamellar tearing UT examinations, however, were performed prior to this contract modification requirement.

This UT was primarily performed due to concern for lamellar tearing at tee-joints where buttering, an original preventive measure, had not been used.'he UT was performed per Leckenby Quality Control Procedure (QCP)-8.0.The defect repair criteria in QCP-8.0 is substantially more stringent than the specification and ASTM A435 three-inch-diameter circle criteria.QCP-8.0 defect acceptance criteria states: o No cracks, lack of fusion, or incomplete penetration are allowed, and o No linear type discontinuities are allowed if the signal amplitude exceeds the reference level and the discontinuities have lengths which exceed: 1/4 inch for T (a)up to 3/4 inch, 1/3T for T from 3/4 to 24 inch, and 3/4 inch for T over 24 inch.(a)T is the thickness of the thinner portion.CONCERN RESOLUTION Leckenby performed 129 straight beam ultrasonic examinations for lamellar tearing, 81 for-electroslag welded tee-joints and 48 for flux core arc welds.They performed 60 angle beam examinations for lamellar tearing at joints with geometry or access not compatible with straight beam examination, two for electroslag tee-joints, 58 for other processes.

No lamellar tearing was observed or recorded.The Leckenby UT exceeded the 215 Contract requirements.

Implications for defects as a result of improperly performed UT by Mr.E.B.Hamilton are discussed in Concern No.4.No further action is required for this concern.

CONCERN NO.17 1.Leckenby used liquid penetrant (LP)testing to examine SSW structures at Leckenby shops.Leckenby representatives reported that there was no approved LP procedure at the time the inspections were performed.

2.The procedure submitted by Leckenby which provides for weld sequence control (entitled: "Sacrificial Shield Wall Assembly Procedure")has no procedure number, no revision number, no date of preparation, and no evidence of ever having been approved, The American Melding Society (AWS)Structural Welding Code, Dl.l-72, paragraph 3.4.3, requires the following:

~h 3.4.3: BACKGROUND The Contractor shall develop welding sequences which, in conjunction with the overall fabrication methods, will produce members and structures meeting the quality requirements specified.

These sequences and any revisions necessary in the course of the work shall be sent for information and comment to the Engineer.1.The 215 Contract contained no specific requirements for surface examination, dye penetrant or magnetic particle inspection.

The Leckenby Shop guality Assurance and guality Control Manual, dated October 28, 1975, has in Section 10 of the gC portion a procedure for liquid penetrant inspection.

The Structural Welding Code, AWS D1.1-72 (applicable to the SSM fabrication) in paragraph 3.7.2.4 states: Ascertain the extent of the crack by use of acid etching, magnetic particle inspection, or other equally positive means;remove the crack and sound metal 2" beyond each end of the crack, and reweld.The liquid penetrant examinations were primarily performed for information after removal of material defects by grinding and/or air arc gouging.The related defects in the SSM were as follows: o Surface laminations o Edge 1 amination o Blow-outs from burning o Gouges from burning o Material surface cracks o Incomplete stud welds o Material flaws o Slag.7 1 6 3 4 (a)2 2 2 (a)One report may be associated with cold lap rather than surface cracks.

There were no requirements for liquid penetrant examination other than providing a positive means to define the extent of cracks, of which four of the above are in this category.Also, the defects were identified visually;therefore, there was no requirement for PT after repair.2.The following outline summarizes the procedures which have been submitted by Leckenby and/or referenced in this concern: The procedure entitled"Fabrication and Erection Procedure For The Sacrificial Shield Wall (SSW)", No.LEFP-1, new issue,-dated April 10, 1975 was submitted by Leckenby to cover shop and field fabrication and erection of the sacrificial shield wall;however, this procedure does not address the area of welding sequence to control distortion and maintain dimensional stability.

This procedure was"approved as noted" at the"new" issue and was returned to Leckenby for revision.This procedure underwent five additional review and revision cycles before receiving final approval on November 17, 1976.A five-page document entitled"Welding Sequence S.S.W.", dated October 29, 1975 was submitted by Leckenby to cover several specific welding sequence items.This document has no proce-dure number and no revision number and is essentially incomplete in that it only addresses a few specific items with respect to distortion control and dimensional stability.

Item 4, page 3 of this document states: "additional information to follow on the other built-up columns and members";however, no further information has been received to date and Leckenby states no additional related documents exist.The procedure entitled"Sacrificial Shield Wall Assembly Procedure", referenced in the concern above has never been received from Leckenby.(Note: Telecon inquiries to Leckenby about a procedure with this title indicate that this title is incorr'ect).

'ONCERN RESOL'UTION 1.Based on discussion with Leckenby, the liquid penetrant (dye penetrant) examinations were performed per Section 10 of the shop gC manual.The liquid penetrant exam>nations were performed in 1976, after Leckenby approval of the procedure.

For information relative to defect implications from improperly performed dye penetrant examinations, refer to Concern No.4.No futher action is necessary for this concern.

2.In spite of the fact that Leckenby failed to orepare a complete and detailed welding sequence procedure, the sacrificial shield wall was fabricated and erected with a minimum of distortion and with reasonably good dimensional stability.

This fact alone indicates that Leckenby had implemented a reasonable welding sequence and distortion control during the fabrication and erection of the sacrificial shield wall.The as-built dimensions of the sacrificial shield wall at elevation 541'-5" with respect to circularity and vertical plumb have been evaluated by Burns and Roe and have been found to be acceptable.

Although it was necessary to install shim plates between rings 3 and 4 in order to maintain=vertical plumb due to variations in'ertical dimensions, it is believed that these variations are the result of tolerance stack-up and not due to weld sequencing.

The lack of a welding sequence,procedure also implies the possi-bility of having high reaction stresses in the SSW (residual stresses due to member rigidity during welding rather than localized welding stresses).

However, the fact'hat no cracks were found during the Burns and Roe visual'nspection or during the UT performed for the Task Force, and post-fabrication weld cracks identified at the site wei e few (9 known, 7 other cracks of unknown location), provides confidence that a problem with high reaction stresses does not exist.In view of the above, it is concluded that the lack of a formal, detailed welding sequence procedure was not a significant factor in the'final outcome of the fabrication and erection of the sacrificial shield wall and that direction was implemented which enabled Leckenby to meet dimensional tolerances.

Based upon this information, no further action is deemed necessary for this concern.

CONCERN NO.18 Leckenby, as SSW fabricator, hired a consultant to determine the cause of an unusual crack in the SSW.Burns and Roe rejected the consultant's determination.

According to Leckenby, their consultant's opinion was misunderstood by Burns and Roe.Burns and Roe has not had an opportunity to review the consultant's last letter (dated June 21, 1977).BACKGROUND During initial installation of radial beams at elevation 541', a crack was discovered in the SSW at the point of attachment.

Leckenby, through their consultant, proposed a cause for the cracking to the Supply System and Burns and Roe.Burns and Roe reviewed and disagreed with the consultant's proposal.A response was forwarded to Leckenby at that time.Subsequently, the NRC was informed of the existence of a second letter from the consultant to Leckenby, in which the consultant clarified his initial position.The NRC questions whether Burns and Roe received, reviewed and responded to the letter.CONCERN RESOLUTION Burns and Roe has reviewed the June 21, 1977 letter and considers the amplifying remarks by, Leckenby's consultant to be unpersuasive.

In brief, he proposed that the SSW cracked by a 5-step process because of the design.Burns and Roe felt that cracking was caused by the welding method and the fabri-cating sequence selected by Leckenby.The welding conditions presented unusually severe restraint which resulted in cracking.Figure 18.1 illustrates these conditions.

The radial beam consisted of two 24" thick steel"cheek" plates rigidly welded to opposite sides of the web of a massive W14 beam, a 426 pound per foot wide flange column section.The attachment to the SSW was made with two electroslag tee welds between the cheek plates and the SSW.The second of these two welds was deposited directly against an electroslag butt weld within the SSW which joined a 14" thick"skin" plate to a 3" thick skin plate.The thermal and weld-shrinkage effects were compounded by the use of a single steel bar which served as.a common dam between the.two tee welds.Thus, the weld shrinkage strains of the two large tee welds could act additively on the SSW.Moreover, when the second tee weld was deposited directly against the butt weld in the SSW, the severe thermal effects and deep penetration character-istic of the electroslag welding process developed transient high tensile strains on the inside surface, towards the concrete, which when added to the high residual tensile strains from the original electroslag butt welding exceeded the yield strength.Within such a plastic field, normally innocuous discontinuities may initiate fracture.Burns and Roe believes the crack initiated under these conditions, and that the crack propagated into both skin plates when they cooled to the ambient winter temperatures.

Then, in the zone where the lateral shrinkage forces of the three electroslag welds wer additive, the crack branched and turned roughly parallel to the welds forming a figure"3".Indeed, a sample cut from the point of branching revealed that the branchina occurred at the edge of the heat-affected zone where the combined lateral shrinkage forces would be expected to be high;and, that the crack path was predominately transgranular with plastic deformation, indicative of stresses well in excess of the yield point and of ductile overload fracture.The correctness of the conclusion that the SSW cracked because of the way the radial beam was welded to it and the incorrectness of the proposal of Leckenby's consultant that it cracked because of the design, wer e proven by disassembling the radial beams and rewelding them to the SSW correctly.

This work was accomplished without a recurrence of the cracking and without the other dire effects such as a steam explosion and blowing of molten metal predicted by Leckenby's consultant.

TASK FORCE ASSESSMENT In addition to the consultant's report discussed above, additional reports by Peloux and Conrads, commissioned by Bovee-Grail/GERI, have been reviewed (reference attachments to WBGBR-215-77-235).

The original debate between Burns and Roe and the Leckenby'consultant, Holt, centered on the source of stress promoting the crack.Holt felt that expansion of the concrete, resulting indirectly from preheating/welding, provided the stresses.Burns and Roe's position was that the source of stress was residual welding stresses produced by welding with an incorrect sequence.The report by Conrad also attributes the failure to residual welding stresses and poo'r sequence, but added that the design of the connection was also a contributory factor.All the subject welds made using the electroslag process and the original sequence (eight)were examined by.UT and repaired or reworked as'ecessary.

Those which were reworked, and all subsequent joints, were made using the SHAW process, with a different sequence.In addition all welds were examined by UT and accepted.Thus, the cracking problem was identified and eliminated.

The debate over the original cause is only significant if the conclusions would have affected the corrective action taken or would cast doubt on the adequacy of the joint for service.The Burns and Roe repair action was formulated based upon the assumption that.process/sequence was the main contributor.

The success of the repair supports their assumption.

If the source of stress were concrete expansion, then additional problems might have been expected to occur as all welds are preheated continuously.

Similarly, if the weld connection design were a dominant factor, it would be expected that further problems might have occurred, which was not the case.It is the Supply System's opinion that the design of this connection is such that careful procedures are required to successfully make the joint and that the primary problem was the combination of process and sequence-used.

No further action is required on this concern.

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..v~(<yc.st@~fr A I'z f.'YP.'LA~-.T~P.ee~M C,O~N.e, SWC,.eHIELD~gVL+OP.H hx42&WITH COVE.P.PLATE,&T.gb.~F.L:&41-2~4" causa It..-: QHEEk..It 0 7P.Is co~wlt.'E, C,T I OH.Fi aure 18.1 CONCERN NO.19 Tne presence of free water was identified in the SSM structure.

NRC Region'l previously understood that the existence of free water in the SSM was one isolated case.However, a review of Contrac" 215 Inspection Repor s (IR's)shows seven cases where evidence existed o-'ree hater or moistur emanating from the SSW.The water could have had a detrimental effect on welding if it was present in the weld preparation during welding.BACKGROUNO Burns and Roe has conducted a review of all IR's written on the SSM and determined that there are only five documenting free water, which may have implications for the associated weld quality.IR 2525 (Two locations)

IR 3069 IR 1703 IR 1464 (Two locations)

IR 2915 NCR 4043 NCR 4561 ACR 5141 No NCR ACR 4463 CONCERN RESOLUTION The seven documented cases of water leaking from the SSll all occur at deficient welds.The subject welds have all been repaired and magnetic particle examinations of the repaired areas have been made.The subject welds are now acceptable and no further"leaks" have been detected.Six of the welds involved were made prior to placing concrete in the enclosed compartment.

Therefore, water was not present at the backside of the joint, during welding, and the question of its effect on the weld is moot.The remaining wel.d (IR 3069)was made between a 2" thick"window" plate and an internal diaphragm plate immedjately after concrete was p'laced in the compartment, bounded by azimuths 15 and 30 and elevation 541'-5" and 544'-8", This compartment had been left open to facilitate other welding.This compartment was subsequently filled with concrete using the window plate opening f'r access.The joint configurations for the window plate welds were designed to seal the concrete out from the back of the weld joint prior to weld:ng.However, when repairs were conducted on the window plate weld, it was determined that water possibly could have been present, due to the weld preparation.

Such a weld could not be performed with water present.'Hithout doubt, the area of the joint was dried out prio~to welding.However, all window plate welds have subsequently been inspected and any deficient welds have be n documented and repaired.The conclusion is that no water was present behind the subject welds during installation.

The source of any free water observed on the SSW prior to review of the IR's was'the concrete behind the skin.plates.It would only be specu-lation to make a statement on how water found its way through the deficient welds.The main point to be made is that the inspection program located such defects, the defects were repaired and any other suspect areas of the same type were investigated.

No further action is necessary CONCERN NO.20 Burns and Roe Drawing S-802, Note 3, refers to the Burns and Roe specification for post-weld.

heat treatment (PWHT)requirements for the stabilizer truss assemblies.

The specification does not appear to specifically address PWHT of stabilizers.

It is, therefore, unclear whether or not Burns and Roe intended to require PWHT.Stabilizer truss mater ial is A514.SSW material at the stabilizer truss attachment weld is A588.'ontainment vessel material at the stabilizer truss pin location is SA537.BACKGROUND Burns and Roe Drawing S-802, Note 3, reads as follows: "Note 3: For welding and heat treatment requirements for stab1Tizer truss, see specs." The note does not specifically address PWHT requirements, as it refers to welding and heat treatment.

Heat treatment may apply to one or more'f three phases;preheat, interpass temperature, and post-weld heat treatment requirements.

Each phase is accomplished as required.Ih Paragraph 3.6, Post-Weld Heat Treatment from specification section 170 of the 215 Contract states: 'ost-weld heat treatment shall be performed in accordance with the applicable specification requirements and/or manufacturer recommendations." Paragraph 3.9, Stress Relief Heat Treatment, from the 1972 and the 1975 editions of the AWS Structural Welding Code refers to footnote No.12, which states: "Stress relieving of weldments of quenched and tempered steel is not generally required.Stress relieving may be necessary for those applications where weldments must retain dimensional stability during machining or where stress corrosion may be involved, neither condition being unique to weldments of quenched and tempered steel.However, the results of notch toughness tests have shown that post weld heat treatment may actually impair weld metal and heat-affected zone toughness and intergranular cracking may some-times occur in.the grain-coarsened region of the weld heat-affected zone." A change was made to the above footnote in the 1979 edition of the AWS Structural Welding Code.This change appears in footnote No.9 of paragraph 4.4;Stress Relief Heat Treatment, which states:

"Stress relieving weldments of A514, A51-7 and A709 Grades 100 and 100M steels is not generally recommended.

Stress relieving may be necessary for those applications where weldments must retain dimensional stability during machining or where stress corrosion may be involved, neither condition being unique to weldments involving A514, A517 and A709 Grades 100 and 100M steel.However, the results of notch toughness tests have shown that post-weld heat treatment may actually impair weld metal and heat-affected zone toughness, and intergranular cracking may sometimes occur in the grain-coarsened region of that heat-affected

'zone." CONCERN RESOLUTION The question as to whether post-weld heat treatment of the stabilizer truss assemblies was required has been thoroughly reviewed with Burns and Roe and they have confirmed that the stabilizer truss assemblies were not to be post-weld heat treated.Post-weld heat treatment is performed on welded assemblies for the following basic reasons;o To relieve stresses in the weldment base metal and weld metal, o To improve the dimensional stability in the weldment, and o To improve the machin'eability of the weldment.In the case of the stabilizer truss assemblies, none of the above items were significant factors;therefore, there was no reason to apply post-weld heat treatment to the stabilizer truss assemblies.

In addition, the drawing reference was to heat treatment in general, not to post-weld heat treatment specifically, and as indicated post-weld heat treatment may degrade 5514 steel toughness properties and promote cracking.No further action is necessary for this concern.

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CONCERN NO.22 Based on implications from previously identified Leckenby documentation irregularities, a review was performed of Leckenby welder qualification records to determine if the welders were properly qualified and if the testing was properly documented.

BACKGROUND The welder qualification record review was performed by Burns and Roe and the Supply System and consisted of the shop and field qualification records submitted by Leckenby.The qualification records were evaluated for completeness, correctness and testing requirements as required by the AWS 01.1 Code and the Design Specification.

A total of 32 welder's qualifications were submitted for field work and 38 welder's qualifications were submitted for shop fabrication.

The welder qualification records exhibited varied deficiencies that were considered to render some qualifications invalid and deficiencies that were generic documentation problems that required clarification.

gualifications considered invalid involved qualification records for three welders without test results, two welder's coupons incorrectly tested by UT, ten welder's records which did not identify the type of bend test and one welder for which another company's qualification record was used without the Engineers'-approval.

The deficiencies were evaluated recognizing that evidence does exist that the welders performed a qualification test and that because the record or manner of qualification was in error does not conclude the welder does not have the ability to produce sound welds.Some of these welder qualifications were found not to have been applied for SSW usage.Leckenby has been requested to provide the missing information from their files where possible.gualifications which contain generic documentation problems include items of missing or incorrect information such as: omission of contractor name, record title, certification statement, identification of weld backing, vertical progression direction, uninitialled changes, the number of electroslag wires;shielding gas designation, welder symbol, bevel angle, or qualifying code;one symbol assigned to two welders;conflicting procedure and process numbers;and typographical errors.These deficiencies.

do not apply to all the qualification records, but are provided as a summary of generic problems which include single or multiple items unique to an individual record.These generic documentation problems are considered as not invalidating a welder's performance capabilities as demonstrated by qualification even though some items violate the specific requirements of the AWS Dl.1 Code.These qualifications are considered adequate to provide evidence of qualification to fulfill the intent of the Code to determine a welder's ability to produce sound welds.However, Leckenby has also been requested to update and clarify these welder qualification records.

In addition to review of qualification records it was determined that some welders were identified to have welded on the SSW for which no qualification records were on file and-it is assumed that they had not performed a qualification test.When considering welder qualifications, the purpose of the test, to determine a welder's ability to produce sound welds, must be in mind as the test is not meant to serve as a training operation but a verification of his previous-training and existing ability.Most welders possess the ability'o produce sound welds and when performing a qualification test for each contractor which employs him, he is verifying his ability.If a welder did not possess an a@i:lity to produce sound welds due to inexperience or lack of training, his welds would clearly evidence it by exhibiting defects of non-fusion, slag entrapment, porosity and surface appearances with uneven and rolled beads, excessive arc strikes and weld spatter.In an effort to determine if the lack of qualification was a significant factor in a welder's ability to produce acceptable welds, a study was conducted to examine the weld reject history for those welders that were definitely known to lack the proper qualification credentials to ascertain the quality of the welds they produced.The lack of proper qualification credentials includes invalid qualifications defined above, and no evidence of qualification tests being performed.

These cases are subsequently termed as"unqualified" welders in the balance of this concern.In order to attain a high level of confidence in this study, the scope was confined to those welds which were part of the Burns and Roe visual inspection and for which recent MT and UT was performed.

CONCERN RESOLUTION A total of thirteen (13)"unqualified" welders (both shop and field welders)comprised the complement of welders for the assessment associated with the Burns and Roe inspection.

These welders collectively produced four hundred (400)welds of which only twelve (12)contained rejectable defects, for a defect percentage of three (3)percent.All of these welds were made using several different w'elding processes as tabulated below: Process No.Welds No.Defects SMAW FCAW-Self Shielded FCAW-Gas Shielded ESW 157 63 173 7 These results indicate that when considering only visual inspection in this case, the lack of proper qualification credentials by these welders was not a significant factor in the welder's ability to produce acceptable welds.(It should be noted that for all of the welds made on the SSW, with most of them being made by welders whose qualifications meet the intent of the AWS Dl.1 Code, the defect per centage was 7.6 percent.)

Comparison of welds performed by welders with invalid qualifications and those with minor deficiencies (termed qualified below)in their qualifications to recently performed MT and UT, however, presents a different conclusion.

Specifically, o X weld rejects by UT by welders unqualified

'in one or more process-21Ã, o X weld rejects by UT by qualified welders-9.5%, o X weld rejects by MT and UT by welders unqualified in one or more process-17'A, o 5 weld rejects by MT and UT by qualified welders-7.7%, 5 weld rejects by, UT by welders unqualified by process-33K and, (a)X we14 rejects by MT and UT by welders unqualified by process-25K (a)Sampling only included welds for which the welder was unqualified in.that process.Based on the unqualified welder NDE sample sizes, 29 UT and 7 MT, the statistical results above may be prejudiced.

The deficiencies noted for invalid welder qualifications in the fourth paragraph of BACKGROUND for this concern are not necessarily indicative of the capability of a welder to produce sound welds.Potential defects associated with improper welder qualifications were evaluated to be few in number and structurally acceptable based on the recent visual inspections and nondestructive examinations (refer to subsection III.C of this report)and the structural assessment in subsection III.D which envelops known and postulated defects.

CONCERN NO.23 Based on implications from previously identified Leckenby documentation irregularities, a review was performed of Leckenby welding procedures to determine if adequate welding procedure specifications were used and if those used were properly qualified to provide representation of the SSW welds.BACKGROUND The welding procedure review was performed by Burns and Roe and the Supply System.The welding procedures were evaluated for completeness, correctness and qualification requirements per AWS Dl.1-Rev.1-73 and the Design Specification.

The review included 26 shielded metal arc welding (SHAW)procedures, 23 flux cored arc welding (FCAW)procedures and 25 electroslag welding (ESW)procedures.

The welding procedures involve the welding of A588 and A36 base material and combinations thereof with E7018 electrode and A36 material with E7028 electrodes with the SHAW process.E70T-G without external shielding gas was limited to A36 material and E70T-1 with external shielding gas was used for both A588 and A36 material and combinations thereof for use with the FCAW process.The welding of A588 and A36 material and combinations thereof with the ESW process used EM12K wire with Linde 124 consumable guide tubes and flux.Due to the use of only EM12K wire for the ESW process the number of applicable ESW procedures was reduced from 25 to 12 as the other ESW procedures were for EL12 and EH14 wire.The welding procedures exhibited AWS Dl.1 and Design Specification deficiencies.

The Design Specification deficiencies are identified as such, but actually resulted in AWS Dl.1 deficiencies by exempting the prequalified status of the A588 base material.The Design Specification requirement to qualify the welding of A588 material in accordance with AWS Dl.1 resulted in qualifications that were incomplete and inadequate for the support of the welding procedure.

This deficiency is attributed to an incorrect interpretation of the Design Specification to qualify low alloy materials in accordance with ASME Section IX.Since A588 is'onsidered a low alloy steel, the contractor used Section IX for the qualifications which resulted in cases of incomplete representation for positions, joint design, groove welds and fillet welds when applied to AWS Dl.1.Welding procedure deficiencies identified were evaluated in an attempt to assess the impact they may have on the welded i'ntegrity of the SSW.CONCERN RESOLUTION (by Process)Fourteen of the 26 SHAW procedures were found acceptable or accepted as-is.The procedures accepted as-is involved joint designations of the 1974 AWS Dl.1 Code.However, the joint details conform to the 1973 revision of AWS D1.1 and is, therefore, not considered to have any weld impact or engineering significance.

The balance of the procedures contained AWS D1.1 and Design Specification deficiencies.

The AWS D1.1 deficiencies resulted from the provision of horizgntal instead of overhead position for joint design, TC-U4a with a 30 bevel angle and 3/8" root opening for both E7018 and E7028 electrodes.

By AWS classification the E7028 is a flat groove and horizontal fillet electrode and the E7018 is an all position electrode.

If the E7028 was used for horizontal groove welds using this joint design, it would be expected to produce more defects than the E7018.However, due to the joint design specified-i-t-is possible because of electrode manipulation problems that intermittent inclusions and lack of fusion could occur with both electrodes.

These defects would be considered to be limited to the first part of the joint on the bevel edge as accessibility would increase as deposited thickness increased.

The extent of possible defects would be dependent upon the individual welder's sk'ill and attending circumstances.

It is estimated that the depth of possible inclusions or lack of fusion would be 3/16" maximum per weld bead.The evaluation and effect these possible defects may have on the load bearing capacity or potential for fracture of the SSW are enveloped by the structural assessment in subsection III.O of this report.The Design Specification deficiencies resulted because of the specification requirement that exempted the A588 material from a prequalified status.The welding procedures would be acceptable under a prequalified status of AWS Dl.1 except for-the same joint designation and welding position problems previously discussed.

The A588 material procedure qualifications were performed in accordance with ASME Section IX and as allowed by Section IX a groove weld on the flat position was used to support the procedures.

When these procedure qualifications are applied to AWS'1.1, it results in unqualified procedures.

The major resulting deficiencies were no fillet weld qualification, the vertical, horizontal and overhead positions not qualified, omission of travel speed and pas~numbers, amperage range unqualified, and bevel angles less than 35 unqualified.

In addition, the tensile dimensions were incorrectly machined.The omission of fillet weld testing is not considered significant as the fillet weld macro-etch is defined to determine soundness which is the same AWS defined purpose of bend tests.The groove weld test with bends and tensi les would be considered adequate representation.

The weld positions, trav'el speed, pass numbers and amperage range must all be considered in conjunction.

The objective is the determination of the effect of the heat input on notch toughness and.tensile strength of the weld.The travel speed having the most effect on heat input is controlled to a low level by the restriction for essentially stringer beads with a maximum weave width of 3 times the electrode core diameter.In addition, the amperage ranges given are reasonable for the positions and electrode sizes specified.

It is therefore considered'hat the heat input was not varied enough to degradate the weld properties.

The bevel angle deficiency is not considered significant as the joint designs used are as allowed by AWS D1.1 and weld soundness would become a factor of the welders'bilities.

The procedure qualification tensile specimens were machined to a width of 1.5" nominal instead of 1" nominal as required by the coupon thickness.

This is not considered a significant item as the weld tensile properties have been adequately represented.

FCAW Eighteen of the 23 FCAW procedures were found acceptable or accepted as-is.The procedures accepted as-is involved joint designation of the 1974 AWS Dl.1 Code.However, the joint details conform to the 1973 revision of AWS D1.1 and is, therefore, not considered to have any weld impact or engineering significance.

The balance of the procedures contained Design Specification deficiencies.

The Design Specification deficiencies resulted because of the specification requirement that exempted the A588 material from a prequalified status.The welding procedures would be acceptable under a prequalified status of AWS 01.1 except for omission of a specific travel speed range.The travel speed is indirectly specified and limited by the requirement for a stringer bead technique when possible and a torch oscillation or weave not to exceed 1/4".Therefore, this is not considered a significant item.The A588 material procedure qualifications were performed in accordance with ASME Section IX and as allowed by Section IX a groove weld in the flat position was used to support the procedures.

When these procedure qualifications are applied to AWS Dl.1, it results in unqualified procedures.

The major resulting deficiencies were the vertical, horizontal and overhead positions not qualified, amperage range unqualified, voltage range unqualified, bevel angles less than 35 unqualified, and tensile dimensions incorrectly machined.The E70T-1 electrode w'ire used is primarily intended for flat and horizontal position welding>but out of position welding with electrode wire diameters less than 3/32" are possible if used on the lower end of the manufacturer's recommended amperage range.The amperage and voltage ranges specified are in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations which complies with AWS Dl.1 under a prequalified status.However, the higher end of the amperage range if used in out of position welding as allowed could be expected to cause loss of puddle control.This could result in overlapped beads, inclusions, porosity and non-fusion.

The extent of possible defects would be dependent upon the individual welder's skill and attending circumstances.

It is estimated that the width or depth of possible defects would be 3/8" maximum per weld bead.The evaluation and effect these possible defects may have on the load bearing capacity or potential for fracture of the SSW are enveloped by the structural assessment in subsection III.D of this report.The weld position, travel speed, amperage range and voltage range must be considered with regard to applied heat input and the effect on notch toughness and tensile strength of the weld.The travel speed was controlled to a degree by the procedure requirement for basically stringer beads and in conjunction with a need to operate at a relatively low amperage for puddle control.The resulting heat input would be controlled to a reasonable level.It is, therefore, considered that the heat input was not varied enough to degradate the weld properties.

The bevel angle deficiency is not considered significant as the joint designs used are as allowed by'WS Dl.1 and weld soundness would become a factor of welders'bilities.

The procedure qualification tensile specimens were machined to a width of 1.5" nominal instead of 1" nominal as required by the coupon thickness.

This is not considered a significant item as the weld tensile properties have been adequately represented.

ESW All the ESW procedures used for the SSW welding were considered to contain AWS D1.1 deficiencies.

The major concern is no qualification records and therefore no mechanical or weld metal tension tests for the use of EM12K (Linde 29)bare electrodes with A588 base material which would verify that the weld would produce a yield strength of 50,000 psi minimum.Other concerns involve provisions in the welding procedures that are not fully qualified by mechanical or soundness tests.The full thickness range spec~fied in some procedures is not qualified by bend and tension tests.The mechanical and chemical properties of an electroslag weld, depends upon the type and thickness of base material, the welding consumables composition, and the welding parameters.

Therefore, a change in base metal thickness affects the welding para-meters and dilution rate which will affect the weld form factor and chemistry which may alter the mechanical properties.

The AWS D1.1 Code recognizes the effect of base material thickness by limiting the qualified thickness to 0.5T to l.1T times the test thickness.

The approach used by Leckenby on the qualifications to accomnodate a change in base metal thickness by performing a supplementary coupon of differ-'nt thickness and nondestructively examining for acceptance is incorrect and does not evaluate the change in mech'anical properties involved with a thickness change.The ful'I amperage range of some procedures are not qualified.

AWS Dl.l allows a change in welding amperage of 205..Some procedures exceeded the qualified amperage by IX.With the use of a 1/8" diameter electrode over 400 amps, as is the cases involved, an increase in the amperage increases the deposition rate and also decreases the weld form factor which results in a lower resistance to cracking and weld centerline inclusions or lack of fusion due to the dendritic grains meeting at an obtuse included angle.The weld form factor is the ratio of the weld pool width to its maximum depth.An increase or decrease in the amperage is not detrimental providing the welding voltage.is correspondingly adjusted so that proper fusion and, a high form factor is maintained.

Amperage and voltage combinations that result in a low form factor could result in crack-like defects through the weld.Changes in joint root openings are not qualified in some procedures.

AWS Dl.1 allows a change of 1/4" in the root opening from that qualified.

A change beyond the 1/4" requires a supplementary test with the new root opening to be qualified by nondestructive examination.

The purpose of the supplementary nondestructive examination is to determine if a sound weld is achieved with a given.procedure when the root opening is increased or decreased.

An increase in the root opening increases the form factor which raises the resistance to cracking.However, a large increase in the root opening in conjunction with similar parameters may result in a lack of fusion or slag entrapment along the side walI.These defects could be intermittent or continuous with weld length and typically shallow to 1/2" in the through-thickness dimension.

Changes made to design of molding shoes from fusing to non-fusing are not qualified in some procedures.

The types of molding shoes involved are copper both sides, copper one side and fusing steel backing the other side, and fusing steel backing both sides.A change in the type or design of molding shoes from that in the qualification requires supplementary testing with nondestructive examination to determine if the change in the molding shoe with a given-procedure will produce a sound weld.A procedure with parameters adequate with steel backing may produce non-fusion at the corner edge when used with copper backing if the voltage is not increased enough to increase the depth of fusion to overcome the chilling effect of the copper backing.A change from copper backing to steel backing may result in non-fusion or slag entrapment at the corner edge if the flux burden and resultant slag depth is excessive.

These types of corner edge defects could range in depth from a slight undercut appearance to possibly 1/2".Due to the extent of the ESW procedure deficiencies, instructions were issued to the 215 Contractor to have qualification tests performed for the parameters specified in the ESW procedures.

It must be noted that the potential ESW procedure related defects postulated above were not found in the SSW welds by recent UT examinations (refer to subsection III.C of the report).With respect to the EM12K electrode and A588 base material qualification, strength property concerns do not exist.The design load calculations of subsection III.B resulted in maximum design stresses for the SSW being less than 18,000 psi.PROCESS

SUMMARY

The main concern for Leckenby welding procedures are the deficiencies associated with the ESW process.The deficiencies identified for the SMAW and FCAW processes are not considered to have significant impact as discussed above.The postulated defects are believed to be few in number as the recent MT and UT examinations of welds (refer to subsection III.C of the report)did not disclose defects as proposed.Based on the Task Force investigation, it is concluded that due to the examinations performed and the large design margins available, the existing welds in the SSW are acceptable without concern for structural integrity due to welding procedure deficiencies.

CONCERN NO.24 Based on SSW Certified Material Test Report (CMTR)discrepancies noted by the 215 Contractor (WBG), the Supply System and Burns and Roe, concern arose with respect to the completeness and correctness of these documents.

