ML17223B119

1990 Annual Operating Rept.

ML17223B119
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	12/31/1990
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
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ML17223B118	List: ML17223B117 ML17223B119 ML17223B120
References
NUDOCS 9103050254
Download: ML17223B119 (90)

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1990ANNUALOPERATING REPORTST~LUCIEUNITS1&21990ST~LUCIEUNITS1&2STEAMGENERATOR IN-SERVICE INSPECTION REPORTt9103050254 910227PDRADOCK05000335RPDR

..9103050241 TABLEOFCONTENTSSection1Section2Section3Section4Section5Annual10CFR50.59ReportSteamGenerator In-Service Inspection MangroveStudyPersonnel ExposureSummaryChemistry Summary SECTION1ST~LUCIEANNUAL10CFR50'9REPORTAsummaryofchangestothefacilityasdescribed intheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)(10CFR50.59(A)(1)(i))issubmitted byseparatelettersatthesametimeastheannualFSARupdateforeachunit(July22forSt.LucieUnit1andApril6forSt.LucieUnit2).Changestoprocedures asdescribed intheFSAR(10CFR50.59(A)(1)(ii))andtestsandexperiments notdescribed intheFSAR(10CFR50.59(A)(1)(iii))areattached.

10CFR50.59Evaluations Temporary ChangesviaJumper/lifted LeadsRecgxests 10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-07Component/System Affected:

Refueling MachinemaincontrolcabinetDescription ofChange:Thisjumper/lifted leadrequestistoinstallajumperacrossLS-HULtosimulateasignaltothehoistuplimitswitch.TheotherjumperistosimulateasignaltoLS-FSRtoindicatethefuelspreaderisretracted.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thehoistboxontherefueling machineisnotinstalled andundergoing repairs.Thesejumpersarenecessary toprovideelectrical powertomovetherefueling machine.Thiswillenableunlatching oftheCEA'susingelectrical power,ratherthanhavingtohandcranktherefueling machine.Cautiontagtobeinstalled oncontrolstickonrefueling machinetoindicatethesejumpersareinstalled.

Thejumpersaretoberemoveduponcompletion ofunlatching CEA's.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR,Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-09Component/System Affected:

HeatingandVentilation Exhaust(HVE)fan8BDescription ofChange:Thisjumper/lifted leadrequestistorunHVE-8Bwithpowerfromthe"A"trainoroppositetrain.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.The"A"powerbusforthepurgefanscontactswillbeworkedon.Thisjumper/lifted leadrequestallowsthefanstocontinueoperation.

Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-17Component/System Affected:

1A&1BDieselGenerators Description ofChange:Thisjumper/lifted leadrequestresultsfromtheinadvertant dieselgenerator startcausedbytheEngineered Safeguards FeaturesActuation Signal(ESFAS)PlantChangeModification (PC/M).Startsignalstothedieselgenerator fromSafetyInjection Actuation Signal(SIAS),Containment Isolation Signal(CIS),andContainment SprayActuation Signal(CSAS)werelifted.Undervoltage dieselgenerator starthasnotbeenaffected.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Inmode6operation theliftedleadonlyisolatesthedieselgenerators fromESFASandarenotinvolvedintheoperation ofotherequipment.

Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Again,thisliftedleaddoesnotimpactotherequipment operation, onlythedieselgenerator start.ESFASisnotrequiredtobeoperableinMode6.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-18Component/System Affected:

ControlRoomOutsideAirIntakeRadiation Monitoring Description ofChange:Toperformcalibration ofControlRoomoutsideairintakeradiation monitoring.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:OnlyonechannelofControlRoomoutsideairintakeradiation monitoring canbejumperedatatime.Oncethejumperisinstalled workmustbeprogressed inanexpeditious manner.Ifworkmustbestoppedpriortocompletion jumpersmustbeimmediately removed.IftheControlRoomoutsideairintakesystemactuatesfromanothersource,immediately stopworkandremovejumpers.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.OnechannelofControlRoomoutsideairradiation monitoring willremainoperableatalltimes.Thisiscapableoffullyactuating theControlRoomoutsideairintakeventilation system.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Only"onechannelofControlRoomoutsideairradiation monitoring willbejumperedatatime.Containment Isolation SignalforUnit2willnotbeaffected.

TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

TheControlRoomoutsideairintakeventilation systemactuation signalsarenotaddressed intheTechnical Specification, equipment addressed bytheTechnical Specification 3.7.7.1willremainoperable.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsmIUnit:RequestNumber:0-30Component/System Affected:

Turbinetripfrom20ETSolenoidand20Overspeed Protection ControlDescription ofChange:Needtostroketurbinevalves.Liftinglead38inRTGB101willdeenergize 20ETsolenoid.

Thiswillallowtestingofgovenor,reheat,throttleandintercept valvesofturbine.SafetyEvaluation Summary:SincetheUnitisshutdowninMode5withmorethanadequateshutdownmargin,thereisnoincreaseintheprobability ofrisktosafetyofhealthandpublic.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.UnitbeingshutdowninMode5withadequateshutdownmargin.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evalatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-31Component/System Affected:

CEARod¹30Description ofChange:Aproblemoccurredwiththeindicator forCEA¹30.DuringtheUnit1outage,theReedSwitchPositionTransmitter (RSPT)forCEA¹30dayswasreplaced.

Thepurposeofthisjumper/lifted leadistousesparecable,previously forpartlengthCEA¹35,fromthequickdisconnect incontainment totheterminalconnections inthecablespreading room,Sinceallofthecolorcodesarethesame,onetagisusedforthecableinthecablespreading roomcabinet.Verification ofproperhookupwillbeaccomplished viaroddroptestingpriortostartup.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFVSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Thesparecablewillbetestedviaroddroptesting.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

Thesameindicator isbeingusedfortheRSPT,howeverusingsparecablefrompartlengthCEAquickdisconnect tocablespreading room.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-33Component/System Affected:

Transferpumps/Domestic waterpumpsDescription ofChange:Thisjumper/lifted leadwasinstalled temporarily toavoiddomesticwaterpumplockoutwhiletestinglowlevelalarm.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.FUSARsection9.2.6.3specifically statesthedomesticwatersystemperformsnosafetyfunctions.

Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-38Component/System Affected:

MainFeedwater Regulating ValveDescription ofChange:Specialpostmaintenance testingchannelcheckonmainfeedwater regulating valves.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Operators havemanualcontrolcapability ofallfeedsystemcomponents asperFUSARsection7.7.1.3.1.

Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR,Aspreviously stated,operators havemanualcontrolcapability ofallfeedsystemcomponents asperFUSARsection7.7.1.3.1.

TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specifications.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsRequestNumber:0-39Component/System Affected:

27-1Undervoltage (degraded voltage)relayforthe1A2480Vloadcenterterminals 11&12.Description ofChange:Thisjumper/lifted leadrequestmaintains thereferenced relayinthetrippedpositionasperTechnical Specification 3.3.2.1.Therelaymustbereplacedorrepairedbythenextcalibration channelcheck.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thisjumper/lifted leadrequestiscoveredintheFUSARsincea2-out-of-2 logicisusedfortheseundervoltage relays.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Asreferenced intheFUSARpage8.3-5a,eachClassIE480Vbus(1A2&2B2)utilizestwoundervoltage definitetimerelaysina2-out-of-2 coincident logicscheme.Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-75Component/System Affected:

Line5ofGaitronics alarmrelaycabinetDescription ofChange:Thisliftedleadreflectsachangerequested byoperations tosplitchannel5ontheGaitronics betweenUnit1andUnit2.Thisliftedleadwasoriginally doneunderjumper/lifted leadnumber7-55,butanNCRwasgenerated inordertoupdatetheevaluation.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-77Component/System Affected:

FlowIndicator SwitchFIS-21-9A Description ofChange:Thisjumper/lifted leadistofacilitate liftingleadforannunciator S-3toremoveahardelectrical ground.Thisgroundiscausingspurious, falseannunciations.

Thecauseofthegroundiswaterintrusion andapparentdegradation oftheconduitfromFIS-21-9A intheComponent CoolingWater(CCW)area.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR,Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.TheworstcaseintheFUSARislossofoffsitepowerwithbothemergency dieselgenerators failingtostart,naturalcirculation wouldbemaintained foratleast3hours,averagerestoration ofoffsitepoweris36.6minutes.Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.OneCCWHeatExchanger alonecansafelyaccommodate aLossofCoolingAccident(LOCA)heatloadaspersection9.7.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

OnlyneedoneComponent CoolingWater/Intake CoolingWaterHeatExchanger tohandledesignbasisLOCA.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-01Component/System Affected:

HCV-25-58cHCV-25-6Containment PurgeValvesDescription ofChange:Thisjumper/lifted leadrequestwasforinstalling anairjumperaroundthefollowing valves,SE-25-7andSE-25-8.Thiswasdonetosupportmechanical maintenance byfailingopentheHCV-25-5EcHCV-25-6containment purgevalves.-SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Containment integrity wasnotsetduetoMode5operations duringarefueling outage.Therefore, itwasnotnecessary forthepurgevalvestobeclosed.Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR,InMode5operation containment integrity isnotrequired.

TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-03Component/System Affected:

TurbineTripInstrumentation Description ofChange:Thisliftedleadrequestdisabledturbinetripinstrumentation toenableworkonlimitswitches.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Turbinetripinstrumentation isnotrequiredtobeoperableduringMode5operation.

Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-04Component/System Affected:

ReactorProtection System(RPS)ChannelA&BSteamGenerator LevelTripsDescription ofChange:ThisliftedleadentailedliftingofmultipleleadsinRPScabinetsA&Binordertosimulatenormallevelonsteamgenerator A.Thiswasdonetoallowworkonthecontrolelementdrivesystem.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.DuringMode5operations, thesteamgenerator leveltripsarenotrequiredtobeoperable.

Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:tiRequestNumber:0-8Component/System Affected:

FIS-14-15B Description ofChange:Thisjumper/lifted leadallowsforatemporary hookup(lessthan72hours)ofinstrumentation acrossthefollowing components oftheBchannellossofCCWcircuitry:

(1).Testresistoronoutputofflowtransmitter forCCWflowchannelB.(2).Resistoronsquarerootextractor output.(3).Agastatcoilontime.SafetyEvaluation Summary:ThiswillallowthenickelAinstrumentation tobeginrecording whentheoutputofthesquarerootextractor goeslessthan4.3volts.Inturn,thiswillallowrecording ofanyfluctuations inthecircuitsuchthattherootcauseofthespurioustripsignalcanbeidentified.

Toobtainmoredatathisjumper/lifted leadwaschangedtogreaterthan72hoursinstalled.

Atthistimeitappearsspikesarebeingreceivedfromflowtransmitter.

ChannelBisoutofservice.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.WithchannelBoflossofCCWtripinbypass,thereisstilltherequired2outof3logicasreferenced insection7.2.1.1.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.ChannelBisalreadyinbypass,thisinstrumentation ismerelymonitoring forachangeintransmitter output.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification.

Marginofsafetyisstillassuredwiththe2outof3logicwiththeBchannelinbypass.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-12Component/System Affected:

Maincontainment purgevalves,FCV25-4,5Description ofChange:Thisjumper/lifted leadwasinstalled toallowFCV-25-6toopenwithoutopeningFCV25-4and5.Thepurposeofthisjumper/lifted leadwastoallowtheTestGrouptoperformalocalleakratetest;thejumper/lifted leadwasremoveduponcompletion ofthetest.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.FCV-25-4and5remainedsealedclosedcontainment isolation valvesasrequiredbyTechnical Specification 3.6,1.7.Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsRequestNumber:0-13Component/System Affected:

ReactorCoolantPump(RCP)2A2StatorTemp.(TI-1165),

UpperGuideBearingTemp.(TI-1166),

LowerGuideBearingTemp.(TI-1167).

Description ofChange:Thisjumper/lifted leadfacilitates monitoring theRCP2A2UpperandLowerGuideBearingThermocouples andStatorTemperatures witharecorder.

Thiswasduetosuspected inaccuracy ofthe2A2upperoilreservoir levelindication.

Levelwaslowered;however,noevidenceofoilsmokeinatmosphere isevident,nosignificant amountofoilhasaccumulated inRCPoilcollection systemandtherehasbeennoincreaseorabnormalities notedinother2A2instrumentation.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Jumpersareforrecorders, for2A2RCP.Stator Temperature, UpperGuideBearingTemperature andLowerGuideBearing-Temperature.

Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-16Component/System Affected:

FSE-27-12, oftheHydrogenSamplingSystemDescription ofChange:FSE-27-12 solenoidistobereplaced.

Itssolenoidisdeenergized underPlantWorkOrder(PWO)¹6816.Thismeetstherequirement ofTechnical Specification 3.6.1sincethisliftedleadremovesvalvepositionindication.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.FSE-27-12 isafailedclosedvalveandisdeenergized whichputsitinthefailedclosedposition.

Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

Thevalveisinitscontainment isolated(closed)position.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-20Component/System Affected:

HCV-09-1B ValveBox,Annunciator P-16&Localannunciator Description ofChange:OneswitchinPS-09-1B2 hasfailedcausingtheannunciator tolockin.Needtoreplaceswitchandrestorewiringinaccordance withcontrolwiringdiagram(CWD).

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thisjumper/lifted leadistodocumentworkalreadycompleted asperrequestoftheInstrumentation

&Controldepartment andtheAssistant NuclearPlantSupervisor(ANPS).

APlantWorkOrderwasissuedandperformed toremoveanuisancealarmthatislockedinwithnoreflashcapability.

ThewirestothefailedpressureswitchPS-09-1B2 wereliftedandthelocalannunciator switchwasthenwiredtothecontrolroomannunciation.

Alterations tothewiringperCWD656(2998-B-327),

MainFeedwater Isolation ValveHCV-09-1B, weremadeasfollows:1.Bluewirewasliftedoffterminal13.2.Redwirewasliftedoffterminal14.Thereasonthiswasdonewastopreventthefailedpressureswitchfromlockingintheannunciator inthecontrolroom.3.Orangewirewasliftedoffterminal11andlendedtoterminal14.4.Yellowwirewasliftedoffterminal9andlendedtoterminal13.Thiswiredthelocalswitchintothecontrolroomannunciator circuit.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Useofswitch,normallyusedforlocalannunciation, forannunciation incontrolroomhasnotaffectedequipment safety.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.

TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-21Component/System Affected:

HCV-09-1A ValveBox,Annunciator P-6&Localannunciator Description nfChange:OneswitchmPS-09-1A2 hasfailedcausingtheannunciator tolockin.Needtoreplaceswitchandrestorewiringinaccordance withcontrolwiringdiagram(CWD).

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thisjumper/lifted leadistodocumentworkalreadycompleted asperrequestoftheInstrumentation

&Controldepartment andtheAssistant NuclearPlantSupervisor(ANPS).

APlantWorkOrderwasissuedandperformed toremoveanuisancealarmthatislockedinwithnoreflashcapabilities.

ThewirestothefailedpressureswitchPS-09-1A2 wereliftedandthelocalannunciation switchwasthenwiredtothecontrolroomannunciation.

CWD655(2998-B-B27) andMainFeedwater Isolation ValveHCV-09-1A, hadthefollowing alterations:

1.Bluewirewasliftedoffterminal13.2.Redwirewasliftedoffterminal14.Thereasonthiswasdonewastopreventthefailedpressureswitchfromlockingintheannunciator inthecontrolroom.3.Orangewirewasliftedoffterminal11andlendedtoterminal14.4.Yellowwirewasliftedoffterminal9andlendedtoterminal13.Thiswiredthelocalswitchintothecontrolroomannunciator circuit.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Usingloca'.switchforannunciation inControlRoomhasnotaffectedequipment safety,onlylossoflocalindication.

Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.

TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-22Component/System Affected:

HCV-09-1B TestStrokeDescription ofChange:Torepairand/orreplaceopenlimitswitchandfixoilleaks.Reasonforthisrequestwastopreventthevalvefromcontinuous testingduetoshortinlimitswitch.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thisjumper/lifted leadisnecessary duetothevalveopenlimitswitchbeingfullofoil.Thiscausedshortingbetweenterminals 24&25whichenabledanddisabledcontinuously, thepartstroketestcircuit.Thisjumper/lifted leaddisablescompletely thepartstrokecircuitry.

Testingcanstillbefacilitated (ifneeded)withassistance fromtheInstrumentation

&Controldepartment.

Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theactivityaffectsthetestcircuitry andnotthemechanical integrity ofthesystemasreferenced intheFUSARsection15.2.5.1.

Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment tosafety.Containment integrity willbemaintained.

Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafety.Testcircuitry thatalreadymalfunctioned onthevalveforthisjumper/lifted leaddoesnotaffectthesafetyfunctionoftherelatedvalves.Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-49Component/System Affected:

HCV-08-1B TestPanelDescription ofChange:Changedrawing2998-B-327 sheet316toshowthebluewireincable20316A-SB isopen.Thesparewhite/black wireistousedinitsplace.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theinstalled sparewireistobeusedforabrokenonesothatanewwiredoesnothavetobepulled.Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Useoftheinstalled spareisfortheexactpurposeforwhichitwasoriginally installed.

TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

Theinstalled sparewireisthesamesizewireasthebluewireincable20316A-SB.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-57Component/System Affected:

6.9KVSwitchgear 2B-1MeteringDescription ofChange:Thisjumper/lifted leadrequestwilleliminate theuseofabrokenfixedcontactblock.Thissamejumperwasinstalled previously onUnit2.Thisrequestisapersonnel safetyconcernasitdefeatsthebusPTtransformers isolating capability.

Thisisonthe2B-16.9KVbus.Acautiontagwillbeinstalled ontheoutsideofthecabinettowarnpersonnel ofthefactthebusPTtransformer isolation capability isdefeated.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:The6.9KVbusespowertheReactorCoolantPumpsandtheMainFeedwater Pumpwhicharenecessary forpoweroperation butnotforthesafeshutdownofthereactor.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification.

10CFR50.59Evaluations Summaries ofEvaluations ApprovedbytheSt.LucieFacilityRevievGroup ST.LUCIEUNITlUSEOFSEALINGCOMPOUNDONVALVESI-FCV-23"3,4,5 INTRODUCTION:

PSL-1BlowdownContainment Isolation valvesI-FCV-23-3 and5andSGBDsystemisolation valveI-FCV-23-4 havehadahistoryofleakageproblems'.

Numerousleakrepairshavebeenperformed ontheseSteamGenerator blowdownsystemcontainment valvesonbothunits.Thepurposeofthisevaluation istoprovideamethodfortemporarily repairing bodytobonnetleaksonvalvesI-FCV-23-3,4 and5.Themethodofrepairwillbesealantinjection.

Thevalvesshallbereplacedorpermanently repairedduringthenextscheduled outageorothersuitabletimeperiod.Thesevalvesarenonisolable andnormallyopen.SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased.

Thesevalvesarenotaccidentinitiating components.

Thesevalvesservetoisolatecontainment andtheSGBDsystemintheeventofanaccident.

Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased bythisrepair.Thevalvesarerequiredformaintaining containment andsystemisolation, andtheirabilitytodosowillnotbeaffected; Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.

Thevalvesarerequiredformaintaining containment andsystemisolation, andtheirabilitytodosowillnotbeaffectedbythisrepairsincethecapnutsperformanidentical functionastheheavyhexnutsandbeltloadingsarenotaffectedbytheinjection ofsealant.Thegasketand/orsealantdoesnotperformasafetyfunction.

Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased.

Theconsequences ofthefailureoftheinjection sealisthesameasthefailureofthegasket,whichwouldresultinalossofsystemfluidintothecontainment penetration roomorcontainment.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.Theproposedrepairdoesnotprovideanewmodeofnormaloremergency plantoperation.

Chemistry limitsarenotalteredandnootherchangeisproposedtotheplantdesign,modesofoperation orassumptions inthebasisfortheTechnical Specifications orSafetyAnalysis.

Therefore, thisrepairdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.Limitingtheinjection ofsealanttojustinteracting outsidethevalvepressureboundaryprecludes amalfunction ofadifferent type.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION FORTEMPORARY MODIFICATION OFPOLARCRANEBRAKESYSTEMINTRODUCTION:

ThisSafetyEvaluation istoprovidejustification forremovalofthedamagedportionofthepolarcranemainhoist7P1brakedrumliningandtomodifythecontrolcircuitforthemainhoist81and7P2brakes.Themachining ofthedamagedpositionofthedrumisnecessary toremovecracksandtherebypreventtheirpropagation.

Thecircuitmodification willallowtheinterchanging offunctions ofthe81and8'2brakesonthemainhoistintermsofengagement afterdeenergization ofthemainhoistmotororthecreepmotor.SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased sincethesetemporary modifications andassociated operational restrictions willassurethecapability ofthepolarcranemainhoisttosafelycarryloadsuptoandincluding thereactorheadanditsliftrig.Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated

$ntheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased bythesetemporary modifications.

Themodifications performed underthisevaluation aretothepolarcranebrakingsystem.Thepolarcranecontinues tocomplytotherequirements ofNUREG-0612.

Thepossibility ofan'accident ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedbythistemporary modification.

Themanufacturer hasindicated thatthemachining oftheNo.lbrakedrumandthecircuitry revisions toswitchtheprimaryandtime-delay brakingfunctions willnotadversely affecttheabilityofthemainhoisttosafelycarryloadsonlyuptoandincluding thereactorheadanditsliftrig.Themodifications tothepolarcranebrakingsystemdonotcreateanynewfailuremodeswhichcouldimpacttheoperation ofequipment important tosafety.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesofanyTechnical Specifications hasnotbeenreduced.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION FORTEMPORARY MODIFICATION OFPOLARCRANEBRAKESYSTEMANDLOADCELLCONTROLFUNCTIONS INTRODUCTION:

ThisSafetyEvaluation istoprovidejustification forremovalofthedamagedportionofthepolarcranemainhoistfPIbrakedrumlining,modifythecontrolcircuitforthemainhoistfland82brakes,andmodifytheinterlock functions performed bytheLoadCell.Themachining ofthedamagedportionofthedrumisnecessary toremovecracksandtherebypreventtheirpropagation.

Thecircuitmodification forthemainhoistbrakeswillallowtheinterchanging offunctions ofthe81and82brakesonthemainhoistintermsofengagement afterdeenergization ofthemainhoistmotororthecreepmotor.SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased sincethesetemporary modifications andassociated operational restrictions willassurethecapability ofthepolarcranemainhoisttosafelycarryloadsuptoandincluding thereactorheadanditsliftrig.Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated inthe'USARhavenot~~beenincreased bythesetemporary modifications.

Themodifications performed underthisevaluation aretothepolarcranebrakingsystemandloadcellcontrolfunctions.

Thepolarcranecontinues tocomplytotherequirements ofNUREG-0612.

Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased bythesetemporary modifications.

Themodifications performed underthisevaluation areforthepolarcranebrakingsystemandloadcellcontrolfunctions.

Thissystemcontinues tosatisfytherequirements ofNUREG-0612.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedbythistemporary modification.

Themanufacturer hasindicated thatthemachining oftheNo.1brakedrumandthecircuitry revisions toswitchtheprimaryandtime-delay brakingfunctions willnotadversely affecttheabilityofthemainhoisttosafelycarryloadsonlyuptoandincluding thereactorheadanditsliftrig.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesofanyTechnical Specifications hasnotbeenreducedbythesetemporary modifications.

II ST.LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION FORPLANTOPERATION WITHCEMECHANICAL PLUGSINEDMDAMAGEDSTEAMGENERATOR TUBESINTRODUCTION:

Duringimplementation ofPCM251-189inFebruary1990,"SteamGenerator TubePlugReplacement

-Westinghouse toCEDesignPlug",fortytubesinthesteamgenerator AandBcoldlegsideweredamagedbytheEDMprocessoperations whileremovingtheWestinghouse plugs.Inaddition, aproblemwasidentified intheSteamgenerator Acoldlegside.AnEDMscarwasfoundtohaveataperthatwasnottypicalasthosedemonstrated duringpreviousoperations andCEqualification tests.Afterreview,tenofthefortytubeswithEDMscarswerepluggedwiththeCEmechanical plugandtheremaining thirtyhadweldedplugsinstalled.

Priortofinaldetermination oftherootcauseofthenonperpendicular electrode travel,anumberofweldedplugswereinstalled becauseoftheuseofaninterimacceptance criteria.

SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofadesignbasisaccidentofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARisnotincreased sincetheflowdiodeeffectdoesnotresultinadverseplantconditions suchasunacceptable damagetoadjacentintacttubes,doesnotdecreasethedesignmarginoftheRCSpressureboundaryanddoesnotalterexistingaccidentmitigation equipment orsyst'ems.

Theconsequences ofapreviously postulated designbasisaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARarenotmademoresevereforthesamereasonsgivenabovetheconsequences offishmouthing andplugcollapsearenomoreseverethanasteamgenerator tuberupture,apreviously evaluated condition.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethanpreviously addressed intheFUSARdoesnotexistsincefishmouthing doesnotresultinunacceptable damagetoadjacenttubesnoradversely impacttheperformance ofthesteamgenerator.

Primarytosecondary leakageafteraplugcollapserequiresasubsequent tubeleak.Failureofatubeplugwouldbenomoreseverethanasteamgenerator tuberupture,apreviously evaluated condition.

