ML17223A203

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Suppl to 1988 Annual Operating Rept
ML17223A203
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/31/1988
From:
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17223A202 List:
References
NUDOCS 8906200245
Download: ML17223A203 (66)
v • d • e


Text

7mrrhnViaumer/LiftdLad-1FR0.59Evalnit1Request08-035,component

/SystemAffected:

PI-1181,1B2RCPMIDDLESEALCAVITYPRESPIA-1182, 1B2RCPUPPERSEALCAVITYPRESDescription ofChange:Installed a100ohmresistorinthepressureinstrument currentlooptodeveloptherequiredvoltageforastripchartrecord~hookup.-.SafetyEvaluation:

Thistemporary changeisrequiredtomonitorRCPsealcavitypressureoscillation todetermine ifthereisanycorrelation betweenthesealpressureoscillation andRCPpumpvibration.

PIA-118283PIA-1183indications arenotaffectedbytheinstallation ofthe100ohmresistor.

i)Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.ii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.iii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.

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()50903'90<~13PDRAOGCK"'DCR mrrhnVimr/LifdL-IFR.59EvalComponent

/SystemAffected:

LS4420,FUELPOOLLEVELANNUNCIATOR TE4420,FUELPOOLTEMPANNUNCIATOR Description ofChange:Modifyinstrument mountings forspentfuelmachineclearance SafetyEvaluation:

Duetothelossofannunciator alarmcapability, fuelpoollevelandheatexchanger outlettemp.willbemonitored every2hours.Byfollowing thealternate meansofmonitoring fuelpoollevelandtemp.,itcanbedemonstrated thattheremovalofLS442085TE4420doesnothaveanadverseeffect.i)Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.ii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.iii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.

mrrhnVimr/LifL-1FREvalit1Request08-041Component

/SystemAffected:

BQRQNQME'IZR Description ofChange:Toinstalltemporary highvoltagepowersupplyinordertorestoreBoronometer indication.

Theinstalled powersupplyunitfailedwhileinservice.SafetyEvaluation:

i)Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.ii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.iii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.

mrrhnVimLifLEvIit1Request¹8-058Component

/SystemAffected:

V6565ANDRE26<2Description ofChange:Allowoperation ofwastegassystemtoplantstackwithWasteGasMonitor(ch.42)outofservice.SafetyEvaluation:

Thistemporary jumperisnecessary toallowwastegastobealignedtotheplantstackwithRE-26-42, WasteGasRadiation Monitor(ch.42)outofservice.RE-2642initiates aclosuresignaltothewastegasheaderisolation valve,V-6565,onhighradiation.

SinceRE-2642isoutofservice,V-6565failedclosedandneedsto'beopenedviaajumpertoalignwastegastotheplantstack.Theplantstackwillbeusedtomonitorthewastegasreleases.

Additional information:

WasteGasDecayTankswasalsooutofservicei)Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.ii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.iii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasde6nedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.

mrrhnVimrLifLFR9Evalit1Request¹8-061Component

/SystemAffected:

PRESSURIZER PRESSURE(LOWRANGE)CH.1103Description ofChange:PlantChangeandModification (PCM)033-188relocatePR1103/1104SafetyEvaluation:

RemovingPR1103/1104fromservicedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestioninthat:i)Jumpering outthepressurerecorderdoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Whiletheexistence oftherecorderismentioned insection7.6.2.1oftheFSARasproviding clearindication ofsystemstatus,otherredundant indication isalsoavailable onRTGB104.Annunciation capability oftheOMS(Overpressure Mitigation System)isnotaffected.

Therefore, whilecreditfortheexistance ofPR1103/1104istakenintheFSAR,otherinputsareavailable whichprovidethesameinformation.

ii)Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFSARisnotcreatedbecausetheinstrumentation loopsforPI'103andPT1104willnotbedisabled.

Ajumperwillbeinstalled betweenpointsXl(+)andXl(-)andanotherbetweenX2(+)andX2(-)onterminalboard0toensurethecircuitremainsoperationaL Thesignalsfromthepressuretransmitters willstillbeoperational andabletoprovideinputtoSDCinterlock loopandtheOMSloop.iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdeGnedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isnotreducedasPR1103/1104isnotrequitedtobeoperabletomeetanytechnical specification requirements.

mrr1nVimrLifLEvIit1Request08-064Component

/SystemAffected:

ANNUNCIATOR K,WINDOWSK15,16,17,1831,2233,24,30 Description ofChange:IConstruction tomakemodifications toAnnunciator KWindowsK2132,23,24 perPlantChangeorModification (PCM)005-188SafetyEvaluation:

PCM005-188replacestheexistingCEAmetrascope systemwithanupgradedCEAPositionDisplaySystemwhichmonitorsanddisplaysCEAposition.

TheremovalofAnnunciator Karmingscrewwillaffecttheannunciators K15,16,17,18,2l~g3~,

and30asshownontheControlled WiringDrawings.

Theseannunciators providealarmsforCEApositioning requirements duringpoweroperation.

ThesealarmsarenotrequiredduringModes546.Theremovalofalarmcapability hasnoadverseeffects.ThisworkisrelatedtoPCM005-188andtheEngineering Packageprovidedthesafetyevaluation.

hnVimrLifLEvIit1Request08-069Component

/SystemAffected:

FEEDTO"A"ANNUNCIATOR FORSSXFMER1B2CABLE"B"-SBDescription ofChange:ReplaceNormal/Isolateswitchin1B2bkr.cubicleasperNonconformance Report142-185-1974E SafetyEvaluation:

Duringtheperformance ofPlantChangeandModification 142-185,theNormal/Isolateswitchlocatedonthe1B2bkr.cubiclewasfoundnotabletooperateproperlyineitherNormalorIsolateposition.

Thisbreakeristhe480VStationServiceTransformer 1B24160VFeederBreakerlocatedonthe4160SWGRBus1B3Cubicle2.Engineering hasevaluated thereplacement oftheswitchinitsdisposition oftheNon-Conformance ReportandFieldChangeNotice.Also,PlantChangeandModification 142-185hasbeenpreviously approvedbytheFRGwithitssafetyevaluation.

mrrhnVimrLifL-IFREvIComponent

/SystemAffected:

ANNUNCIATOR L-2"RXTRIPCEABUSSESDEENERGIZED" Description ofChange:PlantChangeandModification (PCM)007-188construction requirements torelocaterelay27/RTSSafetyEvaluation:

PCM007-188wastoinstallnewBentleyNevadaVibration Monitoring equipment fortheReactorCoolantPumpsbehindRTGB104.ThisPCMcallsfortherelocation ofthe27/RTSrelaythatislocatedbehindRTGB104toanewlocation, Thisjumperistofacilitate removalofrelay27/RTSwhichhasbeenidentified byPCM007-188asoneoftherelaysrequiring relocation.

Theremovalandrelocation hasbeenevaluated byEngineering viathePCMdesignverification andsafetyevaluation.

ThePCM007-188hasbeenFRGapprovedforimplementation.

TmrrhnVimrLifL-1FR5EvIit1Request08-073ComPonent

/SystemAffected:

SPENTFUELHDLG.MACHINEPOOLEND,JIBBOOM(JUNCTION BOX)Description ofChange:Temporary feedtoSpentFuelHandlingMachinePoolEndjunctionboxSafetyEvaluation:

i)Thetemporary feedswillbeutilizedtopowernon-safety relatedequipment, andwillnotaffectthefunctionofequipment orsystemsimportant tosafetyaspreviously definedintheFSAR.ii)Theproposedtemporary feedswillbeutilizedtopowernon-safety relatedequipment.

Theoperability ofequipment orsystemsimportant tosafetywillnotbeaffected.

iii)Theoperability requirements ofTechnical Specification 3.8.2.2canstillbemetwiththetemporary feedsinstalled.

SincetheexistingTech.Spec.requirements arenotaffectedbythetemporary feeds,nochangestotheTechnical Specifications arerequiretL mrrhnVimrLifLEvIit1Request¹8-074Component

/SystemAffected:

REACTORBUILDINGCRANEDescription ofChange:Temporary electrical feedtoReactorBuildingCrane,cable010993CSafetyEvaluation:

i)Thetemporary feedswillbeutilizedtopowernon-safety-related equipment, andwillnotaffectthefunctionofequipment orsystemsimportant tosafetyaspreviously definedintheFSAR.ii)Theproposedtemporary feedswillbeutilizedtopowernon-safety-related equipment.