BACKGROUNO A review of'll available SSW CMTRs in conjunction with the SSW material traceability logs and other documentation identified 26 missing CMTRs.Five of these CMTRs have been located by Leckenby and transmitted to WBG.Additionally, numerous deficiencies have been identified in the CMTRs submitted by Leckenby.CONCERN RESOLUTION Eighteen of the missing CMTR numbers were determined to be associated with non-existent certifications.

The numbers were originated from observation of missing CMTRs from the CMTR consecutive number list, e.g., 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, etc., (4 not.included).

The missing CMTR numbers are not associated with material in the SSW.The remaining three CMTRs are missing and Leckenby is currently reviewing their records for these documents.

One of these CMTRs, No.196, is associated with pipe whip support girder material, not the SSW.No.245, is associated with plate material used to bolt SSW ring segments together prior to welding (after welding, these plates serve no necessary structural function).

As such, these 2 missing CMTRs do riot structurally affect the SSW.The third mi'ssing CMTR is associated with an'electrode used in the SSW.SMAW welds made using the subject electrode have been tested using a Clandon metascope.

This instrument has established that no chromium exists in the welds, and as such, it is believed that the deposited weld filler metal is E70XX series, since no E60XX series electrode was selected for use in the SSW.It is believed with reasonable confidence that the missing CMTR is for E7018 electrode.

Leckenby is currently pursuing the missing documentation with the electrode suppIier.The heat number is known, 630R.When/if the 3 missing CMTRs are found, they will be submitted to WBG for the standard review and documentation program.The disposition of deficiencies identified in the available CMTRs will not affect the conclusion of the SSW structural assessment.

This statement is based on the following:

o Nine deficiencies are associated with accessible bolts, washers, and cotter pins in the SSW penetration door assemblies, o Eight deficiencies are associated with accessible bolts, washers, nuts and shim material for the attachment of pipe whip restraints to the SSW, and o One of the deficiencies is associated with accessible cotter pins in the stabilizer truss assemblies.

Resolution of, these deficiencies, e.g., replacement, can occur by the normal engineering disposition process and not change the structural conclusions in this report.o Six deficiencies are associated with bolts used to connect ring segments in the SSW prior to welding.Subsequent to welding the ring segments together, the bolts serve no structural design function.o Three deficiencies are associated with weld filler metal for which recently transmitted CMTRs appear to resolve the missing or erroneous information.

o One CNTR is missing for backing bar material used with A588 base material.Review indicates that the backing bar material is A36 or A588.Either of these materials are acceptable.

In addition, the backing bar is not part of the design weld strength.o One heat of A36 plate material was recorded to have a yield strength of 35,500 psi.The minimum yield strength for A36 material should have been" 36,000 psi.Based on the design stresses in subsection III.B, this heat of A36 has been evaluated to have no structural significance for the SSW.The above deficiencies will be resolved by the normal engineering dispositon process.

CONCERN NO.25 Based on a Quality Assurance review by the 215 Contractor of Leckenby documentation, it was determined that two weld maps of the SSW had not been submitted.

r'ACKGROUND Review of the Leckenby weld maps by the 215 Contractor identified that weld maps WF-205 and WF-253 had not been submitted.

The 215 Contractor requested from Leckenby an index of the weld maps and the associated revision data to assure an accurate weld map list was available for further documentation reviews.CONCERN RESOLUTION Weld map WF-205 illustrates door stop weldents.NCR 5009 was issued on this missing weld map.Corrective action for NCR 5009 requires the six related door stops to be removed from the SSW and reattached per the 215 Contractor's Work Procedure 84.Weld map WF-253 was transmitted by Leckenby to the 215 Contractor and has been informally submitted to the Task Force.The drawing pertains to pipe whip support girders.Weld map WF-253 will be reviewed by the normal Quality Assurance and engineering process.No further action is necessary for this concern.

CONCERN NO.26 Based on defects identified in the SSW by the 215 Contractor, general concern arose with respect to the SSW weld quality.One action item that resulted was a review of Leckenby documentation to ascertain from a~desi n standpoint the completeness and correctness of the SSW welding.BACKGROUND The documentation review was performed by Burns and Roe and consisted of 166 Leckenby weld maps.All weld maps were reviewed to confirm that structural members included on Burns and Roe engineering drawings were included on Leckenby weld maps.Additionally, 20 of the weld maps were further reviewed to check that each Leckenby weld description was correct when compared to the.appropriate Burns and Roe weld design drawing.CONCERN RESOLUTION All structural members and their associated welds were documented on the Leckenby weld maps.Six engineering related concerns were identified and dispositioned as follows: o Four Leckenby weld details did not duplicate the preparation associated with the weld procedures.

Investigation of these welds found.negligible effect on the structural integrity of the connections.

Two welds indicated no root opening, rather than a 1/4 inch or 3/8 inch root.A review of the original associated design margin indicated no.structural concern.The other two welds had an angle that did not match the weld procedure.

Either weld angle developed the full strength of the member and th'erefore did not effect the connection.

o The remaining two weld details did not match the Burns and Roe engineering drawings.These welds were not structural welds,'but seal and reinforcing fillet welds.These welds were not included in the design of member connections and therefore have no effect on the SSW integrity.

Based on the small number of engineering related deficiencies identified in this review (six in approximately 1300 welds), and the fact that no structural concerns were identified, no further action is planned for this concern.

CONCERN NO.27 Lamellar Tearing-Implications For The SSW Structural Evaluation NRC Noncompliance Status Report 038-(80-06)

(6)(5/20/80)identifies a concern over the potential for failure of SSW attachment welds caused by operational or welding stresses and low short transverse ductility of the A36 material.The response to this concern has been expanded to cover the potential for lamellar tearing in the SSW as a whole, and the potential for failure in service caused by lamellar tears, laminations or low short transverse ductility.

BACKGROUND Lamellar tearing (LT)is a form of cracking which can occur when plate or forging steels are strained transverse to the primary rolling or forging planes.The most frequent form of LT occurs during welding and is caused by residual stresses (or strains).It is also possible that lamellar tears could be initiated by applied loads, though only one instance was found in the literature.

Many types of material and weld joint designs are potentially susceptible to tearing.However, only in relatively few instances is tearing observed.Furthermore, a recent survey (Reference 1)has shown that only one instance of service failure can be attributed to the presence of a lamellar tear.However, when LT is encountered during fabrication it is usually repaired;often at substantial cost.Also, it is prudent to take precautions against LT during the design and fabrication of structures and pressure vessels.It is usually difficult to specifically define a set of conditions which will result in (or conversely eliminate)

LT.The factors promoting LT are known in qualitative terms.However, the absolute values required to give LT and the interactions between variables are not well understood.

It is within this context that a concern has been raised over the possibility of lamellar tearing in the sacrificial shield wall (SSW).This concern is addressed as follows: A.The potential for LT in the SSW structure has been considered in terms of: o Material, o Joint design, o Erection sequence, and o Welding process.

B.The measures taken during design and fabrication to prevent LT have been assessed.C.The inspection methods used to detect LT during and after fabrication have been identified and the results reviewed.D.The potential for LT during the welding of attachments to the SSW has been addressed.

E.The effect of possible LT's on the performance of the SSW have been evaluated.

F.Conclusions as to the overall implications of this concern on SSW integrity have been made.In addition, two related concerns have been addressed.

These are the effect of plate laminations and low short transverse ductility on structural performance.

I I DEFINITIONS LAMELLAR TEARING has been defined above.LAMINATIONS are planar plate or forging defects which lie parallel to the primary rolling or forging plane of the material.They result from the rolling out of ingot defects.Laminations resulting from blowholes, blisters, exogenous inclusions, piping, etc., are macroscopic discontinuities.

Smaller laminations, or laminar inclusions, result from the rolling of indigenous inclusions

-sulphides or oxides of silicates.

Lamellar tearing may, or may not, be associated with laminations.

SHORT TRANSVERSE DUCTILITY (STD)is a condition where the ductility at as ure measured transverse to the rolling plane is low.Again this may or may not be associated with laminations, However, it does indicate a susceptibility to LT.The degree of susceptibility being inversely proportional to the ductility.

An STD value less than ten percent indicates high susceptibility.to LT.III.DISCUSSION A.Potential for LT in the SSW The SSW is fabricated from ASTM A36 rolled sections and plate and ASTM A588 plate.Thicknesses are up to three inches with most material lg to 2>inches thick.Susceptible weld joint designs include fillet welded T-joints, butt welded T-joints, and corner joints.The welding processes used were shielded metal arc, flux cored and electroslag.

No supplementary controls on plate chemistry were specified and the sulphur levels in the A36 range up to.0.045 wt5.Also, no volumetric examination was specified.

Thus, there is some potential for LT of T-and corner joints within the SSW.However, there have been no reported cases of LT associated with electroslag welds (Reference 2).Some of the more susceptible joints are identified in Attachment 1 (drawing details).Some of the SSW joint details were changed to minimize LT.These changes are discussed further in the next section.Given some susceptibility to LT produced by the joint type and the material, the level of risk is influenced by the weld sequence.The sequence used on the SSW was not very detailed (Attachment 2).However, from the general erection sequence we do know the order in which the structure was put together.Each ring was assembled separately and then the complete wall put together in the field.The potential for tearing of a given joint will depend on the erection sequence.Thus, the first welds attaching the columns to the base plates, or ring members will be relatively unrestrained.

However, closing connections between beams and columns or between the columns and the top ring member could be more highly restrained.

Given the difficulty in predicting go-no/go conditions for LT (refer to I of this concern)and the lack of specific information on the erection sequence, it is difficult after the fact to judge whether LT would or would not have occurred in a given joint.Precautions Taken During Design, Fabrication and Erection During the design of the weld details for the SSW a number of changes were made to minimize the potential for lamellar tearing (see Attachment 3).These changes related primarily to the fabrication of the built-up columns and beams.In most instances the joint designs used were of the type recommended to minimize tearing in that the bevel was placed on the susceptible member in a corner joint.One exception is member 4 where the bevel is completely on the intersecting member.However, in all of the box sections the joint design is such that any tearing would propagate to the end of the plate with a high probability that it would be detected visually.Member 9 is a built-up beam and the design required that the flange faces be grooved and buttered to prevent tearing under the flange/web welds.Thus, it is concluded that there is no reason to suspect a major problem with LT in the built-up*beams and columns.However, in assembling the wall, the ring beams and columns are joined by welding.Also, there are numerous internal stiffeners welded into columns and also spanning column to column.

Amongst this set of weld details there are many with a susceptibility to LT (see Attachment 1).No precautions were apparently taken to prevent LT in these joints.C.Inspections to Detect LT During Fabrication The 215 Contract (Section 5B, paragraph 5.4)required ultrasonic testing (UT)of electroslag welded joints in the SSW for lamellar tearing.The joints were to be examined by straight beam UT per ASTM A435-74.The Leckenby lamellar tearing UT examinations, however, were performed prior to this contract modification requirement.

This UT was primarily perfo'rmed due to concern for lamellar tearing at tee-joints whe're buttering, an original preventive measure, had not been used.The UT was performed per Leckenby guality Control Procedure (gCP)-8.0.

The defect repair criteria in gCP-8.0 is substantially more stringent than the specification and ASTN A435 three-inch-diameter circle criteria.gCP-S.O defect acceptance criteria states: o No cracks, lack of fusion, or incomplete penetration are allowed, ard o No linear type discontinuities are allowed if the signal amplitude exceeds the reference level and the discontinuities have lengths which exceed l/4 inch for T (a)and up to 3/4 inch, 1/3T for T from 3/4 to 24 inch, and 3/4 inch for T over 24 inch.(a)T is the thickness of the thinner portion.Leckenby performed 129 straight beam UT examinations for LT.Of these, eighty-one were on ESW and forty-eight on FCAW.Also, two angle beam examinations were performed on ESW and fifty-eight on other processes.

The number of lamellar tearing UT examinations performed by Leckenby exceeded the specification requirements.

No lamellar tearing was found.This sample consisted of about six percent of ESW (83 of 1273)and about 1.5Ãof all welds on the SSW.Considering that many of the weld joints are not susceptible to lamellar tearing, the sample percentage of susceptible welds will be much higher.2.UT Examinations Performed for the Task Force All SSW exterior, accessible electroslag welds have been UT'd.As a part of this examination the base plate six inches on either side of the weld was scanned for laminations or lamellar tears.A total of seventy-three welds were examined.Of these twenty-seven were potentially susceptible to LT (Type A in Figure III.C.1);thirty-four were not susceptible (Type 8);the details of twelve are not readily available.

None of the welds were rejectable for LT.In only one instance was a lamination detected in the material adjacent to the weld.In addition, seven double bevel, full penetration, T welds made using the flux cored arc process were examined by UT.The weld detail is shown in Figure 27.1 of this concern.No laminations or LT was detected.3.Ultrasonic Examination Performed as a Result of Cracks Associated With the Radial Beam to SSW Connection All radial beam to SSW welds were inspected and repaired after discovery of a cracking problem associated with the original attachment electroslag we)ds.At the time of discovery of the crack eight welds had been made.All were UT'd and repaired as necessary.

In addition, all other attachment areas were UT'd before attachment of the remaining beams.An area eight inches to all sides of the connection region was included.The areas were then buttered and HT'd.After completion of the beam/SSM connection the welds were again UT'd.This inspection was performed after seventy-two hours had elapsed from completion of the weld.In all these inspections no evidence of lamellar tearing was found.4.Conclusions Related to Inspections A significant number of volumetric examinations of welds susceptible to lamellar tearing have been made during and subsequent to fabrication of the SSW.These include welds attaching members.to the outside of the SSW.No evidence of LT was detected.D.Potential for LT Occurring During Melding of Pipe Whip Restraints, and Other Attachments, to the SSM The welding attachments to the SSW since 1977 have been to the controlled procedures of Work Procedure-84.

Prior to attachment the area of the SSW is examined by MT.The complete attachment area is then buttered and re-examined.

All welds are made using an approved sequence.All welding is performed at controlled preheat.Intermediate passes are peened and MT examination performed on the root pass and at completion.

Welding heat input is also controlled.

Initial experience with the repair and subsequent installation of the radial beam to SSW connection welds gave confidence that even under restrained conditions these procedures were adequate to prevent LT.This confidence resulted from extensive UT of the attachment areas before and after welding (see previous section of this concern).It is concluded that adequate precautions to minimiz'e LT under attachments have been taken.E.Influence of LT, Laminations and Low Through Thickness Ductility on Joint Performance 1.Laminations or Lamellar Tears Laminations and lamellar tears will have a similar effect on joint performance.

It is worth reemphasizing at the outset that only one instance of service failure from LT or a lamination has been reported.There has been little work done on the effect of this tvoe of discontinuity on joint performance.

However, the effect of LT/laminations on structural integrity can be addressed in the same manner as for other cracklike defects provided the reduced through-thickness properties of the material are considered (Reference 3).Though the Charpy impact energy and fracture toughness of the material in the short transverse direction is lower than in the longitudinal/transverse directions, the nil-ductility transition temperature (NDT)is not increased significantly.

The main difference is in the upper shelf energy.Thus, at a significant margin above the NDT the fracture mechanism in the short transverse direction is low energy ductile tearing.Provided the structure operates at an adequate margin above the NDT, unstable fracture by cleavage under elastic loading will not occur.Plastic strains and displacements will be required to cause fracture.Under these circumstances the controlling failure mechanism is probably plastic collapse.Unpublished experimental work by the Welding Institute supports these conclusions.

Their findings are summarized in Figure 27.2.The joint types used in the testing are shown in Figure 27.3.The tests were performed on a material which had a short transverse Charpy impact energy of 15 ft.lbs.At the test temperature some cleavage was observed, but failure was predicted by plastic-collapse analysis.0 arm The two lines shown on Figure 27.2 represent failure predictions based upon such analyses.Three expressions were used: 2a~V ('-D)-27.I p"=p-(I-W)-27.2 2a/arm v q'rm=Flow (I-0)-27.3 Where: vy is the yield stress, Flow=~o+o, aod Va=ultimate tensile stress.Refer to Figure 27.3 for other parameter definitions.

Equation 27.3 accurately predicts failure for configuration (B), (Figure 27.3), but is very conservative for configuration (A)where the width of the weld across the toes exceeds the thickness of the branch member.Thus, it is considered that the influence of any laminations or lamellar tears are covered by the fracture and plastic collapse assessment presented in this report.In addition, McDonald has derived an elastic-plastic fracture model to predict the effect of laminations on joint performance (Reference 4).McDonald's data for A36 and A588 shows that even with large laminations considerable plastic deflection is required to produce failure.In addition, in spite of the very large laminations, the residual strength of the joints was substantial and in excess of half the nominal yield, even with laminations several inches wide.Thus, with normal levels of elastic design stress, the potential for failure is low.This data also tends to support the Welding Institute findings.The use of buttering on the outside of the SSW will also reduce the potential for failure from laminations or LT.The buttering distributes the applied strains over a much larger area of the base material, effectively the dimension W (Figure 27.3)is increased.

Thus, the potential for failure for buttered joints will be even less than that for conventional joints.

2.Low Short Transverse Ductility Low short transverse ductility promotes susceptibility to lamellar tearing.From 0 to 105 there is a potential for LT in lightly restrained structures, from 10 to 15Ãin moderately restrained structures and from-15 to 20Ãin highly restrained structures (Reference 2).Low values (as low as 0 percent)have been reported from transverse tensile specimens.

However, these results are pessimistic in that only a small area is sampled and the presence of inclusions or small laminations can cause failure at low strains.Under extreme circumstances it could be visualized that service loads could cause a laminar failure in a steel which had low short transverse reduction in area.However, in the SSW service stresses in the susceptible areas are well below yield and thus plastic straining of the base material does no't occur.Under these circumstances it is difficult to envisage the formation of lamellar tears.Tearing during welding occurs after significant plastic strains which are of the order of a magnitude higher than the elastic design strains.Even if a laminar tear were to initiate, further plastic strain would be required to cause failure as discussed in III.E.1 of this concern, with a significant additional margin against joint failure.Similarly, the use of buttering reduces this risk for the SSW attachments.

3.Conclusions with Respect to Effect of Laminations, LT or Low STD It is concluded that the potential for failure initiating from LT, lamination or low transverse ductility is low.This is based upon: o The low incidence of reported failures, o Experimental data showing the need for high strains/deflections to promote failure from large laminations, o Even with susceptible materials some plastic strain is-.ne'eded to promote tearing and the tear must be propagated to cause joint failure.Thus, for elastically stressed joints there is little potential for failure caused by LT, laminations or low transverse ductility.

o The use of buttering reduces the potential for failure from laminations, lamellar tears or-low short transverse ductility.

IV.CONCLUS IONS o There are a number of weld joint details in the SSW which are potentially susceptible to LT.o Inspections performed during and after fabrication indicate that there was no generic problems with LT in the SSW.o The potential for joint failure caused by LT, laminations or low short transverse ductility is low under elastic design stresses.o The use of buttering before making attachment welds to the SSW makes potential for LT under these welds very low.o The use of buttering reduces the potential for joint failure from laminations, LT or low ductility in the through-thickness direction.

o The implications of LT, laminations or low short transverse ductility for SSW integrity is discussed further in the main body of this report.The conclusion is that there is no significant concern.This is based on the low probability of failure by elastic fracture and the multiple parallel load paths which preclude plastic collapse.o The overall conclusion is that there is reasonable assurance that failure of the SSW resulting from laminations, LT or low short transverse ductility will not occur.References 1.NUREG-0577 (Comment issue)2.Lamellar Tearing In Welded Steel Fabrication, The Welding Institute, 1972.3.A.A.Willoughby, United Kingdom Welding Institute, private communication.

4.B.D.McDonald"Effect of Laminations on Moment Connection Capacity." ASCE Journal of the Structural Division.

FIGURE 27.1 LAHELLAR TEARING UT FCAl<TEE-JOINTS

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.for f.bricatzon of the SSN X.The baSe pI;ate shauXd.be cut-tO 3 larger r3CT9.uS aS t~icelding of the caIumns vi.ll cause it to shrink about.001"/l" ef circum-'ercnce, This is equal ta 1.05 inches on the circum=erence

~or about 5/8" on the diameter.I assume"that as the bearing plate has an equaI.amount af welding thar the same silrilLQ3ge value would.hold;true for it..The drawings wiU.net how this inciease in, diameter but the cutting diagrams vill be-rev'ised to reflect it.-2., Ringbeara (23.The 5/4" b3 e pLate should be yrec3mbere4 SI16" as shown belo~and the toe ends of the i l/4.plates should bc prese=1/8" as sholem i n IC E~l-I IIgctIVGO IN IHSr ECTIO..i Fox gwa: cONTRoL REC INSP" QoURCg INSP-I&QEC$7 1975: P.Q.REVII.VI-Cl'Inpo oNLY Ll iVSViR REOO.QQ HECOiI>~0 I QQKEI45Y a2%l The calnxlatxon for Qnding the'required toe offset is as fo3.lots 4 a~~~zaao~'Ci~~0(" g~~~'ri~g7~'..'....~.';..'M+g(pm~sr~~~3 g+~~MCHVKtl W...lt4SPECTfov Foe CwG coATRQt RKC,.reer...-outa,.rrfsp.

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~J r$>>P 4.Additional iafonaatioa to follow on the other built-up coIumns and mcmbcrs.5;Questions to be answered on the 2nd Ring Assembly.',..a,'.'Do've cut'he Ring Bean to a longer cEiapeter..'::'.

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+GO 7 HOG w 0 W EVAN P'R>QR,"YO WK LP1t4C F lLLE.i, CHC'o, F>t LE.T S(LE.PROV~iO~~A,gDE.V N~owF-, Cw aw, ambi oF RFl 2lS-q7.CE,M.-7/Zl/7S CONCERN NO.28 It was noted during review of defect related documentation that four repairs of cracks in SSW shop welds did not comply with AWS Dl.l requirements.

BACKGROUND During reviews of Leckenby documentation by NRC Region V, it was discovered that several crack repairs did not include the proper inspections and excavation criteria.This documentation was associated with the SSW and the pipe whip support girders.Additionally, during review by the Task Force, four such repairs associated specifically with the SSW were identified, two of which had been previously identified by the NRC.CONCERN RESOLUTION The AWS Code requires a positive means to ascertain the extent of cracks in weld or base material prior to weld repair.No dye penetrant or magnetic particle examinations were performed during three crack repairs on the SSW to our knowledge.

However, the repair instructions did state to air arc out the defect to sound metal.Additionally, the AWS Code requires removal of the crack and sound metal to 2 inches beyond each end of the crack prior to repair.Confirmation of such removal is not available for four known SSW crack repairs, the above three included.Two of these weld repair areas are accessible.

Recent UT performed on the accessible areas found no defects or indications.

Potential defects remaining in the SSW associated with the other crack repair areas as a result of not complying with these AWS Code require-ments are enveloped in the bounding defect assessment in subsection III.D.No further action is necessary for this concern.

APPENDIX B SSW Load Analysis Refinements This appendix contains an explanation of the refinements in loads and analysis techniques made subsequent to the submittal of Reference III.B.l.Tech.Memo.No.1185-Refinements in Annulus Pressurization Analysis for a'ostulated Feedwater Line Break Tech.Memo.No.1187-Simplified Dynamic Model Used for Structural Assessment of the SSW Tech.Memo.No.1188-Finite Element Seismic Analysis of the Reactor Building Tech.Memo.No.1190-Pipe Break Loading on SSW YKKM3C=AE.

ME,EP C)HAi~i MUM CQP'IES TO: JJVerderber CJSatir DCBakex AICygelman EJWagner F JPatti KRonis/MRamchandani GATE 7/8/8 0 TC R.E.Snaith FRQM P.A.Bickel SUB JECT W.0.2808 Washington Public Power Supply System WPPSS Nuclear Project No.2 Refinements in Annulus Pressurization Analysis for a Postulated Feedwater Line Break Technical Memorandum No.1185

REFERENCES:

EFerrari GHarper MParise TTHsu PABickel TM File pf db 1)Burns and Roe Calculation 5.07.04.10, Feedwater Blowdown for Annulus Px'essurization 2)Burns and Roe Calculation 5.06.30.2, SSW Pressure Analysis from Feedwater Blowdown, RELAP 3 Input 3)RELAP 4/MOD 5-A Computer Program for Transient Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis of Nuclear Reactors and Related Systems, ANCR-NUREG-1335, September 1976 4)WPPSS-74-2-R2-B, Sacrificial Shield Wall Design Supplemental Information 5)GEBR-2-75-765, dated April 15, 1975'he purpose of this Technical Memorandum is to discuss the refinements in annulus pressurization analysis which have resulted in a reduction in annulus pressuriza-tion load for a postulated feedwater line.break.The basic refinement which has been made is a reanalysis of the feed-water blowdown mass and energy data which is required for the annulus pressurization analysis.The revised feedwater blowdown calculation is Reference 1 and the subsequent annulus pressurization calcu'ation is Reference 2.The physical model of the annulus is unchanged and needs no discussion.

The postulated feedwatex line break is an instantaneous double-ended guillotine pipe rupture of the 12 inch main feedwater line at one of the six nozzles to the Page 2 R.E.Snaith Technical Memorandum No.1188 7/8/8 0 reactor pressure vessel.A brief review will be made of the two methods of calculating the feedwater blowdown data, followed by a comparison of the blowdown data results.Annulus pressurization results will also be compared.Revised Blowdown Data The revised feedwater blowdown data for the current assessment of the sacrificial shield wall (SSW)annulus pressurization are from Reference 1.ln Refer-ence 1, a comprehensive model was developed for the entixe condensate/feedwater system from the condenser to the reactor vessel.This model in conjunction with the RELAP 4/MOD 5 computer program.(Reference 3)was used to calculate the transient mass and energy blowdown data.Ori inal B'lowdown Data The SSW design of.Reference 4 is based in part on the original.feedwater blowdown data of Reference 5.The analysis.of Reference 5 was a hand calculation based on the physical properties of the blowdown fluid and the applicable bxcak areas of the feedwater line.The break areas chosen were conservative and resu3ted in high mass and energy blowdown data.Blowdown Data Com arison Figures 1 and 2 compare the revised and the'original feedwater blowdown'ata.

Figure 1 is a comparison of mass flow rates and Figure 2 is a comparison of energy rates.The significant portion of the txansient is before 0.100 second and during this part the revised mass flow rate is 30%of the original mass flow rate and the revised energy rate is 25%of the original energy rate.Com arison of Annulus Pressurization Results Figure 3 is the node model for the sacrificial shield wall annulus for the feedwater line break.Typically~data for nodes near the break (1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 11)are shown to illustrate the annulus pressurization results.

Page 3 R'.E.Snaith Tcchnical Memorandum No.1185 7/8/80 In Figures 4 through 9 the annulus pressurization data are compar'ed for the original blowdown (dashed curve, Reference 4)and the revised blowdown (solid circle curve, Reference 2).In general, the peak differential pressure reduction approaches a factor of three for the higher pressure nodes (1 and 2)and is about a factor of two for the lower pressure nodes (3, 6, 7 and 11).Prepared by: P.A.Bickel Approved by: T.T.Hsu TTH/PAB/pn Attachments

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Braverman~g~gp~y W.O.2808 Washington Public'Power Supply System.WPPSS Nuclear Project No.2 Simplified Dynamic Model Used for Structural Assessment of the Sacrificial Shield Wall Technical Memorandum No.1187

Reference:

1.Burns and Roe letter, BRGE-2-78-009, 1/19/78 2.GE letter, GEBR-2-79-1447, dated.-9/7/79 CQPIEG TCl: JJVerderber CJSatir AICygelman DCBaker FJPatti BBedrosian EFerrari EJWagner JO'Donnell PHsueh JBraverman DBagchi pf db TM file The present base line design of the sacrificial shield wall (sac wall)is based on equivalent static analyses for dynamic loadings.In order to approximate what conservatisms exist in the equivalent s'tic method of analysis, a simplified dynamic model was developed to assist in the structural reassessment of the'sac wall.This simplified dynamic model provides a more realistic response of the sac wall to the dynamic loadings it is subjected to.Following this investigation, which utilizes the simplified dynamic model, a more refined and accurate model will be developed.

This technical memorandum provides a description of the simplified dynamic.model and the method of analysis used in reassessing the structural adequacy of the sac wall.A finite element mathematical model of the entire reactor building and supporting soil was.u'sed to perform the dynamic analysis.The various structural elements (base-mat, exterior walls, containment, pedestal, sac wall, and RPV)were represented by axisymmetric conical shell elements which have non-axisymmetric loading capability.

Structural elements such as the columns, stabilizer truss, bellows, and shear lugs were'odeled using springs.In the sacrificial shield wall region where the annulus pressurization loads are applied and where a more accurate representation is required, the node locations are more closely spaced.The mathematical model of the reactor building and internals is illustrated in figure l.

Page 2 Technical Memorandum No.1187'he commercially available computer program ANSYS, Rev.2 was used to calculate the structural response of the reactor building and internals due to the annulus pressurization loads.The capability of ANSYS to perform a reduced linear transient dynamic analysis was used to obtain displacement time histories at essential degrees of freedom.This is done by solving the equations of motion by direct integration.-

For the recirculation line break, the following loads have been cohsidered:

1.2.3.4~pressure-as defined in reference 1 pipe restraint-as defined in reference 2 jet reaction-as defined in reference 2 jet impingement

<<as defined in reference 2 These loads are shown pictorially on the attached.figure 2.They are applied to the sac wall and reactor pressure vessel using time dependent concentrated forces at applicable nodes and distributed circumferentially'y a Fourier series.Since the sac wall was modeled using axisymmetric thin shell elements, the calculated displacements are representative of the overall dynamic displacements.

Inherent in this assumption is that displacements at openings would not be significantly higher than the overall displacements calculated from the simplified dynamic model.The displacements obtained from the simplified dynamic model were then used as input into a more refined, three dimen-sional model of the sac wall.This model is used to calculate the stresses since it is more representative of the real sac wall structure.

It contains the actual properties of the individual elements (vertical columns, circumf erential beams, and cover plates)and also models the sac wall openings.JB/gb Prepared by r/'4~~~Braverman~7 Reviewed by i.v:=.t~Hsue i Approved by~.-~~~-:..C.<<0 Donnell/

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R.E.Snaith M.Ettouney W.O.2808 Washinton Public Power Supply System.WPPSS Nuclear Project No.2 Finite Element Seismic Analysis of the Reactor Building Technical Memorandum No.1188 C OIP'lEKA YCj: JJVerderber CJSatir ACygclman DCBaker FJPatti BBedrosian EFarrari EJWagner JO'Donnell MEttouney.

GHarper pf db SF-2 TM File Objects of Analysis The finite element seismic analysis was conducted to establish a more realist'ic response of-the WNP-2 reactor building to the design earthquakes specified for the site.The analysis utilizes finite element techniques in obtaining the dynamic interaction effects between.the structures and the soil in accordance with the provision of the Standard Review Plan 3.7.2.Design response speccra are generated as a result of the analysis'Conclusions The major f'indings of the study were: A.A new set of design response spectra at all the mass points of the reactor building mathe-matical model and for all the degrees of freedom were generated, both for SSE and OBE with maximum horizontal and vertical ground acceleration of 0.250 g and 0.125 g, repectively.

ln general, the new response'spectra were found to be less than previously generated using a lumped mass spring approach.B.For the.soil-structure system analyzed it was found that it: is more conservative to specify the control motion at the elevation of the base of the reactor building rather than at the finished grade level.The final analysis was based on specifying the free field control motion to be applied at the elevation of the reactor building mat.

Page 2 Technical Memorandum No.1188 July 18, 1980 III Discussion

-=f A.General The total soil-stxucture system was modeled and analyzed in'ne step.A finite element approach was used in this step.The design motion was deconvoluted to the base rock in the free field, then the structural response-to this deconvoluted motion is evaluated.

was performed in the frequency domain.The Reg.Guide 1.60 ground motion was used as input to this study.BE Programs The fixst, step in the seismic analysis analyze the dynamic soil-structuresystem.

The PLUSH program was used for this purpose.The>LUSH program was a u3.ane strain finite elements program, which also has one-dimensional beam ele-ments.The main features of the PLUSH program are:-It incorporates the Lysmer semi-infinite boundaries thus being able to account for the radiation damping in an inexpensive way.-It can account, for the soil nonlinearities by an intexative scheme.It accounts in an approximate way for the three-dimensional soil behavior.The output of the progxam (accelerations of the different mass points of the structure) could be used directly in the design.However, due to the f act, that the structural model in the soil-structure model is not detailed enough, an extra step in the analysis was performed.'

Page 3 Technical Memorandum No.1188 July 18, 1980 B.Programs (Con't)2.The next step in the analysis was to build a detailed three-dimensional mathematical model of the reactor building.The input to this model were the resultant acceleration time histories at the base of the structure (soil-stxucture interface) of the simplified

'soil-structure model analyzed as described before.The program NASTRAN was used in this step.The advantages of performing this step are: Analysis of the reactor build.ing in more detail is possible.It accounts for the coupling of the six different.

directions (three translations and three rotations).