Atubeplugcould"loosen"andfallfromthetubesheet afterplugcollapse.

Ifthisscenarioweretooccur,theplugcouldcometo"rest"againstthelowersurfaceofoneormorefuelassemblyretention grids,flowtoaffectedfuelassemblies wouldnotbesignificantly

affected, duetothesmallsizeandgeometryoftheplugs.Ifaplugweretomigratetothelowerpartofthecore,existingloosepartsmonitoring equipment wouldalertcontrolroomoperators totheproblem,andactionasrequiredbyTechnical Specifications wouldbetaken.Therefore, nonewaccidents arecreated.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification isnotreducedsincethetotalnumberoftubespluggedhasnotchanged.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION FORI-HV-09-08 BYPASSLINEELBOWLEAKSEALANTENCLOSURE INTRODUCTION:

NCR1-507identifies apinholeleakontheupstreamweldonthefirstelbowonthe1"bypasslinearoundvalveI-MV-09-08.

ThisSafetyEvaluation willpermittheinstallation ofaleaksealantenclosure aroundtheleakingelbowandprecludelossoffeedwater orauxiliary feedwater inventory.

Anengineering evaluation willproceedinparallelfortheuseoftheenclosure aslongtermmodification.

SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theimplementation ofthistemporary modification willhavenoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation.

AreviewoftheplantTechnical Specifications andtheSafetyAnalysisReporthasshownthattherearenounreviewed safetyquestions orTechnical Specification changesinvolved.

Theprobability ofanoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARisnotincreased becausetheinstallation ofaleaksealantenclosure hasbeenevaluated andithasbeendetermined thatthemodifiedsystemstressesremainwithinCodeallowables.

Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased becausethedesignandoperation oftheauxiliary feedwater systemhasnotbeenchangedandthecapability ofsupplying feedwater tothesteamgenerators isnotaffected.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment'important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased becausetheinstallation oftheenclosure hasbeenseismically analyzedwithacceptable results,thesystemroutinghasnotbeenchangedsooperational performance remainsthesame,thepressuredesignoftheclampwillprecludetheclampfrombecomingasourcemissileorfallingobjectbecauseithasbeendesignedforthesystempressure, thechemistry oftheleaksealanthasbeenevaluated andwillnotintroduce deleterious materials intothefeedwater system,theinjection ofsealantwillbelimitedtothevolumeofannularspaceinsidetheenclosure perLeakRepairprocedures andtheclampdesignpreventsdisengagement ofthepiping.Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedbecausetheinjection ofsealantwillbelimitedtoavoidtheintroduction ofsealantintothefeedwater system,thechemistry ofthesealantiscompatible withthepipingmaterial, theenclosure isfabricated ofcarbonsteelandtherefore hasthesamecoefficient ofexpansion asthepipingandthepressuredesignoftheclampwillprecludetheclampfrombecomingasourcemissileorfallingobjectbecauseithasbeendesignedforthesystempressure.

N1 PAGE2SAFETYEVALUATION FORI-MV-09-08 BYPASSLINEELBOWLEAKSEALANTENCLOSURE Theproposedmodification doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification becausethemarginofsafetyasdefinedintheTechnical Specifications istohavetworedundant auxiliary feedwater systemscapableofproviding feedwater tothesteamgenerators tomaintainsteamgenerator levelforremovalofdecayheat,coolingthereactorcoolantto325Ftemperature.

Theinstallation oftheleaksealantenclosure doesnotpreventthemodifiedsystemfromperforming itsdesignfunction.

STLUCIEUNIT1ST.LUCIEUNIT1CYCLE10,10CFR50.59FORMODE6OPERATION INTRODUCTION:

TheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10reviewofMode6operation, (Reference 1)presentstheevaluation tosupporttheshuffling offuelfromtheCycle9loadingpatterntotheCycle10loadingpattern.Thisreviewwasdeemednecessary duetotheearlyshutdownoftheCycle9.SAFETYEVALUATION TheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10reloaddoesnotresultinanychangestotheoverallconfiguration oftheplantforMode6,exceptfortherepositioning ofthefuelassemblies withinthecore.Nothingoutsidethecoreisalteredbythischangeandthemethodofplantoperation whileinMode6remainsunchanged.

Therefore, theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment forMode6important tosafetyisnotimpacted.

Foroperation atSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10themethodforrepositioning fuelinsidethecoreduringMode6hasnotchangedfrompreviouscycles.Nomodifications inthemethodofplantoperation ortheplantconfiguration arerequiredasaresultofthischange.ForMode6thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously analyzedinthesafetyanalysesisnotcreated.TheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10reloaddesignneutronics inputforMode6andtheresulting safetyanalyseshasbeenreviewed, andinallcasestheresults'rewellwithintheacceptance criteriaofthedesignbasis.Furthermore, nochangesweremadeinthemethodsusedtoevaluatethemargintosafety.AsperFederalRegulation 10CFR50.59(b)theaboveSafetyEvaluation providesthebasistoconcludethattheimplementation offuelshuffling fromtheCycle9loadingpatterntoCycle10loadingpatternforSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10Mode6reloadoperation doesnotinvolveanychangeswhichintroduce anunreviewed safetyquestion.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1EVALUATION OFBgCCENTERFINGERCONTROLELEMENTASSEMBLIES (CEA's)INTRODUCTION:

DuringCEAoperability testingatMaineYankee,acontrolelementassembly(CEA)jammedatapproximately 80%ofitsfullyinsertedposition".

ThecenterfingerofthestuckCEAhadbecomelodgedinthecenterguidetubeofthehostfuelassemblyduetoalossofthemechanical integrity ofthecenterfingertipregion(seeFigure1).Combustion Engineering, thedesignerandmanufacturer oftheCEAsinuseatMainYankeeidentified thefailedCEAashavingthe"oldstyle"CEAdesign;i.e.,aCEAwhichcontainsBgCabsorbermaterialextending tothetipofthecenterfinger.St.LucieUnit1cycle10coreoperateswithtwenty(20)CEAsoftheoldstyleCombustion Engineering design.St.LucieUnit2operateswithCEAsthatarenotoftheolds'tyledesign".'n general,thesafetyconcernassociated withthefailureofCEAsisthatinsufficient shutdownreactivity willbeavailable ifrequiredduringnormalor'transient operation.

Theresultofinsufficient shutdownreactivity couldbeassevereasexceeding fueldesignlimitsleadingtolossoffuelrodintegrity orexacerbating theconsequences ofalimitingFUSARtransient".

Inthisspecificcase,theconcernisthepotential forcommonmodefailureofoldstyleCEAs'.FailureinthiscontextmeansthefailureofoneormoreoldstyleCEAstoinsertondemand.EVALUATION:

St.LucieUnit1i.scapableofsafeoperation duringCycle10witholdstyleCEAs.Thefollowing supportsthisconclusion.

TheSt.LucieUnit1inspection resultsindicatenoCEAendcapfailuresorcircumferential crackingforaninspection grouphavingexposures whicharerepresentative oftheoldstyleCEAscurrently inoperation.

TheSt.LucieUnit1reviewofCEAmanufacturing recordsshowedthatdesignandconstruction ofCEAswereinaccordance withapprovedmaterials,.tests, inspections, procedures, andspecifications.

TheSt.LucieUnit1CEAinspection waswithintherangeofexposures experienced by"thefailedCEAsatMaineYankee.NoneoftheSt.LucieUnit1CEAshadfailed.Theevaluation ofnormalplantoperations indicatethatcontinued operation witholdstyleCEAsdoesnotaffecttheplant'sabilitytoachievesafeshutdown.

Thepostulated failureofthreehighreactivity worthCEAsatanytimeduringtheremainder ofCycle10resultsinsafetyconsequences whicharewithintheacceptance criteriaforthecurrentUnit1safetyanalyses.

Toensuresafeoperation withthe20oldstyleCEAsuntiltheendofthecurrentcycle,thefollowing augmented CEAsurveillance programwillbeinplacetoreducethelikelihood ofoperation withaninoperable CEA.

PAGE2Evaluation ofBgCCenterFingerControlElementAssemblies'(CEAs)

FullstrokeCEAexercising aftertripsandcoldshutdowns willensureCEAoperability following themostprobableprecursor tofailure,namelyathermaltransition.

Quarterly fullstrokeCEAexercising willprovidefurtherassurance thattheplantwillnotoperatewithafailedCEA.Incorefluxmonitoring willbeperformed semi-weekly toprovidedetection ofagrossCEAfailure,andthusproviding furtherassurance thatCEAsarenotfailedandthattheplantisoperating inasafemannerRepositioning of20'oldstyleCEAstothefullywithdrawn positionwillprovideminimumneutronfluencetothetipregion,thusminimizing anyembrittlement affect.Therefore, basedonthesurveillances andevaluations discussed, St.LucieUnit1iscapableofsafeoperation witholdstyleCEAsuntiltheendofthecurrentfuelCycle(EOC-10).

Thisconclusion hasreceivedtheconcurrence oftheNuclearRegulatory Commission, OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1CYCLE1010CFR50.59INTRODUCTION:

TheSt.LucieUnit1,Cycle10reloaddesignestablished byFPLconsistsof92BatchMnaturaluraniumaxialblanketassemblies.

SixteenoftheBatchMassemblies containnoburnableabsorberrods,twelveassemblies containfour4w/oGd203,16assemblies havetwelve6w/oGd203yfortyfourassemblies havetwelve8w/oGd203rodsandtheremaining 4assemblies havetwelve6w/oandfour8w/oGd203rods.Theremaining ofthecoreconsistsof8BatchH,9BatchJ,16BatchK,and92BatchLassemblies.

TheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10SafetyAnalysisReport(FUSAR)(Reference 1)presentstheevaluation ofthereloadcorecharacteristics withrespecttothesafetyanalysispresented intheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle9FUSAR(Reference 2).ThisbaseSafetyAnalysiswasperformed tosupportoperations ofSt.LucieUnit1,Cycle10.Afterthisanalysiswascompleted, theplantshutdownearlytoendCycle9.ANFperformed anadditional SafetyAnalysisforCycle10(Reference 3)inordertoaddresstheimpactoftheshortened Cycle9.ThisSafetyAssessment supplements theCycle10FUSAR.SAFETYEVALUATION:

Basedonthetechnical evaluation performed andthe'resultsofthereanalysis discussed inthisSafetyAnalysisReport,itcanbeconcluded thatt'eSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10reloaddesignmeetsallthedesigncriteria, andcanbeimplemented withnochangesrequiredtotheexistingSt.LucieUnit1Technical Specifications.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased.

TheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10reloaddoesnotresultinanychangestotheoverallconfiguration oftheplant.Theplant'smodeofoperation remainsunchanged.

TheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10reloaddesigndoesnotresultinanychangesexternaltothereactorcorewhichimpacttheoverallconfiguration oftheplant,orthemethodinwhichtheplantisoperated.

Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously analyzedinthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.TheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10reloaddesignneutronics andfueldesigninputtosafetyanalysishasbeenreviewed, andinallcasestheresultsofanalysisarewellwithintheacceptance criteriaofthedesignandlicensing bases.Theacceptance criteriaforthesafetyanalysishavenotbeenchanged.BasedonFPLtechnical reviewsoftheFUSARreportandofthesafetyassessment oftheCycle9earlyshutdown, itcanbedetermined thattheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10reloaddesignmeetsalltheexistingacceptance criteria.

Therefore theCycle10reloaddoesnotresultinareduction tothemarginofsafetyrelativetotheTechnical Specification basesforSt.LucieUnit1.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1ICWSYSTEMISOLATION VALVERELININGINTRODUCTION:

Theoriginalinteriorrubberliningonthesubjectbutterfly valve(s)havedemonstrated arecurring problemofdisbonding/loosening fromthevalvebody,allowingtheturbulent processmedium(seawater) tocomeincontactwiththecarbonsteelvalvebody.Thishasresultedinerosion/corrosion deterioration onthevalvebody.Replacing theentirerubberliningwithapolymerepoxycoatingaccomplishes therequiredvalvebodyprotection.

Theaffectedbutterfly valvesserveintheIntakeCoolingWater(ICW)System(ASMESectionIII,Class3),aClass3,SafetyRelatedSystem,andtherefore, thischangeisclassified asSafetyRelated.Theoriginalvalverubberliningisidentified as"Resiloseal NaturalP",affixedtothevalvebodyatthefactory,Thereplacement coatingsarePalmerInternational materials, "Ceramalloy CL,CPandDuratough DP",appliedinaccordance withthe"ICWValveLiningTechnical Procedure/Guidelines" providedwiththeQL--2RPAforthison-siteworkandthemanufacturer's application instructions.