Theoperability ofequipment orsystemsimportant tosafetywillnotbeaffected.

iii)Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification hasnotbeenreduced.

mrrbnVimrLifL-IFREvalit1Request08-079Component

/SystemAffected:

FCV-25-1pj,4$A6;HVE-8A;HVE-8BDescription ofChange:Temporary jumpertoopenthecontainment purgevalveswithoutrunningtheContainment PurgeFans.ThisjumperistosupportM/Minrepairofthepurgevalves.SafetyEvaluation:

i)Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment importanttosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.TheFSARevaluates thepurgeassumingcontainment integrity.

Thisjumperwillbeinstalled onlywhilethemaintenance hatchisopen.ii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.iii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisfor.anytechnical specification.

rrhnVimr/LifL-1FREvtit1Request08-099Component

/SystemAffected:

BORONOMETER Description ofChange:Toinstalltemporary highvoltagepowersupplytorestoreBoronometer indication.

Theinstalled powersupplyunitfailedwhileinservice.SafetyEvaluation:

i)Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment importanttosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.ii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent'ype thanpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.iii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.

mrrhnVimrLifLdFR9Evalit1Request¹8-106Component

/SystemAffected:

BFEEDREGULATING CONTROLRACKDescription ofChange:Suspectleadlagunitiscausin'g4-5%oscillation offeedflowsignalSafetyEvaluation:

i)Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Lead/lagunitdoesnotimpacttheabilitytoprovidefeedwater.

ii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Operability offeedwater regulating systemisnotaltered;operation ofsafety-related systemisnotcompromised oraltered.iii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical speciflcation.

Feedwater regulating systemisnotrequiredbyUnitITech.Spec.

YmrrhnVimr/LiftLdFR0EvIit1Request¹8-111omponent/SystemAffected:

PNUEMATICTUBINGONMAINFEEDWATER REG.VALVEACTUATORS (FCV-9011 4FCV-9021)

Description ofChange:Installation oftestportsontheinstrument airsupplylinetofacilitate testingofvalvemovement.

SafetyEvaluation:

Thistemporary changewaspartoftheongoingtroubleshooting activities todetermine thecauseoftheerraticoscillations ofsteamgenerator levels.i)Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.ii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.iii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.

mrrhnViumr/LiftedLad-1FR50.59Evalit1Request08-122Component

/SystemAffected:

CHEMNUCLEARSYS, INC.RESINTRANSFERFILLHEAD(NOTPLANT INSTALLED EQUIP.)Description ofChange:Tobypassmalfunctioning High-High Levelalarminterlock inthedisposalcontainer.

SafetyEvaluation:

Thisjumperbypassesaninterlock whichisohtestheresintransferfillheadontheHigh-High levelalarm.Thisinterlock isstillcapableofisolating theresintransferfillheadviatheHighlevelalarmwhichwasdemonstated tofunctionproperly.

Furthermore, allresintransfers tothedisposalcontainer aremonitored withvideocamerastoensurepropertransferofresinandtomonitorthecontainer levels.Thisjumperdoesnotinterphase withanysafety-related plantequipment; therefore i)Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.ii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.iii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.

TmrrhnViumrLifLd-1FREvalit2Request¹8-027Component ISystemAffected:

PDIS.2216 Description ofChange:JumperoutPDIS-2216 becausetheswitchfailedwhileinservice.SafetyEvaluation:

ThepurposeforPDIS-2216 istoisolateletdownupstreamoftheRegenerative HeatExchanger intheeventofapiperupturedownstream ofthisheatexchanger.

Thepiperupturewouldcreateahighdifferential pressurewhichwouldbesensedbyPDIS-2216 andisolateletdownflow.Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyevaluated inthesafetyevaluation reporthasnotbeenincreased sincethepressureswitchisnotaconsideration inthedetermination oftheprobability ofaccidents addressed bytheFSAR.Further,theprobability ofanaccidentofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated inthesafetyevaluation reportisnotcreatedbecausePDIS-2216 isnotassumedtoisolateletdownintheaccidentscenariooutlinedinSectionIIIabove.SincePDIS-2216 isnotreqturedtobein-service bytheTechnical Specifications, themarginofsafetyasdefinedinanybasisforanyTechnical Specification hasnotbeenreduced.Technical Specifications arenotaffectedbyremovingthesubjectpressureswitchhornservice.

mrrhnVimr/LifLFREvalit2Request¹8-036Component

/SystemAffected:

TR-22Description ofChange:Tore-routeconduittoTE-22-8B, ImpulseChamberSteam(pt.N2onTR-22-6)SafetyEvaluation:

Thiscomponent hasnocontrolfunction8tnon-safety-related andisusedforstarting&loadingoftheturbine.Theturbineiscurrently atbaseload.i)Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.ii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.iii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.

IrrhnViIrLifLEvIit2Request¹8-039Component

/SystemAffected:

RCP2Ali1)UPPEROILRESEVOIR, LIA-11562)LOWEROILRESEVOIR, LIA-11573)CONTROLLED BLEEDOFFFLOW,FIA-1150Description ofChange:TorepairFIA-1150, 2A1RCPControlled Bleedoffflowindication SafetyEvaluation:

Thistemporary jumperremovesthepowertoFIA-1150whichalsodeenergizes LIA-1156ALIA-1157tofacillitate thereplacement oftheSigma.i)Theproposedchangedoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARbecausethereareotheravailable indications whichprovideinformation aboutsealcondition andpossibledegradation.

Therefore, theabilityoftheRCOstorespondtoafailureofthe2A1RCPsealisnotcompromised.

Theseindications areannunciation ofhighpressureintheuppersealcavity,andtempandpres.indication onthecontrolled bleedoffline.ii)Apossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanevaluated previously intheFUSARisnotcreated.Shouldallinstiumentations onthe2A1RCPfail,andtheRCPseize,theRxwouldtripduetolowRCSflowtripontheRPS.Thelossofcoolantflowthroughthedestmyedsealisenveloped bythesmallbreakLOCAaccidentanalysisinChapter15oftheFUSAR.iii)Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isnotreduced.Unit2T.S.3.4.6.2,actionstatement (a)requireswithRCSleakage,whichisconfirmed inaflowpathwithnoflowindication, tobedetermined bytheperformance ofanRCSinventory balancewhichistobestartedwithinthehour.Shouldsealfailureinthe2A1RCPoccurwhiletheflowindication inthecontrolbleedoffflowwasoutofservice,thehighpressureannunciator intheuppersealcavitywouldalertoperators tothecondition, whichcouldbeconfirmed bythetemp.andpres,indicator inthebleedoffline.Actionstatement 3.4.6.2.a wouldthenbeenteretLTherefore, themarginofsafetydefinedbythisspecification ismaintained.

mrrhnViumr/LifdLd-1FR0Evli2Request08-041Component

/SystemAffected:

2A2RCP:FS-1166,FS-1167,PS-1160Description ofChange:RemoveDCpowertocomponents incontainment duetoelectrical groundSafetyEvaluation:

REVERSEROTATIONINDICATION SWITCH:Removingtheannunciator capabilities fromFS-1166andFS-1167wouldnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionbaseduponthefollowing:

i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction previously evaluated intheFSARisnotincreased.

Bothflowswitchesmonitoroilflowinthelubeoilsystematthemainthrustbearingbracket.Inorderforareverserotationcondition toexist,theRCPwouldhavetobestoppedandrestarted, andtheAnti-reverse Rotationdevicewouldhavetomalfunction initsentirety.

IftheRCPweretobestoppedwhiletheunitwasatpower,theunitwouldtripduetolowRCSflow(RPStripunit).Shouldthepumpberestarted, andthemotorsomehowreverserotation, onepinintheanti-reverse rotationdeviceiscapableofholdingthepumpstationary againstthetorqueproducedbytheapplication of100%voltageinsuchareversephaserotation.

Therefore, eventhoughthecontrolroomoperators wereunawareofareverserotationcondition

existing, theanti-reverse rotationdevicewouldpreventthepumpfromturninginthewrongdirection.

ii)Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFSARhasnotbeencreated.WhentheRCPshaftstopsrotatingwhenthemotorisstopped,thepinsintheanti-reverse rotationdevicepreventtheRCPfromrotatinginthereversedirection, evenagainst100%voltageappliedtothemotorinthereversephase.Withannunciator capabilities losttotheoperators, itisconceivable thatthepumpmayberestarted; whiledamagetothemotormayresult,andtheanti-reverse rotationdevicewouldpreventbackflowthroughtheRCPandthe2Asteamgenerator, thuscorresponding toacooldownusinglessthan4RCPsforRCScirculation.

