ML18100A570
| ML18100A570 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/1993 |
| From: | Hagan J Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NLR-N93147, NUDOCS 9309020271 | |
| Download: ML18100A570 (34) | |
Text
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Public Service Electric and Gas Company Joseph J. Hagan Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609-339-1200 Vice President - Nuclear Operations AUG 2 51993 NLR-N93147 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen:
REQUEST FOR ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION*
1 1
,,~~:~. J TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.8.2.3.2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-70 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-272 (b)
( 1)
Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) requests Enforcement Discretion from the provisions of Technical Specification surveillance requirem~nt. 4~8.2.3.2 (b) (1), for individual cell (# 47) voltage on the ic 125 volt battery for a 7 day period beginning 9:04 AM on August 24,1993.
As discussed in Attachment A to this letter, PSE&G has concluded that granting this request will not be a potential detriment to public health and safety, or involve adverse environmental consequences.
Additionally, this request does not involve a significant safety hazard.
Salem Technical Specifications state that at least once per 92 days, the voltc.ge of each connected cell-: must be verified greater than or equal to 2.13 volts under a float charge.
On August 24, 1993, PSE&G requested and received Enforcement Discretion for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period (beginning August 24 at 9:04 AM) to allow sufficient time to install a new replacement cell for the degraded cell in the lC 125 VDC battery.
The new cell was installed on August 24.
We completed individual cell charges to raise cell voltage after installation.
The cell voltage did improve but subsequently drifted below the 2.13 volt limit.
PSE&G believes that this reduced voltage reading is normal for a new cell and that a greater duration charge is required.
Upon completion of the equalizing charge, we will take individual cell voltage readings on the lC 125 VDC battery cells.
Based on those readings we will declare the lC 125 vpc battery operable or inoperable.
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Document Control Desk NLR-N93147 AUG 251993 2
This request was reviewed and approved by the Salem Station Operations Review Committee (SORC), and discussed with NRC Regional and NRR representatives during a conference call on August 25, 1993.
The NRC verbally approved this request upon completion of the telecon.
This letter provides the written followup to those discussions.
Should you have any questions concerning this transmittal, please contact us.
Sincerely, C
Mr. T. T. Martin, Administrator - Region I
- u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. J. C. Stone, Licensing Project Manager -
Salem U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Mr. s. Barr (S09)
USNRC Senior Resident Inspector Mr. K. Tosch, Manager, IV NJ Department of Environmental Protection Division of Environmental Quality Bureau of Nuclear Engineering CN 415 Trenton, NJ 08625
)I
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REF:
NLR-N93147 STATE OF NEW JERSEY COUNTY OF SALEM SS.
J. J. Hagan, being duly sworn according to law deposes and says:
I am Vice President - Nuclear Operations of Public Service Electric and Gas Company, and as such, I find the matters set forth in the above referenced letter, concerning the Salem Generating Station, Unit No. 1, are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
SubBcribed and Sworn to before me
. this Js"!_>-:-
day of..bl-t~., 199.3
~~ij;ft;;:;; '
My Commission expires on KIMBERLY JO BROWN NOTAR~ P~BLIC OF NEW JERSEY My Commrssron ~xpires April 21, 18!18
NLR-N93147 ATTACHMENT A
- I.
Licensee requests for Enforcement Discretion require responses to specific questions.
PSE&G provides it's responses below:
- 1.
The Tech.Spec. or other license conditions that will be violated.
Technical Specification surveillance requirement 4.8.2.3.2 (b) (1).
Applicability: Modes 1,2,3,4 The surveillance requires that: At least once per 92 days verify that the voltage of each connected cell is greater than or equal to 2.13 volts under float charge and has not decreased more than 0.27 volts from the value observed during the original acceptance test.
- 2.
The circumstances surrounding the situation, including the need for prompt action.
The specified quarterly surveillance was conducted on August 19, 1993.
At that time, one cell (no.47) of a sixty cell battery had a voltage below the required value of 2.13 volts.
The associated battery was declared inoperable and the appropriate Technical Specification Action Statement (TSAS) was entered.
The affected cell was placed on an individual charger (as specified in plant procedures) to restore cell voltage.
Approximately (4) hours later, the individual cell charger was removed and the cell was placed on float charge.
The cell voltage was verified greater than 2.13 volts and the TSAS was terminated.
PSE&G consulted the battery vendor (C&D) to discuss this situation.
The vendor concluded that one cell could have a degraded charge and recommended that we continue with the individual cell charge for a period of several days.
The individual cell charger was reinstalled and hourly cell voltage readings were taken.
Plant personnel continued to evaluate the cell and battery status with respect to Technical Specification operability.
Battery design capability with the remaining 59 cells was confirmed and documented in an Engineering Evaluation (Attachment B).
However, there was concern with Technical Specification compliance regarding the statement that all connected cells remain at or above 2.13 volts.
2 Jumpering out the degraded cell would have resolved the problem, however, this action requires disconnecting the entire battery from the bus/battery charger while completing the single cell jumpering.
During this period when the battery charger is supplying the DC bus without the normal battery load, a loss of battery charger or excessive output fluctuations (charger is not designed to operate independent of the battery) could result in a plant trip.
A conference call was conducted on August 23, to discuss PSE&G actions and the possibility of requesting Enforcement Discretion should the individual cell voltage drop below 2.13 volts.
PSE&G had disconnected the individual cell charger and increa'sed float voltage to 135 volts (allowable range is 132-135 volts).
This action was maintaining cell voltage above 2.13 volts while on the float charge.
Affected cell voltage readings were recorded through the night.
At 7:04 AM on August 24, the affected cell voltage dropped below the 2.13 volt limit and the associated TSAS was entered.
Since the arrival of the new replacement cell was imminent, jumpering the degraded cell could result in a plant trip, and compliance with the existing TSAS would require a plant shutdown, a decision was made to seek Enforcement Discretion.
PSE&G conducted a conference call with NRC Regional and NRR representatives to formally request Enforcement Discretion for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period beginning at 9:04 AM on August 24, 1993.
Enforcement Discretion was verbally granted upon completion of the conference call.
PSE&G received the new cell at 10:30 AM on August 24.
Installation was completed during the night of August 24.
After installation, an individual cell charger was connected to the new cell.
When the individual cell charger was removed, voltage was above the 2.13 volt Technical Specification limit, but subsequently dropped slightly below this value.