Better modeling of the water masses is obtained which the FLUSH program cannot, handle.The output from NASTRAN were acceleration time histories.of the different structural mass point associated with the six dynamic degrees of freedom.e~C.Generation of Res onse S ectra The last step was to generation design response spectra from acceleration time histories.

The generation of the response spectra was based on solving the dynamic" equation of a damped single degree of freedom system.Prepared by M.M.Ettouney ME/has Approved by J.O'Donnell YKC KE85C SkK.II'-MC)HAHGlU M COPIES TO: J JV erderber ACygelman DCBaker CJSatir FPatti JGorga MRamchandani KRonis ZStudnicka RDubey EWagner EFexrari HTuthill GHarper DATE 7/23/80 TQ R.E.Snaith F~Ogg R.K.Dubey\

Reference:

Memo to M.Fialkow from R.K.Dubey.dated 4/15/80,"Pipe Break Loading on Sacrificial Shield Wall" BGR Report No.WPPSS-74-2-Rl, Rev.2 dated January'76,"Protection Against Pipe Breaks Inside Containment" 2.'S~@~ECT W 0~2808 Washington Public Power Supply System WPPSS Nuclear Project: No.2 Pipe Break Loading on Sacrificial Shield Wall Technical Memorandum No.~cg pf db SF-2 TM File~Pur use The purpose of this technical memorandum is to document the basis for refinements in pipe break reaction loads which have been used in the reevaluation of the<sacrificial shield wall.Back round Pipe break reaction loadings used in the original design of sacrificial shield wall (SSW)were based on approximate locations of pipe whip supports and conservative gaps between pipe and pipe whip supports.Current Loadin The current loadings used in the reevaluation of SSW design, have been determined using final locations of pipe whip supports and more realistic gaps between pipe and pipe whip supports (reference 1).D namic Anal sis An analysis has been performed for each postulated pipe break.An energy balance model has been used in the analysis;Kinetic energy generated during the first quarter cycle movement of the ruptured pipe is imparted to the piping/restraint system through impact, and is converted into equivalent strain energy.

Page 2 4 Technical Memorandum No.1190 July 23, 1980 Simplified dynamic analyses as described in reference 2 have been performed to obtain pipe break loadings.The entire structure including pipe,~support linkage,-restraint beams and major structure to foundations absorbs energy by elastic, elasto-platic, or plastic deformation.

The maximum deformation of the restraint member has been limited by limiting the ductility ratio p, the ratio of the maximum deflection (Ym)to the elastic deflection (Ye).The maximum permissible ductility ratio is limited to 50%of Pc, the ductility ratio that corresponds to collapse.Time history of unbalanced forces on the ruptured pipe has been simplified to a suddenly applied, constantly maintained force.Dynamic loading on the pipe whip restraint is assumed to be a suddenly applied constantly maintained force described above, in conjunction with a kinetic energy of impact.Prepared by R.K.Du ey Approved by~7~M.Ramc a anz RKD/gb L D Report AN EXAMINATION OF THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE SACRIFICIAL SHIELD WALL OF THE WPPSS.NUCLEAR PROJECT NO 2 BY: A A Nllougby I r~':.".;.'"=':~.,""'::.st/'ATTACHMENT 1~,"r.i~.~~m~r LD 22526 June 1980 4;~i~'<'l.'l'arP~~et'Vz4

~I~."',-'g 1';, FOR: WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM (WPPSS)5 A 1".:..'i'.~"'>>~'as r~',",;Ž'-"s.

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L D Report LD 22526 June 1980 AN EXAMINATION OF THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE SACRIFICIAL SHIELD WALL OF THE WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO 2 INTERIM REPORT FOR: WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM (WPPSS)BY: A A Willougby THE Mf ELD I MD I NRTITLITE Abington Hall, Abington, Cambridge.

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CONTENTS 1.INTRODUCTION peae ac.2.GENERAL APPROACHES TO FRACTURE ASSESSMENT 2.1.Plastic Collapse 2.Z.Fracture 2.2.1.Initiation 2.2.Z.Arrest of a propagating crack'.METHODOLOGY TO BE APPLIED TO THE ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IN THE SSW 3.1.Plastic collapse assessment 3.2.Crack arrest approach 3.3.Prevention of fracture initiation 4.DATA APPLICABLE TO THE SSW 4.1.4.2.4.3.4.4.4.5.Stress levels and distribution Materials Inspection and defect details Plastic collapse data Crack arrest data 4.5.1.NDT temperatures from available data 4.5.2.NDT temperatures estimated from Charpy energy 4.5.3.Discussion of NDT temperatures 9 10 12 5.EVALUATION OF'STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 5.1.Plastic collapse 5.2.Crack arrest 13 13 16 6.FRACTURE INITIATION 17 7..CONCLUSION 17 8.RECOMMENDATIONS 18 References Tables Figures Appendix A LD 22525 AN EXAMINATION OF THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE SACRIFICIAL SHIELD WALL OF THE WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT No 2 Interim Report By: A A Wi 11oughby 1-.INTRODUCTION The sacrificial shield wall (SSM)at WPPSS Nuclear Project No.2 (WÃP-2)is a cylindrical wall surrounding the pressure vessel.It consists of a framework fabricated by welding plate and rolled members into box sections, with the outside covered with skin plates, and the inside filled with concrete to provide a radiation field (Figs.1(a)and 1(b)).Steels used were A36 and A588 in I"-3" thickness.

Whilst it may be assumed that the concrete would contribute to the structural strength of the wall, no credit is taken for this in the analysis to be presented.

Melding processes used in fabricating the wall include shielded metal arc (SMA), flux-cored arc (FCA)and electroslag (ES).During normal service the design stress is small but in certain circumstances (for instances, a loss of coolant accident coupled with seismic loading)the nominal design stress would reach approximately the minimum'yield stress of the base material.Host of the 13,000 welds, which are not stress relieved, are now inaccessible, but the survey of the visible ones has revealed many instances of welding defects which exceed AMS D1.1 visual acceptance criteria.In addition, during fabrication, the contractor who made the SSW had a significant problem with the quality of electro-slag and flux-cored arc welds, and magnetic particle inspection of areas.of the outside of the SSM by another contractor has revealed a number of cases of cracks and linear defects.Because of these concerns, an assessment of the structural integrity of the SSM has now been called for.2.GENERAL APPROACHES TO FRACTURE ASSESSElENT Failure of the structure may occur by either of two mechanisms:

i)Plastic collapse ii)Fracture 2.1.Plastic Colla se Plastic collapse occurs when the net section is insufficient to support the load on it.This could be a problem where extended defects result in a significant reduction in net sectional area.Consideration of'his possibility involves the assessment of the the likely maximum size of defects at the various levels of section size and nominal stress present in the structure (residual stresses, which are self-balancing and are relieved by plastic flow, do not affect the tendency towards plastic collapse).

If plastic collapse cannot be ruled out in certain details, the effect of loss of load-bearing capacity in these details must be examined.2.2.Fracture Fracture in the structure requires the operation of two mechanisms:

i)Initiation ii)Propogation In order for the structure to fail, both stages must take place.An assessment of structural integrity in a welded structure can therefore be based on either a)The likelihood that fracture'will not initiate from pre-existing defects, or b)The likelihood that an initiated fracture will not propagate a sig-nificant distance but will arrest in the material.The application of these two approaches will now be considered further.2.2.1.Initiation From a knowledge of fracture toughness and stress level, the maximum tolerable defect size and shape may be calculated by means of fracture.mechanics.

The fracture toughness should be obtained for all materials employed (parent materials, weld metals and heat affected zones (HAZs)).In structural steels, the measurement of"valid" KIc or KId values requires very large specimens, and so yielding fracture mechanics para-meters, such as COD, are more readily obtained.Alternatively, a lower bound value of KId may be estimated via correlations with other para-meters.1 The stress level employed in the analysis is the nominal applied stress with allowances made for stress concentration and resi-dual stresses.In the COD approach, the toughness, stress and maximum allowable defect size are connected by means of the COD design curve.2 The maximum allowable defect size calculated by this means is not the critical value for fracture initiation, but incorporates a safety factor of the order of two or three.2.2.2.Arrest of a propagating crack The philosophy behind the crack arrest approach is to assume that cracks can initiate at defects, at locally embrittled regions and at regions of high local stress and to demonstrate that fracture will be arrested by the surrounding material.The details of the initiating defect and its immediate environment need not be considered.

The simplest approach is based on the drop weight test (DWT)test of Pellini which is semi-empirical but is well supported by available data.From a knowledge of the nil-ductility transition temperature (NDT), crack arrest can be assumed at a temperature of NDT+x, where x depends on nominal stress level, section thickness and size of initial defect.For initial defects of comparable or smaller size than the plate thickness, and for nominal stresses.of around yield, the crack arrest temperature vill be taken as: NOHINAL STRESS/YIELD STRESS 0.25 0.5 1.0 Crack arrest temperature (1" thi.ckness)

F NDT+10 NDT+30 NDT+60 Crack arrest temperature (3" thickness)

'F NDT+40 NDT+60 NDT+90 with intermediate thicknesses in proportion.

These temperatures are obtained from Pellini's Fracture Analysis Diagram (FAD)for 1" thick material, and by applyi.ng a recommended 30 F temperature shift to allow for the extra constraint in 3" thick material.This may be an over-estimate at low stresses.The whole approach is considered to be con-servative if defects are not extremely large, although it is not known what the precise margins of safety are.In applying this approach, all possible crack propagation paths must be considered.

This includes fracture in parent materials, weld metals, and, possibly, in HAZs.3.METHODOLOGY TO BE APPLIED TO THE ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IN THE SSW 3.1.Plastic Colla se Assessment The possibility of plastic collapse will be assessed in terms of the nominal design stresses, the likely defect sizes and the estimated flow stresses of the materials (based on generic data).tAthere this possi-bility is found to'exist, the effect of redundancy of structural members and the nature of the applied loading system (which will be principally displacement controlled due to the effects of load distributi.on into the framed structure and to the restraint of the concrete in-filling) wi.ll be considered.

3.2.Crack Arrest A roach The crack arrest philosophy will next be applied since details regarding the defects, such as severity and local embrittlement, need not be con-sidered.The crack arrest temperature, as defined in Section 2.2.2, will be estimated for all materials where cracks might propagate-i.e.A36 and A588 plates and sections, all weld metals and possibly the HAZs.Speci.fic.data in terms of NDT temperatures on the materials of the SSW are not available, and so estimates will be based on generic data where possible, on a worst case basis to gi.ve conservative predictions.

Use 3 may also be made of conservative Charpy energy/NDT correlations, where applicable.

Several reasons may be envisaged which prevent the assurance of struc-tural integrity by means of the crack arrest approach: (a)The available generic data on NDT temperatures may be indadequate, (b)The upper bound NDT temperatures estimated may be too high to guarantee crack arrest at the service temperatures.

In the first case, steps should be taken to acquire more data, by means of laboratory tests on procedure qualification weldments or on material cut from the SSR.In the second case, consideration should first be given to raising the service temperature above the crack arrest tempera-ture.If it is not possible to raise the temperature sufficiently, then those regions and materials which are below the crack arrest temperature will be identified and assessed in terms of the maximum allowable defect sizes for crack initiation, as detailed below.3.3.Prevention of Fracture Initiation For those regions where crack arrest cannot be assured, as identified in Section 3.2, the maximum allowable defect sizes to ensure that fracture initiation will not occur will be determined.

1 The first approach will be via the reference KI>curve , which is a standard K versus temperature curve for all materials of yield strength below 50ksi, referenced to the NDT temperature.

There exist some doubts, however, concerning the applicability of the KIR curve in all cases.Peilini4 suggests that it is excessively conservative for low strength materials such as A36, and its use for higher strength materials such as the weldments in the SSV has not been established.

Depending on the margin of safety, it may be necessary to conduct laboratory tests in a few specific cases.In this case, fast strain rates will be used because the pipe whip loads following a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA)will be dynamic in nature.Linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM)tests could be employed, but the thickness of material involved would almost certainly mean that these tests would be invalid, in which case dynamic COD tests on specimens of full section thickness will be used.The material for the tests could be either cut out of the SSW'or simulated in the laboratory, using the same welding conditions as those used in the wall.From the value of the dynamic fracture toughness, however estimated, the maximum allowable defect sizes will be calculated.

These must be compared with the actual defect sizes in the regions established to be at risk, and so non-destructive examination should be carried out on all accessible details in order to allow an estimate of defect population to be made.From this, the probability of fracture in the details at risk may be calculated.

4.DATA APPLICABLE TO THE SSW 4.1.Stress Levels and Distribution It is under'stood that, during normal operation, the nominal design stress on the SSW'is small, consisting principally of the deadweight of the structure and attached pipework.If one of the high energy lines were to rupture, however, the resulting movement of the pipe ends would apply large dynamic loads to the SSW,via the pipe whip restraints.

Alternatively, the rapid release of steam into the annulus gap between the SSW and the reactor pressure vessel as a result of a coolant pipe break within the annulus would induce radial stresses.For pipe failures in this region the radial loading would be additive to the pipe whip loading.The main causes of stressing may thus be summarised as follows:-.(1)Deadweight loading.(2)Seismic loading.(3)Pipe-whip following a LOCA.(4)Annular pressure following'a LOCA, It must be emphasised that the probability of these loads being applied simultaneously is extremely remote, requiring as it does a combination, of a pipe break inside the annulus and an earthquake.

Nevertheless,.the structure was designed-with this contingency in mind, and the architect engineer, Burns&Roe, Inc., estimate that the maximum nominal stresses.could reach yield in certain regions of the SSW.The rate of application of the load for the various categories outlined above is different:

the first is static, the second of slow to inter-mediate rate, and the last two are dynamic in nature.Calculations by Burns&Roe indicate that the annulus pressurisation load reaches a maximum (of 92.4psig)within approximately 0.005 seconds'f a LOCA and then decays to approximately 40psig in 0.01 seconds.In the absence of further data it will be assumed that the pipe whip loads are applied at a similar rate, and that the combination of pipe whip and annulus pressurisation causes loads approaching yield stress magnitude to be attained in the 0 F 005 seconds.The nominal strain rate is then approxi-mately 0.5 in/in/sec.

This figure is intended to be a guide only: part of the loading is static or relatively slow, thus reducing the strain rate, whereas the rate at stress concentrations and discontinuities could be much higher.A finite element analysis has been carried out by Burns&Roe, and the calculated stress distribution under the worst combination of loading is approximately depicted in Fig.2.The most highly stressed regions are in the top ring and in the second ring up from the base.The fourth ruing up is mostly stressed to less than half the allowable design stress.It is understood that these calculations of stressing are conservative in nature, and that Burns&Roe are currently re-analysing the situation in an attempt to define the stresses more precisely.

4.2.Materials The ma)ority of the structure is fabricated from A36, as-rolled.

Plates of~~"-3" thickness and rolled sections, of up to 1" flange thickness were used.A588 plate, Grades B and H, were used for the uppermost ring, in 2$" and 24" thickness.

Melding processes were of three main types-shielded metal arc, flux-cored metal arc and electroslag.

The electrode type, manufacturers designation, and the specified minimum tensile properties for all the materials are given in Table l.In the case of the electroslag weldments, no tensile properties were specified, so for the welds in A36 the results of the weld procedure test are given.For those in A588, the scatter bands for the similar weldments reported elsewhere~0 are taken as giving a good indication of tensile properties.

4.3, Ins ection and Defect Details Three different inspections were carried out on various weldments:

(1)Leckenby, the contractor, visually inspected all welds and repaired as necessary.

Defects were found in 37%of the electroslag welds.Some ultrasonic inspection was also carried out to detect lamellar tears associated with the electroslag T welds.(2)Magnetic particle inspection was carried out independently by the mechanical installation contractor in all areas where attachments were to be made to the SSW.A total of 74 defects were detected and repaired.This number is small compared to the total number of welds inspected (700).(3)After fabrication, Burns&Roe carried out visual inspection on accessible welds and found a large number of defects, mainly attri-butable to bad workmanship.

Some accessible welds were omitted in error and it is understood that these will be inspected and the defect analysis updated accordingly.

The various defect types, with the largest size reported, are given in Table 2~There are three main areas of concern:-Firstly, the.high re3ect rate on the electroslag welds indicated that there was a problem with the process used.The ma5or defects were from lack of fusion (39" was the longest reported).

These usually, break the surface in electroslag weldments, so it is probable:that where removable copper shoes were-used, all these defects were found and repaired.However, a small number of welds (approximately 100)were made with permanent steel shoes, and in these cases, it is probable that lack of fusion defects would remain undetected.

Secondly, the original visual inspection of all weldments performed by Leckenby was shown to be inadequate by the later examinations on accessible welds, and so it is highly likely that the inaccessible welds contain similar workmanship defects.Thirdly, the magnetic particle inspection on accessible welds revealed a number of linear and crack-like indications.

This inspection was carried out prior to grinding, and therefore any small discontinuities would be detected, giving a pessimistic indication of the weld quality.Nevertheless, it is possible that crack-like or linear defects exist elsewhere in the structure, in the welds which were not inspected magnetically.

The potential failure mode (plastic collapse or fracture)as a result of the defect is also indicated in Table 2.In general, plastic col-lapse must be considered as a possibility for any defect which causes a significant reduction in load bearing area (hence only the larger defects are important)., wbereas fracture could initiate from any defect which is sufficiently sharp to give a significant stress concentration (for instance, lack of fusion defects and cracks)or which embrittles the material (as with arc strikes).Defects such as excess metal will not increase the propensity to collapse or fracture.Since a crack arrest approach will first be considered,'he tendency of small defects to cause fracture initiation is unimportant, and therefore the dimen-sions of defects need only be taken into account in terms of their ability to cause plastic collapse of the structure.

Referring to Table 2, the defect types which cause the greatest reduction in load bearing area are lack of fusion, underfill and undersized fillet.The lack of fusion defects in the electroslag welds which were made with removable shoes were all ground out and repaired.Unfortunately, only one inspection report gave the depth of excavation required, which was approximately

$".European experience suggests that lack of fusion defects in electroslag welds, which occur at the edge of the weld pool,2>are seldom this large, even in a 3" thick weld.It has been suggested that the welding parameters were incorrect-the root gap was too large, and the guide tubes were too far from the backing shoes.On the other hand, lack of fusion defects were thought to be less prevalent in welds made with permanent steel backing shoes, due to the lower rate of heat removal.These conclusions must be regarded as somewhat specula-tive.Nevertheless, it is considered unlikely that lack of fusion defects of depth greater than$" would exist in the small number of welds made with permanent steel shoes, It is understood that the fillet welds where extensive lack of fusion had been reported by the Burns&Roe inspection were re-examined, and that the indications were found to be caused by inter-run crevices, sharp re>>entrant angles between weld bead and base metal due to a highly convex weld profile, or in one case by a mechanical gouge.The greatest loss of section caused by any of these was found to be only 3/32", in a 5/8" fillet.WPPSS have analysed the data irom the Burns&Roe inspection reports in terms of defect length per unit area of wall and per unit length of weld.Prom a sample of about 200'f weld, both fillet and butt, lack of fusion.defects were found in 2'5, underfill in 6%and undersized fillet in 1%, of total weld length (all in fillet welds).These figures suggest that the proportion of welds with large defects is small.

~,

Other possible defect types, which were not reported, include hydrogen cracks, lamellar tears and lack of penetration.

Hydrogen cracks, if present, are found in the weld metal and HAZs, particularly at the toes of weld beads where stress concentrations may occur.They generally break the surface but may not be detected by magnetic particle inspection unless the area is ground locally.Because they tend-to be sharp and disconti.nuous, they tend to cause brittle fracture rather than plastic collapse (which requires large reductions in net sectional area).Lamellar tears often initiate at hydrogen induced cracks and propagate parallel to the rolling plane in the base metal and HAZ.They occur while the weld is cooling down, and are encouraged by poor short trans-verse ductility and joint configurations which give rise to welding stresses acting perpendicular to the plate surface, for instance cruci-form and T-butt points.The risk of tearing increases with increasing restraint.

If the tears break the surface they are frequently detected visually, but this is not always possible because they may be entirely buried.In this case they can be detected by ultrasonic examination.

Since lamellar tears are crack-like and may be large, they could con-ceivably cause failure by either a collapse or a fracture mechanism, In practice, however, service failures occurring as a result of lamellar tearing are extremely rare.The possibility of such failures occurring in the SSW will be examined in Section 5.1.Lack of penetration defects, if present, are not normally sharp, and so would tend to promote failure by plastic collapse rather than by brittle fracture.This possibility is also considered later.4.4.Plastic Colla se Data For the evaluation of the risk of failure by plastic collapse, the data required are the defect sizes, the nominal-stress levels and the minimum stresses to cause plastic flow in the net sections.Specific information on defect sizes for certain types is limited, as shown in the previous section.Concerning the nominal stresses, as a first approximation, it will be assumed that these reach the nominal yield stresses of the base metals.The flow stresses of the various materials, aflow, will be taken as the average of the minimum yield and tensile stresses, i.e.cr flow a+a Y u where 0Y and 0 are the yieI,d and ultimate tensile stresses respectively.

The effect of 8ynamic loading will also be considered, since the loads following a LOCA are dynamic in nature and these=materials will be fairly sensitive to strain rate.It is suggested in Reference 5 that an increase in aflow of approximately 65$would be appropriate for strain rates in the range 10-1,000 in/in/sec.

The strain rates in the SSW are likely to be smaller than this, except possibly in the region of severe stress concentrations (see Section 4.1).For a strain rate of 0.5 in/in/sec, available experimental data, suggest that for low strength structural steels the likely elevation in flow stress would be approximately 30-50%.Therefore a lower bound esti-mate of 30%, will be taken as the elevation of flow stress for the likel: strain rates in the SSW iollowing a LOCA.4.5, Crack Arrest Data The initial approach to the assessment of structural integrity will consider the likelihood that brittle fractures, once initiated, will arrest rapidly.This requires the nil-ductility transition temperature to be estimated for all materials in which extensive brittle fractures could conceivably run.4.5.1.NDT temperatures from available data.The NDT temperatures from data available in the literature are summarised.in Table 3, column (a).A considerable volume of data was found for A36 plate.The maximum value reported was+40 P.Reie'rence 6 quotes 52 measurements (although some of these may refer to rolled sections).

These had an average NDT temperature of+25'F, with a standard deviation of 11'P.Data from the North Anna investigation were also included, where the A36 plate was found to exhibit ahorse than average Charpy impact energies.Kuang reports NDT temperatures in the range+20-+40'F for 2" thick plates and 5 different heats of steel.It is, therefore, concluded that the highest probable NDT temperature for A36 plate is+40 F.One factor which adds some uncertainty is that the skin plates were'cold bent to a radius of about 12', resulting in a plastic strain in the outer fibres of about 0.7%for 2$" thick plates.Prestrain is known to have a deleterious influence on tearing resistance, but there is some uncertainty as to its effect on cleavage fracture toughness.

Work on precracked COD specimens at the Welding Institute, where the material was given a lg plastic strain locally around the crack tip, has indicated that the resulting reduction in toughness decreases to an insignificant amount as the level of toughness diminishes (at tough-nesses corresponding to that at the NDT temperature)

~These results are supported by the work of Jones and Turner25 on mild steel, where even comparatively large prestrains'-were found to have negligible effect on the stress for'crack arrest in notched tensile specimens where failure occurred by a cleavage mechanism.

The tentative conclu-sion is that the small plastic strains produced in-the skin plates and other members will cause a negligble reduction in NDT temperature, especially when compared to the variability in published data for these materials.Data on A36 rolled section are less numerous (although some may be included in Reference 6).The highest value obtained,~however, was+54 F.Dolby reported values of+41'F to+54'F for 3" thick flanges of A36 beams which supported a platform at WNP-2.The beams used in the SSW are of smaller section, and therefore an NDT temperature of+54 P will be taken as the maximum probable value.

Limited information was found for A588, and that only on Grade A plate.10 F 12 The NCHRP Report gave NDT temperatures for 1" and 4" thick plate from the same heat as+40 and+60 F respectively (the plate was stated as being of Grade B composition, but it in fact corresponded to Grade A), US Steel have measured NDT temperatures in the range 0-+60 F for 1" thick plate, and+10-+80'F for 1>>2" thickness.

The mean oi all these data (13 plates)was+51 F, with a standard devia-tion of 21 F.The maximum upper bound NDT temperature for Grade A plate is therefore estimated as+80'F.The impact properties are probably influenced more by rolling conditions than by composition12 but neverthe-less, it is doubtful if these values can be assumed for the Grade B and H plates used in the SSM.13 There were few NDT data found for the weld metals.Masubuchi et al , found that NDT temperatures for all C-)Qx electrodes fell within the range-5-+40 F, and for E7016 type electrodes within 0-+20 F.This result may be taken as a good indication for the LH70 electrode (confor-ming to E7018).The only difference is in the iron powder added to the E7018, which may slightly reduce the toughness because of the larger bead size.For the electroslag weldments, no information was found for the exact combination of weld metal, flux and plate (the parent plate composition will have a large effect on the composition of the weld metal due to the extensive melting, which occurs during the process).14 Australian data give NDT temperatures in the range-30-+60'F for un-specified electroslag weldments, and values of 0 and+10 F were found 0 10 for welds in A588A made with an EM13K-EW wire (Hobart 25P)and Hobart PF201 flux.This wire is very similar in composition to the Linde 29 used here, and it has been suggested that the Linde 124 flux tends to give improved Charpy impact properties compared to PF201 flux.Even so the data cannot be considered to be conclusive since only two heats of steel were used, and a similar but not identical wire/flux combination.

The welding conditions were also diiferent, in terms of preheat, shoe type, guide tube and heat input.NDT temperatures estimated from Charpy energy.Several correlations have been attempted between NDT and Charpy energy, Zt appears that the absorbed energy at the NDT tem-perature varies quite markedly with material.For instance, Harsem and Mintermark found CV energies at the NDT temperature of between 22 and 93ft.lbs (average 41ft.lbs)for longitudinal Charpys of fine grained C-Mn-steel.This is in agreement with Pellini where high energies are 3 reported for these improved steels, aC compared to the much lower values for"ship fracture" steels similar to the ones of interest here.The available data for steels similar to A36 and A588 are summarised in Table 4.For A36 plate, the NDT temperature would appear to correlate with a Charpy energy of 10-30ft.lbs.The correlation energy for ES weld metals and HAZs is lower, in the range 6<<23ft,lbs.The main area where NDT temperature data are scarce but C data are available is in the SMA-and FCA weld metals.No direct data correlating the two were found.However, the%%T temperatures for all low hydrogen multi-run welds were observed to be within the range-76-+20'F 10

'I (Table 3 column (a)), so if the individual welds used here show good Charpy impact properties, it is reasonable to conclude that there NDT temperatures will lie within this band.Therefore in order to estimate the NDT temperatures for the other weld metals it will be assumed that these are given by the temperatures at which Charpy impact energy of 50ft.lbs is obtained.Despite the absence of direct correlations for these materials, it is felt that this will give conservative estimates of the NDT temperatures.

Zn his commen-tary on the AASHTO Bridge Codes, Hartbower recommends that minimum Charpy impact values be specified at the lowest anticipated service temperature, while Hurlick in the same document advises testing 20-40'F below this temperature.

This is in contra'st to the AASHTO requirements of testing at 70'F above, and it is aimed at ensuring arrest of a fast moving crack which initiates at an embrittled region.The si'tuation is thus very'similar to that envisaged in the SSW, but even the most stringent recommendation in Ref.19, of achieving 20ft.lbs at 20-40'elow the service temperature is much less conservative than the criterion adopted here-namely, 50ft.lbs at 60-90'F below service temperature (depending on thickness, at yield stress levels).Therefore, a.considerable degree of confidence is felt in the overall safety of the approach proposed here.Charpy impact energies were obtained from the electrode manufacturers and from weld metal qualifications (in both cases on weldments made to AWS A5.1/A5,20 specifications), from Welding Institute data on actual weldments, and in the case of the Chemetron IZIAC electrode on a weld made for procedure qualification.

The results are given in Figs.3, 4 and 5.For the LH70 electrode (Fig.3), the Welding Institute data is considered to be the most representative since it refers to actual weldments.

Welds were made in the vertical up position, which would give worst values of toughness.

Also shown is the scatter band for welds made with several electrodes corresponding to E7018 specification.

Taking the LH70 data on welds, 50ft.lbs was absorbed at-12'F~It can therefore be concluded that the NDT,temperature for LH70 weld metal lies below 0 F.Pigure 4 shows the Cv/T transition for the Lincoln NR203H electrode.

Results were obtained from a variety of sources.Taking the bottom of the scatter band (data from Ref.20)gives 50ft.lbs at approximately

+40'F.Therefore it will be assumed that the NDT temperature is at+40'F or below.Por the Chemetron IZZAC welds, a considerable number of results were available from AWS A5.20 test specimens (Fig.5).Some procedure qualification tests had also been carried out at O', and these fall close to the bottom of the scatter band for the manufacturer's data.The lower bound of these data would then seem a reasonable estimate of true impact energies above 0 P.At+32 F, the AWS A5.20 welds gave a minimum of 51ft.lbs and so this temperature will be taken as a conserva-tive estimate of NDT temperature.

The estimated NDT temperatures, derived irom Charpy data, for these weld 11

metals are given in Table 3 column (b).Because of the lack of specific data on NDT temperature/Charpy correlations for these materials., the estimates cannot be verified conclusively, but are nevertheless felt to be conservative.

No consideration has so far been given to the welds made with the E7028 electrode (Lincoln LH3800).There was originally some doubt as to whether this had been employed on the SSW, but it now appears that it was used fairly extensively.

Figure 6 shows, from the small amount of Charpy data obtained, that its impact properties are inferior to those of the other weld metals.It is not possible to estimate an NDT tem-perature with any confidence, on the basis of these results.It is understood that WPPSS are in the process of measuring the NDT tempera-ture on a simulated weld made with LH3800.Culp has published a lot of data on the Charpy properties of electro-14 slag weldments in A36 and A588, using four electrodes.

The type most relevant to the present case are welds in A36 and A588 Grade A plate, using Hobart 25P wire and Hobart PF201 flux (a similar combination to the Linde 29/Linde 124 used in the..SSW).

At+20'F, this weld metal gave a Cv impact energy of 30-.60ft.lbs (depending on specimen loca-tion)for both base metals.Using the correlation between NDT tempera-ture and Charpy energy from Ref.10 (see Table 4), this would suggest that the NDT temperatures of the weld are well below+20'F, a conclu-sion supported by the data in Ref.10 for welds of similar composition in A588.Once again, however, caution must be exercised when drawing these conclusions, due to differences in base metal composition and in welding parameters.

Discussion of NDT temperatures.

The, assumed NDT temperatures for the materials in the SSW are given in Table 3 column (c).The maximum values are estimated with confidence for A36 plate and rolled section (from available data), and for the LH70, IIIAC and NR203hf weld metals (from Charpy impact data).The materials where insufficient data were found were the A588 plates (Grades B and H)and the electroslag and LH3800 weld metals.For the A588 plates, the NDT temperatures found all referred to Grade A material, although there is no reason to assume that the value of+80 F will be.exceeded in Grades B and H.For the electroslag weldments, the NCHRP Report10.indicates that the NDT temperatures are comparable to, or better than, those of the parent plates, for A588 welded with a similar electrode to that used on the'SSW.However, no iniormation was found for the combination of A36 and EM12K electrode used, and very little for LH3800 weld metal.It is understood that steps are being taken to measure NDT temperatures on samples of A588 plate cut from the SSW, and on simulated weldments using Ebtl2K (electroslag) and LH3800 (SMAW)electrodes.

No consideration so far has been given to the possibility of fast frac-ture occurring in the HAZs.This is discounted in the case of the SMA and FCA weldments, because the HAZs will be narrow and do not lie in a plain perpendicular to the plate surface, due to the geometry of the 12 weld preparation.

Brittle fractures normally travel on planes perpendi-cular to the plate surfaces, and so could not run down the HAZs.Also, shrinkage of the weld during cooling will induce tensile residual stresses of near yield magnitude running the length of the weld and extending a short distance into the plate.These stresses would tend to direct a running crack out into the plate.The same arguments concerning residual stress and plane of fracture can be applied to the HAZ;in electroslag weldments.

In the latter case, the weld preparation is normal to the plate surface, but because of local melting the fusion boundary is curved, concave to the weld.Heat affected zones on ES weldments can be fairly wide, but Culp points out that most of this has much improved impact properties and it is only the narrow region (1-2mm wide)next to the fusion boundary which undergoes grain coarsening.

In any case, the Charpy energy absorbed was found to be greater in this region, due to its find secondary struc-ture, than in the base metal.This phenomenon may be expected to vary with other factors such as heat input and steel type, but it is suppor-ted for',the specific type of steel under consideration by the results of Ref.10, where the HAZs in A36 and A588 plates had lower NDT tempera-tures than the base metals, unless these were already very low.For these reasons, an extensive brittle fracture running exclusively along the HAZs is not considered to be a serious possibility, in either the shielded metal arc, flux-cored arc or electroslag weldments.

