ML20087N369
| ML20087N369 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1984 |
| From: | Lipsky M, Olson D, Purcell A, Saegert S SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20087N362 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-3, NUDOCS 8404030380 | |
| Download: ML20087N369 (100) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. e. -s RELATED C0rgtsPONDM APO '2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l6 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION _ Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ) In th'e Matter of ) ) LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 ) (Emergency Planning) (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Unit 1) ) ) ) TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR H. PURCELL, DAVID J.
- OLSON, MICHAEL LIPSKY AND SUSAN C.
SAEGERT REGARDING CONTENTIONS 11 AND 15 i 4 8404030380 840330 PDR ADOCK 05000322 PDR T G
=- o e UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ) In th,e Matter of ) ) LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 ) (Emergency Planning) (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Unit 1) ) ) ) TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR H. PURCELL, DAVID J.
- OLSON, MICHAEL LIPSKY AND SUSAN C.
SAEGERT REGARDING CONTENTIONS 11 AND 15 O. Please state your names and positions. A. My name is Arthur H. Purcell. I am Director of the Resource Policy Institute in Washington, D.C. I served as a senior staff member of the President's commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island. In that capacity I was the fulltimecoorbinatoroftheCommission'sEmergencyPreparedness and Response Task Force'. The Resource Policy Institute is a non-profit research and education group focusing on energy and environmental policy issues. I have served as its Director since founding it in 1975. The Institute maintains offices in Washingto,n, D.C., and Boulder, Colorado. I also serve as an , i I l ~~ _J
Associate Professional Lecturer, George Washington University, School of Engineering and Applied Sciences. I hold doctorate, master's and bachelor's degrees in engineering from Northwest-My 'rofessional quali-ern University and Cornell University. p fications are set forth in more detail in my resume which is hereto. My name is David J. Olson. I am Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Science, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. My primary area of spe-cialization in the last four years has been the formal organi-zation and behavioral patterns of public corporations owned and operated by agencies of the state, with particular attent' ion devoted to seaport authorities. My professional work has also centered on public responses to civil disorders and what can be donc to prevent recurrence of disorders, as well as the nature of political corruption and conflict of interest, all of which are subjects of continuing interest to me. These areas of l scholarship address questions of command and control, conflict of interest, and credibility of authorities, which are relevant i to Contentions 11 and 15. My professional qualifications are set forth in more detail in my resume which is Attachment 2 hereto. 9. G
o o My name is Michael Lipsky. I am Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Within the, general field of political science I specialize in American politics, urban politics, and public policy. I have taught graduate and under-gradu' ate subjects related to t'nese subspecialties in political i science since 1966, first at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, and since 1969 at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-nology. I have also taught _for brief periods at the University of Massachusetts, the University of Washihgton, and the Harvard University Graduate School of Education. I have written exten-sively on delivery of public services in a variety of policy areas such as public safety, education and social welfare. I am the author of three books and numerous articles ap-pearing in such journals as the American Political Science Review, the Journal of Politics, the Harvard Educational Review, the Journal of Health Policy, Politics and Law, the' Tulane Law Rehiew,'and the Social Services Review. My book, Street-Level Bureacracy', was awarded the C. Wright Mills Award of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, and was named i co-winner of the Gladys Kammerer Award of the American i Political Science Association for the best book on national policy pu,blished in 1980. My professional qualifications are' .. _ _.. ~. -. __... _..-,- ___,..
set forth in more detail in my resume which is Attachment 3 hereto. My name is Susan C. Saegert. I am an Associate Professor of Psychology and Environmental Psychology at the CityyniversityofNewYorkGraduateSchool. My professional qualifications are described in my curriculum vitae, which was submitted and admitted into evidence as an attachment to my testimony on Contention 65. See Tr. 2259. Q. What is the purpose of this testimony? A. In this testimony we address the concerns raised in Emergency Planning Contentions 11 and 15. Unless otherwise noted, the testimony Which follows is joint,1y sponsored by all of us. Contention 11 Q. Please state Contention 11. -s A. Contention 11 reads as follows: Preamble to Contentions 11-14. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A requires emergency plans to describe the organiza-tion for coping with radiological emergencies, including definition of authorities, responsibilities, and duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's ' emergency organization and identification , ~ W 4 ra---s ~ r >--,,,r-- eev-w--n ,e-- v-w -,,rw ,n, ~-- m-,v-,. n-
of the State and/or local officials j responsible for planning for, ordering, and j controlling appropriate protective actions, including evacuations. In the LILCO Tran-sition Plan, in place of " State and/or local officials," LILCO employees (including in the case of the " Radiation Health Coordinator," an unidentified LILCO " Contractor" which, for purposes of these i contentions is included in the term "LILCO a employees") are identified as being respon-sible for planning for, ordering, and con-i trolling the entire offsite emergency re-sponse. Thus, all the commend and control l functions, as well as all management and coordination of the entire emergency re-sponse, are to be performed by various LILCO employees. (Plan, at 3.1-1.; OPIPs 2.1.1, 3.1.1, 3.6.1). Accordingly, the "offsite authorities responsible for coordinating and implementing offsite emer-gency measures," with whom the LILCO onsite emergency coordinator must exchange infor-mation (see 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.2.c), are fellow LILCO employ-ees. In Contentions 11-14 below, the Inter-venors contend that there cannot and will not be offsite emergency preparedness that provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures.can and will be taken in the event.of a radiological emergency at Shoreham because LILCO employees are not able to exercise effectively the command and control responsibilities necessary to i plan for, order, manage; coordinate and control appropriate protective actions. Each of the deficiencies identified in Con-tentions 11-14 results in noncompliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3), Part 50 Appendix E, Section IV, and NUREG 0654 Section II.A. - Contention 11. The LILCO employees in command and control positions under the . LILCO Plan may experience a conflict .4 .,-v -,. -,, ~,,..,-, e,...-,- e,..,-~_
~ between LILCO's financial and institutional interests and the public's interest, which may substantially hamper their ability to perform the functions assigned to them in a manner that will result in adequate protection of the public. The Intervenors contend that LILCO employees will have a strong incentive to minimize the public's perception of the potential or actual danger involved in a radiologoical emer-gency in order to avoid engendering public or LILCO shareholder disapproval of LILCO, or anti-Shoreham sentiment. Thus, for ex-ample, they may not recommend an appropriate protective action in a prompt manner because to do so would be contrary to LILCO's financial interest in maintaining a public perception that Shoreham is not a source of danger. LILCO has failed to institute appropriate measures to ensure the independence of LERO personnel. Accordingly, there is no assur-ance that correct and appropriate command and control decisions will be made by LILCO employees. O. Do you agree with Contention 11, including its pream-ble? A. Yes we do. t O. What is meant by the term " command and con. trol" in the context of responding to an emergency which affects a com-munity? .A. In the context of responding to an emergency which may affect an entire community, " command and control" refers to authoritative direction of activities designed to mitigate the G r e -. --. ~.
emergency. It includes (1) the existence of decision-makers who can and will make authoritative decisions; (2) the exis-tence of a group or. groups of people Who have been assigned the duty of followin3 and/or implementing the decisions; and (3) a relationship of authority such that the decisions will be ac-copte'd as binding by the individuals Who are expected to carry them out or obey them. The scope of " command and control" extends to all those individuals who are expected to play some. part in implementing the emergency contingency plans, including private agencies and private individuals, as well as the general public Which at times is expected to respond to command and control directives. There are thus two aspects to the command and control relationship: readiness and ability to command; and readiness and ability to respond to commands. Q. Who is responsible for command and control under the LILCO Plan? A. The., command and control functions under the LILCO Plan are to be exercised by LILCO employees or, in the case of the Radiation Health Coordinator, a paid LILCO contractor. The LILCO employees designated to fill command and control posi-i tions have management positions in the LILCO corporate hier-archy. For example, the three persons designated to fill the. h r 4,
a top position of Director of LERO under the LILCO Plan are the ~ Vice President in charge of Transmission and Distribution (Joseph Acker), the Vice President of Purchasing and Stores (Andrew Wofford), and the Vice President in' charge of Employee Relations (Mr. Procelli). The four employees designated to fill khe position of the Manager of LERO (the position immedi-ately below the Director) are the Manager of the Power Engi-neering Department (John Weismantle), the Manager of the Coal Project in the Power Engineering Department (Raymond Plaskon), the Manager of the Customer Service Department (Arthur Seale, Jr.), and the Manager of Engineering (Adam Madson). See OPIP 1983 2.1.l'at 5.6; Deposition of John Weismantle, September 7,, (hereinafter, "Weismantle Depo.") at 83-84, 116-17. These gen-tiemen clearly hold senior management positions with LILCO and will, for reasons' discussed below, be subject to conflicts of interest when performing their LERO functions. Although Suffolk County has been unable to obtain detailed information about each of these individuals, depositions yieldc4 the following specific data: Mr. Wofford has been employe$ by LILCO for approximately 15 years, Mr. Weismantle for more than 18 year, and Mr. Seale for more than 37 years. Mr. Wofford and Mr. Seale are LILCO stockholders.1/ We infer 1/ See Weismantle Depo. at 4; Deposition of Arthur Seale, Jr., October 13, 1983 (hereinafter, "Seale Depo.") at 5, (Footnote cont'd next page) e 4. ' g-- n - w ,y w p --r -y-g-- - - - - ~ -, - + y W. e
~ from their positions with LILCO that the other senior managers are also likely to be long time company employees Who own LILCO stock. The various. senior coordinators Who represent the command and control level immediately below the Manager of LERO in the LILCO Plan, are also LILCO management employees. See OPIPt2.1.1 at 7 (Health Services Coordinator), 26 (Evacuation Coordinator), 51 (support Services Coordinator), and 69 (Coordinator of Public Information). Q. Contention 11 refers to LILCO's failure to ensure the independence of LERO personnel. How is independence related tc command and control? A. Independence from the source or cause of an emergency -- or objectivity -- is essential to effective command and control of an emergency response. One important element in the exercise of effective command and control is the ability to weigh and evaluate the appropriateness of all possible options before making., management decisions. Without objectivity, it is quite possible, in the, face of emergency management pressures, that the optimal approach (es) will be discarded or ignored (Footnote cont'd from previous page) 156; Deposition of Andrew Wofford, October 13, 1983, at 5, 20.
because of pre-existing biases or simple lack of desire to consider all reasonable perspectives. (Purcell, Saegert) The Three Mile Island accident, repre-senting the single extensive historical experience of record of a nuclear accident, provides some basic lessons in this regard. A number of statements by the utility in the early stages of the TMI emergency clearly indicated that there was little ob-jectivity in the utility's approach to informing the public about the seriousness of the accident. For example, the utili-ty designated its public relations director, instead of a technical spokesperson, for public briefings, and this individual displayed open anger at suggestions that coping with the accident might be beyond the capability of the utility, al-though this subsequently was shown to be the case. This individual's subjective approach to the emergency, combined with his obvious lack of independence from the utility, led to a serious loss of the utility's credibility with both the pub-lic and goverhment officials. For this reason, the Governor of Pennsylvania asked an outside expert from the NRC, an l individual presumed to be objective and able to exercise inde-pendent judgment, to serve as the manager of the TMI accident response.2,/ -2/ Testimony of Governor Richard Thornburgh, Public Hearing, President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Is-land, August 21, 1979. ( l ' g .-a
~ After the TMI accident, the utility continued to display behavior that suggests the utility was more concerned with its image and organizational maintenance than with objectively presenting information about the severity of the accident. In a presentation made by the chairman of General Public Utilities in Re'ading; Pennsylvania on May 30; 1979, two months after the accident. Mr. Dieckamp concluded his " Report to the Met Ed Com-munity" by stating: "As we look forward, we think the plant will be out of service for approximately three years." This was an irresponsible prediction; while tolerance should be allowed for overoptimism, Dieckamp's prediction of a return to service in three years indicates not only that he had little idea of the seriousness of the accident (the fact is that the d unit may never return to service), but also that he was so pre-occupied with the idea that TMI could not fail totally that he did not even hold forth the possibility that' TMI-II was lost.3/ (All) The term " mind set" was used frequently by the l President's Cbmmission on the Accident at Three Mile Island to describe institutional ' biases that seemed to have developed in the nuclear power industry and were evidenced during the TMI l l 3/ "A Report to the Met Ed Community," Metropolitan Edison Co., Reading, Pat May 30, 1979, Report No. 2. l l. 4
~ accident. Individuals employed by a utility are simply too close to the source of the problem to maintain the objectivity and open-mindedness necessary to manage and control the re-sponse to an emergency involving a nuclear power plant. Utili-i ty employees could' serve a valuable function as advisers in emerg'encies, since they are familiar with the commercial nucle-ar power systems. But this same familiarity leads to inevita-ble biases and mind sets that can lead to ineffective or unworkable emergency responses. S Q. Will the LILCO employees responsible for exercising command and control under the LILCO Plan be independent and objective in the event of a Shoreham accident? A. The LILCO employees assigned to positions of command and control lack necessary independence and objectivity for a number of reasons. First, they are not independent, as the term " independent" commonly is used. To be independent is to be not dependent. This means that the individual is not subject to control by others and not directly affiliated with larger controlling units. The three LILCO employees designated to be the LERO Director are clearly subject to control by others; they are all officers (vice presidents) of LILCO and they report to the President and indirectly to the Board of 0 12 - l w m-e w---, w ..,...-,=,.---.+*-,--..-,--w, y---,.----,-.--wey, e-,-s ,-,-.y .4--
Directors. Indeed, Mr. Acker, who is the primary LERO Director (Plan at 3.1-2), was assigned to that position by the President of LILCO (See Acker. Depo.'at 122), and he has been described by Mr. Weismantle, himself a Manager of LERO, as " representing [LILCO's] top corporate management." (Weismantle Depo 4 at 35). The four LILCO employees designated to be the Manager of LERO are all managers of departments in LILCO. Clearly, the command and control personnel under the LILCO Plan are in a dependent corporate status to superior officers of the company. 9 Second, the LILCO employees in command and control posi-tions also lack objectivity in the' roles assigned to them as LERO officials. By definition, objectivity requires that facts and conditions are received and dealt with without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations. Yet facts and conditions surrounding a radiological emergency at Shoreham necessarily impact the future existence, well being, profit and public perception of LILCO and LILCO's management. l LILCO managemAnt level employees cannot help but interpret, judge and feel about those facts and conditions, at least in part, according to their positions in the company. Their rela- , tionship with LILCO, their employer, fundamentally and unavoidably compromises their ability to act objectively in the l command _and control functions assigned to them in the LILCO Plan.
Third, this lack of objectivity is compounded by the ex-traordinary length of time each has been in LILCO's employ. Members of an organization increase their commitment and at-tachment to an organization over time. Thus, the lengthy af-filiation of these individuals,with LILCO reduces their objec-tivity even further. Equally important, it compromises public and non-LILCO emergency personnel perceptions of their indepen-dance and objectivity. See discussion of Contention 15, below. Fourth, these individuals lack necessary objectivity and independence because of their inadequate training in relevant emergency response management and their institutional inability to be involved in emergency preparedness efforts on a ful1 time or near full time basis. Because of this, they simply lack the f tools and perspectives necessary for objective and independent decisionmaking in the event of an emergency at Shoreham. This is discussed more fully in the Suffolk County Testimony regarding Training. -s Does the LILCO Plan include measures to ensure the Q. independence of the LILCO employees designated to be in command and, control of a response to a Shoreham emergency? i A. From our review; we find no measures by LILCO designed to attempt to ensure independence or objectivity. Let I. e e -.,,,e ye,, p.,wp,,3,fe,_--,,,,,3- ,-w--.. -r,-w- -_,w4,7
us add, however, that in our opinion, there are no measures i h LILCC could take to ensure with any degree of effect veness t e . independence or objectivity of LILCO management employees act-ing in the context of exercising command and control over a nu-clear accident at the Shoreham plant Which is owned and oper-ated'by_their employer; LILCO. For the reasons we discuss below, their positions with LILCO render them inherently non-objective. .Q. Contention 11 states that LILCO employees in command and control positions may experience a conflict of interest between LILCO's financial and institutional interests and the t l public's interest. What does the term " conflict of interest" s: mean? A. ~ All organizations have interests embedded in'the very L structures Which define-them as organizations and the ends they seek to achieve -- that is; the purposes, objectives and goals l that are pursued. The question of conflict of interest is usu- ~ ally associated with behavior of individuals who occupy official positions of public trust in the public sector.4/ .- 4 / Generally, organizations are categorized as falling within l either the private sector or the public sector. Familiar private sector organizations are trade unions, private l l firms, and' voluntary associations; familiar public-sector E orgahizations are national, state and local governments (Footnote cont'd next page) l ~ I-w g www= 9 yg y. --e g. -g-r---.----v--m-7em yw um. my, -m ery<-wpm --y e-.ya-w aw-, g- -w,,a.-p. ym.-
4 Where the pursuit of private gain or advantage accompanies or interferes with the fulfillment of the mandated public trust and responsibilities, a conflict of interest is said to exist. Through history, standards of acceptable conduct for public sector officials have evolved for the purpose of avoiding conflicts of interest or even the appearance-of such conflicts. However, no comparable threshold standards exist for private sector officials. The primary objectives, purposes and goals of a private company (such as LILCO) are to reward stock-holders and other investors by making profits. In the course of pursuing these-objectives in the private sector, there rare-ly arises a conflict of interest, or even a question of such conflict, because the' firm's interests are narrowly defined and internally consistent, and its goals are oriented toward earn-ing a profit in order to reward investors. When conflicts of -interest _do arise in the private sector, the conflicts usually J (Footnote con't'd from previous page) and specialized limited purpose agencies created by ~ governments. Private sector organizations tend to have more narrowly defined interests than public sector organi-zations. They also tend,to experience " conflict of inter-est" problems less frequently and less severely than pub-lic sector organizations; mainly due to the narrow defini-tion and limited purposes of private sector organizations and the interests they pursue. D + r. e- -r--- _,.-m ,.w-- r. ,-m-, c.
i involve employees pursuing their individual interests' which are at odds-with the profit goals of the company, rather than with any "public interest" goals. LILCO represents a particular type of private firm, given itsayatusasaregulatedutility. As a regulated utility it does perform limited public functions (i.e., extending electric service lines to customers within its service area, maintaining and repairing such lines, etc.) as mandated and monitored by the utility regulatory agency of the Stat,e. These public func-tions tend to be of a routine and repetitive sort, where conflicts of interest rarely surface because the public func-tions are consistent with LILCO's profitability goals. As discussed and developed more fully below, however, the public interest functions which LILCO employees are expected to per-form under the LILCO Plan, including attempting to ensure the public health and welfare of Suffolk County residents in a po-tentially life-threatening nuclear plant accident, are not con-sistent with the profit goals of LILCO as a private company. i O. Are the LILCO employees in positions of command and control under the LILCO Plan likely to experience conflicts of interest in the event of a radiological emergency? l l
A. Yes. The two roles LILCO employees are expected to perform in command and control positions under the LILCO Plan -- managing LILCO for profit making purposes on one hand, and-acting to ensure the public safety, health and welfare in case of a radiological emergency on -the other -- are potentially conflicting. The latter role places them in a position of pub-lic trust (responsibility for emergency planning and plan execution), and conflicts with the former role, which clearly is a position of preserving and furthering the private inter-ests of LILCO as a for-profit entity. In such mutually incom-patible and-conflicting roles, objectivity may be sacrificed and the appearance of objectivity certainly is eroded. a Q. Please explain. A. When a private firm such as LILCO attempts to assume i responsibilities for activities traditionally located in the public sector -- such as planning for and implementing emer-( gency measures during. radiological emergency -- its goals, purposes and objectives, at least in theory, must expand beyond its normal limited goal of profitmaking. The new goal of af-firmatively protecting the public health, safety and welfare must be added and, in theory, must become the primary objective l 1 l l of the company and its employees. i. ..,-m...,-.
17te addition of the goal of providing for the health, wel-fare and safety of the public would result in a conflict of in-terest for the LILCO employees in command and control posi-tions, because the steps necessary to achieve that goal in the most effective way are likely to produce results at odds with the p'rofitmaking goal of the company which they ordinarily . pursue. We agree with the statement in Contention 11 that LILCO employees will have a strong incentive to minimize the public's perception of the potential or actual danger involved in a radiological emergency in order to avoid engendering the disapproval of the public, LILCO shareholders, LILCO bondhold-or the financial community upon which LILCO relies for in-
- ers, vestment capital.
The LILCO officers and other management em-playees who are expected to exercise command and control will know that such disapproval could result-in financial harm to the company, and possibly to them individually. Similarly, such LILCO employees will have full knowledge of the enormous costs, to the. utility and to the society, that would be in-volved in' ordering an emergency response, and they would be i mindful of the great loss in public confidence, resulting from the vastly heightened public awareness that people living near - the facility are at risk, that would follow such an order. l t i l l-I ..,n-., -.,,+,n ,,-e-we. ,,w,, e-.--,-a,,-,,,,-w,,--,,.--,e-,,, ww--
4 Thus, the LILCO employees who are in command and control positions under the LILCO Plan' owe their allegiance to two in-consistent mandates. On the one hand, as high level employees of LILCO, they report to LILCO's President and Board of _ Directors and their mandate is.to enhance the utility's profits and r'putation; and, as long time management employees or offi-e cars of the company, their personal prestige, reputation, and economic well-being is inextricably tied to the financial success and organizational stability of LILCO. On the other hand, as the primary decision-makers in the LILCO-run offsite emergency response organization, these same individuals (theo-retically) owe their highest loyalty to the public; in that role their mandate is to ignore completely any consideration of LILCO's interests and to protect the public health, safety and welfare. There are inherent, irreconcilable conflicts of in-l l . terests between these two incompatible roles. l The fact that the individuals in command and control are long time empkoyees of LILeo, with strong personal and economic j ties to the utility and its management, produces an additional conflict. Their longstanding and, presumably, ingrained and personal loyalty to the utility and individuals in the manage-L ment hierarchy, will likely result in a desire to please LILCO management during an emergency. This could be manifested, for 20 - O O y v y
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4. example, by their taking the advice of other LILCO executives, or making statements during ths emergency that present manage-ment in the most favorable light.5/ However, the requirement imposed by their positions in LERO -- that is, loyalty only to the public interest -- presents th'e opposite demand. If truly answering only to the public, a person in command and control would make independent decisions after evaluating imput from the utility and perhaps other sources, and would be objective and forthcoming in portraying the emergency and its dangers without consideration of the public reaction vis-a-vis LILCO or the competence of its management. We are not saying that in every instance LILCO employees necessarily would make decisions that are incompatible with the public interest. We are saying, however, that the LILCO Plan creates conflicts of interest such that we are not confident that the key decision-makers are in-dependent or capable of making necessary judgments in the public interest. 5/ This-desire to please management could be increased as a result of LILCO's recent personnel reduction actions. As part of an austerity program, LILCO has recently termi-nated approximately 20% of its work force, including some employees at management levels, including some with decades of service to the company. The combination of in-creased job insecurity brought about by LILCO's employee r . terminations, and the employee resentment reportedly gen-erated.by the manner in which the terminations were han-died by LILCO, (see Attachment 4 hereto), may diminish further the capacity for objectivity of the LILCO employ-ees in command and control positions. i I I l l
1 Effective command and control during a radiological emer-gency requires the exercise of~ authority traditionally exer-cised by governments. Such power and authority have traditi. onally been vested in public officials rather than in the private sector to ensure that their deployment is in.the public interest and not used to the benefit of any private or partial interest. This need for objectivity and avoidance of conflicts of interest also explains why we have conflict of interest leg-islation governing the behavior of public officials during their tenure in office, and why we often require divestiture of corporate holdings by political appointees. No such protection from the effects of conflicts likely to be experienced by those in command and control under the LILCO Plan is provided in that Plan. Q. How can the lack of objectivity or independence, and conflicts of interest experienced by LILCO employees affect their ability to perform command and control functions in the I 1 event of a Shoreham emergency? i A. The conflicts will likely be experienced by the LILCO employees in command and control as they attempt to answer questions such as when to announce the existence of a radio-logical emergency; how to describe or characterize the . i ~ -e .m,.,-_%.,. ,--,,w .y e-.,,,, y-, ,ec, -,-,,m
emergency conditions; what protective actions to recommend and when they should be recommended; and when to declare the emer-gency terminated. We will discuss a few specific examples; first, the decision to announce the existence of a radiological 1 emergency. Under the LILCO Plan, the responsibility for in-forming or alerting the public of the occurrence of an emer-gency is assigned to the Director of LERO. OPIP 2.1.1 at 5. There are two respects in which the exercise of this command and control function would likely be adversely affected due to its performance by LILCO officers. The first of these is the speed and timeliness with which the announcement is made. There may be questions, doubts, or uncertainties about the actual nature of an event l'n the plant at the outset of an accident. The persons in command and control must weigh the need for beginning an emergency response against the consequences of unnecessarily frightening or worrying the pub-lic. A LILCO employee would be more likely than a person not L affiliated with LILCO to delay the announcement that an emer-gency had occurred because of his perception of the adverse personal and corporate consequences of a premature or unneces-sary announcement. This would be the case because those LILCO employees designated to fill command and control positions, by training and experience, would be more sensitive to the danger 23 - I i r -%+rw, .e-- -- ~ e,----- w ee
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of compromising LILCO's reputation, undermining public perceptions of LILCO management competence, or eroding esteem l for LILCO in financial communities. As officers and management . level, employees and in some instances stockholders of the com-pany, they would also have a personal interest in avoiding what they would' hope would be an unnecessary or premature announce-ment of an emergency since, if the announcement turned out to be an error, they would be subject to being personally blamed by the company for both the error and the resulting effects on LILCO's image. In addition, the effects on the company could have a direct impact on their own jobs and financial security. i The employee need not be consciously aware of these conflicts forJthem (1) to result in delayed perception of nega-tive events, or (2) to produce a tendency to misinterpret facts or data in conformity with expectations and desires. All these contingencies could result in a delay in the Director of LERO's decision to apnounce to the public that an emergency had occurred at Shoreham. The nature, scope and content of the notification is also likely to be affected by the lack of objectivity and conflicts -experienced by the LILCO personnel in positions of command and I control. For many of the same reasons specified above with 24 - D D ., -, +,, -,. ,,.,wa -e e e.,,. +n--,--,. .~-.w------,-------, ,--.,,--e-,------,-e,_n,--n-----v e-- e r---,m.,,,w.. -a ,a ,e,_s,,-,
respect to the promptness question, the extent to Which the severity or seriousness of a particular radiological emergency . is conveyed to support personnel or to the public generally, as well as the manner in Which the emergency is characterized or described, particularly When some uncertainty exists, is likely to be influenced by the fact that the individuals responsible for deciding on the content of public information are LILCO em-ployees rather non-LILCO employees. Second, the decision to recommend pr.ot'ective actions is also one that is likely to be adversely affected by the conflicts of interest experienced by LILCO personnel in command and control positions. It is one thing to alert the public to the occurrence of an accident; it is much more significant, however, to tell the public (1) that the accident has resulted in a release of radioactive materials, and (2) that the public must take What may be perceived as drastic affirmative actions with an undefined probability of success in order to avoid physical harm Thus, admitting the existence of an emergency is contrary to LILCO's corporate interests and admitting that the emergency is so severe that it is health threatening and requires disruption to the lives of large numbers of people, is an even more difficult step. Again, the risk of delay in mak-ing such An announcemnt must be weighed against the risk _-
involved in unnecessarily or prematurely frightening members of the public or causing them to begin to evacuate or take other actions in an effort to protect themselves. For the same reasons we discussed above, we believe that the conflicts of interest experienced by the LILCO personnel in command and contr'l positions are likely to result in their weighting those o risks differently than would an independent authority not af-filiated with LILCO. LILCO employees are more likely to delay making protective action recommendations. Third, conflicts generated by the affiliation of command and control personnel with LILCO, similarly are likely to affect their decisions as to what protective actions should be recommended. In particular, the LILCO personnel in command and control positions will believe that the disruption, confusion and anxiety generated by an evacuation recommendation is likely to be far greater than that generated by a sheltering recommen-dation, assuming that persons will actually obey a sheltering recommendatiob. Moreover, once an evacuation order is given, complex procedures regarding traffic control, busing people without access to cars, evacuating school children and patients in health care facilities, and activating relocaticn centers, all involving large numbers of workers and equipment, must be put into,effect and coordinated. And, an evacuation once- - a 6 --,a
l 3.. begun, is difficult to call off or reverse. Sheltering, on the other hand, is a much easier action for LILCO's offsite re-sponse organization.to implement, at least in the short term. The recommendation is made, and it is assumed that most people will stay in their homes (or schools or hospitals) until they are fold it is safe to come out. The majority of LERO's field workers (as opposed to those with coordination or communication roles)'are not called upon to act, and, in theory, the amount of immediate disruption caused in the community is less since the problems of assembling families and r'elocating them to dis-tant areas are avoided. As a result of the conflicts of inter-est discussed above, the LILCO employees in command and control may be more likely than non-LILCO authorities to recommend sheltering as a protective action, even if evacuation were the more appropriate protective action, because of the relative " ease".with Which a sheltering recommendation could be imple-j mented and the relative lack of short-term disruption. i ' Finally, the most-obvious conflict of interest scenario in the event of a Shoreham' accident is the one we have discussed above in Which.the Director of LERO feels compelled to take an action that does not harm the image of the utility, despite its possible inappropriateness for the general population. But a l different, scenario presents an equally difficult problem, and' i _
o one which appeared to be significant in the Three Mile Island situation. This is the case of the LERO Director feeling pres-sure to rely on the counsel of other LILCO management employees during an emergency in order to demonstrate loyalty to LILCO management -- regardless of the. competence, objectivity, or -naturn of such counsel.6/ Indeed, since under the LILCO Plan I almost everyone with whom command and control personnel are to consult is a LILCO employee or paid contractor, such pressure is unavoidable. Thus, the LERO Director could make inappropri-ate decisions not necessarily in an effort-to minimize public relations damage or potential harm to his own reputation or po-sition, but rather based on advice from non-objective or biased LILCO employees. Moreover, if officials with command authority feel pressures to consult with others, they are likely to spend precious time locating and consulting others when the situation may require speedy, authoritative judgment. Thus, conflict of interest may 32.ad to delay and compromise the effectiveness of l _ emergency response procedures. l 6/ For instance, the LERO directors will rely on LILCO per-l sonnel for data regarding the seriousness and conditions at the plant. A LILCO employee Who is the LERO Director is less likely to critically challenge the wisdom of rec-ommendations emanating from LILCO personnel at the plant than would a person in command and control having no direct ties to LILCO or LERO. 28 - b e o -m m r w-- me- -w-m ---~m ,rn-r -r-
e The result of the conflicts of interest we have-discussed upon-implementation of the LILCO Plan is two fold. First, the conflicts would affect the LILCO employees' ability to perform I properly the roles assigned to them -- i e., they would have y difficulty making necessary decisions and they would have a tendency to make the wrong decisions. Second, given the conflicts, the public at large and non-LILCO emergency person-nel would have rational bases for withholding their trust in LILCO employees in command and control positions, and for refusing or hesitating to comply with ord'ers or recommendations made by LILCO employee (we will discuss this further below). This would result in the delay or complete failure of LILCO's attempt to implement protective actions,_and the delay or fail-ure of the public to be protected adequately. Q. What is your conclusion concerning Contention ll? ' A. We conclude that in light of the conflicts of inter- - est which will be experienced by the persons in command and control of the emergency response under the LILCO Plan by vir-tue of their being LILCO officers and management employees, there can be no finding of reasonable assurance that correct or appropriate command and control decisions will be made in a . timely manner. Thus, there can be no assurance that adequate I 4 -,w m -w-- - - - e----,, ,.--.v-y.
