ML17209A294

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Tech Spec 3/4.4 for Reactor Coolant Sys
ML17209A294
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/30/1980
From:
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17209A293 List:
References
NUDOCS 8011030561
Download: ML17209A294 (18)


Text

3/4-4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMREACTORCOOLANTLOOPSLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.4.1.1Fourreactorcoolantpumpsshallbeinoperation-APPLICABILITY:

Modes1and2.ACTION:Withlessthanfourreactorcoolantpumpsinoperation, beinatleastHOTSTANDBYwithin6hours.SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.4.1TheFlowDependent SelectorSwitchshallbedetermined tobeinthe4pumppositionwithin15minutespriortomakingthereactorcriticalandatleastonceper12hoursthereafter.

ST.LUCIE-UNITI'">>0S0$4)3/44-110;30'=80 I4 REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMHOTSTANDBYLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.4.1.2a.AtleasttwoofthereactorcoolantloopslistedbelowshallbeOPERABLE.

b.c~1~ReactorCoolantLoop(A)andatleastoneassociated reactorcoolantpump.2.ReactorCoolantLoop(B)andatleastoneassociated reactorcoolantpump.3.ShutdownCoolingLoop(A)(Mode4only).4-ShutdownCoolingLoop(B)(Mode4only).AtleastoneoftheaboveReactorCoolantLoopsshallbeinoperation*.

Whenoperating withlessthan4reactorcoolingpumpsinMode3,theSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirement ofSpecification 3.1.1.1.shallbeincreased toandmaintained at>4.1$.wk/K.Theprovisions ofSpecifications 3.0.3and3.0.4arenotapplicable.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES3and4ACTION:a.Withlessthantheaboverequiredreactorcoolantloopsoperable, restoretherequiredloopstoOPERABLEstatuswith72hoursorbeinCOLDSHUTDOWNwithinthenext30hours.b.Withnoreactorcoolantloopinoperation, suspendalloperations involving areduction inboronconcentration oftheReactorCoolantSystemandimmediately initiatecorrective actiontoreturntherequiredlooptooperation.

SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.4.1.2.1 Atleasttheaboverequiredreactorcoolantpumps,ifnotinoperation, shallbedetermined tobeOPERABLEonceper7daysbyverifying correctbreakeralignments andindicated poweravailability.

4.4.1.2.2 Atleastonecoolingloopshallbeverifiedtobeinoperation andcirculating reactorcoolantatleastonceper12hours.~eA1reactorcoolantpumpsmaybede-energized forupto1hourprovided(1)nooperations arepermitted thatwouldcausedilutionofthereactorcoolantsystemboronconcentration, and(2)coreoutlettemperature ismaintained atleast10'Fbelowsaturation temperature.

ST.LUCIE-UNITI3/44-la10-30-80 IItt REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.4.1.3a.ThetwoShutdownCoolingloopslistedbelowshallbeOPERABLE:

l.ShutdownCoolingLoop(A)¹2.ShutdownCoolingLoop(B)¹b.Atleastoneoftheabovecoolantloopsshallbeinoperation*.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE5withoutRCSintegrity ACTION:a.With1essthantheaboverequiredcoolant1oopsOPERABLE, immediately initiatecorrective actiontoreturntherequriedcoolantloopstoOPERABLEstatusassoonaspossible.

IfrequiredloopsarenotrestoredtoOPERABLEwithin8hours,immediately initiateactiontorestoreRCSintegrity.

b.Withnocoolantloopinoperation, suspendalloperations involving areduction inboronconcentration oftheReactorCoolantSystemandimmediately initiatecorrective actiontoreturntherequiredcoolantlooptooperation.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE5withRCSintegrity ACTION:Withnocoolantloopinoperation, suspendalloperations involving areduction inboronconcentration oftheReactorCoolantSystemandimmediately initiatecorrective actiontoreturntherequiredcoolantlooptooperation.