PSE&G believes that it is normal for a new cell to require a charge after installation and proposed to conduct an equalizing charge.
The time required to complete the equalizing charge exceeds the duration of the Enforcement Discretion granted on August 24.
On the morning of August 25, PSE&G conducted a conference call with NRC Regional and NRR representatives to formally request Enforcement Discretion for 7 days beginning at 9:04 AM on August 24, 1993.
The NRC verbally granted that request.
3
- 3.
The safety basis for the request that Enforcement Discretion be exercised, including an evaluation of the safety significance and potential consequences of the proposed course of action.
PSE&G evaluated whether 59 cells could meet the design limits of the 125 volt battery.
Assuming that the remaining lC 125 VDC battery cells meet the specific gravity and cell voltage requirements, with a normal float voltage of 2.13 volts per cell, 2.13 x 59 cells yields 125.67 volts which meets the Technical Specification requirements for the overall battery.
The minimum voltage required at vital equipment terminals for a design basis 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> discharge rate is 105 volts.
When the full battery design (60 cells) is considered, 4 loads do not pass the 105 volt criteria.
These loads have been previously justified and accepted through Engineering Evaluations.
For a lC 125 VDC loading of 749 amps (0-1 minute) and 337 amps (1-120 minutes), the minimum battery terminal voltage at the end of the battery load cycle will be 1.88 volts per cell.
Therefore, voltage drop calculations were analyzed at 110.92 volts (1.88 volts per cell x 59 cells).
When 59 cells are considered, three additional loads fall below the 105 volt criteria.
Two of these loads are non-lE (500 KV circuit switcher 1T60 and the oscillograph).
The third load is the solenoids associated with 11 & 12 feedwater control and feedwater control bypass valves.
These feedwater solenoid valves are not required to be energized during an accident response (refer to Attachment 3 of Attachment B).
While on the equalizing charge, the lC 125 VDC battery is available to respond to any loading requirements.
With the new cell installed, the positive affect of this cell on the overall battery capacity will improve the results achieved when only 59 cells are considered.
- 4.
Any proposed compensatory measure(s).
PSE&G does not propose any compensatory measures while the lC 125 VDC battery is on equalizing charge.
- 5.
The justification for the duration of the noncompliance.
The NRC approved Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (STS, Merits) allow a 30 day action statement with individual battery cells below the 2.13 volt limit but above 2.07 volts.
Hope Creek Generating Station Technical Specifications contain
i I
4 limits similar to the Westinghouse STS, but allow 7 days for recovery actions.
The extended time for cell recovery is based upon assurance that although reduced, sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function and maintain a margin of safety.
With cell voltages below 2.07, the assurance of sufficient battery capacity no longer exists and the battery must be declared inoperable.
Since the new cell is only slightly below the 2.13 volt limit and well above the 2.07 volt level, PSE&G believes that Enforcement Discretion for a 7 day period is conservative and justified.
- 6.
The basis for the licensee's conclusion that the noncompliance will not be a potential detriment to the public health and safety and that a significant safety hazard is not involved.
PSE&G has concluded that this situation does not involve a significant safety hazard.
As discussed in the response to question #3, the lC 125 VDC battery is fully capable of meeting all functional requirements with 59 cells.
The addition of the new cell improves the battery capacity over that achieved with 59 cells.
Since the battery is fully capable of meeting its design function, public health and safety are not adversely affected.
- 7.
The basis for the licensee's conclusion that the noncompliance will not involve adverse consequences to the environment.
The lC 125 VDC battery can meet all design functions with the new cell at a slightly reduced voltage (i.e.,
below 2.13 volts).
All accident requirements are met such that postulated offsite releases and other environmental consequences are not adversely affected.
- 8.
A statement that the request has been approved by the facility organization that normally reviews safety issues (Plant Onsite Review Committee, or its equivalent)
This request for Enforcement Discretion was reviewed and approved by the Salem Station Operations Review Committee (SORC) on August 25, 1993.
,i L
5
- 9.
Any other information the NRC Staff deems necessary before making a decision to exercise Enforcement Discretion.
The NRC Staff did not request any additional information prior to granting verbal app~oval for Enforcement Discretion.
.1 ATTACHMENT B
Engineering Evaluation For Salem Unit 1 lC Vital 125 VDC Battery Continued Operation EvA-Lv4r10/\\J Alo.
1-
1.0 SCOPE
This evaluation will analyze the lC Vital 125 VDC Batteries for continued use with only fifty nine (59) battery cells meeting technical specification in reguards to cell voltage measurements (one cell registering lower than tech spec float voltage). Battery voltage, system voltage drop, and battery capacity are key elements for the analysis in meeting design basis operation.
2.0 PURPOSE
To insure all vital loads fed from the lC 125 VDC Battery system are operable with a reduced battery voltage (with out taking credit of voltage contribution from the degraded cell).
3.0 REFERENCES
Salem Unit 1 Tech. Specification; Sections 3.8.2.3 & 4.8.2.3.1 calculation ES-4.003 PSBP 309448-c & D Battery Operation Manual
4.0 EVALUATION
Salem Vital lC 125 VDC Battery systems must meet the following Technical Specification 4.8.2.3.2 (b-1) for a
quarterly surveillance:
f The voltage of each connected cell is ~ 2.13 volts under float charge.
However, cell no. 47 showed voltage degradation and didn't meet the 2.13 volt criteria.
Also, the lC 125 VDC Battery system at a reduced cell count of fifty nine cells must maintain proper voltage at the vital load terminals at a design basis discharge rate:
f minimum voltage at vital equipment terminals ~ 105 volts for a design basis discharge rate of 2 hrs Assuming that the remaining lC 125 VDC battery cells 33 type) meet the specific gravity and cell requirements, the remaining areas require analysis; battery voltage, voltage drop.
(C&D LC-vol tage overall
lC 125 VDC Battery Overall Voltage:
Normal float voltage for lC batteries is 2.13 volts per cell.