Thenewcoatingisreportedtoberesistant toerosion,corrosion andcavitation, andiscompatible foruseoncarbonsteelsurfaceswithinaseawatermedium.EVALUATION:

Application of,thepolymerepoxycoatinginaccordance withthe"ICWValveLiningTechnical Procedure/Guidelines" andthemanufacturer's instructions willpreventdisbonding.

DesignEquivalence ofthereplacement polymerepoxycoatingmaterialtotheoriginalrubberliningisassuredby:1)2)Resistance ofthepolymerepoxycoatingtoerosion,corrosion andcavitation willpreventvalvebodydeterioration.

AProcurement Classification ofQL"2fortheRPAwasselectedbasedon:theICWsystemisSafety-Related, thereliningmaterialiscommercial grade,10CFR21isnotrequired, QADapprovalisrequiredonboththeRPAandtheP.O.,'hesupplierisQAapproved, anddocumentation isrequired.

FUSARSection9.2(Table9.2-1)willberevisedtoreflectthischange.Theaboveevaluation establishes design'equivalence andconformance totheoriginalbasisandsupportstheanswersgivenonthe"NuclearSafetyEvaluation Checklist" (JPNForm4C).Ithastherefore beenshownthatthereisnounreviewed safetyquestions orTechnical Specification changesinvolvedinthismodification pursuantto10CFR50.59.

FUSARChapter9definesthis'systemassafetyrelated,therefore, thisDEEPisclassified assafetyrelated.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1EVALUATION OFBgCCENTERFINGERCONTROLELEMENTASSEMBLIES (CEA)REV.2INTRODUCTION:

Recentinspections attheMaineYankeeNuclearPlantidentified threeControlElementAssemblies (CEA's)withmissingcenterfingerendcapsandoneCEAwithacircumferential crackinthecenterfingerendcapweldregion.ThefailedCEAsareofanoldCombustion Engineering CEADesign,whichhasthecenterfingerwithBz,C'pelletsextending tothetip.Theterm"old"CEAisdefinedinthecontextofthisdiscussion asaCEAofSt.LucieUnit1iscurrently operating with17old=CEA's.

EVALUATION:

TheSt.LucieUnit1inspection resultsdefinitively indicatenoCEAendcapfailuresorcircumferential crackingforaninspection groupwhichisoverthreetimesthesizeof,andrepresents theprojected exposures of,theoldCEA'scurrently inoperation.

Inaddition, reviewofCEAmanufacturing recordsindicates thatdesignandconstruction ofCEAswereinaccordance withapprovedmaterials, test,inspections, procedures, andspecifications.

Therefore, theprobability ofCEAinoperability duringCycle10isconsidered low.Nonetheless, thefollowing augmented CEAsurveillance programwillbeinplacefortheremainder ofCycle10tofurtherreducethelikelihood ofoperation withaninoperable CEA.1):FullstrokeCEAexercising aftertripsandcoldshutdowns willensureCEAoperability following themostprobableprecursor tofailure,namelyathermaltransition.

2)Quarterly fullstrokeCEAexercising willprovidefurtherassurance thattheplantwillnotoperatewithafailedCEA.3)Incorefluxmonitoring willbeperformed semi-weekly toprovidedetection ofagrossCEAfailure,andthusproviding furtherassurance thatCEAsarenotfailedandthattheplantisoperating inasafemanner.Further,anevaluation ofnormalplantoperations indicates thatcontinued operation withthe17oldCEAsdoesnotaffecttheplantsabilitytoachievesafeshutdown.

Therefore, basedonthesurveillances andevaluations discussed, St.LucieUnit,liscapableofsafeoperation with17olddesignCEAsuntiltheendofthecurrentfuelCycle(EOC-10)/

Theconclusion hasreceivedtheconcurrence oftheCombustion Engineering NuclearSafetyCommittee.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION TOPERMITAMODIFIEDLITHIUMREACTORCOOLANTPROGRAMFORST.LUCIEUNIT1,CYCLE10INTRODUCTION:

Lithiumhydroxide isusedtocontroltheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)pHtomaintainazerocoefficient ofsolubility fordissolved corrosion

products, i.e.crud.ThisresultsincrudgoingintosolutioninhotterregionsoftheRCS(thecore)andcruddeposition occurring incoolerregionsoftheRCS(thesteamgenerators).

Theoverallcorecrudloadwouldbereducedbypreventing crudfromdepositing onthefuel'surfaces.

Althoughthecrudloadinthesteamgenerators wouldincrease, theneweffectistominimizetheactivation ofcorrosion productsbyreducingtheirresidence timeinthecore.Thecoordinated lithium-boron controlprogramfollowedinCycle9waspredicated onthezero-coefficient ofsolubility ofthecrudbeingatpHof7.4,basedonacrudcomposition ofmostlycobaltandnickelsubstituted ferrites.

Thepurposeoftheprogramistoreducetheactivation ofcrudandtherebyreduceoutofcoreradiation fields.SAFETYEVALUATION:

Themodifiedlithiumprogramwhichminimizes thetimethelithiumconcentration isabove2.2ppmdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionanddoesnotinvolveachangetotheTechnical Specifications.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.

Themodifiedlithiumcoolantchemistry programproposedforcycle10willresultinazircaloycorrosion ratethatislowerthanthecorrosion rateobservedfollowing useoftheelevatedlithiumcoolantchemistry programincycle9,whichwasfoundtobewithinacceptable limits.Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated.Nochangestothefuelortothefueloperating environment, otherthanincreasing thelithiumconcentration, arebeingproposed.

ThemodifiedlithiumRCSwaterchemistry programproposedforuseinPSL1cycle10doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionasfarasitseffectonnuclearfuelperformance isconcerned.

Theaccelerated corrosion effectonzircaloyfromextendedexposureto3.5ppmlithiumwillbemitigated byoperating belowthislevel.Theresulting zircaloyoxidation willbewithinthefuelroddesigncriterion.

Assuch,nosafetyanalysisisimpactednorisanynewanalysisrequired.

0 ST.LUCIEUNIT1HPSIHEADERVALUEPOSITIONCHANGEINTRODUCTION:

Thissafetyevaluation willpermittheopeningoftheeighthighpressuresafetyinjection (HPSI)headerisolation valvestoafullopenposition.

Thevalvesarecurrently setforapproximately two-thirds open.Thepurposeofthismodification istoincreaseHPSIsystemflowdeliverytothereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)whenevertheHPSIpumpsareactuatedand,therefore, increasethemarginbetweenactualandrequiredflows.SAFETYEVALUATION:

FullyopeningtheHPSIsystemheaderisolation valvesdoesnotalteranyothercomponent orequipment.

ThesafetyfunctionoftheHPSIsystemisactuallyenhancedbythismodification.

Therefore, thismodification hasnoadverseimpactontheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction previously evaluated.

FullyopeningtheHPSIsystemheaderisolation valvesdoesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentormalfunction important to'afety.

Theonlyplantsystemimpactedbythismodification istheHPSIsystem.FullyopeningtheHPSIsystemheaderisolation valvesdoesnotincreasetheprobability ofexceeding asafetylimit,sincetheincreaseinHPSIsystemflowdoes'notrequireachangetoanyofthe'lants'echnical Specifications.

Thetechnical specifications reviewedforpotential impactwerethoseregarding maximumallowable heatupandcooldownrateswithsingleHPSIpump(figure3.1-1b),borationsystems(3/4.1.2),

P/Tlimits(3/4.4.9),

emergency corecoolingsystems(ECCS)(3/4.5),

andemergency core'coolingsystemsdesignfeatures(5.5).Nochangestothesetechnical specifications arerequired.

Further,thesafetyanalysisconclusions havenotchangedandtheplantprotection andengineered safetyfeaturessystemssetpoints remainunchanged.

Therefore, thereisnoreduction onthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesofanytechnical specification.

Thesystemmodification, whichpermittheHPSIsystemheaderisolation valvestobefullopen,canbeperformed undera10CFR50.59sinceitinvolvesneitherachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications noranunreviewed safetyquestion.

Therefore, plantoperation withtheHPSIsystemheaderisolation valvesfullyopenisnotasafetyconcern.

ST.LUCIEUNITlSAFETYEVALUATION FORREACTORCOOLANTP&1P(RCP)MOTORBEARINGLUBEOILDRAINVALVESINTRODUCTION:

Thissafetyevaluation ispreparedtodocumenttheacceptability oftheasinstalled configuration oftheUnit1upperandlower,RCP motorbearinglubeoillevelindication.

'urrently plantdrawingsdonotcallforthepresenceofadrainlinebetweentheisolation valveandthesightglass,whichistheasinstalled configuration.

AlloftheaffectedpipingisqualitygroupDpiping,non-safety relatedandnon-seismic design(seismically supported).

Theexistingcondition hasnoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation.

AreviewoftheplantTechnical Specifications andtheSafetyAnalysisReporthasshownthatthere'arenounreviewed safetyquestions orTechnical Specification changesinvolved.

SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased sincetheasinstalled configuration doesnotaffectanyaccidentinitiating components.

ThedrainlinesdonotimpingeuponanyRCSpipingandareclassified asnon-safety, qualitygroupDlines;Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.

Theexistingconfiguration doesnotalterthefunctionordesignofanyexistingcomponents, andthusdoesnotincreasethepossibility oftheirfailure.Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased sincetheexistingconfiguration doesnotcreateanewpathforuncontrolled radioactive releases.

Thedrainlineswillnotadversely affectanyradiation monitoring equipment orequipment whichperformsacontainment isolation function.

Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedsincetheexistingconfiguration willnotinhibitorotherwise adversely affecttheoperation ofanyequipment important tosafety.Theaffectedpipingisnon-safety, qualitygroupDpipinganddownstream ofthebearinglubeoilheaderisolation valve.Theconfiguration ofthedrainlineprecludes thepossibility ofleakageduetoasinglefailure.Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthe'safetyanalysisreporthas,notbeencreatedsincetheexistingconfiguration doesnotaddoraffectanyequipment capableofinitiating anaccident.

Theaffectedpipingisnon-safety, qualitygroupDpipingandservesnosafetyfunction.

Theexistingconfiguration doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification sincetheexistence ofthedrainlinewillnotimpacttheoperation oftheRCPmotorbearinglubeoilsystemortheRCPitself.

0r,~~4I'T+~Jll ST.LUCIEUNIT1EVALUATION OFB4CCENTERFINGERCONTROLELEMENTASSEMBLIES (CEA's)INTRODUCTION:

Recentinspections atMaineYankeeidentified threeCEA'swithcenterfingersmissingendcaps.GiventhatSt.LucieUnit1iscurrently operating withsimilardesignCEA's(20outof73),anevaluation wasperformed toexaminetheimpactofpotential multipleCEAfailuresonplantoperation.

Theevaluation isnotcomplete, however,theresultscurrently available provideaddedassurance thatintheeventofmultipleCEAfailuresSt.LucieUnit1canbesafelyshutdown.Inaddition, detection ofCEAfailuresislikelythroughtheuseofCEAexercises and/orincore/excore monitoring.

EVALUATIONSz Currently, noevidenceexiststhatSt.LucieUnit1hasexperienced aCEAfailureofanytype.Tothecontrary, objective evidenceexistswhichdemonstrates thatall73CEA'sarefunctioning asdesigned.

Duringthespringrefueling outage,theCEA'swereshuffledwithnoindication ofabnormaloperation.

CEAsurveillance forreactivity measurements (rodbankworth),involvedmovementofCEA'sfromtheirfullywithdrawn tofullyinsertedposition.

AllCEA'sfunctioned normallyandmeasuredrodworthsmetacceptance criteria.

Forexample,thedifference betweenpredicted andmeasuredtotalCEAbankworthforthecurrentcyclestartupwas2.2%comparedtoanacceptance criteriaof10%.Sincethespringrefueling outage,'ull insertion andwithdrawal ofthe73CEA'shasbeenperformed priortostartupon4/23/90,5/9/90and5/24/90.Priortostartupon6/14/90,allregulating banksunderwent fullinsertion andwithdrawal, andfunctioned normally.

(Twelveofthereference CEA'sarepartoftheregulating banks.)TheCEA'scurrently intheSt.Luciespentfuelpoolhaveexposures of4200-4400 EFPD,whichisroughlyequivalent tothenominalCEAexposures projected forEOC-10.Sincenofailuresorabnormalities ofthespentfuelpoolCEA'shavebeenobserved, thisindicates furtherassurance oftheintegrity oftheincorereference CEA's.Inspection toconfirmthecondition ofrepresentative discharge CEA'sisplanned.Initialcriticality conditions wereattainedwithinacceptance criteria.

Forexample,measuredHZPcriticalborondifferedfromdesigncalculation by27ppmcomparedto+50ppmacceptance criteria.