Astheunitisdesignedtoaccomodate anaturalcirculation

cooldown, nonewaccidents ormalfunctions areassumedtobecreated.iii)Themarginofsafetyasdefinedin thebasisfortheTechnicalSpeciflicationsisnotreduced.

Reverserotationindication isnotrequiredbyTechnical Specifications.

GASKETLEAKAGEINDICATION/

ANNUNCIATION Removingtheannunciation capabilities onPS-1160doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionbaseduponthefollowing:

i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARisnotincreased.

PS-1160isdiscussed insection5.2.5,"Detection ofLeakageThroughRCSPressureBoundary,"

oftheFSAR.Theprimaryindications ofRCSleakagearegivenasthecontainment sumplevelandcontainment radioactivity alarms.Asthelossofannunciator inthe2A2RCPgasketpressureswitchdoesnotaffectanyoftheseprimaryindications, noexistinganalysisareaffected.

ii)Apossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFSARisnotcreated.Withnoindication ofgasketleakageinthecontrolroom,theoperators wouldstillbemadeawareofanyRCSpressureboundaryleakagedetectable bytheRCSPressureBoundaryleakagedetection system;thissystemiscapableofdetecting unidentified leakageof1.0gpmorlesswithinonehour.Thisredundant capability ensuresthatRCSinventory ismaintained withinanalyzedlimits.iii)Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical speciTication isnotreduced.Unit2T.S.3.4.6.1and3.4.6.2statetheoperability requirements fortheRCSLeakagedetection systemsandRCSleakage.Theinoperability oftheRCPgasketpressureswitchisnotincludedinthesespecifications andisboundedbythecapabilities oftheleakagedetection system.Therefore, themarginofsafetydefinedbythebasisforthetechnical specifications isnotaffected.

mrrhnVimr/LifLEvIit2Request¹8-052Component

/SystemAffected:

TURBINERUNBACKCIRCUITDescription ofChange:PIS-22-36 failedatpressurefor100%power(runbackwouldnotterminate),

theunitwasat859owhenthefailedpressureswitchwasdiscovered.

SafetyEvaluation:

i)Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Turbinerunbackfeatureisnotimportant tosafetyperFSARsection7.7.1.1.10.3.

ii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Equipment associated withtheturbinerunbackisnotimportant tosafety.iii)Theproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.

Althoughturbinerunbackproducesanenergyimbalance betweentheprimaryandsecondary, FSARsection15.2.1.2analyzesfortheworstcasecondition ofenergyimbalance whichisisolation ofturbineat102%power.

ST.LUCIEUNIT2RCSINSTRUMENT NOZZLECRACKINGPURPOSESafetyevaluation writtentoconcludethattherearenosignificant nuclearsafetyissuessurrounding theconcernsofpotential intergrannular stresscorrosion cracking(IGSCC)intheseveninstrument nozzleswhichhavebeendetermined tobesusceptible toIGSCCatSt.LucieUnit2.SAFETYEVALUATION Theissuessurrounding theRCSinstrument nozzleIGSCCsusceptibility donotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionforthefollowing reasons:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequence ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportisnotincreased.

TheRCSinstrument nozzleshavebeenshownnottocreateasmallbreakLOCAiftheyshoulddevelopthrough-wall cracks.Normalshutdowncanbeaccomplished sincethemaximumleakagewouldbewithinthenormalchargingcapacity.

Thepressurizer lowerheadlevelnozzlehasbeenshowntobethemostlimitingcase.TheRTOhotlegnozzlesandthereactorflangeleakdetection nozzlearenotaconcernforCycle4operation.

Thepressurizer canoperateforupto604dayswithanozzleleakofapp'roximately 0.1gpmbeforeunacceptable corrosion results.Modifications implemented byPC/M137-287toinsulation nearthesubjectnozzlesensuresleakagewouldbedirectedtothecoatedconcretefloor.Therefore, withrespecttotheconsequences ofthrough-wall cracks,thepossibility ofcorrosion ofthepressurizer andothermaterials inthevicinityisnotaconcern.Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysisReportisnotcreatedsincenonewequipment oroperating procedures areaddedasaresultofthisevaluation.

Inaddition, thepreceding engineering evaluation hasshownthatnonewtypesofaccidents ormalfunctions arecreated.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isnotreduced.Technical Specification 3/4.4.6willrequireshutdownshouldpressureboundaryleakageoccur.

ST.LUCIEUNIT2RCSINSTRUNENT NOZZLECRACKINGPageTwoCONCLUSIONS Basedontheforegoing

analysis, therearenosignificant nuclearsafetyissuessurrounding theconcernofpotential IGSCCinthesevenRCSinstrument nozzlesdescribed herein.Theanalysisdemonstrates thatinthelimitingcase,thepressurizer lowerheadlevelnozzle,thestructural safetymarginofthepressurizer isnotcompromised forassumedleakageofoneoperating cycledurationorless.

EXTENDEDBURNUPANALYSISFORST.LUCIEUNITIPURPOSESafetyevaluation toaddressSt.LucieUnit1operations withhigherburnuplimits.Thisevaluation supportstheoperationoftheunitwithacoreaverageburnupto40,000MWD/MTUandamaximumassemblyburnupupto52,000MWD/MTU.SAFETYEVALUATION Sincealltheanalysesaffectedbytheextendedburnupoperation havebeenreviewedanddemonstrated tomeetthecurrently approvedsafetycriteria, itcanbestatedthat:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased.

Theincreased assemblyburnuplimitsdonotchangetheoverallconfiguration ofthePlant.Theincreaseinburnupdoesnotrequireaphysicalchangetothefuelorfuelhandlingequipment atthePlant.Sincethemodeofoperation remainsunchanged, theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotimpacted.

The.safetyanalysesperformed insupportofincreasing theassemblyburnupbeyond47,000MWD/MTUdemonstrates thattheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction havenotbeenincreased beyondthoseevaluated previously.

Thisisdemonstrated intheradiological releasecalculations whereconservative releasecalculations resultinsiteboundarydoseswhichareasmallfractionofthe10CFR100limits.Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously analyzedinthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.Asdiscussed earlier,theincreaseinburnupdoesnotrequireachangeintheoverallconfiguration ofthePlant.Themodeofoperation remainsunchanged sincetheincreaseinburnupdoesnotrequirechangesinfueldesign.

EXTENDEDBURNUPANALYSISFORST.LUCIEUNITIPAGETWO111)Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforeverytechnical specification isnotreduced.There-analyses oftheradiological assessment androdboweffectstosupportextension ofthemaximumendoflife(EOL)peakassemblyaverageexposures, haveshownthattheresultsarewellwithinthedesignbasis.Theeffectsofrodbow,whichaffecttheMDNBRcriteria, havebeenshowntobeboundedbytheexisting1.22safetylimitforassemblyexposures upto52,500MWD/MTU.Theanalysisshowsasmallrodbowpenalty(<0.5X)abovethe1.22safetylimitforassemblies withburnupsintherangeof50,900-52,500MWD/MTU.However,duetothedepressed powerlevelsassociated withthesehighburnupassemblies, thecalculated DNBR(fortheseextendedburnupassemblies) isboundedbytheDNBRassociated withhigherpoweredfreshfuelassemblies.

Basedonthesefindings, itisdetermined thattheincreaseinassemblyexposures does"notresultinareduction inthemarginofsafetyrelativetotheTechnical Specification basisforSt.LucieUnit1.CONCLUSION AsperFederalRegulation 10CFR50.59(b),

theaboveSafetyEvaluation providesthebasistoconcludethatoperation oftheSt.LucieUnitIwithacoreaverageburnupofupto40,000MWD/MTUand/orwithpeakassemblyburnupupto52,500MWD/MTUdoesnotinvolveanychangeswhichintroduce anunreviewed safetyquestion.

Therefore, implementation ofthischangeispermissible withoutpriorNRCapproval.

I REVIEMOFCHAPTER15EVENTSFORST.LUCIEUNIT1MITH15$STEANGENERATOR TUBEPLUGGING-10CFR50.59 DETERMINATION PURPOSEAreviewoftheFSARChapter16non-LOCAeventsforSt.LucieUnit1wasperformed byAdvancedNuclearFuels(ANF)tosupportoperation withupto15%steamgenerator tubeplugginglevel.Inaddition, aLOCA-ECCS accidentre-analysis forupto15Kaveragesteamgenerator tubepluggingwascompleted andhasbeenapprovedbytheNRC.SAFETYEVALUATION Sincealltheeventshavebeenreviewedandprovedacceptable, itcanbestatedthat:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafety,previously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,isnotincreased.