Therefore, 2.13 volts/cell x 59 cells = 125.67 volts, which will meet technical specifications.
lC 125 VDC Voltage Drop:
For lC 125 VDC loading of 749 Amps {0-1 minute) and 337 Amps (1-120 minutes) the minimum battery terminal voltage at end of battery load cycle will be 1.88 volts/cell. Therefore, voltage drop calculation are analyzed at 110.92 volts {l.88 volts/cell x 59 cells). In accordance with Attachment No. 1, all lC loads pass the 105 volt criteria except the following:
PANEL CIRCUIT lCDC 5
lCDC 34 lCDC 35 lCDC 42 lCCDC 24 lCCDC 32 lCCDC 36 DESCRIPTION 500 KV CB 20X & 21X CONTROL & PROTECTION TRANSIENT DATA REC.
500 KV CIRCUIT SWITCHER 1T60 OSCILLOGRAPH RELAY ROOM 11,12 SCFW CTL &
BYPASS VALVE lC DG CTL & FIELD EXCITATION lC DG ALARMS JUSTIFICATION S-C-125-EEE-0275
{ATTACHMENT 2)
S-C-125-EEE-0275 ATTACHMENT 2 NON-lE, MANUAL OPERATION AVAIL.
NON-lE, NOT REQ.
FOR OPERATION IN DESIGN BAS. EVENT I & C EVALUATION ATTACHMENT 3 S-C-125-EEE-0275 ATTACHMENT 2 S-C-125-EEE-0275 ATTACHMENT 2 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH BATTERY MANUFACTURER:
c & D, the battery manufacture, stated that the 12 5 VDC system is capable of supporting an emergency discharge with the degraded cell still inplace and it will not be a detrimental to the system.
L COMPENSATORY MEASURES:
Degraded cell voltage shall be monitored Degraded cell shall be replaced at the earliest time frame to correct this situation SAFETY EVALUATION:
The above evaluation on the lC 125 VDC Battery System confirms that all system required for plant operation will perform as intended.
This reduced voltage battery operation does not create the possibility of any potential safety hazard.
1-Zl-f 3
f' PSE&G SALEM NGS UNIT N0.1 1C-125VDC BATTERY SYSTEM VOLTAGE PROFILE CALCULATION
SUMMARY
1C - 125 voe BUS 74 Conductor Temperature (Deg. C) 125 Load Rated Voltage CV) 110.92 Battery Terminal Voltage CV>
Item No.
Load/Cable Description 1 Min Sending End Voltage (VOLTS) 1 Min Cable Current CAMPS) 1 Min Receiving End Voltage (VOLTS) 120 Min 120 Min 120 Min I Notes Sending Cable Receiving I and End Current End I Co1T111ents Voltage Voltage I (VOLTS)
CAMPS)
(VOLTS) I 00 0
1 2
3 4
5 Battery Internal Resistance Battery 1C Cable
- 11&12 STA ESSENTIAL CTL INVTR SPARE
- 1C VITAL INST INVTR C10 KVA)
ALT SHUTDOWN DIST PNL 1ASDS
- 1C1 BATTERY CHARGER 6
- 1C2 BATTERY CHARGER 7
FUTURE 8
FUTURE 9
SPARE 10 SPARE 11
- 13 EMERG LTG INV TR (5 KVA) 12 SPARE 13 SPARE 14 SPARE 15 SPARE 16 SPARE 17 GROUND DETECTION 18 UV RELAY & VOLTM 19 SPARE 20 SPARE 21 1CCDC-125VDC DISTR CAB 22 1CDCDG-125VDC DISTR CAB-EMER 23 GROUND DETECTION 24 SPARE 25 SPARE 26 SPARE 27 1CDC-125VDC DISTR CAB 28 C1DDC DISTRIBUTION CAB - EMER) 29 SPARE 30 SPARE 31 SPDS COMPUTER INTRF RACK C 32 1C-4160V VITAL BUS 33 SPARE 34 FUTURE 35 FUTURE' 36 FUTURE 37 1C-460V VITAL BUS" 38 FUTURE NOTES: SEE PAGE 1.
EBASCO I JRG I VDS1C125.WK1 110. 92 110.92 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110. 20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 648.195 648.195 125.300 0.000 124.698 123.824 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 49.252 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 74.531 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 49.651 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 49.155 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
- 51. 784 0.000 110.92 110.20 109.53 110.20 109.00 109.49 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 109.94 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 107.62 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 109.58 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 108.56 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 108.19 110.20 110.92 110.92 110.61 110.61 110. 61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 283.218 283.218 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 49.432 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 28.394 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 192.on 0.000 0.000 o.ooo 0.000 7.011 0.000 o.ooo 0.000 0.000 6.286 0.000 110.92 I 110.61 1 110.61 1 110.61 I 110.61 1 110.61 110. 61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.34 110.61" 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 109.62 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 108.20 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.37 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.36 110.61 CALC1.ilAllON S*C*EOOO-EDC-0129-0, ATTACHMENT 1C-1
PSE&G SALEM NGS UNIT N0.1 1CDC*125VDC DISTR CAB 74 Conductor Temperature (Deg. C) 125 Load Rated Voltage CV) 110.92 Battery Terminal Voltage CV)
Item No.
Load/Cable Description 1C*125VDC BATTERY SYSTEM VOLTAGE PROFILE CALCULATION
SUMMARY
1 Min Sending End Voltage (VOLTS) 1 Min Cable Current CAMPS) 1 Min Receiving End Voltage (VOLTS) 120 Min I Notes Receiving I and End I Conments Voltage Voltage I 120 Min 120 Min Sending Cable End Current (VOLTS)
CAMPS)
(VOLTS) I 1CDC-125VDC DISTR CAB SPARE 2
SPARE 3
CARRIER EQUIP 500KV SWYD 4
SPARE 5
500KV CB 20X & 21X CTL & PROT 6
SPARE 7
REG RELAY PANEL, DC TEST 8
SPARE 9
4KV SWGR INSP BOX 10 11X BKR CTL REG,RMTE TRIP XMTR 11
- 11 13/4KV MULTI TRIP 12
- 1 GEN OVERALL DIFF (REG) 13
- 12 13/4KV MULTI TRIP 14
- 11 SGFP, TURB, & EO PP CTL 18 1G 4KV GRP BUS BKR FAIL 1BGGD 19 DEMIN MAKE-UP SYS ANNUNCIATORS 20 STATOR COOLING WATER PUMP CTL 21 SPARE 22 SPARE 23 SPARE 24 SPARE 25 SPARE 26 SPAR~
27 SPARE 28 SPARE 29 SPARE 30 11A-15C LPFW HTR INLET VLVS 31 SPARE 32 11A-15C LPFW HTRS BYPASS VLVS 33
- 1 STA PWR XFMR DIFF RELAY 34 TRANSIENT DATA RECORDER 35 500KV CIRCUIT SWITCHER 1T60 36 MISC RESIN VALVE~*
37 16A-16C HPFW INLET BYPASS VLV 38 SAMPLING VALVES 39 STAND PIPE SUP & SEAL LKOFF VLV 40 UNDER VOLTAGE ALARM RELAY 41 SPARE 42 OSCILLOGRAPH RELAY ROOM NOTES: See Page 1.
