ML23361A099

LLC, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI 10083) on the NuScale Standard Design Approval Application

ML23361A099
Person / Time
Site:	99902078, 05200050
Issue date:	12/27/2023
From:	Shaver M NuScale
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
Shared Package
ML23361A098	List: ML23361A099
References
RAIO-155263
Download: ML23361A099 (1)

Text

RAIO-155263 December 27, 2023 Docket: 52-050 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738

SUBJECT:

NuScale Power, LLC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI No. 10083) on the NuScale Standard Design Approval Application

REFERENCE:

NRC Letter RAI-10083 Chapter 10, Steam and Power Conversion System, Revision 0, dated October 11, 2023, RAI# 10083 The purpose of this letter is to provide NuScale's response to NRC Requests for Additional Information (RAI), RAI# 10083, noted in the Reference above. The responses to the individual RAI questions are provided in the attached Enclosures.

This letter contains NuScale's response to the following RAI Question from NRC RAI# 10083:

10.1-1 Enclosures are grouped with all proprietary version responses first, followed by all nonproprietary version responses. NuScale requests that the proprietary versions be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR § 2.390. The enclosed affidavit supports this request.

This letter makes no new regulatory commitments and no revisions to any existing regulatory commitments.

Please contact Elisa Fairbanks at 541-452-7872 or at EFairbanks@nuscalepower.com if you have any questions.

Sincerely, Mark Shaver Director, Regulatory Affairs NuScale Power, LLC Distribution: Getachew Tesfaye, NRC Thomas Hayden, NRC Mahmoud Jardaneh, NRC NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330, Office: 541.360.0500, Fax: 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com

RAIO-155263 : NuScale Response to NRC Request for Additional Information RAI# 10083, proprietary : NuScale Response to NRC Request for Additional Information RAI# 10083, nonproprietary : Affidavit of Carrie Fosaaen, AF-155264 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330, Office: 541.360.0500, Fax: 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com

RAIO-155263 :

NuScale Response to NRC Request for Additional Information eRAI No. 10083, proprietary NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330, Office: 541.360.0500, Fax: 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com

RAIO-155263 :

NuScale Response to NRC Request for Additional Information eRAI No. 10083, nonproprietary NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330, Office: 541.360.0500, Fax: 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com

NuScale Nonproprietary Response to Request for Additional Information Docket: 052000050 RAI No.: 10083 Date of RAI Issue:10/11/2023 NRC Question No.: 10.1-1 Regulatory Basis Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 52.137(a)(2) requires an applicant for an SDA to provide a final safety analysis report (FSAR) that that describes the facility, presents the design bases and the limits on its operation, and presents a safety analysis of the structures, systems, and components and of the facility, or major portion thereof. Section 52.137(a)(2) requires that the applicant include:

a description and analysis of the SSCs of the facility, with emphasis upon performance requirements, the bases, with technical justification, upon which the requirements have been established, and the evaluations required to show that safety functions will be accomplished. It is expected that the standard plant will reflect through its design, construction, and operation an extremely low probability for accidents that could result in the release of significant quantities of radioactive fission products. The description shall be sufficient to permit understanding of the system designs and their relationship to the safety evaluations. Items such as the reactor core, reactor coolant system, instrumentation and control systems, electrical systems, containment system, other engineered safety features, auxiliary and emergency systems, power conversion systems, radioactive waste handling systems, and fuel handling systems shall be discussed insofar as they are pertinent.

Issue FSAR Chapter 10 describes the steam and power conversion systems. For the staff to understand the system design and its relationship to plant safety, the descriptions in Chapter 10 should include the systems design and performance characteristics and a reference heat balance diagram based on the normal plant operation at rated power. In general, the balance of plant (BOP) secondary plant system components and parameters are developed from the heat balance mass flow, temperatures, and steam system pressures which are used. If these are not used, a description of the bases for BOP system calculations and evaluations is needed. Power conversion system and component design must take into account the conditions established by NuScale Nonproprietary

NuScale Nonproprietary the secondary side heat balance in order to ensure safety related components can perform their functions. For example, the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) which will be required to close against system flow and pressure associated with the plant operating at rated power. In addition, the information provided in the heat balance allows the staff to confirm that analyses performed in Chapter 15 adequately reflect the design and use appropriate initial conditions reflective of the plants normal operation at rated power. The heat balance also provides information on the turbine bypass and main condenser heat removal capacity.

Requested Information Based on its review of Chapter 10, the staff has determined that additional information is required to fully satisfy 10 CFR 52.137(a)(2) requirements. The staff requests that NuScale include in Section 10.1 of the FSAR a reference heat balance diagram and associated table based on normal plant operation at rated power.

NuScale Response:

Summary NuScale disagrees with the premise and regulatory basis for this question. The US460 standard design approval application (SDAA) description of the steam and power conversion system currently complies with 10 CFR 52.137(a)(2) in that it permits an understanding of the system and its relationship to safety analyses. For the NuScale US460 design, the secondary side is nonsafety-related and is not used as input to safety analyses, so including a reference heat balance diagram and table is beyond the level of information required for the FSAR. This information will be available for the site-specific design, but would be of limited use in the SDAA since values will be site-specific and inclusion in the SDAA would be representative.