Theincreaseintubepluggingleveldoesnotchangetheoverallconfiguration ofthePlant..Themodeofoperation ofthePlaritremainsunchanged.

Therefore, theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentormalfunction, previously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,isnotincreased.

TheANFreportdemonstrates thattheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction havenotbeenincreased beyondtheseevaluated inthepreviousanalysessincealltransients meetcurrentcriteria.

Apossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously analyzedinthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.Therearenohardwareorprocedure changesfortheincreaseintubeplugginglevel.Themodeofoperation ofthePlantremainsunchanged.

Therefore, apossibility ofanewaccidentorequipment malfunction hasnotbeencreated.

REVIEWOFCHAPTER15EVENTSFORST.LUCIEUNITIWITH15$STEAMGENERATOR TUBEPLUGGING-10CFR50.59 DETERMINATION PAGETWO111)Themarginofsafety,asdefinedinthebasisforeveryTechnical Specification, isnotreduced.'heeventbyeventevaluation presented intheANFreporthasshownthatalleventsareboundedbytheresultsofpreviouscycleanalysisexceptfortheLossofExternalLoadevent.Theresultsofthere-analysis presented intheANFreportdemonstrate thatthemaximumsystempressurewascalculated tobe2725psia,whichisbelowthevesselpressurizationcriterionof2750psia(110Kofdesignpressure1imit).Therefore, thereisnoreduction inthemarginofsafetyrelativetotheTechnical Specification basis.CONCLUSION AsperFederalRegulation 10CFR50.59(b),

theaboveSafetyEvaluation providesthebasistoconcludethatthereisnounreviewed safetyissueassociated withtheincreaseofthesteamgenerator tubeplugginglevelto15%.ThisreviewwithinFuelResources meetsgI-FRN-07 requirements.

ST.LUCIEUNITIHYDROGENREGULATOR TOTHEVOLUMECONTROLTANK10CFR50.59 EVALUATION DESCRIPTION OFCHANGESetpointchangeforthehydrogenregulator (V-6758)tothevolumecontroltank(VCT)from15psigto50psig.Thelistedoperating pressuregivenintheFUSARfortheVCTis15psig.Thispressurecorresponds totheminimumsetpointforrequiredhydrogenconcentration.

Thereasonforchangeistoallowgreaterflexibility forhydrogeninjection intotheRCSinordertomaintainspecified hydrogenconcentration requirements.

SAFETYEVALUATION Theprobability ofanaccidentormalfunction previously evaluated hasnotbeenincreased.

Also,thepossibility ofcreatinganaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated hasnotbeencreated.Thisproposedchangeenhancestheoperability ofthechargingpumpsbyproviding ahighersuctionpressureandenhancing thenetpositivesuctionhead.Thischangedoesnotaffectthebasisofanytechnical specification sincethecomponent orparameter isnotreferenced intheTechnical Specification andwillallowmaintenance ofchemistry requirements referenced therein.Basedontheabove,itisconcluded thatthechangeinquestiondoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalisnotneeded.

SAFETYEVALUATION FORREMOVINGTHEPAGECAPABILITY FROMTHEBELLPHONESDESCRIPTION OFCHANGEThischangeremovedthepagingcapability fromtheBellphonesbecauseofunrestricted accessofhighvolumepaging.TheControlRoomsstillhavethecapability forhighvolumepagingviatheGaitronic phones.SAFETYEVALUATION Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARarenotincreased becausethiscommunication systemisnotconsidered intheevaluation.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFUSARwillnotbecreated.111)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification isnotreduced.

INCREASEINRCSpHATST.LUCIEUNIT2DURINGFUELCYCLE4DESCRIPTION OFCHANGEThisevaluation isconcerned withchangingtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)Lithium/Boron ControlProgramatSt.LucieUnitNo.2.Theproposedchangeinvolvesincreasing theRCSpHatSt.LucieUnitNo.2fortheremainder ofFuelCycle4,from6.9toa7.1-7.4bandbyincreasing theRCSlithiumconcentration toamaximumof2.4ppm.Thelithiumwillthenbeheldconstant(7.1-7.4)fortheremaining periodofcorelife.Thischangeisapplicable onlytoSt.LucieUnitNo.2andonlyfortheremainder ofthecurrentfuelcycle(FuelCycleNo.4).ThepurposeforraisingthepHflowfrom6.9to7.1-7.4isbecauserecentdataindicates thatslightlyhighpHwilllowerthetransport ofcorrosion productsfromthecoresurfaces; thuslowerthePlantradiation levels.SAFETYEVALUATION ThechangeinRCSpHisnotanunreviewed safetyquestionbaseduponthefollowing:

Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARarenotincreased.

ThebasesforConclusion Iareasfollows:a)Theproposedoperation witha7.1-7.4RCSpHdoesnotaffectanysafetyfeaturesofthePlant.b)Operation withapHof7.4iswithinthenormalrangeofoperation allowedbythefuelvendor'longstanding traditional recommendations forRCSlithiumconcentrations (1.0-2.0ppm).c)Thebasisforthischangeisconsistent withtheFUSARstatedobjectives forchemistry andpuritycontrol,Section9.3.d)LithiumHydroxide isthedesignbasispHcontrolchemicalfortheRCS.e)Themaximumlithium(2.4ppm)forthisoperation iswithintherangeofthevendor'scurrentrecommendations forRCSlithiumconcentration.

INCREASEINRCSpHATST.LUCIEUNIT2DURINGFUELCYCLE4PAGETWOg)WithrespecttoanyconcernforZircaloyhydriding andfuelfailures, thethreshold foraccelerated attackonZircaloyisapproximately 35ppm.Themaximumlithiumconcentration forthisoperation is2.4ppm,providing asignificant marginfromanareaofconcern.Consequently, theprobability offuelcladdingfailuresisnotsignificantly alteredbytheproposedchange.TheSt.LucieUnitNo.2steamgenerators donotcontaintubematerialconsidered highlysusceptible toprimarysidecracking.

However,withregardtosteamgenerator tubingfailureconcerns, ithasbeenfoundthatwithinthetypicalrangeofPWRchemistry control,primarysidecrackingofsusceptible Inconnel600steamgenerator tubingisrelatively insensitive topH.Recenttestsconducted byEPRIindicatethatthereisnosignificant effectoflithiumorpHovertherangeofpractical interestonhighlystressedspecimens ofsusceptible tubematerial.

Similarindications havebeenobservedforlesshighlystressedspecimens andlesssusceptible materials.

h)Withregardtootherprimarysystemboundaryfailures, nonegativeeffectsarepostulated fortheproposedchange.ExistingTechnical Specification chemistry limitsandLCO'sareunaffected bythischangeinoperation.

2.Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFUSARwillnotbecreated.ThebasisforConclusion 2isasfollows:a)Theproposedoperation doesnotinvolveanychangestothePlantoritsdesignbasisotherthanashorttermincreaseintheRCSlithi.umconcentration andanewconstantpHbandbeingmaintained.

3.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification isnotreduced.ThebasisforConclusion 3isasfollows:a)Notechnical specification changesarenecessary toimplement thisoperation.

Alltechnical specification chemistry limitsandLCO'sremainineffect.

INCREASEINRCSpHATST.LUCIEUNIT2DURINGFUELCYCLE4PAGETHREECONCLUSIONS Basedontheaboveevaluation, itisconcluded thatthemid-cycle pHchangeissafetoperformandthechangecanbeimplemented withoutpriorNRCapprovalpursuantto10CFR50.59 becauseitdoesnotinvolveachangeinPlanttechnical specifications andbecauseitisnotanunreviewed safetyquestion.

ST.LUCIEUNITIFUELHANDLINGANDCASKDROPRADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT PURPOSESafetyevaluation toaddressfuelhandlingandcaskdropradiological releasestoamaximumassemblyburnupof47,000MWD/MTU.Thisevaluation supportsfuelhandlingoperation oftheBatchHassemblies, currently inthecore,whoseburnupswillbeexceeding thepreviously analyzedradiological assessment burnuplimitof44,600MWD/MTU.SAFETYEVALUATION Basedonthetechnical evaluation performed andtheacceptable resultsshown,itcanbestatedthat:Theprobabi1ityofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased.