EBASCO I JRG I VDS1C125.WK1 110.20 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 49.651 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.545 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.354 0.044 0.515 0.044 0.044 10.215 0.044 0.898 0.044 1.181 0.175 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.195 0.000 0.489 0.044 9.681 0.158 0.770 0.245 1.183 0.271 0.158 0.000 4.355 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 107.52 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 108.65 109.54 109.13 109.54 109.54 106.40 109.55 108.95 109.55 108.53 109.49 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 109.58 108.02 109.58 109.24 109.57
..tQM4..
109.58 108.21 109.41 107. 14 109.39 109.58 109.58 110.61 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20
- J04. 70" ' 108.20 192.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 25.733 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
- 14. 194 0.000 0.466 0.000 0.000 10.086 0.000
- 0. 156 0.000 1.166 0.156 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.500 0.000 0.268 0.043 9.559 122.890 0.558 0.029 0.759 0.059
- 0. 156 0.000 4.301 108.20 I 108.20 I 108.20 I 108.20 I I~
108.20 lok: P;.J~,-,
1-031°1:6-I I 9, 11 108.20 I 108.20 108.20 108.20 106.12 108.20 107.80 108.20 108.20 105.06 108.20 108.09 108.20 107.16 108.12 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 108.20 107. 14 108.20 108.01
~
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- 99.s1 I 8, 9
- 1~r 9 11 s 1.+i-Gi-~. *
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- P'~.sw1TC-ll 108. 18 I O"C/1-(\\..I/)..
106.64 I 108.16 I 108.20 l~
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CALC1JlATION S*C*EOOO-EDC-0129-0, ATTACHMENT 1C-1
PSE&G SALEM NGS UNIT N0.1 1C-125VDC BATTERY SYSTEM VOLTAGE PROFILE CALCULATION
SUMMARY
1CCDC DISTRIBUTION CABINET 74 Conductor Temperature (Deg. C) 125 Load Rated Voltage (V) 110.92 Battery Terminal Voltage (V)
Item No.
Load/Cable Description 1 Min Sending End Voltage (VOLTS) 1 Min Cable Current CAMPS) 1 Min Receiving End Voltage (VOLTS) 120 Min 120 Min 120 Min I Notes Sending Cable Receiving I and End Current End I Co11111ents Voltage Voltage I (VOLTS)
CAMPS)
(VOLTS) I 1
2 3
4*
5 6
7 1CCDC DISTRIBUTION CABINET AUX BLDG VENT#11.SUPPLY UNIT POST LOCA SAMP SYS !SOL VLVS TRAIN A & B SEC BLOCK SPARE AUX BLD VENT EXH FLTR DAMP CTL SPARE FH AREA VT EXH FLTR DAMP CTL 8
DAMPER CTL IN 11,12&13 SW !NTK 9
CONT PRES VAC RLF INS VLV CTL 10 CHARGING ISO VLV 1CV79 TO RCS 11 ST VNT VLV & TEMP ALMS CNES) 12
- 13 FAN COIL UNIT FLTR DAMP CTL 13 MISC VLVS 14
- 13 FAN COIL WTR VLV CTL 15 MISC VLVS 16
- 15 FAN COIL *fLTR DMP CTL 17 VLVS 13SJ93,-58,-27,-57 & -20 18
- 15 FAN COIL UNIT WTR VLV CTL 19 SPARE 20 VLVS 1SJ19,-79,-30,-40, & -69, 21 SPARE 22 SPARE 23
- 13 AUX FEED PUMP CONTROL 24
- 11,12 SGFW IN CTL & BYPASS VLV 25
- 11-14 SG SLOWDOWN ISO VLV 34 1C DIESEL GEN UNIT TRIPS 35 STEAM DUMP VLVS 36 1C DG ALARMS 37 RAD MONT #11&12 CTL SMP VLV 38 CONTROL ROOM DAMPER 39
- 14 MAIN STEAM SVLV PUMP 42 UNDER VOLTAGE ALARM RELAY NOTES: See Page 1.
EBASCO I JRG I VDS1C125.WK1 110.20 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 107.62 74.531 0.418 2.181 0.592 0.000 1.625 0.000 0.447 0.630 0.430 0.241 0.856 0.499 1.676 1.240 0.849 0.706 0.806 1.240 0.000 0.542 0.000 0.000 0.892 1.032 0.215 2.387 0.215 2.581 1.229 2.721 1.080 32.983 0.695 0.503 3.740 4.543 1.483 1.579 0.798 0.060 0.798 0.017 107.62 106.76 106.06 107. 18 107.62 106.92 107.62 107.43 106.46 107.44 107.62 106.97 107.61 106.89 107.60 107.25 107.61 107.16 107.60 107.62 110.61 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 107.61 109.62 107.62 109.62 107.62 109.62 107.24 109.62
~04-:91'-
109.62 107.53 109.62 106.58 109.62 107.53 109.62 106.49 109.62 106.68 109.62 105.96 109.62 107.10 109.62 1;.~07""1 109. 62 107.32 109.62 106.60 106.01
- ~
106.56 106.66 107.27 107.58 107.27 107.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 109.62 28.394 0.218 1.554 0.559 0.000 0.987 0.000 0.219 0.218 0.202 0.026 0.663 0.403 1.152 0.815 0.569 0.403 0.394 0.815 0.000 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.595 0.639 0.000 2.010 0.000 2.423 0.655 2.132 1.100 0.000 0.490 0.469
- 1.924 3.116 0.881 1.142 0.604 0.061 0.604 0.018 109.62 I 109.17 I 108.51 I 109.21 I 109.62 109.20 109.62 109.53 109.22 109.54 109.62 109.12 109.62 109.12 109.61 109.37 109.62 109.40 109.61 109.62 109.62 109.62 109 62
~-**.