5~EVALUATION OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 5.1.Plastic Colla se It will be assumed that plastic collapse occurs when the net section stress reaches the flow stress (as defined in Equation (1)).For a long surface breaking defect of depth, a, in a member of thickness, t, the critical ilaw depth to thickness ratio, a/t is given by the expressions (see Appendix):-

1.020Y a 1 t a flow simple tension (2)0'75 Y a t 0 flow pure bending~~~(3)assuming that the nominal stress reaches the minimum specified yield stress (O'Y).The critical values of a/t are given in Table 5, for two levels oX flow stress: (1)Assuming static tensile properties (2)Assuming dynamic loading conditions and an elevation in 6 of 30%.13 At the critical combination of loading conditions, as described in Section 4.1, the majority of the loading will be dynamic in nature, especially in the region of pipe whip restraints.

The initial strain rate during a LOCA was estimated to be 0.5in/in/sec, giving a likely elevation of 30%, in flow stress.Table 5 shows that this assumption significantly increases the critical defect sizes for plastic collapse.Under statically applied loads, the most critical regions for plastic collapse are the A588 plate and ES weldments when loaded in tension with critical defect depth to thickness ratios of 0.15 and 0.12 respec-tively.The first category would embrace HAZ defects such as hydrogen cracks, if it is assumed that the flow stress equals that of the parent plate.However, these cracks do not usually extend down the length of the HAZ, but are intermittent in nature, and so greater depths could be tolerated without collapse occurring.

Defects in the electroslag weld metals in A588 are particularly critical, because of the low value of flow stress assumed.It was in these weldments that numerous lack of fusion defects had been reported, the majority of unspecified depth.These were all repaired, but some doubt exists as to the state of the ES welds made with permanent fused shoes, where visual inspection was not possible.However, it is argued in Section 4.3 that these are likely to be shallow (less than 5" deep), so the critical defect depth should not be exceeded except for the welds of smaller section thick-ness.The probability and consequences of collapse at such defects is considered below.The loading for the majority of SMA and FCA fillet welds is likely to be a combination of tension and bending, although in fact the mode does not make a great difference to the defect tolerance.

The critical depth ratios are 0.24 (tension)and 0.38 (bending), for static and dynamic conditions respectively, in A588 weldments.

Judging from the deiect reports, there is a slight possibility that defects of one quarter the section thickness might exist-for instance, the.worst case of under-fill reported was of length 24" and depth 3/16" in one leg of a 3/8" fillet weld.No instances of lamellar tearing were reported, although it is possible that lamellar tears could exist either as surface breaking or buried flaws.However, service failures resulting from lamellar tearing are extremely rare.Recent work at th'e Welding Institute has shown that failure in the.laboratory may be assessed in terms of the same two criteria as for other defects-namely, brittle fracture and plastic collapse.The risk of collapse is dependent on the loss of cross sec-tional area caused by the tears, assuming that the through thickness stress in a plate at a weld is transmitted over a distance equal to the width of the connecting arm, D, (see Fig.7).A simple analysis sho~ed that, for large defects, failure could be predicted conservatively if the maximum stress in the arm is cr=cr (1--)2a max Y D~.(4)where 2a is the maximum defect width.In fact no reduction in load

bearing capacity was observed until the defect area exceeded 30%of the arm area.Similar findings were reported by QacDonald for the case of a beam or tab welded end-on to a column containing extensive lamina-tions.No reduction in strength was observed for laminations which had defect area/load area ratios of approximately 0~25 for A36 and 0.15 for A588.These defect area ratios agree well with the predictions for static loading given in Table 5 of 0.23 and 0.15 respectively, even though the geometry of the laminations with respect to the weld is not the same in the two cases.Table 5 was evaluated on the basis of flow stresses applicable to the longitudinal direction in rolled plate.The agreement with Ref.24 would suggest that this assumption is realistic, despite the fact that the flow stress in the short transverse direction is likely to be lower.Compensation for this fact is probably caused by the.conservatism of the plastic collapse analysis as discussed later.Slightly larger critical flaw sizes are predicted in Table 5 in the presence of bending stresses.These are calculated assuming surface breaking flaws, and will be conservative estimates if the flaws are buried.The same predictions" of allowable deiect size apply to lack of penetra-tion defects, if these are present.Since none were reported in the visual inspection, any defects of this type are likely to be buried (for instance, at the root of double V butt welds).Assuming reasonable point design and preparation, they are likely'o be small and should therefore not pose a threat to the integrity of the structure.

The predicted flaw sizes are relatively large for all other details (of the order of one quarter of the thickness, even for static loads), and it is unlikely that there would be many extended defects of this depth in the SSlf.Nevertheless, since the ma5ority of the welds are now inaccessible, it cannot be proven that the critical defect size for plastic collapse will not occur'somewhere in the structure.

However, there'are several points which suggest that the a'nalysis is very pessi-mistic:-(1)The effect of dynamic loading.Table 5 shows that, assuming an elevation in flow stress of 30'$, the defect tolerance of the most critical members is increased by a factor of two or three.(2)It has been assumed that the nominal stresses reach yield, whereas current work by Burns h Roe is indicating that in many regions of the SSV, the stresses are considerably lower.(3)The analysis itself is known to be very pessimistic.

Even a simple tension specimen fails at-its ultimate tensile strength (by defini-tion)rather than at the estimated"flow" stress, and the effect of incZeased triaxiality will be to raise the ultimate tensile stress (UTS)further towards the true fracture stress.Better estimates of the flow stress would be the UTS or the average of the yield and the true failure stresses in tension.The former estimate would increase the assumed flow stress by about 20~~for the weld metals.The exception to this argument is the case of collapse from lamellar tears, where the use of the UTS measured in a longitudinal direction 15 would be an overestimate compared to its true-value in the through thickness direction.

If the flow stress in the longitudinal direc-tion is to be applied to collapse in the through thickness direc<<tion, Welding Institute work and Ref.24, discussed above, would suggest that the usual estimates of flow stress (Equate.on (1))would not be unduly conservative.

(4)The vast ma)ority of welds in the SSW will be limited in the strain they can undergo, because of the redundancy inherent in a system with multiple load paths, and because of the large mass of concrete which would provide some restraint.

Vlhile it is probable that any region with critical defects will reach yield on the net section, in order to reach the flow stress (however defined)considerable plastic deformation will need to take place.This could only be possible if all the members in parallel had defects of the critical dimension.

This is extremely unlikely because, although many welds probably contain defects, it is only the large, extended ones which are critical, and the chances of these existing in all parallel welds is very remote.As discussed in Section 4.3, of the sample of welds examined visually, only 2%of the total length contained lack of, fusion defects (and most of these were found to be interrun crevices), 6%had underfill and 1%an undersized fillet.This last argument, concerning structural redundancy and strain limita-tion on the welds, does not apply to certain details, The pipe whip restraints are attached to skin plates, which are welded to the frame-work of the SSW.On the application of pipe whiploads, the skin plate welds would not have these limitations, and collapse could occur at any large defects present.'hese welds should be inspected to ensure that they do not contain defects of, size greater than those given in Table 5 (see Section 8.1), and that they'atisfy dimensional requirements.

It is therefore concluded that there is a possible risk of plastic col-lapse occurring in the welds of the skin plates which support the pipe whip restraints, but that the risk elsewhere in the SSW is negligble.

5.2.Crack Arrest The criterion for crack arrest is that all materials should operate at a temperature of NDT+x, where x depends on stress level, defect size and section size.For stresses of.yield point magnitude and defects of a size comparable to, or smaller than, the section thickness, x varies between 60 and 90 F for 1" and 3" thickness respectively (see Section 2.2.2).Using the estimated NDT temperatures, crack arrest temperatures at yield stress levels have been calculated and are given in Table 6.Because of the uncertainty in NDT temperatures for certain materials (A588, and LH3800 and electroslag weld metals)the crack arrest tempera-ture is only tentative.

It may be seen however, that for materials where the NDT temperatures were estimated with confidence, the maximum crack arrest temperature is+130'F (for 3" thick A36 plate and NR203H weld metal at stresses of yield magnitude).

As discussed in Section 16 4.5.3, the possibility of crack propagation occurring in the HAZs was dismissed.

The estimated crack arrest, temperature for the A588 steels (165 F)is based on data from a different grade of material and is uncertain.

No estimate could be made for LH3800 weld metal, and laboratory tests should be carried out in order to acquire data.The crack arrest tem-peratures for the electroslag weld metals are low in, comparison to those of the parent plates, but they are sub5ect to uncertainty because the data found were not completely relevant to the materials and welding parameters used in the SSW.This analysis indicates, therefore, that the minimum operating tempera-ture to ensure crack arrest in A36 plate and the SMA and FCA weldments (except those made with the LH3800 rod)is+130'F at nominal stresses of yield magnitude.

Firm conclusions on desired minimum operating temperature could not be drawn in the case of A588 and the LH3800 and electroslag weld metals, but the indications are that the A588 could be limiting, with a crack arrest temperature of 165 F.Steps should therefore be taken to acquire more, data on these materials, by testing simulated or actual welds and samples of A588 cut from the SSW.It is possible that the stresses on the SSW have been overestimated:

Burns&Roe are attempting to refine the calculations and the initial indications are that in some areas the stresses may be as low as 20%of yield.If this, is the case, or if the loadings can be reduced further by a change in operating conditions, the criteria for crack arrest of NDT+(60-90'F)can be relaxed accordingly, allowing lower operating temperatures.

6.FRACTURE INITIATION P It is not intended to calculate initial defect sizes for crack initia-tion at present, because it would be pointless to do so until more crack arrest data have been acquired for those materials, where such information is inadequate; Vlhen the maximum crack arrest temperatures for all materials have been established, consideration should first be given to raising the service temperature of the SSW to the maximum crack arrest temperature.

Only if this is not feasible will crack initiation arguments be considered.

V.CONCLUSIONS 1.During a critical incident, there is a small risk of plastic col-lapse in the skin plate welds which indirectly support the pipe whip restraints.

2.The.risk of plastic collapse occurring elsewhere in the SSW is remote.17 3.Crack arrest temperatures were estimated with confidence for A36, and for welds made with LH70, NR203H and IIIAC electrodes.

The maximum value for these materials was 130'F at nominal stresses of yield magnitude.

4.Crack arrest temperatures could not be estimated reliably for the A588 plates, or the LH3800 weld metal and for electroslag welds.S.Extensive crack propagation in heat affected zones is considered to be highly unlikely.8.RECOMHENDATIONS l.All exterior skin plate welds which indirectly support the pipe whip restraints should be inspected and repaired as necessary.

Table 5 gives the allowable defect depths, assuming nominal stresses of yield.These depths should be taken as the maximum depths for extended surface or buried flaws, or the maximum lengths for through thickness flaws, as a fraction of weld thickness or length respec-tively.For intermediate cases (ie.short, deep flaws)the figures in Table 5 should be taken as giving the allowable loss of cross sectional area.It is recommended that for these critical areas the figures appropriate to static loading, and the worst value for either tension or bending, be used as a basis for acceptability.

Nevertheless, there will be some margin of conservatism as a result of the dynamic nature of the pipe whip loads.Inspection should consist of two stages:-(1)Visual inspection to ensure that all welds meet the dimensional requirements stipulated in the design drawings.(2)Ultrasonic inspection to detect the presence of surface breaking buried flaws which exceed.the.critical sizes given in Table 5, for static loading.Further recommendations on the testing procedures can be supplied when details concerning the'kin plate welds are known.These re-commendations only apply to failure by plastic collapse.Fracture must also be considered, as below.2.The feasibility of raising the temperature of the SSIV to 130 F should be examined.Lower operating temperatures may be considered if loads can be reduced.3.Drop weight tests to determine NDT temperatures should be carried out on A588 plates, Grades B and H, on weldments made with LH3800 electrodes, and on electroslag weld metals in A36 and A588 plates.Where possible, weldments should be simulated using the same conditions and materials as used on the SSW.

If the crack arrest temperatures determined from the laboratory tests are higher than+130 F, the feasibilitv of raising the service te-perature of the SSM to the maximum value should be considered.

The probability of load reductions should also be explored.If nei.her is adequate, critical defect sizes for crack initiation for all materials where the crack arrest temperature exceeds the service temperature, should be considered and compared with the likely defect population.

REFERENCES PVRC"Recommendations on toughness requirements for ferritic materials".

Melding Res.Council Bulletin, No 175.2.BURDEKIN F H and DAMES N G Practical use of linear elastic and'ielding fracture mechanics with particular reference to pressure vessels.Ib1echE Conf.on Pressure Vessel Technology, London, May 1971.p 28.3.PELLINI M S Principles of structural integrity technology.

Office of Naval Research.4.PELLINI M S Analysis of fracture-safe reliability for pipe whip support weld-ments in MNP-2.Report for MPPSS, 1979.5.FAILURE ANALYSIS ASSOCIATES Fracture mechanics analysis of pipe whip support weldments in MNP-2.Report for MPPSS, 1979, Vol.1.6.SNAIDER R P, HODGE J H, LEVIN H A and ZUDANS J J Potential for low fracture toughness and lamellar tearing on PkYR steam generator and reactor coolant pump supports NUREG Report 0577, 1979 (issued for comment).7.HARRISON J D and DOLBY R E The safety of, steam generator support structures for North Anna Units 1 and 2.Melding Institute Report, LD 22055, 1976.8.KUANG J G Fracture toughness of steels for offshore structures.

Sixth Annual Offshore Technology Conf., Vol.1;1974, pp 205-214.9.DOLBY R E Cracking in 541ft.platform, Hanford No.2 Pro5ect.Melding Institute Report, LD 22244, 1978..19 0 BENTER W P>" KONKOL P J i KAPADIA B M i SHOEMAKER A K and SOVAK J F Acceptance criteria for electroslag weldments in bridges.Phase 1, NCHRP Report 10-,10, 1977.ROLFE S T and BARSOM J M Fracture and fatigue control in structures.

Published by Prentice-Hall, N.J., 1977.12.Private communication from R Stead, US Steel, to D Burns, WPPSS, March 1980.13.MASUBUCHI K, MONROE R E and MARTIN D C Interpretive report on weld metal.toughness.

Weld.Res.Council Bulletin, No.111, 1966.14.GULP J D Electroslag weldments-performance and needed research.Weld J., July, 1979.pp 27-41.15.Private communication from P J Konkol, US Steel to D Burns, WPPSS, March 1980.16 HARSEM 0 and WINTERhtARK H An evaluation of.the Charpy impact test,"Impact Testing and Materials", ASTH>>STP-466, 1970.pp 53-75.17.GROSS J H Effect of strength and thickness on notch ductility.

ibid.pp 21-52.18.NORRIS E B and MVLIE R D Investigation of transition temperature tests for line pipe materials.

ibid.pp 192-223.19.HARTBOWER C E Reliability of the AASHTO temperature shift in material toughness testing.Structural Engineering Series No.7, Federal Highway Administration, August 1979.20.DORLZNG D V, RODRZGUES P E L B and ROGERSON J H A comparison of the toughness of Self shielded arc and submerged arc weld metals in C-Mn-Nb steels.Welding and Metal Fabrication, Sept 1976, pp 479-481.21.Private communication from R Heid, Newport News Shipbuilding, to C M King, WPPSS, March 1980.22.IRWIN G R Linear fracture mechanics, fracture transition and fracture control.Eng.Fract.Mechanics, Vol.1, 1968, pp 241-257.20 23.FRANCIS P E.COOK T S and NAGY A The ef ect of strain rate on the toughness of ship steels.Report SSC-275, Southwest Res.Inst., San Antonio, Texas, 1978.24.htACDONALD B D Effect of laminations on moment connection capacity.submitted to ASCE J of Structural Division, 1980.25.JONES G T and TURNER C E A fracture mechanics interpretation of low stress fractures in pre-compressed mild steel.J.of Iron&Steel Inst., 205, 1967, pp 959-965.21 TABLE 1.Details of the steels used ia the SS 11'a)Parent Plates STEEL GRADE THICKNESS YIELD STRESS aY ksi TENSILE STRENGTH a ksi u A36 A588 Grade B A588 Grade H Plt 3II up to 2$" up to 24" 36 50 50 58 70 70 (b)Weld Metals PROCESS TYPE ELECTRODE hfANUFACTURER

'ELECTRODE SPECIFICATION DESIGNATION l g 1 BASE METALS IN JOINT ksi ksi SHAW SHAW FCAW FCAW E 7018 E 7028 E 70T-G E 70T-I Lincoln Jet LH 70 Lincoln Jet LH 3800 Lincoln NR 203M Chemetron III AC A36/A36 A36/A588 A36/A36 60 72 60 72 A36/A36 A36/A588 62 70 A36/A588 60 72 ESW EH 12K Linde 29/Linde 124 flux A36/A36 A36/A588 A588/A588 42.9 70.1 46 69 61 87 Minimum specified values, unless otherwise stated Actual values from procedure qualification Scatter band from Ref.10 Shielded metal arc weld Flux cored arc weld Electroslag weld TABLE 2.Summar of worst case defects in weldments as iven in the ins ection~re orts REGION DEFECT TYPE LARGEST REPORTED LENGTH x WIDTH x DEPTH ins POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE Parent material Arc strike Fusion boundary Lack of fusion 3/8 x 3/8 x 1/32 42 x 0 x 0 (FCAW/SHAW) 39 x 0 x 0 (ESW)P, F P, F Weld metal"Crack" Undercut Undersized fillet Overlap Under f ill Overfill Porosity Crater Unequal leg Convex fillet 13 xo 3/8 x 3/16 9 x 0 3 x 0 24 xo 72 x0'2 x 1/2 1 x 1/2 0 48 xo x 0 x 1/8 x 3/8 x 1/8 x 3/16 x 1/4 (bounding area)x 3/8 x 1/8 P, F P~(F)P F P (P)(P)1 0 signifies that the dimension is unknown or not reported.F=Fracture~P=Plastic Collapse~()=signifies lower probability Defects which were not reported, but which may conceivably be present, include toe-breaking defects (e.g.lamellar tears, hydrogen cracks), lack of penetration, slag inclusions and internal porosity.

TABLE 3.Summary of estimated NDT tern eratures.i4's TER I AL a)b)c)NDT range from published data Ref NDT from Cv correlation Assumed, Haximum NDT Ref F A36 plate-20 to+40 4)6i 8, 10, Il+40 A36 rolled section+41 to+54 A588 (Grade A)+10 to+80.4, 9 10, 12+54+80?LH70 W7f)LH70 WH)NR203M (61))IIIAC WM))LH3800 Nk)0 to+20 (all E7016)-76 to+14 All multi-run, low hydrogen electrodes 13-12+40+32-12+40+32 A36 ES WM A588 ES WM A36 ES HAZ A588 ES HAZ-40 to 0-30 to+60 0 to+10-30 to+60-40 to 0 0 to+10 10)6)).<+20 10)6)10 10 10,12+20?+See text?signifies insufficient data TABLE 4.Charov ener v at NDT-renorted data for materials similar to A36 and A588 material Cv energy at NDT Reference" (f t.lbs)A36 plate ES Weld metal in A36 ES HAZ in A36 ASSSA plate ES weld metal in ASSSA ES HAZ in A588A Low strength C-bin steels similkr to A36 A36 Hot rolled ABS-C (similar to A36)Normalized A302-B (similar to A36)25-30 6-21 14-23 28-33 9-15 8-14 10-20 15-20 17-26 22-44))10)))10)4 17 17 TABLE B.Critical flaw death to thickness ratios for lastic collanse assn=in ion surface breakin defects.Material Design Stress 1 ksi Static Loading a/t flow ksi Tension Dynamic Loading a f lovr ksi Bending a/t Tension Bending A36 36 47 0.23 0.24 61 0.41 0.37 A588 50 60 0.15 0.21 78 0.36 0.35 E7018/A36 E7028/A36 E70T=G/A36 E70T-I/A36 EM12K/A36 36 36 36 36 66 66 66 0.45 0.45 0.45 66 0.45 56.5 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.31 86 86 86 86 73 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.51 0'7 0.47 0.47 0.47 0'3 E7018/A588 E7028/A588 E79T-G/A588 E70T-I/A588 EM12K/A588 50 50 50 50 50 66 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25 86 86 66 0.24 0.25 86 66 0.24 0.25 86 58-0.12-0.20-75-2 74 0.32 0.29 96 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.34 0.48 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.34 0'1 E7018/A36/A588 50 E70T-I/A36/A588 50 EM12K/A36/A588 36 66 66 0.24 0.24 56.5 0.36 0.25 O.f25 0.31 86 80 73 0.42 0.42 0,51 0.38 0.38 0.43 From procedure qualification Scatter of data from Ref.10 Value for Ehi12K/A36 assumed Design stress for A36 assumed TABLE 6.Estimated crack arrest tern eratures at maximum design st-esses.iMATER IAL hiAXIhiUM THICKNESS ins-ESTIhiATED NDT CRACE ARREST TEMPERATURE Op A36 plate A36 rolled section A588 Grade B~A588 Grade H LH70 Whi LH3800 WM NR203M Whi II IAC WM EM12K/A36 Whi EM12E/A588 WM+40+54+80?+80?-12+40+32+20?+20?130 114 163?163?130 122 110?1 10??Signifies insufficient data

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Tt!U55 SUPt OAT AT btOSttlELO WALL IHGOAP.O PlAOlu$OF 5tOS)tlELO WALL l'l.o8,5'l 0 C)I tL 0 41 DC 5'IS'W'lt)S')o'}S'15' I 1)C)')S)ho'o})}S'ohS'o II I IS 4$)15I5 4 IC i)!)I I tq mls'lf i!))7)gg(a]II~I~II~M r%Ld)l4 I 111 tUn li 1 I I!I IS'11 I!'lI II I)n r'll 4!I II)Sl S)~)SI I e}D~re~l IC ll)l%Sl EI~~C)'!l)g.El.I ,IS!I I Q 1)C'It-.I)ll)1)ll I IQ i!Il I I I I~l)f(((foal(((illl): lji'4 ice)l i l~i 77 So)i~0 1~}71 v~0 nl UP: lt)'i]J:!l)).1 I I lsl o I)tv~\%%1 i 110 I l)o I X'!~)I r l.~,v IC v.I,.Q fg EJ)~g',~I I gl I,}Si I}l 4lh t'~'lav~IJ)r.~tl~Ill!)IQl i~~'t Ll I tB'QC)t 1+4 I)4 1)ir S!lA)1}>85 M t}c)A)B4 VD tt4 r'1~r~r-)I))I'!I 4 7 0~i tAi, 5'44.4?S l)4.,I'1Lil,l.)lt 0))Xf, L~f~i~'>Jl QJ yV lV t~go)4o 1~~v i r~'~1 l~41 j)4 ni i:s1~i)&it I)5 I)C~1~4)I~t)'"~~l ri s 15-A1...'M IO~I'i%!%5)" l}s'}1~11.1,!1)I 1 I~}).I~(l')cn---il))4th 48 iD$5J 50 50 n.1, O m)tA1,)K I~)I R(gt I z.rISA.IL)S (.C Ir'~t.: r Ii,l 1 OpN CC 0 V CC~I.0 0 0~(I it)ii)C}I~I~EI LECF D::.f]lgl)Sfra~s Skin 4 s Hyh Sb'en~Fr~nplhy.ModNla'4'//ees Skrj))Ps/HD derange 8)!ries Fran!i n 1'l0 375 l36~LECk lJD JOIN T$..))E)4EEas i-i lD)r 5h~r<'i ELEMENTS ln)r 5br>>Fn>>P Fig.2.FINITE ELEhIEHT STRESS ANhLYSIS OF SS'i'f.SCASI)tttctolt PWt tC Po)ltit SUPPt.r SEISIN SSW MOOEL Fot).GOI)P)tTE!)-ItGl!ou I r l o o!n Ir r 1 un A I.l h 1 v C I c l'.T cl i I rli (

140 120 10D~80 4 4 60 20-80-40'(0 40 t I I X I 0 I x I X x I I I/'o/I/x I I//X/o I//Melding Institute Da/---Scatterband

/---for E701S o Lincoln LH70.surface I/~.roof r From Ab'S A51Velds r x 4'eld metal tests 0 for Leckenby Lincoln data 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 120 f00 80 60 40 20 0(-40-20 0 20 40 x a a a X X'9~, X~0 Xo ltfelding Ins ti fute Data.o Surface~Roof Dafa on A VS AS 20 Spec.a Lincoln x Leckenby a Data from Ref,4-Scat terband-from Ref.20-4D 0 40 80 120 160 140 QO 100 80~60 40 20-120-80-40 0 40 SO 120 Temperature

'F Fig.3.Charpy impact data for LH70 weld metal.Temperature

'F Fig.4.Charpy impact data for NR203M weld metal.

100-40 oc 0 40-40 oC 40.60 C 40 X x x 1ZO 100 80 60.40 20-1ZO-80-40 40~Data on AVS A51l/elds x Leclrenby procedure qualification o Lincoln data 0 40 80 120 20 0 Procedure quaLn 40 on veidment x Procedure qual." on AVS ASZO Chemetron data A(VS A5.20-40 0 40 80 1ZO Temperature

'F Fig.6.Charpy impact values lor LH3800 weld metal.Temperature

'F Fig.6.Charpyimpact data for Chemetron 111AC weld metal.<Za~Fig.7.Lamellar tearing beneath fillet weld.

APPENOIX A CALCULATION OF CRITICAL OEFECT SIZES FOR PLASTIC COLLAPSE The SSW is designed according to the elastic working stress method of the AISC Code, Part I, 1969.This gives allowable stresses in tension and bending as follows: Allowable tensile stress Allowable outer fibre bending stress 0.6 CFY 0.66 cF (compact members)Y Under certain unusual circumstances, such as earthquake loading, a load factor of 1.7 on allowable stress is applied by Burns h Roe, with NRC approval, i.e.Maximum tensile stress Maximum outer fibre bending stress (a)Tension 1.02 O'Y 1.12 Cr Y Considering a member of thickness, t, containing a surface defect of depth, a, and equating the design load on the gross section to the load for plastic collapse gives:-t~cf=a(t a).0'flow where 0'1 is the nominal design stress.1.020'Y Hence-=1 t a flow (2)with Cr1 1.02(ZY For an outer fibre stress equal to d , the bending moment on a solid rectangular beam is The collapse moment, for a surface defect of depth, a, is M c 0't-a)flow Hence the initial defect depth is given by (y t2 1 6 1 flow flow with (X1=1.12 6 ATTACHMENT 2 Sco e Of Task Force Review I.Sacrificial Shield Wall Quality Assurance (QA)Review Scope The QA SSW documentation review consisted of: o Location and.identification of all non-destructive examination (NDE)reports, o Identification of all inspectors that performed visual, surface or volumetric examinations, o Location of all fabrication, weld and material defect identification reports, e.g., Leckenby Incomplete/Rejection Tags and Leckenby (Field)Inspection Reports," o Review of'Leckenby inspector qualifications, o Review of the 215 Contract related Leckenby shop and field QA manuals, o Identification and review of Leckenby NDE procedures, o Identification and review of Leckenby welder qualifications, o Review of appropriate Leckenby documentation for photocopied signatures or records falsification, o Review of welder and inspector qualifications against NDE and defect identification reports to establish physical versus paper-work credibility, o Review of Leckenby inspector performance to determine correlations, if any, between inspectors and reported defects or defect types, o Review of Leckenby welder performance to determine correlations, if any, between welders and reported defects or defect types, o Review of the material traceability system, o Review of Leckenby weld maps for structural, welding and documentation irregularities, o Review of material test reports for completeness and accuracy, and o Review of the appropriate sections of the 215 Contract to identify additional areas requiring investigation.

II.Sacrificial Shield Wall Engineering Review Scope The SSW engineering review consisted of: o Performance of additional visual, surface and volumetric examination on the SSW, o Review of all NDE reports for defect classification, description, severity, trends and implications, o Review of all material and weld defect identification reports for classification, description, severity, trends and implications, o Review of documentation for welding process defect trends and implications, o Review of welding procedures for improper qualification and implications for physical impact (providing direction for requalification where prudent), o Assessment of weld map recorded discrepancies and weld defects for structural and welding significance, o Review of defect distribution, o Review of weld filler metal control, o Review of cold forming and heat straightening processes used during fabrication and assessment of their technical significance/

implications, 0 Review of material properties including assessment of ni 1-ductility transition temperatures (providing direction for additional testing where prudent), o Assessment of the nonconformances in material test, reports for SSW structural implications, o Review of welding defects with respect to cause, e.g., process, position, procedure, or welder technique, Review of the fabrication and erection methods for potential effect on stresses and distortion, Review and reassessment of SSW design loads (including an update to current codes and models)to assist in the evaluation of known and potential defects, and o Review of the as-built structural integrity of the SSW taking into account the potential for failure by brittle fracture or plastic collapse.

~:..Burns~Ia 0" Timmins~(a S='e,'.:le

~1~lb'-=(2)~s THIS I~iR (DOESi (DOES'IOT)Esi ABI.IM A AEYT CONNITNEHT'.

WIiIiSS C RRESiiONDEHCE,'IO, ATTACHMENT 3 July 15, 1980 G02-80-152 A.A.Willoughby The Welding Institute Research Laboratory

=Abington Hall Abington Cambridge CBI 6AL United Kingdom

Subject:

WI REPORT LD 22526

Dear Tony:

Enclosed are the Supply System's comments on your n eri S W p t.If the new information presented changes h era c ions in the report or if you disagree with any of th tatem s, se let me know as soon as possible by Telex or telephon i Otherwise, I don't think th re is any need t spond formally at this stage.We plan to comp e he open items with respect to stress analysis and material testing e you that data.At that time we will request a final repor t c e out the task provided that additional fracture mecha ics anal s't required.The enclosed comments can then be inco o ated or e d as appropriate; We p n t pres n r eport to the NRC in the near future.The Welding I ut r port wi be incorporated as an attachment to that report.ot e any need for a representative of the Institute at this r i'r eting.However, such a need could develop as the NRC r v ws the report.Tha you for the letter on lamellar tearing and laminations.

The data and coments were very useful and certainly support our earlier position that the effect af lamellar tears/laminations is'better analyzed by plastic collapse rather than L.E.F.M.Any comments on the letter will be sent under separate cover.Again, we can incorporate the findings in a final SSW report.Sincere/y, DB/rmm Attachment cc: WNP-2 Files I D.Burns Lead Materials/Welding Engineer AUTHOR'X~iON vms j(I I I FOR SICMATVRE OF 0.Burns OQR~RovAI-ol I DC Ti ins I APF$lOV ECl ATTACHMENT Comments on Melding Institute Report LD 22526 (June 1980)Section Comments a.Line 5:-"shield" for"field"~2.2 3.2 4.1 General: Since our letter of 4/12/80 the Supply System has directed the UT examination of electroslag, flux cored arc (FCAW)and snielded metal arc (SHAW)welds and HT of FCAW and SHAM welds.These inspections identified a possible generic problem with incomplete root penetration of the FCAM and SHAW welds.Further details of these inspections are given in our.comments to Section 4.3 of LD 22526.Line 3: "propagation" for"propogation" Line 13: typo-"inadequate" Line 6: "Additionally" for"Alternatively".

A given break could cause both annulus pressurization and pipe whip reaction loads.Paras.1&3 The pipe breaks which produce annulus pressurization

.are within the SSM penetration cavity not within the annulus.The only weld within the annulus is the nozzle to vessel weld and break is not assumed at this weld.The safe end to nozzle weld lies within the SSW penetration.

General: Burns and Roe have completed their preliminary analysis of the reduced loads and resultant SSW stresses.The results of this analysis can be summarized as follows: 1.Normal Load Conditions Stress levels less than or equal to 25$of allowable (allowable is about 2/3 of yield)2.Normal+Seismic Stress levels less.than 37K of acceptable (acceptable is, in this case, about 2/3 of yield).3.Accident Conditions Stress levels are less than 50%of acceptable (acceptable for this load combination is approx-imately yield).The analysis for the accident condition is a dynamic analysis using a simplified SSM model.Burns and Roe are now doing a dynamic analysis with a three dimensional finite element model to confirm this data.

Section Comments 4.2 General: Further review revealed the use of one heat and thickness of ASTM A588 grade A plate for stiffeners in the top ring.(ring 6).Charpy impact data on the mill csrt shows a Charpy energy of above 100 ft.lbs.-at+40 F (all three specimens).

Me have concluded that this material will not be limiting in terms of its NDT temperature.

Electroslag welding procedures for ASTM A588 are being qualified.

Tensile tests and drop weight NOT measure-ments will be made on the test welds.4.3.(l)Line 3: 4.3.(2)Line 5: The defect rate for electroslag welds has been revised to 30.5%following re-analysis of the data.7Z6 areas were MT'd.Note the inspections were of 726 areas not 726 welds.Some areas may liave contained more than one weld;some may have contained no welds.4.3.(3)General: All accessible welds have now,been examined.4.3.Page 7: Para.3.General: General: Substitute"excavated" for"ground out".Usual method for removal was air-arc gouging.Does the Melding Institute have any data on the probability of occurrence of corner lack of fusion defects in ESM welds made with steel backing shoes?The SSW Task Force has directed additional inspections of accessible welds.The findings are summarized below: 1.UT of ESM Joints o 73 welds were examined per AMS D1.1 o 1 contained a rejectable reflector.

The design drawings indicate this is in a permanent backing shoe.o 3 contained questionable reflectors.