Theincreaseinassemblyburnuplimitdoesnotchangetheoverall.configuration ofthePlant.Theincreaseinburnupdoesnotrequireaphysicalchangetothefuelorfuelhandlingequipment atthePlant.Sincethemodeofoperation remainsunchanged, theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotimpacted.

Theradiological consequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyhasbeenevaluated.

Asdemonstrated inthesafetyevaluation, theradiological consequences oftheFuelHandlingandCaskDropaccidents resultinsiteboundarydoeswhichareasmallfractionofthe10CFR100limits.Theprobability ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously analyzedinthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.Asmentioned earlier,theincreaseinburnupdoesnotrequireachangeintheoverallconfiguration ofthePlant.Themodeofoperation remainsunchanged sincetheincreaseinburnupdoesnotrequirechangesinfueldesign.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1FUELHANDLINGANDCASKDROPRADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT PAGETWOThemarginofsafetyasdescribed inthebasisforeverytechnical specification isnotreduced.Theradiological assessment ofincreasing thefuelassemblydischarge burnupfrom44,600MWD/MTUto47,000MWD/MTUhasshownthattheresultsarewellwithinthedesignbasis.Basedonthisfinding,itisdetermined thattheincreaseinassemblyexposuredoesnotresultinareduction inthemarginofsafetyrelativetothetechnical specification basisforSt.LucieUnit1.CONCLUSION AsperFederalRegulation 10CFR50.59(b),

theaboveSafetyEvaluation providesthebasistoconcludethatFuelHandlingandsingleassemblycaskoperations involving fuel'ssemblies withburnupsupto47,000MWD/MTUdonotinvolveanychangeswhichintroduce anunreviewed safetyquestion.

Therefore, implementation ofthischangeispermissible withoutpriorNRCapproval.

REMOVALOFGUIDETUBEPLUGGINGDEVICESONST.LUCIEUNITIPURPOSESt.LucieUnit1wasoriginally designedwithpartlengthcontrolelementassemblies (PLCEAs).

ThePLCEAswereintendedtohelpcontroltheeffectofxenonoscillations onaxialpowerdistributions duringnormalPlantoperation.

PriortothestartupofCycle2,astudywascompleted thatdetermined thePLCEAswerenotnecessary.

Inordertopreservethedynamicoperating characteristics ofthereactor,thePLCEAswerereplacedbyGuideTubePluggingDevices(GTPDs).EachGTPDwasdesignedidentical tothePLCEAs;i.e.,fivefirigersperpluggingdevice.AtotalofsixGTPDswereinstalled.

Asaresult,duringeachfuelreload,theseplugsmustberemovedfromthecoreandre-installed intheirpropercorelocations priortostartup.RemovaloftheseGTPDscanpotentially resultinasavingsofthreeorfourhoursofcriticalpathfuelmovementtimeeachrefueling outage.SAFETYEVALUATION Basedonthetechnica1eva1uationperformed, itcanbeconcluded thattheremovaloftheGTPDs,duringtheCycle9refueling, doesnotresultinaviolation ofanydesigncriteria, isboundedbythereference analysesandcanbeimplemented withnochangesrequiredtotheexistingSt.LucieUnit1Technical Specifications.

Therefore:

i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased.

RemovaloftheSt.LucieUnitIGTPDsdoesnotresultinachangetotheoveralloperation andperformance ofthePlant.Therefore, theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotimpacted.

Theimpactofthechangeinflowcharacteristics wasdetermined, andtheeffectonalltransient analysesandsetpoints wasevaluated.

Theconsequences oftheanalysesevaluated donotexceedtheirrespective acceptance criteria.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction'f adifferent typethananypreviously analyzedinthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.

RggVALOFGUIDETUBEPLUGGINGDEVICESONST.LUCIEUNIT1PAGETWO111)Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforeverytechnical specification isnotreduced.TheremovaloftheSt.LucieUnit1GTPDsdoesnotimpacttheneutronics inputtothesafetyanalysisassumedforCycle9.Thesafetyanalyseshavebeenreviewed, andinallcasestheresultsarewellwithintheacceptance criteriaofthedesignbasis.BasedonanFPLsafetyevaluation, itcanbedetermined thattheremovaloftheSt.LucieUnitIGTPDsduringtheCycle9refueling outagedoesnotresultinareduction tothemarginofsafetyrelativetotheTechnical Specification basisforSt.LucieUnit1.CONCLUSION Asper'federalRegulation 10CFR50.50(b),

theaboveSafetyEvaluation providesthebasistoconcludethattheremovaloftheSt.LucieUnit1guidetubepluggingdevices(GTPDs)duringtheCycle9refueling outagedoesnotinvolveanychangeswhichintroduce anunreviewed safetyquestion.

Therefore, implementation ofthischangeispermissible withoutpriorNRCapproval.

ST.LUCIEUNITICYCLE9FUELRELOADANALYSISPURPOSETheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle9SafetyAnalysisReportpresentstheevaluation ofthereloadcorecharacteristics withrespecttothesafetyanalysespresented intheSt.LucieUnitICycle8SafetyAnalysisReport.SAFETYEVALUATION Basedonthetechnical evaluation performed andtheresultsofthere-analyses includedinthisSARreport,itcanbeconcluded thattheSt.LucieUnitICycle9reloaddesignmeetsallthedesigncriteria, isboundedbythereference analysesandcanbeimplemented withnochangesrequiredtotheexistingSt.LucieUnit1Technical Specifications.

Therefore:

Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased.

TheSt.LucieUnitICycle9reloaddoesnotresultinanychangestotheoverallconfiguration ofthePlant.Themodeofoperation remainsunchanged.

Therefore, theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotimpacted.

Thephysicsdatainputtosafetycalculations incorporated inCycle9werefoundtobe.conservatively calculated.

Thefueldesignmodifications incorporated forCycle9wereevaluated.

TheCEAejectioneventandtheMode5and6BoronDilutioneventsweretheonlytransients re-analyzed forCycle9.Asdiscussed inthesafetyevaluation ofthisdocument, theresultsofboththeCEAejectionandtheBoronDilutioneventswerewellwithintheacceptance criteria.

Basedontheconclusions oftheindependent FPLreviewandtheattachedsafetyevaluation, theconsequences ofaccidents orthemalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously analyzedinthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.TheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle9reloaddesigndoesnotresultinanychangesto.theoverallconfiguration ofthePlant,orintheactual.Plantoperation.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously analyzedinthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.

ST.LUCIEUNITICYCLE9FUELRELOADANALYSISPAGETWOiii)Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforevery'technical s'pecification isnotreduced.TheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle9reloaddesignneutronics inputandtheresulting safetyanalysishavebeenreviewed, andinallcases,theresultsarewellwithintheacceptance criteriaofthedesignbasis.BasedonFPLindependent technical reviewsoftheSARreport,itcanbedetermined thattheSt.LucieUnitICycle9reloaddesigndoesnotresultinareduction tothemarginofsafetyrelativetotheTechnical Specification basisforSt.LucieUnit1.CONCLUSION AsperFederalRegulation 10CFR50.59(b),

theaboveSafetyEvaluation providesthebasistoconcludethattheimplementation oftheSt.LucieUnitICycle9reloaddoesnotinvolveanychangeswhichintroduce anunreviewed safetyquestion.

Therefore, implementation ofthischangeispermissible withoutpriorNRCapproval.

ST.LUCIEUNITISAFETYEVALUATION FORGAGGINGV-3483SHUTDONCOOLINGSUCTIONRELIEFPURPOSEThissafetyevaluation addresses gaggingV-3483toallowtestingtheSt.LucieUnitIIntegrated Safeguards Testandtocontinuewiththerefueling outageactivities.