109.37_ rrJ.~~./
107.94';J' 8 /"'
109.62~
108. 75 I 109.62 108.57 109.12 108.32 109.10 109.62 109.41 I
I I
I lo~~~
I 108.67 I
~
108.80 I 1r (/'f\\
lf" 1 ~CJV' I 10Jd:l!?ij 0 8, 9 108.99 I 108.93 I 109.36 I 109.58 I 109.36 I 109.62 I CALC\\JlATIOll S-C-EOOO-EDC-0129-0, ATTACHMENT 1C-1
PSE&G SALEM NGS UNIT N0.1 1CDCDG DISTRIBUTION CABINET 74 Conductor Temperature (Deg. C) 125 Load Rated Voltage CV) 110.92 Battery Terminal Voltage (V)
Item No.
Load/Cable Description 1C-125VDC BATTERY SYSTEM VOLTAGE PROFILE CALCULATION
SUMMARY
1 Min Sending End Voltage (VOLTS) 1 Min Cable Current CAMPS) 1 Min Receiving End Voltage (VOLTS) 120 Min 120 Min 120 Min I Notes Sending Cable Receiving I and End Current End I Conrnents Voltage Voltage I (VOL TS)
CAMPS)
(VOL TS) I 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 1CDCDG DISTRIBUTION CABINET STANDBY POWER ON 1A DG UNIT TRIP & BKR FAIL PROT 1A DG CTL & EXCITATION 1A DG CTL & ALARM 1B DG CTL & EXCITATION 1B DG UNIT TRIP & BKR FAIL PROT 1C DG CTL & ALARM 1B DG CTL & ALARM 1C DG CTL & EXCITATION 1C DG UNIT TRIP & BKR FAIL PROT NOTES: See Page 1.
EBASCO I JRG I VDS1C125.WK1 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110.20 110. 20 110.20 110.61 110. 61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110.61 110. 61 110.61 110.61 110.61 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 110.61 1
110.61 I 110.61 I 110.61 1 110.61 I 110.61 I 110.61 I 110.61 1 110.61 I 110.61 1 110.61 I CALCULATION S*C*EOOO-EDC-0129-0, ATTACHMENT 1C-1
PSE&G SALEM NGS UNIT N0.1 1C-125VDC BATTERY SYSTEM VOLTAGE PROFILE CALCULATION
SUMMARY
ALT SHUTDOWN DIST PNL 1ASDS 74 Conductor Temperature (Deg. C) 1 Min 1 Min 1 Min 120 Min 120 Min 120 Min Notes 125 Load Rated Voltage (V)
Sending Cable Receiving Sending Cable Receiving and 110.92 Battery Terminal Voltage CV>
End Current End End Current End Comments Voltage Voltage Voltage Voltage Item No.
Load/Cable Description (VOLTS)
CAMPS)
(VOLTS)
(VOLTS)
CAMPS)
(VOLTS)
ALT SHUTDOWN DIST PNL 1ASDS 110.20 123.824 109.49 110.61 0.018 110.61 1ASDS 15KVA INVERTER 109.49 123.807 108.22 110.61 0.000 110.61 2
SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 3
1ASDS 125V UV ALARM 109.49 0.018 109.49 110.61 0.018 110.61 4
SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110. 61 0.000 110.61 5
SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 6
SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 7
SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 8
SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 9
SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 10 SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 11 SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 12 SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 13 SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 14 SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 15 SPARE "109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 16 SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 17 SPARE 109.49 0.000 109.49 110.61 0.000 110.61 NOTES: SEE PAGE 1.
NOTES: See Page 1.
EBASCO I JRG I VDS1C125.WK1 CAL :-..11*'.C. S*C*EOOO-EDC-0129-0, ATTACHMENT 1C-1
,,-AS-C-125-EEE-0275-0 Pa.
1 of 10 PSl<Z\\__J-Da ~:
January 4-rrA-ct+ - z 24, 1989 TITLE:ucE~ !Wf~~G EVALUATION OF THE SAFETY-RELATED 125 VDC ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS WITH UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITIONS FOR SALEM GENERATING STATION 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this Enqineering Evaluation is to assess the safety significance of the identified undervoltage conditions persistinq in certain 125 VDC circuits as documented in calculation no. S-C-EOOO-EDC-0129-0, dated 12/19/88 for Salem Generating Station -
Units 1 & 2.
This undervoltage condition was realized durinq 0-1 and 1-120 Minutes followinq a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) occurrinq concurrently with a loss of Offsite Power (Loop) and a loss of essential power supplies to all battery chargers.
2.0 SCOPE The scope of this evaluation is limited to a few discrepant circuits identified in Attachment 1, across which the voltage is reported to be below the minimum acceptable operating voltage (ie 105 volts} of the components.
Where appropriate, each ci.rcui t is analyzed qualitatively to assess the effects of a transient and/or sustained undervoltage conditions persisting during the two time frames (ie, 0-1 Min. & 1-120 Min}.
Resolutions with disposition notes are provided for each discrepant circuit.
3.0 REFERENCES
3.1 NRC Inspection No. 50-272/87-35: 50-311/87-35 conducted on Nov. 30 to December 4, 1987.
3.2 Calcuation No. S-C-EOOO-EDC-0129-0, dated 12/19/88, "125VDC System Study."
3.3 Memorandum No. ELE-88-0243, dated July 25, 1988 from Vi J*. Polizzi to M. Metcalf.
3.4 IEEE std. 141-1976, IEEE Recommended Practice for Electrical Power Distribution for Industrial Plants.
3.5 ANSI/IEEE std. 242-1986:
IEEE Recommended Practice for Protection andCoordination of Industrial and Commerical Power Systems.
3.6 Salem Generating Station UFSAR, Revision 6: February 15, 1987: Section 15.3.
EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEPT81
Page 2 of 10 Date:
January 24, 1989 4.0 DISCUSSION NN :srg 4.1 Calculation Basis The referenced calculation (Ref. 3.2) was performed on the assumption and quidelines listed below:
4.1.1 No emergency interties exist between 125VDC Systems 4.1.2 Concurrent Events are:
Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP)
Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
Loss of AC Power for atleast two (2) hours such that no battery chargers are available (ie, a multiple contingency failure)
- 4.1.3 For a voltage profile calculation, cable resistance is calculated for an ambient temperature of 40°C and a cable temperature as specified below for all battery circuits:
lA 66°C lB -
74°C lC -
74°C 2A 67°C 2B -
70°C 2C -
71°C For a short circuit calculation; a cable resistance at 25°C is considered.