Uponr'eactortripsand/orcoldshutdow'ns, reference CEAexercising (fullinsertion

/withdrawal) willbeconducted.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1INSTALLATION OFTEMPORARY MONITORING EQUIPMENT ONTHE1A1REACTORCOOLANTPUMP(RCP)INTRODUCTION:

ThisSafetyEvaluation istoprovidejustification forthetemporary useofadditional shaftdisplacement vibration monitoring equipment onthelAlReactorCoolantPump(RCP).Thiswillallowadditional datatobecollected ontheRCPperformance duringalignment andbalancing oftheshaft.Theprobesandassociated supportbracketsforthistemporary modification areallowedforuseduringanymodeofoperation forthefacility.

Allothertemporary monitoring equipment andtemporary jumpersshallberemovedpriortotheunitenteringstartupoperations (mode2).Theuseoftheadditional monitoring equipment willhavenoadverseeffectonanypermanently installed equipment andwillbedisconnected priortostartupoperations.

SAFETYEVALUATION:

AreviewoftheplantTechnical Specifications andtheSafetyAnalysisReporthasshownthatnounreviewed safetyquestions andnoTechnical Specification changesareinvolvedwiththistemporary modification.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased sincetheadditional vibration monitoring equipment hasnoeffectontheoperation norwillthestructural integrity orfunctionofthemotor/pump beaffected.

Theconsequences ofanyaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased bythetemporary vibration monitoring equipment orlossofcontrolroomvibration indication oralarm.Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased bythesetemporary modifications.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment.

important tosafetyhasnotbeenincreased bythesetemporary modifications.

Themodifications performed underthissafetyevaluation aretothevibration monitoring systemofthelAlRCP.Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedbythistemporary modification.

Thevibration monitoring systemisapassivesystem.Thesystemperformsnoautomatic controlling functions.

Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedasaresultofthesetemporary modifications.

Thetemporary lossofvibration indication andalarmfortheRCPlAldoesnotcreateanynewfailuremodeswhichcouldimpacttheoperation ofanyequipment important tosafety.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1INSTALLATION OFTEMPORARY VIBRATION MONITORING EQUIPMENT ON1A1REACTORCOOLANTPUMP(RCP)INTRODUCTION:

ThisSafetyEvaluation istoprovidejustification forthetemporary useofadditional shaftdisplacement vibration monitoring equipment onthe1AlReactorCoolantPump(RCP).Thiswillallowadditional datatobecollected ontheRCPperformance duringalignment andbalancing oftheshaft.Theprobesandassociated supportbracketsforthistemporary modification areallowedforuseduringanymodeofoperation forthefacility.

Allothertemporary vibration monitoring equipment andtemporary jumpersshallberemovedpriortotheunitenteringstartupoperations (mode2).Theuseoftheadditional monitoring equipment willhavenoadverseeffectonanypermanently installed equipment andwillbedisconnected priortostartupoperations.

SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased sincetheadditional vibration monitoring equipment hasnoeffectontheoperation norwillthestructural integrity, orfunctionofthemotor/pump beaffected.

ITheconsequences ofanyaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased bythetemporary vibration monitoring equipment orlossofcontrolroomvibration indication oralarm.TheRCPvibration monitoring systemisnotusedtomitigatetheconsequences ofanyaccidentevaluated intheFUSAR.SincetheRCPshavenotbeenfunctionally affectednorwilltheaddedequipment affectitsstructural integrity, theRCP'swillcontinuetoperformtheirintendedpurposeandprovideadequatecoastdown flowfollowing anaccident.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyhasnotbeenincreased bythesetemporary modifications.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedbythistemporary modification.

Thevibration monitoring systemisapassivesystem.Thesystemperformsnoautomatic controlling functions.

Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased bythesetemporary modifications.

Themodifications performed underthisevaluation forthetemporary installation ofadditional vibration monitoring, equipment andtemporary lossofcontrolroomindication andannunciation ofRCPvibration hasnoimpactontheoperation ofanyequipment.

SincetheRCP'shavenotbeenfunctionally affectednorwilltheaddedequipment affectitsstructural integrity, theRCP'swillcontinuetoperformtheirintendedpurposeandprovideadequatecoastdown flowfollowing anaccident.

ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesofanyTechnical Specifications hasnotbeenreduced.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1CONTAINMENT FANCOOLERUNQUALIFIED COATINGINTRODUCTION:

Thissafetyevaluation addresses thepresenceofunqualified coatingsonthelA,1B,1C,and1DContainment FanCoolercoilflanges.Newcoolingcoilswereinstalled underPC/M081-189duringtheUnit11990Winterrefueling outage.Uponinspection ofthecoilspriortoinstallation, thecoatingonthecoilflangeswasdetermined tobeimproperly applied(i.e.-unqualified).

Someoftheseunqualified coatingscouldnotberemovedandreplacedduetotheirproximity tothecoppercoilsandtheresultant potential fordamageofthecoppercoils.SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased sincetheunqualified coatingsdonotperformsafetyfunctionandtheirfailureduringaLOCAwillnotadversely affectthefunctionofanystructure, system,orcomponent important tosafety,oraffectanyaccidentinitiating events.Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased sincefailureoftheunqualified coatingswillnotaffectthefunctionofanyequipment requiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased sincefailureoftheunqualified coatingswillnotalterthefunctionofanystructure, systemorcomponent important tosafety,andthusdoesnotincreasethepossibility oftheirfailure.Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFUSARhasnotbeencreatedsincetheunqualified coatingsdonotperformasafetyfunctionandtheirfailureduringaLOCAwillnotadversely affectthefunctionofanystructure, systemorcomponent capableofinitiating anaccidentThepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedsincefailureoftheunqualified coatingswillnotinhibitorotherwise adversely affecttheoperation ofanystructure, system,orcomponent important tosafety.Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased sincefailureoftheunqualified coatingscannotaffecttheperformance ofanystructure, system,orcomponent important tosafety.Thefailedcoatingscannotadversely affecttheECCSsincetheywillnotclogthecontainment sump,oraffecttheperformance ofECCSpumpsandcontainment spraynozzles.Theproposedmodification doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification sincetheunqualified coatingscannotaffectthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION FDRUSEOFSEALINGCOMPOUNDONVALVEI-V09252INTRODUCTIONs ThegasketsealingsurfaceonthevalvebodyhingepinboreofvalveV09252(feedwater supplycheckvalveto2Asteamgenerator) wasweldrepaired, inaccordance withNCR-2-307.

Asacontingency intheeventthevalvecontinues toleakatthisjointduringstartup,NCR-2-308 wasinitiated torequestinstallation ofLeakRepairs,Inc.capnutsandwirewrap.Thevalveislocatedsuchthatinstallation ofthecapnutswouldbedifficult whiletheleakisinprogress.

Ifleakageisdetectedduringstartup,thesealantwouldbeinjectedthroughthecapnutsintothegasketarea.Thepurposeofthisevaluation istoevaluateinstallation ofthecapnutsandwirewrap,andshouldleakageoccurduringstartup,provideamethodfortemporarily repairing thebodytohingepinleakonvalveI-V09252.

Themethodof'repairwillbesealantinjection.

Thevalvesshallbepermanently repairedduringthenextrefueling outageoroutageofsufficient duration.

SAFETYEVALUATIONs Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased.

Failureoftheinjection sealiscomparable toagasketfailureandistherefore encompassed bytheoriginaldesignbases.~~~~Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased bythisrepair.FUSARSection15.2.5discusses thelargefeedwater linebreak(18"linedownstream ofthecheckvalve).Totalfailureofthisgasket/sealant wouldinnowayapproachthisscenario.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction

'ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.

Thegasketand/orsealantdoesnotperformasafetyfunction.

Thesealantwillbelimitedtothevolumeofthegasketareavoidandtherefore, willnotadversely affectoperation ofthevalve.Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.Theproposedrepairdoesnotprovideanewmodeofnormaloremergency plantoperation.

Chemistry limitsarenotalteredandnootherchangeisproposedtotheplantdesign,modesofoperation orassumptions inthebasisfortheTechnical Specifications orSafetyAnalysis.

Therefore, thisrepairdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.

ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION FORWIDERANGE'CONTAINMENT LEVELCHANNELMODIFICATION INTRODUCTION:

ThisSafetyEvaluation allowstemporary repairofthewiderangecontainment levelmonitoring instrument channelL-07-13A.

Thisrepairisnecessary as,sensor11ofLE-07-13A isnolongeroperational.

Inordertocompensate forthiscondition, theelectronics ofLT-07-13A aretoberepairedThistemporary circuitrepairwillprovidefortheproperoperation ofchannelL>>07>>13A; Thisevaluation documents theacceptability oftheleveltransmitter's circuitry repair.Therepairwillnotadversely affecttheoperation ortheexistingqualification ofthecontainment levelsystem.SAFETYEVALUATION:

Thistemporary repairwillhavenoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation"

.AreviewofthePlantTechnical Specifications andtheSafetyAnalysisReporthasshownthat.thischangeisnotanunreviewed safetyquestionanddoesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications.

rTheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased.

Theinoperability ofthissystemisnotconsidered aninitiating eventinanyaccidentscenario.

Thewiderangecontainment waterlevelmonitoring channelsareutilizedsolelyforpostaccidentmonitoring purposes.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased withthiscircuitry repair.Thechannelstillprovidesmonitoring ofcontainment waterlevelduringananalyzedaccident.

Therepairdoesnotresultinanincreaseinprobability ofamalfunction.

Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased bythisrepair.Thewiderangecontainment levelchannelswillcontinuetomonitorthewaterlevelincontainment duringananalyzedaccident'.

TherepairedchannelL-07-13Awillcontinuetoprovidepostaccidentmonitoring capabilities withtheexception ofdecreased resolution betweensensorll(approx-imatelyelevation 18'3")andsensor12(approximately elevation 20'2"0.Waterlevelinthisrangewillbeindicated astheelevation ofsensor10(approximately elevation 16'5").Theredundant channelL-07-13Bwillcontinuetoprovidepostaccidentmonitoring capabilities andwillprovidecorrectresolution betweensensorslland12.Possibleinoperability ofchannelL-07-13Bbetweensensorslland12willnotadversely impactanyoperatoractionsassociated withaccidentmitigation asnoactionsordecisionpointsareanticipated tooccurbasedonacontainment waterlevelcondition betweentheelevations ofsensorslland12.Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typeandanyevaluated previously intheFUSARhasnotbeencreated.Therepairedinstrument loopprovidesonlymonitoring capability ofwiderangecontainment levelduringananalyzedaccidentandwilloperateasdescribed inthepreceding paragraph.

Theproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specifications astherepairedchannelwillcontinuetoprovidethenecessary monitoring functionofpostaccidentcontainment waterlevelasrequiredbythePlantTechnical Specifications' ST.LUCIEUNIT2ATWSDIVERSESCRAMSYSTEMINTRODUCTION:

Aspartoftheprojecttomeettherequirements oftheATWSRule,lOCFR50.62, aDiverseScramSystem(DSS)hasbeendesignedbyEatonConsolidated Controls(ECC)andwillbeinstalled intheSt.Lucie-Unit2Engineered SafetyFeaturesActuation System(ESFAS)cabinets.

ThenewDSScomponents willbecomprised ofprintedcircuitboardswhichwillbeintegrated intotheexistingESFAScircuitry andwillbeinstalled asagroupofindividual modules'.

Inaddition, theDSSmodulesaredesignedtoreplaceallexistingmodulesinthecabinetswhichhavesimilarcomponent functions, (i.e:bistabletrip,isolation, two-out"of-four actuation logic,three-out-of-four blockpermissive logic,andautomatic testfunctions).

Therefore, thenewmodulesaredesignedtobefullyinterchangeable withtheexistingonesandwillbeutilizedforfuturereplacements'.

SAFETYEVALUATION:

ThePlantTechnical Specifications, Section3/4.3.2describetheLimitingConditions forOperation andthesurveillance requirements oftheESFASinstrumentation.

Forthepurposesofthetest,onlyChannelAforContainment Radiation"High, ChannelAforRefueling WaterTank-Low,andtheAutomatic TestInserter(ATI)module,willbeutilized.

AsstatedintheTechnical Specifications, forbothContainment Radiation-High andRefueling WaterTank-Low, twochannelsoutoffourarerequiredfortripandthreechannelsarerequiredtobeoperable.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequence ofanaccidentofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreport(FUSAR)willnotbeincreased becauseoneoffourchannelswillbeconsidered tobeinoperable atanytime.Thisleavesthechannelfunctions inatwo-out-of-three tripcondition duringthemajorityofthetest,whichiswithinthePlantTechnical Specifications.