- -~-,-.-~,-*,-v w-v r.<v=.-
-y.- ,+, --
l- - protective measures could or would be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Contention 15 O. Do you. agree with contention 157 t A. Yes we do. That contention and its preamble read as follows: Preamble to Contention 15. The LILCO Plan is dependent upon LILCO/LERO personnel providing essentially all necessary infor-mation and recommendations Which are required during an emergency. Contention 15 addresses the question Whether LILCO/LERO recommendations for protective actions (and other information provided by LILCO/LERO) will be believed and followed or whether LILCO will.be distrusted a.= a source of information with the result that its protective action recommendations (and other information provided) will not be believed or followed by the public. Contention 15. Intervenors contend that LILCO is not considered by the public to be a credible source of information. More than 60 percent of the people in Suffolk County would not trust LILCO - officials.at all to tell the truth about an accident. See Social Data Analysts Survey. Persons are more likely to-question, refuse to believe, disobey or ignore orders, rec-ommendations, or information that come from persons Whom they do not believe than that from authorities they trust and consider credible. Because the public does not perceive LILCO as a credible source of information, O e w -~ ._w.,_---.,-g., w. w ---.._%__4_m-,,.m --w.- g,--.y q.-p
protective action recommendations and other. information disseminated by LILCO in an emergency will not be followed or believed by the public. Further, LILCO may be viewed hostilely as the source of the problem in the first place, or skeptically because the public will perceive that it is not in LILCO's financial interest to dis-close all pertinent information. (Members of the public will perceive that LILCO will not disclose the seriousness of an accident due to fears of lower ratings in the finan-cial markets, NRC sanctions, or a lower public image'than already exists.) There-fore, people will be likely to disregard or disobey protective action recommendations or other emergency instructions dissemi-nated by LILCO during an emergency. Inter-venors thus contend that the LILCO plan cannot and will not be implemented, and ac-cordingly, there can be no finding of com-pliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47. The paragraphs which follow set forth the particular aspects of, or operations con-templated by, the LILCO Plan which cannot be implemented as a result of LILCO's lack of credibility, and the resulting lack of regulatory compliance. Contention 15 also has seven subparts, which we will discuss separately below. O. What is meant by the term " credibility" and how does it relate to the implementation of LILCO's emergency plan? A. Credibility means the extent to which someone or something is considered capable of being believed. The concept relates to implementation of LILCO's emergency plan in several important ways.
(Saegert) First, for people to be willing to follow an emergency plan, the plan itself and its contents must be credi-b,le.1/ That is, it sho'uld present information about the char-acteristics of the emergency that are health. threatening in a way that addresses people's beliefs and concerns. It should recommend courses of action that seem plausible, adequate and capable of being carried out.8/ The recommended actions should take into account people's priorities, needs and behavioral intentions and should not include courses of action that conflict with what people believe they and others would do in 4 an emergency.9/ 7/
- Drabek, T.E.
& Boggs, K.S. " Families in Disaster: Reactions and Relatives," Journal of Marriage and the Fam-i 1968 30, 443-451; Perry, R.W.,
- Lindell, M.K.
& Green, Jl M.R, "The Tmplications of Natural Hazard Evacuation Warn- .ing Studies for Crisis Relocation Planning, Battelle Human Affairs Research Center, Seattle, Washington: February, 1980. FEMA #B-HARC-411-035; Quarantelli, E.L. " Disaster planning: Small and Large -- Past, Present and Future, i " Disaster Research Center; Ohio State-University, February, 1981; Article 141; Sims, J.H. & Baumann, D.B. Educational Programs and Human Response to Natural Hazards," Environment and Behavior, 1983, 15, 165-189. -8/ Christensen, L. & Ruch, C.E., " Assessment of Brochures and Radio and Television Presentations on Hurricane Awareness," Mass Emergencies, 1978, 3, 209-216; Janis, I.L., " Psychological Effects of Warnings," in G.W. Baker & D.W. Chapman (Eds.). Man and Society in Disasters, New York: Basic Books, 1962. 9/ Davenport, S. & Waterstone T. Hazard Awareness Guidebook: Planning for What Comes Naturally, Austin, Texas: - Coast-al ahd Marine Council, 1979; Drabek, T.E. & Stephenson l (Footnote cont'd next page)
(All) Second, for a plan to be credible people must believe that the entity or individuals responsible for directing implementation of the plan know What they are doing', are committed to the plan, and are capable of carrying it out. l That organization must be seen as an honest and believable i l soure'e of information and a trustworthy advisor during a i i crisis. Credibility takes on added significance during an actual emergency. As LILCO's witnesses Dennis Mileti and John Sorensen stated in testimony previously submitted: " Emergency i public information or warnings must seem credible and reliable to the people receiving them." They also stated that "If peo-ple learn or suspect that they are not receiving the 'Whole truth,' they are likely to ignore instructions about how to respond, and respond instead in ways consistent with their sus-picions.=10/ The credibility and reliability of the organiza-l tion and personnel involved in assessing the existence of a l L (Footnote cont'd from previous page) j
- III, J.S.,
"When Disaster Strikes," Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 1971, 1, 187-203; Lewis, J., O'Keefe, P. & Westgae, K.N., "A Philosophy of Precautionary Planning," Mass Emergencies, 1977, 2, 95-104. 10/ Testimony of Matthew C. Cordaro, et al. on Behalf of the Long Island Lighting Company on Phase II Emergency -~ Planning Contentions 23 (Shadow Phenomenon) and 65.C.2 and i 65.F (Panicked Drivers), ff. Tr. 1470, at 27, 28.
threat, reporting on it, providing directives for act' ion and managing the actions to be taNen must be high in order for the public to accept guidance from these sources. As discussed above, under the LILCO Plan, LILCO personnel are assigned to fill all command and control positions. Be-cause credibility has a direct effect on one's ability to exer-cise effectively command and control of an emergency response, LILCO's credibility will have a direct impact on the imple-mentation of the LILCO Plan. Specifically, the major qualifi-cations for an individual from one organization to be able to exercise command and control over either the public or person-nel in unrelated organizations (as is required of command and control personnel under the LILCO Plan) center around the I credibility and the competence of the indiv.idual and of that individual's organization. However, the first is a prerequi-site to the second. If the organization with which the individual is associated has low credibility in the mind of the l public, no amount of personal competence can surmount the difficulties that individual will face in attempting to exer-cise command and control during an emergency. Similarly, an individual with minimal actual or perceived competence, even if associated with a very credible organization, will face severe obstaclek in attempting to exercise command and control. !
Q. Contention 15 alleges that LILCO is not considered by the public to be a credible source of information, and cites the Social Data Analysts Survey Which is discussed in a sepa - rate piece of testimony. Are you aware of any other data that support the proposition that LILCO is not considered by the public to be a credible source of information? A. In his testimony on Contention 15, Stephen Cole cites other surveys and data Which support the results of the Social Data Analysts Survey. In addition, a variety of public entities have made similar findings. For example, the findings and conclusions of the'New York State Fact Finding Panel on the Shoreham. Nuclear Power Facility ("Marburger Commission"), which were reported to Governor Cuomo after six months of hearings and data gathering, have been widely publicized in the local press. A sample of such press reports is included in Attach-ment 5 hereto. Among other things, according to press reports, the Marburger Commission made the following findings: The Shoreham plant's long construction time and its staggering expense have contributed to a loss of public confidence on Long Island in traditional sources of judgment on utility planning and regulation. LILCO did not prepare itself adequately for its foray into the technology of nuclear power, and still lacks' credibility as an op- ,erator of_a nuclear power plant. 35 - e --r ~ ~ ,-.w-.-3y .-,y v.,--y--..-e,=-.m e,%--,,,,,e.-e.. + y-e ,-e. ,,p.,, w-
See second item in Attachment 5, titled " Excerpts from Shoreham Report." These findings are significant for two reasons. First, the Marburger Commission's apparent conclusion that LILCO lacks credibility supports the survey results cited in Contention 15. Second, the wide publicity received by the findings is likely to cause public perception of LILCO and its credibility to become even more negative. Similarly, several Boards of Education and other organiza- ' tions affiliated with school districts in a'nd near the EPZ have adopted resolutions which set forth the belief that LILCO is not credible or objective, and their unwillingness to rely upon LILCO officials for information or advice during a Shoreham emergency. Such resolutions comprise Attachment 6 hereto. For example, the Mount Sinai Parents Teachers Organization states the following in its resolution, which identifies nine specific weaknesses in LILCO's Plan as it pertains to schools: i l In the LILCO Plan, the only source of I public~information during an emergency is LILCO itself., As a result of LILCO's past statements and actions with regard to Shoreham, many of us in our community are ~ alre.ady skeptical of LILCO's words and i intentions. The fact that LILCO might also l be involved in a conflict of interest -- being both operator of the plant and initiator of emergency actions -- would tend to intensify doubts about the validity ,of LILCO's information during an emergency. l l . l l
o A resolution affirmed on August 15, 1983 by the Middle Country Central School District's Board of Education states: [T]he Long Island Lighting Company has not been able to ensure that its proposed Shoreham Power Plant can meet acceptable safety standards. And a' resolution adopted by that Board on November 7, 1983 states: In the LILCO Plan, the only public information upon which to base decisions for protective actions will come from the utility. LILCO, through its Public Schools Coordinator and WALK-AM Radio will both de-scribe the extent of the emergency and ree-i ommended actions. Because LILCO would be l both operator of the plant and initiator of emergency' actions, potential for conflict of interest exists. School Administrators, receiving information only from LILCO and not from any governmental agency, will be forced to decide upon actions with poten- [ tially serious consequences without the l benefit of information from an objective source. l l As reflected in Attachment 6, resolutions containing similar statements have been adopted by the Miller Place Union Free i School District Board of Education, the Mt. Sinai Teachers' As-sociation, the Middle Island Central School District Board of Education, St. Andrew's School Board, and the Board and Member-ship of the Sound Beach Pre-School Co-Op. Each of the above-referenced resolutions identifies several problems with ,,..... ~ _ _..., _. _. _ _ _. _ _ _..
e LILCO's Plan as it pertains to schools, and concludes that the LILCO Plan does not offer adequate protection for school chil-dren or parents. In addition, the William Floyd Union Free School District School Board, the Mt. Sinai Board of Education and the Board of Trustees of the New Interdisciplinary School have passed resolutions Which do not list specific problems in the LILCO Plan, but Which state their belief that LILCO's Plan is not realistic or workable, or does not provide adequate protection. See Attachment 6. Again, these resolutions further corroborate our view that LILCO is not considered a credible source of information in the event of a Shoreham emer-gency. Additional cerrcborative support for the view that LILCO is not a credible source of information comes from a variety of national studies which indicate public suspicion of the nuclear power industry. For example, a study performed by LILCO witness Steve Barnett for the U.S. Department of Energy, enti- 'tled "Public Perceptions of Future Electric Supply, Utility Fi-nancial Conditions, and'Related Issues," November, 1982, which utilized a nationally administered survey questionnaire, con-l cluded,.among other things, that the nuclear utility industry "has serious credibility problems concerning its competence and honesty."ll/ Sixty four percent of the national sample stated 11/' Public Perceptions of Future Electric Supply, Utility Fi-nancial Conditions, and Related Issues, November 1982, at 4 29. t l i 38 - s .-es -og yy----w=--7 -3 e.,, p- ,e- .,y---.c.- .a vr-.vt n--y 9 y-------.w--g-,.e-----9 -r w
that the utility industry has not been honest about the safety of nuclear power; only 26 percent believed that the industry has'been honest on that subject.12/ Similarly, a majority of the people sampled in the 4 - counties surrounding the Indian Point nuclear power plant stat-ed that they distrusted the utility (Con Ed) for advice and information in a radiological emergency.13/ And, in a study of 1600 households in the State of Washington, utility companies were listed among those sources of information on nuclear power that were distrusted more than they were trusted.li/ These data and the Barnett data reveal a consistent distrust of utilities operating nuclear power plants, and show that even = operating nuclear power facilities are not seen as credible (i.e. believable and competent) sources of information. Thus we would expect that LILCO's existing lack of credibility will continue-in the future. i .i 12/ Id. at B-8. 13/ Altshuler, R.J., " Ready or Not: Public Preparedness for l an Accident at Indian Point," New York: New York Public ~~ l Interest Research Group, Inc., 1982. 14/
- Nealy, S.M. & Rankin, W.L.
" Nuclear Knowledge and Nuclear Attitudes: Is Ignorance Bliss?" Battelle Memorial Institute Human Affairs Research Center, B-HARC-411-002. l'. ! i l 1
Finally, LILCO's credibility, as evidenced in the surveys and other materials cited abovd, has undoubtedly been reduced even further in recent months, for at least two reasons. First, during the past few months, there has been substantial publicity-in Long Island newspapers about LILCO's alleged man-agement incompetence. In addition to the Marburger Commission findings noted above (see Attachment 5), some examples of these articles are appended hereto and we discuss below their effect -on LILCO's credibility.15/ For example, there has been extensive press coverage of the failure of the emergency diesel generators at Shoreham dur-ing both testing and retesting following attempts by LILCO to repair the engines. See Attachment 7 hereto, which includes a sampling of newspaper stories on this subject. Despite reported statements by the NRC and others concerning the incem-petence of the manufacturer of the faulty engines, their unsuitability, and the safety risk posed by LILCO's proposed use of them, according to press reports LILCO has persisted in defending both its choice of engines and the propriety and adviseability of using them for at least 18 months of plant operation. 15/ Many of the articles in Attachments 5 and 7-11 are from Newsday, the major Long Island newspaper, which has a daily circulation of approximately 525,000.
4 Similarly, there has been extensive press coverage of the constantly increasing delay and increased costs involved in completing th'e Shoreham plant and statements that both the delay and the cost are attributable to LILCO management errors. Indeed, an October 9, 1983 Newsday headline stated that a poll f " indicates majority blame LILCO ' mismanagement' for N-plant's rising costs," and the article discussed what was reported as a " dramatic change of attitude" between February and October 1983 concerning LILCO's competence. See Attachment 8 hereto. Further, the press has reported that the Staff of the New York Public Service Commission has recommended that approxi- [ mately $1.5 billion of the projected cost of Shoreham sho'uld be borne by LILCO rather than its ratepayers, because those costs are attributable to LILCO mismanagement. hereto includes a sampling of articles related to the Public Service -- Commission Staff recommendations. In addition, other govern-mental entities and authorities have also reportedly made serious alleg tions about the competence or prudence of LILCO's I management with respect to Shoreham.
- See, e.g., 0 hereto, for newspaper articles concerning such allegations by the NRC, the New York' State Consumer Protection Board, Suffolk County, and.New York Governor Cuomo.
These well publicized suggestio,ns of LILCO incompetence, inexperience and I. 4
mismanagement (regardless'Whether true or not) will combine ~ with the preexisting public perception that LILCO lacks the ob-jectivity or capability to handle an emergency to decrease further LILCO's credibility. .Second, LILCO's recently imposed policy of refusing to respond to, or comment upon, reports in the press relating to 't Shoreham, emergency planning, or any other matter will also further decrease LILCO's credibility. See Attachment 11 hereto, which is an editorial in Newsday Which states, among 'other things: LILCO's current uncommunicative policy could undermine the credibility it needs to convince the NRC and the public that.it's capabic of managing its own emergency plan for Shoreham. [LILCO's President] Catacosinos isn't helping LILCO by trying to keep the public in the dark about the company and Shoreham. Q. How does publicity about LILCO's mismanagement relate to LILCO's credibility as a source of information during a radiological emergency? A. Perceptions about LILCO's management competence will have a profound effect on perceptions of LILCO's credibility in I the event of a Shoreham emergency. Perceived management
incompetence will lead the public and non-LILCO organizations to doubt the adequacy of both LILCO's Plan and LILCO's ability to implement it successfully 'or properly. Both planning and implementation will be expected to suffer from the same per-ceived incompetence marking LILCO's other planning and imple-mentation efforts related to Shoreham which we have discussed above. In addition, perceptions of LILCO's organizational incom-potence will lead the public and non-LILCO organizations to doubt the individual competence, and therefore credibility, of the LILCO employees assigned to implement the Plan for three reasons. First, the lack of objectivity and conflicts of in-terest discussed earlier, that can lead the LILCO personnel in command and control to ignore, delay disseminating, or distort information having negative consequences for the organization, may well be assumed by the public to exist. Thus, any genuine or legitimate hesitation, misunderstanding or lack of clarity demonstrated by LILCO personnel during an emergency may well be attributed by the public to efforts to protect LILCO's inter-eats at the expense of the public. Second, perceptions of LILCO's organizational incompetence will also lead the public to doubt the adequacy and propriety of plans and operating pro-cedures being implemented by LILCO, thus leading to N. i +
~ s non-compliance. Third, perceptions about LILCO's incompetence will also lead to suspicions that LERO personnel have not been trained to acceptable standards of competence. Thus any mistakes made by individual LERO personnel Will confirm the ex-isting presupposition that LERO as a whole is incompetent to manag'e an emergency. Q. Are there any other reasons why LILCO.will not be perceived as a credible source of information and direction
- during a Shoreham emergency?
A. Yes. As we just discussed, when an organization or an individual acts in an emergency, the nature of the actions will be interpreted in light of previous opinions about the or-ganization or person. However, as an actual emergency develops, LILCO is likely to lose credibility even further. Since while the plant is operating it will be LILCO's job to assure safe operation of the plant, any accident that occurs will be interpreted by the public as both a breach of faith and evidence of LILCO's incompetence. Public perception of LILCO's absence of credibility and competence will be extremely salient from the onset of any emergency at Shorehamt that is,.when news of the accidsnt breaks, it will be uppermost in people's minds that LILCO failed to ensure public safety. Previous statements S 9
by LILCO about the plant's safety will be perceived to have been proven untrue. Thus, at ihat moment more than at any other time, mistrust of LILCO and skepticism about LILCO's com-potence are likely to be high. As a result, LILCO's already low credibility will spiral downward once an accident happens, becadse much of the public will link the emergency to some error committed by LILCO. In the event of a Shoreham accident, under the LILCO Plan the very company that is viewed to have caused the emergency will be seeking to be believed and obeyed, by holding itself out as having the ability to lead the public out of the emer-gency. We believe that LILCO's efforts to control information will actually be perceived as further evidence of an effort by LILCO to avoid or deflect blame for the emergency in the first place. In summary, the public distrusts information provided by nuclear utilities. Beyond this, LILCO's credibility on Long Island is low and is exacerbated by the public perception of both potential conflicts of interest involved in the LILCO Plan I and LILCO management incompetence. For all these reasons, we believe that the public will not view LILCO as a credible source of information or' direction during a shoreham emergency. i l -=
Q. How does LILCO's lack of credibility, as discussed in Contention 15, relate to the issues you have discussed with respect to Contention 117 A. For many of the reasons discussed in connection with Contention 11, LILCO's preexisting lack of credibility will be substantially increased if LILCO were to attempt to implement its proposed emergency plan. LILCO's lack of credibility will cause the public to question the accuracy and adequacy of notice that an emergency exists, to doubt that the full dimensions of the emergency are being conveyed to them in a manner that accurately discloses the true nature of the emergency, and to question the propri-ety, accuracy and adequacy of the protective actions recom-mended by LILCO. The public would have an understandable basis for such distrust because, as discussed above, the LILCO em-l i i playees who are in command and control and are the source of l information provided to the public, will lack objectivity and will experience substantial conflicts of interest. This public perception is evidenced in the school related resolutions discussed above and included in Attachment 6. 4 1 w w = v y V --w?wn "c'
The public similarly is likely to disbelieve statements made by officers and employees of the company that is responsi-ble for the emergency, and will not believe that those employ-ees are acting in the best interests of the public's health and safety rather than LILCO's own corporate welfare. Thus, infor-mati[n provided by LILCO employees prior to or during an emer-gency would be ignored by many people, and in any event, is likely to be interpreted in a variety of ways not anticipated ,or intended by LILCO. Thus, reassurances that no real danger exists, that danger is minimal, or that p' articular actions will protect, would be viewed skeptically and could increase some-people's fears that the situation was serious and that LILCO was covering it up. Q. Please state subpart A of Contention 15. A. That subpart reads as follows: Contention 15.A. LILCO employees are assigned the responsibility of command and control over the personnel in the support organizations. relied upon in the Plan for emergency response services (ARC, DOE-RAP, ambulance, fire, rescue organizations, local law enforcement agencies, and the U.S. Coast Guard). (OPIP 2.1.1; Plan at 2.2-1, 2.2-2, 2 2-4, 4.2-1). Intervenors allege that such individuals will share the public perception that LILCO is not a cred-ible source of information. Therefore, it ,is likely that orders from the LILCO em-ployees in command and control will not be I obeyed by the non-LILCO emergency workers relied upon in the Plan. Accordingly, there is no assurance G.it the portions of the LILCO Plan involving participation of non-LILCO personnel can or will be imple-mented, and there can be no finding of com-pliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1). The likelihood that non-LILCO workers will not obey LILCO command and control orders means that the following aspects of the LILCO Plan cannot and will not be imple-mented: (1) Offsite accident and dose assess-ment and projection, and recommendations to the LILCO Director of LERO as to what particular protective actions should be recommended to the public, resulting in noncompliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(9), 50.47(b)(10), 50.47(c)(2) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.I, J.9 and J.10. (2) The protective action of evacua-tion resulting in noncompliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10. (3) Staffing of relocation centers, and the provision of necessary sdrvices for evacuees, resulting in noncompliance with lO-CFR Sections 50.47(b)(8), 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.10 and II.J.12. Q. Do you agree with Contention 15.A? A. Yes we do. The lack of objectivity and credibility of the LILCO personnel in command and control positions is likely to result in noncompliance or at least questioning of directives from LILCO employees by those non-LILCO personnel who are r,elied upon for actions necessary to implement the 6 9 n -a ~ u- - -- -r--
....._~ I i LILCO Plan. Assuming that such persons are in fact going to be available to LILCO,16/ individuals affiliated with schools, am-i bulance companies, hospitals, nursing, homes, bus companies, the American Red Cross; the Department of Energy; the U.S. Coast Guard, fire and rescue organizations, and other emergency per-sonnil will in many cases question, doubt, and not believe directives from LILCO employees in command and control for the same reasons as the public. Indeed; most of those non-LILCO personnel will themselves have had more emergency response or other experience pertinent to the actions' required cf them by LILCO than will the LILCO employees who will attempt to i " direct" them. Accordingly, the non-LILCO response personnel ) are even more likely than the public to follow their own proce-dures or beliefs as to the best course of action in an emer-gency rather than to obey a LILCO command. In addition, non-LILCO personnel are likely to search for confirming information or directives from more credible sources orfromsourebswithWhomtheyareaccustomedtodealingbefore they follow orders from'LILCO employees. This will result, at a minimum, in delay and loss of time in initiating or l 16/'b See Suffolk County Testimony on Contention 25 for some ex-planations of Why such individuals are unlikely to be avai,lable to implement the LILCO Plan. 49 - w .--,,n y,., r,,m., ,.,_.y -..,,,_-.r w%, ,m,.,.,e....,-..,._,y.,,,_,-y m,
implementing a response to the emergency. In any event, the perception of LILCO by persons'in non-LILCO organizations is likely to result in such persons failing to follow orders given to them by the LILCO personnel in command and control posi-tions. A Q. Please explain. A. The effective exercise of command and control -- that , is, for there to be compliance and obedience to commands -- requires that those being commanded view the source of their orders as legitimate. The concept of " legitimacy" is closely related to and indeed is part of credibility. Particularly in the emergency context, authority must be viewed as legitimate if compliance is to be secured swiftly and throughout the af-fected area. The legitimacy of authority is a major component of the credibility of those Who make decisions and issue orders. Q. What do you mean by the " legitimacy" of authority? A. Social scientists generally agree that those who ex-ercise authority possess legitimacy by virtue of either holding public office, or because of their skill, knowledge and compe-tence.ll/ The LILCO employees designated to command and 12/ See Talcott Parsons, ed., Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York Free Press, 1947), pages 56-57. r,, - -, -, - -+ g,, e,-r-,-m.v-e- -r,,,,,- ~,ma-,---~ n-em---, -.we,~---n-n, w v.
o control the offsite response to a shoreham emergency meet nei-ther of these standards. They'have not been elected to their positions by the public and themselves hold no public office. And, based upon their LILCO job titles and information obtained by suffolk County during discovery, they lack the technical compitence, knowledge and skill possessed by police, fire fighters and other trained governmental emergency service per-sonnel, Whose regular course of employment routinely includes exercising command and control functions during community emergencies. See suffolk County Testimony on Training. In the event of a Shoreham accident, the community is un-likely to accept LILCO as the entity in charge of the emergency response. LILCO will be viewed as the perpetrator of the emer-gency, with vested institutional interests, and will have lit-l tle community acceptance, and correspondingly low credibility l in the role of directing and controlling the response and protecting the public safety. LILCO's legitimacy and credibil-itywillbefbrtherreducedbecauseitwillbeoperatinginde-pendently and without tf.e cooperation or involvement of a gov-ernmental entity Which is viewed as a legitimate authority. l Responding to an emergency affecting a community, particu-larly a radiological emergency, fundamentally requires the use 51 - -e-., ,s -n e-. ---,..v ---,,,.,,..~--,e-,.e,,--,,,,.,.- ,.-,.,,,n-.>,,,._,-n.,
i of authority in the command and control of movements of population segments to areas of safety. Government is the only entity in our society that regularly exercises authority in matters of public safety. Only government ' officials, typi-cally, can get people out of their homes, order people about, commind priority service, and so on. The exercise of authority means not only issuing sensible orders, but also being able to have confidence that those orders will be accepted. They will not be accepted unless the entity which issues them has been granted the authority to do so and/or is perceived as legiti-mate and credible by the public and members of organizations which are expected to follow orders. That will not be the case for LILCO. Q. Are there any other reasons that LILCO's lack of credibility or legitimacy will lead non-LILCO organization members not to obey LILCO command and control directives? 2 A. Yes. The LILCO employees designated to act as con-tact poin's for non-LILCO organizations responsible'for re-t laying command and control directives, recommendations, and information, generally have no established relationships with the organizations or individuals they are assigned to "coordi-nate," nor do they appear to have prior experience or knowledge 9 cm..,, m.. 4 -.._y- .,,.m.
pertinent to the fields or concerns of such organizations and individuals. As a result, the'non-LILCO authorities, such as school and health care facility administrators and law enforce-ment agencies, are not likely to perceive the LILCO employees as a credible source of directives or information relating to the particular field of expertise or concern in Which the non-LILCO authority regularly operates. Thus, the general lack of credibility assigned to LILCO as an organization will be ex-acerbated by the lack of particularized experience and knowledge likely to be evidenced by individual LILCO coordinators. I Q. Please explain. A. Discussion of some specific examples will be helpful. First, according to OPIP 2.1.1, the three LILCO employees des-ignated to fill the position of " Health Facilities Coordinator" are the LILCO Marketing Planning Program Coordinator, the LILCO j Commercial Industrial Service Representative, and a LILCO Project Coordinator.18/ (OPIP 2.1.1.at 42) The Health 18/ According to the computer printout of LERO workers dated October 27, 1983, Which was provided by LILCO to Suffolk County during discovery, all three of.these individuals are from the Marketing Department. To.date, however, LILCO'has not yet been able to respond in detail to a County inquiry as Whether these previously identified LILCO employees are still with the Company following its termination of over 800 members of its work force. -- 5 3 -
4 ~ Facilities Coordinator is assigned the following responsibilities in the LILCO Plant (a) Acting as a point of contact with the local hospital, nursing homes, and other inpatient health care facilities providing information/ recommendations as appropriate. (b) Coordinating the evacuation of the health care facilities, resolving transpor-tation difficulties through close coordination with other LERO coordinators and the health care operators. (c) Providing status reports to the Spe-cial Facilities Evacuation Coordinator. OPIP 2.1.1 at 42. Thus, these three LILCO employees are ex-pected to deal with administrators and others in charge of med-ical facilities in connection with the implementation by'those facilities of a LILCO directive.to evacuate their patients. It does not appear from their LILCO job titles that any of the three. individuals assigned to be the Health Facilities Coordinator normally has anything to do with hospitals, nursing i homes, their administrators, or the needs, concerns or problems likely to be on the minds of such administrators when contemplating an evacuation of all their patients. Suffolk l County was able.to depose the LILCO Marketing Planning Program Coordinator who is one of the gentlemen designated to be the Health Facilities Coordinator. I l i I
This deposition testimony confirms that he has virtually i no relevant experience likely to create in health care professionals confidence or trust in his advice concerning evacuation of ill patients.19/ As of September 1982, Mr. Big-gers had worked in the LILCO Marketing Department for 19 months. Previously, he had been a sales manager for Gillette Company, held various management positions with Hertz Corpora-tion, and held the position of customer service supervisor for Allstate. One of his major projects for LILCO involved the de-velopment of a marketing strategy for bringing the heat pump into use in Long Island. (Biggers Deposition, at 4-8.) At the 4 time of his deposition, Mr. Biggers had attended "six or seven" of the six classroom training sessions assigned to his LERO po-cition. (Id,., at 23). However, he did not know what health facilities he was expected to " coordinate" in his LERO job. (Id., at 27). He had never had any contact with any hospitals, nursing homes, or adult homes in the EPZ, or with ambulance companies or rescue squads. (Id., at 51-53) He had never received accredited first aid' instruction other than a Red Cross course in swimming in the 1970s. (Id., at 60). Clearly he has no relationships or experience that would enable him to 19/ See Deposition of James V. Biggers, September 22, 1983 (hereinafter, "Biggers Deposition").
speak authoritatively or knowledgeably about the problems or concerns likely to arise in connection with an evacuation of medical facilities. Similarly, the persons designated to fill the position of Public Schools Coordinator are'the LILCO Administrator -- Ad-mini tration Services, the LILCO Administrator -- Economics Re-search, a LILCO Department Manager -- Transportation, a LILCO Consumer Service Representative, a LILCO Engineer, and a LILCO Commercial and Industrial Representative. OPIP 2.1.1 at 40. The duties of the Public Schools Coordinator include: (a) Acting as a point of contact with the local public school district authorities, providing information/ relaying LERO recom-mendations as appropriate. (b) Coordinating the evacuation of public schools, resolving transportation difficulties through close coordination with other LERO coordinators and school district officials. OPIP 2.1.1 at 40. Suffolk County deposed Ronald Brady, a Con-sumer Service' Representative, who is assigned the position of Public Schools Coordinator.20/ He lives in Wantagh, Nassau County and works in Mineola. (Brady Deposition at 8, 9). He 20/ See Deposition of Ronald Brady, September 22, 1983 (here-inafter, "Brady Deposition"). 56 - O m--- ,-_e y-
stated in his deposition that he knew "nothing, really" about the public schools in the EPZ,'that he had had no contact with the schools, and no. contact with superintendents, school boards, or bus companies. (Ld., at 24, 44,.45). It does not appear that Mr. Brady; or; based on their LILCO job titles, any of the other individuals designated to be Public Schools Coordinator, have developed relationships or experience that would enable them to speak authoritatively or knowledgeably about the problems or concerns likely to arise in connection with the evacuation of public schools. A LILCO Systems Designer in the Information Systems Department, an Administrator Assistant to the Controller, and the LILCO Corrosion Operations and Instrumentation Supervisor, are similarly unlikely to have developed relationships or expe-rience relevant to their acting as a credible or knowledgeable point of contact for local law enforcement agencies, and fire and rescue agencies,.as they are expectedJto do in filling the l position of Pbblic Services Liaison. See OPIP 2.1.1 at 10. Generally; inter-agency relationships of the type required under the LILCO Plan may be thought of as created, negotiated and cemented by boundary personnel. In lay terms, boundary personnel are individuals who have developed relationships of. ,~
trust, understanding, and respect with each other and each other's organizations. The employees designated in the LILCO Plan to be liaison or coordinators with necessary non-LILCO entities do not possess by virtue of previous experience the necessary background of boundary personnel. Q. How does LILCO's failure and inability to develop boundary personnel relate to LILCO's lack of credibility and its ability to implement its Plan? A. LILCO's Plan depends upon cooperation of a wide range of public institutions such as hospitals, schools and fire departments. To achieve such cooperation, governments and spe-cialized agencies normally draw upon ongoing relationships with each other -- relationships nego'tiated by boundary personnel through regular interaction on a variety of matters. They depend upon the shared assumptions that each party in these re-lationships has the right to call upon the other's coorperation., A private utility has no such right except perhape.in its specialized functional areas, such as supplying electric power. A private company such as LILCO cannot assume the cooperation of public agencies or other private entities, particularly when the company (here LILCO) seeks to assert itself by exercising authority and-providing necessary l - I
'information and advice in areas that involve the relatively exclusive territory and expertise of others. And, LILCO's pro-posal to rely on employees who have no prior contact with, or experience relevant to such specialized entities will merely exacerbate the credibility gap. Thus one might expect discus-t sions of LILCO employees with hospitals and other health care facilities on emergency health procedures, and with schools on matters of childrens' safety, to be fractious and problematic. This is not to say that it is impossible to imagine the LILCO employees successfully dealing with the pertinent non-LILCO authorities. It is to say that the LILCO Plan fails (1) to recognize the need for, and the difficulties involved in establishing cooperative relations with ancillary institutions, and (2) to provide for the resolution of such difficulties. Without established relationships of trust and confidence, there can be no assurance that the schools, health care facilities and other non-LILCO organizations relied upon by LILCO will follow LILCO's command and control directives. Moreover, LILCO has already demonstrated boundary organi-zation relationship difficulties. For example, officials from several school districts, health care facilities, and the Suffolk County Police Department have stated that they believe .. ~.
