05000400/LER-2012-002, Regarding Missed Surveillance Resulting in Inoperable Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices
| ML12213A252 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 07/30/2012 |
| From: | Kapopoulos E Progress Energy Co, Carolina Power & Light Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk |
| References | |
| HNP-12-084 LER 12-002-00 | |
| Download: ML12213A252 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) |
| 4002012002R00 - NRC Website | |
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~ P ogress Energy July 30, 2012 Serial: HNP-12-084 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-400 I Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-63
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 2012-002-00 Ladies and Gentlemen:
Ernest J. Kapopoulos, Jr.
Plant General Manager Harris Nuclear Plant Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.
10 CFR 50.73 Carolina Power & Light Company submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) 2012-002-00 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. This report describes a condition where two overcurrent protection devices had not been tested per Technical Specifications and resulted in missed surveillances. This LER is submitted within 60 days following discovery ofthe condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). The management review and assessment ofthe completed root cause evaluation is ongoing. This LER will be supplemented if appropriate based upon that ongoing review.
This document contains no regulatory commitments. Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Dave Corlett at (919) 3 62-313 7.
Sincerely, Enclosure: LER 2012-002-00 cc:
Mr. J. D. Austin, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector, HNP Ms. A. T. Billoch Colon, NRC Project Manager, HNP Mr. V. M. McCree, NRC Regional Administrator, Region II P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 T> 919.362.2000
NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects.resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)
- 1. FACILITY NAME Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1
- 2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000400
- 3. PAGE 1 of 4
- 4. TITLE Missed surveillance resulting in inoperable containment penetration overcurrent protection devices
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME None DOCKET NUMBER 05 31 2012 2012 - 002 - 00 07 30 2012 FACILITY NAME None DOCKET NUMBER
- 9. OPERATING MODE 5
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 20.2201(b) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.36(c)(2) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71(a)(4) 73.71(a)(5)
OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in
Safety Consequences
Both safety related and non-safety related containment penetrations are protected against overcurrent.
Primary and backup overcurrent protection meets the requirements of IEEE 279-1971 with regard to testing and independence. As part of the plant's maintenance procedures, circuit breakers are inspected and tested periodically, based on vendor recommendations and/or industry standards. Testing includes manually operating and/or electrically tripping circuit breakers and calibration of associated relays. In all cases, the penetration circuit protection has been designed so that the primary and back-up disconnecting devices can each limit the maximum current at the containment penetration to a value less than that required for thermal damage to the penetration conductor.
There were no adverse safety consequences as result of this event. During the time the missed surveillance was identified, the plant was shut down and in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) for a refueling outage. There were 36 overcurrent protective devices that missed their surveillance. The two that could not pass (either could not be tested or failed the acceptance criteria) their surveillance test were replaced and tested.
For the RCP relay, there is redundancy in the breaker circuitry so a loss of function did not occur.
Corrective Actions
Completed Corrective Actions
- The breaker and relay were replaced and tested satisfactorily.
- A comprehensive review was performed on Tech Spec 3/4.8.4.1 surveillance requirements.
- Surveillance procedure MST-E0048 was revised to add the subject overcurrent protection devices.
Planned Corrective Actions
- Calculation 0030-PKR, Electrical Penetration Protection (Reg. Guide 1.63) will be revised to correct the identified discrepancies.
- Plant Procedure PLP-106, Technical Specification Equipment List Program and Core Operating Limits Report will be revised to correct the identified discrepancies.
Previous Similar Events
A review of LERs for the previous five years did not identify any missed surveillance events.
Commitments
This report contains no regulatory commitments.