Fortheshortperiodoftimethatthefunctionisinone-out-of-three logic(i.e.duringbistableandisolation modulechangeout),

thecondition ismoreconservative thanPlantTechnical Specification limitingconditions.

Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreport(FUSAR)willnotbecreatedbecausethetriplogicconditions arethosepreviously evaluated arespecifically statedintheplantTechnical Specifications.

Inaddition, thecabinetcircuitdesignseparates andelectrically isolatesmeasurement channelsfromeachotherandsafetychannelsfromeachother.Therefore, theoperation ofanyotherchannelwillnotbeadversely affected.

ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification isnotreducedsincetheTechnical Specifications allowforplantoperations inatwo-out-of-three triplogicforaspecified timeperiod; ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAPETYEVALUATION POR2BCCWHEATEXCHANGER PLANGEGASKETREV'.1INTRODUCTION:

Thepurposeofthisevaluation istoaddressthepotentially degradedsealingcapability ofthetubesheet/channel flangegasketintheinletandoutletwaterboxesofthe2BComponent CoolingWater(CCW)HeatExchanger (RefNCRk2.-434,NCRfP8740-2694M) andtojustifytheuseoftheArcorS-16/Arc-Thane jointcoatingsystemtoenhancethesealingofthejointforCycle6operation".

Repairweldingperformed toresolveNCR8'-428andNCR2-434slightlywarpedthetubesheet flangesatthe120'clockposition, whichmayimpacttheabilityoftheexistinggaskettosealthethesubjectflangejoints'.PC/M350-290MREV.2providedforcoatingthetubesheet/channel flangejointwiththeArcorS-16/Arc-Thane jointcoatingsystemtoallowforthermalmovements andpreventseawaterfromcontacting thecarbonsteelchannelflange.TheArcorS-16/Arc-Thane jointcoatingsystemwillenhancethecapability ofthegasket/flange jointconfiguration toprovideaproperseal,particularly intheareaofthedetectedwarpage.SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased';

Thiscondition doesnotalterthefunctionofanyexistingcomponents, andthusdoesnotincreasethepossibility oftheirfailure'.

TheadditionoftheArcorS-16/Arc-Thane systeminthe2BCCWheatexchanger tubesheet/channel flangejointprovidesanenhancement totheexistingjointconfiguration toensurethejointissealedandnoleakagewilloccur.Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased sincethiscondition doenotaffectanyaccidentinitiating components.

The2BCCWheatexchanger isnotanaccidentinitiating component".

Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased sincethiscondition doesnothaveadetrimental effectonanysafetyrelatedequipment orcomponents".

Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedsincethiscondition, willnotinhibitorotherwise adversely affecttheoperation oftheCCWorICWsystems.Thecomponents ofthecondition areincompliance withtheSafetyAnalysisReportrequirements forthesystemelements.

Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased bythiscondition sincethiscondition doesnothaveadetrimental affectonanyequipment requiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.'ailure ofthegasketinthewarpedareaonthe2BCCWheatexchanger flangewouldallowonlyminorleakagecomparedtothetotalICWflowrate".TheleakagewouldbeontheICWoutletoftheCCWheatexchanger andtherefore wouldnotaffecttheabilityoftheCCWheatexchanger toperformitssafetyrelatedfunctions.

ShouldleakageoccurontheICWinlet,sufficient marginisavailable toperformthesafetyrelatedfunctionasaddressed inSection4:0".Failed PAGE,2ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION FOR2BCCWHEATEXCHANGER FLANGEGASKETcoatingpieceswouldbecarriedthroughthesystemandbereleasedintothedischarge canalwithoutaffecting theoperation ofthesystem.Thiscondition doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification sincethiscondition isonlytoajointconfiguration onthe2BCCWheatexchanger.

Nochangesarebeingmadetothesystemdesign,modesofoperation orassumptions inthebasesfortheTechnical Specification ortheFUSAR.

ST.LUCIEUNIT2LEAKREPAIROFVALVE2I-V08111 INTRODUCTION:

Valve2I-V08111 isleakingatthevalvebodytobonnetgasketconnection asidentified byNCR2-335.LeakRepairs,Inc.sealantwillbeinjectedtostoptheleakagebythedrillandtapmethod.Thepurposeofthisevaluation istoevaluatethetemporary installation ofthe1/8"injection valveforinjection ofthesealant,andinstallation ofapipeplugsubsequent toinjection.

Thevalvebonnetwillbedrilledintheareaoftheboltcircle,atanangletointersect thegasketsealingsurface.Thevalveshallbepermanently repairedduringthenextrefueling outageoroutageofsufficient duration.

SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theuseofthismethodtorepairthesubjectvalveswillhavenoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation.

AreviewoftheplantTechnical Specifications andtheSafetyAnalysisReporthasshownthattherearenounreviewed safetyquestions orTechnical Specification changesinvolved.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased.

Failureoftheinjection sealandplugiscomparable toagasketfailureandistherefore encompassed bytheoriginaldesignbasesandaccidentanalysisdescribed inFUSARSection15.1.6.Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased bythisrepair.FUSARSection15.1.6discusses themainsteamlinebreak,whichresultsinthemaximumsteamgenerator blowdownratethrough6.36sqft(36"linebetweenthesteamgenerator nozzleandtheflowventuri).

Totalfailureofthisgasket/sealant wouldnotapproachthisscenario.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.

Thevalveisrequiredtomaintainpressureboundary.

Itsabilitytodosowillnotbeaffectedbythisrepairsincetheboltloadingsarenotaffectedbytheinjection ofsealant.Thegasketand/orsealantdoesnotperformasafetyfunction.

Thesealantwillbelimitedtothevolumeofthegasketareavoidandtherefore, willnotadversely affectoperation ofthevalveoranycomponents inthesafetyrelatedportionofthemainsteamsystem.Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.Theproposedrepairdoesnotprovideanewmodeofnormaloremergency plantoperation'.

PAGE2ST.LUCIEUNIT2LEAKREPAIROFVALVE2IV08111Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.Limitingtheinjection ofsealanttojustinteracting outsidethevalvepressureboundaryprecludes amalfunction ofadifferent type.Leakageofsealantintothemainsteamsystemisprecluded bylimitingsealantinjection volumetothevolumeofthegasketareavoid,andthemethodofinjection, thusdownstream components willnotbeadversely affected.

Chemistry limitsarenotalteredandnootherchangeisproposedtotheplantdesign,modesofoperation orassumptions inthebasisfortheTechnical Specifications orSafetyAnalysis.

Therefore, thisrepairdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION FORI-FCV-23-3 AND5LEAKREPAIRINTRODUCTION:

PSL-2BlowdownContainment Isolation ValvesI-FCV-23-3, 5havehadahistoryofleakageproblems.

Numerousleakrepairshavebeenperformed ontheseSteamGenerator Blowdownsystemcontainment valvesonbothunits'.SteamGenerator Blowdownisutilizedtocontrolsteamgenerator secondary sidewaterchemistry, monitorsecondary sideradioactivity foranyprimarytosecondary leakage,reducethesteamgenerator blowdowncontaminants toanacceptable levelpriortodischarge totheenvironment, andprovideblowdownsystemcontainment isolation capability.

Theportionofthepipingandvalvesatthecontainment penetrations areseismictoensurecontainment integrity following acontainment isolation signal.Thepurposeofthisevaluation istoprovideamethodfortemporarily repairing bodytobonnetleaksonvalvesI-FCV-23-3 and5.Themethodofrepairwillbesealantinjection.

Thevalvesshallbereplacedorpermanently repairedduringthenextscheduled outageorothersuitabletimeperiod".Thesevalvesarenonisolable andnormallyopen.SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theuseofthismethodtorepairthesubjectvalveswillhavenoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation.

Thefailureofanycomponent intheSteam.Generator BlowdownSystem=doesnotaffectsafeshutdownoftheplant.'he probability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased.

Thesevalvesarenotaccidentinitiating components".

Thesevalvesservetoisolatecontainment intheeventofanaccident.'he consequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased bythisrepair.Thevalveisrequiredformaintaining containment isolation, anditsabilitytodosowillnotbeaffected".

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.Theproposedrepairdoesnotprovideanewmodeofnormaloremergency plantoperation".

Bylimitingtheinjection ofsealanttojustinteracting outsidethevalvepressureboundaryprecludes amalfunction ofadifferent type.Chemistry limitsarenotalteredandnootherchangeisproposedtotheplantdesign,modesofoperation orassumptions inthebasisfortheTechnical Specifications orSafetyAnalysis.

Therefore, thisrepa'irdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.

0't ST.LUCIEUNIT2INSTALLATION OFBLINDFLANGEONOUTLETOFPURGEEXHAUSTVALVEFCV-25-6INTRODUCTION:

Thecontainment isolation systemprovidesthemeansofisolating fluidsystemsthatpassthroughcontainment penetrations suchthatanyradioactivity thatmaybereleasedtothecontainment atmosphere following apostulated DesignBasisAccident(DBA)isconfined.

Table6.2-52andFig.6.2-69oftheSt.LucieUnit2FUSARshowsisolation valvesFCV-25-4,

-5and-6areinstalled inseriesinthe48"containment purgeexhaustsystemsandarelocatedinsidecontainment, intheannulus,andoutsidetheshieldwall,respectively.

ValvesFCV-25-4and-5provideadoubleisolation forthecontainment penetration.

ValvesFCV-25-5and-6provideadoubleisolation fortheshieldwallpenetration.

FUSAR,Table6.2-53showsthesevalvesarenormallyclosed.ValvesFCV-25-4and-5arealsolistedasContainment Isolation Signal(CIS)valvesintheSt.LucieUnit2Technical Specification, Table3.6-2whichisineffectformodes1,2,3and4.SAFETYEVALUATIONs Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedbecausethecontainment purgeexhaustsystemisneitherrequiredtofunctionfollowing apostulated DesignBasisAccidentnorisitrequiredfortheoperational designofanysystem.Containment purgeduringnormalplantoperation isperformed bythe8"containment purgesystem.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotreducedbythischangebecauseafterimplementing thischange,theblindflangeofvalveFCV-25-6providesasecondisolation boundaryandreplacestheisolation functionofFCV-25-5whichhasrepeatedly leakedduringLLRT.ThischangeiswithintheactionitemsstatedintheSt'.LucieUnit2Technical Specification, Section3.6.3.Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthecontainment purgeexhaustsystemisnotasafetyrelatedsystemandisneitherrequiredtooperateduringnormalplantoperation norafteraDesignBasisAccident".'owever, itisrequiredtoisolatetheContainment aftertheAccident.

Theinstallation ofatemporary blindflangeontheexhaustsideofvalveFCV-25-6willprovideasecondisolation boundaryandreplacetheisolation functionofFCV-25-5.

Thepipingassociated withvalveFCV-25-6andPenetration P-10,theweldbetweentheclosureplateandshieldbuildinganchorplantringandpenetration sleevewereevaluated fortheadditional seismicanddeadweightloadsofthenewlydesignedflangeandexistingvalveFCV-25-6associated piping.Theywerefoundtobeadequatefortheadditional loads.Application ofsealantinthevalvepackingofvalvesFCV-25-5and6willnotadversely affectthenormalfunctionofthevalvesandwillenhancetheabilityofthevalvestoperformitsdesignfunction.

ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION FORWIDERANGECONTAINMENT LEVELCHANNELMODIFICATION INTRODUCTION:

ThisSafetyEvaluation allowstemporary modification ofthewiderangecontainment levelmonitoring instrument ChannelL-07-13A.

Thisalteration isnecessary assensorllofLE-07-13A isnolongeroperational.

Inordertocompensate forthiscondition, theelectronics ofLT-07-13A aretobemodified.

Thistemporary circuitalteration willprovidefortheproperoperation ofchannelL-07-13A.

Thisevaluation documents theacceptability oftheleveltransmitter's circuitry alteration.

Themodification willnotadversely affecttheoperation ortheexistingqualification ofthecontainment levelsystem.SAFETYEVALUATION:

Thistemporary modification willhavenoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation.

AreviewofthePlantTechnical Specifications andtheSafetyAnalysisReporthasshownthatthischangeisnotanunreviewed safetyquestionanddoesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased.

Thefailureofthissystemisnot,considered aninitiating eventinanyaccidentscenario.

Thewiderangecontainment waterlevelmonitoring loopsareutilizedsolelyforpostaccidentmonitoring purposes.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased withthiscircuitry modification.

Thechannelstillprovidesmonitoring ofcontainment waterlevelduringananalyzedaccident.

Themodification doesnotresultinanincreaseinprobability ofamalfunction.

Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased bythismodification.

Thewiderange,containment levelloopswillcontinuetomonitorthewaterlevelincontainment duringananalyzedaccident.