~ the LILCO Plan is unrealistic and unworkable with respect to their areas of concern and expertise. Q. In your opinion, does LILCO's proposal to assign th'e command and control role of Radiation Health Coordinator to a LILCO contractor eliminate the' problems you have identified and discussed, in connection with Contentions 11 and 15, as arising from LILCO's status as a private corporation with low credibil-ity? A. No. The use of such a contractor would not only not avoid problems associatad with.3uthority, legitimacy, conflict of interests and credibility, but such a contract relationship would actually compound those problems. The " Radiation Health Coordinator" would be directly dependent upon LILCO for the contract, and for its future renewal, and, thereby, would possess a set of interests in appealing to and meeting LILCO interests in conflict with tha public's interest. Thus, to l that extent, the contractor would also lack legitimacy a,nd r credibility in the eyes of the public. Attempts by the con-i tractor to exercise command and control would be as ineffective as attempts by LILCO. Q. Please state subpart B of Contention 15. 9 60 - S e -w-n- y gm 9a yw -- mg -a -3 y-,-m-7,--.- - -- ---m--+,.--e-- 3 ..y-. . - - - - --e w- -ee- + - e-i w m-* e.%.--
A. That subpart reads as follows: Contention 15.B. A protective action recommendation of sheltering could not or would not be implemented. Based on a survey of Long Island residents, a substantial number of the people advised to shelter will choose to evacuate instead as a result of their lack of trust in LILCO's interest or_ ability to properly and objec-tively determine and recommend actions that are in the best interests of the public. Thus, the protective action of sheltering could not and would not be implemented in violation of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections l-II.J.9. and J.10. The views we have stated above support the foregoing statement, but we have a few additional particular concerns. l We believe that people will not follow a LILCO recommendation to shelter because people will not believe or trust LILCO. (Saegert) In addition, people will not believe that their homes provide adequate protection from radiation despite a LILCO recommendation that they shelter in their homes. The information that an emergency of any kind exists will activate ( their fears, and suspicions of LILCO-will prevent them from accepting advice from LILCO.that goes against_their own judg-ment of the best course of action to follow. The Social Data Analyst and other surveys discussed in the County's and LILCO's testimony on Contention 23 reveal that evacuation is the - l
preferred public response in an emergency, even when it is not recommended for a specific population. When a discrepancy exists between the position of the public and the source of information, people will lower their assessment of the source's credibility rather than change'their position.31/ People will redu[etheconflictbetweentheirviewandLILCO'sviewof j radiological hazards and emergency management by lowering their assessment of LILCO's credibility. The behavior of TMI area . residents during the radiological emergency there, further supports this position.32/ See also discussion in Contention 23 regarding the evacuation shadow phenomenon for further data as'to why a sheltering recommendation would not be implemented. l 21/
- Aronson, E.,
Turner, J. & Carlsmith, J.M., " Communication Credibility and Communication Discrepancy as Determinants ~~' of Opinion Change," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psy-chology, 1963, 67, 31-36. 22/ Goldhaber, M.K., Lehman, J.E.l " Crisis Evacuation During ~~" The Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident," The TMI Popula-tion Registry, Paper for the Annual meeting of the American Public Health Association, N vember 16, 1982; o
- Flynn, C.B.,
"Three Mile Island Telephone Survey: Prelim-l inary Report on Procedures and Findings," prepared for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., 1979;
- Houts, P.S.,
Health Related Behavioral Impact of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Incident, Part II, Report, submitted to I the TMI Advisory Panel on Health Related Studies of the Pennsylvania Department of Health, November 21, 1980.. O
Q. Please state subpart C of Contention 15. A. That subpart reads as follows: Contention 15.C. The LILCO Plan provides for early dismissal, sheltering or evacuation / relocation of students in schools within or near the EPZ, depending on the nature and circumstances of an accident at Shoreham. If protective actions are recommended for the public in the EPZ, schools outside the EPZ having children who reside in the EPZ are expected to retain such children at the schools after the end of the school day. (See Ap-pendix A, at II-19 through 20).
- However, under the LILCO Plan, the decis' ion to implement an early dismissal or to shelter, evacuate, relocate or retain students rests with the schools.
(See Appendix A, at II-19). The recommendation to dismiss early or to implement any other protective actions will be made, by LILCO, over the EBS radio (Plan at 3.3-4 through 3.6-6; Ap-pendix A at II-19). The school authorities, being members of the public, are likely to share the perception that LILCO is not a credible source of infor-mation. Therefore,.they may not believe, or follow, the information or recommenda-tions provided to them by LILCO. As a result, there is no assurance that any pro-tective actions for school children (including sheltering, evacuation, reloca-l tion, retaining children after. school l hours, or early dismissal to permit shel-tering or evacuation with parents) can or will be implemented, and there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) or 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10. l l Q. ,Do you agree with subpart C7-D 63 - s
T A. Yes we do. For the reasons we have discussed above with respect to Contention 15 in general and subpart A, we b,elieve there is no assurance that LILCO's recommendations regarding protective actions for schools wi'll be followed by school authorities. Our opinion is also based on the official state'ents by many of the school districts having children in m or near the EPZ. See Attachment 7. Q. Please state subpart D of Contention 15. A. That subpart reads: Contention 15.D. Assuming that the traff'ic control measures specified in the LILCO Plan are not prohibited by law (see Contentions 1-4), LILCO's traffic guides will be disobeyed by motorists, as a result of LILCO's lack of credibility. Similarly, LILCO personnel assigned to perform securi-ty functions under the LILCO Plan (i.e., i performing law enforcement functions at the EOC, relocation centers, and at the EPZ perimeter), again assuming they are not prohibited from performing such functions, are unlikely to be trusted or obeyed by the public result of LILCO's lack of credibili-ty. In addition, since the emergency will i emanate from an incident at LILCO's own fa-l cility, the public will be likely to hold LILCO and its personnel responsible for the emergency, which will cause LILCO's employ-ees to be viewed with hostility and suspi-cion, and will increase the likelihood that orders from LILCO employees will be ignored or disobeyed. As a result, there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E Section IV.A. and NUREG 0654
- Section II.J.8 and Appendix 4, because l
1. l l l /*m-
LILCO's evacuation time estimates are unrealistically low (being based on the as-sumption that all evacuees will follow the evacuation routes and instructions pre-scribed by LILCO). The Plan also fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10 because there is no assurance that the protective action of evacuation can or will be implemented or that there will be adequate security during an emergency. In l addition, the lack of effectiv'e perimeter control will result in persons' entering the EPZ, and being exposed to radiation, and impeding evacuation from the EPZ. Q. Do you agree with subpart D? A. Yes we do. The public will not obey the LILCO employ-ees designated to act as traffic guides and security personnel assigned to perform security functions at various locations such as the EPZ perimeter and relocation centers, for several reasons related to LILCO's lack of credibility. First, since LILCO's credibility is low, LILCO traffic guides and security personnel will not be respected or believed because perceptions about LILCO will be transferred to LILCO employees. l Second, the public.'s distrust of, and refusal to obey, LILCO employees will be increased and reinforced by the inabil-ity of these LILCO employees to provide during an emergency helpful or meaningful information about the status or danger involved in the emergency. Although the individual field 1 !
workers will be affiliated with LILCO, to which the public will assign responsibility or blame'for the occurrence of the emer-g.ency, the LILCO field personnel will have no detailed knowledge of what is happening at the plant or elsewhere. Moreover, even if they had such knowledge, presumably they would'not provide it to members of the public, given the re-quirement in the LILCO Plan that all information provided to the public must be reviewed by several command and control per-sonnel and issued only by the Public Information Coordinator. See Plan at 3.8-4. The inability of LILCO's field workers to respond to questions from motorists or other members of the public will increase the distrust and uncooperativeness with which those workers will be met. Finally, LILCO'.: field workers assigned to perform the traffic control and security functions that are normally performed by public servants such as police officers, will not be obeyed, and will be viewed with hostility and suspicion be-cause LILCO employees assigned to emergency response work are not subject to three fundamental background characteristics of public safety organizations that normally contribute to public confidence. We believe that the absence of these fundamental characteristics will influence public perceptions of LILCO's public safety personnel, and will contribute to significant O - ~ -. ~
o distrust of LILCO personnel who are assigned to perform public safety functions. First, recruits.ent of such individuals normally takes place in a competitive, merit-oriented system based as much as possible on criteria appropriate to the roles recruits'will play in public life. In public safety work, effort is made to recruit people who provide evidence of a commitment to public service and the specific occupations for which they have ap-plied. In addition, a period of probation,.both during training and on-the-job, allows for observation of the candi-date in realistic circumstance and permits supervisors to weed out those unfit for the specific service. Because these aspects of recruitment are missing, and will be known by the public to be missing with respect to the LILCO employees assigned security and traffic control functions, the normal public confidence that public service employees are com-mitted~to the work, that they perceive themselves and are per-ceived by.others to be entering a lifetime career, and that they will perform difficult and sometimes dangerous tasks be-r cause they fully appreciate the nature of the commitment, will not exist with respect to the LILCO traffic guides and security L l personnel. In our view, this will contribute to the distrust j ~ l I' , I-l
~ o with Which these LILCO workers will be viewed, and will increase the likelihood that their directives will not be followed by the public. Second, a critical fact of public service work (indeed, perhaps all work), is that there are considerable discrepancies betwe n What one learns in school or in the academy about the work structure, and the job itself. The job itself is the real teacher. On the job, new recruits learn the limits of theory . when confronted with real situations, and techniques to handle responsibilities, routines to help them process the work expe-ditiously, and emotional survival skills that allow them to re-solve t*, psychological contradictions in their jobs.23/ The requirements of apprenticeships and on-the-job training are di-rectly related to public confidence that public service employ-ees will be able to handle complex, stressful, difficult and ambiguous situations skillfully and judiciously, and results in their being afforded respect and obedience. In the case of LILCO traffic guides and security person-nel, however, the public will know that they are LILCO employ-ees Who have been trained to perform jobs relating to the ~~/ These matters will be discussed in detail in the Suffolk 23 County Testimony on Training. 68 - S -,,,--y-, e-., e --e
production and provision of electricity, rather than.the public service jobs they have been assigned in the Plan. The confi-dence and resulting. grant of credibility which can come from the public's knowledge about extensive on-the-job training, will thus be missing with respect to those LILCO workers and will: contribute to the likelihood that their directives will not be followed by the public. Third, LILCO's proposal to use LILCO employees as traffic' guides and security personnel lacks the potential for regular feedback and self-correction that is. intrinsic to governmental bureaucracies, and that (a) helps to maintain workers' account. ability, and (b) provides opportunities for citizens to re-gister opinions and complaints and thereby insure that public service workers remain accountable to citizens' interests. The public will know that LILCO personnel assigned to traffic and public safety duties have not had the benefit of supervisory guidance during training and probationary employment in those 1 jobs, and hav'e not been subject to regular criticism and ac-countability mechanisms'that help to insure reliability among l l public safety personnel. And, since LILCO employees are with-out experience in the field in their public safety roles, the public will know that they have never been subject to citizen interactions'and feedback, nor have they ever been held f -
l a accountable to supervisors through citizen comments and complaints, concerning their performance in those roles. Hence, LILCO traffic and public safety personnel will not be credible sources of information and directives, particularly where complex, split-second judgments may be required, and wheri citizen compliance is most essential. Q. Please state Subpart E of Contention 15. A. That subpart states: Contention 15.E. The sample messages for EBS broadcasting which are contained in the Plan (OPIP 3'.8.2) identify a LILCO employee (Director of LERO) as the source of the information and the protective action ree-ommendation. Since the public does not consider LILCO to be a credible source of information or advice, instructions from a LILCO employee will not be obeyed. There-fore, these messages will not accomplish their intended purpose of providing clear instruction to the public and there is no compliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5) and NUREG 0654 Sections E.5, E.6 and E.7. Q. Do you agree with Subpart E7 A. Yes we do. The sample EBS messages included in the LILCO Plan contain the following statement preceding protective action recommendations: The Director of Local Response for ,emergencice for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, (name), has consulted with (names,. 9 w ~ m ,r w
s titles) scientists, LILCO officials, nuclear engineers, and officials from public agencies and has recommended the following public action.- .OPIP 3.8.2 at 13-26. Assuming the public knows, based on LILCO's public information program, that the " Director of Local Response" and Messrs. Acker, Wofford and Procelli are LILCO em-ployees, the instructions or advice c'ontained in the EBS mes-sage will not be believed, trusted or obeyed for the reasons we describe at length above. As we have noted, LILCO's witnesses, in previously sub-mitted testimony,' have stated that~to be effective, a warning message, or one containing protective action recommendations, must be from a credible source. We agree. LILCO's EBS mes-sages do not meet that requirement, since the identified source of recommendations is a LILCO officer. Moreover, the inclusion in LILCO's proposed EBS messages of the statement that the LERO Director "has consulted with" other individuals inclu, ding LILCO officials, nuclear engineers, and scientists, does not increase the likelihood that they will be believed or followed by the public. First, despite such supposed " consultation," the source of the recommendation remains a LILCO official'. Second, LILCO officials and nuclear 9
engineers will be perceived as being just as biased, untrustworthy, and not credible on the subject of a nuclear emergency at Shoreham as the LERO Director. O. Please state Subpart F of Contention 15. .A. Subpart F reads as follows: Contention 15.F. LILCO's proposed rumor control point is to be manned by LILCO em-ployees. (Plan, at 3 8-5). This rumor control effort will be ineffective and will fail to comply with NUREG 0654, Section II.G.4.c, because it relies on LILCO -- a non-credible source of information -- as the authoritative source for squelching, explaining or otherwise controlling rumors. Rumors cannot be effectively controlled if the source of control is itself not credi-ble. Thus, the LILCO Plan does not comply with NUREG 0654, Section II.G.4.c and 10 ~ CFR Sections 50.47(b)(5) and 50.47(b)(7). Q. Do you agree with Subpart F7 A. Yes we do. The LILCO Plan provisions relating to rumor control are the following: + . Correcting Misinformation The Emergency News Center (ENC) will be the central location for rumor control. The public will contact the LILCO Customer Relations District Offices and the LILCO Customer Call Boards for information con-cerning the emergency response. LILCO per-sonnel at these locations will be provided with~ updated press releases. If they can-enot answer the inquiry they will call the. O e --w-- e r y .,.e3-- ,,-y,- -a,,-, ,,m--m--,,,-m--- v.--sri---- w
- e-=--ve w w w w-w--
w +- ---
ENC where a coordinated rumor control point will be manned by representatives from LERO and the Utility. Public Information and Rumor Control Procedures provide details of the emergency function of the CPI (See Pro-cedure 3.8.1-Public Information). Plan at 3.8-5. OPIP 3.8.1 referenced in the Plan provides, in pertinent part, that the LILCO Coordinator of Public Infor-mation is expected to: c. Confer with the Director of Local Response and the Public Information Staff at the ENC on a regular basis to maintain consistent information content. d. Prepare and disseminate press releases as appropriate. Assign personnel to monitor media and radio e. broadcasts for incorrect information. f. Control misinformation by providing current information for LILCO Rumor Control person-nel and answering any questions regarding local response. and that the Public Information Support Staff is to: b. [S]upply the Coordinator of Public Infor-mation with information as the incident + develops. f. Supply the Rumor Control Staff with the most correct information available. OPIP 3.8.1, Sections 5.1.2 and 5.2.2. -,-.----e,_-- -..m-w --n+-n,, ,,-.,,,a -,.-,,.,,-,-,,v, .w- ..-,..-,.-.m-,,,.,
The rumor control effort proposed by LILCO will be inef-fective for several reasons reiated to LILCO's lack of credi-bility. First; it is unreasonable to suggest that the public will, as predicted by LILCO; " contact the LILCO Customer Relations District Offices and the LILCO Customer Call Boards for l'nformation concerning the emergency response," or that the public or the media will utilize LILCO's " Rumor Control system" as an authoritative source of information. The perception of ,LILCO as not credible, not objective, and not trustworthy in discussing the extent, danger, or effect of a nuclear accident at Shoreham will cause the public and the media to seek sources of information other than LILCO. Thus, the basic premise upon which LILCO's rumor control proposal rests is erroneous. (Purcell, Saegert) The events during the TMI accident provide evidence of this fact. At TMI reporters turned to sources other than Met Ed because they viewed the utility as evasive, and not to be trusted.31/ Many journalists interviewed after TMI expressed the opinion that utility personnel generally cannot be trusted to report on utility-related problems.25/ l 24/
- Rogovin, M.
& Frampton, Jr., G.T., "Three Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public," Vol. III, r l part,3, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Special Ingdiry L Group, 1980; 1057-1070. l 25/
- Rubin, D.,
"The Public's Right to Know: The Accident at Three Mile Island," In D.L. Sills. C.P. Wolf & U.B. (Footnote cont'd next page)
(All) Second, even if the public or the media were to con-tact the LILCO " Rumor Control" organization, the LILCO employ-ees designated to fill the positions of Public Information Coordinator and Public'Information Staff will not be capable of overcoming the serious LILCO credibility problem so as.to en-able.them to squelch, explain, or otherwise control rumors. t Under the LILCO Plan, the primary " Coordinator of Public Infor-mation" is the LILCO District Manager for Customer Relations. The alternates are the LILCO Supervisor of Regulatory Require-ments from the Economic Research Department, and the LILCO Resource Management Administrator from the Corporate Management Department. OPIP 2.1.1 at 69, 69a. The Public Information l l Support Staff is comprised of a Rate Analyst, a Regulatory Ana-I lyst, a Cost Analyst and a Marginal. Cost Analyst Coordinator from LILCO's Economic Research Department, an Employee Relations Representative and an Employee Relations Assistant from LILCO's_ Employee Relations Department. None of these individuals is likely to have any experience or knowledge con-l cerning (1) the response to, or facts involving, a radiological emergency, (2) dealing with frightened, panicked or confused (Footnote cont'd from. previous page) l Shelarski (Eds.), Accident at Three Mile Island: The l Human Dimensicns, Boulder, Colorado, 1982. I l L
e members of the public, or (3) dealing with the media. There is no reason to believe that they'would have any particular compe-tence or abilities that could enable them to overcome the general perception that LILCO is not a credible or' objective source of accurate information.during a Shoreham accident. (Saegert) Third, under the LILCO Plan, the Rumor Control personnel (who are never identified), the Public Information Support Staff, and the LILCO personnel at the Customer Call Boards and Customer Relations District Office are severely lim-ited in what they are permitted to say in response to inquiries. They are allowed only to repeat press statements that have already been released to the press. Of course, those very releases will presumably have given rise to the inquiries in the first place, particularly those inquiries from the media. Thus, LILCO's proposed rumor control will actually have no content aside from information already in the public domain. This fact will contribute to the perception that LILCO is being secretive and' evasive, thus reducing even further LILCO's cred-ibility. Fourth, if any additional information is to be released to the public or the media, under the LILCO Plan such a release involves a complicated series of consultations and approvals, 4 e m .3-p...-y-- p -w,&-aT- -.,f-..* -p y,--- y-,wyw
necessitated, at least in part, by the fact that the. persons who are to release the information will have no first hand knowledge of events. See OPIP 3.8.1. Perceived hesitation in responding to inquiries, or perceived ignorance about relevant facts, will further reduce the likelihood that LILCO's. rumor control efforts will be viewed as credible or effective. At TMI, delays in distributing information were interpreted as withholding information by the utility, and detracted further from the utility's credibility.21/ Finally, LILCO's proposals that it alone will control the flow of information during an emergency and its expectation that any contrary information can be identified or corrected by LILCO personnel assigned to monitor media and radio broadcasts for " incorrect" information, are unrealistic. There is no in-dication in the Plan nor is there any basis in actual experi-ence for assuming that LILCO personnel could control the flow or content of information to the media or to the public in tha event of a Sh'oreham emergency. Indeed, LILCO's attempts to control the range, flow, and content'of information are likely to exacerbate the media's perception that information released by LILCO is self-interested, biased, and not credible. 26/ Rogovin (1980); Rubin (1982).
o (All) For all these reasons, we believe LILCO's attempts at rumor control will be ineffective. Indeed, because people would not believe the information provided by LILCO, they would seek other sources of information. Thus, the conflict between LILCO's efforts to control all information and the public's distrust of LILCO would lead to an increased proliferation of rumors. Q. Please state Subpart G of Contention 15. A. Subpart G reads as follows: Contention 15.G. LILCO proposes to conduct all public education activities designed to inform the public about Shoreham and about actions to be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency. (See Plan at 3.8-1 through 3.8.4). LILCO's lack of credibili-ty renders LILCO incapable of effectively educating the public on these matters. The public will likely disbelieve, disregard or discount purported educational materials regarding preparations for a radiological emergency at shoreham, if such materials are received from and/or prepared by LILCO. Thus, the LILCO Plan cannot and does not comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(7) or 'NUREG 0654, Se'ctions II.G.1 and 2. Q. Do you agree with Subpart G? j A. Yes. As noted above, if the public does not trust the source of information, the information fron.that source will be largely d,isregarded. When a source'is seen as not just" 78 - 9 v-w w . m w y, .-.----g n-,- e, -,w -,.-.---,.w-my-,,,-, ---w w , - =., -, - --y r-i- ..y +e.
unbelievable but also as having an interest in denying or understating the extent or sighificance of a risk, information from that source will be distrusted even more. (Saegert) The public will not only be unlikely to believe \\ public education information provided by LILCO, they will al-ternatively, or in addition, discard or disregard it. In i general, brochures tend not to be effective in developing emer-i gency preparedness.11/ Research on emergency preparedness in the Indian Point area has shown that the public tends to be al-most completely unaware of information presented in brochures. In the Indian Point study discussed above, more than one third of the persons sampled stated that they had not received the brochure that had been distributed by Con Ed. Of those who thought they had received it, approximately one third had not read it, and another twenty-two percent said they had only read "some of it."18/ When the source is viewed as not credible or likely to provide unreliable information as LILCO would be, the public will bh even more unlikely to read such material. Q. Does that conclude your testimony? A. Yes. 27/ Sims and Bauman, (1983). 28/ Altshuler.(1982). l i n
ATTACHMENT 1 Resume of Arthur H. Purcell I e I o. I r
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RESOURCE POLICY INSTITUTE TECHNICAL INFORMATION PROJECT, INC. 1346 CONNECTICUT AVENUE. NW 82U ' WASHINCTON, DC 20036 202 466 2954 ARTHUR H. PURCELL VITAE EDUCATION PhD, MS, Northwestern University, Technological Institute, Materials Science and Engineering, 1973, '72 BS, Cornell University, Engineering,1966 Certificate, Institute.for European Studies, Vienna,1965 CURRENT POSITIONS Executive Director, Resource Policy I~nstitute, Washington, DC,1982. The Institute is a non-profit research and education group speciali7 ng in resource d policy and technology issues. Director, and Founder, Technical Information Project, Inc. (TIP), Washington, DC, and Boulder, Colorado,1975. TIP, corporate parent of the Resource Policy Insti-tute is a non-profit policy and analysis group dealing with a broad range of tech-nical issues facing our society. These include toxic substance and hazardous waste management, alternative energy development, materials conservation and technology, and environmental impact assessment. Associate krofessorial Lecturer, School of' Engineering and Applied Sciences, Depart-ment of Civil, Mechanical, and Environmental Engineering, the George Washington Univ..1975. Teach graduate seminar on materials policy and technology. Past work has included a) designing, securing support for, and directing research in mater-ials conservation technology and b) teaching undergraduate engineering. Professorial Lecturer, Center for Technology and Administration, the American University,1980. Teach graduate seminar on Management and Conservation of Energy kuources. Independent Consulting Engineer. Recent clients have included the Economic Com-mission 'for Europe, Mellon Institute, and Naticnal Science Foundation, US Inform-ation Agency, 1974. PAST POSITIONS
- Senior Staff Member, President's Cc= mission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, 1979.
Ran one of the Comission's six investigative task forces. I
Deputy Director, Office of Science and Government, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1973-1974. Staff Intern, US Army Environmenta1 Office,1971. RELATED PROFESSIONAL AND CIVIC ACTIVITIES Founding Director, Global Water, Inc.,1982. Glo.bal Water is a non-profit organization dedicated to furthering US participation in the UN Decade on Water Chair (appointed) and Commissioner (publicly elected), Advisory' Neighborhood Commission, District of Columbia, 1981. Represent 10,000 District citizens in government liaison activities. Chair monthly public meetings. Responsible for all budgetary and personnel matters of Commission. Member, President's Commission on Scholars, 1977-1981. Member, President's Science Policy Task Force, 1976-77. Member, US Delegation, First UN Conference on Non-Waste Technology, Paris,1976 Review Panel Member, US Office of Technology Assessment,1977 PUBLICATIONS 92 Professional Papers, Monographs, and Books. Recent Book: The Waste Watchers (Doubleday/AnchorPress,1980). ' WORK REVIEWED OR CITED IN The Wilson Quarterly The Wharton Magazine ~ Newspapers and Media including New York Times, Baltimore Sun, Christian Science Monitor, National Public Radio, NBC News, United Press International, Associated Press Features, Newsday, Boulder Camera, Sedam Dana (Zagreb) I SEMINAR AND LECTURE PRESENTATIONS ( Colleges and Universities in U.S.: California (UCLA), Minnesota, Denver, Maryland, New Mexico, Cornell, Catholic, Georgetown, George Washington, American, Belmont f Abbey College, University of Pennsylvania, Glasboro State, Stockton State (NJ) Colleges and Universities Abroad: Technical University of Lisbon, University of Malta, University of Belgrad, University of Titograd Research and Government Agencies in U.S.: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, i Arizona State Energy Office, Springfield, Massachusetts / Lower Pioneer Valley I~ Regional Planning, Commission. US Environmental Protection Agency Research and Government Agencies Abroad: German Institute for Aeronautical Research (Koln), Dept of Industry (UK), Portugese Ministry of Finance, Portugese Ministry of Industry and Energy, Joint Group of Maltese Engineers (Valletta,- Malta'), Croation Republican Energy Committee (Zagreb, Yugoslavia). Krsko Nuclear Facility (Yugoslavia), Statenskarnkraftinspektion (Stockholm, Sweden) ?> ,~m-- -..,... - _. -.. - - -, - ~
RESEARCH ACTIVITIES (PARTIAL LISTING) Cooperative University Arrangements: George Washington University--Ferrous Metal. Scrap Reutilization (Designer and Director of Project, with funding secured from Natio.nal Science Foundation). University of Michigan--Materials Technology Trends (with Prof. Marc Ross, for the Mellon Institute Energy Produc-tivity Study) I'nde' pendent Arrangement: Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations / Geneva-- Development of In-depth Background Papers on Rational Utilization of Resources Topics for Use by the Senior Advisers, Environment and Human Settlements Program (on-going work in 1983) Resource Policy Institute / Technical Information Project, Inc. Arrangements: US Environmental Protection Agency--Development of Funding Program for, University-Level Training in Hazardous Waste Management; US Environmental Protection Agency-- Information Transfer to Public Sector on Hazardous and Non-tiazardous Waste Management; National Science Foundation--Impacts of Federal Withdrawl from Tech-nology-Based Programs; National Science Foundation--Information Flow and Ethics and Values in Toxic Substances Management; US Department of Energy--Appropriate Technology for Recycling; Department of State--International Business and Tech-nology Exchange; German Marshall Fund--International Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Waste Management PROFESSIONAL SOCIETY CONFERENCE AND OTHENPRESENTATIONS (PARTIIL LISTING) First UN Conference on Non-Waste Technology: Non-Waste Technology in' Steel-making (Invited Paper) . Fourth Oak Ridge National _ Laboratory Life Sciences Symposium: Setting Priori-ties in Hazardous Waste Management (Invited Paper) ~ First Engineering Foundation Confdrence on Accountability in Hazard,ous Wsste l Management: Invited Rapporteur First Recycling World Congress: Utilizatio'n of Secondary Rubber First European Ccmmunity Conference on Radioactive Waste Management: Observer Fourth Elmia'/Avfal Conference on Northern European Waste Management: Observer (Attendance at this and previously listed meeting supported by German Marshall FundAward) 98th Annual Meeting, American Association for the Advancment of Science: Sym-posium on Materials Achievements (Invited Symposium Arranger) US Congress: Senate and ' House Comerce, Foreign Relations, Public Works Committees HONORS, AWARDS, LISTINGS Society of the Sigma Xi Alumni _ Merit Award, Technological Institute, Northwestern University; German Marshall Fund Travel Award (2), USIA Lecturer Who's Who in America, Who's Who in Business and Finance, Who's Who in the World, l. Men o_f, Achievement, International Biocrachical Dictionary, Qntemocrary Authors f l MISCELLANEOUS ' Languagest French, Spanish., German l l REFERENCES aie n f l m hl a llann Daniact
ATTACHMENT 2 Resume of David J. Olson 9 9
Fa ll-19 8 3 CURRICULUM VITAE David J. Olson HCME ADDRESS OFFICE ADDRESS 6512 East Green Lake Way N. Gowen Hall, Rm. 106, DO-30. Se a t.t l e, Washington 98103 De pa r tme n t of Political Science (206) 522-6340 Sea ttle, WA 98195 (206) 543-2780 PERSONAL BACKGROUND f Bo rn Ma y 18, 1941, Branford, North Dakota Married, one child 4 PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS University of Washington, De partment of Political Science, Chairman,
- 198 3-pre se nt; Professor, 1979-present; Associate Professor, 1976-1979; Visiting Associate Professor, 1974-1976.
Indiana University, Department of Political Science, Associate Professor, 1973-1976~(leave of absence, 1974-1976); Assistant Professor, 1971-1973; Lecturer, 1969-1971. University of Wisconsin, Institute of Governmental Af f airs, Le c tu r e r, 1966-1967; Madison. Redevelopment Authority, Co m muni ty Planner II, 1965-1966. EDUCATION University of Wisconsin, Madison; 1964-1971; M.A., 1966; Ph.D., 1971. Union Theological Seminary (N.Y.C.), 1963-1964. Concordia College (Minn.); 1959-1963; B.A., 1963. West Fargo North Dakota Public Schools; 1947-1959; d.iploma, 1959. ~ C'IURSES TAUGBT Undergraduates Introduction to American Government; American Government and Politics; Minority Group Politics; Government and Ad minis tra tion
- o f Ur ban Co m munities Urban Politics; Political Conflict and Violence; Experimental Course for Minority Group Students; Class and Race Politics in the United States; Urban Bureaucracies; American Public Policy; Urban Public Policy; State and Local Politics; Urban and Suburban Government; Se minar on Political Analysis; Politics of Public Corporations; Se a po r t j
Politics., ~ Graduate: Urban Politics; Urban Public Policy Fo r ma tion; Urban Administration; Formation of Public Policy; American Political Institutions; Se minar on Am erican Na tional Politics; Politics of Urban Reform; Approaches to Subnational Politics; American Po li ti c s Co re Course: Politics of Public Corporations.