Location indicated backside geometry.o 8oth L-wave and 70 angle inspection used.2.UT of FCAM Joints o 9 Joints examined: 7 double bevel, full penetration T-welds.2 single bevel full penetration corner welds.o 6 of 7 T-welds had incomplete root penetration along length of weld with 5/32 (max)dimension through thickness o Both single bevel corner welds also showed incomplete penetration (IP).o Beam path measurements indicate the defects are IP and not lamellar tears or underbead cracks.3.UT of SMAW Welds o 6 SMAW single bevel, full penetration welds examined per AWS Dl.l 2 acceptable 1 rejected-incomplete penetration

'acceptable indications characterized as incomplete penetration.

4.MT Inspections o 18 SMAW fillet welds and 5 FCAW fillet welds examined.o Ho cracks or lack of fusion.4.3.General: Underfill/Undersize Fillets: 4.5.1 Para.3 Line 16 The Burns and Roe inspection data has been reviewed to clarify the terminology.

The term underfill is now used only for butt welds.Only one case was observed (dimensions 4xOxl/8).Undersize fillet now includes both local and general undersized areas.Burns and Roe examined 1170 welds from a total of 12842.Of these 74 were undersized fillets (6.3X).Of the 74 we have analyzed size data on 66.Of the 66, 10.6" had effective reductions in load bearing cross-section of 505 or more.(505 is lowest critical FCAW size for plastic~collapse at design stress of 1/2 yield)thus, 0.67~of welds examined exceed this size.However, population of welds examined is biased as proportion of accessible welds which are fillets, is greater than proportion in SSW as whole.Primary structural welds are mainly full penetration butt welds with low.probability of underfill defects.Typo."negligible".

Substitute"increase" for"reduction".

Section Comments 4.5.1 Para 3.Me plan to measure the effect of cold bending on the NDT of A36 plate.4.5.3 Para.1 See comment on 4.2 for proposed testing of.ESM welds.Tests on E7028 are complete.Results are: Root NDT+30 F 5.1.Upper Part of Meld 0 F Tests performed per WI recommendations.

However, root crack occurred during welding which required repair.Removal of ASTM A588 from wall is held up by strike.Plastic Review of PWS attachments revealed two general types: Collapse At Attachments 1.Large restraints attached to many members (see figur.e 1)2.Small restraints attached to limited number of members (figure 2).We are assuming that our general plastic collapse argument is still valid for type 1.For type 2;we have reviewed the BSR visual inspection data and performed sample NT and UT of welds in SSW which take loads from the PWR.No defects other than the IP discussed in the comments to 4.3.were detected.Me have concluded that there is no reasonable risk of collapse at these attachment areas.Burns and Roe indicate that the SSW is generally redundant in that complete members can be removed at critical locations without exceeding the acceptable stress levels.This does.not apply to members directly under PWR's.5.2.General: In view of the reduced stresses we have concluded that arrest is provided at 100 F, for all materials except A588, subject to confirmation of maximum NDT fot ESM joints.Table 2 Table 5.An up date of Table 2 is attached."E70T-6" for"E79T-G".A modification to Table 5 for applied stresses of 1/2 yield is attached.

Section Ficure 5 Comments Symbol missing on Chemetron data.Oata from A5.20 is material qualification not procedure qualification.

Appendix A (a)First equation should read: 4.3.(2)Line 3: 84 defects were detected, not 74.

FIGURE El 567'-~" I Az.270 t<II ll lf S I l 1 f>>W>>I I i II II I l l, l l RFW Penetration Area T j l I I l I~lf II lt Ll ti tl~l<t)l~~I~t 1)~ll IW ll 4 4>A l~PWS(PMR)28-3 Support Location E't.556'-S~"

FIGURE g..Az.240.;jY l I tl li~i-li~~+'e l<.}l ll lf.ti~I~)~~'~1 l I'l l I'l I l.L HPCS'Venetrati

~tl.'" Area~~on~~~~~h W%%~PMS(PMR)2-1 Support.1.ocation

~5~~0 h.~~', h'~~El.556'-%" h~~:.jl L li i I.:~~~\~~I~~~~~

TABLE V.Z CR'T.Cn'LAii PEPTH TO TH.CKNESS RATIOS FOR Dl~<TIC CO!LAPSE ASSU.(IQQ LONQ SURFACE BREAKIHQ PEF CTS va-.erial Design Stress~l ow Sta.ic Loadina a/Tension Bendina Pvnamic Loadinc c a/t Flow t Tensions Bena.n!A36 18 0.62 0.50 77 0.77 O.aa~A588 25 60 0.58 0.48 99 0.75 0.59-"7018/A36 E7"28/A36 E70T-Q/A3o

~7-"'-/A36.El ll 2K/A36 18 18 18 18 66 0.73 66 66 56.5 0.73 0.73 0.68 66 0.73 0.58 109 0.58 109 0.54 03 0.58 109 0.58 109 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.67 0.o7 0.67 0.67 O.o4 E?0 8/A588 E7028/A588 E70T-G/A588 E70T-1/A5S8 cl'12K/A" 88 25 25 25 25 25 66 66 66 66 58-74 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.57-0.66 0.50 0.50 0.,50-.0.50 0.47-0.53 109 109 109.109 96 122 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.61 O.ol 0.61 0.74-0.63 0.80<0.77 O.ol~A7 018/A36/A588

~7QTWPAS6v'A$

88-EYil2K/A36/A588 25 18 56.5 0.68 66;"';-.0.

62.0.54 93~0.50.109 0.77 0.81 0.61 0.64 a-slaw depth t-material thickness 4 ABLE y.5 SUl;f~.-".RY QF WORST C"SE DEFECTS IN WELDlENTS Aecion Defec Tvoe Laroest Reported Length x Width x Depth'nches 4 fl~v e~~se<cl Fa i azure t Qde."aren Pl ate Arc S.rike Lamellar fears 3/8 x 3/8 x 1/32 None r P, (F)Fusion Boundary Lack of Fusion+,'end Yietal Crack Undercut Undersized Fillet Overlap Underfill Excess-Reinforcement Porosity Crater Fill incomplete Penetration Slag Inclusions

'=-at Affected Zone H-cracking Liquation Cracks None None~8 x 0 x 0 ()39 x 0 x 0 (ESW)(f)13 x 0 x 1/8 ()8xox3/32 24 x O x O (ESW)26 x 0 x 1/4 ()3 x 0'x 1/8 4 x 0 x 1/8 24 x 0 x 0 (ESW)72 x 0 x 1/4 8 x 0 (boundary area)19 x 1 (boundarv area, ESW)Z.x 1/2"x 3/8 48 x 1/8 x 5/32.(subsurface) a~xoxo', (p)F P, F (p)(p)P, F F=Fracture, P=Plastic collapse, ()-signifies lower probability

~(a)Depth in the.hru-thickness direction.(b)0-signi ies dimension unknown.(e)Estimated from fit-up requirement.

SP.~iS Y{Pa I 9)u(Tlb SovQc5 lN/(W~~A~~au~c Mca.~m-msi~~(c)'ne 2@inch long crack extended through the 1%inch thick electroslag weld.No other such occurrences have been identified in the documentation.(d)Worst case based upon percentage reduction in area from original weld size.

~i ATTACHMENT 4 Concern No.1 Additional Information This attachment provides additional information on the proposed partial penetration groove weld at elevation 541'-5".The infor-mation provided herein is briefly discussed below.o The Project Engineering Directives (PED)which provide the instructions for the qualification, joint preparation, in-spection, shim gap shielding repair, and welding of the partial penetration weld are enclosed.P ED-215-CS-2741 P ED-215-W-2749 PED-215-W-3775 (a)PED-215-W-3776 (b)PED-215-W-3830 P ED-215-M-2746 P ED-215-M-3320 P ED-215-M-3604 (a)This PED supersedes PED-215-W-2742 which was previously submitted to the NRC on this issue.(b)This PED supersedes PED-215-W-1604 which was previously submitted to the NRC on this issue.One additional change to the above welding (W)PEDs will be issued in a PED addendum.The change provides for buttering the bottom face of the joint after the MT inspection.

o The Welding Procedure Specification, WPS No.26, for the partial penetration weld is enclosed.o A sketch (Sketch-1) illustrating details of the existing area to be affected by the partial penetration weld is enclosed.o A section titled"Partial Penetration Weld Str'uctural Consid-erations" is enclosed.Within that section, additional infor-mation listed below is attached.Burns and Roe Technical Memorandum No.1173 Burns and Roe Calculation No.6.19.37 Discussion titled"Analysis and Design of Sacrificial Shield Wall" Leckenby drawing F124 CODE PROJECT ENGINEERING DIRECTIVE'URNS AND ROE, INC.WPPSS~f\r rlVv'rrA~A<<va v I NO.2 PROJECT r N G I FII C C P IN G DIRECTIVE 2 1-CS-271/1 2 31'16 21 6 I 6 IpIqrl'~ITSIIc DATE 1031/3 i I 10'RIORITY 16 12 118 ID I~I g r r~!r:.-ASOh.'OR P.E.D.INFORMATION

~/g COP IF S SPIEET r OF~S~Oi-WZ~OS HZCPuiZEO RZ o~;~.o-zoaa(s~a6 xn~o 7O 7OP OP Seine'S Au@Do/I/Oy'G/~'Aic.Ci.7/~C7 3 (+9<.4&/P/T=I-'//JO/AC 4'(j3EAm rVPZQZ)A'g n ji+EQ REFERENCES SUBJECTSAC.

ShlELO kfALL ELD5 LOCATION E4.54/-5 ZL A'A'Ollh!0 ENG.SYST.EM A'/F.S/U SYSTEM QUALITY CLASS ORIGINATING

., DOCUMENTS"h/Cg g/Q-5Cjgg(g DESCRIPTION OF WORK: QEPZA'CE SLO/4 E/DS I/ri/jH 4 PAR7IAI P+4'LIRA'7/o&

kE/ci 8E/HIE&I.7HE DPPEg/-/i(ID:~o~ER>Vines As DEr~//-Eo o/(l SIIEE/.s 3 THIRD 5 oP Tu/s PEG kfE~D PREPARArroa'eA/l BE g9 pppEC7.g~0~I j.ED..9I9-ln/-P 749.klEzD gUA7l I&lcAT/oM 5c/A/l 8E 45 DIRER Eci Oe'E.D Z/5 bv'7-4'R-Pzrc/P oP GAc s A'r Smuts (AICR Pres-4884) 5/////I.8EAs DtREcrEo 04 AD pgg-~@pe.l4kZO Sea~/.BEM~oE Ah Die~cr~~O~PE.D Zl5-/I(l-lC a4.'O Z 1.THIS PED REVISES DIRECTION PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED BY THE FOLLOWING PEDIEI'.THIS PED VOIDS D IR ECTION PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED BY THE FOLLOWING PEDIs): 3.THIS PED WORK SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH KNOWN 2/~OTHER WORK 2/5-W-8 7 r 4.THIS PED DEPENDS ON THE PRIOR INSTA'S.T)On OF FOr I OY,IF<r.DeDs REVISE: NONE DRAWINGS SPECIFICATION APPROV LS: W~)EA I IP IN NGINLER E/g LIAISON EtI&NEER r~r-SrD r"~I r" wOJ CT"ih>N'I~iDAT": 'r.2+p'ATE~/~~8..DAT"" I'r'/~%<<grhP8+3 PROJECT ENGINEERING DIRECTIVE WNP 2 BURNS&ROE, INC.PAGE 2 OF&2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 1011 1213 14 15 CODE PROJECT ENGINEERING DIRECTIVE ENCE DR AW IN GS REFERENCE DRAWINGS~>iAW ,ING h SM TN SUFF IX RE V.DRAWING NO.SHEET NO.SUP F IX REV.SI8 26 27 28 30 31 32 33 34 35 23 24 25 26 27 28 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 3S REFERENCE SPEC.PARAGRAPHS

, SECTION PARAGRAPH PAGE REV.REV 1 BR 803-1 11."ie<.f 5.10 1 1:-I1 lii115 I15 I1 (18.I 21 25 ie.l I e I i.)I w)e iel I e i 1~3 ll'~l vg)C lr)r 1 CI I;,I.i 15 5 I II i'1~e VI iei L I)tl I~I I'I'i r I I rI (,'>[))(I)Q'I-t)lrl 0>r7~'0 Z Ill~)Ill Ill C)I)l b)II Q r)I'uj~laJ I-V)I).0'kj.:.I:::.!'l'C'IO 12 I~ill J l).I 6~CQ AJ.t-o24.7&246&249+)QQQO.e~~~e'I i WZ 7YP.g'Siiu 4.344 I',*'.'k/P..-.E I'@gay f8 9P@385.y!~toy I I I'II>~n,-tlI~4 c)a>0~(.Ii<>:r=;I g;, C')gJee fy)b, I I j K.l'I (~X tJ)C 37 V)0 7)0 In r)0 Vl U)z 0 I rn V 7)n C rn O"l z 0/-Oh"~ECy:.&a<8iGQSo,><i

..g C8~n+8el" f ARTIA4 PEAEQ'A7IOAI coL 5PL cE As.8/9 o.c.7" A ISO-BW'A/SPL/cE O'LZ 54/Pj TYP E.XTD<(Ofi SP ICL FP HCOL[JMNS

~,

/5./@)C/g.+SH!h7 78 45 8 (1 tl'2~BHlhAG VAR~vs Bc cripes&384&584 TYP(CAl'IIJCLD PROFILE'HERE LEVCj+.l6 A MlhJlhAUQ OF{." ielPE.I ((>>QQg~+/5-96+48 WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJ=C7 HG.2 BURNS A!JD RO=.IN r pj'-";,/'wG.ZON=: I~(retral I P l(I Lt:-QQE AiCjg'/PQ~

g,~Ig I!yp,y Hlb QEcG0 P ROI-lI.=r r~2s CO VARI~a\30 i>>~VAR(cs'&Eel'!c~Q3S5-+pgQ 7'(P!cAI WE!D ppoFILE t->>4~L5 I-~+6 pH4,Q R=.D'DC'W'l:Q Q(~gQ)V/PPSS NUCL+~R PRO':"CT NO.2 R-.~.S: ilO?4: r*o=-i*au 6URNS AND ROE INŽ.4v4V~I i r t 1 i'Am.c.M'4 idea.I P="~Z/5-P3-8

/-y!5 i'=~(t~~)J./.D'!</~ov w~r fi P;>>'~r i(.'I i hei~P r~wl i!7i Q f i<<~p>>i~~/LR Q,ei~~l lP./i!~Ž~.I i!r,

~>Ih II I/II~ll 0.C)".'~I.I~1 lgl ((J)-]0 Ql" Il I I'-'ll I'>~"1~W U V IJ 5 Q 0 r.I I I i l'3" g'I Il 1~I 4--t~0 U V)T 0 I rn)r:0 rl 2)0 I..I II O 2'tJ~~~")t't-:"yf(::trr.;if'.

~I ii jL>ph (~>g>~~1~~~~'>>l~.".~~-'~~-'"--l~).r."i-'.~

I"..':)~': g)'~"I)r C.iLIL: PROJECT i N GIN EE RING D IR ECTIVE BliRNS ANC ROE, INC.WPPSS r~uCLEAR PROJECT NO.2 REASON FOR P.E, D..PROJECT ENGINEERING DIRECTIVE 2 1 1 2 5 6 18 IQ IiaTS III 3 ie INFOIsMATICN COPIES 1 0.PRIORITY I li8 Io 20 21 SHEET I Or"~8 9 1011 121314 IS Tliis PI.D is to allow the contractor to prepare for welding to be done by Dual Shield FCAW Process.REFERENCES SUBJECT Dual Shield FCAW ualifica or LOCATION ENG.SYSTEM/'UALITY C LASS OR I G IN AT IN G DOCUMENTS DESCRIPTION OF WORK: Contractor shall obtain machinery, welding wire and test materials to qualify a procedure and personnel, suitable to perform necessary capacity of welding to be done on the Sac.Wall.Type of Filler Hetal Required 25 lb.spools Hanufacturer:

(1500 lbs)Cliemutrom W, lding Supply (Dia..045)

(206)682-2880 Dual Shield Gas-Argon-C0 (E-70T-1)2 98-27, Joisn Brosnann (415)658-5010 Contractor shall coordinate all operations with Burns and Roe Welding Engineer in contractors establishment for qualifying procedures and personnel, to inable this program to be expedited.

The procedure and personnel shall be qualified in the horizontal position.The test plate for qualifying the procedure and personnel shall be xn accordance with AWS Dl.l and Spec.215-17D.A 2'x 2'ock-up of the plate thickness (as close as possible);

and joint design shall be welded by each welder prior to welding on the Sac.Wall.Type of Hachinery Required 12 tlanufacturer:

Airco Flux Core Welding i~lnchines 1.THIS PED REVISES DIRECTION PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED BY THE FOLLOWING PED(sI: 2.THIS PED VOIDS DIRECTION PR'EVIOUSLY PROVIDED BY THE FOLLOWING PEDIsl'.THIS PED WORK SHOULD BE COO R D IN AT E D WITH K N OWN OTHER wORK UNDER THE FOLLOWING PED'S REVISE: NONE D 8 AE I'IN GS SPECIF ICATION APPROVALS:

P~iF~~LEAD DISCIPLIINE ENGINEER<DATE.THIS PED DEPENDS UN THE PRiOR INSTAi.LATION OS-I is E F U L LOW IN G P I.I~5 ri~V I 8 R 803 2 r<<uaC<<Cr<VWCC<<<<T<V Ul<<CL<IVC BURNS AND ROE, INC.WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.2 PROJECT ENGINEERING DIRECTIVE 2 1'I 2 3 4 6 6 DATE 0 7 0 16 17 16 9 10 8 0 20 21-3 775 11 12 13 14 16 PRIORITY E REASON FOR P.E.D.: This PED is to revise PED 215-W-2742 for the preparation of the partial penetration weld joint to be used on the sac.wall at 541'-5" el.INFORMATION COPIES SHEET 1 OF~REFERENCES The stop Work Order must be lifted before work is started.SUBJECT Sac.Shield Wall'Welds LOCATION 541-3 All A ENG.SYSTEM N/A S/U SYSTEM N A QUALITY CLASS I ORIGINATING DOCUMENTS NCR 215-05688 DESCRIPTION OF WORK: Refer to pages 2 through 6 of this PED for direction of weld joint preparation as shown on attached details.1 documentation for this work shall be prepared in accordance with WP 84 Rev.15 and approved procedures.

I-0 z'I.~THIS PED REVISES DIRECTION PREVIQUSI.Y PRQVIDED By 215-W-2742 THE FOLLOWING PEDIs): 2.THIS PED VOIDS DIRECTION PREVIOUSLy PROVIDED By 215-W 2742 THE FOLLOWING PEOEI:<3.THIS PED WORK SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH KNOWN 215-CS-2741 OTHER WORK UNDER THE FOLLOWING PEDS: 4.THIS PED DEPENDS ON THE PRIOR INSTALLATION OF N A THE FOLLOWING PEDS: REVISE: NONE DRAWINGS SPEC IF ICATION APP ROVALS: D S IP NGINEER"A IS IP INE ENGINEER L ISO F GINE R NT OJE ENG INEE'".~/MW DATE DATE DATE~r DATE REV 1 S R 803-2 C (0 A=27O L=aQ Q4~C 0 c3&HAV~c EREAS lkn<cAi t=eat i-oe wEeeaw Qa t30~~gpg Ape,g5 lgolcATE t OIL)-.up.MEMBER.Q~RB-'.OOC,.PCN RFF SPEC.5""CiiO~REF QW PAGF,~rYCP ZzW-agS'WG.

ZONE NPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT HO.2 BURHS APED ROE, INC.EO++-.g~HY.Z tTt-e:+i Af+OW~/4~P~~qV/DEiP~D

!C,=gllD Ii-l'g" P'"-=i" iAl~i[lee~sHtu&-I.Bd.(-~'7'"=X(5 l.g4LD CY U, uk'-,oar usED-Fl<L Z2 Alt CAPs,Assam~

..'=TYPICAL WELD PREPARE!OhJ WHcgz LEDCE 15 4 MtMlhftUQ OF~n A'1DE 6 SIDE Z;/euILI-uI IVIcWS=.ROS IS ih"!haT:-:))-3)iiau e p opc~cheat o 2DO a~5~4 2 1 f aa aok p.o: to a': a=c-goug~ag jo'"-p:epa:ac'or..

Clem md gwd a~tc=a'-a=c~oug~mg to a v'aual accapcmcc pc AVS Dl.1-'o to ueldag.Jaw e=eea:a'aaa atuQ1 have a~=ave eae a h/8" t~~~tailaae o o bacldng Qhc c.ooe coot cata'nsulation was pumped fn shall be seaf welded and not be considered.

root pass of original weld."This seal weld around backing stay tend to leave gas pocket holes fn seal weld, which shal'i be blended out and acceptable as fs for applfng root passes of original welda Exfstfng coluran splice welds shall not be renoved, only beveled to oake 5ofnt preparatfon acceptable.

REF.DOC.: PCN RFF SPEC.SECTIO REF OWG.PAQ GAG.ZONE'PPSS-NUC~~ILR PROJECT.NQ.

2 BURNS AND ROE, INC.PEONY)+~gy~~SHT.g OF~SCALE'AAWN Bv QHKQ ev OAT$7wfig APPYQ g.9 OATg j//EZD W~r~ex+>>~

gn~/ae', 3Q."~X,l5).UV LZ~~l.M.M-UP M,q.~~>-C'ii'/I'ya/D S, ASSu~~ua Q I~I 25 32-0=.Q4~ptCAt WELD PRcPARATtOW WHpPp~~LEDCe ie LOESS tHPW<uiqq e~i~--~LitLT-UP.MEMe coos iS th")t0T: 1)3)Xnsu:e pzopa pzahasc of 200 s.-25:.~6 its hrs.soak pc o co sir are SouSSng 5oinc p epss'ation Clean and pA dca" xi=Lc-goug&S co 4 visusl acceptance pe hLS D1.1 pcioc to~1dfng.Joint prcpeation shs11 have a widaca"oot gap of 3/8" Cth iwtsliscicn of backing vhene open:ooc Ms.'Areas where insulation was pumped in shall be seal welded and not be consid<<erect root oass of original weld.This seel weld around backing nay tend to leave.oas pockeg hqles.5n~ttl weM~which shall be blended out and acceptable as is for applfng root passes of original weld.Existing colmn splice welds shall not be-removed, only beveled to nake 5oint preparation acceptable.

SCAt.c'RAWING ev~D ev REF.DOC.: PCN RfF SPEC.SHCTIO REF Ovf AGE.ctATE DVIG.ZON DATE NPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT HO.2 BURNS Al40 ROE, 1HC.PEON/5=+SHT.OF g~~~PgzPzzx~>>~

e~~~~~~~~I 0'~~~.~.~~~~,~~f~~~~~~~~~~.~~~~~~~0 g~'~~'~~'~

s'r.g Q P../ELIILI-UP MEMBER Qa I5 3"')~u=c pmpc=p=chea of 200 F.25:.i~A 14 h=s.soal e p o=to a'=a=c-Sousing

$oac p=epa=acioc.

2)C'can eP.Schd s ce=a'-s=c-Sought to a visual scccpance pc=Ars Ql.l p~o: co ucI~3)Jolt p"cpa=stion shaU.have a-i"'~=ooc Sap of 3/8" s~h EwcsLlscico of barking ubs=e open wc educ.Areas where insulation was pumped in shall be seal welded and not be considered root pass.df originIIl;.we)d.

This seal weld around backing may tend to leave gas pocket holes in seal weld.which shall be blended out and acceptable as is for appling root passes of original weld.4)cmisting colmn splice welds shall not be removed, only beveled to make joint preparation acceptable.

REI'.OOC..PC s=RFP SPEC.SECTION: PAQP PARA NPPSS NVCLEAR PROJECT HO.2 BURRS AND ROE, INC.REF OWG.'VIG.ZONE'EED SHT OF 42K DRAwN QT~D DATE pre+jj~Q+DATE TITLE: NEZd PP~//P<7/8//

~,

CODE PROJECT ENGINEERING OIRFCTIVE BURNS AND ROE, INC.WPPSS NUCLFAR PROJECT NO.2 PROJECT ENGINEERING D I R ECTI V E DATE 3 2 I16 17 S(6 18 I-W a 9l10 10 19 20 21-.I 3 7 7 6 11 ll 13 li IS PRIORITY T.REASON FOR P.L.D.: INFORMATION COPIES SHEET I OF.~This PED is to revise PED 215-W-1604 for'elding to replace the slot welds required per detail D 2038 (S782)made to top of shims and do not connect ring (Beam type 3)and ring 4 (Beam type 2)as required.The stop Work Order must be lifted before work is started REFcRENCES Sa..Shield Wall Welds LOCATION 541'-5".All A FNG.SYSTEM N/A S/U SYSTEM QUALITY CLASS I ORIGINATING DOCUMENTS NCR 215-05688 DcSCR IPTION OF WORK Replace slot welds with a partial penetration weld between the upper and lower rings as shown on attached details with FCAW process being used for complete joint welding.All welding is to be performed per direction of Burn&Roe Welding Engineers, Addenda System and this PED which includes a work procedure with peening, grinding, visual inspection, YiZ inspection and a sequence.All documentation shall be prepared in accordance with WP 84 Rev.15 and approved procedures.

I O Z 1.THIS PED REVISES DIRECTION PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED BY THE FOLLOWING PEOI$)$2.THIS PED VOIDS DIRECTION PREVIOUSLY.

ROVIDED BY THE FOLLOWING PEDI$): 3.THIS PED WORK SHOULD BE-W-2749 cooRDINATED wITH KNowN 215-w-2741 OTHER wORK UNDER THE FOLLOWING PED'S 4.THIS PED DEPENDS ON THE PRIOR INSTALLATION OF THE FOLLOWING PEO'S'EVISE:

NONE D RAWINGS SPEC IF ICATION APP ROVALS: DATE D P"" NGINEcR ZEX DATE~gg LEA DISCIP INE ENGINEER.z/U AIS c GINEcR DATE r~7 R D NT PROJECT ENGINEER DATE REV 1 BR 803-2 REPJLIX PROC')URE FOR HCR f05688 hT THE 541s 5>>LEVEL Ill REACTOR CONTLIIQKÃT VESSEL.1)PROCEOURE I!C.The purpose of this procedure fs so cstabMh the reqcf"eaenss for the smscsuraL steel repaf"'velding inside the contaiaaeat.

hny devfatfoa i-on sha raquf=c=en s of thfs procedure E.D require speci fc approval of she Burns and Roe Veldfng EagE~er.Oaves~approvals vill be granted oaly after aa'natura of she problen areas snd a resolution give by Bu s and Roe"eldfag hgfaeer bv Addcadua syssea.Vel&mg sequences shel be issued as artcc~eats to~proccdu=a.

Any changes or add'sio..s

-veld sequences or other special hstrucsfoas shaLL require approvaL by the Bms and Roe Veldfng hgiaaer.N.hc Quality Control Y~ger shall be responsible for assuring coaplfsnce vfth these procedures.

1)OOUD~TZOH Vork packages shaLL be used fo all structural steel vork'aad shaLL be prepared fn accordaace vith VP 84 Rav..15 snd approved procedures.

The Struc~al Steel Veld Record fora shall ba used for'tructuraL steel veld fag docmcatatfon.

Veld repaf"s, ff aequi:ed, shall be docuae=ted oa the Structural Steel'eld Repai=foams.The Loss of Preheat/Znte~Mn od Ve1d Sequeaca fora sha11 be used to doczcEens such occurcnces.

Zf cracks are d scovcrcd, aa Znspec&Report~~~also be inisfased.

Upon couple'oa of she fora, a copy v~also be edfatcly given so Burns aad Roe Veldt Engineer oa duty for approvaL.P=ahcat recorder charts shaLL be fdeatf~ied by velds fsoP s or dvg.noP s aad trsasnft ed, upon compLatfoa of vo k, to she ll.hP vault.P 3)~ZAI PP Elecsrode Coasrol shaLL be fn accosdsnce v'th thc vork procedure.

Elect=odes shal1 bc pa=chased fn haraesfcsLLy sealed consafners and shall be drfcd for as Least oae(L)hour at'senparatures betveen 750 F.aad 800 F.prior to 0 issuance.~ELectrodes shQ be~N"rained at a afnfaun temperature o~JO F.after thc hfg'a teapcraturc bake un fl v'shdravn'r use or tcaporaty storage porsable ovens or a ssorage oven conveniently placed near she vork area.Elec=-odes.

shall be r~ed roa porsablc ovens one as a~sad used Eaedhsely.

'lec nodes shat have been or are vas shall be bent and discarded fa an caoroved contains..

('qote: FC'" s ra does not requf a pre-bakfngg.

REF.DOC.: PCN RFF SPEC.SECTlON: PAgE PARA.NPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO-2 BURNS AHQ ROE, INC.REF DWG.;DAIWH BY CHKD BY OWC.ZONE: DATE DATE+~~/A~~DATE PED+~-~~g SHT.g OF TlTLE: l4zld kIorek'~oezt~e~

":CAu v'=e shell be aeiatsiaed a sealed coatainecs uatil vf.thLreua for use the"eld.Spools sbe" tot be ac=awed to ovens s tet'ach sb'.A a~effort shall be taken to keep vite spools coveted sad clean ia dustptoof<<Me feedets.~~".~gNLIPIC'FELONS ill welders using>is pr cedure shall be qucli.ied to unlitIi uC='Ii=Sess and all positions in ac=~ance e-'I approved~eld pw cedures and N5 Dl.I.Q lders quali~Iied by groove weids on 8" sched.IRO pipe or larte" and on pla~I" or over are quali.ied or all thicknesses of s:ruc-trual s~l o)P ROCHURE PRINT PROC')UR".

AND RcgU?Rch=HTS follMng material shall be on operations a)Heating tor hes b)Heating coils or blankets c Heat retaining blankets 6)TORA HATING hand prior to prehea and w lding d)Clips for holding coils, blankets, ew., in place.e).Tempera~control and.e-carding equi pnani.I)Torches my be used for applica ions involving aw-air gouging, w.wching strongbacks, he ter blanket clips>tackino, backing bars and Qnor repairs.Preheat shsll be 200 F.25 E.eith a 15 niaute soak t'ae.2)Neatino.orches cay be used to locallv prehea he s ruc~an.'ld si-in the areas to be hack mlded.o)Heating torches shall be used vfth a neutral flame.'L 4)%hen preheat is obtained through totch heating foe other then teapotezy tack velds, Q.C.shall ftequeatly aoaitor the site both pziot to sad during veldiag to assam that ziaimue preheat ead mad~intetIase teeImtetute te~iresants are scdntaiaed

~REF.DOC.: PCN RFF SPEC.SECTION: AGE.I AFIA: WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.2 BURNS AND ROE, INC.REF DWG.: SCALE: 0 RA WH BV~O BY OAT DWG.ZONE: OATS PED~gy g SHT.Q OF/~TITLE:

7)RESISTANCE HEATZSC,~~'h11 areas to be preheated, axcept those specifically exasEptecl by the Burns ancI Roe MelEIing Engineer, shall be preheated'using electric heating elements The precise locations oE the heaters EEill be~designated by che preheating contractor's

~ldiag engineer Stl ip chart r cards o.weld join prehea-and cool down are required.Only magnetic holders shall be used to hold heaters and blankets ta-'Ic Sacrf icial Wall and ta struc~s on th'4i'evel.~A The preheat and maximum interpass aerator shall be held from JIe center line of JIe join-outward z at least 3" on each side of the joint.H"re JIan 3" fm JIc jain-JIe temperat re range may be less.hen the minimum specified but shall nat be mor JIan thc maXiIjxsa speci.fed.

The~couples shall be located no tmre JIan 3 fram JIe weld center line and their placementrequires approval by the Burns and Roe Welding=ngfneers.

inspec:ars shall check preheat with a'-contact pyrometer at fi;-up before allowing welding to becin.During.weld!ng, fnspe fon shall monitor minimum preheat and maximum interpass temperatures fn the joint using a cantac pyrometer.