TheShutdownCoolingReturnReliefValvesV-3468andV-3483provideredundant overpressure protection fortheShutdownCoolingSystemduringsolidRCSoperation withallchargingpumpsrunning.V-3483hadunsatisfactory performance withunrepeatable liftsetpoint; therefore, itwasgaggeduntilrepaired, andV-3468providedtheoverpressure protection fortheShutdownCoolingSystem.SAFETYEVALUATION Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofanaccident, norcauseanincreaseintheprobability ofmalfunction orconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafety.GaggingofV-3483doesnotcreatethepossibility ofanaccidentpreviously unanalyzed intheSARorcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofeguipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheSAR.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1EVALUATION OFSTEAMGENERATOR SLUDGELANCINGCONCURRENT WITHREFUELING OPERATIONS PURPOSEAsafetyevaluation waswrittentosupportsteamgenerator sludgeoperations usingPenetration 854,ILRTPressurization Station,andPenetration 856,HydrogenPurgeMakeup.Thisevaluation isappliedtothesludgelanceactivities performed onSt.LucieUnitIsteamgenerators duringtheSummer1988refueling outage.SAFETYEVALUATION Thesteamgenerator sludgelancingarrangement concurrent withrefueling operations doesnot:increasetheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipment important tosafetybecausethesepenetrations usedforsludgelancingactivitiqs havingdirectaccessfromthecontainment atmosphere totheoutsideatmosphere arecapableofbeingclosedbyamanualisolation valve,orthedirectpathwayhasbeenfittedwithaleak-tight stuffingboxtomaintainanairtightsealatthecontainment penetration; 4createthepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferent typethanpreviously analyzed; iii)reducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specifications.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1POTENTIAL LEAKINGSTEAMGENERATOR TUBEPLUGSSAFETYEVALUATION PURPOSEOuringtheJuly1988refueling outageatSt.LucieUnit1,visualinspection oftheprimarysideofthesteamgenerator tubesheetindicated possibleleakageofWestinghouse mechanical plugs.TheseWestinghouse plugswereinstalled duringtheOecember1985refueling outage.Westinghouse haswrittenasafetyevaluation toconservatively addresssubsequent Plantoperation withsteamgenerator mechanical plugs.whichmaybeleakingasaresultofdegradation suchasprimarywaterstresscorrosion crackingorplugswhichmaybeleakingatthetube-to-plug interface.

SAFETYEVALUATION 10CFR50.59 allowsachangetoanuclearfacilitywithoutpriorNRCapprovalifanunreviewed safetyquestiondoesnotexistandifchangestoTechnical Specifications arenotinvolved.

Basedontheevaluation offailuremodes,itisconcluded thatanunreviewed safetyquestiondoesnotexistrelativetothepotentially leakingplugssince,Theprobability ofoccurrence ofa.designbasisaccidentisnotincreased sincetheleakagethroughacrackintheplugorbetweenthetubeandpluginterface wouldnotbeexpectedtoproduceanygreaterleakagethanthatcausedbysmallcracksinasteamgenerator tube,andlossofasteamgenerator tubeplugwouldnotbeexpectedsincethestructural integrity oftheplugisnotinquestion.

Theconsequences ofapreviously postulated designbasisaccidentarenotmademoresevereforthesamereasongivenin(i)andsincenoaccident-mitigating equipment orsystemshavebeenaltered.iv)Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethanpreviously addressed intheFSARdoesnotexistsinceasteamgenerator tuberuptureconcurrent withtubeplugfailureisnotconsidered apossiblefailuremode.Onlytubeplugleakage(withinTechSpeclimits)isexpectedforthelimitingcaseofatubefish-mouth failure.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification isnotreducedsincenochangeisbeingmadewithrespecttothenumberofpluggedsteamgenerator tubes,.andanyprimary-to-secondary leakageindicative ofadegradedtubeplugcouldbeidentified byexistingradiation monitoring equipment andsecondary chemistry sampl.ing procedures.

ThiswouldpermitanorderlyPlantshutdown.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1POTENTIAL LEAKINGSTEANGENERATOR TUBEPLUGSSAFETYEVALUATION PageTwoCONCLUSION Theassessment hasconcluded thatcontinued operation oftheunitisacceptable sincetheevaluation hasshownthatnoaccidents orsafetyconcernsoutsideofthoseanalyzedintheFSARaregenerated, andoperation withinthecurrentTechSpecswillcontinuetoprovideappropriate detection andcontrolparameters.

Finally,themarginofsafetyofthePlant,asdefinedinthebasisofanytechnical specification hasbeenevaluated andisnotreduced.Evenifapluggedn'on-active tubeexperienced through-waIl degradation (including afish-mouth openingasaresultoftheflowdiodeeffect),alargeprimary-to-secondary leakageeventwouldnotbeexpectedandorderlyPlantshutdowncouldbeachieved.

Therefore, subsequent Plantoperation ofSt.LucieUnit1doesnotrepresent anunreviewed safetyquestionpursuanttolOCFR50.50 criteria.

ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION FORGAGGINGSR-143502ASHUTDOWNCOOLINGHEATEXCHANGER PURPOSEThechangeinvolvedthegaggingofasafetyreliefvalveSR-14350thatprovidesoverpressure protection ofaprotected boundarywhichincludesthe2AShutdownCoolingHeatExchanger.

Thesafetyreliefvalvewasgaggedtoterminated thepremature liftingofthesafetyrelief.SAFETYEVALUATION Theself-actuated springloadedreliefvalveisdescribed inparagraph 9.2.2;2oftheFUSAR.Thereliefvalveisdescribed asadeviceusedforoverpressure protection oftheshutdowncoolingheatexchanger.

Theoverpressure protection isrequiredontheSDCheatexchanger topreventanoverpressurization eventcausedbythermalexpansion offluidshouldtheprotected boundarybeisolatedwhilefilledwithwater.However,thenormallineupofthecomponent coolingwatersystemrequiresthattheprotected boundaryisolation valves(SB-14348

&SB-l4365) tobeplacedinthelockedopenpositionexceptformaintenance purposes.

Thepositionofthesevalvesisverifiedtobelockedopenonaquarterly basisperAdministrative Procedure 1-0010123.

Therefore, basedontheabove:Thechangedoesnotincreasetheprobability ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated sin'cetheprotected boundaryisnotisolated, thusanoverpressurization eventwouldnotoccur.Theproposedchangedoesnotcreateconditions foradifferent typeofaccidentthanwaspreviously evaluated sincearedundant shutdowncoolingheatexchanger isavailable andthereisnosinglefailurethatcouldpreventtheshutdowncoolingsystemfromperforming itssafetyfunction.

ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedintheTechnical Specifications isnotreducedsincethesafetyreliefvalveisnotreferenced thereinandthegaggedreliefvalvewi11notrendertheshutdowncoolingsysteminoperable.

Furthermore, basedonthepreviousstatement, achangetotheTechnical Specifications isnotrequired.

ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION FORGAGGINGSR-143502ASHUTDOMNCOOLINGHEATEXCHANGER PAGETWOCONCLUSION Basedontheabove,itisconcluded thatthechangeinquestiondoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionnorachangetotheTechnical Specifications; therefore, priorapprovalbytheNRCisnotrequired.

ST.LUCIEUNITISAFETYEVALUATION TOPERMITINCREASING REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMLITHIUMCONCENTRATION TOREDUCERCSRADIATION LEVELSBACKGROUND Lithiumhydroxide isusedtocontrolRCSpHtomaintainazerocoefficient ofsolubility fordissolved corrosion

products, i.e.,crud.ThisresultsincrudgoingintosolutioninhotterregionsoftheRCS(thecore)andcruddeposition occurringincoolerregionsoftheRCS(thesteamgenerators).

Theoverallcorecrudloadwouldbereducedbypreventing crudfromdepositing onthefuelsurfaces.

Althoughthecrudloadinthesteamgenerators wouldincrease, theneteffectistominimizetheactivation ofcorrosion productsbyreducingtheirresidence timeinthecore.Currently, RCSpHcontrolismaintained atconstantpH6.9byacoordinated lithium-boron controlprogram.Thisprogramisbasedoncrudbeingcomprised primarily ofmagnetite, andthezerocoefficient ofsolubility ofmagnetite occursatpH6.9.Recentinvestigations ofcrudsolubility, however,suggestthatcrudismadeupmostlyofcobaltandnickelsubstituted ferriteswhosezerosolubility coefficient occursatpH7.4.Itissurmisedthatsignificant reductions inRCSradiation levelsareattainable byoperating atthishigherpH.SCOPEThissafetyevaluation proposestaincreasethelithiumconcentration intheRCS,asatest,fromthecurrentlimitof2.2ppmto3.5ppmforthedurationofSt.LucieUnit1Cycle9.Thiscorresponds toaninitialpH6.9at2000ppmboron.Lithiumconcentration wouldbeheldconstantat3.5ppmfromBOCuntilpH7.4isreachedatapproximately 650ppmboron.Acoordinated lithium-boron programwouldthenbeinstituted tomaintainpH7.4untiltheendofcycle.SAFETYEVALUATION FuelRodPerformance Nodesignchangesarebeingmadetothefuelassemblydimensions, norwillanyoccurasaresultofthehigherLi/pHcontrol.Giventhatfuelrodperformance iswithinlimitsofpreviousanalysis, rodgrowth,andassemblyirradiation induceddimensional changeswillalsoremainwithinanalyzedlimits.Theeffectofoperating atthehigherlithiumandpHlevelsproposeddoesnotresultinanincreaseintheprobability offuelfailureeitherdirectlyorindirectly.