Olson-Vitae Fall 1983 Page 2 UDIVERSITY AND DEPARTMENTAL SERVICE University of Washington: University: Faculty Senate; Execu tiv'e Co m mittee o f Fa culty Se nate; Faculty Le g i s la ti v e Re p r e s e n ta ti v e to the Washington State Legislature; Urban Gran.t Co m mi ttee; Senate Special Budget Committee; Graduate School Research Fund Co m m i tt e e ; Urban and Regional Science Research Group, Council of Faculty Representatives; Executive Dir e c to r, Faculty and Friends of the University of Washington. College Executive-Co m mi ttee, So cie ty and Justice Program; j Associate Member, Program in Co mpa ra tive Studies in Ethnicity and Na tionali ty; Affiliate Me mber, Center for Law and Justice; Truman Scholarship Committee. De par t mental: Chairman; Graduate Admissions Co m mittee; four American Politics Faculty Se ar c h Co m m i t te e s ; Financial Aid Co m mittee; Graduate Adviser; Executive ' Co mmittee; NSF/RIAS Grant Applica tion Committee; M H oc W alke r-Am e s Nomina tion Co mmittee; various personnel review committees. l PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Research for P r e s i d e n t's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1966. Consultant, In s ti tu te for Re search on.overty, University of Wisconsin, 1967-69 Me m be r, American Association of University P ro f e s so r s' Na tional Committee on Teaching Assistants and Junior Members, 1968-72. Me mber, Advisory Board, In s titute f or the Study o f Et hical Is sue s, 1969-71 Presented a paper, "The Office of Governor in W i scon s in," at the I Mi dwe s t conference of* Political Scien tis ts, April, 1967. Presented a paper, "On the Politics of Riot Co m missions," at the American Political Science Association Convention, Se p te m be r, 1968 (with Michael Lipsky). ~ " Advisory Co mmissions and the Uses of Social Presented a paper, l Science," 'at the American Association for the Ad va nce me n t of I Science convention, December, 1969. p a p'e r, "The Kerner Re po r t Re v i s i te d, " at the twelfth LPresented a annual' Illinois Legislative Assembly, January 1970. Presented a paper, " Urban Violence and Political Change," at the sixth annual conference on Contempory Issues, Drury Co lle ge, l Springfield, Missouri,- March, 1970. i Pre sented a paper, " Politicians, ' Pro f essionals, a nd the Poo r," for the 'We w, York Acade my o f ' Medicine's 19 7 0 symposium o n " D e c'i s i o n - Making and Control in He alth Ca r e," sponsored by the Na tional Center of Health Services and De ve lo pm e n t of the Department of Health, Education and Welf are, July, 1970. ' Presented a paper, "Civ'il Disorders and the American Political Process: The Me aning o f Re cen t Ur ban Rio ts," a t a Co nf erence on
- Poli tical Micro-Violence at the Lyndo n B. Johnson School of Public l
l l _.. ~,
1 son-Vitae all 1983 ago 3 Affairs, the University of Texas, Austin, Texas, March, 1971 (with Michael Lipsky). Presented a paper, " Interpreting Re ce nt Civil Disorders: An Alternative to Ban field's Riotin g Main ly f o r Fun and Pro f i t'," at the Americ,an Political Science Association Convention, Se pte mbe r, 1971 Panel discussant on a panel reviewing "The Legacy of Protest in the 1960's," at the American Political Science Association convention, September, 1971. Chairperson of panel on "The Politics of Local Change Processes" at the Midwest Convention of Political Scientists, May, 1973. Chairperson of panel on " Issues of Professionalization" at the American Political Science Association Convention, September, 1973. Presented a paper and a film, "An Urban Mo n ta ge," at the Midwest Convention of Political Scientists, May, 1974. Presented a paper and a film " Twentieth Ce ntury Ame rican Ra ce Ri o t s," at the American Political Science Association convention, September, 1974. Chairperson of panel on "The Unwalled Ci ty: Is sues of Ju risdiction and Equi ty," a t the Midwest Con ve n tio n of Political Scientists, May, 1976.
- Member, Us e r s' Task Fo r ce of American Political Science Association / National Science Foundation Political Science Education Project on Instructional Innovation, 1976-1980.
Chairperson of Roundtable Panel on "The 1976 Elections in the Pacific No r thw e s t," at the Pacific Northwest P o l~i tica l Science Association meeting, April, 1978. Panel discussant on a panel dealing with " Urban Politics and Public Policy" at the annual meetings of the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association, April, 1978. Panel discussant on a panel dealing with " Pathologies of Politics" at the Western Political Science Association meetings, March, 1979. i Me m be r (1978-1980) and Chairperson (1980), Ho mina ting Co m mittee, Western Political Science Association. I Chairperson of panel on "In s truc tional In nova tion U ti_lizing L AP S S Module s," a t the Wes te rn Political Science As sociation meeting s, March, 1980. j 1 Presented a paper, " Regionalism in Port Development," at the Re gional Port Institutions Seminar sponsored by 'The New England River Basins Commission, August, 1980. ) Advisor to Washington Public Ports Association, preparation of Port System Study Update, September / October, 1980. Presented a paper, "Public En terprise and the State," at the Western l Political Science Association meetings, March, 1981 Advisor to Port of Seattle in writing " Port in a S tor m," the official publication marking the Port's 70th anniversary, August, 1981. Presented a paper, "Public En te rprise and the Emerging Character of State Service Provision," at the American Political Science Association convention, August, 1981 (with Michael Denning). S y n --
4 Olson-Vitae Fall 1983 Page 4 Presented a paper, "Research on the Fr on tie rs," at the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association meetings, October, 1981. j Chairperson of panel on "Ec o no mic Development and Ci ty Politics," at the Western Political Science Association meetings, March, 1982. Conference discussant at a conf erence on "The Future o f the Ci ty," University of Chicago, June, 1982. Presented a paper, " Economic Develoment and the R o' l e of Public Enterprise," at the American Political Science Association i convention, August, 1982 (with Michael Denning). Consultant to Washington State Legislature, Select Co m mi tte e on Port consolidation, April, 1982. Consultant to Na tional Harbour Bo ard of Canada, September, 1982. Consultant to Alaska State Le g i s la tu r e on The Alaska Railr o a d transfer legislation, November, December, 1982. PUBLICATIONS Book Reviews: Review of Jerome Ro then be r g, "An Economic Evaluation of Urban Renewal," American Political S cience Review, September, 1968. Re view of Willis D. Ha wley and Fr ederick H. Wirt, "The Se arch f or Community Power," Social S cience Quarterly, December, 1969. Review of W. Michael Re isman, "Fo lded Lie s: 3ribery, Cr usades and Reforms,' American Political S cience Review, June, 1980. Articles: Co-author of "Wincanton: The Politics of Co r ruption," Task Force Report Organized Crime ( Washing to n, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), (with John A. Ga r diner), " Citizen Grievance Letters as a Gu b e r n a to ri a l Control Device in-W i s c o n s i n, " T h e J o u r n a l o,f, P o li ti c s V o l. 31, No. 3 ( Augu s t, 1969), f pp. 741-755. "P e r s pe c tive s o n P oli tic a l Vio le nce'," Dia lo g V ol. 8 ( Wi n te r, 1969), pp. 9-17. Co-author of " r i,o t Co m mission Politics," Trans-action Vol. 6, No. 47 (July / August, 1969), pp. 8-21 (with Michael Lipsky). Reprinted in Peter Rossi (e d. ), Ghetto Revolts: Gary Marx (e d. ), Racial Conflict; Walter Dean Burnham (ed.), American Government Fr e d Harris (ed.), National Policy and Social Science. " Urban Violence and Political Change," in violence and Political change (Springfield, Missouri; Drury College, March, 19 7 0),, pp.3 7 - 48. " Riot Co m missions and Political Ch ange," in Philip Me ran to ( e d. ), "The Kerner Report Re vi s i te d," University of Illinois Bulletin Vol. 67, No. 131 (June 1, 1970), pp. 163-169. " Changing Political Processes, Channels, Structures, and the System," Discourse Vol. XIII, No. 1 (Winter, 1970), pp. 20-27. W e n,.,. ---n y--,.r, -n, .__,,-,,w,.---.e,.-,-- .w..,, .e .-y,,,.,-y.-,
Olcon-Vitae Fall 1983 Page 5 Co-author of " Civil Disorders and the American Political Process: The Meaning of Recent Urban Rio t s," in He r be r t Hirsch and David C. . Perry ( e d s.), Violence as Politics: A Series of Original. Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 161-186 (with Michael Lipsky). of, A me rican His tor y (Ne w Yo rk: Scribner f "Ba cklash," The Dictionary and Sons, 1976), p. 239. Co-author of "The Processing of. Racial Crisis in America," Politics & S ocie ty Vol. 6, No. 1 (1976), pp. 79-103 (with Michael Lipsky). "Re gionali sm in Port De ve lopm e n t" in Washington Public Ports Association, Port S y s tem s S tudy U pd a te (Seattle, WA: CH2M Hi l l, 1980), pp. 167-182. Books: "Co-edited and contributed chapter to: Edward S. Greenberg, Neal
- Milner, and David J.
Olson (e d s.), Black Politics: the Inevitability of Conflict (Ne w York: Holt, Rinehart a nd W ins ton, 1971), 374 pages. Co-edited and contributed essays to: John A. Gardiner and David J. Olson (ed s.), Theft of the City: Readings on Corrup tion in Urban Anerica (Bloomington, Ind In diana Unive rsity Pre ss, 1974), 432 pages. David J. Olson and Philip Meyer, To, Keep the Republic (Ne w York: McGraw-Hill, 1975) 588 pages. Michael Lipsky and David J. Ol s on, Co m mis sion Politics: The Processing of Racial Crisis in Am erica (New Brun s w i ck, N.J.: Trans-action Books, Inc., 1977), 476 pages. David J. Olson and Philip Meye r, Governing the United S ta tes (Ne w York McGraw-Hill, 1978) second edition, 611 pages. AWARDS, HONORS, GRANTS Rockefeller Fellowships 1963-64. Vilas Fellowship; 1966-67 University Fellowship in Recognition of Distinguished Teaching 1967-68. Ins ti tute for Research'on Poverty Grant 1967-69 Brookings Institution Predoctoral Research Fellowships 1968-69. Trans-action Grant; 1968-69. National Center for Health Services Research and Development Grants 1970. Faculty Grant for Multimedia experiment, Indiana Univers'ity; 1972. Faculty Fellowship, Office of Research and Advanced Studies, Indian a University; 1973. Distinguished Teaching A w a r d-Th e Frederic Bachman Lieber Memorial Award, Indiana University, 1973. Port of Seattle Re search Grant for Study of public port corporations: 1979-80. O l i -e -n-. -,,.--n-n..-n-,m.- ,,---,.-,-n,--
Olson-Vitae Fall 1983 Page 6 Research' Grant; Na tional Ocea'nic and Atmospheric Ad ministration, U.S. Depa r tmen t of Commerce, Washington Sea Grant, Summer, 1980. Research Grants Na tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis tration, U.S. Departmen t of Commerce, Washington Sea Grant, 1981-82. Research Grants National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington Sea Grant, 1983-84. 9 0 8 e e t t O i l l o -,,e,
e ATTACHMENT 3 Resume of Michael Lipsky G l e f l
BIOGRAPHICAL
SUMMARY
OF MICHAEL LIPSKY November, 1983 ADDRESS: 42 Brington Road DATE OF BIRTH: April 13, 1940 Brookline, MA 02146 PLACE OF BIRTH: New York, NY TELEPHONE: (617) 731-5137 MARITAL STATUS: Married NATIONALITY: U.S.A. CHILDREN: Two EDUCATION: Oberlin College, B. A.,1961; Woodrow Wilson School ~ of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, M.P. A., 1964; Princeton University, M.A. (Politics), 1964 ; Ph. D. (Politics), 1967. PROFESSIQiAL EXPERIENCE: Current: Professor, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Previous Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Teaching: University of -Wisconsin-Madison, 1966-1969. Other: Assistant, Public Affairs Program, The Ford Foundation, Summer, 1965. Brookings Institution Predoctoral Research Fellow, 1965-1966. Consultant to Upward Bound, Office of Education, H.E.W., previously Office of Economic Opportunity, 1966-1972, l Special Assistant to the Chancellor for Equal Opportunity Programs, University of Wisconsin (Madison Campus), July, 1968-June, 1969. Staff Associate, Institute for Research on Poverty, i University of Wisconsin, 1966-1969. I Consultant on evaluation and urban policy, ACTION, l l Washington, D.C., 1977-1978. Me rber, Law and Government Study Grcup, National Institute of Education, 1979-1982. Director of Policy Studies, Legal Service Institute, Jamaica Plain, MA, 1979-1981. Member, Board of Trustees, Justice Resource Institute,1978. l Consultant,-Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare,1993. l O t
~ i l 1 PUBLICATIONS.- BOOKS: Protest in City Politics: Rent Strikes, Housing and the Power of the Poor (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970). Law and Order: Police Encounters, 2nd edition, edited with an Introduction (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books,1973). Theoretical Perspectives on Urban Politics, edited with an Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976) (with Willis Hawley). Commission Politics: The Processing of Racial Crisis in America (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books,1977) (with David J. Olson). Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (New York: Russell Sage, 1980). 'In August, 1981, Street-Level Bureaucracy was named the 1981 recipient _ of the C. Wright Mills Award of the Society for the Study of Social Problems. In September, 1981, the American Political Science Association presented Street-Level Bureaucracy with its Gladys E. Kammerer Award as the best publication on national policy published in 1980 (co-winner). PUBLICATIONS - ARTICLES: " Outputs, Structure and Power: An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics," Journal of Politics 30 (May,1968), pp. 220-248 (with Herbert Jacob).* " Protest as a Political Resource," American Political Scienca Review, LXII (December, 1968), pp. 1144-1158.* " Rent-Strikes--Poor Man's Weapon," Transaction, Februasf,1969, pp. 10-15.* "Rict Commission Politics," Transacti'on, July-August, 1969, pp. 9-19 (with David J. Olson).* " Landlord-tenant Law in the United States and West Germany: A Comparison j l of Legal Approaches," Tulane Law Review, XLIV (December), 1969, pp. 36-66 i (with Carl Neumann). l " Review Symposium" (on the Supplemental Studi~es for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders), American Political Science l Review, LXIII (December, 1969), pp. 1278-1281. l-I: (* Indicates article reprinted in journal or anthology.) l l l l l
" Radical Decentralization: A Response to American Planning Dilemmas." Paper presented to the Second International Symposium on Regional Development, sponsored by the Japan Center for Area Development Research, September 17-19, 1968, Tokyo, Japan. Published in the proceedings of the Symposium (Tokyo, Japan: Japan Center for Area Development Research, 1969), pp. 102-110.* " Social. Scientists and the Riot Commission," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 384 (March), 1971, pp. 72-83. " Street-level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform," Urban Affairs Quarterly, 6 (June, 1971), pp. 391-409. * " Citizen Participation in Federal Housing Policies." Paper submitted to Subcolunittee on Housing Panels on Housing Production, Housing Demand, and Developing a suitable Living Environment, Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, First Session, June, 1971, pp. 895-925 (with Donald Dickson, John Mollenkopf, and Jon Pynoos). " Street-level Bureaucracy and the Study of Educational Politics," in Michael Kirst, ed., The State, School and Politics: Research Directions (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company,1972), pp. 205-212. " Community Organization as a Political Resource," People and Politics in Urban Society, Urban Affairs Annual Review, Vol. 6, Harlan Hahn, ed. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1972), pp. 175-199 (with Margaret Levi). " Civil Disorder and the American Political Process: The Meaning of.Recent Urban Riots," in David Perry and Herbert Hirsch, eds., Violence as Politics (New York:' Harper,1973), pp.161-186 (with David J. Olson). " Views on the American Experience with Social Experimentation," Social Research and Public Policies. Proceedings of the O.E.C.D Seminar on Social Research and Public Policy, Hanover, N.H., September 13-15, 1974. "Toward a Theory of Street-level Bureaucracy," in Willis Hawley and Michael Lipsky, eds., Theoretical Perspectives on Urban Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19 76), pp. 196-213. * "The Processing of Racial Crisis in America," Politics and Society, Vol. 6 (1976), pp. 79-103 (with David J. Olson). " Citizen Participation and Health Care: Problems of Government Induced Participation," Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 1 (Spring, 1976), pp. 88-111 (with Morris Lounds). "The Future of the Veteran's Health Care System," Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law,1 (Fall,1976), pp. 285-294 (with Lawrence McCray, Jeffrey Prottas and Harvey Sapolsky). e I e ,r, -, - -,,,-~,. ,,-,y ,,,w,--, .-,m- .m-. =,-.-----.,,,-,,e- -r
. s' " Street-level Bureaucrats and " Institutional Innovation: Implementing Special Education Reform in Massachusetts," Harvard Educational Review 47 (May,1977), pp.171-197 (with Richard Weatherly).* " Preface," Political Language,'by Murray Edelman (Chicago: Academic Press, 1977). "The Assault on Human Services: Street-Level Bureaucrats, Ac, countability, and the Fiscal Crisis," in Scott Greer, et al., eds., Accountability in Urban Society (Beverly Hills, Cal. : Sage Publications,1978), pp. 15-39. " Standing the Study of Public Policy Implementation on its Head," in W. Deen Burnham and Martha Wagner Weinberg, eds., American Politics and Public Policy _ -(Caubridge, Mass. : M.I.T. Press, 1978), pp. 391-402. " Poverty and Administration: Perspectives on Research," in Vincent Covello, ed., Poverty and Public Policy: An Evaluation of Social 4 Science Research (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1980), pp. 164-186. "The Welfare State as Workplace," Working Papers 7 (May/ June,1980), pp. 3 3-3 8. * " Quality Control in AFDC as an Administrative Strategy," Social Service Review, 57 (March,1983), pp.1-34 (with Evelyn Brodkin). " Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs," Social Service Review (March,1984 forthcoming). " Evaluation and Problems of Governance," in Langeley Keyes and Jennifer Leaning, eds., The Counterfeit Ark (Cambridge, Mass. : Ballinger, forthcoming). PUBLICATI0 tis - OTHER: Member, Subcommittee, on the Planning Process and Urban Development, of the National Academy of Science's Advisory Committee to the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Subcommittee's report: Revenue-Sharing and the Planning Process: Shifting the Locus of Responsibility l for Domestic Problem-Solving (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1974). CRM Books, Primary Advisor, American Government Today (Del-Mar Co. : 1974), and author of Chapter 16, " Mass Political Participation: Mcbilization, Protest, and Violence," pp. 457-477.
ATTACHMENT 4 Daily News 3/11/84 "LILCO Cuts shocking" New York Times 3/8/84 " Layoffs at Lilco Leave Workers Hurt and-Bitter" Newsday 3/16/84 "A Company Man No More" ~ I 4 s i I f.- 4 , - - - ~ 4 w s e,r--,--, rw, .s.,,,-, --.,+- ~ws,-e-p.- n,-- e-----p-~etr-em-m<m.- y ~w me
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ff g. - ~ N M duis's, MT p J. m $f l~ ,w &.e t v='.,,/g.. ~- Q. U M.$.;gS., h . 7ee8M ) ; /. '.E..~~.. 7 N ..;. m..,.,,.,s f; l'.. y n.r P s 2 3NOV = By MICHAEL HANRAHAN.. b EHE MOOD WAS'one of shock" ' ~ ( more than anger. ' 7 ~ ' !, T,.. 1 rather than disbelief, one of fear ie l'.. l. Although Long Island Lighting Co. .v 1 employes and stockholders were told' f
- g... '-
~. there would be cuts, few realized thec extent to which they were to becoma 7 - , ~ - - h'S.l.E. affected. Few can yet understand how ' s-the seemingly omnipotent LILCO can ~ r. E,' i bnngmg longi:herished beliefs of job 3. ? De conung down on its knees and l and imancial security along with it. "We are the victims," exclaimed one - 5 of the workers who was discharged * %e ~ i after four years on the job. i He asked that his name not be used M I because, now that he was out of work.- 1 he did not want to get a reputation for ' being a malcontent with any potential. 3C l employer.. i l "I am bittert we who are being fired q are not the people who made the-decisions that have ruined the m g,g:.. g. compey. ,c "The chiefs are still there. Itis only 5 i' the Indians who were let go," said the 4.h l former worker, who had been - em-M' ~ (t, department - ~~ ,d m ployed in the community.. affairs 2 Charles Slevin, 46, of Brentwood, ,11.x i, O"
- N As the third in seniority in the depart ' I
~ ' ~ .C-- y ~. had worked for LILCO since he was 20L ment of real estate, he was one of two y j, $' O ~ men let go. .,. Exponalve Shoreham nuclear plant (top) may have played role in announcement "It is hard to put into words how I really feel," said StevinL "I am not sure by ULCO chairman William Catocesinos that,741 employee were to be let go.- t . hat it has really yet sunk in." The shock and the fear are express-nefits, were se}ected for discharge be. necessary forthe Shoreham WCet. in ed on the part of all of LILCO's 5.600 cause some of the neweremployes cost. bems hard-nosed in dealing with other 2mpicyes. The shock is over how work-less. individuals.. But, I believed it was ers were selected to be cut. The fear is That offers little cons'olation, necessary for the company,* said Sle. L. ner who or what is next. however, to a man who has lost his jott vm. "It was a difficult job, but all of p;. Slevin, after 26 years on the job, was Slevin, who has a wife and three teen.1 that counts for nothing now." l aven an hour to get out the door. His age children, lost no time in lookmg '!he 741 LILCO workers who were ['
- o workers were as dismayed as he for worlL let go were notified about it at the same L
"It is a diffEult feeling,* be sakL... time that William J.-cairo.-- ;- ras. "I still think of the lighting com.. You consideryourself a quallfled pro.. newly selected chairman of the board pany as my company,. said Slevin. fessional in.domg one type of wort for LILCO, was announcing the firings i, "You have to bring yourself to change Then you are faced with the prospect to the press during a conference at the [ your way of thinking."- of going to a defense plant and seekmg posh Garden City Hotel-e. There was no explanation as to why whatever work they have to offer." Catacostnos also announced a 20rb r Stevan was one of the two selected. Slevin's.dutaes at LILCO had him. cu. in pay for corporate officers. l from his department All he feels is: dealing with a ykriety of people and Hdwever, while his pradecessor was i
- !t was ruthless and meant to be so."-
situations, from engineering to purch. paid a reported $230.000 a year, Cataco. Some say Slevin, and others like ase of private property.- sinos, a member of the board of direc-l sim, with seniority entitling them to "There were times when I didn't11ke tors, was brought in one month ago in ndditional vacation time and other be-harmg to. do the things that were See LILCO Page 3 ' g 4p ,g y' 'g .,e-. . \\ T E-i 4 9 (N M -dM. a- '*.4 i** ' ^ 3-N-PV ~ gg3 _ j [ =m P
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-.____t i gg. ~ WiUBEnnpleyBBBWende,):,6r" ~W g o i f4 ( e..\\ i' ~ a. g ).. f y O' J[% ' i ? r A A }!ql 4 y -a p,4 LILCO FFIOM PAGE ONE pany's long-term Albany fobbyist., .. Ironically Duffy is the son of a l the position of chairman at $275.000,to.. former pres,ident.of 'the company;,.
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A ' ( y M - Q{j '* rescue the company from bankruptcy.,. g y g, g,,, of a former board. ' ' l L ; y,yh j So,while the company embarked on r c_ - gg it was the senior Duffy and senior. 1p a stringent $100 million austerity pro-. Doebler who brought LILCO through i :<; N s pyr . gram,.the pay of the highest paid { w . g-T .i its Initial and difficult growth pains, : corporate officec in the utility.-after.: from the days that Levittown was a
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the $275.000 was cu , duced by just 2.3%..t by 204-was re potato field to the company's seeming ' ' g}U I. 3,,',,,, .. ly invincible pre-Shoreham majesty. ...,s J i 'Catacosinos, announced 4 alary cuts g d [ of 10%'for manag'ement personnel ear O'iFor the stockholders' there were jef" similair reactions of shock and fear. ning $35,000 or more, and a 5% reduc ' Shock to the holders of common stock b lion for those below that level, '. e 'on which the dividends were elimin- ) 'j 3 Also announced'was a cutback of.: ated for the remainder'of the year: "I - i s j .h ~ 11% in the' company's 1984 capital. had anticipated a reduced dividend" - l h, ' budget and a 22% redpction in the 1984 ; bins of Northport. 1. ) I 4 but nothing more," said Charles Rob. l - > operating budgep*v"'d. .' 3 i,.. "I certainly didn't expect to have the
- i
... ~ j '.3 IIE MEASURES REACIIinto v!r-dividends
- totally eliminated for the
) . tually every aspect of the com ' rest of the year, We have alreadylost a .i '/,(,g; j t(' WFh??- c, i.. Bob Duffy, a 21 year LILCO veter'an,'!. nearly $10."],,l,p,' ", 't, "- c pany's,operatiosis. - fortune on the. stock. It has dropped s..;f i 'i . _ m,f i y3 headed the regional affairs office that...he, fear comes to those who'are - 1 A 5'['
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- worked with Nassau and Suffolk coun-holding issues of Lit.CO's preferred ' -
) 1 i T ties on economic development. He said stock. They must now' watt to. learn " , L 1 ) ' gg that he knew' for the past several about their future dividends. ' ' i i g ..montha'that his five person office was
- LILCO. investors bought.their. '-
N. w,trr. i., i 1 , pinerable. It was eliminated. i e : ^ y" Fired too, everf before the formal dividends are counted on" sa O More than 700 LILCOemployes are no longer on the %. j4' Caus,terit,y. was,He,nq poep,le,7,.the com-bins. "All that'has. changed now." ... W." -j ...,p 'l0j',';e3} ~. c J i a i i i i i
. %n v .. us.io LayotisatLilco F . *'ana==a="=="seM the cuts were, c~*~ ~ ~ Dr 8 r "a herrlMe enestional shock" Sur the i-g. Leave Workers - ~ ~ " ~ ~ ~ - = ~ = ~ 4 esserve k." He onM the layeIIs were "the kantest deciales that I've had to HUitGRd,3 M/- =a" " amhe.aNmaywee - to .:,,vince seghiatore that the
- ALIT #*18 Y 1 w= e-to make -me ". M r.
ByIJNDSEY4'RUSON j "scas to deserve state help. But Frank Jemme, esq SulleEL 4 f cashes $st fainag to scrap the more. I' ve, cr eM pr. Casa ~, I s,. esse e n.sein sea n g MINEOt.A. LI., March 7-The tirag I Commty==ea e day of work as a constructime nschanic ".' W "'-' e'tl:nt:;r,.1 rad.'ca."d :*4s: c beht. cauedtoday."neisgreattohasw you. ever budget, at 84.1 bilusa.1he inAty traces many of ks Ilmancial puebsome were with a sassag outat. I Agused I to cost everrums at the SID4magawatt i csuid stay for say career." lP ant. 1 i i But yesterday, aher as , air * "1JIco's weakases is Shershman and s Hart's career with the manana I les sessagth has always been Its ese-e And the and was without the cercanomy cated werh8esce " he said. "It's infur. 1 that the SG-yeard supervisar and Ier. j tumete to see that Mr. Catasselmas has j peer amedemic had come espect, l d=rna d to attack his strength and 1g-i j In as austerny artve essly,ad to anse Ms weshmens, Sk1ruham." 4 , ner. some leiseef said they save the nyear Id Ts nort wasland ear. it wa ehared seit k was udeer met wem being by hundrais et causegues, esimo og mecharged for mistakes meado la the, -l.
- ' I' whom had been with the esagemy Amr board seam-
+ i n y=ue er anae.The ese,any said a t i 1Jico comanen sted rese today'te would alWe= a totalof ESTjobs-et close at 7E. It had 2% Tuse. l least S44 through layeGs and lpT l through attritten and astiremente. day, the '3ay the nose an.
== macarf, to close at he lowest in j For those hacky emog to retain ~ smore them a d=rada ti.cir jobs, k was monetheless a Mour. Some' haamed appaments Seune wlE he doenoted and wlE have to ofthe plant.whehaveheema, taka sharp salary cuts. Others wul tacter in the delays in the plant's can. have their routines laterrupted. Edaey structica scheduto. 6 willlose close artends. others said the layette smarted the [ )lMS Employed by UtWey and of a special.a.sa mmhap ,e It was a palmfulcoeuw toa asenthof "Managemeest asullaher were totaEy I and uncertainty far a5 et / doveted to the composay," ene ess.. b compney's 5,m empisyees. They pseyse sam. "It was a love afsnir, and < asw that miey he over. i laid e of stameng by helplessly.*-, wide friende burnt late tears. 0me said 1 l f,, putyforbelegeBoundtotesy { g i; " Sad sed creesmewh.i.iMos., Mr. Haft said. "Ibere's sadness at the j Poskienthecampmay isinandameness l that Hielong." ^
- at work have j
heen brokeen up. "Dut smaybe ey mayleaviusIcont6 used help them sur' vive.pmyleavingwill - Ma 1 } De new chainaam of the staty,Dr. I I t f -.1. h sa.idthalayette WSMaa J. 8'=^= INER Inteolvesecy.When cmumMmed i a variety of other austerity lacauding the suspemoton et Payments en cesanque teock, may wel save the ra==ra=y sure senas. 6 1
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.p C, A i l $M' '_ .i .,w - s ,a Ex-LILCO supervisor bid McCarthy. right, and his wie, Madehne, far left,wtth 11 of their children: front row,from left, BiHie, j i 17; Katie,13; Ronnie,12; Greg'11 ; Paul,8, and Jodi,3. Back row Maddy,14; Matt,15; Bnan,16; Mike,16, and Robert,18. f h A Com,1 anyMagoMote 5 By Joe Calderone-%. times, he had answered the calls that came in the middle In the cafeteria, when his coworkers would begin grip.. of bitter winter nights to go fix.a leaky gas main some-ing about the the I.cngIsland Lighting Co., Bill McCarthy..'.where. He never refused overtime. He did what he was, would hear none of it. .m ' ' told and then some. Wiien LI140 came under attack for He had come to LILCO at 21, fresh out of the Marine the Shoreham nuclear power plant, he wrote letters to the' Corps, an ambitious man with a stocky build and an urge newspapers. He supported nuclear power and he defended to work outdoors. Hired as a laborer at 370 a week, he felt LILCO. . <.~- privileged to get the job. And during the next 21 years, as He was so loyal," says his wife,~ Madeline. He. he moved up the LIILO ranks from ditch digger to me-wouldn't take a_ pencil home from LIICO. He was a real chanic to equipment operator to welder, to a supervisory company man. You couldn't complain to him about your job helping to oversee construction projects, his affinity for LIIIO bill." the company only grew. McCarthy, 42, a father to 13 children, stopped being a He ran the United Way campaign in his department, company man last Tuesday. To his astonichmant, he re. Ha orgamzed a company. wide soccer team. Hundreds of . --Continued on Page 25 j l i i i 1 1 1 1 I. l l t } e-f f l l l w 4r =
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- LILC.O Company Ma.irX.o.More-J'=*i===d hem Page 3 f
.romisiand, while he is without a job beenus orhis decimen p esind naties thathewasamongthe937 and one of nine years ago to leave his uniongM - pb u==eh==lelaw who alas !. L the 181===g====+ parenanel whose basaelimi. and enter===as===* His two _ - nated to try aad save the heat Samanal ruia. ;. workforLIILO,forinetance,etayediaunionjabsandhove ' f.- ) N Aringswereablowto O workers. But they.. survived the layedh. But he said he does act regret becom. l>- emme as a, r' __ :-ly diNieultjolt to the white collar nea.' ing part of menessment, a etep he took for the challenge 3 union eenployeeslikeMcCarthy,manyofwhomhadmany;'and the esperisase rather than der Sama years of service and who were not laid of assenhar to- . Hissamhbyheads the rimof a satse asbe seniority, like the union emple7ess, but who were choses < est with his wife la the oftheir. hases for =< ^ ' reasses.Meayofthe white.eellerworkerenot a pianis tahlsm the McCarthyv purebased te as Q. enid they view their Erings as arbitrary and unfair, esausedate their large hally.'Iber had nine aluldren of, Asa the beguunag that he's at the bestem of the toteen; when Bill's sister died====ra=*a*. Eleven of the chil. "Ihe blue eeller perses who gets land of understands. their inra and adopted four othere who were lea homeless 4 N i 4 pole and that if there s any beat a the reed, he's the one dren, who in ages temi 3 to 23, ressana at home. '. r l run more than 81,000 a month.. m } who falls of the wagon," said Ur. Timothy W. f'a=nalla Their gresary - who They have met talked la detail yet about how they I president of Adelphi University and a a _' ' %heresq latead so meet their debte'without McCarthy's enlary. He l has studaad lastitutions feming large layedb. " I i there is no such est of rules for whiteeeller werkers. A went to for food stampe Wedaseday but was told heT white collar worker asemass that if he's ' a goodjob, was because the family has more than 81,500 in % his job is escure. If you've done a good job yes're laid assets. his wife han Sansed out their' monthly [ of, there's mething harder to take." bills and she knows they een't make ende meet on his $170 ~ i "I was very =hachad when they laid me of," McCarthy weekly unemployment ehmeh and the 4400 she brings. said. "Iwas amased. h people I worked with, we got. home every two weeks bem herjob as an aide at Central along fabulously...they made a anstake when theylaid Islip Psychistne Center."We're 8800 short a month right-i an of. I never renamed omrtium. You can ask anyese that. 'new." Bill says,'"We'n got to cut back esenwhere? I 4 l - I worked at night... I remseber la Bay Shore one night McCarthyhasspeatmuchofthelastweekpreparingte ~ l where we had to build dans ofles around a holis to keep apply for joke He's een8 dent that he will get a more re. { the homen water hem comingin while we worked en a gas ' werdi.ag posities than the one he had at LI140, although mala. 'Ihat was when I was a weider.'lhe street would be, he's not as eartain that he will Sad one that will pay him i Gooded with water. It was very cold, bitter... and you the $31,900 he earned there annually. He fears that aAer. j had to work dews there under these==di+4a==
- 1Avesting two decades gettag to a esafortable position at -
Ta McCarthy, a high scheel dropout who ressath LII40, ajoh with some r-pn==hli+y, he now may be forced earned sa===acia*. degree hem Safolk Ceannuaity Cof..to return to physical labor to support his family. - ' lege by going to elaos at night, the layof held speaal ire...."I don't want to go back to being a welder or k truck nies. Cha' f among them is the know that orworkers driver. Of course I'll do it ifI hhve to. I could get a job as a when he had surpassed la position at company have garbage man ifI had to. But that's not what I want to do." ~ a I ~ _ e.a.. .e a.., as.- .-.;-*.: * ~. -, =s-i n 9 i f i t' t l F e ) i l 4 l t l (3 A l - - - _ -__, - ~ ___.... .,- -,,. _-, W..,.. - - _ _ _ _, - .ee,.t.o
t' i t i i ll i. ATTACHMENT 5 Newsday Cover ~12/15/83 "The Shoreham Findings" Newsday 12/15/83 " Excerpts from Shoreham Report" suffolk Life - 11/23/83 " Gov.'s Shoreham panel; LILCO ' lacks credibility'" New York Times 12/15/83 " Report by State's Shoreham Panel Criticizes Planning and High Cost" I l I l 4 4 9 B-9 7.- ,-6,..;jy.