J After reaching preheat tmcra ur,.paak the joint a~erature.or Vg hours before beginning welding.Maintain'the temperature range un.il all weldfno has be n completed and JIcn soak for another.three (3)hours be&re starting cool'-down..Heat retaining blankets shall be used as necessarv to cantrol caol-down ran.The cool-down rate shall not exceed 50"F.per hour.ilankcts may be removed when ambfen~erature has been reached.The hea.retaining blankcz, which mus-be maintained JIraughcu preheat, all welding fnspecbon, and cool-down, may be adjusted ta per-mi-w lding.For instance, a heater and blanket may be placed dfrec:ly o'ver the'joint for prehea and soak.then rmnavcd during welding.When Ne preheat drops below JIe specified minimum, a loss of pre-hea form shall be prepaM.The tcmperatur

" shall be resumed as soon as possible a.er thc low temperaarre is de~W.8)lEp~~EEc R gQ/R~i he pr heat rccufrwt far local zrch heating for a achfng s=rongbacks, heater blankit clips, backing bars, and far tackina shall~~REI-.DOC.: PCN RF+WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.2 RFF SPEC.SECTtCR PAGE PARA: BURNS AMD ROE, lNC.REF DWQ.;SCALE: DRAWK BT~K BY QA vva.ZONE'*T'f PED Q~~p~g SHT.TITLE: O be 150 F.to 200 A A for at 1Esasc, 2" m each diractioa fron the EEeld siss,&th a 15 oiuoto soak titsE at temperature

'Prior to bEESiaaioc.EEorkA 9)Melders and/or operators shall be provided temperature indicatino crayons or contact pyrometers 0 assure that prehea requirenents are being met.~~MAXI'HTBP ASS PRBQT'::.Tt+tcATURr Melds" Sacrificial Shield Mall and within 24" of the Sacrificial Shield Mall.2oa'-'-'F.25PP.The mini~preheat and maximum interpass temperature for all weldihg shall be as noted above.10)FIT-UP AHD TACQHG The joint gap!or s rurbcral and partial penetration welds shall no-exceed 3/16" for caterial tnicknesses less than 3".The Joint gap shall not exceed 5/16" for material thicknesses 3 and above.Suchgoints shall incorporate adequate backino agains which to weld.~.The roo opening for single bevel grooves agains backing bars shall be as ,ollows.1/4" min.to 9/16" max.backing bar renoved.after weld'.ng...3/8 min.to 9/16" max.backihg bar lef.on.Tack welds shall be subject to the same quality requirements as the final welds excep-tha-discontinvities such as undercut and unfilled craters need not be revived before Jm final arc weld.'rehea.is mandatory for single pass tack welds which are remelt and incorporated into continuous arc welds (final welds).Tack welds mus be large'enough to preven shifting or cracking dvring subseqven welding.Th y est be clean, contain no cracks, lack of..usion, pr slag and shovld he designed to become part~of:he.inal weld.S~Tack welds which are incorpor.teC into he final welds shall be made with electrodes meeting the requirements o the final welds and shall~Ra-.OOC.: mN RPP SPEC.SECTICM: PAGE~ARA:%'PPSS NUC~>>PROJECT NO.2 BURNS AND ROE, lNC.REF OWG." SCALE: D~V DA*wN BY~KD~g DATE'" DA OWG.ZONE~~DATE PEO~~-g/-Qpg SHT.~OF/~TlTLE'

uKLuIBC 11)hlI voiding shall be perforaed asian saarmred veldiag procedure according to 46 Dl.l cad Saeciiicatioa Section 2808-215-DD h, seer bead tadudque shall be used ta the greatesc extent possible.In say case, the vidch of bead shall uat Eoccsed three (3)core dismeterscof the electrode (except far dual shield flsrc cared vtre vhich shall aot exceed 3/8" in vidth The ninicxas aire of a zoot pass shall be sufficient to prevent craddng sad che aaricwss thictasess of'layers sub~t co root pais shall be I/S for velda Scads in the ilac position sad 3/16" for velds cade in any othet'ositioup Each veld pass of deposited veld natal shall be thoroughIy cleaned using slagging piiJcs, vire brushes, or by grfssdtug.

hay c ache, blov halos, or other defects that appear on the surface of-veLd beads shall be renoved by chipping or grinding before tha next cosFecing veld bead is deposited.

As'er'.beads, acept-haec h the:oot and hal layers, shall be peeaed Ewedhtely sf ar tarsal of slag.Soviets say<sible defects such as pecos'q, creche, or slag pothcts est be rezosred by g Ahg prior to peag, Ptci>>j shams be dolce using sn s~c~vi 5 t aund Dose col-o a'.-'"'~dQaetcr of oaa aua.cr mh (e").Peening shall ba dona'sz a s:ra'ght and co=ts~cus Icme.Ca"c shsII be exercised to p:csFe-t scs'Emj c: f'a)-~Eg of vs base natal fran over-pee"s j.Peehg shas'e usaf h all cases, ca:capt vhere speci~icsssy prohibited by a nota on tha veld sectuance sheet P A ope a ed needle sls jgag guns shall nat be used far pe~cg~ses.Peen pe." shetch attached.No dovch&'velding

~~M be pM tad.--csaat sapu+age shsL'o aceed the folloc~ag:

35k)/a has-Qtput shQ be nashua for velding.guttc~wg tcsy be done ho~~a11ys veZcsLy (up);o" any conbmtian oc~~o, guttering does aot require peeaiagp AD g=oova velds and a's'c""at velds agsEEst Qe Ssc.QQ requ'-a that the Sac.<<s" ba butterecP~REF.DOC.: PCN~4ZZzrs=WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT HO.2 RFF SPEC.SECTION: PAGE PARA BURNS AND ROE, lNC.REF OWG.SCALE: DRAWN BY CAD BY DATE OWG.ZONE'ATE PEO SHT.g OF I Every effo=should be~e Co provicLe con~~nous veld~kg en~~the ioint cmle e.As a~cn, 3/4" throat t"'cIaess sha11 be obeyed vi out aa'a~dcm"Lra~tions" shall be defied as vcLcLing vs&con~~fo are M 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> but Less Jm 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> JLI1"htcamtions" shs~'e=ceo=ed.A~veld w~Uch a&cont'M fo.na e then 1 hou=~t be~desi oned accL appmve6 by the Scans 4 Roe~Udge Kc~.~veld~exceeds~2 hour int~tion i~t shall recpd~doancata~on cn ZR/BCR if deened necessary by tha~&Roe IIeLding En~act., yor aLL imtc~tions, the foILovtng action shaLl be takcnc')Qc las" veLd Laye=aaaQ be peened bc o:e tha veld is Ls'-2)The veld sha" be cove:cd v'th~~"ion%meets and da"a~ed p"cheat~~ed Q C~4'c~y~G 3)The ver shaU.bc visua'etad Eor to r~g~g.Thc W~~ec on repo no~g the'~she" be>>udcd~w wk oaccagc Y a c aek A,CScovcedG an Q.~s~~be preps=ed j 4)~veld shaLL bc pcened and i~ac-ed.-pa=atwehed s~~12)~ISHCiZN to any veldm~g, the a=ca to be v'eldcd she~i bc v~~inspec cd i~accordance v M ASS D1.1, and afte s"y mc~ou~g, eu~ig o g~i.LL'.vclding shall be M~=cd at 100Ã~Le~a" p cheat t~e"s~c.AiI v~~"'hall be~~~ec ed 72 hams after cool dovn whe=Se~G"'ed~vt'i be hccessibla o>>the 72 hou=nagna&pa'cia~ac~~because anothe-veld o acabe v~have cov~G..acceptance vD be based on a hot 8'ade vhen A veld~a conplatc uL.v~~an'd V2 hour K of any rene'.-Žg ccposed a cas.M4 ccception is on1y aLLoved vhcn it cL'-hates hca cycL'a veld rona, snd'-shsLL.be appeared by tha R~!Roe Valuing v~aaa.'g 5 IL weLM4g vw~shaLL evaluate a?L regectabla aundice~~ealed by visual 0>>~+~tc~on p~a~to cd~o~/13)ILv~SS@EBM ganove the G~ic&m reves1ed by visual i>>>>p~to sound mtal beyond each end of the d&co~~p by@+~4 or chippiag.L~A defe=<<xtcnds one haL~.~~)a~ging nay be used.'Tha recto"ed p:cheat shall be specified L~~a to be used spa~y to M~~a&posiibQ~w of c"act pro~~/Dccxva~w shall be=aha@ected to assu=e that Se d>>cc has been renoved cld axcaveted area follov'app:crrAsta pa=agraphs im~~p ocadu=c.FIEF, DOC.;PCN RFF SPEC.SECTIOk: REF DWG.PAGE.>AAA: DWG.ZONG: WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.2 BURNS AND ROE, INC.PED SHT.OF SCALF'R*wH BY~KO BY OATE~OATE OATE TITLE:,

'L~~Q=-QlV IH<RlE5 L,"M~<RE a'u.II~.C++SPA,~~g.blotch.LAaE~mar asm'L..alt--g-g

~~A!LAG Ex(57.A'~is ,~Ac@;uP.EAq/2,Q 0--3 O4 iaea 4 TYI-ICA(PH~E i V/EL 9'E 1 M/I DE.P.-/BUlL-LIP MEME>ERI&La".P05I i III/HERE LEDGE IS A MMIMLjkft OP" DE 0 l)~star root paa~hasFe been applied all reaaillfnC 2)A iodicatiolla that shoEEId be yicIEad up W EFia~~~~~b B&R VWding gag.prier co aay raEForL/3)KP.T.fib'aZd ac preheat cezzzp aod 72 bra after coaplata cool deva~pc ecme paaC REI'.DOC PCN RFF SPEC.SECTlON: PAGE~ARR, WPPSS NUGAE EAR PROJECT NO.2 BURNS AMD ROE, INC.REF DWG.'CALE.'RAWN BY CHFl'0 BY DATE" OATEg~fa$OWG.ZONE'ATQ PED g)SHT.OF (E~~I~~~PH~+~>WELD DEm~lT~H'-~'>><<i~LES~rWau L-wiD;<~p~~LjtL-UPMEMKQ I&f'g" l)Af tet toot passes have bc app+ed~doddcatdoes that,~be,picked op~vtsoal jospectdoc shall be evaluated>B.4 R~~t.Sag.pelox to cay rssotk.3)K.P.T f~EFeht at preheat tssnp, and 72 hei.aftet co7aplate cool doEFn.+Ezcspt cava pass R9'.DOC.PCN RFP SPEC.SECTION: PACE'ARR.WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.2 BURNS AND ROE, tHC.REF DWG.'CALE:

DRAWL BY CHKD BY OATE'WG.ZONE.DATDS+jg APPVTF~DATE, PED+SHT, OF pn BL54t'c-P 0~SIDE g?1)Afte=toot paaees have baca a 11ed pa*peed~veld at preheat tep.and 72 hta.agre-co@plate cool doe.*~apt covet'aaa~REF, DOC.: PCN RFP SPEC.SEC lCN:~PACE PARA NPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.2 BURNS AND ROE, INC.FREF QWG.: SCAN E'AAwH DATE'Y$75 S~AS~~rtA SAFE P/~DWG.ZONE'~~i~~

DATE PED SXT.~g OF J~

,~

1)L te root passes have beai appal all tea.'~~g passes shaIl bc paenet.*2)tf.P.T.Hna1 veld at ptehcat t~.and 72 hrs.aXre~late cool nova.*Except cover pace.REF.DOC.: PCN RFF SPEC.SECTION: PAGE;PARA, NPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.2 BURNS AND ROE, INC.IIEF OWG.: SCALE'T5 04AWH BY Bv~~~OATEN//OWG.ZONE'pp DATE PED~~~~gg SHT.OF I~..LEDGE-h/<oZH~l.(z'~I.J~C~I'0 AAAAS Vl~)Wc T~~LC A 0 l YPICAI.'MELD DEPOT (.Wl'IER-2DG"-.I5'A IL{-LIP MEMBERQC IS 8'MINI VILITY.OF'<"NIDG e.BID 2)K P.T.f I)L~:cx'oc passes have baaa app11ef aLl=eaaLzdag paca ha11 b esca'.c ct c c pcMAkp W EFcL4 ar.p".cheat tey.and TZ hs.aGcc.cmplcte cool dofn.GQg.cpt covcx'atcp REI'.DOC.PCN REF SPEC.SECTION:~PAGE..-..PARA.

WPPSS NUCL.EAR PROJECT HO.2 BURNS AND ROE, tNC.REF QWQ.'CALE:

l8 DAAwN BF ClwCD BY DATE OWG.ZONE A DATE PED~~~~p7g sHT.~0

iYI=ZICAL I'BLIIL<~LD DEFoOSI~WWEPE L DC"IS LESS lIAIl I WIP 0=, I)httar"oot paaaaa have boca app11ed 2)K7.T.f~~veLd at r~r~~w~g pa55E5 5hkl1 be peeoedP at preheat tarp.aod 72)ea.aCta ccotpsata coo1 dovn.*Kggept cover pa5$P REI-, DOC,." PCN NFF SPEC.SECT/ON: PAGE~ARA: WPPSS MUCH EAR PROJECT NO.2 BURNS AMO ROE, INC.REF O'Is/G.: SCALE.'tt5 DRAWN 8Y CHKD ev DATE'ATP~g~fg DPtG, ZONE~'EO~Pg SH>,/Q O" C=-r A-A.Z0~&a"4)4-1L" cas~a a=as's sha11 ba~a.'"stf o assu"a~tha a fA 0 unrcac to&sfaQ aLso to esabmh W stab"'~fo".the tax'~N-'s.3)LES.te=s'"'"g sfals'.~E cay be c~p'ateI1 4a a 4" a".est saquesca'o desE~td by 3 IE K Mg=-gE~.1)yen (4)Efa&am to EF~E sE~~aous'~

-~outshout saquasca.)"-st saquaoca to sta at Q, 7-30f P 3)SasouI1 sequence to sa a-AZ 191-30f P 4)Tb~M saqu~a to sts=at 4X.103-30')Ho veda s&ptocaod ahtc4 o c2f ot a TE4 6'a saqucLcaP 6)EM saquaca~e caskets o appt~te1y ll".REF DWG.;SCALE: DRAWN BY DATE'HG.ZONE'7@~~" 7/g.-DATErg/REF SPEC.SECTION: PACE PAPA DATE WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT HO.2 BURNS AND ROE, lNC.PED~+~~pg SHT.OF TITLE:

~g Qar (QR/0~t F28'g5~<" 4I<I~8 E f A)O S lO/E iS 5 psC,g Iq R Av@=cci B=QU=-4l-~

Q IFIDt CA755 FIELD SEIAttIEAICE IJIINISEg WoRQ?u)5 SweH.4'w~+<R E~As REF.OOC.: PCN RFF SPEC.SECTION: PAGE Rcf OWG PARA: OWG.ZONE WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NQ.2 BURNS AND ROE, INC.PEDg SHT.~OF~g SCALE.'RAWN BY DATE'Y~~DATE jW wAA DATE CODE PROJECT ENGINEERING DIRECTIVE BURNS AND ROE, INC.WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.2 REASON FOR P.E.D.: PROJECT ENGINEERING DIRECTIVE DATE i F16 IN FORM ATION COPIES t2 1 I5-l3 8 t3 0 212 I 810 1S)19 20i21 P R IOR ITY I SHEE4 IS This PED is to establish the inspection criteria for the partial penetration joint prior to welding on the Sac.Wall at the 541'l.between Ring 3 and 4.REFERENCES SUBJECT Insoection Criteria LOCATION 541'l.Dr ell ENG.SYSTEM S/U SYSTEM QUALITY CLASS AMS Dl.1 Class 1 ORIGINATING

<DOCUI<"ENTS DESCRIPTION, OF WORK: Mag.particle inspection of 2" partial penetration excavation joint.1)Linear indications shall not be arbitrarily rejectable as a crack until excavation has been done for evaluation.

All cracks shall be completely removed.2)Inspection criteria for magnetic particle examination shall meet the requirements of AMS Dl.l-74, para.8.15 except for crack or laminations all other indications shall be excavated to a depth not to exceed 3/8" then sealed and welded out.3)If a linear discontinuity is proven to be a lamination in the base plate material, the requirements of AWS D1.1-74, para.3.2 shall apply, except that, for discontinuities over 1 inch (25.4mm)in length with depth greater than 1 inch shall.not be cause for rejection of the plate and weld repair shall be limited to 1 inch in depth of the plate from the prepared joint surface.I.THIS PED RE VISES DIRECTION PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED BY THE FOLLOWING PED(sl: 2.THIS PED VOIDS DIRECTION~.PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED BY THE FOLLOWING PEDIs): 3.THIS PED WORK SHOIJLD BE 1-W-2749~COORDINATED WITH KNOWN 215-W-3776 OTHER wOR K-REVISE NONE DRAWINGS SP EC IF ICATION APP ROVALS: g~~p Ip I ENGIN z~AT"-I 4.THIS PED DEPENDS ON THE PRIOR INSTALLATION OF THE FOLLOWING PED'S: LE'LI ENGINEE S/LI NG EE IDENT PROJECT ENGINEER T/T~zV 725 8'~DATE REV 1 BR 803-2

~-i."URN S aND"OEE, INC..t~O.2 r~?!'+J Q~~i~iiv, ih w D COD"I)PROJECT ENGINES=.!hG"i=,="TIV E 3',I:'2il'5 I I!!Yi~:~7i4~~~d'or I 4!~, i6i r i 6!t e'-'='r~irl--i=!0 4 Irr')O'I 4rr/'~!'!6I!'.!S IS..'.".!I j~I R=ASO': FOR?.E.D.: INFORMa ION cOPIES I--w~Te direct con-.ract 215.o repair the forty (40)gaps L tween shims located at the 541-'5" elevation on.he sacrificial shield wall (SSW).This repair is necessary to restore-the-sh1eld-'ng adequacey of the SSW at this elevation.

REFERENCES SUSJEgT 5 denim ap<>cpa r LOCATION 54 0'I Lon-.a.nmen7.ENG.SYSTEM S/U SYSTEM ua ITY CLASS I QRIQINATINQ SSW Task Force DOCUMENTS II~'Ctian Plan Concern No.2 DESCRIPTION OF WORK:-Refer to sheets 2 through 6.of this PED-1.THIS PED REVISES DIRECTION PRiVIOUSL'Y PROVIDED BY THE FOLLOWING PEDIE): 2, THIS~ED VOIDS D IR ECTION PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED BY THE!'OLLOWING PEDIEI: N/A N/A REVISE: NONE X DRAWINGS SP ECIF ICATION I i~:!i 3 H I P D WORK SHOULD B-P<-21 5-W-27<9 coQRDINai gD wlTH KNowN P-215-W-1604 OTHER WORK UNDER THE i".OLLOWING PED'S: 4;-DEP Nh5O~THE.15 W 2I'2 PR iua INS i aLLATIOh OF THE vo LOW!NG Pir g SCIP.": G IPSE=, E i r Qr 4/4/80 4/4/80 u~rr.

~i~i

,GENERAL D"SCRIPTION Tni'.-ED direc.'s contract 2'=to repair.ne forty (40)gaps between's.".i...s

='.".at were'.dent-.-.'.ed a.".-'ocumier-.ed dur inc thie month of Deco,.ber'."-I.'ne survey tha was perfol,.e" a-:hiat time was documen e~an"'",4i5 d"melitatloni pa" I: ">>e (oe a"se o.'"" I l')'" il be pl'ovided o vo" bv-he owner (Fre'.Weingard, Ext~287)ur."er separate cover.'.Tne s.rvey identifies each Gap nUPilelically

(-.-: 1-4G)and gives the a"im;t.'".

or thie centerline of ac",.aap and all.measured parameters of the gape Each gap shall be repaired by fill'ing wi.h an Owner approved shield.'.ng material (.o be specif-ted later in this PED).Due to he nature of-,.--=his repair, and as the result of commitments to the NRC, prototype~testing shall be implemented to develop a verified procedure for repair.The scheduling of all repairs shall be controlled by Construction Nanaoement.

This work shall be implemented after PED-215-M-2742 is imnlemented for the area of concern and before PaD-215-M-1604 is',mplemented in the area of.concern.Technical direction for this repair shall be controlled by B&R Engineerina (Fred S.Weinaard, Ext.2876).All work to be done by contract 215, as directed by this PED, shall be done to Owner approved, guality Class I, procedures and shall be implemented only wi.h a B&R Engineering represen a.ive present at all times.It should be noted that.hroughout the context of this PED, contract 215 is directed to procure the products and/or services of Brand Industrial Services, Inc.(BISCO).It is highly recommended that.contract 215 work these requests through their BISCO sub-contractor

~on site.To assist in this effort, the following contacts are pro-vided: 1.MI.Mike Marsh, BISCO site contact..2.Mr.Jim Sherwood, Director of Marketing, BISCO.3.Mr.James Anderson, Technical Support, BISCO.4.Mr.Clayton We Brown, Yice President, BISCO.DETAILED DESCRIPTION I.Material Speci ication.Contract 215 sha procure enough.shielding material to fill all the gaps in the SSW and to perform prototype testing.The total amount of shielding ma erial required is (with conservatism) approximately that amount of shielding material capable of filling 2.5 cubic feet of volume.All shielding material brought on site'shall be stored in strict accordance with ma'nufacturer

's recom-mendations.

The shielding ma erial to be'used shall be BISCO product NS-1 (high density).'O SUBSTITUTE shall be acceptable!

NS-1 (high density)is a combination of BISCO's NS-1 binder and lead filler QQC P Pd-hlA-AFI i~~-NP-~Ar~=--h,'A-'A~-V,A,-wppss NUcLKAR ppcsscT wc.e"Up+S g gg p~~=,<w:~.~wQ'aOW-L~I~i~a~~i~~4 I.uu Ie C7 (11":: by volume).A silicon based comoound may be added to the..x".e 70 ca use Gaming i~a on:rol 1 ed manner."=xpansion due:" foam.'nc may.~o-exceed 11-27 oy volume.The to-.al density of s ina i as~5 a 1~"=.""""": (a-.:er curiro an'ocr:.)rus-be greater trsan or equal-.o dna-.density of ordinary concrete whi"h is 2.<grams/cc or 1=0'ebs/fi.Certification must be oro-v'ued ha?h~'Ps installed" m xture m ts the above criteria.Density Composition

'(chemicals by~weight)~Lead fill by volume)Com osite flame spread: 1.2..3.4.p (a)ASTM E-84 b)ASTN E-3.62 c)ASTN E-119 5.Tensil e strength 6.Elongation 7.Durometer (hardness)

K Halogen content The a orementioned test reports and property data shall be trans-mitted to the Owner for approval~rior to procurement of the shielding material.The thermal stability of the"as-installed" material must also be cer.ified for the following concerns: The, radiation shielding properties o the"as-installed" material must meet or exceed the shi~lding properties of ordinary concrete.The above criteria shall be documented via experimental data or by analytical modeling and computer programming such as with tne AWLSH program or others.This docunentation shall also be trans-;-.-.=d to the Owner=or approval orior to procurarent of the matsrial.ihe"as-insta11ed" product shall be capable of wi.hs andino an integrated dose of 2.0 x 10'-0 rads over the 40 year life of the p a'nil radisation test repo ts or tne material shall be tra'ns-mitted to the Owner with a lis.of the ollowing properties pro-vided giving data before exposure and after exposure (if available):

1.Continuous ambien temperature of 270 F for 40 years and Z.Short term heat input due to welding that might bring the temperature close to 600 F.ttote that certification for concern-.1 (above)may be extrapolated from shorter term data.The construction features o this shielding material shall be such that it may be injected into a shim gap as small as 1/16 inch by 1/16 inch by 24 inches and a ter oaming and curing, fill this gap completely.

The flow characteris.ics, cohesion, adhesion, and s g-i(i g-QA-O'PPSS NUCLKkR PRCSECT HQ.2 a 8e~J I we (I I l~s'i 5.Cs

>>>><I:~I>>I W~<an amu<~<~~<>>>>>><<~>>~~y t'<enz<<>>Q~>>cn~>><<>><,~<<<<>><<~~<u~<<<>><<>>~I c<I 0 I Ic I I.IJ'c All<<sI>>llc l<<<lie a<~O e as'.ze (=/16 x 1/15 x 24)will be filled complezely a: temipera=ure o I no area zer than 100 F.Tpe expected te".>>oera-dur-n: f".i';-'I."".

or',."...e.ziion) and curing shall be bezween>>s~uŽ.i Qn=='.es anc corIcern numIoer two (2)o I the therr;~l fea:ures shall be verified during pro:o-ype:es.ing.

It is impera-.;".;-=.he sh'=-.."-..=--.=-rial be procurec and de,vered to the size as soor, as possible.I I.Pro".otvoe Testing for'.The Owner shall provide a test fixture"prototype testing of the construction features of the shielding material.This.es..ixture consis s o"wo (2)1/2" x 18" x 2'0 3/4" plates for which varying shim stock may be inser ted between the pla es to simulate gaps between shims at,.he 541'" elevation of the SS';.'.The plaz s are held tooe+her by heavy du.y"C" type clamps..The simula ed gap sizes shall vary between: 1.Height: 1/16" to 5/8" 2.Circumferential length: 1/16" to 9" 3.Radial depths shim depth on either side o'f gap shall either be 2'3/4" or 1'0".<'ote that the 2'3/4" radial depth shim prototype represents

..straight-thru gaps as depicted in the survey data.The 1'0" radial depth shim prototype r epresents gaps where the shims on either side of the gaps do not extend the full radial depth of the.SSM wall as indicated by the hooked probes during, the;;,,,'.....,.'.;;..~=:"-'him'g'ap"survey.':-':" In both-cas'es't'shall'fbe"assumed""tHRt"hthere

""""'s nq.backing for the flow of the shielding material into the gap.The backing and methodology for inserting backing:shall be determined during prototype testing.-It is recomnended that'-oil free, steel wool be used for backing the gap, however, other me.hods suggested by contract 215 or BISCO may be tried.to determine feasibility.

Any material inserted as a backing (or a.dam)for the shielding must be approved by the Owner.-.-, The.;.--,-chemical-analysis of the backing (or dam)shall be submitted to he Owner or approval.Prototype testing shall be implemented in the following stages: 1.2.Write a'prototype proc dure'elinea+ing steps and controls.The procedure should closely follow these steps: a.insert hackling b..apply (pour or pressurize or.inject)shield material-method o application shall be determined by BISCO c.let cure (and/or foam)-foam control and cure~.time established by BISCO d.-remove"C" clamps and disassemble test fixture e.observe gap for complete fill (Owner mus.be'present)

I R=I Dch PCH RFI QP WPPSS NUCLEAR PRCJ=C IIQ.2<<C<<<<<>><~-t'a--C<<.~'L\h I<aI>><<'r'G=.=.A WA->><<<<~tSI>>Q<>>I<<>><>>~>><<Jf<<<I<>><&0<~I>><<>>.1'V.~<<<"<<<<-NA-M wi~I<>D 2 t,'('dI isj/emented in a pa.".icular area 0 r;,=-.-.={Ct",'.".:".ac: 2i=snail-'clean ou-" a: gaps in the work zone spe"'fied by Ch'i.In no case shall cleaning involve blowinc air~o>>liquidj in-;o tne aap.All cleaning oI caps shall be accomplished bv vacuum technicue.

.'t is recommended

"'hat-BISCO direct.he cleaning o,-he caps so as to insure the proper cleanliness., for'the'njection o'he Bisco shield product into the gap.~As was noted previously, al,l aaps and their locations are identified in the survey docunen ation package to be pro-vided to you under separate cover.~;or the'aps (in the work zone)identi ied to be repaired, contract 215 shall post a man in he nearest SSM door opening so that he can observe with a flashlight the inner.openings of the gaps,(if they are straight thru'r"point thru').Leakage out of these inner openings during-filling shall be reported to the Owner's representative immediately.

~'.'he gaps shall'be filled with the shielding material per the approved, finalized procedure which was determined during.prototype testing.The safety precautions, as recomended'y the manufacturer, shall be strictly adhered to durin'g the mix-ing and curing process.y'-,;,"';",-.-.,D'.-:.".=;.The'.'repair..crew.;shall-.

go on'.to"a'ew work zo'hed"at'he'direc-

.=""--tion of CM and shall proceed with the repair of those gaps ,'n the work.zone.-'E.A procedure incorporating steps A through D above shall be submitted to the Owner.IV.~51 d li It is anticipated that the shield repairing of the gaps will start in early May 1980.Prototype testing,may be s iarted as soon as the shieldina ma erial arrives on site.The proto.ype testing must be completed and aooroved by Owner prior to implementina the actual repai'rs on the SSM.["=r oo" wcw RFI QA!W~s V U CLZ<a m C J~CY H O.c I k~BURRS t Nv~RG".i::.~-"~'-9l s-V-g>-'6~>>~v r~~,I C Wl x I P>>>>.

CODE.PRO>EC.c A'a%~-.~'~CTIVE BURNS AND ROE, INC.Vs'"!SS NUCLEAR PROJECT NQ.2 PROJECT E N G IN""E R IN G 0 I R ECT'IV E 2 I~a DATE I 6 17 I~I i'l3 2 0 ii 14 IS P t~I-'RIORITY I-(Rush REASON FOR P.E.0.: 1.To-expedite the initiation of prototypotesting as delineated on sheets 4 and 5 of PED-215-M-2746.

2.To.delineate a different prototype test fixtur as prescribed on sheet 4 of PED 215-M-2746.

This new fixture will.allow for several (4>gaps to be tested at one time and therefore decrease the over all prototype testing time which is'ependent on the shield material cure time (10 hrs.)INFORMATION COPIES SHEET I OF M S/U SYSTEM QUALITY CLASS roce ures ORIGINATING Yerbal with Nike Brewer on 5/2/80 REFERENCES SUBJECT SSM shim a rototv e test g LOCATION off Si te ENG.SYSTEM N DESCRIPTION OF WORK: 1.(a)Sheet 3 of 6 of PED 215-M-2746 requires (in two places)the transmittal of documentation to the owner for approval grior to procureamnt of the shielding."'aterial.'his requirement shall be implemented for the shielding material*to be installed in the SSM and does not apply to shieldirig material required on site for prototype testing.The purpose of.this PED is to clarify the...~intent of those statements so.as..to expeditethe.initiation:of; prototype testing;I 4 (b)In line with the above, Contract 215 is authorized to have the prototype testing shield material air-freighted to the site to reduce the delivery time.~r'2 (a)Revise sheet 4 of 6 of PED 215-M-2746 as per, sheet 2 of 3 of'this PED.(b).Refer to figure 1 on sheet3 of 3 of this PED.This figure delineates the test fixture required to perform prototype testing as called out in Sheet 2 of 3 of this PED.***Note that two (2)test fixtures are required by this PED.***O z I.THIS PED REVISES DIRECTION PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED BY THE FOLLOWING PEDIEI: 2.THIS PED VOIDS DIRECTION PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED BY THE FOLLOWING PEDIEI: 3.THIS PED WORK SHOULD BE cooROINATED WITH KNOWN 215-M-2746 oTHER 215 WORK UNDER THE FOLLOWING PEDY 4.THIS PEO DEPENDS ON THE'RIOR INSTALLATION OF THE FOLI.OWING PED'S'EVISE:

NONE DRAWINGS SPECIF CATION pwrn A Cl IN)ER LEA 0 GINEc R-S/U IA E I ER RFS DENT PROJECT.ENGINEcR Ed fD DATE st DATE d-<.EO DATE.Eg DATE RPV 1 RR Anal

~at a<<~ta<<a~<<t<<Coo@a.-..~n-;ar.cd cao si ('/'~x I/I6 x.4)wf11 be ffll>>asaaoo<<oa>INa ed c~<<lately a: Ti a oxaai<<tr a~tr%a~~a av~Snail Qc ac loccn~~t<<t t<<to<<a v a<<ta at tait i fatal o~o~~<<<<a Svvoo aa opvSS oaiao I<<~'o<<a aao at t<<at<<a<<)o h<<~I a~<<t t<<it<<<<~o~~a<<a<<t~<<~~~o t~~.Pratatvae Tcstino~~Zsao A.The Owns~shall provide bto identical test fixtures far pt'O protatype testfng of the construction features of the shfe dfng material.Each test.fxture shall ba capable of simulatfng four (4)oeer prescribed gaos..The test ffxture shall consist of mto (2)plates far'&fch varying shim stack may be inserted beorecn the plates to simulate gaps bcotcen the shfms at the 54'1'5 elevation of the SSM.The plates are held together by heavy duty"C" type cianas.The test fixture and all dfeansfons are delineated fn figure 1 on sheet 3 of 3 of PED 215-'ll-332O.

The gaps Pre-scribed in thfs figure arc indfcatfvc of those found per th'e survey.Each fixture (set of four gaps)shall fulfill the rcqufrcmcnt far varyfng gap sizes as called out fn step 3 on sheet 5 of 6.~o'I o I'Tn alT ascs it ihall'be,assumed that there fs nq.acksng for the of the shielding material into the gap.The backing and methodology for insertfng backing shall~~~-.--+.,~

...,,~r~~':,-.'<'.

-"":"-.be detcrmfned during,-prototype, testing.>,'.It fs, reco{nacnded thai,"'f1'free,'teel moi'e used.or backing the gap.h{ntevcr.other'ethads.suggested by contract 225 or SISCO ray be.trfed to determine feasibility.

Any material.inscr.cd as-a-backing (cr-a-.~.dam)for the shielding must be aoproved by the Seer,.The chemical analysis of the backing (ar dam)shall bh submft~to the Seer for approval.Prototype cstfng shall be implemented in the foliodng stages: I.Mrfte a'prototype procedure'elfncating steps and controls.r-" 2.The procedure shauld closely fol]m these steps: a.insert bact;fng~~b.applv (pour or pr ssurfzc or in]act)shield catcrfal-mcthad a.aoplicatian shall bc aetcrmined by BISCO , c.lct ccrc (and/or.oam)-foam control and cure time established by=.ISCO d.re<<ave"C" clamps and disassemble

.s-.fxture a.observe aap.or amplctc fill'{incr mus be pres nt)l-tt-"-w pig>>.Rtl WATS HU~<<R K'Q<<~vo'MO~ttl ttt ot~ao.~4ro.4 k.a.a.<<t~'o amor o~o 0~~~Oa a o'o i~o.~{/J<<t t u.vi)t+>!~, o Ce<<-MA-t aoo 55@5I~1 o g~Var<<ppo a REI-.OOC PCN Rf F SPEC SECTION PAGE.RFI PARA;WPPSS NUCLEAR PRbJECT NQ.2 BURNS AND ROE, 1NC.REF QWG.~SCALE.ono DAAwN QV Cat',D 8v DATQ Pr(DATc (=t'.({" OWG.ZONE DAve<<'<PEo g<p-6-33@o>>T c)<<3 TITLE: ggvhc Ss'4J S4~&~('2{p~lr (to

~~t lt$.0 I i~1'TO'L.'2'-O~io s r~J;-, rL>~&~r M uk'~,)4~V~.T$Q C.'P.hT I C tA L.t=QC-i7.'I LJ, IA I-1Cg Q'T C)I=Cg cht MAX Wl&'71.1 C.I='CqA'P')<j.