4.1.4 All existing data on the drawings, in the documents identified in Section 5 and Attachments lA-4, lB-4, lC-4, 2A-4, 2B-4 and 2C-4 of Ref. 3.2, have been verified by PSE&G procedures.
4.1.5 For the battery loading calculated, the voltage at the terminals of each cell, one minute, and two hours after the inception of the postulated event is taken equal to l.89V for battery lA, 1.88V for batteries. lB and lC.
These values are the lower of the two voltage/cell values obtained for the two time periods of interest.
e5/525 EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEPT81
NN :srg Paqe 3 of 10 Date:
January 24, 1989 4.1.6 For the battery loading calculated, the voltaqe at the terminals of each cell, one minute and two hours after the inception of the postulated event is taken equal to l.89V, l.88V, l.88V for batteries 2A, 2B and 2C respectively.
These values are the lower of the two volts/cell values obtained for the two time periods of interest.
4.1.7 The voltaqe drop, due to wiring connecting circuit components located outside the distribution cabinets or switchgear is negligible *.
4.1.8 All the various relays and other devices that obtain power from the 125 volt de batteries, are rated for 125 volts and have a common minimum operating voltage equal to 84 percent of rated voltage (105V).
4.1.9 For the purposes of determining load, where the identity of a particular relay was indeterminable but the function was established, the relay was taken to be identical to relays identified elsewhere in the system having the same function.
4.1.10 Where a circuit contained many unidentifiable relays, lights and other unknown circuit components, the load to this circuit was taken to be 80 percent of the rating of the breaker supplying the circuit.
- 4.1.11 Wherever a relay was found whose operation was indeterminable, it was taken to be energized for the entire two hours.
4.1.12 For more specific assumptions relating to the load profile calculation see Ref. 3.2, Section 3.1.
4~1.13 The vital buses are energized by* the diesel generators within 10 seconds and then the Vital Instrument Inverter Loads are sequenced back onto their vital AC bus.
e5/525 EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEPT81 -
I S~C~l25-EEE-0275-0 Page 4 of 10 NN :srg Date:
January 24, 1989 4.2 DC Load Evaluation Criteria There are six (6) 125 voe batteries associated with the Salem Nuclear Generatinq Station.
Batteries lA, lB and lC provide the necessary DC power to Unit 1 and batteries, 2A, 28 and 2C deliver this power to Unit 2~
It is the purpose of REf. 3.2 to determine the load each of these six batteries must supply to safely shutdown their respective units following the worst case postulated accident.
An enqineering assessment of the load for each of the batteries is to be made based primarily upon a review of the drawings associated with each of the various circuits connected to the batteries.
For this purpose, the tollowing accident scenario has been chosen: a unit undergoes a coincident loss of offsite power (LOOP), and a large break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) while both of the battery chargers associated with each battery are out of service for two hours.
It is assumed that at the inception of the accident, the batteries are fully charged.
According to the statement made in SGS-UFSAR, Rev.
6, 2/15/87 Section no. 5.3.2.2, page no. 8.3-12 (last paragraph), the PSE&G commitment is to size batteries in support of a loss of AC power (ie. loss of offsite power for two consecutive hours).
However, all other analyzed design scenarios described in Chapter 15 of SGS-UFSAR will be mitigated by the active support of all three diesel generators beyond one minute including a single active failure for one vital battery system.
This study in Ref. 3.2 is conducted to establish, conservatively, all possible loads that might be supported from the vital buses under an unlikely concurrent event of a LOOP, a LOCA and loss of all battery chargers (uncommitted operating condition)
.for two hours.
e5/525 EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEP'f81
NN :srg Paqe 5 of 10 Date:
January 24, 1989 The two hour time period is divided into two segments.
The first segment is the time between inception of the postulated accident and the first minute (0-1 minute).
This time period is critical since many automatic systems will respond to the accident situation.
The second time interval (l-120 minITtes) identifies the time to safely shutdown the plant.
During the 1-120 minute time interval for the purpose of this calculation, a return of offsite power is anticipated allowing the operator, as required, to restore power manually to the group buses *
. 4.2.l First Minute Time -
Sequence Analysis During the first minute of this postulated LOOP/LOCA accident, certain automatic operations are initiated.
The group bus main circuit breakers are tripped.
The breakers connecting the Reactor Coolant Pumps to these four buses are tripped.
This happens within 30 seconds following the event.
The main circuit breakers to the vital buses are tripped and most of the feeder breakers from these vital buses are tripped.
On examining the circuit breaker control schematics, it was discovered that this action was initiated by the Loss of AC power on the buses monitored by an undervoltage relay (Device 27).
Fourteen rules were followed to evaluate circuits.
For details refer to section 3.0 of the study (Ref. 3.2).
4.2.2 (1-120 Minutes) Time Sequence Analysis During the second time period (1-120 minutes), most loads on the 125V batteries are the resultant of the actions and operations initiated during the first minute of the accident.
In this calculation, any circuits which are activated by system parameters are assumed activated during the first minute (Rule 7); and these loads are conservatively assumed to remain as loads on the 125V batteries for the entire two hour period.
e5/525 The connected relay loads are subdivided into seven categories and are integrated with the actual battery loads (Ref. 3.2, Section 3.1 IV).
EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEPT81
NN:srg Page 6 of 10 Date:
January 24, 1989 4.3 Load.Identification The fourteen circuits across which the voltage is identified to be lower than the minimum acceptable operating voltaqe (i.e. 105 volts) of the components are listed, reviewed and dispositioned in Attachment A. -Tne.detailed discussions regarding the various dispositions are provided in 4.3.1.
4.3.1 Disposition Notes:
Note 1.0 These circuits are non-essential and are not required to mitigate the consequences of a design basis event.
So its unavailability is insiqnificant from the point of systera safety and these loads may even be manually or automatically shed selectively or categorically on receipt of the following simultaneous signals:
0 0
0 Loss of offsite power (LOOP) ie the trip of generator breakers and breakers supplying station power transformers (SPTs) coincident with turbine trip.