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. New are musrpm hem me e/me Mas
- 9. The popumalsms isr Imag Islaats home aims.
,. ;*,. m. 4 9 - > W. c ' 'W 3 7, d,-:, C*L trisal emergy sende en whosh the Shasehen aus- /6 'Mr i hs gr esammessaan en she musier ~ stressnea a=had=la was ensiaally based were i pimit
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.# 1.- elmeesty asenstammaan. h paast le puremaded v i f thst a=ri= m s-sing ass =ay==usaay =- ,,MER 'W desde,"and 'p'ahan"ty image. a.h ammains an of .J d
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MarburgertoGw MarioCuonno-4- r h /;d h' M wd <d. suures ankomst to the esas - that samme i The !hmukana plemts Isms umssrestina ihme and ho magmeng ssysume bess esumibetss te e less t " " y. ' q (1 the eripaal prepsmems to be as wrung. But at this 4 4t gh.: >h'T' '. k.F M tems, it is d:Semit to ase hour the dommad for else-of pukhs essaismas a Zass Island in meditismal adske pen nyseng es agua pehism etge aosM.w. g%- /j.[ .%g samen ef) signet a ominy piamming and agels-3 treaty muld be se peut as m aques a sharshen. I ties... Li mand plant within a desude er more. We euge yes to spesista pumal of apuu to... j,!l
- 10. Flmally,if the plant shsmid sumamaHy re.
'F f y 1 mamsvenasimmensmentsemideseifth y-4,[e esin a useums a speens, as public wenis w won ,E, . 1 emed by am shasam hapseen by sain ' E. .'*4,r .E 3,?. l 4.. - .g,,9 ansehen sen halnded medely la es IMO depudsmatssammlerna w hdaral.saem f rem wass p[ 9%.,,p...t%p 9 4 " i Q .r sad isal genmann, a seu as the unihty. Puhus Ihaps est Gmdthisupsnandinammdmet amadsam in es quehty of the plant is Msw. desmamas assEne peu est m enabhsh a ensa nle 1 r t -u N.9 and asraer inspesases wul mese reveal t in the mapies pubisms in whiah Shanham is asw v,:
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N that abonid ha addmesi pur m speamm a ma- .a. c >C ". membed. h passt memban inhund pamain m peduss mis mesa, and I weh e ashewiedge ilar'.g t. arm as mammes of pre,mu ins,memes tan
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,,, p w ^ h.ad unie man he ammen, 1, J M..g: eSeres here in what may aAur au have bass an in-p==* muman. q, e _.. f.3 i+. s. F ceparate Views @.h4M $ k" h " h" I4on J. Campo Of Psnel Members General Conclusions (ne runne uns en am sury maihr eerend sana I. thanhasa's oiscarmty is asaher assamery aer. sury gesatJ
- . a, L no Gret paime le that Sussik Caumty adspeed John Marburger at noms corifererios adhreshis...
to psames aAer mamamamag sendies of teams. Imag Isisedis a*dsed ear-the pseer is shin gmaker.The esumsymunhasse en apumbie ta lesandatapoetwhienamany meps,- eaa. a i ear aside, and ear nome inesses das, and an what usaded a he dame. The hhneiset nie of the eset.asedteses, thsenade of nedsam en me nam esent asuhmeal kmselsign of the issess mth whisk hdmal assumes has fossand the penspess that -Ihd... 7 i they dealt Many pamel ambas behsee that the they am respammble hr poviding gaanmaan of es h pises wiR pndues the anst empsum eiss, . massiasmas tuned a he massmene in ther ap. tenhamal qualny of plant mesmusam and spe tristymr in New YorkStone. AHparass - r t , psessh, but mens het that es aparts me inespam. seisms whom, by their own admeman, they an un-W ar and the PSC agnethes to puism.^ 'd ^' his er pudy munisadas. At the same time, a is abis to provide ansk guarameset ' "was a mamahn. Mast impernamt af au the enseriety '
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. impmenetundermandthatthemumsypamanniea 5.The NRC pusneofdefernasemndsemessof tasa Shanham is met asada! by the resumma of *
- c resalt af gesurumsmaal, est puoly smemmes er tesh. esses smarguery rosymmse piammag a===hler un - Imag lainmemuc Flanuy, there east nable aherne "
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$ ans.1, thesis,thessesynamertsditsnght tu aamr==r3=a== ef dans met make treen,assbas ~ ofaddannel 4 + te doomsme of geserummet based upon whs6-semas. Sunk sammdsensises were in inst immodused,. hans, whish sun amansfy, at a 8mmena of herehasn's '. d i .mer imhrmansa as isosisaw and unseen ta maaham u._. t-=g hamnmes but. me, an immessed ensamte used in me y.or sooo.. o neemshes how evenable a them. This duemman seemed bytinhamnageSaarmereissestattet ' Aj89d I. EahA. 88r68Ff J. Koudt ] hosuuss the""Ty seselk caussy== soumed by E musisar ps.ar plant is a p mel imenna a and and William J. Raton esmedesmentseanssandthesses, tems. It is clear that the ensemass of a esmpisand u al psames teh= the musty end seeme ngniamms to the gemel as well rumsses to past an operanag Hammes. It is tse lme h esumsy, metraryto the studies whish 1 The assmed past a that the paast does met tr a ' hasamag pestise to af. 3esemamamed, adedthattheremighthesams
- view muiser pseer as ta'memely amends, althseph het the Shareham sese, but the yhdansmhv et an. emergumsy mamansa of emmensiy mau probabihty' esmo haussethatthesenestessesof ta see seertag meni$samt enseelaasd gummems katse udarwhisit lesusyeSmals)maidmet genres.
=== lame induary has met ashessed a of adsey massrusses is ese advensed may he apphed to the ten the saisty eversumsin Sessik Caumey.Thee. e spanennes he puhue ess.This view was shand by. uness low 9 suer basemag etnamen. The guver. "* fantheywouldestymnimpmeetmaasmaguayplen... memy who psesided amm-any Alekseek the puest mer's nquest af the NRC that a ise, suer sparasing this assism uvelves a remarkshie ememas of did hear masares akset es emmermal une etassie. homas est he issued beime the esase pisamme in, enerumsmaal disseuse - a nfusal te parempene g . arpsmer,ganarauyassetoftheemmeermsseespamf. pane is sweelied is essmasat wak this phalassphy u piamming for na amargenry, pesumanly la the. y is to the sharehama plant he h=sh= geslay of
- g. The tammen te tissess is menaed by the ag..espaammen that by a ruimmag, ther esmal nesse
~sumsmuselsa, and genlity of====g====r miSammt invasensat la the plant. It is ruialmend by the threat Isasif. J l [ ,s 3.ThepsmalayeestbatthetsrehmapisetwiR* the appenet Sasonal adamenge of operamag the - Alpgd J.Kah4 [, i ~ puhahiy yese to have basa a adenke ta the assse piset as empend mth amt sparasing it, as neg.. I holisse that a ransmal esmany usImid span sad ' .l . that everysme makt have hamn besar ef tf the piamt maad by the ensaame analyme pedumed by pamal aparase the Asraham plaat. It is, se far as we ma ' had asser bass budt. The pamal belasses that the mas. LH40 and SuSelk County's masahames. We, tau, wenk submarisinDy aura to es paspie ofImag " If . ta-sh= would pekahir be ngarded as unsuitable are imensand by how assan that ammbermay weal.
- Island and es mais aparatang eas diammedad...
~' I .g , as a mas for a musisar poner sentima and would met ly be reistive to the meerly $4 biuisa that udl be. - Sanse ' % hr thas Sases in, sa the one I g . be essepaable as a homesable ate modar cariumt me. invasend in the plant regardises of whether it oper. head, ammsdung einse'te amansmal, and, en the sher - j e. Ing yesnest Esammes of d==amd for elssertaty,. anat Evua la these cinnammasm, it is amt obvious.., span 6 sally atmeusehns to see =w=-d-of.. ..a. - i ..g es pnen eful ee eut eressuresmen au turuse out thet thoure to epermee the plaat womid bo tastamount managunal += r a -- and n;y had task... a-d. .to be pesslyinassernas, to a pomeradname to emmenic muside for the man-ar the russa. r. .1 Whoe ne essesme aanlyuss avanshis a the. mamsa me einerestesmesumereen tang faland. and espasses that neans, uIrO,wamand. mamm in mm,ie a.ri be regured a bear e*?
- Opuses as u how mush hisme must asupt semel de indimos a amammal advemange asemased. aman,burdse.
hr mesmer emah a asummen very en our passL It is 'annmany pasmhis to blame the presamt mese of af. yens take inte asssent russmaly amasumand additism.. Herbert J. Kouis and W.Ha.antJ.Ronaa..'. with the sparensa of Shoreham, meme of these anal.
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' has en the insvetahis ignummse we au beve of the al delays in the operansa of shmeham, pnmanly misly b"ea"t and m a epsen"d amisty, and theme. But, as when la====e aussess a amnes d emnbutahne is prehisms with the esasrsmery damelc e* diammare led to esseuman etes mamarsh regedians gamerseers. m panel reassaims that the delay meme leale d!ang Island and tem nah sudd.
- ofhas shGay to presamt them, many asw may aa6='==a= sees or au of the essesmarhansSt. be indly hart by a demaism act a pneed with oper.,
e < isnt that must be held mapsumbioist aDow.
======*=d with operatism dShareham We did ast ades. hnine, we helma that the Shanham na.f, {. - ing the shauhes disaster to happse. han the time to analyn the- ..clar pseer piams.abould in pumund w operam ; ,3 4.1%is lesde to the fuerth vue, that I.U40 did af the delay. The mammaman nessmands that the whm es NRC emelude it is nady tow ast wapan nuit adagenesty ser its isrey taas tem Governsr make sush en emmens emnlyss em ises. Dopid J.WiEmoetandMarge Harrtson i tsahmensgrafassisarps oradstalleekseredibaar. dieu pnsnty. 1n teninsey and has - aducannauy re. r' as an apermest of a maclear power plant.1he pame! '
- 8. Althoudthe evaluatism efe5eine inferend ourinstalbalists haaghe===d eardamn *
. i visse nacisar pesar as a high-tsubasingy industry. - [ Federal Emergemey Idamagsmaat Assmey],the te de everythmg uttua sur power to isredemn the that demands a *mre doisets" managessant staitude plans is the rosysambahty of pasmhis openseg of this facihty which,we have came .=milar to that in the aanspese industry. What the ; el dass meh to espnas rumorvations about O's to the arm esechsman, poses a genname, very real pmaaliserned abset u140 treming programs, qual. ahGity to i=plaa==* a plan that achasvus an ade. and estresmaly frightsmag threat to our lives, our 3 l itysamummsesosienne.andmanagessutespansame, quate mais of paperedeems =thout me --- wh and theme paspie you nynssat... with reiseent ausleer teamer operemma led many to of esumsy goversmaat. The State's r==r===h hey for.. It is lampmenge that the governor make the hard i ,.. g.. quasman whether such an etsitude is presamL MICO emergemey preparedases regares that it pay elsee domaion asw: enior the PSC to cut the losses by } has temded to res ised to entems by psenag te its e**=ar=== to the subsequent osures of the lissmang tang en end to the Shareham anslaar pseer t 3 -s.mamusfragng.iary - ad - pe-s a mmfy in.if eat we,aredeem a ade.. beard en b.e afmy ad esmamm svery day es i to es to han nuedins mesh en - for guid. quase esmedag is its swa mandards absold a u. governsr wets snuses tem ad he-i-to nm by., .I ,)- sans rusher thea upsa am smanseaenet osase he awardet mauses of deusru. f g.. ,, i -*g 2a e l +.. t .~ - I8 7 g E ..pl I
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n t . -@gMembersp ot t Governor - members and Liffo of.* Ilut aecording to repbrts,, issues scen as cruciallo the fly PETEtt Scifft.Y while some _ p'anel . panel," he said. touched on a number of l g I q poin ed ;out the ' the 10 co.sensus items are-resolution of the figl t over e,iffarioiCyotno's,Shoreham 2. ficials e Comtnissi on diave* con: malertal is not the final .the,, relatively . few Shoreham. fpltludedlSuffdik','offic'ials ~~ l report to the governor, the.,; Shorehpto issues on,sehich SUFFOI.K*S STUDIES . actedT' reasonably in i. leaked findings were'seenc r manytof thh inembers 'do-NOT I.ACKING [usludy ng '. emergency S 'hy many as a strong blow agree "!!oth on economics Thestudies performed as j l j 3'hplanni if pr bleins for the to I.Ilf0 officials, who .and safety -the consensus part of Suffolk Cou ity's l _.q,)Shorehant?'hucienP p,lant.. have charged ' repeatedly items seem to weigh very emergency planning effort, E'i ,. liefore concluding the f that Suffolk's; emergency 1 heavilyagainst operation," most commission mem- ) @fenttor should not operate,.* planning effort was-said Leon Campo; a bers conclude, are of l , Un difcedrdirig.;to% list of ' designe4 solely to prevent member ef the panels,-,, reasonable quality. The !? general 4iews of tht panel Shoreharn's operation.. The corisensus. Iterns cons empses s i / %doctinidnle'd.*IW.iccent . D e p u by Count y ' -s s $ if 'lhiediaYeports.'id-8. - ! Executive Frank Jones - ' ',Iri a list of 101cqnsenius } said he felt "vimBeated" [f. W *. h* f a. I I6 i. - it'emis serving k'"to the full rep.aNbretude J by.thelindings.J:What the,. ) j .commissioh has sald is that l5te/ thi htonth;fth'e)3 ort: expected. I f everything'iwe. did'last ~ ~ ' ' ' i '~ 4 niegn{oef 1 insl* sts'i 'gon-~ ' 1Fetiruary.w'as reisohable. i + II gg- .f Y ', MugtielsflEd at'$hohhamd.['tpIra eJhe,pbinijd'oold)bIIILQ jdMo&}iss[elyst, 4 64 the
- plant.
r j T' > %- #d( MyT *'" C fdda),lndthat(ond tsland" g evacuation would be a tr D , l'.dheseditillit)to'operafell.T ~p charade, the"($tgfil not" '@t.lghtingfCompailyyJapkO 1 t Q needed, and the economics - " '. Pulltichitf6bseTrv'ers$ simply are, not, there. i .~ M HAPPYf'HAN G G These two chltdren symh
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Thankigiving Dsyi"5 lOlning together for the offering of,( .t
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bollte th 'M Litf0's Charles;.Salit I j tha'nRs5forn the ; abundant, harvest, and the spirit.cf. , reporter; from :a Long fitlownlp'.thit,llhksbeople of different origini with'the -.' island ~ daily lold panel c conceded the findings were s disheartening, but pointed bounds of. friend' hip'a.Suffolk Life offers ourJeaders our;24Amembers who gathered to i very best"wlshes for haphy. holiday, with the hope your, . view and discuss t he, out that the commission's ]j . list of reasons for,gliting thanks is a past with rich rewards,,,','. document for the first time final report has yet to be j and a future'of bright hope.' Happy Thanksgtving. Photo,'., on Saturday, that his issued. "This does not j by Jean Worthington.. ( publication already had it. necessarily represent the opinions of everyone on the ] ) 4
n. i 0 itI5.. 6Ti.f. ci,kBM.:.amn.n.. W. t wen f n - .,..w..c. =. e ~:- .e county
- consultants are,. quality of cemetracticeiand e
- .,, Jand,their* reports Indicateu neiuser eas.reputalde
- la,their fleidsg.aparation;whouc la ' fact,-
_P deep'. j and :.~releviatj ' r,guem" provide.secb .,- 4. W.r j technical knowledge of thet< v,De NRC's deGeetion ofr issues ;with ~which they+ (consideratioe> '. of. the } ' doek.the ceasemus found.L *emergener plasming issue ; 1 The f consultants, had *, until the plaat. had been, 4 I comeloded. that-as - substantiauy-cornpieted.. I aveeustion' of the.'aroe(,"does not snake sense; and, withis i 20- miles. olethe governor's request that;. Shoreham condd take;:30 Tfsel.not be loaded at.. [ {,.. hours,amid that 4.300'destd Shoreham untd the leeue isL and i,additionaMaleet,'resolyed,gis e reaseeable.,f (' I, cancers could occur'la'a,. reports 4 edientet com - 1 I successful evacuations F ~ =iamia="(rasabersefoundJ5 i Pt.ANTPOORLYStTED w.Siacai.jiuffolk, Count 7s.. De fact fineng panel's oppoantion to the reactor's' conclusion that the plaar lir.* operaties,p'isW,. e not, ) ,.*?.m i,-arguems.tu.d womia.ets.or."A SullbDr-the- ' T., M the few major reeds isp ' demandlaterventle'sby the e 'Jhe5 arearn weeld;. make a state to breek'the licemeing t} M.Shoreha's, accident.difi h impesse sCueinschasVrepeatedy ' stated that'he l '.evacuadesla theevent of a. ficult, if not impossible." ? ' Woulddast',8fsp,ose!' n3 a According to the report! Cemergency.fplamb for*2 the~ panel agrees that the.Shoreham ee'Suffolk/ 'l
- Shorehara,. plaatt?will y 24 Det===3=adaat found 4 probably provet te) haveM.thatidotermiaing,.how?
been' a anistake is the sanom Shoreham's ihorrendous S that everyone.might.have. finnahnal impilcations ' ig ~~ w g been better off'If this plaarll' beffesolved' la-a; more. had never been 6uut.. De13' pressing",qu'estloa thia;], n" NRCadmits that the, region;g whethergreactorf wiH, i woulds-e probably.ti be40persfer, or<;.*notf-fand. regarded ask tes. dan==Ay,f,4 7 recoauneuled the burden' f popidated ta' age berushared4by t utilityu j licensable isite. under.. stockholders'or New York 3 current sidsigt leesi i State taxpe'ersi., *f. y y ~'RUNSHORDIAW[*, *f tbifle==ialbenents which' } . LICCO UNFIT'lO . ' The panel also found that ;~ l Despite the controversial
- could.2. result. from;
- 18-year-history. of. the' ',Shoreham'ar' operation ars -
Shoreham, project,= com-. Islime and that, abend masseen members begeve.: donmentof the plant wondd g g4 LII4tT* didfatt* " prepare 'not cost much morv than 1 adequately for'iti-foray'.d' letting it go on'line? De-- 4 l Into the technology of ~..commissiost staff ~found[.- l nucleiar' power, and stia rates would be six points: l !acks' credibility' as an higher in an abandonment L operatedof a nuclear plant. scenario, but"some pensif , Testimony ~ on LILCO's members have argued that. 'g q u a ll t yt.1, a a a u r a a c.es.{the projections were based Ja, programs. and: operator ** on outdated figurse J and-confidencesis?thdf,.Tatilityg;.. thit aheadan=ent,would.. trainingf did: notQnspire. i be'more attractive in !!sht.. among commission of =' ongoing' problems. ( members.;M".OVW.J.g"/Recent~aarimates place the.=: .In.the opinion', f mostM. cost.of the plant at 34 o ' commissionn>nemberi, p, billion, far. higher.than the,,, LILCO has too oftes. 33.4 billion. con 7 responded to criticisms by.';J the stafL4 %gidered by pomting,to its success in ' Ds c'npleted report is , satisfying. regulatory J expec ;- rasch Cuotao agencies, rather than upon.' - by ear., % bor, atd he independent conviction of has said as - I make his what needed to be done, position on ths Sheeham ~ Criticism,was also aimed. issue known by early next at federal regulatory, year. agencies, the NRC and its ne NRC, meanwhile, is predecessor, the Atomic scheduled to begm hearing Energy Coenrnission, for tesumony on LILCO's own, offering the impression worker implemented that approvals by both emergency plan in early gave insursoces of the - December. m...n , ~. -.-..._,.c ..-__.m m, .r,---- ___.c-
ReportbyState'sShorehamPaneli Criticizes PlanningandHigh Costi 4 a ayIWATINEWL WA[.D v _ HAUPPAUGE, LI., Dec.14 - The ham, given by its members in recent weeks. Long Island Lighting en-pany made a Hm atanewsconferenceinthe i mistake when it doculed to butid the tagislative Auditortan at the County l Shoreham reactor,was not prepared to OfDos Complex here, bickering broise supervise its construction and is not outannengtbseven enemie=6an mom. ready to run the nearly comoisted bars present over whether the 10 con. Plant, according to a special penet ap. ? a ca===a-a view. pointedbyGovernorCuomo. chastons..r._ N panel, which released its report As Leon J. Campo, a school adminie. today after a six-mooth study, said, mkEastMeadowanda h "The economicimpact of Shorehamon W read from the h Longialand whetheritceperstesornot, Dr. Winissa J. Ronan, another men. is11kelytobe esvare. bar, interrupted. Dr. Ronan, a former Tne saving to be realised by running r h enPage35 Celaamt the power plant-as cpposed to aben. damng it - were small relative to its - u.Gw. cost of nearly H hillion, the panel said. and there might be no saving at all. It also-said that the plant's electricity would not be needed foratleast10 years. en-.6 e==' With Drafts The 13-member group, which IE ~ cluded proponents and opponents of Shoreham, issued two and a half pages of " general conclueicas" and more than 100 pages of diamantint views, clarifications, amplifications and addi. tional observations by individual mem. bers or small group 5 of enmmteeinn I membets. l 'Ibe plant is 55 miles east of Manhat. tan, on the north shore of Suffolk Coun. ty. The final report was generally con. sistent with the findings of drafts and descriptions of the wcrk of the panel, I l the Governor's Comimetan on Shore. l i l l 4 l
ShueeiamPanal " ' ' ~ ~ ~ *
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A spokesman for 1.11co, Judith Brab. ham, said tonight that the company n, FGUliSDQnnW b** *
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but that the caroumstances of its re. le "would seem to inmeate that And Costs -- as. _g_r~ mm e - was and the had toolittle time to thor. aview and analyn an of the CondamedFrom Pese A1 An assistant county executive. Frank /v chairman of the Metropolitan Trans. Jones, said Suffolk hr.d not had time to .%) portation Authority and now vice chair. Among the conclusions described in fomulatearescuan, h man of C.C.X. lac. of Carle Place, the report as "enagulattana of consen. said- "Nhere has been no consensus. This ,"g ' does not roptesent the majonty opin. q"It is dear that the existance of a g ion, haranan there was no majority enmpiarani nudear power plam is a g voteevertaken." powerfulincentive to find reasons to "I want this dear that there's a die. grant an operating hcense." the study 90 agreement," Dr. Rocan said. Dr. John said. It criticized the Federal Nuclear A-H. Marburger 3d, chairman of the Regulatory Commission for leaving consideranon of emergency ptanning panel, attempted to quiet him, promis, untiltheplantwas almost ftniahant L ingthatbecouldspeaknext. 9Before Suffolk reached its decision 5 Later, when Dr. Ronan was asked that emergency planning was impossi. A ow manysessions he had attended,as ble and the reactor should not open. It h he rephed, "De bulk of them." an. had commismaried sadies "of reason. other member of the panel, Marge Har,. able quality' on the question. How. rison, co chairman of the Long, falan, ever, "tne county position is a result of 8 Progressive Coantion, an anti.Shoro. guanctal, ut purely sdentific or ham group, abook her head toindicate tactmical, processes," the panel found. the esagreed, 9"1.11co sc not papan itself ad. Answersin Another Pa'st equately for its foray into the tech. The panel has ban mwfficially nology of nuclear power. and still lacks caued the Martnarger enmmwan, credibility as an operator of a nudear after its chairman, who is president of powerplant." ( the State University of New York at (Facause,the report said, Shoreham Stony Brook. Dr. Marburger said the would be expensive ta run and maynot mmmteston had developed answers to operate reliably, "it is not obvious that xbe nine specific questians asked by the failure to operate the plant would be Governor - indudng whether the tantamnunt to economic suicide for the electridty was neocad, what the risks state orthe region." of operation would be and whether the 1"The Shoreham piant willprobably state should step in to insure the plant prcve to have been a mistake in the couldopen. sense that everyone might have been He said the answers had not been ap. better off if the plant had never been by all of the commiseion mem. built " the report said. It added that .ne answers werein a part of the new delays created by the discovery of report separt te from th3 conclusions. !!aws in three emergency diesei gener. Amongthe answerswas a conclusion stors,mayremove whatever economic that Mr. Cuomo not step in to break an benefit remains by adding to the cost of impasse between 1.ilco and Suffolk thereactor. Countyaemergucyplanning. 31JMIRion aDayinIhterest The licensing of the plant is threat. De Engawattplantis scheduled ened by the dispute, in which the 2 open in January 12, if the diend county has conduded that emergency geeramrs can be made m work p@ panntne for the site is impossible and erty, accordmg to the utihty. If them l thatthe reactorshould open. are further problems with the genera. RoleofSuffolkCoum7 tors, Lilco has said that Shotoham may Accortling to Federal offidals, the notopenuntila yearlater. plant might be licensed without the As the plant sits idle, the interest participation of Suffolk, if the state charges on the more than 53 binion al. took on the role usually filled by a local ready invested init come to $1.2 million government in developing and testing a day, an emergency plan. The officials have According to Shoreham opponents, said licensing would be unlikely with. the cost of the plant is co!c-TS 7::!g. out either state or county participation. ments about safety. According to Mrs. De Governor had asked the panelto Harrison, "If it were not for the ques. determine whether Suffolk was acting tion of the investment, we would prob. properly in trying to block the plant. nbly be here today preparing to go out Governcr Cuomo issued a statement to a ribborw:utting ceremony, where Governor Cuomo would be opening the todaysaytag: Shorehamantinuclearmuseum." "I am pleased to receive the report i l from the Marburger Commission. I ap-Dr.Marburgersaid about the cost: preciate the extraordinary amount of "In hmdsignt, I think it was a mis. time and energy comributed by the dis. take. The question is, so what?" The tmgmshed members. The commis. problem now, he said, was to deter. ston's exposition of facts sur:cundmg minewhat should be done. the Shortham controversy indicates the wide spectrum of uncertainty REMEMBERTHE NggDIESTI whichstiu exists." 1 .aw -g-_ ,y,-
4 ATTACHMENT 6 Resolution of Mount Sinai Parents Teachers s Organization 8/15/83 - Resolution of Middle Country Central School District Board of Education 11/7/83 - Resolution of Middle Count.ry Central School District Board of Education 9/1/83 - Resolution of Miller Place Union Free School District Resolution of Mt. Sinai Teachers' Association 9/29/83 - Resolution of Middle Island Central School District's Board of Education - Resolution of Saint Andrew's School Board a 11/16/83 - Resolution of Sound Beach Pre-School Co-Op 12/7/83 - Statement of William Floyd Union Free School District Board of Education - Resolution of Board of Trustees of The New Interdisciplinary School e J l ~
t l Mount Sinal Parents Teachers Organization l North Country Road l 'f.e Jan3I Mount sinai. new York iirss o., 9,. ee Sai'.uSZ*j' 25e 18)O4 l 1 .O.. h CO 10.2y CCnCcrtis j
- 'erc is a recoluihor a:io;.ter 1y the t.
iinci . !. i. I conecrr.irc the licencirc of t! c J,orob==. uc1 car i cuer fler.t. l l l r idar. ercer i rouir.ont l l, o ,._ = a 90
s I.T. SINAI FAhEhT TEACHEn OhGANIZATICh--DRAFT nESCLUTIch WHEhEAS, the 1.t. Sinai Parent Teacher Organization, having dis-cussed LILCO's emergency evacuation plan for schools in the event of a nuclear accident at the Shoreham plant, wishes to advise the Nuclear negulatory Commission's Shoreham licensing board of the plan's workability for its community: and l WHEREAS, LILCO's emergency evacuation plan is dependent on our schools' early dismissal procedures: and t l l WHEREAS, this PTO has considered the following weaknesses in the LILCO evacuation plant
- 1. Transportation We are certain that the required number of buses and
' drivers for successful early dismissal will not -be available to the schools. Drivers may need to attend to the safety of their own families first and may re-fuse to drive school buses. Furthermore, because of the shortage of buses in our school district, transporting children from school to home normally necessitates three bus shifts. Consequently, there is no possibility of a quick evacuation.
- 2. Needs of School Personnel We are certain that not all teaching and non-teaching personnel will stay in ' schools to supervise early dis-missal.
kany of the teaching'and non-teaching staff will leave school to attend to the needs of their own families. Consequently, not enough school personnel will be available to attend to emergency-related jobs. A tescher survey conducted in the v.t. Sinai ' school dis-trict indicated that a majority of the teachers would not remain in school to supervise emergency procedures.
- 3. Lack of Parental Supervision Should there be a nuclear accident at the Shoreham plant, the success of an early dismissal plan depends not only 9
on prompt dismissal from. the schools, but on prompt evacuation of children from their homes as well. It. is probable, however,, that many panic-stricken children will be locked out of their homes: or that even if these children can enter their homes their parents will not-be present to carry out the necessary second part of an l evacuation. j
- 4. Parental Intercession We cannot be assured that all parents will wait at home for their children to arrive, l..any parents will attempt
.to retrieve their children at schools, thereby increasing confusion and chaos. l l
i I
- p. 2--RES01UTION
- 5. Panic
'The announcement of a nuclear emergency at Shoreham will cause disorientation and panic in children, tea-chers, non-teaching staff, and parents. This will further hinder effective and safe dismissal from our schools.
- 6. Relocation If an emergency at Shoreham requires evacuating our children from schools directly to a relocation center, our school district would be unable to handle this situation effectively.
(See #1, Transportation)
- 7. Supervision at helocation Centers Cnce again we are certain that teaching and/or non-teaching school personnel will not all travel to and remain at relocation centers to supervise children for a possibly indefinite period of time.
The Mt. Sinai teacher survey showed that over 70% of the teachers i would have left for their own homes after the first hour, and that a majority of the teachers would refuse to accompany children to relocation centers.
- 8. Shelterina The LILCO plan suggests that sheltering, rather than evacuating, mgy be' the preferred protective action in schools in spe'cific Shoreham emergencies.
The Lt. Sinai school district has one basement in its elementary school. The size and function (for furnace and boiler facilities and the storage of extra furniture) of this basement preclude the sheltering of all but a small L number of our school population.