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RFI Ph Rh'PPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT HO.2 BURNS AND ROE, INC.REF OWG.SCALE.QGQ<0+*wN e~LYQ C>KO ev DWG.ZONE Q AT f/4+0 ATeSr (,P*PRO o*T 6/~6'PED g)<-[van-+~)(>

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I)YYUIF.'F C BURNS,AND ROE, INC.~VstPPED NUC'AR PROJECTi NQ.2 i PROJECT ENGINE""RING DIRECTIVE ICODEI I PRCJ" CT ENGINE" i:lS I=:"CiIVE E?i I 2I1!6 I"'i I-:.3!6 0',4 i I 6 I 6 I V 6191'::>>.::

IIatii!I6 DATE I OI 5 I2 9,.'O'RIORITY 116 17'l5 19 0 I".i!I.REASON FOR P."-.5.: , Tile mockup fix ure oer section IIB of P D-215 M-2746 is used soley for the qualification of he shield materi.al with respect to expected heat input during welding.2.The mock-up fixture willgdestructively cut for the purpose of observing shIald cross section after welding to evaluate if any detrimental affects have occurred.3.The"fill procedure" has been qualified per.section IIA of PED-215-M-2746.

INFORMATION W COPIES SHE=~: OP REF FRENCFS SUBJECT SSW Shim Gao Mock-uo Testin LOCATION Ts I Te ENG.SYSi EM S/U SYSTEM g 5 QUALITY CL'ASS ORIG lNATING NPNE DOCUMENTS DESCRIPTION OF IIvORK'er reasons 1, 2, and 3 above, it is not necessary to the fill the weld mock-up fix-ture using the finalized SSW shim gap fill procedure as originally called out in section IIB of PED-215-M-2746.

It is only required that the gap in the mock-up be completely filled with the shield material and cured before preheat and welding commerre." Note that this'direction does not constitute new work since the mock-up fixture has already been constructed by C2~1 and is approved by the owner..Replace in its entirety, section IIB on sheet 5 of 6 of PED-215-M-2746 by the follow-ing B.Contract 215 shall construct a test mock-up fixture with configuration similiar to the fixture constructed to qualify welders per PED-215-M-2749..

Construction of this mock-up shall be BIt the direction of the BLR welding engineer.This mock-up shall contain four (4)gaps.Two (2)gaps shall be 1/16 x 1/16 x depth of mock-up.The other.two (2)gaps shall be 5/8 x 2 1/2 x depth of mock-up.The depth of the mock-up shall beminimum of one (1)foot.Mock-up is subject to final approval by owner.EE All four (4)gaps shall be filled completely with the approved shield material per Section I of this PED.The shield material shall be allowed to cure.1.THIS PED REVISES DIRECTION IX'REVIOUSLY PROVIDED BY THE FOLI.OWING PEDIE): 2.THIS PED VOIDS D IR ECTION PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED BY THE FOLLOWING PEDIE): 3.THLS PED WORK SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH KNOWN OTHER WORK UNDER THE FOLLOWING PED'8: REVISE: 'NONE DRAWINGS SPECIF I TION IP N~ŽLEAD I LI ER G INEER~nZ-ESI DATE 4-PR-IP~DATi W~~4.THIS PED DEPENDS ON THE PRIOR INSiALLATION OF THE FOLLOWING PEDC'L I N ER DATE 4 sam.RESIDER i PRDJEGi ENGINE":R DATi

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VENDOR/CONTRACTOR QRANIING THANc'ItIITTAL FDHM CONTRACTOR TO COMPLETELY FILL IN AREA WITHIN HEAVY SOROER SURNS 5 ROE, IHC AIIH;hiR J.B J YEROERBER OGRESS: 185.CROSSWAYS.

PARK: ROODBURY (L.I.)HcM,YORK'1797 MPPSS NUCLEAR PRMECI HO.2 RROM..I HBH/BQECQN/GGRI

.AT%: 5~ll,lHARRIllGTON OABSO 9 0..BOX 1040 RICRLArNQ.

rlABHINGTQN 99352 aalu FCLLCWINQ PVSLICATIONSIORAWINGSrARE SUSMITTEO FOR EK'APPROVAL.

C3OISTRISUTION C3INPORMATICN Hc 4r iiirrra~or au M0,48 RrrroDvrrs~~+I SAcrr~EUEM~sY: rLf APH IHGTOtk'tTLEG GEHERAL hGAHAGER'SUBVENOOR.R~I CONTJP.O.NO..

"~I'IBGB!l;>>Q-QI Bg a]Re S hn'ttai-Orrrr i lrirB~LPR2 I Comract No.P.O.No.Worit Order No.Spec.No.Spec.Sec No.'sar R pRINT RLE NO PVSLICATION OR ORAWINQ NOr REV.NO, PVSLICATION OR ORAWINQ TITLE MANUP*~iRER ShR ACTION cut ssiacQ BURNS AND RQE, INC.-ENGINEriS AND CONSTRUCTORS One c"py of ea&ot the above tlrblnittals is returned with ac:ion as indicated above.TO SE REVIPWEO SY>>ENG.CES.I P!IIIE CATE ROUTING AECORO RECORCS CCM PV TER NG'G OESIGN PROJECT FILE IN CUT IN CUT IN CUT IN CUT IN TITI ol OATEI$4 R 4WCN I oNOI A Aoo'd tor Fsrsriarion P Rsisaaoo IOr Pr<<iln-l<<o.AN~Aoo'4 as Nosrd tor Fsoriarion N*~Nos*oorovars CISi RISUTICN%TAIL TOI Tc Igc Plea OATS I FIBNN I Ccirns I Conc@'.Cont I I I I I I raS I'Io Isle, O

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BOVEE 6 CRAlt I GERl (a joirit venture)COVER SHEET FORM NF-IOS RY I PAGE I OF I OOCUMENT NUMBER: ORIGINAL OATKD: waI C I+CI VOCE.uuwPa~cIFI~~laN wa.2@te/~TW K-vVELDINQ Pe%:EDUCE, SI GC;LFI~TION".:

.<AW~~~~W<PI D~CMWt L.RE~I%SCOPE OF REYISION-'E'4 P~CKQURB PER, Q~ULREHF-RTG eF e C Z~S-W-ISW"CHhl H S Ram&APPROVALS, OATES~SIGNATURES 8 INITIALS REV INI T.8 ATE REV IHIT.8 OAT" REV (INIT.a OATE AUTHOR a.A.MGR.EN G I HE:-'R I COAST.g~(~+D

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WSH:Boecon GERI W=I DING PROCEDURI=

SPECIFICA I IOiV MANUAL STRUCTURAL

$VELOING Np'M REV I proof g<OOI r lONAI INFORPv1A TION NOTES: 1)The General Structural Welding Standard (GWS 81)shall be used in conjunction vith this procedure.

Xt establishes the requirements

.for documentarion, joint design, base metal preparation, fit-up,',-

'reheating,.methods, worhaanship,,technique, veld appearance, and defect repairs.P.E.D;215-W-1604 shall be used in conjunction with this proceduxe.

2)Preheat and interpass temperature for velding to P.E.D.215-W-1604 shall be as shown below.MAXLlUM ZZiERPASS T~PARATURE

+o Welds to Sacxificial 200-'5 7 Sh'eld Wall and with-in 24" of the Sac-ri icial Shield Wall.I 250 3)The joint design on page 1 does not fall vithin the limits set for preoualified joint design TC-U4C so vas qualified by test per AWS D1.1 Sect'on V.4)All fillet velds and prequel<<ied joint designs in GWS 1 are approved or.use vith this procedure.

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'3 fI I I r fe s to sim/1at mqmb~~I as noted i preyious~ubNitta1 g 6 e'As indicatedj E1.541-5.'shim E)ap var;esj As di a ed E.41-51ed e I I e 2 rs 2-80-E.5 I I~in cg,, 1 5 g sat!tee~Existing lockup bar not indicated'in previou submitta1;, G02-80-95~Existing w'aids in Q2 not indiaatdd i'previous submittal, G02-00-95 0 ATTACHMENT 4 ENCLOSURE PARTIAL PENETRATION WELD STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS INTRODUCTION For the overall Sacrificial Shield Wall structure, a description of the design loads, load combinations, and methods of analysis, including assumptions and postulations, is furnished in the enclosed paper entitled: Analysis and Design of Sacrificial Shield Wall.The description of the=loads, load combinations, and analysis specifically applicable to the proposed partial penetration weld is given in calculation 6.19.37 (attached).

The following paragraphs discuss: the influence of the SSW as-built conditions on the analyses for the partial penetration weld, the contact bearing areas at the subject interface, the influence of the partial penetration weld eccentricity, and load considerations used in the evaluation of the partial penetration weld.EFFECTS OF SSW AS-BUILT CONDITIONS The effect of as-built conditions on the analysis and design of the partial penetration weld is discussed herein.The significant as-built deviations from design conditions are of two types.The first type includes deviations from the dimensioned SSW configuration due to construction out-of-roundness and non-verticality.

The second type includes defects in the welds of the SSW.The as-built deviations from the design configuration which may affect the internal force system of the SSW and the design of the partial penetration weld are discussed in Technical Memorandum No.1173, attached.Additional information on these deviations is given in pages 55-69 of the enclosed calculation.

As indicated in these documents, the deviations involve displacement of one end of a member relative to the other end in the direction perpendicular to the length and result in changes in the member shears and moments.Assuming conservative values for the displacement, it is shown in the calculations that the changes in stress in the members are minor and that the partial penetration weld has sufficient capacity to sustain the additional shear due to the deviations.

The internal force system used in the analysis of the partial penetration weld is based on the investi'gation of the SSW in its design configura-tion as described in the enclosed paper, Analysis and Design of Sacrificial Shield Mall.The member properties used in the analysis correspond to the prismatic nature of the members and do not include the effects of local deviations in cross section such as those due to reduced weld section at member ends.The internal force system of the SSW which results'from the analysis represents a set of forces which is in equilibrium with the applied external forces, which satisfies the boundary conditions, which has directions in conform-ance with the SSW configuration and which is compatible with the linear elastic stress-strain law.The local weld defects have influence on the internal force system only through the last require-ment for satisfying linear elasticity a'nd only insofar as changes in member stiffness result from the weld defect.The defects in structural members are only local compared to the overall member length so that no substantial change in member stiffness will occur.Considering all the requi rements which must be satisfied by the internal force system, it is apparent that no effective redistribution of internal forces will result due to the weld defects.ELEVATION 541'-5" CONTACT BEARING AREAS In the design of'he SSW it was postulated that all vertical stress would be transmitted across the interface via the vertical splice plates at the columns and'hat all horizontal shear would be trans-mitted across the interface via the slot welds between the channel member above and the box member below the interface.

Consequently, these splice plates, which join the flanges of the columns above to the box member below the interface, have sufficient capacity to transmit all internal vertical forces and bending moments across the interface.

Additional contact areas exist at the interface which will transmit vertical stress, but these are not included for this purpose in the analysis.In this category are the shim plates inserted at the interface to plumb the structure and the partial penetration weld to transmit horizontal shear in replacement of the slot welds.Leckenby drawing No.F124, indicating the location of the shim plates, is enclosed.The vertical splice plates at the columns are shown on Burns and Roe drawing S-835, refer to Attachment 5 to this report.PARTIAL PENETRATION WELD ECCENTRICITY The subject of the relative locations of the partial penetration weld and the original welds is considered here.As stated in Technical Memorandum No.1173, the partial penetration weld with fillet weld reinforcement is installed along the exterior circumference between the channel ring above and the box ring below the interface.

It is proposed as a substitute for the original requirement for slot welds symnetrically located with respect to the wall centerline.

The analysis and design for the partial penetration weld have taken due account of the location of forces, welds, and members in the transmission of shear across the interface.

As shown in the attached calculation, the eccentricity of the shear load with respect to the partial penetration weld has been accounted for in the design of the weld and in the investigation of the stresses in the adjoining channel member.It is shown in the calculations that under design load conditions, the maximum stress in the weld due to the loads is less than half the permissible stress and that the resultant stresses in the member are small.It is also pertinent to note that, although the design margins afforded by the partial penetra-tion weld and the slot weld are about equal, the shear area of the partial penetration weld is 2.8 times as large as the slot weld area to account for the eccentricity associated with the partial penetration weld.ELEVATION 541'-5" INTERFACE DESIGN In the SSW interface design, the vertical splice plates which join the flanges of the columns above the interface to the box ring beam below, have sufficient capaci:ty to transmit'cross the interface all vertical forces and bending moments causing vertical str esses.Thus, sufficient capacity to transmit all required vertical forces and moments (causing tension or compression) is available without any requirement for participation by the partial penetration weld in transmission of vertical stress.It is also noted that'under controlling design conditions for trans-mission of vertical stress, the portion of the total transmitted vertical stress applied by the column above is eighty-four percent of the total, and applied by the skin plates above is sixteen percent of the total.Analysis shows the partial penetration.

weld to have adequate capacity to carry both the, design horizontal shear and the preceding vertical stresses.If the tension from the skin plate above the weld is carried together with the design shear, the design margin decreases from 2.39 to 2.27.If the total vertical tension on the weld side of the SSW is taken by the partial penetration weld together with the design shear, the design margin decreases to 1.78..LOAD DEFINITIONS USED FOR THE PARTIAL PENETRATION WELD Technical Memorandum No.1173 describes the generic load types which are significant with respect to the partial penetration weld design.Two of the principal loads are feedwater pipe break loads and seismic loads.The feedwater pipe break loads used in the partial penetration weld design are the original loads used in the design of the SSW as described in the design report WPPSS-74-2-R2-B.

With current definition of the feedwater pipe break loads in Technical Memorandum No.1185, (refer to Appendix B to this report), the annulus pressures and the pipe break reactions are substantially reduced so'hat increase in the design margin above the value of 2.39 would result from design based on the current definition.

However, the seismic loads used in the partial penetration weld design are based on the current definition of seismic'oads, Technical Memorandum No.1188 (refer to Appendix B), and not on the original seismic loads used in the SS>l design.Calculations have been made to determine the effect of using the original seismic load definition together with current NRC criteria as to combination of the effects of three ortho-'onal seismic events by the square root of the sum of the squares method.The calculations show that, as a result, the design margin decreases from 2.39 to R.07;also the controlling.

load combination is SRP combination 6 instead of combination

5.

R.:-.Sna'th F'R.O~M.N.Fialkow nasa 3/19/80 COPlKB a O: JJVerderbe" w/1 CJSati" w/'Cvgel>~.

w/DCBake" w./1 JO'Dorm 11 w/1 MFialkow w/'Ferrari w/'SURQECT

-FEREN&S: W.O.2808 EJWagner w/1 Washinc on Publi'c Powe Supply System.GHarpe w/1 WPPSS Nuclear Project No.2 HTuthill w/1 Sacri'cial Shield Wall-Assessment Prog am SF 2 w/2 Connection of Upper and Lowe Wall Segments pf w/1 T-CERLCAL;~IOBANDUN NO.1173 db w/0-.TM File w/1 1.NRC Letter=om R.'.Engelken to N.O.Strand dated 2/8/80,

Subject:

Washington Nuclear Project No.2, Pipe Whip Restraints and Sacrificial Shield Wall.2.HPPSS Lette" WPBR-80-96 from R.M.Fo'ey to J.J.Verderber,.

dated 3/6/80,

Subject:

WPPSS Nuclear Project No.2, Sac ificial Shield Wall (SSW)Assessment Program.3.Calculation No.6.19.,37, Book No.SV 489 Pages 45-61 Title: WPPSS-Hanford No.2>>Reactor Bldg.-Sacrificial Shield Wall,

Subject:

Correction Measures at Interface El.541'-5".4.Washington Publ'c Power Supply System Nuclear Project No.2 Report No.WPPSS-74-2-R2-B,"Sac ificial Shield Hall Design Supplemental Information".

5.ASCE Manual No.41,"Plas ic Design in Steel" r.'2nd Edition, 1971, Chapter 10: Multistory Frames, pp.246-247: P h.Ef ec ts.INTRODUCTION:

It has been determined that the horizontal rings in the Sacri icial Shield Nail (SSW), located above and below the inte face at Elevation 541'-5.", a e not welded together as shown on the contract d awings.Correction measu es to transmit the design horizontal shear between the chanel r'ng above the'nter ace and the box ring below the inter-"ace are recui".ed.

he con"=a" rec.ires that upper channel" ng co..neet ng t-a=t'l penet=a"'.-.

groove we d 0 between-he two r~..cs.at each o 24 locations aro"." be p ovided in-'he web o;e o the lowe box ring.In lieu's proposed to'nstall a alongŽhe exterior.ci"curn erence S"=uct'-al ana'sis in justi icat'on o=the p oposed cor=ec"ion

?'s been accomplished (ReŽezence 3).Th's memorandum furnishes per"'ent in ormat'on re3.at've to this analysis in compliance wi lette s rom USNRC and WPPSS (Refe ences 1, 2).The following is included: V~>a.Description o co=ection weld b.Design cons'derations c, Analysis based on the design SSW configuration d.Analysis oz as-built SSW dimensions.

DESCRIPTION OF CORP~CTION WELD The correction weld's a partial penet"a"ion groove weld with f'let weld rein orcement to be installed along the exterio circum e ence between the ings above aid below the interface at~Elevation 541'-5".The location and ex"ent of the weld are shorn in Figure 1;weld details a=e shown in Figure 2.As shown in the figures, the correction weld is to be installed each of the 24 panels around the SSW for the width available between the column splice plates.Preparation for the groove weld eauires removal of mate ial from the channel ring.The specific configu ation of the weld in each panel,,including the groove depth and the size of the fillet weld reinforcement, depends on the width of ledge at the interface.

From the design viewpoint, a minimum overall weld depth of 2 inches, corresponding to an effec ive weld throat of 1 7/8 inches, is maintained in all configu ations.D"SIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR CORP"CTION WELD 1.Basic Data The analys'is and design of the proposed correction weld u ilizes the values of the sŽess esultants in the members and ski..plates obtaine'd'n"he analysis of the'verall sacrificial shie'd wall.A desc iption of the analysis and design of the SSW including loads, load combinations, and acceptance criteria was submitted to NRC by Repor No.WPPSS-74-2-R2-B (Reference 4)and approved by NRC'by lette dated October 15, 3.975.

The analysis and design o the co=rection weld's'.".con-c~anŽe wi"~NRC Standa=d Rev"e~Plan (SRP)3.8.3.~Zn~ar"='".a=, rec"rements re a='ve to'oads, 3.oad combinations, and acce==a."." c=i"e=ia a=e ccmpl-'ed w'th.The bas'o design is the e'st'working stress me=hod, Pa-t 1 of the 1969 ZZSC design spec='ca"'cn.2~S icn f icant Loads The o3.low'ng sign'cant loads, considered in the analysis a..c design of the sac=i icial shield wall, a e applicable to the co=rection measures:.

P Dead and live loads Se'smic 3.oads: OBE and SSE Pressu=ization of the annulus be"ween RPV-"and SSW Reactions due to pipe break'nnulus pressurizations

'nclude-those due to postulated pipe b eaks in the ol owing lines: Recirculation outlet 3.ines Recirculation inlet lines Feedwater lines RHR/LPCZ lines'ipe break reactions include those due to the, preceding breaks and due to other severe postulated b eaks occurring in the drywell p=oper.Ten controlling b eaks in the drywe3.1 are included..3.Controll~~

Loadin and Load Combination The significant loads are considered in he load combinations of SRP 3.8.3 with egarc to hor'zontal loads at the interface.

The controlling loading with associated acceptance.criteria wiA regard to horizontal loading pe panel is noted below: SRP Combination 5: 1.6S~D+L+Pa+Yr+E D, L: dead, live load Pa: annulus pressure due to break in feedwater line at a imuth 90o..Y: pipe reaction due to the feedwater line break E: combined ef ect (by SRSS)due to OBE seism'c events.in the easterly, northerly, any vertical directions.

ANZ~~YSTS BAS=D ON D-S:GN SSW CO¹ZGURATIOH Desicn Conce~".The co"'ection weld carries the ho izon al shea loa"s which a e-transmitted between the ring channel above'n er ace and the ring box member below the interface.

The hor'ontal loads rom the channel are due to ho'ontal eactions rom the skin plates-and, columns which connec to the, channel rom above.Reactions om the analysis o the SSW in its design configuration ar'e used.The shear loads om the skin plates are tangential (circumfe ential)'n direction..

Shear loads rom the columns have tangen"ial and radial components.

The connection design is based on the largest combined shea load in any one'anel due to the associated skin plates and columns.The same co ect'on is applied-to all panels.2.Desi'oads The largest comb'na ion of shear loads per panel in the controlling load combination 5'has magnitudes as listed below: Skin plates: Tangen"ial shear~318.1 kips Column: Tangential shear=8.9 kips Radial shear~27.4 kips The total panel tangential shear, 327.0 kips, is taken to act with half applied along each flange of the ring channel.The total panel radial shear, 27.4 kips, is taken to act along the line of the column web.3~Weld Desi Criteria Welding procedures will be qualified in accordance with the requirements of the Structural Welding Code AWSDl.l.Weld design is based on allowable st esses associated with partial penetration groove welds.Correction Weld Stress Anal sis The panel design loads esulg in tangential and radial shear resisting orces in, the panel correction weld.The total panel tangential load causes a uniform tangential force in the'weld of 9.9 kips per inch..A radial weld force which varies linearly between extreme values at the ends.o the weld esists the moment on the weld due

'""('d,hJ.Cisi K':OPZ.NDUM FO.3.173 to the eccentricity o'the applied tangential load along the'nte io" ace;the maximum value o this radial=o ce's 21.6 kips per inch.An'addi ional=adial weld orce with constant magnitude equal to 2.7 kips pe'nch acts over a limi ed portion o the weld near i" s end to resist the appl'ed adial load along"he column web'line.The maximum value'f the resultan weld force occurs at-the end of the weld and is ecual to 26.3'kips per inch.5.Controllinc Desi Marcrin The design margin, which is ne ratio of the permissible stress to the ac ual stress, equals 2.3 for the above zraximum value of the weld for'ce.ANALYSIS POR AS-BUILT SSW DIMENSIONS 1.Conceat or Anal sis As-built deviations of the SSW which af ect the proposed'o ection weld at interface Elevation 541'-5" are illustrated in Figure 3.As shown in the figure, the deviations rom verticality of the columns above the interface and the deviations from the design circulari y of the ring channel members.above the interface are involved.The lateral displacement of one end of a membe relative to the other end in conjunction with the prima~axial load in the member, P, results in additional (secon-dary)shears and moments in the member (reference 5).This Pb, effect with the associated end bending moments and shears is shown below:)P~Q=rom eauil'brium conside ations",'t is determined that: P4 Q++2M~

Conservatively, a""itic.".al enc snea-Q'non-ex'ten"..-..s the addi'onal end moment KL~and the a"e ea"h evaluated as-hough the c"her is done'n the o'owing ecuations.

.5 pa 2.Design Loads The controll'ng axial loads in the columns and r'nc channels a e cue to the same applied loads taken in SRP Com-b'natio..5 which control fo" the transmission o shea across~e inte-face.

The axial fo ce'the ring channel is'taken equal to the design panel tangential shear o 327.0 kips.The axial orce in the column is taken as the total panel vertical load due to both column and skin plate reactions.

~Conservatively, the maximum vertical loads in the column and skin plates are used even though these a e not located in the same panel as the panel which controls fo shear.The design ver ical axial load is 316.5 kips.3.Ef ect on Annulus P essu ization on With respect to the effect of as-built SSW dimensions annulus pressurization calculations, the following is noted:/a.The measurements of concern apply to the annulus space be ween the sacrificial shield wa.ll'and the reflective insulation.

These measurements are very diffi;cult to obtain and are not available.

However,.it is noted that the insulation suppor" system is mounted on the SSW so that the dimension between insulation and wall would tend to be unaffected by the as-built deviations.

b.For the design of the wall, NRC required that calcula'ted annulus pressurization loads be increased by 40 percent.One of the reasons for this requirement was to account for as-bu'lt conditions being dif erent from the conditions assumed in the analysis.4.Haani ude of As-Built Deviations The as-bu'lt deviations used'n the analysis are based on'he most conservative

'n erpretatioq of the revised erec'n tolerances which were adopted for the erection of the SSW togethe with a supplementary field check o the deviations.

I LVlll'a J'4C W L"'VAa ALJUI 1 LVV~I e)"-z'o=to e ect'on of the wall, the cont=actor ecues"e" and was granted zelaxa"'on of the original con""act recuizo~e~"s cn e=ect'o.".-

olezances.

-he maximum permissible deviation="c-..;'c cula'as cha ced"o-.'0.90'nches in lieu of the original 0.125 inches.The maximum horizontal devia"ion-at the top o=he wall"om the vertical line th ouch the co~responding point'n the base o the wall was rev'sed to~0.90 inches i..1'eu o" m'e or'ginal+0.25 inches.The most conservative interpretation of the adopted tolerances results in the deviation values noted'below.

These va'ues aze used'n the analysis.Circula ity-The maximum tolerance is taken to occu=at one column relative to the adjacent colums on e'ither side.Refer ing to Figure 3, C~G'C'C (Qt (0'I f'80>hC~CS b.Verticality

-The maximum to'le ance is taken to occur at a column between Elevation 541'-5" and Elevation 549'-5>".Using the terminology oz Figure 3,, E~=O.go-(0 gn)=l.Sn inches.I Zi-.r'>P>>-'-ra+.'*~~~'8 w~~-'f>1i~e'Fij~;-(~, i'~.,pg'a',p

~i'~,<<'g~g,*~Pield measurements pertinent to the vertical and circular deviations have recently been made.The magnitudes of 6+.as defined in Figure 3 were determined around the shield wall.Hawever, precise determination of the circular deviation is not practical due=to"interference of existing construction.

As a measure of the'circular deviation, the radial deviation between the ring box member below the interface and the ring ch'annel above the interface is used.I Comparison o the devia ions f om field measu=ements with those based on the tole ances makes apparent the conservative basis of the analysis.'Thus the analysis uses 4>=1.8 inches compa=ed..to a maximum measured value of 0.625 inches'.Also, the analysis uses hg,.-hRs<=1.8 inches compared to a corzesponding value of 0.875 inches based on field data.-

Ccrrec"ion beld St=ess Analysis ,As nc-'e"'.."'".e Concept o Analys's, the des'g..ax a'oads acti'n" wi"".".e=a o="ed des'n deviat'ons.

result in a"d'"'"nal e..d momen s anc shea=s in"ae colu~s and r'ng channels loca e above the'n"er=ace.

The add'tional end moments in the'olumn and rinc~channel are 285.0 inch kips and 294.3 inch kips respectivelv..he associated inc eases in flexu=al st ess in the membe s'are less 2:an 0.7 k'ps pe square inch.This increase'i.n st ess's ela"'vely small and is w thin the capacity, o the wall members.The adcitional column radial shear i;s 5.9 kips.,'he~,addi ional radial shear in each of the two ring members at the column's 13.4 kips.Thus, a total of 32.7 kips of additional adial shear esulis due to the design deviations.

Conservativelv, this addi"ional radial shea.is taken to occur in the.controlling panel used for the design of the correction weld.The total panel radial shea=is increased to 60.1 kips and the resulting local~radial weld fo ce increases to 6.0 kips per inch from the previous'alue of 2.7 kips'per inch in the Analysis Based on Design SSN Conf iguration.'..

~"ith the ab'ove increase in panel radia,l'hear, the design margin is 2.1 as compared to the previous value of 2.3.~'*a'*E CONCLUSXON

'Based on the preceeding analysis, the proposed correction weld at interface Elevation 541'-5".has sufficient capacity to, sustain the required loads.The correction provides a design margin in excess of 2.1.Prepared by: M.N.~a xa row n A~aroved by: '.O'Donnell 4~,~,