SURVEILLANCE REURIEMENTS 4.4.1.3.1 Therequiredshutdowncoolingloop(s)shallbedetermined OPERABLEpertheSt.LucieUnitInservice Inspection Program,Pump,TestProgram,andValveTestProgram.KllreactorcooTantpumpsanddecayheatremovalpumpsmaybede-energized forupto1hourprovided(1)nooperations arepermitted thatwouldcausedilutionofthereactorcoolantsystemboronconcentration, and(2)coreoutlettemperature ismaintained atleast10'Fbelowsaturation temperature.

¹Thenormaloremergency powersourcemaybeinoperable inMODE5-ST.LUCIE-UNIT13.44-lb10,:30,-;80 II'5IIIIIaiI'llIIII,b REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/49.8SHUTDOWNCOOLINGANDCOOLANTCIRCULATION ALLWATERLEVELSLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.98.1Atleastoneshutdowncoolingloopshallbeinoperation.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE6ACTION:a~Withlessthanoneshutdowncoolingloopinoperation, exceptasprovidedinb.below,suspendalloperations involving anincreaseinthereactordecayheatloadorareduction inboronconcentration oftheReactorCoolantSystem.Closeallcontainment penetrations providing directaccessfromthecontainment atmosphere totheoutsideatmosphere within4hours.b.Theshutdowncoolingloopmayberemovedfromoperation forupto1hourper8hourperiodduringtheperformance ofCOREALTERATIONS inthevicinityofreactorpressurevesselhotlegs.c.Theprovisions ofSpecification 3.0.3arenotapplicable.

SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.9.8.1Atleastoneshutdowncoolingloopshallbeverifiedtobeinoperation andcirculating reactorcoolantataflowrateofgreaterthanorequalto3000gpmatleastonceper4hours.ST.LUCIE-UNIT13/49-8,10-30-80;=

REFUELING OPERATION LOWMATERLEVELLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION

'3.9.8.2Twoindependent shutdowncoolingloopsshallbeOPERABLE.*

APPLICABILITY:

MODE6whenthewaterlevelabovethetopoftheirradiated fuelassemblies seatedwithinthereactorpressurevesselislessthan23feet.ACTION:a.WithlessthantherequiredshutdowncoolingloopsOPERABLE, immediately initiatecorrective actiontoreturnloopstoOPERABLEstatusassoonaspossible.

b.Theprovisions ofSpecification 3.0.3arenotapplicable.

SURVEILLANCE REUIRENENTS 4.9.8.2Therequiredshutdowncoolingloopsshallbedetermined OPERABLEpertheSt.LucieUnit1Inservice Inspection Program,PumpTestProgram,andValveTestProgram.*Thenormaloremergency powersourcemaybeinoperable foreachshutdowncoolingloop.ST.LUCIE-UNITI3/49.8a10'-3040 4I'h4Ii'j 3/4.4.1REACTORCOOLANTLOOPSTheplantisdesignedtooperatewithbothreactorcoolantloopsandassociated reactorcoolantpumpsinoperation, andmaintainDNBRabove1.30duringallnormaloperations andanticipated transients.

ByoriginaldesignSTARTUPandPOWEROPERATION maybeinitiated andmayproceedwithoneortworeactorcoolantpumpsnotinoperation afterthesetpoints forthePowerLevel-High, ReactorCoolantFlow-Low, andThermalMargin/LowPressuretripshavebeenreducedtotheirspecified values.Reducingthesetripsetpoints ensuresthattheDNBRwillbemaintained above1.30duringthreepumpoperations andthatduringtwopumpoperation thecorevoidfractionwillbelimitedtoensureparallelchannelflowstability withinthecoreandthereby,preventpremature DNB.However,lessthan4pumpoperation inModes1and2iscurrently notauthorized fortheunit.Asingleshutdowncoolinglooporasinglereactorcoolantloopwith.itssteamgenerator filledabovethelowleveltripsetpointprovidessufficient heatremovalcapability forcorecoolingwhileinMODES3and4,however,,singlefailureconsiderations requireplantcooldownifcomponent repairsand/orcorrective actioncannotbemadewithintheallowable out-of-service timeifatleast2redundent loopsarenotOPERABLE.

Theadditional SHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementforMode3providesassurance ofacceptable resultsshouldtherebeaMSLBwithlessthan4RCPsoperating.