- 9. Trust in Public Information In the LILGO plan, the only source of public information l
during an emergency is LILCO itself. As a result of LILCC s past statements and actions with regard to Shoreham, many of us in our community are already skeptical of LILCO's words and intentions. The fact that LILCO might also be involved in a conflict of interest--being both operator of the plant and initiator of emergency actions--would tend to intensify doubts about the validity of LILCO's information during an energ ency. New, be it therefore RESOL'.SD, that the I.t. Sinai Parent Teacher Organization finds that LILCu's emergency plans for our schools do not offer us. adequate protection or quick and ef fective evacuation for our children in the event of an accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plants and l n._- p 7
i I p. 3--RESOLUTION hESOLVED, that we agree with our Suffolk County legislators j that in fact no safe evacuation of our community is possiblet and RESCLVED, that we believe that a full-power license should not be granted to the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant. i i 6 I 1 I l l 6 I t 1 l l l 9 i +- -,ww --m-- w -w,,w w =--m y-w----m-n v ,mr-wwy -w-ee n,mv v-, 4
11/7/A3;,.... Mr Yolanda Puterio, Pres of the Middle Country ] Sec terial Association to er a statement re: ~ i negot tions. s A repres totive of Andrea Do Lodge r sted-considerats of d participation tr lumbus I Day Parade n t ar. Arlene Po eski, Hawkins Path PT oe t upon the success the Hal en Party Hawkins th; to ahis the Board of Then e Club activi and re sted that there t when the report ft tree is dis ed. Jennie
- tro, kins Pa 5 to ca m e u the underbrush lon Boyle Road the need or sidewalks there.
Robert gel r substitute to r placeasaf Probeynhn rs: .out dicap
- students, ffered his services k regard.
x 8 Superintendent s Report. SUPERINTENDENT 85 Mrs. Adler led discussion concerning the resolution MEPORT g adopted last year and re-affirmed on August 15,1983 3 to wit: 8 WHERE&B, the Middle Country Central School District s Board of Education has as its prime concern the welfare of the children of the School District and S}OREHAM POWER WHEREAS, the Long Island Lighting Company has not been PLANT able to insure that its proposed Shoreham Power Plant can meet acceptable safety standards, and WHEREAS, no acceptable evacuation plan has been devised by the long Island Lighting Company and Suffolk County BE IT RESOLVED that the Board of Education in the interest of protecting the welfare of the children of Middle Country does hereby go on record as opposed to the opening of the Shoreham Power Plant until both an acceptable safety standard can be met and an eaceptable evacuation plan can be developed. Mrs. Adler asked the Board to consider that the above stated resolution might be sufficient and there would be no need to go further. w g p, .,n-- g-<n-g---- .,,,,,,.r
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l.43 I The following resolution was offered by Gallo, who 11/7/33 e,s. moved its adoption, secon ed d by Durkin to wits l .s WHEREAS, federal regulations for full power operation .of the Shoreham Muelear Power Plant require an emer-gency plan for communities surrounding the plant which will assure those communities adequate protection in eveny of a nuclear emergency; and ( WHEREAS, the County of Suffolk has determined, after substantive study and lengthy hearings, that no emer-gency plan can be developed to provida citizens sufficient protection in a Shoreham emergency; and WHEREAS, the County of Suffolk has therefore concluded that it cannot, in good faith, prepara or implement an emergency plan, or support full power operation of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant; and WIBREAS, the long Island Lighting Company, in an effort j to meet federal regulations, has prepared an emergency plan which only LILCO, lacking coordination with local l or state governments, will attempt to implement; and WHEREAS, the Nuclear Regulatory ==4 =sion's Shoreham licensing board is now conducting hearings to review l the adequacy of the LI140 emergency plan; and l WHEREAS, the LI140 emergency plan includes protective actions to be taken by schools; and WHEREAS, this board of education, having reviewed LII40's emergency plan for schools, and having discussed those plans with concerned parents,' wishes to advise the NRC's Shoreham licensing board of the plan's workability for its district; and WHEREAS, this board has identified the following weak-nesses in the LII40 emergency plan: 1. Early Dismissal Normal early dismissal procedures, which l LI140's plan incorporates, cannot bring I children to uncontaminated areas quickly enough to protect their health and safety. 2. Transportation We cannot guarantee that the requisite number l of buses and drivers required for successful l l l l
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l l early 44==4= sal will be available to the /7/83 schools. Drivers may need to first attend ,.w..- to the safety of their own families and may-decline to drive school buses. This will prolong childrens' stay at schools in non-taminated. areas. a
- 3. Needs of School Personnel We cannot guarantee that teaching and non-teaching personnel will stay in schools to supervise early dismissal. These teachers, and staff may need to attend to the safety of their own families and therefore may not be available to perform emergency-related tasks.
4.14ck of Parental Supervision The success of an early di==4= sal plan depends .not only on prompt dismissal from schools, but on pruapt evacuation of children from their homes. In cases in which parents will not be at home during the day, children will be sent to unsupervised homes from which they will not be able to evacuate promptly. S. farental Intercession We cannot be confident that parents will wait at home for their children to arrive. Many parents map.:. attempt to retrieve their children at schools, perhaps causing increased confusion and chaos.
- 6. Panic An announcement of a nuclear emergency at shoreham may cause disorientation and panic in children, l
teachers, non-teaching staff, and parents. Thim will further prohibit effective, safe di.=i= sal from schools.
- 7. Relocation l
If a Shoreham emergency develops quickly and requires an evacuation of children from schools directly to relocation casters, this district will not have sufficient buses or drivers to transport all children to relocation centers in a timely, 3 efficient manner.
- 8. Supervision at Relocation Centers l
Wecannotguaranteethatteachingand/ornon-1 tenching school personnel will travel to and I l rannin at relocation centers to supervise children 8 i i .i
\\ s .L ~t e) I. 1 until parents arrive to retrieve them. 11/7/g3
- 9. Sheltering The LILCQ plan suggests that sheltering (remaining indoors) may be the. preferred protective action in specific Shoreham emergencies. However, many of this district's schools do not have basements or other structures necessary to provide adequate protection.
- 10. Trust in Public Information In the LIIIO plan, the only public information upon which to base decisions for protective actions will come from the utility. LIII0, through its Public Schools Coordinator and WALK-AM Radio, will l
both describe the extent of the emergency and I recommend actions. Because LII40 would be both operator of;the plant and initator of emergency actions, potential for conflict of interest exists. School Administrators, receiving information only' from LIII0 and not from any governmental agency, will be forced to decide upon actions with potentially j serious consequences without the benefit of information from an objective source.
- 11. Indemnification LIII0 does not provide 4=hification for school j
disteimts should damages, injuries, or deaths result I from school Wai=trators' decisions during an l emergency, decisions which can be based only upon information and rec-- -'=tions offered by LII40. Now,.be it.therefore this school district finds that LIIro's emergency RESOLVED, that plans for schools do not offer children school personnel, or parents of this district adequate protection in event of an accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant; and be it further this school board cannot direct its schools to RESOLVED, that initiate or pai-ticipate in emergency actions which not only' fail to protect childrens' safety, but place it in further jeopardy; and, he it further RESOLVED, that this school board believes that full power licensing of.The Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant should be forbidden unless or until complete and reasonable resolution of these outstanding, critical emergency planning problems.can be achieved. 9 e-e e-w wp+,--.--=-----w.e. .w,---w---.m-- - -,- - - ~ -,e--y e--,--e+,-w.-, ,e -m--
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gM. q (_y DOCKET NUMBER PP00. S. UTIL FAC. MILLER PLACE UNION F)kEstSCHOOL DISTRICT MHlIR PLACE.NEN YdRK 11764 (316).47:N)123 SOARD OF EOUCATION '83 SP 19 P2'49 aoMiNiSTRAriON RAYMOND E. EVANS. President DR. JAMES B. 80YO. Supenntencent WILLIAM H. MINE Vice Premioent MARGARET M. FINN. Administrative Asst. ANTHONY RIZZUTO
- l.. c Sti.RtW.
JOHN F. MARINO. Business Administrator SUSAN A. SOKEL '.~ i ' It:G !. SERY:Cf JANIS M. WALSH i:P. A NC!i SERVED SEP 201983 September 15, 1983 Commissioner Nunzio Palladino U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 s
Dear Commissioner Palladino:
Shoreham Nuclear Plant I call your attention to the enclosed Resolution which was passed by the Miller Place Board of Education on September 1, 1983. Very truly yours, (h
- /
\\ ames B. Boyd' erintendent JBB:ps Enclosure
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MILLER PLACE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT Miller Place, New York 11764 SCHOOL BOARD RESOLUTION WEEREAS, federal regulations for full power operation of the Shore-ham Nuclear Plant require an emergency plan for communities surrounding the plant which will assure those communities adequate protection in event of a nuclear emergency; and WHEREAS, the Long Island Lighting Company, in an effort to meet federal regulations, has prepared an emergency plan which LILCO, lacking coordination with local or state governments, will attempt to implement; and WHEREAS, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Shoreham licensing board is now conducting hearings to review the adequacy of the LILCO emergency plan; and WEEREAS, the LILCO emergency plan includes protective actions to be taken by schools; and WEEREAS, this board has identified the following weaknesses in the LILCO emergency plan: 1. Early Dismissal Our emergency early dismissal procedure, which LILCO's plan incorporates, wouldn't bring school children to an uncontaminated area quickly enough to protect their health and safety. 2. Transportation s Tne requisite number of buses and drivers required for successful early dismissal are not available to the schools. This will prolong childrens' stay at schools in contaminated areas. 3. Needs of School Personnel We cannot guarantee that teaching and non-teaching personnel will stay in schools to supervise early dismissal. These teachers and staff may need to attend to the safety of their own families and,. therefore, may not be available to perform emergency-related tasks. 4, Lack of Parental' S'upervision The success of an early dismissal plan depends not only on prompt dismissal from schools, but on prompt evacua-tion of children from their homes. In those cases in which parents will not be at home during the day, children will be sent to unsupervised homes from which they will not be able to evacuate promptly. 5. Parental Tntercession we cannot ce confident that parents will wait at home for their children to arrive. Many parents may attempt j
MillOr Pla,03 UFSD Bocrd Resolution l to retrieve their children at schools, perhaps causing increased confusion and chaos. 6. Relocation If a Shoreham emergency develops quickly and requires an evacuation of children from schools directly to relocation centers, this district does not have sufficient buses or drivers to transport all children to relocation centers in a timely, effective manner. 7. Suoervision at Relocation Centers We cannot guarantee ena teacning and/or non-teaching school personnel will travel to and remain at relocation centers to supervise school children until parents arrive to retrieve them. 8. Sheltering The LILCO plan suggests that sheltering (remaining indoors) may be the preferred protective action in specific Shoreham emergencies. However, none of this district's schools have basements or other structures necessary to provide adequate protection. 9. Trust in Public Information In the LILCO plan, the only public information upon which to base. decisions for protective actions will come from the utility. LILCO, through its Public Schools Coordina-ter and WALK-AM Radio, will both describe the extent of the emergency and recommend actions. Because LILCO would be both operator of the plant and initiator of emergency actions, potential for conflict of interest exists. School administrators, receiving information only from LILCO and not from any governmental agency, will be forced to decide upon actions with potentially serious consequences without the benefit of a directive from a responsible governmental source. 10. Indemnification LILCO does not provide indemnification for school districts should damages, injuries, or deaths result from school administrators' decisions during an emergency, decisions which can be made based cnly upon information and recom-mendations offered by LILCO. Now, be it therefore -RESOLVED, that the Miller Place Union Free School District finds that LILCO's emergency plans for schools do not offer children or school persennel of this district adequate protection in event of an accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Plant; and, be it further
O e 3-Board Resolution Miller Pluce UFSD RESOLVED, that this school board believes that licensing of the Shoreham Nuclear Plant should not be permitted unless or until complete and reasonable resolution of these outstanding, critical emergency planning problems can be achieved. The above Resolution was passed by the Miller Place Union Free School District Board of Education at the Board Meeting on September 1, 1983. O ul d s- / John'F. Marg,o // District Clerk L e .y,---,- y _e.m -,.4-,,- ,,,,.y-. ,,y, ,m,., _y..- -.-g
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- UHEREAS, federal regulations for full power operation of the Shoreham Nuclear Plant require an energency plan for communities surrounding the plant which win assure those communities adequate protection in event of a nuclear emergency; and
- WHDIEAS, the Long Island Lighting Company, in an effort to meet federal regulations, has prepared an emergency plan which LILCO, larWg coordination with local or state governmenta, win attempt to implement; and
- UEREAS, the LILOO emergency plan includes protective actions to be taken by schoolag and
- UHEREAS, this association has identified.the following weaknesses in the LILCO emergency plan 1.
Early Dismissal our emergency early dismissal procedure, which LILCO's plan incorporatss; wouldn't bring school children to an uncontaminated area quickly enough to protect their health and safety. 2. Transmrtation The requisite number of buses and drivers required for successful early dismissal are not available to the schools. This win prolong childrens' stay at schools in con +m=4nated areas.
- 3. Needs of Teachers We cannot guarantee that the teachers win stay in schools to supervise early dismissal. Many of us any need to attend to the safety of our own families and, therefore, any not be avtilable to perform emergency-related tasks.
l 4. Lack of Parental Sum vision l The success of an early dismissal plan depends not only on prompt j dismissal from schools, but on prompt evacuation of children from their, homes. In those cases in which parents will not be at home during the day, children win be sent to unsupervised homes fvna which they win not be able to evacuate promptly. 5 Parental Intercession .We cannot be confident that parents will wait at home for their children to a:Tive. Many parents may attempt to ret =ieve their children at l schools, perhaps causing increased confusion and chaos. 6. Relocation If a Snoreham emergency develops quickly and requires an evacuation of children from schools directly to relocation centers, this district does not have sufficient buses or drivers to transport all children to ralocation centers in a timely, effective manner.
t c g T E A C H E R S' A5SOClATIoN f I i Un MT. 54NM, NEW YORK 11794 516 4734321 Mt. Sinai Teachers' Assan. RISCLU': ION - page 2 7. Supervis' ion at Relocation Centers iie cannot guarantee tnat teacners will travel to and remain at relocation centers to supervise school children until parents ar:-ive to retrieve them. 8. Trust in Public Informstion in tne LILOO plan, tne only public information upon which to base decisions for protective actions will come from the utility. LILOO, through its Public Schools Coordinator and WALK-AM Radio, will both describe the extent of the emergency and recommend actions. Because LILCO would be both operator of the plant and initiator of emergency actions, potential for conflict of interest exists. School =A=4 ni strators, receiving information only from LILCO and not from any governmental agency, will be forced to decide upon actions with potentially serious, consequences without the benefit of a directive from a responsible governmental sodres. Now, be it therefore
- RISOLVED, that the Mount Sinai Teachers Association finds that LILOO's emergency plans for schools do not offer chi dran or school personnel of this district adequate protection in event of an accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Plants I
and, be it further
- RESOLVED, that this association believes that licensing of the Shoreham Nuclear Plant should not be permitted unless or until complete and reasonable l
resolution of these outstanding, critical emergency f =anhg problems can be achieved. 9 6 0 e O
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T E A C H E R S' ASSOCIATION J V A. At m 2b Mt.$4NAt.NEW YORK 11764 516 473 4321 I have read the, Mount Sinai Teachers' Association Resolution on the Shoreham Nuclear Plant. I support the Association's Resolution. NAE NAME W k,,, ss, $% i.>E+ bCw VG:et /X./t]ikdy T.E Y .Ls n%~ V E L % K dea Lutur %t. Gwokasta g J ?J.,6d- &nf%Q kwmJW 4 co 2. 6%ua 01, / ALL /L. xaC.w- &st &f%, JA .i L A' La5 HLa (/ L % G Buub Lon Gy&x ?AiA AR L QB P& //Awat - A h d 1_ h y l __ f ' Os,. Ci;sw 4' %- l 'i&<A 4 Maff I /.1.(j%:s (%a m Auss BaLw LA 1 (19,., MA., l ' L,.,, P!Aa ~ wa
I / s-r, / T V T E A C H E R S' A55OClATIoN b o MT. SIN Al. NEW YORE ll?$$ $16 4734321 I have read the Mount Sinai Teachers' Association Resolution on the Shoreham Nuclear Plant. I support the Association's .1 1 2
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C.. ?:.~ '."'.'.~.\\..5. 0....3. 9.3... 0.,k..3 MIDDLE ISLAND CENTRAL SCHOOLS MIDDLE ISLAND. YADHANK ROAD - MIDDLE ISLAND. NEW YORK 11953 516.H52788 dc N!CK F. MUTO ,M BOAP.D OF EDUCATION Suorm* *no'a' /, ' {,s Gears. L Pnsiin. Pressoent N' NNE aam E.$$ VMh o.-i Tre- ,e x oen,ei JACQ' T !NE LANZARONE h f.) h ( Arend Benren. Annerne Longo Ds:rci Cee k i / Puee Peshmi James Rufhn 0FF;0E 0'sMbss.. 00CKEilliG 6 xb '- BRANCH SERVED OCT 251953 october 3, 1983 James A. Laurenson, Chairman Atomic Safety a.d Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear'te. Laurenson,
Please ne advised that the attached School Board Resciution was adopted at a regular meeting of the t'.iddle Island Central School District's Board of Education on September 29, 1983. Very truly yours, Lori D'Amico District Clerk / lad ~
n- !lU. TI. 7.;t W cc,: inta. 3:rt..0L tris;n;c-MITii,0T. IUUa'D, 2.7 YO7I 000KEik* USNE SCF.OOL DOhnD F2 SOLUTION y bc TirFIAC, fedcral regulations for full poucr, operation of the Sh ham Nuclear Plant require an emergency plan for communities ECEdt.. surroundingthe.plantwhichwillassurethosc'commggi,gkkEM-adequate protection in event of a nuclear emergency, ~dCPIliS, the Long Island Lighting Company, in an effc'rt to mect federal regulations, has prepared an emergency plan which lacking coordinaticn vtith local or state governments,
- LILCO, will.nttempt to implement; and the Nuc1 ar Regulatory Commissisn's'Shorcham licensing 9.IPIAS, benrd is new conduc-Sng hearings to review the adequacy of the LILCO,.merc.enev. c.lan; and' e
the J.ILCO emergency plan includes protective actions to be 3 F.E P I A S, taken by schools; and ifdEPIAS, this board has identific5 the following weaknesses in the LILCO cmcrgency plan: Early Dismissal Cur ca.:crgency early dismissel procedure, which;LILCO's ' 1.- plan incorporates, wouldn't bring school children toan unco ~ ' health and safety. 2.' Transoortation Tne requisite number of buses and drivers required for successful carly dismissal are'not available to the schools. This will prolong childrens' stay at schools-in contaminated' areas. Uccdc of Echool Personnel teaching and non--teaching 3. We cannot gueruntee that personnel will stay in schools to supervise earlyThese teache ' dismissal. therefore, mcy to the safety of their own families and, not be available t'o, perform emergency-related tasks. Lach of ?drental'Succrvi'sion Tne sue = css of an early decmissal plan depends not only 4. on prompt dismissal froia schools, but on prompt eyacua-tion of children from their homes. ~ In those cases in which narcnts will not be at home during the-day, children will b'e sent to unsupervised homes from which they will not be abic to evacuate promptly. 5. Parental Intercension that parents will wait s' home We cannot ce conn. dent for their children to arrive.,Many parents may attempt .m. w-y-, ,y. ..w- - - - - -.. - + - - - - <
'~- s ; nueu CI,::!;nt SCn00L' DIS nICT -3 card Resolution to retrieve their children at schools, perhaps' causing increased confusion and chaos. Relocation 6. If a Snoreham emergency develops quickly and requires an evacuation of children from schools directly to relocation this district does not have sufficient buses or
- centers, drivers to transport all children to relocation centers in a timely, effective manner.
Supervision at Relocation Centers 7. guaranree tnat teaching and/or non-teaching We cannot school personnel will travel to and remain at relocat. ion centers to supervise school children until parents arrive to retrieve them. Shelterinc' (remaining indoors) B. The LILCO plan suggests that sheltering nay be the preferred protective action in specific Shoreham However, none of this district's schools emergencies. have basements or other structures necessary to provide. adequate protection. Trust in Public Information' In une LILCO plan, une only public information upon which 9. to base decisions for protective actions will come.from througn'its ?ublic Schools Coordina-the utility.
- LILCO, tor and HALK-AM Radio, will both describe the extent of Because LILCO would the emergency and recom=end actions.
~ be both operator of the plant and initiator of' emergency. School actions, potential for conflict of interest exists. administrators, receiving information only from LILCO and from any. governmental agency, will be forced to decide upon actions with potentially serious consequences w not source. Indemnification LILCO does not provide indemnification for school districts l 10. should damages, injuries, er deaths result from school administrntors' decisions during an emergency, decisions which'can be made based only upon information and recom-mandations' offered by LILCO. Now, be it therefore ' District f n s that i d that the >Eddie Island Central School
- LILCO's emergency plans.for schools do not offer children or
- RESOLVED, school personnel of this district adequate protection in and, be.
, event of an accident at the Shorcham Nuclcar Plant; it further ,-w-,. .--,,-w .,,m% ...-,4- ~, e- - -.-_~
BOARD RESdLU;' ION N.iIDDI.,5.! SLAW CE!!TML SCHOOL DISTRICT that this school bocrd believes that licensing of t.he Shoreham RES0!/?ED, ~ Nuclear Plant'should not be pemitted unless or until co:cplete and reasonable resolution of these outstanding, critical emergency planning problems can be achieved. The above Resolution was passed by the Middle Island Central School District Board of Education at the Board Meeting en September 29, 1983. \\ s ? d $ ')2 f r B ' ~ S 4.L Lori D'Amico District Clerk O e e 9 e O e e n D 6 4 e O + e O 6 0 0 9 9 e-9 9 e -r r = e-- s-- e * - ' - - - - -me-t =w- "r-,++-- t --~w< ---w---
.+ o o DDCKETED ga g*, gy USNRC REC?tvED g j, a 5 10 27 WD d,h,02-9/ I' veer 83 aic-1 P4:29 I I , FF0t.KCOUN OFF.'? 0F Sit?E ;.r. Ey200TIVE C0ChEilHG h SERV:C' gggppAuGE.N.L BRANCH ... 3. 2. 2 "OL-3 ~ SEi;VED DEC " y.;qj , 7.
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Hovember 22, 1983 i ~ Commissioner Nunzio Palladino U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
Dear Mr. Palladino:
Shoreham Nuclear Plant I call your attention to the enclosed Resolution which was passed by the St. Andrew's Schocl Board. Very truly yours, YY M John Blodorn President, School Board J3: nb Enclosure m .w.,--m ,,.----,y.. ,-s-,, v,. -...,_-,--,,g-
t 1 = = l hb k 5 hh. e DOCMETED SAG HARBOR. N. Y.11963 USNP.0 =1
- 83 DEC -1 P4 :29 E
= SCHOOL BOARD RESOLUTION 5 0FFRE OF SEC E gy = GCCKETitlG & SERvici, 3 BRANCH E
- WHEREAS, the County of Suffolk has determined, after E
substantive study and lengthy hearings, 'that no E emergency plan can be developed to provide = citizens sufficient protection in a Shoreham 5 emergency and j =
- WHEREAS, the County of Suffolk.has therefore concluded 5
that it cannot, in good faith, prepare or implement 5. an emergency plan, or support full power operation si of the Shoreham Nuclear Plants and' E' E'
- WHEREAS, the Long Island Lighting Company, in an effort to 5
meet federal regula~tions, has pr,epared an emergency 5 plan which only LIIro, lacking coordination with E local or state governments, will attempto to implements E and Ei 5:
- WHEREAS, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Shoreham licensing 5
board is now conduction hearings to review the adequacy 5 of the LILCO emergency plans and g =-
- WHEREAS, the LILCO emergency plan includes protective actions 5
to be taken by schools and g a
- WHEREAS, this board of education, having reviewed "IIcors' 5
emergency plans for schools, and, having discussed 5 those plans or lack of with concerned parents, wishes to advise the ECR's Shoreham licensing board of the = plan's workability for its. district and Ei l l
- WHEREAS, this board has identified the following weaknesses in 5
the LILCO emergency plan which has excluded the East E End schools, but the following weaknesses still apply E should there be an accident at Shoreham: MM 1. Transportation - We cannot guarantee that the E number of buses and drivers required for. successful 15 early dismissal, in case of a radiological accident, E will be available to the schools. Drivers may need 5 $o first attend to the safety of their own families E End may decline to drive school buses. This will prolong childrens' stay at schools in possibly, is contaminated areas. = m 2. Needs of School Personnel - We cannot guarantee 5 that teaching and non-teaching persennel will stay 2 in schools to supervise students in case of a radiological accident. These teachers and staff may need to attend to the safety of their own fami%as 5 and therefore may not be available to perfcom P
4 ~ ) ~ ' emergency related tasks. 3 Iack of__ Parental Supervis' ion - The success of any dismissal plan depends-not only on prompt dismissal from schools, but on prompt evacuation of children from their homes. In those cases in which. parents will not be at home during the day, children will be sent to unsupervised homes from which they will not be able to evacuate promstLy. 4. Parental Intercession - We cannot be confident that parents will wait at home for their children to arrive. Many parents may attempt to tstrieve their children at schools, perhaps caus124g increased confusion and chaos. S. Panic - An announcement of a nuclear emergency at Shoreham may cause disorientation and panic in children, teachers, non-teaching staff, and parents. This will further prohibit effective, safe dismissal from schools. ~ 6. Eclocation - If a Shoreham emergency develops quickly and requires an evacuatiun of children from schools, this district will not have sufficient buses or drivers to transport all children to their homes in a timely, effective manner. - 7 Shelterine - It is suggested that sheltering (remaining indoors) may be the preferred protective action in specific Shoreham emergencies.
- However, many of this district's schools do not have basements or other structures necessary to provide adequate protection.
8. Tntat in Public Information - East End School administrators receiving, at best, second-hand information, will.be forced to decide upon actions with potentially serious consequences without the benefit of information from an ob,jective source. 9 Indemnification - LILco does not provide indemnification for school districts should damages, in$uries, or deaths resulting from school administators decisions during an emergency, decisions which can be made based only upon infomation and recommendations offered by LILCO. !;CW, BE IT THIEREFORO
- RESOLVED, that this school board finds it impossible to offer children, school peraonnel, and parents of this school adequate protection in the event of an accident at the Shoreham !iuclear Plants and be it further i
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~ j RESOLVED. that this school board cannot direct its schools to iniate or participate in emergency actions which not only fail to protect childrens' safety, but place it in further jeopardy and, be it further RESOLVED. that this school board believes that any power licensing of the Shoreham I;ualear Plant should be forbidden unless or until complete and reasonable resolution of these outstandir.g. critical emergency planning problems can be achievad, and, be it further l
- KESOLVED, that this school board make it known that although I
we have been excluded from any evacuation plan, we cannot guarantee that our staff will remain here in our East End district which could ultimately lead to panic, resulting in a series of incidents of which we cannot take responsibility. The above resolutions was passed by St. Andrew's School Board -as the majority of school families were in agreement with it. dTYd (/fohn 31odorn V President St Andrew's School Board I O A e e r .u_
SoudBeach he-SchoolGo-Op P.O. BOX 308 SOUND BEACH. NEW YORK 11789 RESOLUTION PRESENTED TO THE ME13ERSHIP OF THE SOUND BEACH PRE-SOH00L ON NOVELGER 16, 1983 "WHEREAS, federal regulations for full power operation of the Shoreham Nuclear Plant require an emergency plan for communities surrounding the plant which will assure those communities adequate protection in event of a nuclear emergercy
- and, "WHEREAS, the Long Island Lighting Company, in an effort to meet federal regulations, has prepared an emergency plan which LILOO, lacking coordination with local or state governments, vill atempt to implement; a;d "WHEREAS, the Nuclear Regulatory Ocmmiesion's Shorehsa licensing board is now conduc-ting hearings to review the adequacy of the LILCO emergency plan; and "WHEREAS, the LILCO emergency plan includes protective actions to be taken by the schools, and
"?lHEREAS, this 'voard has identified the following weaknesses in the LILO0 emergency plan : "1 Early Di.smissal Our emergency early dismissal procedure, which LILCO's plan incorporates, would not bring school children to an uncontaminated area quickly enough to protect their health and safety. "2. Transportation In an attempt to retrieve their children, parents will be faced, not only with added road conjestion due to the ongoing evacuation proceedures, but also with the possible conflict regarding older siblings being returned to an empty home while the parent is in transit to and from our school. " 3.' Needs of School Personnel We cannot guarantee that teaching personnel will stay in school to supervise early dismissal. These teachers need to attend to the safety of their own families and, therefore, ma/ not be available to perform emergency related tasks. "4. Notification The sucess of an early dismissal plan depends on prompt dismissal from schools. In those cases in which parents will not be home during the day, the school may not be able to contact them by phone. We must also take into consideration that conjested telephone lines would hamper our attempts to notify parents immediately, d we y -g
' [. Relocation If a Shoreham emergency develops quickly and requires an evacuation of children from school's directly to relocation centers, this school does not have any vehicules or drivers to transport all children to reloca-tion centers in a timely effective manner. "6. Supervision at Relocation Centers We cannot guarantee that teaching or non-teaching personnel could travel to and remain at relocation centers to supervise school children until f parents arrive to retrieve them. "7. Sheltering The LILOO plan suggests that sheltering (remaining indoors) may be the preferred protective action in specific Shoreham emergencies. However, note of this district's schools nor our own school have basements or other structures necessary to provide adequate protection. "8. Trust in Public Information In the LILCO plan, the only public information upon which to base deci-sions for protective actions will come from the utility. LILOO, through its Public Schools Coordinator and WALK AM Radio, will both describe the extent of the emergency and recommend actions. Because LILCO would be both operator of the plant and initiator of emergency actions, potential 1 for cenflict of interest exists. School administrators, receiving infor-mation only from LILCO and not from any governmental agency, will be for-ced to decide upon actions with potentially serious consequences without the benefit of a directive from a responsible governmental source. "9 Indemnification LILCO does not provide indemnification for school districts should dama-ges, injuries, or deaths result from school. administrators decisions during an emergency, decisions which esn be made based only upon infor-mation and recommendations offered by LILCO. "Now, be it therefore " RESOLVED, that the Sound Beach Pre-School finds that LILCO's emergency plans for schools do not offer children or school personnel of the Sound Beach Pre-School adequate protection in the event of an accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Plant; and, be it further " RESOLVED, that this school board believes that licensing of the Shoreham Nuclear Plant should not be! pe'rmitted unless or until complete and reasonable resolution of these outstanding, critical emergency planning problems can be achieved. " j l UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED BY THE BOARD AND THE MEMBERS OF THE SOUND 3EACH PRE-SOHOOL AT THE OENERAL !!EE*INO ON NOVEMRER 16th,1983 Marie-Anne Humbert-Boasi Directrice of the Sound Beach Pre-School m.m - - ~. y ---.y w - 2
9filliam Sloo d 9tnion Siee 9'c/rool @Mid a....mu y"- of the i M ASTICS-M ORICHES-SHIRLEY BOARD OF EDUCATION 240 Mastic Beach Road Su 1vrEN EN%f 8# P2:27 e,, p t. Rita Rech,' President Mastic Beach, New York 11951 Rcbert Reichert, Vice President Telephone (516) 281-3020 AsstSTANT SUPERINTENDENTS Nichslas Bouhouris W ape Williams, Ete:n. i :Ad cirustsation D r. Eric, G.,Waxg. f.-g'Qg; - Dr. Lewis Wasserman.J jetnanne Dawson 3pggcation Thomas Calinski Hsnry Hennessey ASSISTANT TO THE SUPERINTENDENT Mark Matthews . ~ ' ' ". ' ' " * '~' L4 James 4. Wrisht, Business I' *t C 3. " 'J '.". '., 7.* '., m 5 - 10 0'-- December 7,1983 @\\., D T ' :
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r Mr. James A. Laurenson. Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Bureau United States Nuclear Regulation Commission Washington. D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Laurenson:
The William Floya School District is on the fringe of the ten mile radius surrounding the Long Island Lighting Company plant at Shoreham. While the School Board is not taking a position for or against the opening of the plant, it does oppose the proposed evacuation plans in the event of an emergency. The plant should not be allowed to open until such time that a realistic and workable evacuation plan is developed. ( Very truly yours, / rfm w- . 'icholas Poulos Np/em l l
==
- . ly.