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OUsag<c'>Q RQEs INCs~ii~y f/g~)(0~ass-s pSTE CAI.C.0 BY~CHECK,c~~~i 2I~OQ ZQ2 a 0/ASHIING7QN PI.IBLlC PI""'R SUPPLY SYS.WPPSS t'OUI LKAH PROJECT NO.2 w.0.2908 S U it N S A N D R 0 6, l IN C.ORAQELI.N J:Hci"WTEAQ~.Y. <OS ANGELES, CAIREiiIViA'CD AS CHECXEQ BELQ<<g AkW>L'D FOR FASRICltlOH ~~~~~s~a Q+NOT APPROVED~s~~s~~~HA A>PRtIVCD>5 HOND FOR FASRICAflOti s s s s s AH Q FOR itifORMAVIOH OH'~~~s~~I SUKECT TO ALL CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS THI5 RKVIKW OOKS Hhf iMPLY iCCEPIAHCK Of AHY MALARIAL OR EOIIIP+f let NOl FLILFILLINO ALL Sl KClfICATIOH REOVIRfMRHT5. 'sa i-Q-PROCES ED BY DATE VPPSS'L'0 L.C"3 PHQi-7 Ha.2'QVPK~CHILL CQ;-:~~iR"L.IJQR CQ.ABC Q-N 3~'-'0-WGY i~-"SQ JQCH, I 4C.4 AlNT'I:.'3i J~.CQh.asaACi"Q.ZSQQ-2'9QcBR-~ts-~pg Q WitSLVi't i[~I,.C.APPRC".3 Q.A..Qt: P J~DATE 7/ Page 19 af 21 IV PAINTPifG IV-A SHOP PAQfTING (~fat R quf.ed)IV-8 FIELD PAIÃTZfG BURNS ANO BCE, 1NC.w.o.~>.~-~~Dme>Itive>CALC.¹I~~'~SHEET¹I BY The following orocedur shall be used for the surfac preparation and coating'f the-steel far the Sac~cial Shi ld Vfail..Surfaces of the SPY ta be painted are: l.All outboard and lrwaard sur ces, including s!c~n ol t s and exposed sur ces of beams and columns 2.All exposed sur aces of shieldwall ooenings 3.The too surface of the S&V at elevation 567'4-1/2" 4.The subilizer~ss'and miscellaneous brac!cats at the top of the SSVf 5.All s~ices of the shieldwall opening doors and their-" components '4 Paint is not required, in the are s of the S&V which are filled with concrete.Cleaning: Prior to painQng a11 surfaces ta be blast cl aned per Spec.SS?C-S?-lO. Painting: All s~ces after blast cleanirg to receive one prime cc t of" No.6548 epoxy white primer manufactured by Keeler&Lang, Inc.Dry film Quickness to be nat less than 2.5 mil.Repair: Any repair to be dane must folLow above orocedure of cleaning and painting.See Attachment VI-C,"Painting and Cleaning Procedure". CHECKED BY B 8 C/G.E.R.l. JOB 5215 Rev.3,.lp 4 76 0~1+CKCCKHOC'~I'>'age 2g OC Zl BUANS A40 RCE, liNC.IV 0~i'a-aW OATH>II TA HOOKIIHvTHT MOH 4+CAic.I SHEET 8 l o BY V.SPECIFICATIONS &TOL"BAY)CZS Leckenby Company takes ezc ation.tc the tol rances specified in the cont ct drawings and speci'c Cans fcr fabric ticn and rection af th SSAV.As provided for in Burns&Roe speciPc 8'an Section 15A, Attachment 3, Pamgmph 2.2,.ve are presenting along with our cans~~'cd.on procedure, the necessary talerances for the fabrication and erection oi the SSVf reZuired to achieve the intent of th design dra;vings. Our proposal is based upon the tolerance changes as ncted fn.the following it ms 1, 2, 3 and 4.See AtMchm nt VK-A,"Toleranc Con~i in Fabrication oi SSWV".1.SpeciQcadan Section 1,5A, A~chm nt 3, peg 15A-133, para.4, sta.es,,"The ma%mum toLerance fram circu~~rity fs established as 1/8 inch." However, an Page 15-131, pamgmph 2.2, it was reccgn~~ed that the tolerances set forth in parag.oh 4.0 were tight and the general cont ctar'had the right tc s~<'"nit alter ate procedures, including~pprapr'at tolerances, ta insure fabrication and erection af the walL in accardance vrith the intent of.Section 1.5A.Leckenby Company oroposes the waLL to be built wi~h the ol~owing talerances. Qe d"terence betveen m<mum and minimum diameter s to be: 311.5 inch+50 1.80 inches 200 which means the t the I.D.of the waLL'vould fall inside two circLes 1.8" apart.By tMs interpretation ma&mT~tolerance Qom circularLty will'ae.SO", in lieu oi 1/8" as defined in speciQcatians. It is recognized that these tolerances might have an impact on other parts of the overall containment assemblies,. and Leckenby Company proposes to submit to the Owner all"as-built" dimensions for his approval.Any dimensions not ccr.forming with the foregoing proaosal, that do not meet with the O~vner's approval, shall be changed in accordance with the Contract Change Order Procedure. However, if the above toLer nces do not permit the wall to be installed in the manner stipulated, that is to permit the upper SSW to be instaLLed pre-fabricated, Nese changes will be to the Gener 1 Contractor's account.2.Note 5 on Crawing 5-782, Rev.10, states,"The erection of structural 'teel shalL be canside.ed plumb and acceptable if the tolerance does not Q c 9k-4(5-13 M CHECKED BY 8 8.C/a, F: n i CURNG Fife'D l~vP~!,"!".'I'l.o.~>~ ~QAiV, GOOICIIS~V +I pAC~CA!.C.4 s'REcr!!SY/I/go OF CHECNEOQ Page 21 af 21 exceed+1/4" at elevat!on 567'4-l/2" (tap of wall)." Leckenby Company pro pases the following: "The erection of structtxal steel.sh Q be considered plumb'and acc ptab1.e if the tolera'nce coes not evce d+.90" at elevation 567'-7-l/4".3.Note 5 also st tes, Tolerance of vertical el vat!on of the sac~cia1.shield elevation ai the sacdiicia3. shield ring bemn at elevation 567'-4-1/2", reference st~be-'.1/S".Leckenby Company proposes the following: "Tolerance of vertic 1 elevation of the sacrificial shield ring beam at elevation 567'4-1/2", reference shall be+1/4" in lieu of specified~~1/Q I~4.Tolerance in serg the base bearing plate: 0*~wing S-836, Rev.A, Note 3.3, states that Qxs tap suriac of the bearing be level within 1/32".Leckenby Company proposes the following: "'Qxe tap s~~ce of the bearing plat shall.be level wit"M 1/4 inch."'c 8<->is-v374 CHECKED BY B 6 C/G.=.Fi,t, JOS N215 OATE l Q/29/76 TRANSMITTAL 0 4370 CONTRACTOR 215 TITLE LFEP-I.REYIBIED BY: MJ GiSOSin jYP DISPOS IT?ON DATE DUE COMNENTS: GUANs Atso Roe, It'C.N.O.~>>~'~OKEE SOCKS~iv e5 FACE CANC.lt~'9'41 ,SHEETS~~+OF EY S CHECKEO~~This transmittal 4370 is AN with following ccments: "Final approval pending submittal of complete information on oil and effect of radiation on oil." t~~~0 ~f~~~ I 1)4 I I I I I g I l I I~I III I: s I IL P I C I F I S a P NALYSIS At(0 OESIGN OF SACRIFICIAL SHIELO MALL This paper discusses certain s-ructural aspects of the Sacrificial Shield Mall as originally designed.It does not address itself specifically to any of the concerns which are taken up elsewhere but furnishes pertinent background information relhtive to these concerns.In connection with the analysis and design of the shield wall, it is first noted that the principal methods used are described in Report No.MPPSS-74-2-RZ-B. which was approved by the Commission by letter dated October 15, 1975.The methods used are in conformance with Standard Review Plan 3.8.3.In particular, this conformance holds for the types wf loads considered and for the load combin-.ation and-acceptance criteria which were used.The Sacrificial Shield Mall is analyzed as a steel framework made up of horizontal circumferential members (ring beams)and vertical columns asseabled in cylindrical form.The skin plates which cover the inner and outer surfaces of the wall are included in the analysis as joined to the framework m mbers.The wall extends vertically from its base support on the concrete pedestal to its top where it is supported horzontally by the stabilizer. truss spanning between the SSM and the primary containment. The structural model used in the analysis is shown in Figure 1.The model consists of 378 members, 136 plate elements and 229 joints.Continuity of the beams and columns at the.joints is assumed corresponding to full strength welded connections. The inner and outer plates are treated as one plate of thickness equal to the combined thickness of, both plates;the equiva-lent plate is joined to the framework on all sides with displacement compati-bility at the joints.In the framework action, the beams and columns carry three components each of force and moment and the plates sustain in-plane normal and shear (membrane) stresses.The analysis is a linear elastic analysis and makes use of the commercial computer program, STRUOL.Oeaign is based on the elastic working stress method of Part 1, AISC, 1969.The structure is analyzed for the required, loads and their combinations in accordance with the standards of the NRC as noted previously. The significant loads applicable to the shield wall design and considered in the load combinations include the following: a.Oead (D)and live loads'L).b.Operating basis earthquake (E).'c.Safe shutdown earthquake (E').d.Pressurization of the annulus between the reactor pressure vessel and the shield wall (PA).e.'eactions due to pipe break (YR). The above, loads are applied to the structural mode1 as concentrated or distrtbut d loads and at locations corresponding to their occurrence. Seismic forces are dis ributed throughou. the s ructure in accordance with.he compon nt tttasses and accelerations. Annulus pr ssuri ations are included due o pos"ulated breaks in the various recirculation inlet and outlet lines, the fe dwater lines and the LPCI lines.Pipe br ak reactions due to the prec ding breaks and due to numerous other postulated breaks occurring in the drywell proper are applied to the framework members.which support the pipe restraints. The magnitudes of the'ignificant loads are.such tha only the load combin-ations under factored load conditions ne d be considered and these load caabina-tions are listed below together with the associated permissible stress.1.6S~0+4~To+Ro+E'.6S>>0<L+Ta+Ra-+Pa 1.6S>0aL+Ta+Ra +Pa~Yj+Yr+Ym~E 1.7S>0+t.+Ta+Ra+ Pa+Yj+Yr+Ym+E'6)In most cases.either combination 6 or combination 6 coni.oiled.It is noted that Nese combinations include all the significant loads previously list d.Other load terms in the above combinations are not significant. The boundary conditions adopted for the analysis are in.conformance wi h he ac5sal conditions. Rt each of the 8 joints representing the junc!ons of he stabilizer truss and the Bio-shield wall, the only reartion$s in the tangential direction.-At each of the 24 Boundary nodes along.the top of the pedestal with one node located Below each of the columns, the re~aints.are as follows: a.Vertical deflection is zero.b, No restraint on radial movement.c.Horizontal reason is circumferential. d.Ho moment reaction occurs at the joint.Some of the key points'n the design of the shield wall are now noted.As prevtously s.ated, the design uses the elastic working stress method, Part 1 of the 1969 ABC design speci ication.All plates and maabers in the wall are A36 steel except for the top ring which$a high strength MBS steel.Meld metal is E70 series or equivalent,. The design of the ring Beams and columns starts with the compu er output which furnishes 3 components each of force and moment at the.ends of all members.Intermediate values of menoers are obtained as required.Each member type is designed using the controlling stress resultants for hat type of member.Full streng h welded connections are used at the ends, The skin pla e s.ruc ural.design is based on the computer output which gives the membrane stresses, i.e.the nornal and she r stresses.The plate.hickness and attachment welds are determined rom the con rolling s-resses in typical areas of the wall. I~~5 I 0 1 I'1 I h~I fs I 0 I~'I I.I I!I W~~~~I~~~~o~~~~r~I rr 4 0 I r rr 4 4 0 0 0 ,SkL EY NACCJII JL~I i i raa rrc 2 ra r t~Tp rg r k~Jre ttJ Z l lT2 Z t g 2'PA'/~r'GNIS I I)I 1 e c.'t4+TP I Vttct'IIaaa $2CIICTT g.s+c'l Led ccl sclaLL'Ct Warlt'Tttlcac.Steclolc rr JS lrc~Jctaat cttJ QacltlttJ IC a aarr IttlatlttS cc4IJ~Il<'a cl+tlgltat l 1 ar l o I22u2+I art l74la aa Jrarrt Cla ltd q Ctt Jt I I I~r Z~a~c 3 T rr TJ 1/I Zty-I+WI26~r I~acw+'lpgI7IV laraaF&'I Pjgt~',~jl5a06 l676~I~.lrrccarttcr ar tt.tt.cia 2Stl JCC'AJ tlatla ClaW c~aS.tlat 4a.trrr AK.~atrr.I aA J rrr4 4 I i, lII A,cra.ISTal J 4rra 4, O'A,t Iraaa~I~t, w av Lnt sac a.Srrc'S 1!CN-?I5 5t55 LEC'AE.DV C.":.:.".: I, Lawrt I" va a'1 I-r\S rr r.r.l ATTACHMENT 5 This attachment includes the general SSW erection plan drawing by Leckenby and the Burns and Roe SSW structural design drawings.Attached are: F-136 S-782 S-783 S-784 S-785 S-786 S-787 S-788 S-835 S-836 S-837 S-838 S-865 S-866 /lI l (L>resl,'0 0 EL.SG1'~t L~Sca l4ova QS~0 0 5544>NTS 130 151htl52AS>att>o FT>>IT>NR fatLD Aoac>aoLT Sla Nova (2i o o o 0 0 0 0 o O o 0 IO o 0 a Sa0>>caau 4~Sac~3 2A IO 5>>aotao caa Fa>RT>aaa FTILD Asw>aoav abaci Stout>>TD ot Rwr, Aa~auao 4>S OC0>AL Caot Aaoa>SDLRD a>ITD coa>FLL'Ta aouo Astt>>OLTTS ttaoa To c~waan~Cowes.Sac saaw Q4%.L54>a Sia v 0 4>~~.>h>aar>S.e>K>>ar art CN>at">aa NS CT Orat ea~r>4 aeh.l T~<<<<<<<<0~i sees 4 NOTCQ4 0 4 (I*>0'ousTRI>cTION a(DT~CHANNCL sLoT cLDSI>Rts w>VN luutR coLI>MN SFLlct SNOT>>N au FLACt soR CLARITT Ot COMPLRTRO STRI>CTDRt. 7>httt TV%MS ARc ausTALl cD AC'TRR RPV is o 5TALLRD.SK>u PLATts AND aPF r>OLT Sa>OW>>iu PLACC FOR CIARITT Or COTSPLLTEO sTRDCTI>at TNtst Inca>as AR\auSTALLRD APTCR gaaa RPY ls INSTALLED. QS L>awtR oa>Too ARD PLA f c'5 oM ITT%D i>a 5>>OP Fht>tac>(I IOII OF RW4 SCGMRNVS TD ALLOW ACCt55 FOR'fatLD Wtlol CLOSVRC SK>N PLATCS FIELD IN5TALLED ACTCR V>RLDI>>4 OT COLT>ah>>5 POID PR>OR TO ITILLING SRG>atlIT5 WIT>>CON CRRT t.Q45'KiN'FLATt Palo OT>>aR Masc\LLAutCATS CRAMWG OMTTTsD AT stANT.>>T SFLICts-INSTALLED PT FINAL ASSRNS.Y OC RSIG Asst>>ISLTts QSWoRK Tails DRAWIND Willa Tait FOLLOW>NO Racaat>>ct Dt514N DRAW>AS S78Z>Rtaaq. S785>Rtv.Cr S784>12tv.4'785/Rcv.SP S78ro Rtv.'5 S587>%tv.8/SSSSIRcv.4>> 5%85%tv.5;58SG>%tv 2;5t351>Rtv.S; '5858 Rtv.l>S8(5, Rtv.11%$GG>Rcv.o'58tDZ,Rtv. 81 S142,Rcv.8.- QGFOrl FASRICATlo>a /ND RRFOTioN T>COCRDDRts PP>>>TINT A>>o%4'LLRAucsasl sat LtcKCNST COMOANY 5 ADRIcA'I'lou Auo f Rtcsao>I I>aa>acaooat roa Talc SACR>faclAL SaaatLDW>aL'TPhLLwo>LK ONRaaas DRAw No is QoALIVT CL>>ss 1.TO>!STAaaaltca T11054 cate'TaD AF5til coutctT>o>> or SSW.Sca>Co~Qa~>2A o o 54>acura Cp CthtCSA 5>or>co~<<a Fa>RTNTR Faaco Asaco>SLv 4 I Sca Nora Qi Fa D Aces>ao v 00 vrttR R>RT>o PRIOR To HOISTING a>CNT VCSSRL Saa D045 FCI>SC2>rr>5,F37 Fiol faot ClO3 f 144>catt>f Iso>f 13(>c lCtpf a+c154rtl45 5 NOTRE I 4 Sat 3IoTRQ2 Uttaa PORT>ON Stoaaa>>TS Uh DS~C FNLO Ascc>>octo lu 8 co>>Flora Saa>>CNTS. 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t)0.7 Laac cava'covtvact T si~Ie"sts Iaokt ocoaaf)a>lat rr vvILC'vaLL>¹t>RU ees~t~otova>I'KILLa laceaa>4>31488>>arrl>swc 0 Pealc,rrenro aa rct rcr CSV>IS ai If a~>b)itratoa er o area Ceil CS If.ta LV 0>2M ra VW'.(~p P4 2 I 7 15--=.'l4-.13 12 ll.10 9->~,, 8 1=7 I~<<6 eee V 3~2 is..,1"5 p Ls)3rarkf'~~fir~>a~~Je)-r>>2" I Ia~1 II (I'h('~~I, k}('I lkk (4 (i 7" li h I I'(~~I h I~((I "I I I fI'll f II I I~II"J f"J If, I I I I~g/I)H.~.~(l~~t~)I p1 J 0 I II L"n, l J h k I I~~~C>c..~'w<'U~0 I 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 NOTES: OVTOOAAO FACA tact pt on Col 420 51NM Aoout T44'02)ct%CN 4 I sv-)SLC O<<4$1%1 ttl~aaMS Ttortotttaq 2 l Foll'HOTS%SL%owa$1~'I 2 all woa<<Ovtvss owa svaaa sf ol CO<<JLAACT TIS Vttf<<ca FRLVC l'4 i 4'4 TO SC 24VT 0 L4<<tc w Tv os%usa oe ACLJT~Lv la 420AM%0 LT Tvs Ju<<CT'OH Ot 1<<%4/Y5204 re<<Mt 4 22,4 I J s Iut-/-:1577 Lrce oaeo LocATHF4$SCL awo\Till'2'TLCL C Col.ja FLANOL tv got'9I 4'4 fewt 4 1 Kt li R$%!0C~to'8 i'4$%L I llucll%ILNl IL F'T FRANC t.ANOIC 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lv01tstCL W:TV COVCRCTL ANO TlatwCL Flu av wITN SOTT FRAJUC 4%llttCAC LRLCTFC'ORRCSRONDaKI FRAML'O'4 SCL C 1578 ML~lllev 4~)L SLJ V da ta OFNTI svv As+~CT I FOLJRHOLCS ~4 TCF'taT.PLAT Cs$4NR.SECTION 1579-)'79 Ngg}<Roue~IN vvt Rl 4 T4 ONL.V FJJL LNFORLJ4L cttt Nat T.LOTS Ca$2/LISL vlvjaawo taulll wheat HLASLART I579 Ita svtt R(cl CA Fact atve ME~SEC., ION ISeLO.ISSO SECTION 2023.2023 7-17=L EVATION//<i 2 f Rata auteaARD).Of/sltt 2 taso'4/a(TYPICAL FFEAMIMG DETAIL AT A-26 A A=OPENLN toastltf ala 2 Jtta 14I f W24 Cal.(NNJtv R.t~EEVATLOV~%JT1.2244442 2224N422 TYPICAL FR AMIN6 DETAIL AT A-9A AND A-9B D OPENING LE SVTtca sttttcace I oaHLL a sa($22)4~soavt)(cca 4 4'Illritv\ LY(R%'42(cats) 6NOCELACLACJACLS I I,)S LS 2'}AIOUTSCAAS vERT, coevte--~*STLF PLATCS Fete Ae OPtNtN4 TO Too IL Oa<<6 col.stLDw 44<<L scaM Q t ACLLJUTLI I)0'Not 2 QCO Cla~I<<RAUS t ella FLLLse 10 Hoett.Ulusles I I I581!SO/ore No SU n: scca aa 4 a, Tvl I 4 t R I'4 at<<M p+ALMutv IL~/'!i I,'Qt)L4<<4 facet j 6'Il I et Vf I/Tvv 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gt0$.$205%2$$,54%op seas 4 SSC F.S'24$E>>4,HVLVT) LTSS (Fioa TYPICAL FRAMING DETAIL AT A-2IA AND Av218 OPENINGS C (20.24T V.ti Llt lsaC sso Ccoaclc<<4%1v !let catLUVTFI$ $'4%4Y I)~$414%'at/44 1")co.cat U424 At 1$0'+te 04esoaaou N 224$1v4 4 2(NFIIL9 Oat<<i)Iset)/II!~44/LIR No<<2%, rt)~42(I~If I i 1 fttve<<2$%2/~sacaat.olc Now%0 Rtoo col s(low roF)4=geol sclowsoa stat FRA442 A 210'$$4 ,,R Lt 224-ev SECTION l585 1585 (Lt wowv)ECWIO~NISg-ISSG Ilm Hava)SECTION IS87 I=87.,=,, SECTION 1588-1588 6(0 I LJ 2'J~I~I IC 004 I f AR Ilolt Ctll)4 W 2 ra StLF.PLLTC FLLVJI 10 TOS 4 OF@Etta)It Vv-SECTION 1589-1588 9 0$luu)4 6 NO E~24 Cll I 6 25 6 AP I~~I4'CCC~OIS~~'Wtt44,$2)RRS ALT)ROE, SIC ocsatas leo cpfltctcet 44224LL IL 2 Ktrftcua a.T.Ue NCRCL CJLF,/vtuvc a~tww<<4<<%2" ANT%2""'2 L, 1'0~.Aac~'04L tvua WCL0 aat%%at 4%0<<Naos'%14%20 4~v~s~0 H<<SEO as Fce tco tool A col/tel%OLAReetj tvP cct Oove v IE (4 24IIuv CH~iv!4 ON Nltet<<44<<lilt H4424<<.444 ~lllllva 4442&4<<44'lltvlvllllslltllllIU'lv 4~I llv.ctt llltItltvll4 ~4 lvlttvtl e<<trtavt 2 If t i(elf 4 I Cv 24 4 FI244244 Ltvvl lllwvlvavILIllv %414(4 till I%I'RAL444$Attelvto foe CCHSTI<<JCTION tt<<ev Rcvcl scc T.tstoavlaatvaet tLc 4.4 T"$2$422 SCOT.2$0LFA4).SLCT.204 a ll TACLISI2(LLTAtaaft<al) ALTO NO lLls)'SECT 2%42(OS acct.ls clsacccT Role J,tccT~2 r~ll V Cl e)44 OV TLLS awC 4$Ouaatff'l A22 w~RTJCTTISRAL ILCACICR caaLCOO$2CSCFICIAL SLC<<C K'LL SILS ltASHSICTOR FIISLIC POWER SVFFLT Ststcll vefall<<4 I 4<<L 4~~L>>f liat<<4 N W.O.2808 DW('A 6 766 4 LI 15 14 13 12 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 1 I S/ 4*4 fp ,I V li n l I'I I's>>i 15 I'TISH ACNR~sv~w Y r 44>R t r>>P~r(stir v-hs\14 12 13 ROPCJAHO C COLOCAOW OCT OCTO 24 fs(KO svK M 5 TA tea L Aso>T 4 fftv NC tc.f nvssr)LC<<crvf nass~Ac at LK tv<a,sfsc i~fca Nclfcl>>CC 0>>s(LSTCC ta>L Nota CN f>>s CNC S>>ALL SC Dr CD>>TALC IC ACCC Qi QIWCLD ICS>>)KLTKVA Stt IIOTC>>CS Ov/S.CYOI RADIAL tsLSI I Df I CDL 0 AINIRNS lf>;11'ltl>l'4 >>'(Svsr>>ASDVT 4)CIS>CI\Q<trsLDcactLeatIMVTHSI ID'.ll><41 SNCWK)N J]Is>/sa>i<cpa tsAND j.LOftq I~gin IVI 4 AOA>>nf CONN.C&CLIAAL>I Sc Pwca Niaf Jt./n5+I I 2 49 2>9 0)~V vr IN>>tfftr r>>0 WOD CCO C.s~'I ICLC 29<5 R+NSOADIHT40F wNW Foals C C ae I r 1 t>>D,/R2rco>>N~R tAC>>SC)Os Cea<<'OIOC R S~TIOL)lG89-hDB9 11 10~'9-9 7 6 5 4 3 2 f F LS44>J I~~C<,<j nr 4 ltc FILL C aco Fr)hc~~!p+X-rsthv 4~Dfvh Oic I'cvTtt ssh)wh CN sic)Is(N4ll 7 D>>K 4 Drt,Sist D7 D>>res)D crhr vs scta H(L>s O c(L 4 CCL SCION AL sfs'4 tss trav.foa rona Nett s I TOP SLANCS C40)Ca host LOCATKDI5//>7)r IL 574)5 s<4 SICT.IT)4 v Y"8 Wvg O, t SECT>OL)1&-1~/0 srdt<c>4 cts>tts)4/CL 524>>4'uiof R-2'CO>>sl R~r Ct lr>r ()b PALS rr 4 I AOKJaCNMCIC /(tv/J tl mt A~F SLA, RA I 120 OR f>OO TI N 1.IS DTOS S lON IS-1594-OC TYPICAL FRAMING OETAILS AT A-2 SERIES OPENINGS<cio~EL>>AT I 0 H TYPICAL FRAMING DETAILS AT A-5 ECTIOll IS95-IS9 SERIES OPENINGS VLCOL.J 14<0>>a HA)C>)4>4NW SVOWN)I)C>>IV gn n-S~v sr 3>>vc OCASI 4 WP I A~II aa~I~aCL KAA ra sf cc QI+~IL rt fsl Sf~CL.SH th I SECT<OL)<81<-1811"I 15>>r7 I~is L",)I 2 stOSI/L/VC.>y~<4>24 5 AO 4.sttt I/i t~I L4>l as~0~>>I f.Q~'io.~l/f95 ILLL tst/C'll~rr st>>CL~Itta (l)K'I)011 I ssn L)i~1)VV>>>>SIAA+ )4 1 W 14 1~Cr.SsDC I Aaih I's srrrfc I Ks ssarataa>>A 4 4 cvvrccK AT Wav)SIISC'>>VL'L SO LHW AC(WK R LO CNO ST)It<L SE.CTION 724-7 NC/Dt.SIVIIstas tv COMA/K<ll)474>CV S CTION IG92>>lG92~Ih\IG3I SE ION 1 95-IG95 4>st (CHJ Fir 0 AT.t 0 sf 4 I IN HI SCAN>f CcwlacflOK R, OVC rta OfAK AT A-7 SER ES OPENINGS ov o~"Ro 5 CTION SECTION)C9O-<G30 LR COC CCCCLL4))Stact(IVHC 4 TAN LA!2$I At CA+24'g OAC 40 (Asshewuj Asn 0 RT Iso'(ort>>HAND> N Dots etta)D>CDICSJ<<TYP, CASJC 2>>Vsrt fwfa ca I,~" f424 Ccl~4 sL(DPP wa>~Sb~A SC CLAs h't SNCAAS1 Ovf 40440 fact)r 2/r SNO O(c il frp.Coo)to I O)ftcf)O r 4 Wlsrttccts>AH Pp Soa PLAN/AC)I)LTICN O>>saa otavsf rr.~LD(ate>>tv>It Dws$1)o SECTION IG9.-9 Cr I t rt c>t)ac>>s fath lw>>4 Oofr.SAC SCCT,IIH tal~4 s>>~C RINC OCAH Q2LJ s<<44<fr FJ ausst>aa>c ..Sl>>I fa>>Cd.Rc-.g I re aa h~Aa SIDS 0 NOLC Ct ltahP K g~r scarf\+4 214*J~I X~~'~4742<KO)'Sfo>n'J RA(A TO$RJ.>>, 2 NOTtf f 0 a Info.Oor s>>ow)4 SCS OCCT, I&%4 Isis)H 2>>LAD I AT>I/~sta>R loLO SECTION 1723-1723 Ql>>l f 12 Slth O<TT Cj SECT 0 6 3-G93 Lt m9S I 2(rc S)o SECTION 1694-lG94 4745 sttaAV'4774<4>> TYPICAL FRAMING DETAILS'tO DJOifos CL 57415 4 aof 97 4<'7, t I, STSS OVTOOARO Fact~~I AP IORST)ft 4 OvtsfatD N(4 Ia r>>tata)acs IA>>4D'104'$2 t>>OCC<>YP.VSCSSS NOTCDI CLa)>1 TIC)N)ECTION ALC kV)8 SECTION IG9G-lG9G TYP CAL FRAMING'.SILL SLOT OIT IC Oat Q 9 4 DCIJR NOLO'f\$4<4<TTPJ g95 tt/9DPODRH(IILI Df Stiff.tf>IS 4 445 LS>AT:-'A.S ~S Rl~)~P I TNK.>>)4 Hioh@stoc R SLOT(I AT.>04 4245 O Icc ta It.n~k.s~~,Ãrs~>>P~d/otcv h(AS l>r IS')SI ct'h/11)tsar Istt 5 h 1~SDT Ttf SLOP~,D sa Oftiai>4 ASA I A>>S earl%I>sss 0 4 ILD'ocl T T, os ow G)ODL<7)r+ECTION r T Op Osr IT)Oa Of-rl>>hsr fr,Scag OCY I CLSTAV>2I AP.O t-SICCS I SISOACD ft rt>>ILstirf.)t. ~OR('Ot OICY)th>SV>OC>TRICLL 214-2149 I'ao TVP OOrr.t L>r 2 T/OCS/I SECT)ON I 34-I b4 4 I vr AROVNO wC4 CCL 1 dS STOT.4 I I 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S'ICSL DOOR Ofva>DC FACS ov Svt: 6>>.I~T+FDONV car alla>i Dfoas I':,-'.-; Cltas OrCtkNO Iaalr>S I.Sct Dws$1st roa>loves.woRN I>as ws.V>ITH o>N(LSTS2 TN S'Ts,a'TOO,$ 111 2$6$$S ALL S I.T PDR LOCH>MS CaVICC PLATR sNELL OC 4114 N GALL weak or vf>><<o ssuacc Sv Aott TS ACT 2 IS S.AM NCS(ACN rc((C>>VE 4aall SCFtCM JH GTP/jf SocatAa)tc<<CIAcflcsosv tttacl/Jac rtcaHT FICLCANT PA OIL APPFOICO EOJAL.1 I I>~FR(va~tavwN gca(NNC Da>ACC 4'No(t'S>4 SLR Foa~kcc lo scavs~TY'A'YPE'I5'OTC>I Olt FCRMA(I SV IK foa CPM N.A Ia L A IS 5(CCVC SRICC 2'5 IL'TN>CH 1(NP ENI Waii>AT>af To CC aif(AT(0 All AFOJNO o.o.Cf<<Lcvc Uo SFMCC t.i.-)i O>lTS>DC FACC op wa(L I)2>IVR K 2 ftcval>ENS OERS t>>'F CS>NCCI w>IN lf VSOLIS~PIP t>R~iW.t 4CLvs FCR SMI (Tvp,'Iar c AIT.Sat lvp PEAMll.l s(cvav>OI~ O>HLL (far Daar (I~~~1~Rata>N>NO OAR lc!OPCN>NC'w>OIN (vor 1 sot)Ct At'A>L a(Vol as(t RCTUN>NC SLR tr NK aacv 5 oc of>if(I(a c'ivvr voa c sot)CR aa afvtawlC WEAN D oats 5>tcc>5 at pea>MLI ot Tft CT ON 4457-4457 TYP.HANDLE OET.LC.I I NI 0'CA>C I El 0-I'IfŽ4(CNI cacti aoc ot vcav>CAL>Lof No(2>c~~oa prc)ofaL ca iota cf cvctl5 pa a crka(scc CN>L'$144)I SCC DCTAIL tot>fi I F>ILM'a>c OR MCMsca I STttl DO(fl~R D>AMCTCR Oa PCRMMJ ODNO Foa 4)Uock'I scR>cs oawos.Tost l)f CLCAR (ALL AROVEID)faokl (LD.Ot DLCCVCCICC NOT t.fCR 4 4 ICR)CS)LQC)(ING DEVICE TABLE.Dai(L 2 Tar FRLMt*sit<<a'aaA tsat('Sa.vs~vor C sot)li Tif 4 PCRMLM Jtf Skttts SARK>22't I T4ELCLDCD VO ONTCIOS OF FRLMLR ONLv (Ivt.'Ior C bov)pa v aJ'c'Ila'I.L 1L'k/ovf Iaf vr v fiaso(~I 8 E~OF A N'C TAI IC~PI(A C I 1 M~OT'ca SLcvaTIOH1 ON Dwc sTlc poR c>a TYPICAL PCRMALI DETAIL V'I C Locav>DN or N stilt or>RL oksctcvs o (L f COIF!~ll a (J svww S/T~cc 1~cc~)(y5/5 ff.vest~P))S~445~'i~Car 13'll QMOE E.FOR A IA C AES I l~o f 4+3~o io--'iOEOCCA J.44CG-3 I I>CL I (c(>Noc WAS RS>OL o.SECTION 1590-1590 DCALSI 5(~ILCr tr U<<)G~jf (ft tw ovf rot r>>All tir 9cA>)at stv(L S CS tvvr)~lars)S (Dovk a oas)~I't Slr (SLED(tt TV P.-)()1I" (Lof5C R a CA It,.0.Di D T I g~9 SI>(-iykhh~SS '.i')=-~fc~~I 5 co 3225.<<oats tf<<tia CSVOA'ACSO M)L Lstva 9 Cia lillo 5 AIL cau C vatic oooa Mp RR>NC fwu 5$4 55 DV>LI Avo>TISH$2, I<5k.DLA(ws WAS CR (TIP)S C ION 44&cM45R>WALt I~O (Sastrarc lEAPFLAI(o(INL) ACH OOTT OP DOOR ()E(LI~25OVT Ot CLCAR 1~1~2"'otkiNG--~RtitoVAL UD P NOTCN ALT s cats(tvr)f G I@la 1/r r v(JV Jl SM't)ai o SSIC SECTION 1591-1591 DETAIL 021 5(r(C~<i-($Jt ef~fa CETAIL Ir~hs L, it~aco II At,$49~tsws'd AJ>$0~EQ>S}SKWCR t)INN WC>R R(fop~or>SLNrst DCAi.f: It I 0'955$I-I L 0 TAIL D4ll 5&1 (Ci>O)(O Li I 5(RO(LCR SHAFT CO II DOOR I I'f>a)I scc caT.oas 4144(fo)>Mora-I)r re.Oap(ti()C vi~fa IER r Tt().tAr WCLL (ST>tt.ag 4 I C4 t'TC tcwc.aa ION I,-1)jvvtit sec oct, 4 45 9(DSGG)i J%'TOS EL.5 S I CTE ORCT*=t)F k Siitit i VO.S CL fa'I)I 514 J 145'rirclt V~N)'vo<<AM (fvr)WIQ FmE 0 TRFJ I laoc wsc>Rb.vo Aot'CRL To oat RLOVNECNLNT ~DNOVVN fO>l AS R>tat Mott LOCAI>(wt Nwafw~i'Vl Eltt aw>tt<<Etc~w~foa a(4 41 P'I RI f swa&LW Ala LC STIFF (t.I., IV at 21 vgtoa a>c>taa~la VCR oar wa St RLI.LC.PI ATC 4 o-~-I-PI-~l 1-cf,vco (E(E(Pi w?Pca'(-1--f~'I-Sgwrc~ll~wfvt g.(var/CEO~>r(D>(A<<I$7 M>rv/I-g-cf)oE T I 0 30)4-'30(4 T 2 3020-3020 serac, rlvwr (A>as>>a(\1 1>LLDO 71L)(K)I Ta>c 2, sctocz'Dsc ot 455-'4 S CTI Iai Skat(WO~/RARA'~R 4~~a F-4'11121 t 2.3'25~5@7 f DRAT M))a(J CO~+tl 53>11'~lrt ~GL(I IR L o MLES~I 4'//)I 4/6')lt OCL($(412$))CL$3('Ii ORV Al At SlY 14$;II'(c Cf'2$L 2(I T IOIEI 4 Ig~~NOL C S Alla.ICR 11~1 t (A(f5.H)So(IS oN I Iyf S,CQW~pk)>Moa I(INCAWC~R j (SC>ttoM~ACS j clat o~f a 9 crt~-~v~1O 5 DCRI Ll 4~I O TAI-426 sak:Etc R PLA(t DV G.t>CD I S CTI N 0 7-30 I C>rota+INC t.v)(S(7tvvot HALF)SCALt'.O SI (4'SIO)IE($('2 Mott.COR A sca'cf I: Jj'ics 4'4 s~4'(a, 3 I't>sls$Saat>iOASC R EL STI I S CTION 02 (/14 SLIA~44(tl AI I I 4 A/.a/9(ECT ION 02G-302('D COE I!'~COECICV fc.I 4$1 (MUA (a DCILI Eil I~ILO LVAI tir~I 0 O (oo)VM>O>i N A AN I(CAP R.I 4 ((7IC C NC)ttLE Iafs Orraka>CN 4.G>Cf HO(CS f fOR VI~i>OCr LC>Fr QSTVS COL t IC)2 I TVD vaf1 I.L(TVP)Ck 4/il v lswv vlvaik 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