ForMode5withoutRCSintegrity (i.e.SGmanwaysopen)andMode6whenthewaterlevelabovefuelassemblies seatedinthevesselislessthan23'eet,asingleshutdowncoolingloopprovidessufficient heatremovalcapability forcorecooling;however,singlefailureconsiderations requirethat2loopsbeOPERABLE.

ForMode5withRCSintegrity, intheeventofafailureoftheoperating shutdowncoolingloop,othermethodsofheatremova)areviableandavailable, (i.e.injection viatherequiredOPERABLEchargingorHPSIpump).Theseprovide,as'-aminimum,adequate, timetoinitiateemergency measurestocoolthecore.ST.LUCIE-UNITIB3/4.4-1f~.n,10-,,30-80 3/4.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMBASES3/4.4.2and3/4.4.3SAFETYVALVESThepressurizer codesafetyvalvesoperatetopreventtheRCSfrombeingpressurized aboveitsSafet~Limitof2750psia.Eachsafetyvalveisdesignedtorelieve2X10~lbsperhourofsaturated steamatthevalvesetpoint.

Thereliefcapacityofasinglesafetyvalveisadequatetorelieveanyoverpressure condition whichcouldoccurduringshutdown.

IntheeventthatnosafetyvalvesareOPERABLE, anoperating shutdowncoolingloop,connected totheRCS,providesoverpressure reliefcapability andwillpreventRCSoverpressurization.

Duringoperation, allpressurizer codesafetyvalvesmustbeOPERABLEtopreventtheRCSfrombeingpressurized aboveitssafetylimitof2750psia.Thecombinedreliefcapacityofthesevalvesissufficient tolimittheReactorCoolantSystempressuretowithinitsSafetyLimitof2750psiafollowing acompletelossofturbinegenerator loadwhileoperating atRATEDTHERMALPOWERandassumingnoreactortripuntilthefirstReactorProtective Systemtripsetpoint(Pressurizer Pressure-High) isreached(i.e..nocreditistakenforadirectreactortriponthelossofturbine)andalsoassumingnooperation ofthepressurizer poweroperatedreliefvalveorsteamdumpvalves.ST.LUGIE-UNIT1B3/4.4-1a10'-,30.-80 i'1II'II REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES3/4.9.6MANIPULATOR CRANEOPERABILITY TheOPERABILITY requirements ofthecranesusedformovementoffuelassemblies ensurethat:1)eachcranehassufficient loadcapacitytoliftafuelelement,and2)thecoreinternals andpressurevesselareprotected fromexcessive liftingforceintheeventtheyareinadvertently engagedduringliftingoperations.

3/4.9.7CRANETRAVEL-SPENTFUELSTORAGEBUILDINGTherestriction onmovementofloadsinexcessofthenominalweightofafuelasemblyandCEAoverirradiated fuelassemblies ensuresthatnomorethanthecontentsofonefuelassemblywillberupturedintheeventofafuelhandlingaccident.

Thisassumption isconsistent withtheactivityreleaseassumedintheaccidentanalyses.

3/4.9.8COOLANTCIRCULATION Therequirement thatatleastoneshutdowncoolingloopbeinoperation ensuresthat(1)sufficient coolingcapacityisavailable toremovedecayheatandmaintainthewaterinthereactorpressurevesselbelow140'FasrequiredduringtheREFUELING MODE,and(2)sufficient coolantcirculation ismaintained throughthereactorcoretominimizetheeffectsofaborondilutionincidentandpreventboronstratification.

Therequirement tohavetwoshutdowncoolingloopsOPERABLEwhenthereislessthan23feetofwaterabovethecore,ensuresthatasinglefailureoftheoperating shutdowncoolingloopwillnotresultinacompletelossofdecayheatremovalcapability.

Withthereactorvesselheadremovedand23feetofwaterabovethecore,alargeheatsinkisavailable forcorecooling,thusintheeventofafailureoftheoperating shutdowncoolingloop,adequatetimeisprovidedtorinitiate'mergency,'procedures to=cool~thecore~Therequirement thatatleastoneshutdowncoolingloopbeinoperation isconsistent withtheassumptions inthesafetyanalysisoftheborondilutionaccidentandpreventslocalvariations inboronconcentrations, thusminimizing theeffectsofinadvertent borondilution.