Corrosion failureisnotprobableasneithersufficient lithiumconcentration norahighenoughpHexistforaccelerated corrosion tooccur,noristhereanysecondary failuremechanisms thatmightincreasetheprobability offuelcladdingfailure.Corrosion levelswillnotbegreaterthanpreviously experienced, andnoaccelerated hydrogenpickupduetolithiumhasbeendemonstrated; consequently noweakening ofthecladdingorfailureduetohydriding willoccur.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION TOPERMITINCREASING REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMLITHIUMCONCENTRATION TOREDUCERCSRADIATION LEVELSPageTwoFuelRodPerformance (cont'd)Neithertheprobability northeconsequences ofanyaccidentpreviously analyzedareincreased becauseoperation atahigherlithiumconcentration andpHdoesnotresultinfuelcorrosion ormechanical behavioreithergreaterthan,ordifferent from,previously considered intheinputtoanysafetyanalysis.

Thepossibility ofadifferent accidentthananyalreadyevaluated isnotincreased becauseneitherthefuelnoritsmodesofoperation willbechangedbyoperating attheproposedlithiumandpHlimits.Nochangestothefuelortothefueloperating environment, otherthanincreasing lithiumandpH,arebeingproposed.

Hecausethesechangeshavenoimpactonthedesignofthefueloritsoperation, thereisnoincreaseinthepossibility ofcreatinganewordifferent typeofaccidentthanpreviously analyzed.

Themarginofsafetyasdescribed inthebasisofanytechnical specification isnotreducedbecausenochangesinanyfuelanalysisinputorassumptions arerequiredasaresultoftheproposedchanges;norareanychangestoanalysismethodology necessary todescribefuelrodbehavior.

Asnoinputs,assumptions, ormethodshavechanged,theresultsofprevioussafetyanalysisremainunchanged.

Inconclusion, increasing theSt.LucieUnit1RCSpHto7.4andthemaximumlithiumconcentration to3.5ppm,posesnothreattofuelrodintegrity.

Experiments todetermine thecorrosive effectsoflithiumonzircaloydemonstrated thatlithiumattackonlyoccursathighpHandhighLiconcentrations, neitherofwhichispresentatSt.LucieUnit1.Nochangeinfuelrodperformance isanticipated duetotheelevatedpHprogram.Assuch,nosafetyanalysisisimpactednorisanynewanalysisrequired.

ProgramsinplaceatMillstone andCalvertCliffswillbeexaminedforimportant conclusions applicable toFPLatSt.Lucie.BALANCE-OF-PLANT Theproposedincreaseinlithiumconcentration doesnotincreasethecorrosion ratenorincreasetheincidence ofstresscorrosion ofthecomponents wettedbyprimarycoolantortheletdowntoothersystems.Theresultant increasetoaslightlybasicprimarywatersolutionwillhavenoeffectonthedesignlifeorperformance ofequipment important tosafety,sincecorrosion rateswillnotbeadversely affected.

Therefore, theproposedincreaseinlithiumlevelsdoesnotincreasetheprobability ofaccidents ormalfunction toequipment previously evaluated.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION TOPERMITINCREASING REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMLITHUMCONCENTRATION TOREDUCERCSRADIATION LEVELSPageThreeBALANCE-OF-PLANT (cont')Theoperability ofthesprayadditionsystemensuresthatsufficient amountsofsodiumhydroxide isaddedtothecontainment sprayintheeventofalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)inordertomaintainapHvalueof8.5to11.0(T.S.3/4.6.2.2).

Theincreaseinlithiumconcentration isnegligible comparedtothesodiumhydroxide concentration inthecontainment sumpsolutionanddoesnotaltertheresultant pHfortheanalyzedevents.Therefore, thebasisforthesprayadditivesystemisnotaffected, andtheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously analyzedintheFSARarenotaffected.

Theproposedincreaseinlithiumlevelwi11notcreateamalfunction oradifferent failuremechanism thanpreviously evaluated, sincethecorrosion rateswillnotincreaseforthePlantcomponents whichcontacttheprimarycoolantoritsletdown.Thelimitations

-ontheRCSchemistry (T.S.3/4.4.7)ensurethatcorrosion ofthecomponents wettedbyprimarywaterisminimized andreducethepotential forRCSleakageorfailureduetostresscorrosion.

Increasing thelithiumconcentration asproposedwillnotreducethecorrosion protection norincreasethepotential forstresscorrosion, andthestructural integrity ofthewettedcomponents willnotbeadversely affected.

Thelimitations forRCSpHlevelsandlithiumconcentration arenotprovidedforintheTechnical Specifications, butarespecified intheupdatedfinalSafetyAnalysisReportandPlantchemistry operating procedure.

Therefore, theproposedchangeinlithiumlevelswillnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedfor'nyTechnical Specification basis.Inconclusion, thewettedmaterials withinthosesystemscontacting primaryfluidweredetermined tobeinsensitive totheprov.sedincreaseinpHlevel,sincethisresultsonlyinaslightincreaseinpHfrom6.8-6.9,to6.9-7.4.Corrosion ratesorincidence ofstresscorrosion crackingforthewettedmaterials atelevatedlithiumlevelandpHlevelwillnotincrease.

Theperformance ofsystemscreditedinpreviously analyzedeventsintheupdatedfinalSafetyAnalysisReportwouldnotbeadversely affected.

CONCLUSION Title10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Section50.59,permitsteststothePlantasdescribed intheSafetyAnalysisReportwithoutpriorNuclearRegulatory Commission

approval, providedcertaincriteriaaremet.ItmustbeshownthatthePlanttestdoesnotinvolveanUnreviewed SafetyguestionorrequireachangetotheTechnical Specifications.

ST.LUCIEUNITISAFETYEVALUATION TOPERMITINCREASING REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMLITHIUMCONCENTRATION TOREDUCERCSRADIATION LEVELSPageFourCONCLUSION (cont'd)Thissafetyevaluation concludes thatincreasing thereactorcoolantsystemlithiumconcentration asdescribed, willnotposeanUnreviewed Safetyguestion, requireachangetotheTechnical Specifications, orrequirepriorNuclearRegulatory Commission approval.

ST.LUCIEUNITITEMPORARY TEECONNECTION ONTHEINSTRUMENT AIRLINESTOTHEFEEDMATER REGULATING VALVES,FCV-9011SiFCV-9021DESCRIPTION OFCHANGEAtemporary mechanical jumperconnection installed intheinstrument airsupplylinetothefeedwater regulating valveactuator.

Thepurposeofthejumperistomeasuretheairsignalsuppliedtothevalvesactuator, whichwaspartoftheongoingtrouble-shooting activities relatedtoerraticoscillation ofsteamgenerator levels.SAFETYEVALUATION Thistemporary modification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction evaluated intheFSARisnotincreased becausethemodification meetsalloftheapplicable designrequirements oftheexistingtubing.Additionally, theisolation valveswillbenormallyclosedandcappedtoprecludeleakage.Furthermore, thefailureofthetie-inswillresultintransients alreadyaddressed intheFSAR.Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanevaluated intheFSARisnotcreated.Asdiscussed above,allfailuremechanisms of.thetie-insresultintransients andscenarios thatarealreadyevaluated intheFSAR.Protective equipment existstomitigatethesetransients.

Thismodification doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisoftheTechnical Specifications asthisportionofthefeedwater systemisnon-safety, non-seismic andnotaportionoftheTechnical Specifications.

Asper10CFR50.59,thischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, andpriorNRCapprovalforimplementation isnotrequired.

NoTechnical Specification changesarerequiredforimplementation.

ST.LUCIEUNITICYCLE8EXTENDEDBURNUPASSEMBLIES PURPOSESafetyAnalysisReporttosupportcontinued poweroperations onSt.LucieUnitI,Cycle8beyond9450EFPH.SAFETYEVALUATION Sincealltheanalysesaffectedbytheextendedburnupassemblyoperation havebeenreviewedanddemonstrated tomeetthecurrently approvedsafetycriteria, itcanbestatedthat:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased.