The Now Interdisciplintry Schesi s -FOR FAMILIES OF CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL NEEDS' 1 Scouting Boulevard,* Mediord, New York 11753
- Tel.'(516) 924-5583
~ RHODA ROGOFF Director ' ~, . ~ - - j CLAIRE SALANT Director g c.-lg a g 2 co I Emqq w n 3
- T>
's m ggn c= 2 December 2,1983 ggg% y m* m E E==: ~ The Honorable Peter Fox Cohalan ~z 3
- < Om Suffolk County Executive c=
i H. Lee Dennison Building l Veterans Memorial Highway c, Hauppauge, New York 11788 2
Dear Mr. Cohalan:
~ l i We are enclosing a copy of our letter addressed to the Atomic i Safety and Licensing Board wliich concerns 'the Shoreham Nuclear -facility and.which we believe will be of int'erest to you.- Sin
- rely, 0
Claire Salan Je_+ ~ . ' r r~ ~ -/ Rhoda Rogoff ., e Directors. l { I 1 CS:RR:EL g / ., y L Y.V ? \\ g 9 c3 g p1 l fspy 0 s = 4 \\ \\, w0j w o o ~_ I e _ev-, --n-- -g --,m ,.e
Tho New intcrdisciplinary Sches! -FOR FAMILIES OF CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL NEEDS- ~ 16couting Bouleverd
- Medford,New York 11763
- Tel. (516) S24 5583 AHODA ROOOFF Grector
.CLAIRE SALANT Drector November 18, 1983 Atocie Safety and Licensing Board Nuclear Regulatory Cocaission wash 2.ngton, D.C. 20555 Gentlepeople: We are writing to bring to your attention the passage of a resolution of our Board of Trustees concerning emergency evacuation planning for a nuclear accident originating in Shoreham. The resolution was. passed at a special meeting on October 18, 1983 The New Interdisciplinary School is a preschool for handicapped children from birth to 5 years of age who reside in Suffolk County. over 85:s of the children reside in school districts that fall within the emergency zone considered in LIICO's Emergency Evacuation Plan. " RESOLVED, that LIICO's emergency evacuation plan for schools for its proposed Shoreham Nuclear Facility does not offer children, school personnel, or parents of The New Interdisciplin=T School adequate protection in the event of an accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Facility." Sincerely, / I. p f Rhoca Rogoff l l Og MT t Claire Salant Directors l / ER:CS:EL \\'$ij' a 1-3s e h$?D.T O \\ , G. 7...rywpv 0o I' <f a At40D? V Q Q. 7 ( , O-9 C e o
ATTACHMENT 7 Newsday 10/22/83 "New Defects Found at Shoreham" Newsday 11/4/83 "N-Plant Flaws Laid to Desi'gn Error" Newsday 2/1/84 "NRC Doubtful LILCO Can Fix Diesels" Newsday 2/8/84 "New Problem Halts 2 Shoreham Diesels" Newsday 2/23/84 " Panel Rejects LILCO Plan for Low-Power N-Plant Test" 4 V 9 e..- r -e.-,, - - -+ , -+,. ,w,..n.-
WewDefectsFoundatShoreham Ily Stuart Diamond target for the practically completed..found to have only 20,000 pounds of in 1974, were installed at Shoreham mev-k- $3A billion reactor. The diesel delay strength. Three c'her bearings were eral years later. But he added that not g every facet of design and fabrication Newsday Environment Writer alone is expectc d to add about $250 mil-fyund cracked. could be checked. New tests of the failed emergency die, Muscler said the 44 percent kreakness ( E'nerators at the Shoreh lion to that price. The diesels initially. is the lar est he's seen at the ShorehamLilf0 has on'ered three new diesels 'I'*lant have uncovered addit.am nuclear cost $2.11 million. lant. "It a certainly not good," he said.- from another mrmfacturer, Coltladus-ional defects At firat, Lilf0 thought the diesel fle added that the bearing failure seems tries, as supplements or replacements. a a majorcompnents,meluding abroken #ms might be limited to the engine ~ Warmg that was manufactured 44, per shafts, or crapkshaAs, and the utility or-unrelated to the crankshaft failure. L ' Those units arn expected within 10 6.. he engineer said that the d',esel man-months. pentweakerthanspecificationsrequ red., But, further tests and disassembly ' ufacturer,TransamericaDelavalofOak-The most recent set ofdiesel tests, dis-l The new problems, uncovered m the, dered three stronger ones. closed in a report issued Oct. 20, alsofoun past two weeks by LongIsland Lightmg have found problems with other major land, Calif., had to certify its equipment po. and itsconsultants,haveled the util-components. One is a large, cylindrical met specifications, but he was unsure lty to order a far broader study of the-bearing'nearly a foot in diameter and whether Delaval made a specific certifi-in a main water pump an diesel design and manufacture. connected to the engine shafL Such bear-- cation for the bearings. ~ cuit in one of the generators due to im-Federal inspectors in the past three proper manufacture of a generatur coil, l ""Some of the things we've seen worry %gs allow the shaft to turn after being years repeatedly have criticued Delaval Muscler said. ~* as, William J. Muscler, LILCO's nucle-dnven by the pistons. ar omeo director, said in an interview Oneof thebearingswas brokenintwo for its quality assurance program. Prob-The tests also-found that some bear-pieces. Testing by LIILO's consultant, lema with Delaval diesels almo have been ings were not properly supported and N Failure Analysia Associates of Palo Alto, found at many of the approxistely 30 that the oil pressure was 14 per cent too , yesterday. i The three diesels, needed to safely Calif., found that the bearing could with-U.S. reactors with the company's units. high - a condition that can sause exces-phut the reactor during an chlte power stand forces of 15,000 pounds per squareMoseler said LILCO was satidied sive wear.. ' inch,44 per cent of the specified streng* h with Delaval's overall quality nasurance Delaval officials couldn't lie reached failure, were found in August to have [ racked main engine shafts, leading to a segrahngst,hgjelgtje,the,,opgapg,_=EM,Lyuands; hygo,nd,lypng gas program by the time the diesels, ordered for comment. e, 4 9 I ~~ ..m T H r>
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a f Shoreham D'iesals Still ' Unacceptable' ~ --Continued from Page 7 Catacosinos, who also must cope with LILCO's se. .m u 3 b verely weakened finances and the political opposi-g a. .e. d Jf l L tion to Shoreham's operation. s .u n Shoreham's diesels, needed to safely shut down h the reactor in some circumstances, failed during l m O O tests in August. Since then, Newsday has disclosed i e r that Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspections f 2 .dg.V y Q show Delaval to have violated federal codes mere than 60 times in diesel manufacturing. pO "T '"9 9 9 The NRC is investigating evidence of potential' d J "" l 7 i criminal wrongdoing by Delaval -including "docu. lf L j, 1 mentation discrepancies 7 federal sources said. Dela. val has consistently declined comment. i dey Official says Shoreham,s Last week, Harold Denton, the commission's di. T rector of reactor reguiation, toid 13,tiiities with 37 backuF" units still unacceptable Naval engma that,none gf 6eir 16 nu&ar pl,ans 4 would receive operatmg heenses until the probiems "are adequately addressed." He called the problems s By Stuart Diamond "very serious." At Shoreham. dozens of defe:ts have f. , Newse.y r.nvironment wnter been found in the diesels, including cracked main I A ?y federal nuclear official said yesterday that the repaired, back. '"Ihne shafts, pistons and cylinders. l up dieel generators at the Shoreham power plant are still"unaccepta-al hear gs o e$e s cokteNs 15N ble, - sven with their many newparts - and that it's uncertain whether the units can soon meet the requirements necessary for the increased the horsepower on the units without the fini:hed plant to open. engme redesign needed to increase overall strength. 9 , Ralph Caruso, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Shoreham New, stronger crankshafts installed in the existmg units, Suffolk contends still cannot meet test re. j project manager and its lead staff member on the diesel problems, said quirements. "These diesels will never work right be. ~' [ during ut interview that LILCO may still be able to prove that the stesels work properly. But he said it would be very dif5 cult" because cause they're undersized," Suffolk consulting N attorney Alan Dynner said. "That's why evershing mere are so many defects and,because many quality. control records at is breaking." NRC officials also have suggested that me manufacturer, Transamenca Delaval, are unreliable. the engines are undersized. "Just replacing the parts doesn't make the [ design) problems go X LILCO has replaced many of the major parts in way." he said. "We have very reduced confidence in the engmes and s its Delaval diesels, and Caruso said that the utility's l.iptificant doubts about their ability to perform their intended function." testing program "is genera!!y going in the nght di. If new diesels are needed, Shoreham's commercial operation may be N I rection." But he cautioned that it is too soon to tell I ielayed until 1937 - a year later than previously announced, according g whether the diesels are usable "Right now, running 1 o Long Island Lighting Co. documents obtained by Newsday. Such a with new parts, they don't meet the requirements," l lelay w:uld mean a pnce tag of about SS billion for the plant - $1.6 6 Caniso said. "With the infor=atien we hase, we ! :illion more than the last ofIleial estimate of $3.4 billion, the documents ,N. would not license a plant with Delaval diesels, even l thow. At S3.4 billion, the plant threatened electric. rate hikes of more with new diest! parts." l.han 40 per cent, in addition to a 21 per cent permanent rate hike now LILCO hopes to persuade the NRC with an un. sending. precedented, c2 tailed design review and validation Caruso's comments were in marked contrast to recent statements by of dozens of diesel components. .ILCO of5cials exp:essing confidence the units would pass their current Meanwhile, the utility has ordered three new csts by early April Nuclear regulatorgofficials are monitoring the tests Colt Industries diesels as a contingency and is build. l tt LILCO and at other utilities with Delaval diesels. But the agency's ing a new structure at Shoreham to house them.
- .k
- pticism about the ability of the diesels to meet requirements is based Accordirg to minutes obtained by Newsday cf an sn numerous inspections of Delaval's Oakland, Calif., factory and reports Oat. 26,1983 LILCO board of directors meeting, the
,f major problems with the units at various reactors, according to a building and the new diesels would cost SS7 million ransenpt of a commissron meeting last week. and take 126 weeks to install beginning in Septem. LILCO spokewoman Jan Hi4-said yesterday that the company ber,19S3. Thus, if the Delaval units are scrapped, lad no comment on Caruso's statements, the new cost estimates or other the time needed for the Colt units would push the natters relating to potential diesel delays. initial plant oaeration to March,1986. When the 6 On Monday, William Catacosinos, a computer entrepreneur, replaced to 9 months [.ILCO said it needs for testing and harles Pierce as chief executive of the embattled utility. Fiw w. startup are added, commercial operation could be ! :igned under pressure from the board of directors, sources said. Cataco. delayed until 1987. inos has declined to answer questions about his plans for the utility, In a January,1954. Securities and Exchange neluding Shoreham. The diesels are among the major problems facing Commission filing obtained yesterday, LILCO said -Continued on Page 26 it will have spent $3.S77 billion on Shorenam by the .end of1954 and that delay! beyond then would cost S40.S45 million per month. Thus a two. year delay in commercial cperations would mean a tetal cost of up to S4.96 bilhon. "The whole game is in the current diesels." Dan. ielle Seitz. a utilities analyst with Smith Barney Harris Upham, said yesterday. If the Delaval units are scrapped, she said. "it would be very df.eult to complete the plant."
p ~ l e New Problem' Halts 2 Shoreham Diesels i By Stuart Diamond Newsday Environment Writer LILCO Behind m. Hiring; Two of the three repaired back-up diesel SI:okeswoman Resigns, Page 23 : generators at the Shoreham atomic plant g have been shut down due to another prob-litigation, we should have been notified- ~. t$ed a no t o t. right away." He said the turbocharger prob. [ Bearings in the turbochargers, which in-lem is more prtv>f the diesels are irrepara-5 ject compressed air into the engine to boost ble. E power, failed while long Island Lighting Ira Freilicher,IACO vice president for, o Co. was testing the diesels after major public affairs, said IECO notified the NRC t U modifications. One unit failed last Wednes. of the problems and is trying to find the i day, the second on Sunday. The diesels are cause. He said one of the turbochargers i 5 expected to be shut down at least until the failed on low oil pressure and the other was j 0 end of the week, federal officials said. manunlly shut down after excessive noise 5 "This is a real problem and we're con. and vibration. The third diesel, he said, is y cerned about it," Charles Petrone, Shore-running normally. The NRC's Petrone said g ham site i for the U.S. Nuclear the damaged turbocharger bearings are, O " Regulatory mmission, said yesterday. scored and discolored from overheating. But we won't know the implications until The engines were made by Trananmerica $ the licensee (IACO) and we determine the Delaval in Oakland, Cal. Federal officials Z cause of the failure." He said it is the first two weeks ago said there are "very serious" major problem since the units' recent over. problems with Delaval engines,57 ofwhich haul. have been ordered for 16 nuclear plants. At If the turbochargers are defective, they Shoreham, the diesels have had many prob. would have to be replaced, Petrone said. lems, including cracked cylinder heads and i Ti.e most likely repairs would cause a failed main engine shafts. alight delay in IACO's plans to succeseful. Meanwhile, Brookhaven National Labo-i i ly complete the diesel testa. Approval of the ratory and the NRC are pre 'ng an j diesels is the last step before IJLCO can get agreement under which the wab would - a license to test the reactor at low power. check the diesel repairs and analysis by LIILO did not tell Suffolk about the utilities, said Herbert Kouts, the lab's Nu-problems, although the county is litigating clear Energy Department chairman. Suf-l the diesel issue in federal hearings. After folk's Jones said the county would protest, , being informed by Newsday of the failures, since Kouts and other lab scientists favor l Frank Jones, deputy county executive, last opening the plant. Kouts, whose depart-night called the lack of notification by ment would do the work, asserted that LILCO"an outrafa"uthorities. "It's a clear.. work would be performed a and said Suffolk would there is no conflict of interests since the protest to federa cover-up" he charged. "As a party td the" intific standards. ~ ' '~ l y, -w-, w w r- --en-w,m e-r
b 20- ( O ranel,Relec,cs LW " >,1 ian / For Low-Power N-Plant Test u '.c 11y Stuart Diamond ner argued that new problems are arising ham nactor.h NRC's Brennersaid the fore September. Suffolk's Brown said mwsaay statt corresponaeas even as LIIf0 is making repairs. board was open to that or other proposals November was a more realistte date. rn Washington-A federal panel yester-m NRC has found major defects in but would have to be convinced with a Also yesterday, @ NRC said Brook. ' day rejected a long Island Lighting Co. both the design and manufacture of the detailed case and perhaps further hear-haven National laboratory had p ~ bid to test the Shureham nuclear plant units, made by Transamanca Delaval ings. The judge, however, appeared to out of a study of the Delaval dieseis at at hw power within tbne months and for 16 nuclear planta, and has said no scuttle the turbine proposal because the Shcreham and elsewhere in the wako of y i stead set heanngs on the plant's trou, nactors will operate unul those prob-umts in quesuon do not meet NRC codes complaints by Suffolk County. Susik 6 bled back up die.el generators - a pro-lems are solved. LIIf0's limited design to withstand earthquakes. ' officials have claimed that numerous lab aview was opposed not only by Suffoik, LIIf0 is scheduled to finish testing scienusta have beca active in supporung cess that attorneys said would take at but also by the state and the NRC staff, its diesels Apal 22 and complete its de-Shoreham's openmg. fo least unut September. Lt a major setback for LILCO, a Nu, although the staff was willing to consid-sign review m mid-to late May. m "We felt it was more prudent to go (% er a broader but less-than-complete re. NRC hearing panel ordered a series of with a contractor that did not even have clear Regulatory Commhaion licensing view for low p **r. legal filings by the parues between now an appearance of conflict" Harold Den. panel turned down the utility's request Cov. Mario Cuomo's representative, and early May and said it would set a ton, chief of nuclear regulation, said, that it be allowed to stan up the plant Fabian Falomino, said,'"rbe track rec-further schedule, including heanngs, adding that techmen1 problems involved before tl$ design of the diesel generators ord of these diesels is such that there is shortly afterwariL in the diesels are di!!1 cult enough with-had te.:n a roved. N utility has been weking to accelerate the process because no way they can be made safe by repair Attorneys for both Suffolk and LIIf0 out complicating the issue. abanba it must decide by June whether to LIILO alsosaidyesterdaythatithad, said hearmgs would consume much of or replacement of parts.". Denton said h work is being shifted it sa the summer and that sheer logistics and to Battelle Pacirac Northwest Laborato-on the plant to avoid bankruptcy. other pcasable means to replace the die complexityof thecase madeit highlyim-ries, a nationallaboratory near Hanford, U p pp sels,souch as gas turbinee near the Shore-probable a dactanon could be rendered be-Wash. g" O the diewis are too deep to act otherwise. "W don't have any confidence that any of these diesels can work under any
- nwer level," I4wrence Brenner, chief or the three-judge panel, said at the end of an 111-day conference on Shoreham among representatives from LILCO, Suffolk County, New York State and the NRC stag.
IlLCO of!Icials declir.ed comment on the decision. But Herbert Brown, an at-torney for Suffolk County, which opposes Shoreham's operation, said the decision "shokes otivirtually the last strategy by LILCO to get the plant on line." Brown said a board decision to accept ,. LILCO's plan would probably have en. l abled the utility to borrow enough mon- , ey to keep d! cat for a few mo-a months. I On Tuesday, William Catacosanos, the utility's chairman, told state legisla: cts the company had been unable to borrow because of the uncertainty surrounding Shureham. In its proposal 13140 sought to test l the three rebut!t diesel umts and do a t l design review only of five major compo-nents. b fhl! design review required for low-power tesung includes more than 150 components. The NRC board said there was "no basis' to accept LILCO's proposal h diesels are needed to safely shut the reactor dunng a loss ofofT-site power and must meet stnct safety tests. But dozens of problems have been found with the units both at Shoreham and elae. . where. The Shoreham problems have in-cluded broken engine shafts and cracked pistons and cylinder heads. Yesterday, Suffolk attorney Alan Dyn. 6 l l
ATTACHMENT 8 Newsday 10/9/83 " Opposition to Shoreham Rises" 1
ee. o.em mo em - e .e e =mgeee ..e a. g e, f f ,m... Opposition to Shoreham2 Rises-Poll indicates majority blame LILCO ' mismanagement' for.)Y-plant's ' rising cost.s j '. to trace shiftsin att:tuile,was completed ~ + t" ] Newsday Senior Editor . - W a week ago. It found that since February, l Hy llernie Bookbinder 22 per,cest had switched from support. More long lalanders than eve'r oppose
- ing to opposing Shoreham, while only 8 opening the Shoreham nuclear power.
.per cent h, ad changed from. opposition to, l plant and an overwhelming majority of . support.;m e s,;c. ; ; - ~. 6.Among those who became Shoreham them hold long Island Lighting Co... 7 pponentswasMyrnaWagner,aclothing
- "mismanagemcat" to blame for the pro * '
0
- designer from Plainedge,who attributed iject's escalating costa, according to the.
ir i 6 her change of mind to " enlightenment "- ' latest Newsday Poll. ' The mother of four children ranging in' The telephone survey, conductedt. nu a M_. ; L r-....
- O '" fI.W Y.
inge' from 4 to 18; she said, Tve gotten ' among a representative sample of 605' aa"th** '". " =aa kaa"I'ds' *ad ik"a",btit won't Nassau and Suffolk residents who also' Attitudes Towards Shoreham? E'. t J. won'tprofitfromShoreham had been interviewed about Shoreham ... -. Don't ;
- really do,us,any' good." Although her g
- Favor Oppose.
t in February, found that 61 per cent said the nuclear facility,32 per cent said it U. r.. Shoreham Shoreham1' Y Know'!,
- home is more than 40 miles from the nu g LIILO should not complete and operate mak II k, MN a r
- do think prese ts$n ine ens of pe -
em ?er 42 43 15...J ht safe," she'esid. Tm afraid for b is ' centage intainoppositiontoShoreham MNMNEN N . sake.of my children'" I ' : l. /* *, 83 36 52 u' 12' q .p, One of tho' plant's supporters, who which LilLO announced it woukriodin, during pasteevenmonths,a February 1983 seek a F.99pf.NHwww.af,mtssengsgas; ,,i,ii,es.much cioser to Shoreham ana who i
- W < *.,
' holds no such fears,is Randy Scheller of ( 66 per cent rate increase over three years, .,. i.'.. ', ',..., I the $3.4-billion plant's diesel generators Note: May4uns agures odd up to 10M tocause of soumang t 7 Stony Brook. "fm more afraid of being g - hit by a drunken driver," b college stu-were found defective and a Nuclear Regu-dent said. "There's a possibility of dan-latory Commission licensing board ap-me..a. ca.ru na ora== j proved operation at low power once the. 'i N
- ger, but it's a very small, possibility. You
\\'! ' Q.*. [(g ' *re, N.W g $, ^g,J" have to' trust' government officials' N J generator problem is solved. In the past. j. W C i C>~ o 4 ". - several weeks, Shoreham also has be, icome the mgjorissue in the campaign for, citing factors beyond LilEO's 1' l Suffolk County executive. .. and 38 per cent citing mismanagement. ellets viewed the utility. In February,53 i the'ex1 ertise.-Besidss7 progress always i l The inost dramatic change of attitude .' But'in h latest round ofInterviews, per cent said theiropinion of LIILO was I, involves risks."... e4 s.:... - f since Februaryinvolved Lil40'scompe.':" fully 62 per' cent blamed mismanage,. ment and only 19 per. cent cited facto . c' beyond the utility's control. Even a plu ' the latest survey this poportion dropped a Shorehamiwhile stillby far t I tency.When asked in February whether 1 plant was attributable mostly to factors,* rality of those who in February, men : to orily 35 per cent,while thosew i a the increase in the cost of the Shoreham l beyond LIILO's control, such as chang " tioned factors beyond LIICO's control ' favorable or very unfavorable i l .. ila February,46 per cent of Shoreham's
- ing governmental regulations and infla-now hold the company's managementre. rose to 63 per cent. 'I14new poll,a" panel study"in which'.,
l
- tion, or 'mismansgement by.LIIEO,?sponsible by a 44-34 per cent margin.' '
l g those polled were split,with 36 per cent,,lacreasing dissatisfaction with Lilf01. the same respondents are 'reinterviewed istguini7n,,Page y q
- . _, i,.
- c, a j
,q. c ie .sc. A.- r. i l
Il~,,W.1'AGAA4Incre.as. e.s9.E.>6.., Sa. ys o..~. ' %V Pk' v w' %^ %.. = ~ . c.. --Continued hem Page.3 0 ;. .. - ~~1 power plants are unsafe" was primarily., - N ;... for their positsen,'while in current survey,41 per
- eent. cited safety as a factor.The second most imperi.
'tast reassa given by opp 6nents was their doubts d 1 , that I4ICO could operate the plant cormetly; ans this response rose ham 22 to 28 per cont &.,fe '--- 9 i - e;On a key issue of who should pay for Shoreham, - respondents regneted LI!40's contention that none.' f of the east abouldbe borne byits *~hhahs.When... a asked whether LHEO stockhoklers, ratepayers, the ' " or the federal govern ' l , New York State,,.._ ment should have to pay atlasst part of the eastof ^ u; Shoreham, the largest propertaan,88 per cent, ne. d.3. - tiened the stockholders. "./ '--M .?. i
- /9 Suffolk County Essentive Peter F. Cabalen has.
, M made Shoreham a'esntral part of his campaign fof. .~ ) re election, argang that the plant should be absint - - 1 4." .. domed h-an= itis not possihie to safely evacuate .c. the 20. mile sensi.. iiag the plant. His Demop. l cretic opponent, Assemb Patrick G. Halpin, main- ~ tainsthattheop6amgofShorehamisinevitableenar J ~ 9 ~ that the county abould. cooperate in preparmg an,..' : [-9 ,. evacuation plan.4.?.%e'4 .2 '.'. J. ,. ~. .* If Suffolk Cointy is'nWin blocking the. - Maaint of,Shoreham by the. Nuclear Regulatory ,t* 54percentofthoset P'saidthe:, ;; '. v . / -r enanty shouldwork with LIIfQ to piepare an evsn' 3 ation plan rather theiiinetmus its ah=Hansa in thag.. >I, courts. Forty.ene perisnt imid the fight should go on. .' Accordfag to the' aurvey,Imag Islanders agree'.. l thattheopemag'ofShorehamisinevitableJAno*Q d. v [ ^. . whelming 72 per-cent emid that they thought the - I plant will not open for the next few years, but wilf.;." i l eventually openi aunpared to only 8 per cent'who-I. - believe it will never open and.18,per cent who thinE .:.,N '.,.' ~ /
- /
s. , it will open soon. Regardless ofirhether Shoreham is Snally ap. proved, some opponents have proposed that LIIf0 ' - should be taken over by Safolk County with rev. anne raised through the sale of tax free bonds. When asked if.they would support such a tion,55 per cent of Suffolk remdents said they 'tely.or;. ~ probsbly would,36 per cent said they deffartWy or '
- probably.wou3d not and 9 per centwere andaridadw.
9* Among Nassou residents, tksre.was less support. with 49 percentinfavor,41percentopposed and 10., j'l: 5 ' 4 Q' per cent nadacidad.,g, ,s . In response to other. 'the attitudes of IongIslandersreinained y manlar tothose re-wealed in the February survey.,Once again, when ~ asked how they would react.te an acciderit at Shore - \\ ham if told to.remam inside their himes, a plurality I said they would evacuate. And, in response to amore general question, fully 72 per ce would not be possible to safely evacuate those near -
- Shoreham in the event of an accident, an increase of l
10 percentage points since February. Purther,68 per cent of the., - ' "i anincrease ofnine per ' I l contage points, said that LH40's evacuation plan.. -- i should not be approved by the state or federal gov-ernment if Suffom County believes it is impossible 5 to have a safe evacuation. s -The latest poll, conducted by Social Data Ana-j lysts, Inc. of Setanket between Sept. 27 and last ~ Sunday, succeeded in reaching 605 of the 1,132 Iong u. ~ S Mand-s questionedinthe February survey. Analy-sis by Stephen Cole, president of Social Data Ana-r lysts and a sociologist from the State University at Stony Brook, determinad thatthere were no statisti-cally significant difforencesin the composition of the [ ] two groups. Sampling error for a survey of this size l .s a is plus or minus 4 percentage pointa. -+ ...,..,,-,___y. ..-.,,,,e ,--.._.*,s.,.. ,..-.e-u aw-rwire-,-me wwwm-+i-- s*- m-++--r=m-o--+==iwww-c.r-r w-- "t -+ev-ww--'*-r~*
o ATTACHMENT 9 Newsday 2/10/84 "PSC Staff Urges LILCO Foot $1B of N-Plant Bill" Suffolk Life 2/15/84 "LILCO hovering on the brink" Daily News 2/6/84 "Put S blame on LILCO chiefs" Newsday 3/27/84 "LILCO Requests 6-Month Delay In Hearings on Mismanagement" Daily News 3/27/84 - Ask delay in N-plant probe" P I b w'- -v.,- p_,- .,y,
RS&StaffEri.P,lM,B,111, . @b,.M E C O,.e- ~ r Wde' h.$ [ *,4,1,... @> ~/,M.*. 9 $ h ~ 'i;. B.4g.,4p,f W,,l';i./ - \\" j ~+ +-
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TlF&g i...r*ds -4s,/ e i s. r. 'st l./. .u~......3..m..... .....;n,. ;,,.e.,. . y.y., y, By Stuart Diamond.p3.'u,y .' utility practice and h information e * ., p .c g,....-. . f..,g.u..
- r.,
n.,.: ,Neweday F.avironment_WNtwfi'.. ' available when the slaelahna'were made;,, d h staff of b State Publi Ser, j;.h discleeure of the penalth came' j ) Commissiosi'tode*y'letorecommendthaj famid a day. of aarther bed tows for. [ IJng~ island'Ushting Co.'absorts'morGUlf0.';h, company'e' elock fell. $1 j thpa $1 billio' gf the Shorehala adclear..i share.,yesteroa, to, $8.8),- the $35. }
- i n
j plant's cost as a penalty for mismanag./ west pince the utifity was Arsillstad-has brned. !'....,prqject,Newedayj,on the New York. Stock Exchange in : d0. los construction of b i " 1960.. Utility anal said h decline, "+ ' .n I k ~ E alI'%.reconhnNdelion,I' lved by b eevenM thaQtcompany wi{I probably reduce -25'., . I" M 'I -i", followed reporte ~ l havq to be a catalogs PSC aAac hearings are.bcld[r "o*M"I"*%*'II* nutausdody divi-q +,..,e, p member-d odsto hel it.remala solant.. Ana, u a lyste.said t$e dividend will likely be 20.00 numerous poor managemente decisions and inefficionetlabor practicesf.' halved, to' $1 a share. II would be the. i ~ and adde up the cost of delays -lacludhRrst dividend cut since the utility's ex-p. 1 ing interest - that han resubd hem j change listing in,1960a.j,.,,j..,... 15.00
- 7 g
such actions, state, sources saidy' $1.bilt,, 9.4. .. e .o, 4...., ~ lion penalty could force,Ulf0' into'!..,la additi% fdel emelais diabed ^ State.uperte bsFra said that s that all three of Shoreham's einergency a diesel generatare are now shut due to 10.00 thg sena comnnaalcners, would mean[: are odtore duri . bankruptcy. Such a loss, if appewe..d by failure of a key part.b repeated fall. 9 o-I fb that innetore would not be fWily reim i kept getting abtesting has l use totest l 5.00 $8.87,, burned by customere for scmo of the7 the plant at. low power. - - g1 money they lent Ulf0 to build the $4/. And rs with UILO inlhEupe W.' n i stafra jigure com with: b I 1969 70 '71 72 73}74 75 76 77 78,79',*80 '81.*82 '83'84-
- e a minimum penalty of $21 sus-t yesterday in New York City to die.,.
- Te Das e m.
,.2..- bested bytheStateConsumerProtmetion ;cuse UlfO's disclosure that.it might,.s O ,.I ,* '.'. i. a g J ',b 4, b 'S,* y. a , cwu ra e "5 t si. t. v '- , Suffolk County.and others in an audit filed last Friday,and with a $600.y not be able to continos: paying'for,ite., b ':
- *S 1 s' C' N"
million penalty that.UILO's chief es. I /On Wednesdsz,U140's newchielu,. ? ?*T ' ' i '! ' I share in the~prqlect. ,.,... ity of the penalties suggested by b PSC 'Ibe preciso cap was unavailable yes. ecutive.said the company would.Teeutin William Cataconinda, said 6: staff. Ulf0 fina4cial vice president terday, but sources indicated it la $2.9 s . probably be willing to accept in return compan,y wouldconalder shannianingthe. bmas O'Briesi said Feb. 2 that if the" billion at inost. Shoreham's latest offi-for.a financial rescue plan.7,ly*dEnleil. 4.-state or county help in aaving h con-completed stomic plant. In return for, staff recommend r' . 'Ihe company has consistent ties, the utility would probably not be any mismanagementin tha'canstructios 7 cern. He indicated Llif0 le probably ' 6ble to borrow,needed cash for some, has said the cost could reach nearly $5 / billion if b current dinels cannot be of the $4 billion plant. Yesterday,/ willing to accept $600 millida shinant-time. Most sources termed $1 billion a i repaired and new onen would need to be Ulf0 released a report by Arthur D; asement penalties but stroaeed that substantial penalty.., . b t installed:. ..u...~ UttleInc.,aconsultanttheutilityhired..., Ulf0 will discuss pearly any option. : 1. b PSC staff audit, which Alle ein -.In its audit,b Consumer Prot lon cataloging a litany of probleme during. And he'enid Ulf0 pouldbecome insol ' bt qf docununts, pts a cap on the { Board suggested a$1.9-billionesponthe ~ Shoreham's more than'10-year coratrue Y vent as early as May withoutaid or good. amount of Shoreham a cost that the util plant's cost -rneaning Lilf0 lnvestors tion but concluding that Ulf0 did not news about the plant.~.. -.. , ity can collect from customire; enry i grould have to absorb $2 billion to $3.1 mismanage the project.'Ite report said ' 4A major factor in Ulf0's ibture,' thing above that would han to be billionincosca.WtauditandbPSC's MILO acted prudently given common company officials have said, is the sever-absorbed by Ulf0 investors.- -fontinued on Page 25 NMETLilA.idov. TTErl 'TilaoldaP
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.t ' head Blition Wed.Feb.15.I9M t h... s M E F U L K g *i E E J ~.om w,.w.=. m. ~m :=. :.r. :.~..=......m~.mc.e =....=a.r.a =, _= w..n:.=.:.:. .MNEWSPAMBS 4 ~ m R sa ~ I .n h'*LH..i,CO.)7; :t.. t., :n ahuvedrig'o,.~.cn t h e & q .s.- ...q- [ x 3* .t. n.GA :,. ".> ; s. ?. n. .V$ - k W:t'.& c: w sh.Gr' W k,%*.:. :.A. n ;- .e rA r.ySCstafffeporturbesj.[ e,k ' iJ R ' ' ). ' $1.5 billion p"enalty )*.. I + 4 I .j 4 - -f, I . ;; ?!,. '.,. t 8 l y - ByIDUGILASSO ~< De findings, teleased ha 53.844.278 whida le.in,, EI .h 'i l . A long tenn, exhausuve i ntday,wentfarbeyond the ~,gluded in its geoant rate. s g a PSC staff repost last .matase request. Sines that .p-investigation by the staff of ' the. Put.Ile Servko Com-y figures whids have figure has been seleased,,, .i 'q, j saisioloa,' lato the a rumored for the'past however, the clodt is stlE ' r g, snasagement, by lang several anonths. E the tkking and costs continue l ,3 :;jaland.11ghting Company., figures bold. R anald bring.. le snount..New.psoblems bankruptcy for 1240.