Italsoassuresthatsufficient coolingcapacityisavailable toremovedecayheatandmaintainthewaterinthereactorpressurevesselbelow140'FasrequiredduringtheREFUELING MODE.3/4.9.9CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEMTheOPERABILITY ofthissystemensuresthatthecontainment isolation valveswillbeautomatically isolatedupondetection ofhighradiation levelswithinthecontainment.

TheOPERABILITY ofthissystemisrequiredtorestrictthereleaseofradioactive materialfromthecontainment atmosphere totheenvironment.

ST.LUGIE-UNIT1B3/49-2<10-30~80) c>C REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES3/4.9.10and3/4.9.11WATERLEVEL-REACTOR VESSELANDSTORAGEPOOLWATERLEVELTherestrictions onminimumwaterlevelensurethatsufficient waterdepthisavailable toremove99Koftheassumed10$iodinegapactivityreleasedfromtheruptureofanirradiated fuelassembly.

Theminimumwaterdepthisconsistent withtheassumptions oftheaccidentanalysis.

3/4.9.12FUELPOOLVENTILATION SYSTEM-FUEL STORAGEThelimitations onthefuelhandlingbuildingventilation systemensuresthatallradioactive materialreleasedfromanirradiated fuelassemblywillbefilteredthroughtheHEPAfiltersandcharcoaladsorberpriortodischarge totheatmosphere.

TheOPERABILITY ofthissystemandtheresulting iodineremovalcapacityareconsistent withtheassumptions oftheaccidentanalyses.

3/4.9.13SPENTFUELCASKCRANEThemaximumloadwhichmaybehandledbythespentfuelcaskcraneislimitedtoaloadedsingleelementcaskwhichisequivalent toapproximately 25tons.Thisrestriction isprovidedtoensurethestructural integrity ofthespentfuelpoolintheeventofadroppedcaskaccident.

Structural damagecausedbydroppingaloadinexcessofaloadedsingleelementcaskcouldcauseleakagefromthespentfuelpoolinexcessofthemaximummakeupcapability.

3/4.9.14DECAYTIME-STORAGEPOOLTheminimumrequirement fordecayoftheirradiated fuelassemblies inthethree7X7modulesandtheone7X10modulenearestthefuelcaskcompartment priortomovementofthespentfuelcaskintothefuelcaskcompartment ensuresthatsufficient timehasclaspedtoallowradioactive decayofthefissionproducts.

Thisdecaytimeisconsistent withtheassumptions usedinthecaskdropaccidentanalysis.

ST.LUGIE-UNITIB3/49-31D.30-,:80 NCWf~PQ SAFETYEVALUATION RE:St.LucieUnit1DocketNo.50-335Proposed;Tech SecAmendment I.Introduction Thisevaluation supportsaproposal-to revisespecifications 3.4.1,3.4.1.2and3.4.1.3'and toaddspecifications 3.9.8.1and3.9.8.2toensurethattheLimitingConditions forOperation provideforredundancy inavailable decayheatremovalsystems.II.Discussion Theproposedrevisions toTechnical Specifications 3.4.1,3.4.1.2and3.4.1.3andtheadditionofTechnical Specification 3.9.8.1and3.9.8.2arenecessary tocomplywithaNRCletterdatedJunell,1980.Thepurposeofthesechangesistoprovideforredundancy intheShutdownCoolingandReactorCoolantSystemstoensureadequatedecayheatremovalcapability inallmodesofreactoroperation.

III.Conclusion Wehaveconcluded, basedontheconsiderations discussedabove,that:(1)theamendment doesnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofaccidents previously considered anddoesnotreducethemarginofsafety,(2)thereisreasonable assurance thatthehealthandsafetyofthepublicwillnotbeendangered byoperation intheproposedmanner,and(3)suchactivities willbeconducted incompliance withtheCommission's regulations andtheissuanceofthisamendment willnotbeinimicaltothecommondefenseandsecurityortothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.10;;30.:80 tY'()IIIb