05000354/LER-1999-009, :on 990820,license Condition Violation Re Min FW Temp Limits Were Noted.Caused by Lightning Strike. Recovered & Restored Plant Sys Affected by Electrical Transient
| ML20212F804 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1999 |
| From: | Priest J Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212F757 | List: |
| References | |
| LER-99-009, NUDOCS 9909280380 | |
| Download: ML20212F804 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3541999009R00 - NRC Website | |
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NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REaULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 13-1998)
Estimated burden per rnponse to conuly with this trindatory information collect:nn reQucst 50 hrs Riported lessons leamed tr3 incorporat d into LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington. DC 20555-0001. and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104). Office of Management and Budget (See reverse for required number of Washington. DC 20503. If an informahon collection does not display a digits / characters for each block) currenW valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person F not required to respond to, the information collection.
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
PAGE (3)
Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 1 OF 4 TITLE 61 Lic:nse Condition Violation - Minimum Feedwater Temperature Limits EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FAciuTY NAME DOCKET NUMDER NUMBER NUMBER 08 20 99 99
- - 009 -
00 09 20 99 FACILITY NAME DOCS,ET NUMBER 05000 OPERATINO j
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS Of 10 [FR 5: (Check one or more MIDE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(aH2)(v)
X 50.73(aH2)(i) 50.73(aH2)(viii)
POWER 100 20.2203(aH1 20.2203(aH3)(i>
50.73(a)(2Hii) 50.73(aH2)(x)
LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2Hiii) 73.71 20.2203(aH2His) 20.2203(aH4) 50.73(a)(2Hiv)
X OTHER 20.2203(aH2Hiii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2Hv)
SpecifY in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
N.:.ME TELEPMoNE NUMBER (include Area Codei Jrmes Priest, Licensing Engineer 856-339-5434 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE Q"
TO EPIX TO EPlX SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR
- S X NO fif yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE),
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On August 20, 1999, at 2358 hours0.0273 days <br />0.655 hours <br />0.0039 weeks <br />8.97219e-4 months <br />, a lightning strike caused a momentary loss of a 500kv offsite transmission line.
The associated electrical transient resulted in trips and automatic initiation of several plant systems. These equipment malfunctions resulted in a safety lockout of the Primary Containment Instrument Gas (PCIG) compressors and the isolation of the number 6 Feedwater Heaters.
As a result, the plant entered into Technical Specification 3.0.3 for two inoperable Main Steamline Isolation Valve (MSIV)
Sealing System subsystems and violated the Operating License condition for required minimum feedwater heater capacity.
A less than adequate operator response to the plant transient perpetuated the license condition violation for approximately six hours following the initiating lightning strike.
As a result of the Operating License condition violation, a 24-hour report was made to the NRC on August 21, 1999, at 1627 hours0.0188 days <br />0.452 hours <br />0.00269 weeks <br />6.190735e-4 months <br />, in accordance with Hope Creek Operating License Condition 2.F.
Corrective actions included the recovary and restoration of plant systems affected by the electrical transient.
The Corrective Action Program is also being utilized to investigate and evaluate the operator response to this transient.
9909280380 990920 PDR ADOCK 05000354 G
.(6-1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
Hope treek Generating Station 05000354 YEAR SEQU TIAL REV S ON 2 OF 4
99
- - 009 -
00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)
Feedwater System - EIIS Identifier (SJ/--}*
Containment Leakage Control System - EIIS Identifier {BD/--)*
OEnergy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CC}
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Event Date:
August 20, 1999 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE The plant was in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 (POWER OPERATION) at 100% of rated thermal power.
No other structures, systems, or components were inoperable at the time of the occurrence that contributed to the event.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On August 20, 1999, at 2358 hours0.0273 days <br />0.655 hours <br />0.0039 weeks <br />8.97219e-4 months <br />, a lightning strike caused a momentary loss of a 500kv offsite transmisLAon line.
The associated electrical transient resulted in a trip of the following significant equipment:
"A" Reactor'Feedpump; "A" Electrohydraulic Control (EHC) Pump; "A" and "B" Reactor Water Cleanup Pumps; "A" Technical Support Center Chiller; "A"
Control Room Chiller; "A" and "B" Main Reactor Feedpump Turbine Lube Oil Pumps; and the Drywell Coolers.
In addition, the lightning strike resulted in a safety lockout of both Primary Containment Instrument Gas (PCIG) compressors.
The following equipment automatically started:
"B" Technical Support Center Chiller; "B" Control Room Chiller; "B" Safety Auxiliaries Cooling System Pump; and the "B" EHC Pump.
The trip of the "A" Reactor Feedpump and resulting lowering of reactor water level caused an automatic Reactor Recirculation System runback to approximately 70% power.
The operating shift's initial response was to stabilize reactor power, reactor pressure and reactor water level, as well as to identify the extent of the plant equipment affected by the transient.
On August 21, 1999, at 0045 hours5.208333e-4 days <br />0.0125 hours <br />7.440476e-5 weeks <br />1.71225e-5 months <br />, the operators received an overhead alarm for instrument gas low pressure, which resulted from the aforementioned safety lockout of the PCIG compressors.