Theincreased assemblyburnuplimitdoesnotchangetheoverallconfiguration ofthePlant.Theincreaseinburnupdoesnotrequireaphysicalchangetothefuelorfuelhandling.

equipment atthePlant.Sincethemodeofoperation remainsunchanged, theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotimpacted.

Thesafetyanalysesperformed insupportofincreasing theassemblyburnupbeyond44,500N(0/NTUdemonstrates thattheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction havenotbeenincreased beyondthoseevaluated previously.

Thisisdemonstrated intheradiological releasecalculations whereoverlyconservative releasecalculations resultinsiteboundarydoseswhichareasmallfractionofthe10CFR100.Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously analyzedintheSafetyAnalysisisnotcreated.Asmentioned earlier,theincreaseinburnupdoesnotrequireachangeintheoverallconfiguration ofthePlant.Themodeofoperation remainsunchanged sincetheincreaseinburnup.does notrequirechangesinfueldesign.

ST.LUCIEUNITICYCLE8EXTENDEDBURNUPASSEMBLIES PAGETWOThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforeverytechnical specification isnotreduced.There-analyses ofthemechanical design,radiological assessment, LOCA/ECCS androdboweffects,tosupportextension ofthemaximumendoflife(EOL)peakassemblyaverageexposures, haveshownthattheresultsarewellwithinthedesignbasis.Theeffectsofrodbow,whichaffecttheMDNBRcriteria, havebeenshowntobeboundedbytheexisting1.22safetylimitforassemblyexposures upto52,500MWO/MTU.Theanalysisshowsasmallrodbowpenalty(<0.5%)abovethe1.22safetylimitforassemblies withburnupsintherangeof50,900-52,500MWD/MTU.However,duetothedepressed powerlevelsassociated withthesehighburnupassemblies, thecalculated DNBR(fortheseextendedburnupassemblies) isboundedbytheONBRassociated withhigherpoweredfreshfuelassemblies.

Basedonthesefindings, itisdetermined.

thattheincreaseinassemblyexposures doesnotresultinareduction inthemarginofsafetyrelativetotheTechnical Specification basisforSt.LucieUnitl.CONCLUSION AsperFederalRegulation 10CFR50.59(b),

theaboveSafetyEvaluation providesthebasistoconcludethatoperation ofCycle8beyond9450EFPHdoesnotinvolveanychangeswhichintroduce anunreviewed safetyquestion.

Therefore, implementation ofthischangeispermissible withoutpriorNRCapproval.

ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION FORUSEOFSEALINGCOMPOUNDONVALVEFCV-23-6STEAMGENERATOR BLOMDOMNCONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVEPURPOSESt.LucieUnit2Blowdown.Containment Isolation ValveFCV-23-6wasreportedtobeleaking.Thisvalvewaspreviously repairedperNonconformance Report2-113atthebonnetconnection.

Thepurposeofthisevaluation istoprovideamethodforatemporary leakrepairbyinjecting asealingcompoundforthebodytobonnetconnection.

Thisvalveisnon-isolated andnormallyopen.SAFETYEVALUATION Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequence ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluatdintheSafetyAnalysisReporthasnotbeenincreased.

Thisrepairdoesnotadversely affecttheintegrity oftheblawdownboundaryotherthantoaidinsealingaleakingvalve'sbonnetandlowerflangedjoint.Theprobability ofapiperuptureisnotincreased sincethestru'ctural integrity oftheblowdownsystemcomponents isnotimpacted.

Theimpactoftheaddedweightofthesealant,fittings, andcapnutsonthestressanalysisandsupportshasbeenevaluated anddetermined tobesatisfactory.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysisReporthasnotbeencreated.Theproposedrepairdoesnotprovideanewmodeofnormaloremergency Plantoperation.

Thevalveisrequiredformaintaining containment isolation, anditsabilitytodosowillbeenhancedwiththeinjection ofthesealantintothevalve.Inaddition, newPlanthardwareotherthanthecapnutsandfittingspreviously described, areaddedbythisrepair.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification hasnotbeenreduced.Chemistry limitsarenotalteredandnootherchangeisproposedtothePlantdesign,modesofoperation orassumptions in<heTechnical Specification orsafetyanalysis.

0 ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION FORUSEOFSEALINGCOMPOUNDONVALVEFCV-23-6STEAMGENERATOR BLOWDONCONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVEPAGETMOCONCLUSION 10CFR50.59 allowschanges/repairs toafacilityasdescribed intheFSARifanunreviewed safetyquestiondoesnotexistandifachangetotheTechnical Specifications isnotrequired.

Asshowninthepreceding

sections, thechangeproposeddoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionoraTechnical Specification changebecauseeachconcernposedby10CFR50.59 canbepositively answered.

ST.LUCIEUNITISAFETYEVALUATION FORRAISINGLOWPRESSUREANNUNCIATION SETPOINTS INTHEINSTRUMENT AIRSYSTEMDESCRIPTION OFCHANGERaisethelowpressureannunciation setpoints inpressureswitchesPS-18-7andPS-18-4.Thecurrentlowpressuresetpoints donotprovideadequatewarningtimeforaproblemwiththeInstrument AirSystembecauseofthehigheroperating pressureband.PS-18-7willberaisedfrom75psigto95psigandPS-18-4willberaisedfrom80psigto100psig.SAFETYEVALUATION TheInstrument AirSystemperformsnosafetyrelatedfunctionandisnotrequiredforPlantsafeshutdownnorisitrequiredtomitigatetheconsequences ofanaccident.

Changingthelowpressuresetpointforthesubjectpressureswitchesdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, andthefollowing arebasesforthisjustification:

Theprpbabi1ityofoccurrenceortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportisnotincreased.

TheInstrument AirSystemisnotusedinanysafetyanalysisforaccidents ormalfunctions ofequipment andtherefore changingthesubjectsetpoints willnothaveanyadverseeffectonequipment important tosafety.Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysisReportisnotcreated.PressureswitchesPS-18-4andPS-18-7performnosafetyrelatedfunctionandwillnot,therefore, introduce anynewfailuremodestosafetyrelatedequipment.

Thischangehasnoeffectontheoperational designofthesystem.1ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification isnotaffectedbythischange.PS-18-4andPS-18-7arenotpartofthebasesforanyTechnical Specification.

ThischangerequiresnochangetotheUnit1Technical Specifications.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION FORRAISINGLOMPRESSUREANNUNCIATION SETPOINTS INTHEINSTRUMENT AIRSYSTEMPAGETMOCONCLUSION Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59, thesafetyevaluation whichprovidestheconclusion thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionorachangetotheTechnical Specifications, andmaybemadeonatemporary basisuntilSupplement 2toPC/M050-186isissued.PriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthischange.

ST.LUCIEUNITISAFETYEVALUATION FORUSEOFSEALINGCOMPOUNDONVALVEFCV-23-6STEAMGENERATOR BLONONCONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVEPURPOSESt.LucieUnit1BlowdownContainment Isolation ValveFCV-23-6wasreportedtobeleakingperNonconformance Report1-283.Thepurposeofthisevaluation istoprovideamethodforatemporary leakrepairbyinjecting asealingcompoundforthebodytobonnetconnection.

Thisvalveisnon-isolated andnormallyopen.SAFETYEVALUATION Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReporthas.notbeenincreased.

Thevalveisrequiredformaintaining containment isolation, anditsabilitytodosowillnotbeaffectedbecausetheleaksealwillbecapableofpreventing leakageat985psigundernormaloperating conditions vspsigpost-LOCA.

Thisrepairdoesnotadversely affecttheintegrity oftheblowdownboundaryotherthantoaidinsealingaleakingvalvebodytobonnetjoint.Theprobabi.lity ofapiperuptureisnotincreased sincethestructural integrity oftheblowdownsystemcomponents arenotimpacted.

Theimpactoftheaddedweightofthesealant,fittings, andcapnutsonthestressanalysisandsupportshasbeenevaluated anddetermined tobesatisfactory.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysisReporthasnotbeencreated.Theproposedrepairdoesnotprovideanewmodeofnormaloremergency Plantoperation.

Inaddition, nonewPlanthardwareotherthanthecapnutspreviously described areaddedbythisrepair.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification hasnotbeenreduced.Chemistry limitsarenotalteredandnootherchangeisproposedtothePlantdesign,modesofoperation orassumptions intheTechnical Specifications orSafetyAnalysis.

Asshowninthepreceding

sections, thechangeproposeddoesnot,involveanUnreviewed Safety.guestionoraTechnical Specification change.
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