Safety Injection Signal (SIS) indicating that a LOCA has occurred.
All 125VDC battery chargers are unavailable (even though diesels are running) due to a loss of vital power supplies (an unanalyzed event) to the chargers.
Note 2;0 The actual output voltage at the input terminals of DG unit trip, DG breaker failure protection and generator field including DG voltage regulator & exciter controls is 104.19 volts which is below 105 volts by 0.77 percent.
This value of 105 volt is achieved on the basis of the minimum operating voltage requirements of certain electromechanical relays.
e5/525 EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEPT81
NN :srg eS/S25 Date:
January 24, 1989 However, most of the exciter-requlator is equipped with externally mounted automatic voltage adjust rheostat which can be used to vary the generator voltage over its adjustment range.
These exciter circuits are equipped with motor operated potentiometer, motor-operated auto-transformer, saturable transformers (TSl, TS2 and TS3), current transformers (CTl, CT2, and CT3), Linear reactors (LS l, LS 2, LS 3), three-phase full-wave rectifier bridge (CRSO through CRSS), a field flashinq diode (CRS6), and a surge arrestor (CRS7).
Diode CRS6 serves as a blocking diode to prevent current from tlowing oacK into the tield tlashing source during build-up.
The calculation also additionally considers field flashing amperes to flow for full one minute whlle the field flashing actually sustains for a maximum period of 10 seconds (normally less than 2 seconds).
The manual-automatic switch, 860 when in automatic position regulates the generator voltage maintaining it at a constant value and varies the voltage over the output range of the regulator with rheostat R60.
So this slight droop in voltage during the first minute is not going to pose any significant concern for the voltage regulatqr - exciter control circuits.
The field flashing current is conservatively estimated to be 40 amps.
Actually this current will be lower than 40 amps because the available open circuit field flashing source voltage *of lOS volts at the FO and F -
terminals when divided by the equivalent resistance of RS3 -
R60 in series with the cable and the generator field including the blocking diode will yield much less current.
EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEPT81 -
- ~~~~~~--~~~--;*'St--~~~~~~~~~~~~~-..~
... ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Js~e~12~~EEE-0275-o ~
~
Page 8 of 10 Note 3.0 NN:srg e5/525 Date:
January 24, 1989 Additionally, when the diesel generators are tested periodically according to the test schedule noted in Technical Specification Table 4.8-1, generator field will be left with sufficient residual magnetism to assist rapid build-up of the generator voltage thereby reducing the maqnitude of the field flashing current and its required duration.
The input voltage at the diesel generator local annunciator panel is 100.89 volts -
lU4.U8 volts except tor 2B diesel generator having 96.20 volts and 104.2 volts during 1st and 120 minutes respectively.
The nominal acceptable source voltage requirement for RIS MICROLARM Modem AN-3196 self contained LED annunciator is 105V to 140VDC at 240 MA maximum.
The transient or temporary loss of annunciator if occurs at all will pose no threat to or compromise with the safety of the DG system or the plant as the voltage profile is improved in the second time frame after a minute.
Additionally, no manual action is permisible during this period prior to the lapse of 10 minutes into the accident.
The subsequent restoration of voltage beyond a minute will enable the operator, when and as permitted by the procedures to take appropriate manual actions in mitigating the consequences of an event.
There are also additional instruments in the control boards that provide visual indication of various parametric status to display the system condition.
However, from the system point of view the postulated accident scenario is unrealistically over - conservative and undefined.
This situation will not occur within the defined operating constraints and the present licensing latitudes of the plant.
EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEPT81
Note 4.0 Note 5.0 Note 6.0 NN: srg e5/525 Date:
January 24, 1989 It is understood that no safety-related portable equipment is presently plugqed in these receptacles.
These receptacles are located at 100 feet elevation of the counting room.
The first minute terminal voltage at receptacles is 102.47 volts.
Following a minute into the accident the diesel qenerators would be available to battery chargers instead of being locking out of the vital power supplies.
This insignificant voltage degradation is a direct result of the occurrence of concurrent events listed below:
0 0
0 Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP)
Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
A simultaneous loss of vital AC sources to all battery chargers coincident with continuously energized relay loads to compensate for any estimation errors.
(ref. sec. 4.1.11)
- The above accident scenario is undefined, unanalyzed and considers mechanistic failures of components and systems that is overly conserative within the latitudes of the present licensing commitments.
The input terminal voltage available at the breaker "B" control point is 103.31 volts which is greater than 90 & 70 volts required for closing and tripping coils respectively.
This is not a violation with respect to the suitable voltage requirement for the operating coils (Ref. 3.2, Attachment G}.
Lockout relays utilized have a minimum operating voltage of 70 volts.
So, the value of 104.46 volts is acceptable for the successful operation of these relays.
(Ref.
3.2, Attachment G}.
EDD-7 FORM l REV 0 10SEPT81
- ~~~~--~~~~~~~
Js~t3125~EEE-0275-0 I
Paqe 10 r:if 10 Da t e :
January 2 4, 1 9 8 9
5.0 CONCLUSION
/RECOMMENDATION The circuits in Attachment No. 1 across which the voltage is reported to be below the minimum acceptable threshold of operatinq limits (ie, 105 volts) of components, have been reviewed and dispositioned appropriately.
No modification is required for this condition of operation with present licensing requirements.
6.0 SIGNATURES ORIGINATOR I
I
~~ofrfth OL/J 4 ENGINEERING MANAGER NN: srg e5/525 EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEPT81
ATTACHMENT 1:
PAGE 1 OF 2 L!ST OF 125VDC D!SCREPANT C!RCU!TS D!STR!BUTION PANEL ACTUAL WIRING BATTERY NO. I& !TS SAFETY CIRCUIT CR CIRCUIT DEFICIENCY VOLTAGE DIAG./ SCH. DISPOSITION NO.:
CLASSIFICATION)
ITEM NO.
DESCR ! PT! ON NOTE NO.
. CVOLTSl DIAG.
NOTES IA-125VDC IA CNON-1El 22 13KV GR. A PNL. BD.
9 94.81 219436 I
IAADC (CLASS-IE) 24 IA DG CONTL. & EXC IT.
8 104.19 221408 2
223680 1AADC CCLASS-1El 28 IA DG ALARMS 8
101.40 221408 3
223693 IB-125VDC IBDC CNON-IE) 34 GAS ANALYZER PANEL 8
103.63 221409 1
203682, 86 IBBOC (CLASS-IE) 5 IB DG CONTL & FIELD EXCIT.