- 'Trith '
diesel p.,I De eduali amount that 0 genera,the ' plant's v effi: lain, of the Shoreham //if - e ~ l .g tors; b', hey safety s%. - N p Hu: lear ' Powef Plant f 1 de that the utlhty 1200, rather than 'the. Rem to the event of 7., 9,, and us' thould t 'retepayers'would.baJi thWadshap, threaten td'deby "[ , g[ b-Q l d [{.e absortf.h4 less than '88.5 hahoulder,hiould s be,far.'Vthe plant's operation M N C (
- g... '.
-Q,.. .y # l L2 %,.4 S. t ~ the plant'arfinal ihrgreater? ne; $15' penaky En t h sol abandoned first ' 'M,, ' bilitos cost, an. poselbty) nethv*'hgur'e'Is'Bessd on EBCO's'D far beyond ' the ?Januar'y" s".' i >4 V.*; .g/ j ,l-i 1 i snore.'.fg f. O ' Intest totalcost estimate of ~J;l885 date '.'"predidad > byR i a ~~ _.w-e 1200. Cost n .. - for * *. MAKING.gfl5 DEBUT as thefeR'ctlitrpari of.the board of the Long l Veistliemelbstyreament M gg),nd LightIryiCoridenY;Wihlam1fCaf4cosin64,' met me'e'nnrs of the. ( l egsstygihy,. press-fast 5vicek. Calacosinos=$ aid the istility4 vill $gstend,.ag bamon piandonmeni.p(See,egarding-it e Shorghain nuclear plant - in' lud 2 c altable opti sr l i empha)hes **tlist the totalat story 1nside) Photo by Bob Cherfuk :4 'l ~ ' ^^^~ "'~~ dd s '.shorehase costs, for %kh FM qMP"' " ' ^ ratepayers.'.would'
- be t'
jresponsibl6,'should be himited, to about 42.3 8 { [ 'biBlon, kven it the plant is.. j delayed further *.'.*f not /' i i j.' cap around put ad costskt g above the $2.3 biluon on the shoulders of 1200 and 4h { s j Its stockhoklers. 1 .De PSC, staff,la-j* .vestigation found that IRf0*a managernent of ' [ the Shoieham project was y
- flawed from the very beginning, and never ready.
e improved. "LILCO's. i t management of the [ Shoreham
- project was 4
flawed to the initial stages 'r'and,' although realigned i l l-several tin.es during *the 4 i course of the project, has seen little or no in> provenient., Capabilities I . s >.a ns a
w LILCO hovcring en the brink _ gef' ag =IRf0's failure to abide by m tg.,m,,edm developed through as have act evolved. De "1RCO's adions in the akshol and drug abuse at detaas kn separate atery in " unprecedented hery precedume " E
- s. sma. r
- confusion of mies and area of construction the plant were legion this issuel, and la the area examination of IRf0's s'en ne muk of that of quelley ' control la books and ncords pursuant Prablem met formd he inablaty to effectively allga management came under during the past few 6eeources bse persisted close scrutiny and were but were castantly twgards te-the quality to the Commiselon's E staff to taka their lavestigatloa late tb4 Service inw;.
- r..e FutJie,,
authority under th 1AfD offkse. - 1!rrughout. The strongly critidsed in the by both utuity and unlee ' programs,the report noted, . dificiencies have report: "15f0, as the officiale. Whenever the "Dere wee several la-1 -semalmed," the report owner of the Shoreham subjrd was brought up to stances of dondent sad "The Shoreham Task : De staff report, bowmr, is met he Anal phrea==da=4=a a thorough li declares. project, ultimately le one untom offidalwho was a unreasonable snanagesset. word in this snetter, and la unusually strong responsible for major very active lobbytet se predies en the part of - en site Inva=86 =8h of f does not uned the views of ~lerms, the toport declares. shortcomings la con-behalf of Shor-am,n be IJ1EO. Of. these 12E0 at its verteus altkas the PSC commissioners "1Af0's managernent has struction management. b would resort: "Oh that is . the most la Illchevme, nilaeola and J who have cesne under the failed to address eadilnetamm stated below, )sst something the media ls serious was IJIf0's og the Shoreinem she. De
- repeatedly for,.
gges og ge departasate and.' the intemas of the utlBty .EdJguatoly tbe LRf0 is responsible for trying to stir up. De procreettaatles is ac-musgement respen-unrezaonable management problems are ao greater complishlag the strese eines were seveiwod for rehec has he Pubue. sibultles entrusted by its either by caeming a pan. than at any other)b of this reconcillation. program. Sherobam related la. .. shareholders, ratepayers ticular problem er by not type." Das delayed congletlos of g,, siaa h Tank Ptem l IA O ts edioduled is nie hs nbunal to mue and ngulators. IAfD's. taking corrective steps to Requent nports beve the Shoreham project ts . also saamsteed pereenal findings em Apr9 3, and management actions in sesolve it. AB of these been flowing late tble
- p. 4
- for fuel load." IUes of Sg snanagers, la-a bearings wtg smaannte aggregate >sve been problerus individuaDy and newspaper la past years h soport matinues: . chading the dul runas of the Stayla Hew York City by l defldent med unreasonaM*. , euDedively enntdbuted to about the " liquid lunches * "De staff found other j board and pnoident of IIne PSC commissioners, De prove snanagenent the significant cost enjoyed by Shoreham dendent and unreasonable gJtro.. This latemalve who wul make the Anal organization, lamaalstendy overruns and schedule workers at local management practices examination of IRf0 desta= supported by top alippages experienced at sustaurants, and of "hant which contatbated to . Basiad for four months and snanagement and the Board Shoreham." -liquer and beer beIng leefndency in congleting, a sapaller work force-et Directors, has afforded De nport noted that smuggled hte the plant" ShonhanL c esatinued this effort en an inadequate leadership to " labor productivity was by returning workere. But
- 1AEO's kindequate
. as=== dad basis." Some the project team. Dis very law because of beyond acknowledging a respoose to the con- '33,000 documents were defidency not only aDowed, inadequate supervisboa of few corrective actions. sts setton deficiencies studladla this enandnation, but caused significant aalt workers, poor planing 12I0 and union rendals bleatined as a result of the the report notes. hiadequades in the per and a ladt of management repeatedly helsted me sudt Torrey lines Technology . OriginaRy, he PSC staff formance of engineering support." problem esisted.. . review of :Shoreham and 1AIO had readied De PSC report also died prnrein e" , agreement on the IEf0 for the ladt of an ;Q{esamtsucties and anstruction of the And: " problems with precedures for dismvery ol - effedive 'repostlag splem h s..Torrey ;Phees,
- Shoreham project.".
' uaft labor larbded late a con-ulting Gnsa, was hired by laformaalam. But foGowing W engineering firm of starts, early quits, alcohol . Stone and Webster, prime. abuse and protraded coffee. for Sharehasa, the indt of;i 1.12E0 h an effest to ve that agreement, which breaks. Dese protness *,.as effedive costicastrol !..e pleet was sefeh sequired tREO le sespond scontradora en the plant, also came under fire in the p wereidentined early la the f'. group ' at the plant );and2 tetrugilsapran=hmeson)ast within I week, "IREO After.. reviewtag con-to requests for biformation suport. "De antributions 4 project but were ' neur. serious flame ud el Stone and Webster and effedively resolved # Die. ; planning andwork. " TACO's lead tarui}Yf one per esat of the plant, ' began to aniss this com. (nhitect eaglaeer and entributed,te low craft p inat review deed a number giltment. By the bestnning ' ananager were productivity and, was - planalog predaced 4 M g defects that were of nasy assa, it became estimated maa-votiveh l a senEsti l .mst taro.ver.m s.e,s sieur c.edi.edu es.;R clear that the staff in-a g st.eday. ' estimated t.o.co.st ap-defiden.t, both.withla the .i on 4 ...e wor unda ns .,1. tor,ai met,oi, and e a,- day. t. .A iaa, piens. bas. w w.t e co ha. an-7,sg,,,g,,ig.'
- => "e65-e'm:n' tat;,'uteggergy,,,eg,x r
sete.l mults, including low later was constructed la a 't,...a...
- - - wah as" * ***
- D - productivity.
IREO's reasonable. and o [{ inadequate plannlag of d ma==er as ptoof that fears detailed, work led to In.f f about the plant'_s operadan terferences among "cuells. were, _ t laellicleacles and m PSC. staff report l congestion problems se also cited ".Inadequades nevere that they sometimes with the quality k i prevented crews from management audit ? working at aD." program knplemented by IREO... Inadequacies la { Two key criticisms organizing and stafRng the antained in the report target on IRCO's acuane IRf0 quahty function... 0 lavelving the troubled IAEO's faGure to' take diesel generators (see timely mencuve actions to i resolve and prevent the t recurrence of chronic 8 g quaBly pnklerra."
9W+ 6P&GWhhW Mpego e tw.ms. %. r.t..a,,.a p.h i M$ hBame on LILCO chiefs f and five months in the making,is already somewhat that he did not think it was the state's respo Ily AIICalAEL IIANRAllAN outdattd. The cost of the project has continued to to ball out the Long Island Lighting Co. and that he escalate beyond the assumptions of the analysts in thought the company's stockholders would have to The manar.cment of the Long Island Lighting Co. computing what portion of the project LILCO should absorb at least $500 million of the cost of building the f ailed to adequately supervise the construction of the be held accountable for. now completed, but yet unlicensed plant at' ( The county's analysts used a completed cost Shoreham. Shoreham nuclear plant and should be held account. estimate of $3.2 billion. They declared just $1.9 Several nuclear projects around the country have \\ I able for at Icost half the cost of the now $4 billion billion of that amount was justified. The utility now ' been abandoned due to skyrocketing cost increases. projeti, e report by Suffolk County consultants Projects the final cost to be near $4 billion, but the but Shoreham is the most costly ever completed, j contends. report does not state what if any of the latest according to the county analysis. f l i 'the findings are the work of a team o ana ys s projected rise should be attributed' to LILCO's Jones said the analysts found that in the early emt,loyed by Suffolk County to work in conjunctices. alleged mismanagement of the project. stages of the project, LILCO's top management was ' t i with the Consumer Protection Board and a citizens Deputy County Executive Frank Jones said yesterday that all of the additional costs should be. warned that the situation "was out of con organization. lie said, **LILC(Ys management should have dis-The analysts contend that LILCO's stockholders continued the project lorg ago, but they failed to should be held liable for those cost increases, which h n y s anal s s ched r I heed the advice of their own middle management the analysis concluded came as a result of LILCO's justifiable cost decision by " analyzing the costs of Tian when they decided to supervise the project
- lack of adequate supervision of the project."
300 other nuclear projects and imilding up. They did themselves, it was too late. They were never in The report by the county's consultants is one of not take LILCO's costs and determine what should control And they failed to give their own managers two major presentations to be considered by the have been paid." members of the Public Service Commission when lie contended thecost analysiswasbasedon allof the proper support staff to get the job done hearings open Friday to determine the prudency of the factors in building a plant on Lon'g Island, properly." Lil.CO's actions and responsibility hi building the including wage scales and availability of raw The prudency hearings are expected to last seve-ral weeks, after which the PSC is expected to Shoreham nuclear plan. materials. The second is a presentation by the staff investiga-The PSC staff ' report has yet to be published determine how much the utility.is liable for the cost' Ilowever, Gov. Cuomo on Thursday in an interview over runs on the project and how much of the cost tors of the PSC. with editors and reporters of The Daily News said must be added to consumers' electric bills. The county's report, prepared at a cost of $450,000 9 4 I 4 i l-
_ yy ra.zaw m:r -u, . ::,n [. Wk3L3 g 3 %EA. A E i g lj 4l e!n!$Ihlfg ! h , y h p,i h o"U Ib i ijlijj ~ 4 M h i i l H d i d ~ o la en! flIlla $ li Y'$iP41Pj'!8 n'a"!m..a3q !!e!L!! !INj!I O ~ s pali ein! n i e c. m !a) $I3.5h q I3.idaf) i .a r s=-- gg 'a g M. g h N I hi}lk.lIhjdjII l ed ga im wa e =m lj LNp gm jp - o g jp
- 5 e
hY y bh la !"N - e.5 mi!nigli&e, M. r.aao wgj.g [a.D f upp > >- Q o l: C Cd $$'f I . }l #Il md 11, dhl:lp=h*3* u! ? I ,W M C ill :' j'j3 Hl SM11 d kr W > > Mili.!jP%. i.i pi u Ui!,n null a i P o-
e 9 e Askdelayin N-plant. probe W h h th'e preparatory stage for moucted p (De sty's mono for By AtaCMAEL ITANIAl[Ah. ihe past two years.had been scheduled the postponemer.t on Thursday. The 1.ang Island Lightrag Co. has to begin May 15. LILCD 15 seeking a The staff report, issued eo Feb.10 ssked for a delay in the stars of the delay of up to six additional moetas. aue;;ed ttist the lightiac cormpany cructal"prudester hearings
- st which Ira Freilicher, LILCX:rs vlee prest.
- grossly entsrnanaged* the $Mceham the Public Service Coeussssion is az-deet for putlie affairs, said a motion Ptgject and called 1 spen LILCO to pecsed to mais a deterfrication was filed Mth the corumissbn request. absorb up to SLM bill'en of the H swhether and to what estent the utility lag the delay to give the otDity snore inE3ece tah for the plant f,,1 f"mlernanaged" construction et the $4 time to. respond to the allesstions The hashly entacel report concluded biltien Shoreharn nuclear ges eratt28 contained to a teport prepared by the that LILCO had wastad mere than 10 pleol PSCs on staff.
Mlion rean-hours on the project.had h The he=rinsp are expected ts deter- -We need the tame, due to the extent lost Cattrol of the manage:nent et the mine how snuch of the total ctat is to of the staffstestirmonyasd (lee necessl. construction, and knew at least c%he l n be charged to the UGitfa stockhole ty ter pt:1 logether a relmttal," years before the costly breakdows of J-ers, as opposed to the custosetts. Fredicher said. the diends that there were probleins
- y w;th stmitier units at et er sites.
To "prudency hearirigs. aid th hpagi is tL.I W d-a o U) e i. l I { l
b 8 e ATTACHMENT 10 Newsday 2/8/84 "U.S.: LILCO Still Lacks Nuclear Experts" Newsday 2/5/84 " Panel Urges LILCO Absorb $2 Billion of Shoreham Cost" Suffolk Life 2/8/84 "$2 Billion in Mismanagement" Daily News 2/3/84 "Ses: Shoreham's washed up [ 9 4 k w mea E "'*N 7-- r-9 .9,.-
--- --- ~ -- f U.S.: LILCO. Still Lacks Xuclear Experts s A By Stuart Diamond lent three yars' uprience reactors similu then and that m utilitim m " pirating
- upen'eaced W N
Newsday Environment wruer to Shoreham's. But the utility was e to hire few,1f personnel by o5sring higher pey and other enticements. Federal officials say that Glf0 has made little any, operators who met NRC desires, sources said. Lilf0 officsalspnerally had no==-t and a O beadway in fulfilling its promise to hire aperienced . One reason cited is a national abortage of qualified spokeswoman said rollock declined to==-t.Last g nuclear parnonnel to run the Shoreham nuclear t reactor personnel.'!he Institute for Nuclear Power Op. week, Ulf0 chief esecutive Charles Pierce was re-g - employees a top federal officsal says must be erstions, an industrpp, says that sa of last March by Ulf0 director William Cata===a= amid i for the facility to get an operating license. there were 241 unalled operating,supervisary and tech-of directors' dissatisfaction with the handling of Y Five months ago, aAer criticism by b Nuclear nical advisory positions at US. nuclear power ants. Shoreham. At the time, Ulf0 odlicials said there wwe g Regulatory Commission, long Island Ughting Co. said Industry sources asy the absrtage has worse since no plans for other imm=Aate top management changes. that it would hire a deputy vice president and reactor operators with more esperience la running a nuclear plant. Company officials would not comment, but a com-pany saurce said the utility was hadng trouble Anding those people. both because of a nationwide shortage of qualified nu lear personnel c.nd because of uncertainty over wLether th6 plant will open. As a result, according to' Harold Denton, head of . reactor regulation for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory commission, ' experience both at the manegerial and operator lese.... will probably become a licensing cor.dit.on" fa < the Shoreham plant. Jr. hs si ongest public comments to date, Denton said in air, i. 3rview Friday that Ulf0 nuclear vice presioent Mil.M Pollock, a former fossil fuel manager with no experi.ca running a commercial reactor,is " unacceptable." lie noted that virtually none of UlfO's operators has much esperience running a commercial reactor, while the NRC wants at least six-one for each 2 shifi-to have several yeara' emperience. NRC officials said UlfO's lack ofexperience is among the most seri-1 ous -if not the most serious -in the industry. J ,U140 last fall advertised for operators with at l
i t 'd Yanel Eerges ELCO' Absorb / ve me .m $2 Billion of Shoreham Cost ,T-consequences" the audit says. Shore. !!y Stuart Dihmond g ham is the most costly commercial reac. Newsday Environment Writer .E 1? tor ever - $2,332 per kilowatt of A detailed audit cornmissioned by state and local o!!icials has recommend-l[
- ? l 6*,/.
i. b 'ly " C. $ 4 ~ i electrical capacity in 1980 dollars, the w 'I study says. That is more than twice the ut that long Island Lighting Co. should ,~}./_ h, MT'{Nt absorb at least $2 billion of the Shore-f '., f.g. - W. average of comparable reactors and 23 L J. ' cost as a penalty for mismanaging the ( ,.. :; - Q f E j '*.tP a. ' ', l * {y plant, the unfinished Nine Mile 2 in i ham nuclear power plant's construction N i r cent more than the second mr.st cost-S 9 5 . 4 i i".A.J Q - upstate New York, the study said. project. [L i d . >- km i g... Among the audit's major findings-f; 7 The audit, financed largely by the g,f,. - '. N , N'So ? 3j e UIE0 failed to prepare for regula. l state Consumer Protection Board and g
- t. j$
Shorel.am opponent Suffolk County, 7 y .,j tions ordering hardware changes and so A said customers should pay no more than ]p( did not make them quickly or cheaply,'k ' y $1.9 billion for the plant, which UIEO despite warnings as early as 1968 - five t Ik j. years before construction started. g says will cost at least $3.9 billma and $ g,. h e LILCO relied almost solely 'on I ps n a '" .', fnv ce s 32 I io a_ L o 8"" $3.1 billion loss on the plant. Even with li How Shoreham Compares i ch ng a t1 ug[ l 0 did nd t" " "E Cost per lulowatt in constant 1980 dolars of Shoreham power vs. rnean cost of plants. L, Stone & Webster. UIEO's Simreham g b!! Id b nkr. diti 3 project manager warned his superiors of th h rehane $2,332 ? concerns about Stone & Webster in 19,74 k $0 Ithe sta [ of test in n'y e Fe i Segie-urut reactors operatmo after 1979 1.350 : i and 1975, but Ulf0 made no mapr i Public Service Commission. It was ob-li tained by Newsday late Friday, when it Plants weh same design m1,227 - ( changes n the size ofits licensing staff Q ~ was submitted to the PSC b Suffolk. It.. plants under constructon Nf,NI <~ Reactors in the Northeast - 902 9.
- Lilf0 considered S&W's perfor-1
' is the first of two major stu es that are to form the case against Litf0 in up- ( Plants wah same artMect and engmeet M 933:N . T j mance** con 8t=ti n ananager gmasly $c *"5' 030,, Based $3.2 tMon ti sown n 97 g nent a hore am completed but unlicensed. The accond Plants ordered in same year MI65 / cost for Shoreham. Shoreham" project manager expressed som State Consurner hotecWn CoMssu
- "" $ *d u -y'cIr e ort e LIIf adequately correct y
a t k .} 4
~ 'ity,it has not pt been releasedi ~ ~ ~~~ 'The hist.ory of St.areham is o test- ~ M rc'= m w c==a low lain.r pnsductivity'~~~ ~ ~ ~~ ^ lx=,k c.se of miananagement," said the the state by LIILO and its architecten-
- hl=l== were "ceneestently inac.
coumitants who prepared the audit. Us-. gineer, Stone & Webster.The study alas manageconstructionof100 nuclear - curate, unseliable and virtually iMess" ing charts and references to internal er plante in 25 netime and advi b for planning and cost centrol As a re-Lilf0 documents, the audit says.100 othe; L'.S. reactors. compares Shoreham's costs to those of U.S. Nuclear Eegulatory Comunion 1.1120 failed to solve numerous prob-and laternational Atomic Energy Agen-apond to problems until it was les late. lems usuler its control since the early. One consultant, Robert J. Allio, has cy. N third, Rudolph I. Bertechi is an days of the project. Those problems in-been a senior scanager lur the Atomic analyst for the Alaska Public Utili e An analysis of eennutes of board of clude poor labor productivity, ined-Energy C-- ' D2e, dean of the man-C- ag =* echool at Beneselaer Polytech. who has done engineering lack of attention to Shoreham during equate eoat eoatroI by ita nic lastitute and director of planning for =8=d== en nuclear plant construction. much of... its plannied and cenetruc-All three concurred in b m=-a-tion" h board failed to add niembere architect <ngineer and insuNicient at-tention to impending daniga changes Babcock & Wilcon, a reactor manufac-dation en LIlf0Ities. emper=ac=d in maarlaar from new regulations. turer. Another, Paul C. Rizzo, heads a "llie price of plant - unprec-propecte al-anu,unt of Shoreham's cost that LIff0 -[ 460. member e====%g firm, helped edented in the industry-speaks for the though Shoreham now compnose,soore A final decision on penalties - the than half of LIILO's eneste. cannot collect fro:n customers-is to be made by b PSC.Until now,WallStreet t-analysts have put the most hkely penal-ties at $500 million to $1 billion. Gov. Mario Cuomo en Friday echoed those As-ures - although he has no direct role in 4 the audits. LilEO public aKaire vice preendent Ira Freilicher said yesterday the rosn-I pony has *no conunent at this time." i IJif0 has contended it did not mis-manage construction and that the huge cont overruns were due to facters outen'de its control, such as innation and regula-tory changes-h audit, part of which was filed by long Island Citisene in Action. is the po-sition 'of groupe critical of Shoreham. But the audit itself was done by three consultants who reviewed thousands of pages ofinternal documenta provided to 4 ) h E I i I i 1
r .., e i~'~~.] /.. e w -~;. -=,-s* :. v., ;...;.',.1. . n:r $2 Billion:In M.. ismanag.ednisnt., _.a........ .. 4 The-report was* not the work of f The State' Consumer Protection Board outside agitators, or buntling stow and Suffolk County have rolessed a bureaucrats, it was the condusion of a report on an investigation into the, hoevpeight 'three-man' panel com. irgrudence of ULCO's management Othe Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant.,D, prisec' of. Robert J. Aillo, a former i itis devastating for the corporation for "* senior manager for the Atomic Energy Commission, dean of management. it charges that the mismanagement of school at Rensselawr Polytechnic LILCO was re'aponsible for over'$2 Institute, and director of planning for a, y-billion in Irnproper decialons related to """ ?"8'8**'s.... '. f j %,y.; i. J ~ f i this construction project. - ' x,. -
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o f o s. 4. 4 e.. An. d Why's.,ot: ',. *.. m = - N w u:u a,n g .;* ". 3 .a a.-x, a..~ g _. ~ a2 Bil"lp M4((ion.,In.Mismanagem.5.. w.,.e-r,t e.g ;. y , ent', e.g.s : - - - ~ i, reactor manufacturerr Paul C: RI no - 2 fte benent of the doubt w the utilities, 4 who,'as head'of e consulting' firm, ' holding its empildt trust to the in. M , helped manage constmetion of some vestors up and overtheir obilgations to F: the' ratepeyers. The. Publict Service y l.,100. nuclear plants throughout the Commission,. almost.di. ; is M world, and advloed the NRC and an agected toeleeve a reportMa,rging.0 Infomational ' nudder ' agency. The !., third panel member was Rudolph L.. somewhere between a half bill sortschi, who is an analyst for the ' orm billion dollars in-inprudency. 3 Alaska Public Utilities and has done Eitherway, the picture is not bright for f LILCO's continuance. W.w ;. J projects _.' g work en nuclear plant engineerin ~ " Even if by some mirecte they were j i l The recommendations; on which all able' to overcome the imprudency
- three agreed, could well mean the end charges, they would still be very hard ;
i f of LILCO as a corporation. A pressed to find the mechanism to open i During the hearings
- h' eld ' by Shoreham over the opposition of both '
Govemor Mario Cuomo's Shoreham the county and the staten which is
- Commission, it had beari concluded based upon the geveniment's inability 1 1that 'he maximum.the corporation to guarantee the sa8e' evacuation of all '
' could withstand in irriprudent darges
- the people in case of a mejor acddent.. '
was between $100,000,000 :and Without being able.to open the plant, : 8500,000,000, anything at<sve' that Athe state laws ' preclude charging the l spelled a finandal tomet. to'tte cor - ' retapayers for the construction of this project due 2 tte used and useful poration. Under Public Servie L'aw, a facility ' prtndple of law. The Public. Service cannot be worked into the rate base Commission over the past two decades, unless it is "used and useful," If it is has not upheld this prindple; But the used and uservi,..i Yte tagM2d Attomey General's office is on record were prudent and necessary can be as recognizing these i,. ,-./ b:: ' worised into the rate base. All Im.'- as welld, and has pledged to take legal ) ~ prudent charges must be absortied.by. action, against the Publ.icI., Service the corporation, its stockholders and , Commission and LILCO should they bond holders and its creditors. Just as attempt to burden the retepeyers with 4 . with any other business, if LILCO's . lilegal rate Increases to pay for an ' M-liabl4ities, which. imprudent charges . abandoned Shoreham. " ' "* are, total more than the value of its . Shoreham was a mistake created by, .~ assets, the business cannot continue to,; its.. .g. .! and authorized by its r operate finandally. Its base to borrow./ stockholders.'Shoreham is a mistake j l l ~ is diminished, its credit lines shut off, ' that ' must' be paid fqF by thej I the value of the stock la reduced to its management of thel corporation aind * . ratio of assets to liabilities, orinoir the ' the stockholders 'who encouraged this j f 'i?,_ .;, benefited from its cost.3 ~i Investors perceive it!' ' 6 ', l* ~ ' The Public' Service Commission, #'and Intended' to-benefit from its ji , independently of the State Consumer 3.Popsration.*'"['did not have,a vote dg PP N TN Protect'.on Boardi ts l'n-ftw procnos of d,",The,ratepayers i j conduding,lts own: irrprudency. in, ...,and would never share 'in its'pmfits, f ves,tigaticC ' The Public., Service., thus7 they1 should'f ret # ber held g friend. of itw indu.stry, alwa,ys, giving ' Y.A. nd why not.,?v me.w.ilabil ' responsible for finandng its Commission has boon known to'be a .m F - - N. e,.gj;,;, e. e - h. u.W y [ ." #: L %:. ~. V . 4- .?. -> s f
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4 Sez Shoreham'swashedup' r i Cuomo?... ..'... ke plant: imlFV ~ ~ .i bn nu M4Q .Let L.lC... ~.CO take' aibath W[D # p,
- 3 i
m do n'so that Long' Island' consumers By RIARCIA KRAllER ~.
- do not have to pay the whole cost of*
' [,hy N and DON SINGLET, ON - , ', Shoreham, which has cost LILCO close i , With Michael Llamrahaa to $4 billion in construction costs to' .Jjff l Gov. Cuomo said yesterday that he' ygf'. offered no specific suggestions ^ % N doubts that the Long Island Lighting on easing the burden for Long Island' 4 Co..ever wdl.be able to start up its cpnsumers, however, [ j controversial Shoreham nuclear ' generating plant. Ile' suggested that TIIE'G0VERNOR said that within 'q LILCO'sshareholders"will havelo cat :six weeks he plans to meet.with the, j part of the cost, about $500inillion." ), Legislature to work out an " energy' g i Cuomo said that he sees no reason as;enda" which willinclude some plan' a for the state to bail LILCO out of its, to phase in higher, electricity rates for , 4. i Shorcham losses. . Long Island consumers and import g ' ~ - } l "1.cl them take a bath.' They're a. hydropower for the metropolitan area. $y
- O private corporation,",he said,'addin('from Quebec via a new transmission' fE
~ that, he his opinion, the' Shoreliam'- line through Ma:'cy, N.Y.. .g l i plant *was tjuilt by inferior meclianics LILCO savs that Shoreham is vir:. I-with the worst managers." ' tually completed.'Its scheduled towa P-h; - WY[f l "What makes you think it (the. level tests had to be postponed due to + b Shoreham plant) woul4' work for more the brerkdown of three backup diesel l generators severat months ago. The nacnau uraca o,av uws i than a weekt" he said.. a IN AN l'NTERVildV,5 will5 Daily News editors and reporters, Cuomo - said he does not believe that LILCO's j inability to start up Shoreham would be a " tragedy" for Long Island or the . state. l
- We don't need the power. I'm not
] l concerned about losing the power," he said, explainhig that the purchase of low-cost hydrocicctricity frongCanada a l will offset the generating losses that might have come from Shoreham. Cuomo said that what needs to I.e i done is to find a way to keep the rates l l l I
c ATTACHMENT 11 1 Newsday 2/24/84 "LILCO's Business Is the Public's Business Too" i i i i t I r 4 i um o
N 20 D IEdiron'iMes A nosday ded Pf-F. Y LRCO's Businness Is tine Public's Bassinness Too Despite all the difliculties and negative ness has changed since Wifliam Catacosinos nouncements ofincidents that are reportable publicity the long Island Lighting Co. has took over as board chair: nan last month. to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, such encountered with its Shoreham nuclear pow-With one exception - a Catacosinos piesa as further trouble with Shoreham's backup er plant, until recently company officials conference on Feb. 8 "no comment" has. diesel generators. The public has learned have always been quite forthcoming in dis-become LILCO's reply to questions ranging what Lilf0 wants in the way of rate relief, closing and explaining LIILO's various from the complex to the mundane. cmergency planning and fuel Icading only problems. But that policy of relative open. The company has made no public an-through accounts by state officials and other participants in meetings with Catacosinos. Yet everyone who relies en LIILO's ser-vices has a stake in the utility's finances and the safety and reliability of Shoreham. Like it or not, LIILO's affairs are their affairs. Ll1CO's current uncommunirative policy could undermine the credibility it needs to convince the NRC and the public that it's capable of managing its own emergency plan for Shoreham. Silence and deception by the utility that operates the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor contributed greatly to the public fear, confusion and overreaction that followed the accident there. I The commission that investigated Three - Mile Island severely criticized the lack of re-liable information from the company. That criticism became the basis for new NRC rules governing emergency planning - rules that emphasize credible, reliable and promnt public information. Cahcosinos isn't helping LIlf0 by try-ing to keep the public in the dark about the I company and Shoreham. -}}