ThemodifiedchannelL-07-13Awillcontinuetoprovide'ost accidentmonitoring capabilities withtheexception ofdecreased resolution betweensensorll(approximately elevation 18'3")andsensor12(approximately elevation 20'2").Waterlevelinthisrangewillbeindicated astheelevation ofsensor10(approximately elevation 16'5").Theredundant channelL-07-13Bwillcontinuetoprovidepostaccidentmonitoring capabilities andwillprovidecorrectresolution betweensensors11and12.Possibleinoperability ofchannelL-07-13Bbetweensensors11and12willnotadversely impactanyoperatoractionsassociated withaccidentmitigation asnoactionsordecisionpointsareanticipated tooccurbasedonacontainment waterlevelcondition betweenandtheelevations ofsensors11and12.Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased.

Becausethechannelwillcontinuetomonitorpostaccidentcontainment waterlevelasdescribed inthepreviousparagraph, theconsequences ofamalfunction havenotbeenchanged.

PAGE2ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION FORWIDERANGECONTAINMENT LEVELCHANNELMODIFICATION Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFUSARhasnotbeencreatedasthistemporary modification doesnotintroduce anynewfailuremodestothepostaccidentcontainment levelmonitoring system.Theproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specifications asthemodifiedchannelwillcontinuetoprovidethenecessary monitoring functionofpostaccidentcontainment waterlevelasrequiredbythePlantTechnical Specifications.

I ST.LUCIEUNIT2INSTALLATION OFBLINDFLANGEONFCV-25-5INTRODUCTION:

Thecontainment isolation systemprovidesthemeansofisolating fluidsystemsthatpassthroughcontainment penetration suchthatanyradioactivity thatmaybereleasedtothecontainment atmosphere following apostulated designbasisaccident(DBA)isconfined.

Isolation valveFCV-25-5hasexperienced repeatedleakproblemsduringlocalleakratetesting(LLRT).Tocorrectthisproblem,aspecially designedblindflangewillbeinstalled ontheexhaustsideofvalveFCV-25-6toprovideasecondisolation boundaryandreplacetheisolation functionofvalveFCV-25-5.

SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.

Thecontainment purgeexhaustsystemisnotasafetyrelatedsystemandisneitherrequiredtooperateduringnormaloperation norafteradesignbasisaccident.

Theinstallation ofatemporary blindflangeontheexhaustsideofvalveFCV-25-6willprovideasecondisolation boundaryandreplacetheisolation functionofFCV-25-5.

Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethatanyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated.Becausethecontainment purgeexhaustsystemisneitherrequiredtofunctionfollowing aDBAnorisitrequiredfortheoperational designofanysystem.Containment purgeduringnormalplantoperation isperformed bythe8"containment purgesystem.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isnotreducedbythischange.ThischangeiswithintheactionitemsstatedintheSt.LucieUnit2Technical Specification, Section3.6.3.Thetemporary blindflangeontheoutletofpurgevalveFCV-25-6isacceptable inthatitreplacestheisolation functionofvalveFCV2-5.Theenhancement ofvalvepackingonvalvesFCV-25-5and6provideadditional assurance fortheleaktightness.

1' ST.LUCIEUNIT2INSTALLATION OFBLINDFLANGEONFCV-25"6INTRODUCTION:

Thecontainment isolation systemprovidesthemeansofisolating fluidsystemsthatpassthroughcontainment penetrations suchthatanyradioactivity thatmaybereleasedtothecontainment atmosphere following apostulated DesignBasisAccident(DBA)isconfined.

Table6.2-52andFig.6.2-69oftheSt.LucieUnit2FUSARshowsisolation valvesFCV-25-4,

-5and-6areinstalled inseriesinthe48"containment purgeexhaustsystemsandarelocatedinsidecontainment, intheannulus,andoutsidetheshieldwall,respectively.

ValvesFCV-25-4and-5provideadoubleisolation forthecontainment penetration.

ValvesFCV25-5and"6provideadoubleisolation fortheshieldwallpenetration.

FUSAR,Table6.2-53showsthesevalvesarenormallyclosed.ValvesFCV-25-4and-5arealsolistedasContainment Isolation Signal(CIS)valveintheSt.LucieUnit2Technical.

Specification, Table3.6-2whichisineffectformodes,2,3and4.SAFETYEVALUATION:

Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedbecausethecontainment purgeexhaustsystemisneitherrequiredtofunctionfollowing apostulated DesignBasisAccidentnorisitrequiredfortheoperational designofanysystem.Containment puxgeduringnormalplantoperation isperformed bythe8"containment purgesystem.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotreducedbythischangebecauseafterimplementing thischange,theblindflangeofvalveFCV-25-6providesasecondisolation boundaryandreplacestheisolation functionofFCV-25-5whichhasrepeatedly leakedduringLLRT.ThischangeiswithintheactionitemsstatedintheSt.LucieUnit2Technical Specification, Section3.6.3.Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.

Thecontainment purgeexhaustsystemisnotasafetyrelatedsystemandisneitherrequiredtooperateduringnormalplantoperation norafteraDesignBasisAccident.

However,itisrequiredtoisolatetheContainment aftertheAccident.

Theinstallation ofatemporary blindflangeontheexhaustsideofvalveFCV-25-5.

Thepipingassociated withvalveFCV-25-6andPenetration P-10,theweldbetweentheclosureplateandshieldbuildinganchorplantringandpenetration sleevewereevaluated fortheadditional seismicanddeadweightloadsofthenewlydesignedflangeandexistingvalveFCV-25-6associated piping.Theywerefoundtobeadequatefortheadditional loads.Application ofsealantinthevalvepackingofvalvesFCV-25-5and6willnotadversely affectthenormalfunctionofthevalvesandwillenhancetheabilityofthevalvestoperformitsdesignfunction.

0 ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION FOR2BCCWHEATEXCHANGER FLANGEGASKETINTRODUCTION:

Thepurposeofthisevaluation istoaddressthepotentially degradedsealingcapability ofthetubesheet/channel flangegasketintheoutletwaterboxofthe2BComponent CoolingWater(CCW)HeatExchanger (Ref.NCR/f8740-2694M) andtojustifytheuseoftheArcorS-16/Arc-Thane jointcoatingsystemtoenhancethesealingofthejointforCycle6operation.

Repairweldingperformed toresolveNCR82-428slightlywarpedthetubesheet flangeatthe120'clockposition, whichmayimpacttheabilityoftheexistinggaskettosealatthesubjectflangejoint.PC/M350-290HRev.'providedforcoatingthetubesheet/channel flangejointwiththeArcorS-16/Arc-Thane jointcoatingsystemtoallowforthermalmovements andpreventseawaterfromcontacting thecarbonsteelchannelflange.TheArcorS-16/Arc-Than jointcoatingsystemwillenhancethecapability ofthegasket/flange jointconfiguration toprovideaproperseal,particularly intheareaofthedetectedwarpage'.

SAFETYEVALUATION:

Thiscondition willhavenoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation"

.AreviewoftheplantTechnical Specifications andtheSafetyAnalysisReporthasshownthattherearenounreviewed safetyquestions orTechnical Specification changesinvolvedsincethiscondition doesnothinderorchangetheoperation ofanycomponents orsystems.Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedsincethiscondition willnotinhibitorotherwise adversely affecttheoperation'f theCCWorICWsystems.Thecomponents ofthecondition are,incompliance withtheSafetyAnalysisReportrequirements forthesystemelements.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedsincethiscondition doesnotaddoraffectanyequipment capableofinitiating anaccident".

Thiscondition onlyaffectsthe2BCCWheatexchanger flangejoint.ITheconsequences ofamalfunction of'equipment important, tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased sincethiscondition doesnothaveadetrimental effectonanysafetyrelatedequipment orcomponents'.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.

Thiscondition doesnotalterthefunctionofanyexistingcomponents, andthusdoesnotincreasethepossibility oftheirfailure.Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased sincethiscondition doesnotaffectanyaccidentinitiating components.

The2BCCWheatexchanger isnotanaccidentinitiating component.

PAGE2ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION FOR2BCCWHEATEXCHANGER FLANGEGASKETThiscondition doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification sincethiscondition isonlytoajointconfiguration onthe2BCCWheatexchanger.

Nochangesarebeingmadetothesystemdesign,modesofoperation orassumptions inthebasesfortheTechnical Specification ortheFUSAR.

ST.LUCIEUNITS16c2EVALUATION OFDELETIONOFSPECIFICINSTRUMENT REFERENCES FROMTHEEMERGENCY ACTIONLEVELSINTRODUCTION:

Anevaluation ofthepotential effectsofdeletingspecificinstrument readingsfromtheSt.LuciePlantEmergency Planhasbeenconducted inaccordance withtherequirements of10CFR50.59and10CFR50.54(q.)

Theproposeddeletionwasdetermined torequirereviewinaccordance withtherequirements of10CFR50.59asitinvolvedachangetoarequirement specifically referenced intheSt.LucieUnit2SafetyEvaluation Report,NUREG-0843, datedOctober,1981.Section13.3.2.4, "Emergency Classification System,"specifically references NUREG-0654, andthepreparation ofEALswhichuse"'..'.specific instrumentation, parameters andequipment status."SAFETYEVALUATION:

Deletionofthespecificinstrument references intheEmergency ActionLevel(EAL)TablesintheSt.LuciePlantEmergency Plandoesnotimpacttheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated asthe,EALtablesarenotassumedtoplayanyroleineventinitiation intheSt.LucieUnits1and2UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FUSARs).

Deletionofthespecificinstrument references intheEmergency Plandoesnotimpacttheprobability ofthemalfunction ofanyequipment important tosafetyastheEALtablesdonotaffectequipment operation inanyway.Thepotential consequences ofanaccidentarenotaffectedastheproposedchangedoesnotincreaseanyhazardtothehealthandsafetyofthegeneralpublicinanyway.Theexistingemergency operating guidelines technology isbaseduponCEN-152,Revision3,"Combustion Engineering Emergency Operating Guidelines."

Theaccidentmitigation strategyemployedinCEN-152isbaseduponasystematic approachtoplantoperations basedonahierarchy ofoperational protective actions.Theseactionsaredirectedatminimizing theconsequences ofaneventand,oncefulfilled, ensure'propercontroloftheeventinprogress.

Suchactionsaretermed"safetyfunctions",

andaredefinedasconditions oractionsthatpreventcoredamageorminimizeradiation releasetothepublic.Fulfillment ofacompletesetof,safetyfunctions ensuresproperoperatorcontroloftheeventand,therefore, ensuresthatthehealth'nd safetyofthepublicisnotthreatened.

,Asnochangesarebeingmadetoanyoftheoperational parameters affecting theabilitytomeetanysafetyfunctioninanyemergency operating procedure, theexistinganalyzedpotential doseratesatthesiteboundarywillnotbeaffectedbytheproposedchangetotheEmergency ActionLevelTableintheEmergency Plan.Therefore, theproposedchangedoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafety.TherearenofacetsoftheEmergency PlanEALTablewhichplayanyroleintheoperation ofplantequipment, orinthedetermination ofgeneralplantoperational guidelines; hence,achangetothistablecannotbeassumedtobeaninitiating factorinanyaccidentanalysis.

ChangestotheEALTable

-r0 1JPAGE2EVALUATION OPDELETIONOFSPECIFICINSTRUMENT REFERENCES PROMTHEEMERGENCY

'ACTIONLEVELSwilltherefore notinvolvethepossibility ofcreationofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreport".TheEAL,table isnotreferenced inthebasisforanyTechnical Specification foreitherSt.LucieUnit1orSt.LucieUnit2.Therefore, changingtheEALtablewillnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.

4II ST.LUCIEUNITS16c2NUREG-0737 ITEMII.D.lPRESSURIZER SRVANDPORVDISCHARGE PIPINGSTRESSANALYSISINTRODUCTION:

rItemII.D.1ofNUREG-0737 requiredthatlicensees examinethefunctional performance capabilities ofPWRpressurizer safety,reliefandblockvalvesandverifytheintegrity oftheassociated pipingsystemsfornormal,transient andaccidentconditions.

TheNRCissuedthestaff'sSafetyEvaluation (SE)andassociated Technical Evaluation Reports(TER's)fortheSt.LucieUnits1and2responsetoItemII.D.1ofNUREG-0737 onMay11,1990.TheNRC'sSEconcluded thatFPLmetalloftheII.D.1requirements withtheexception ofthoseitemsidentified inSection5.2oftheTER's.ThemajorityoftheseitemswereresolvedviatheReference 1transmittal.

Thepurposeofthistransmittal istoresolvetheremaining openitem(Item8oftheTER's)associated withItemII.D.1.Item8oftheNRCTER'sidentified thattheoriginalSt.LucieUnits1and2pipingstressanalysesdidnotfollowthethermal-hydraulic modelingrecommendations presented inEPRIdocumentNP-2479,"RELAP5Calculation ofSRVPipingLoads".Toresolvethisissue,newRELAP5modelsweredeveloped forbothSt.LucieUnits1and2incorporating theEPRImodelingrecommendations.