8 103.82 221409 2
252500 IDDC CCLASS-IE>
10 COUNT! NG ROOM 204 8/9 102.47/ 203098 4
RECEPTACLE.
102.86 221415 IC-I 25VDC ICOC CNON-IE) 5 500 CB 20X & 21X CONTL &
104.91 203097/
I PROT.
9/11 208632,34
& 208679 ICDC CNON-IE) 34 TRANS I ENT DATA RECORDER 8/9 102. 55/ 203097/
I 101.26 211086 ICCDC (CLASS I El 32 ICDG CONTL. & FIELD EXCIT.
8 104.82 221410/
2 223692 3
ICCDC (CLASS I El 36 ICDG ALARMS 8
100.89 223695 2A-l 25VDC 2ADC (NON-IE>
14 TURB. GLAND SEAL STEAM &
LEAKOFF 8
104.76 220808/
I 236371 2AOC C NON-IE) 30 12 GEN. EXCIT. YR CLOSE 8/9 86.09/
220808/
86.99 601036,37 I
2AAOC CC LASS 1 El 24 2ADG CONTL & EXCIT.
8 103.63 221417/
2 223677, 78, 80 2AADC (CLASS IE) 28 2ADG UN IT ALARMS 8/9 104.08 221417/
3 223678, 79,
- 93.
ATTACHME~T 1 :
LIST OF 125VCC DISCREP.A.NT CIRCUll I
I I
I I
SCH./ DI SPOS I Tl ON DIS TR I BUT I ON PANEL ACTUAL WIRING BATTERY NO.
C& ITS SAFETY CIRCUIT OR CIRCUIT DEF IC I ENCY VOLTAGE DIAG./
NO.:
CLASS IF !CAT I ONl ITEM NO.
DESCRIPTION NOTE NO.
(VOLTS) DIAG.
1 NOTES 2B-125VDC 2B (CLASS !El 13 2B 4160 VOLT BUS CONTL.
9/11 104.71 222791/
1 2BDC CNON-1El 34 GAS ANALYZER PANEL 8
103.09 220809/
1 203682 2BBDC (CLASS 1El 5
2BDG CONTL & FIELD EXCIT.
8 102. 97 221418/
2 223686 2BBDC (CLASS 1El 9
28 DG CONTROLS & ALARMS 8/9 96.20/ 221418/
2&3 104.21
- 223684, 233694 2BBDC (CLASS 1El 21 REACTOR TRIP BREAKER B 8
103.31 221418/
5 203614 2BBDC CC LASS 1 El 36 230 VOLT VITAL BUS CONTROL 8
104.46 221418/
6 203651 2C-125VOC 2COC C NON-1 El 34 TRANSIENT DATA RECORDER 8/9 103.38 220810/
1 101.19 219419 2CCOC (CLASS 1 El 32 2CDG CONTROL & FIELD EXCIT 8
104.32 221419/
223692 2
2CCOC (CLASS 1 El 36 2CDG ALARMS 8
100.48 221419/
3
- 223690, 223695 DISCREPANCY NOTES:
- 8.
The receiving end voltage at the end of the first minute Is less than the minimum operating voltage of the relays.
- 9.
The receiving end voltage at the end of the second hour Is less than the minimum operating voltage of the relays.
- 11. The circuit voltage profile meets the minimum voltage criteria tor the 1-120 minute time-period when the voltage/eel I tor the 1-120 minute time period (Instead of the lowest volt/eel I value over both time periods) was used In the calculatlon.
For Notes 1 though 7 and* Note 8 refer to Attachments lA-1, 18-1, lC-1, 2A-1, 28-1, and 2C-1 of the reference 3.2.
CERTIFICATION FOR DESIGN VER!FICAT!ON Reference No.
'5-C-!2S-EEE.-029?'5-0
SUMMARY
STATEMENT The undersigned hereby certifies that the design verification for the subject package has been completed and all comments have been adequately addressed.
Design Verifier Assigned By Signature of Design Verifier/Date Design Verifier Assigned By Signature of Design Verifier/Date Design Verifier Assigned By Signature of Design Verifier/Date Design Verifier Assigned By Signature of Design Verifier/Date Page _
of ___;_
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OE-AP.ZZ-0010 Exhibit 3 Rev.O Page 2 of 2
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'5H1 - { oF 1 FEEDWATER CONTROL, BYPASS, AND ISOLATION SOLENOID VAL VE FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION THIS DISCUSSION IS PROVIDED TO DESCRIBE THE FUNCTION OF THE SOLENOID VALVES SHOWN ON DRAWING 203366, FOR DETERMINATION WHETHER OPERATION OF THE SOLENOID VALVES WILL BE AFFECTED BY REDUCED 125VDC SYSTEM VOLTAGES DURING A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT.
SOLENOID VALVES SV543, 544 CONTROL THE 11BF19 FEEDWATER CONTROL VALVES. SOLENOID VALVES SV541, AND SV542 CONTROL THE 11BF40 FEEDWATERBYPASS VALVES. SOLENOID VALVES SV547 AND SV548 CONTROL THE 12BF19 CONTROL VALVES. SOLENOID VALVES SV545 AND SV546 CONTROL THE 12BF40 CONTROL VALVES.
THESE FEEDWATER SYSTEM VALVES ARE NOT REQUIRED TO OPERATE IN THE EVENT OF A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT. UPON THE
. RECEIPT OF AN ACCIDENT SIGNAL, THE SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM RELAYS ACT TO DE-ENERGIZE THE SOLENOID VALVES, THEREBY CAUSING THE FEEDWATER SYSTEM VALVES TO FAIL TO THE CLOSED POSITION. ENERGIZATION OF THE SOLENOID VALVES JS NOT REQUIRED DURING AN ACCIDENT.
SOLENOID VALVES SV1491 AND SV1492 ARE USED TO DIRECT CONTROL AIR TO VAL VE POSITIONING DEVICES FOR THE 11BF40 AND 12 BF40 FEEDWATER BYPASS VALVES, FOR USE DURING STARTUP/LOW POWER EVOLUTIONS. ENERGIZATION OF THE SOLENOID VALVES IS NOT REQUIRED DURING AN ACCIDENT.