The safety lockout of the PCIG compressors resulted in the inoperability of both Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Sealing System subsystems required by Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1.4.
Since LCO 3.6.1.4 has no Action Statement provisions for two inoperable MSIV Sealing System subsystems, Technical ~ Specification 3.0.3 was entered.
The PCIG compressor safety lockout was successfully reset on both compressors and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited at 0048 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
The entry into fCC FORM 366A (6-1998)
.ttM 998)
UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACluTY NAME (1)
DOCKET (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 YEAR SE U REvg NU NU 3 OF 4 99
- - 009 -
00 TEXT Uf more space is required, use additional copies of NRC form 366A) (17)
Technical Specification 3.0.3 is reportable under the provisions of 50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B).
At 0052 hours6.018519e-4 days <br />0.0144 hours <br />8.597884e-5 weeks <br />1.9786e-5 months <br />, after completion of plant stabilization, power ascension began..
At approximately 0449 hours0.0052 days <br />0.125 hours <br />7.423942e-4 weeks <br />1.708445e-4 months <br />, the reactor power was established at 100% of rated thermal power.
During shift turnover, at this power level, operators noted that:
reactor pressure was approximately 10 psig less than normal for rated power flow; feed flow was at 13.1 vice the expected 14.1 Mlbm/hr; Reactor Feed Pumps were at 81 percent demand vice the expected 84 percent; and that APRM upscale overhead alarms were being received.
At approximately 0608 hours0.00704 days <br />0.169 hours <br />0.00101 weeks <br />2.31344e-4 months <br />, snift operators determined that the number 6 Feedwater Heater extraction steam isolation valves were closed and that feedwater temperature was approximately 366 degrees F.
The Feedwater Heater extraction steam isolation valves had closed during the electrical transient following the lightning strike.
At approximately 0608 hours0.00704 days <br />0.169 hours <br />0.00101 weeks <br />2.31344e-4 months <br />, the abnormal procedure for loss of feedwater heating was entered and operators commenced a reactor power reduction to approximately 90 percent at 0646 hours0.00748 days <br />0.179 hours <br />0.00107 weeks <br />2.45803e-4 months <br />.
Hope Creek Operating License Condition 2.C(11) states that the facility i
shall not be operated with a feedwater heating capacity that would result in a rated power feedwater temperature of less than 400 degrees F unless analyses approving such operation are submitted by the licensee and approved by the staff.
The isolation of the number 6 Feedwater Heater during the electrical transient resulted in a feedwater heating capacity insufficient to maintain the 400 degree F minimum limit as specified in the Operating License condition.
As a result, a 24-hour report was made to the NRC at 1627 hours0.0188 days <br />0.452 hours <br />0.00269 weeks <br />6.190735e-4 months <br /> in accordance with Hope Creek Operating License Condition
- 2. F.
By that time, reactor power was restored to 100 percent of rated thermal power and feedwater temperature increased above 400 degrees F.
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of the event is attributed to equipment malfunction resulting from the electrical transient following the lightning strike.
The safety lockout of the PCIG compressors and the isolation of the number 6 Feedwater Heater resulted in the immediate entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 for two inoperable MSIV Sealing System subsystems and violation of the Operating License condition for required minimum feedwater heater capacity, respectively.
Investigations are continuing to determine exact relationship between the lightning strike and the Feedwater Heater isolation.
A less than adequate operator response to the plant transient perpetuated the license condition violation for approximately six hours following the initiating lightning strike.j
N2C FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (S-1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPO?.T (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 YEAR SEQU AL RE S N 4 OF 4 99
- - 009 -
00 TEXT (11more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS No safety consequences were associated with this event.
Operation at 100 percent of rated thermal power with feedwater temperatures as low as 365 degrees F would not challenge the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) limits established for the fuel in Hope Creek's core design.
In addition, the design limits for the fuel established for Chapter 15 accident analyses would likewise not have been challenged while operating during these reduced feedwater temperature conditions.
In addition, the period of time that the station operated with two inoperable MSIV Sealing System subsystems was minimal and was within the shutdown action time limits imposed by Technical Specification 3.0.3.
There was no impact to the public health and safety.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
A review of previously reported events within the last two years identified no previous occurrences similar to this event.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. Following the electrical transient, plant operators initiated actions to recover and restore affected plant systems.
Upon identifying the loss of feedwater heating capacity, operators entered the appropriate abnormal procedure to re-establish normal feedwater temperatures and rated power conditions.
Similarly, operators reset the emergency lockout of the PCIG compressors to restore the MSIV Sealing System.
- 2. The Corrective Action Program is being utilized to investigate and evaluate the operator response to the electrical transient, including the re-establishment of feedwater heating.
Corrective actions to improve operator response to these types of transients are being identified and will be implemented as appropriate.
The investigations into this event will be completed by September 30, 1999.
(
- 3. Investigations are continuing to determine exact relationship between the lightning strike and the Feedwater Heater isolation.
These l
investigations will be completed by October 31, 1999.