TheseRELAP5resultswerethenutilizedininputsintorevisedpipingstressanalyses.

SAFETYEVALUATION:

TheSt.LucieUnit1pipingsatisfies alloftheapplicable requirements ofANSIB31.7(1969)andB31.1(1967).Alltheassociated St.LucieUnit1pipingsupports(withtheexception ofsupportPRC-005-34B) areacceptable forthereviseddesignloads.SupportO'RC-005-34B hasbeenshowntobeoperable/functional foritsreviseddesignloadsfortheremainder ofthepresentoperating cycle(Cycle10).Theoperability evaluation forsupportNRC-005-34B canbefoundintheattachedevaluation JPN-PSL-SEMJ-90-055, Revision0.Support8RC-005-34B willrequiremodification duringthe1991St.LucieUnit1refueling outage.2.TheSt.LucieUnit2pipingsatisfies alloftheapplicable requirements ofASMESectionIII(throughsummer1973addenda)andB31.1(1967).Additionally, allassociated St.LucieUnit2pipingsupportshavebeenshowntobeacceptable forthereviseddesignload.3.TheSt.LucieUnits1and2pressurizer nozzleshavebeenevaluated fortherevisednozzleloadsandtheserevisedloadsproducestressesthatremainwithincodeallowables underallloadingconditions.

I4.TheSt.LucieUnits1and2pressurizer safetyvalvesandPORV'scalculated discharge flangebendingmomentsremainwithinthosevaluesobtainedthroughtheEPRIvalvetestprogramorvaluespreviously approvedbytheNRC.Therefore, operability ofthesafetyvalvesandPORV'sisdemonstrated.

ST.LUCIEUNITS162OCEANINTAKESYSTEMVELOCITYCAPPANELREMOVALINTRODUCTION:

Precastconcretepanels(approximately 12'19'.x1'-3"thick)fortheSt.LuciePlantoceanintakepipelinevelocitycapshaveexperienced structural failures.

Oneofthecenterpanelsforthe16footdiameterpipelinevelocitycapandonepanelforthesouthernmost 12footdiameterpipelinevelocitycaphascollapsed andbrokenapart.Itislikelypaneldebrishasfallenintothepipelines.

Thefailuresweredocumented inNCR's1-324and1-328,whichwereinitially dispositioned withengineering operability assessments concluding thattheplantcouldbeoperatedsafelywiththefailedvelocitycappanels.Anevaluation wasalsopreparedconcluding thattotalfailur'eofthevelocitycapswouldhavenoadverseimpacttonuclearplantsafety.SAFETYEVALUATION:

Adetailed, systematic planformobilization,,rigging, liftinganddemobilization hasbeendeveloped forremovalofsix(total)concretepanelsfromthetwoimpairedvelocitycaps.Onepanelfromthedamaged12footdiameterpipelinevelocitycapwillberemovedusingapedestalmountedcraneonboardananchoredbarge.Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.

Theprobability oflosingtheprimarysourceofcoolingwaterwillnotincreaseforthepanelremovaloperation.

Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated.Thevelocitycapstructures andoceanintakepipelines havenosafetyrelatedfunction.

Inaddition, sufficient coolingwaterwillcontinuetobeavailable forshutdowncoolingbyusingthesecond,independent sourceofwater(BigMudCreek)iftheprimarysourceofwaterisnotavailable.

Therefore, modifications tothevelocitycapscannotcause,contribute to,orbecomefactorsinanewtypeofsafety-related equipment malfunction.

ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specifications isnotreduced.Limitations ontheminimumwaterlevelfortheultimateheatsinkwillnotbeaffected.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated.

ST.LUCIEUNITS1&2IMPLEMENTATION OFAPERMANENT PRIMARYCHEMISTRY CONTROLPROGRAMWITHMODIFIEDLITHIUMCONCENTRATIONS INTRODUCTION:

Primarycoolantchemistry iscontrolled duringvariousplantoperations andevolutions to:minimizecorrosion rateofmaterials incontactwiththereactorcoolant,minimizeexcessive foulingatheattransfersurfaces, andminimizereactorplantradiation levelsincomponent/access

'areaswheremaintenance mayberequired.

Toachievethesegoals,criticalparameters forcontrolincludebothoxygenandpH.Dissolved oxygenisscavenged byhydrazine inthecoolantwhilepHismaintained withinaprescribed rangevialithium(Li)intheformoflithiumhydroxide.

TheidealpHrange(6.9to7.4)hasbeenspecified inconjunction with0.2to2.4ppmLitoprovideawidemarginbetweentheupperoperational limitandthethreshold forattackintheeventanyconcentrating phenomena exist.Thisrangereducesthecorrosion andresultsinlessdissolved corrosion productscirculating inthereactorcoolant.Whenproperlycoordinated, highlithium/pH promotesthedeposition ofcorrosion productsoncoolersurfaces(e.g.,steamgenerator downcorner area)ratherthanathottersurfaces(e.g.,fuelrodsandcoreareas).Theoverallirradiated crudloadwouldbereducedbypreventing crudfromdepositing onthefuelsurfaces.

Althoughcrudloadinthesteamgenerators wouldincrease, theneteffectistominimizetheactuation ofcorrosion productsbyreducingtheircoreresidence time.SAFETYEVALUATION:

Therevisedprimarychemistry programasdescribed inthissafetyevaluation doesnotresultinanunreviewed safetyquestionorreduction inthemarginofsafetyasdefined-by theSt.LucieTechnical Specifications, norhavean,adverseaffectonplantsafetyoroperation.

Sincethissafetyevaluation addresses chemistry limitations whichprovidecorrosion protection toensurethestructural integrity ofthefuelandoftheRCS,thissafetyevaluation isclassified assafety-related.

Themodifiedlithiumcoolantchemistry programproposedforSt'.LucieUnitsland2beginning inCycleslland6,respectively, willresultinazircaloycorrosion ratethatislowerthanthecorrosion ratefromtheuseoftheelevatedlithiumcoolantchemistry programinCycles9and5.Sincefuelrodperformance parameters willnotchange,exposureofthecladdingtogreaterthan2.4ppmandupto3.5ppmlithium,aspartofthemodifiedlithiumcoolantchemistry program,willnotresultinfuelcorrosion ormechanical behavioreithergreaterthan,ordifferent from,thatpreviously considered intheinputtoanysafetyanalysis.

Therefore, theconsequences ofpreviously analyzedaccidents arenotincreased.

Asthefuelisoperatedinthesamemannerasinpreviouscycles,theprobability ofanaccident'r malfunction ofequipment alsoremainsunchanged.

iImplementation ofthismodifiedlithiumprogramhasbeenrecentlyevaluated bytheFPLNuclearFuelGroupandtheNSSSmanufacturer, ABB-CE,withoutanynegativeeffects.Structures, systemsandcomponents continuetomeetoriginaldesigncriteriaand"limitsincompliance withtheFUSAR.

PAGE2IMPLEMENTATION OPAPERMANENT PRIMARYCHEMISTRY CONTROLPROGRAMWITHMODIFIEDLITHIUMCONCENTRATIONS Theproposedmodifiedlithiumprogramwillnotincreasetheincidentofstresscorrosion ofPWSCCofthecomponents wettedbyprimarycoolantsincetestingperformed onmillannealedsteamgenerator tubinghasnotshownacorrelation toPWSCCandhighlithiumchemistry, norhasanyPWSCCobservedatothernuclearplantsduetoelevatedlithiumchemistry.

Theproposedincreaseinlithiumlevelwillnotcreateamalfunction ora,different failuremechanism thanpreviously evaluated, sincethecorrosion rateswillnotincreasefortheplantcomponents whichcontacttheprimarycoolantoritsletdown.Themarginofsafetyasdescribed inthebasisofanyTechnical Specification isnotreducedbecausenochangesinanysafetyanalysisinputorassumptions arerequiredasaresultoftheproposedchanges;norareanychangestoanalysismethodology necessary todescribefuelrodbehavior.

Asnoinputs,assumptions, ormethodshavechanged,theresultsoftheprecioussafetyanalysisremainunchanged.

ST.IUCIE.UNITS1&2BORICACIDSECONDARY WATERCHEMISTRY INTRODUCTIONs Twocommoncausesofsteamgenerator degradation areintergranular attack(IGA)andtubedenting.Botharetheresultofcorrosion mechanisms inducedbythepresenceofimpurities.

Theseimpurities becomeconcentrated todetrimental levelsinsludgepilesandcreviceregions.Theuseofboricacidonthesecondary side,however,hasbeenshowntomitigatetheeffectsoftheimpurities.

TheJNSchemistry staffhasconducted asafetyevaluation inaccordance withJNS-QI-3.0 whichimplements therequirements of10CFR50.59;Thissafetyevaluation addresses theadditionofboricacidtothePSLsecondary systems,inparticular, toPSL-1asaninhibitor totheongoingintergranular attack(IGA)ofthesteamgenerator allow600tuubing.SAFETYEVALUATION:

TheLimitingCondition forOperation (LCO)3.4.5SteamGenerators, addresses theoperability requirements ofthesteamgenerators.

Theassociated surveillance requirements reflectthedetailsofthetubeinspection program.LCO3.4.7,undertheheading"Chemistry" refersonlytoreactorcoolantchemistry.

Thelonechemistry relatedTechnical Specification associated withtheSecondary SystemisLCO3.7.1.4.ThisLCOspecifies alimitforspecificactivityinthesecondary coolantsystem.Therefore, theproposedchangedoesnotaffectthisLCO.Baseduponthisreview,theadditionofboricacidtothesecondary cyclewillnotrequireachangetotheTechnical, Specifications incorporated intothereferenced licensesforSt.LucieUnits1and2asthereisnodirectlyapplicable Technical Specification.

Thecorrosion ratesonsecondary systemmaterials arelow.Duetothelowconcentrations ofboricacidthroughout thesecondary system,corrosion ofexternalcomponents asaresultofleakagefromthesystemwilltakesignificantly longertooccurandwillbenegligible.

Theconsequences ofpotential accidents areboundedbytheanalysesoftheFUSAR.Therefore, theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetywillnotbeincreased.

Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportshallnotbecreated.LCO3.4.5(SteamGenerators) addresses theoperability requirements ofthesteamgenerators.

Thebasisoftheassociated surveillance requirements forinspection istoensurethatthestructural integrity ofthesteamgenerator tubingismaintained suchthatprimarytosecondary leakagefrombothsteamgenerators doesnotexceed1.0gpm.Accordingly,,the plantisexpectedtobeoperatedsuchthatthesecondary coolantwillbemaintained withinthosechemistry limitsfoundtoresultinnegligible corrosion ofthesteamgenerator tubes.Ifthesecondary coolantchemistry isnotmaintained withintheselimits,localized corrosion maylikelyresultinstresscorrosion cracking.

Theproposedchangehasbeenshowntomitigatetheeffectsofcorrosive impurities presentwithinthesteamgenerator.

Therefore, themarginofsafetyasdescribed inthebasisforanyTechnical Specification isnotreduced.

ST.LUCIEUNITS162SAFETYEVALUATION OFROSEMOUNT SERIES115381154TRANSMITTER SUSCEPTIBLE TOOILLEAKSINTRODUCTION:

Intheengineering evaluation fortheuseofRosemount Model1153and1154transmitters atSt.LucieUnits1a2,certainbatchesoftheRosemount 1153and1154seriestransmitters havebeenidentified byRosemount asbeingsusceptible toalossofoilinthesealedsensingcell.SAFETYEVALUATION=

Outofthe42suspectbatchtransmitters, 27areinthestoreroom, 10areinstalled, 4havebeenremovedfromserviceand1hasnotbeenlocated.Thetransmitters inthestoreroom havebeenplacedonQChold.Theonethathasnotbeenlocatedhasbeenverifiednottobeinstalled inanysafetyrelatedapplications atSt.Lucie.Atotalof20suspectbatchtransmitters werefoundinstalled inSt.LucieUnits1&2basedonRosemounts February7,1989andDecember22,1989notification.

Outofthese20,lltransmitters havebeenreplaced.

Thereare9remaining suspectbatchtransmitters inUnits1a2whichwillremaininstalled untilreplacements areavailable.

Thereisnosuspectbatchtransmitter installed inanysafetyrelatedapplication including RPS,ESFAS,andAFASoutoftheseremaining 9transmitters.

Thereisnoconclusive evidencethatthesuspectlotofRosemount transmitters thatareinstalled atS.Luciewouldfailtooperateasdesigned.

Failureofthesetransmitters wouldnotprecludethesafeshutdownofthePlant.