The evaluations of safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSC), such as the main steam isolation valves (MSIV), and the transient and accident analysis in Chapter 15 are not dependent on the Chapter 10 description of the steam and power conversion system. The descriptions for safety-related SSC in the SDAA independently establish their operating parameters and testing requirements in order to perform their safety-related functions. For the MSIV, the safety-related operating conditions are identified in the accident analysis in Chapter 6 and Chapter 15. The operation of the steam and power conversion system at rated power is not safety-related and is bounded by the safety-related operating conditions. Chapter 15 independently establishes the module initial condition ranges for the design-basis event analyses in Table 15.0-6. For nonsafety-related systems, such as the steam and power conversion system, it is sufficient that the FSAR establishes operating requirements within the NuScale Nonproprietary

NuScale Nonproprietary independently-established parameters and initial conditions. This is also the case for nonsafety-related SSC within the steam and power conversion system, such as the turbine bypass system and the main condenser.

As detailed below, the SDAA FSAR contains a level of detail consistent with guidance. Pursuant to SECY-11-0024 and Introduction - Part 2: Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: Small Modular Reactor Edition, the Staff are to rely on performance-based activities (e.g., tests or inspections) wherever possible to satisfy acceptance criteria. Applying this graded approach, other selected requirements (e.g., the initial test program) provide reasonable assurance of SSC performance for the nonsafety-related and non-risk-significant (i.e., Classification B2) SSC in question. In order to reflect a comprehensive response to this request for additional information (RAI), Figure 1, Heat Balance Diagram, Table 1, Nominal Case Conditions and Table 2, Nominal Case Values are included for reference.

Regulatory Basis The staff has not identified NUREG-0800 acceptance criteria applicable to this request, and a representative heat balance does not establish facility compliance with regulatory requirements constituting design bases functions. As further described below, the SDAA presents the design bases of the facility. For example, turbine bypass is not credited in the safety analysis presented in Chapter 15, which describes the limits on operation.

The staff cites 52.137(a)(2) as regulatory basis for this request. As stated, 52.137(a)(2) requires a description of the facility including the design bases and the limits on operation, as well as presenting a safety analysis of the SSC.

The performance requirements of SSC within the scope of Chapter 10 have been described insofar as they are pertinent, and specifically, the description of these SSC permits understanding of their relationship to the safety analysis. For example, turbine bypass is not credited in safety analysis. The request states that the MSIVs must perform their safety function and close against system flow and pressure at rated power. SDAA Table 5.4-2 presents the best-estimate full-load thermal-hydraulic operating conditions of the steam generator, including that nominal steam pressure is 475 psia. SDAA Table 15.0-6 describes initial conditions for design-basis events, stating main steam pressure at 100 percent is 475 psia.

Background Information SDAA Table 10.3-1 establishes design characteristics of the main steam system (e.g.,

full power steam flow, design pressure upstream and downstream of the main steam NuScale Nonproprietary

NuScale Nonproprietary isolation valves). Furthermore, in response to audit item A-10.1-1, NuScale has provided the requested heat balance information. However, it is NuScales position that this information is beyond the level of design information required in the SDAA, particularly considering the risk and safety significance of SSC within the scope of Chapter 10. The RAI states the requested information will allow the staff to confirm analyses in Chapter 15 adequately reflect the design and uses appropriate initial conditions reflective of the plants normal operation. However, as described in the response to audit item A-10.1-1, Chapter 15 defines the initial conditions and parameters used in the safety analysis. For example, Table 15.0-6 identifies the initial conditions and biasing used in the Chapter 15 analyses.

In RAI 10.1-1, the staff expresses concerns that power conversion system and component design must take into account the conditions established by the secondary side heat balance in order to ensure safety-related components can perform their functions. However, the inclusion (or exclusion) of heat balance values in the SDAA does not imply that safety-related components cannot perform their functions. The necessary performance requirements of safety-related SSC are specified in the SDAA.

Specific safety-related SSC are described in their applicable section(s) of the FSAR.

Furthermore, the NRC staff has audited numerous NuScale design documents detailing these SSC. Chapter 10 does not include safety-related SSC. The staff provides an example, stating, the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) which will be required to close against system flow and pressure associated with the plant operating at rated power. The MSIVs are described in FSAR Section 6.2, and the safety analyses in Chapter 15 that credit MSIVs establish the conditions under which MSIVs must be able to perform their credited function. The steam bypass and main condenser are nonsafety-related and non-risk-significant. The safety-related ultimate heat sink (UHS) is located within the Reactor Building and is not impacted by SSC within the scope of a secondary heat balance. The RAI does not establish specific parameters pertaining to safety-related SSC that are missing from the FSAR, and a representative heat balance does not fill such gaps.

Additionally, the SDAA includes several parameters of concern in the staff's request.

FSAR Table 5.4-1 includes best-estimate full-load thermal-hydraulic parameters, including: total heat transfer, steam pressure, steam temperature, steam generator inlet temperature, and total steam flow. Table 15.0-6 provides initial conditions for design-basis event evaluation, and it includes main steam pressure and feedwater temperature at 100 percent rated thermal power.

NuScale Nonproprietary

NuScale Nonproprietary Level of Detail in the Licensing Basis Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.181, Content of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e), endorses NEI 98-03, Revision 1. Though 10 CFR 50.71 is not applicable to the SDAA, NEI 98-03 includes guidance and considerations with respect to FSAR level of details required. It states, Detailed text and drawings may be removed from the UFSAR to the extent that the information provided exceeds that necessary to present the plant design bases, safety analyses and appropriate UFSAR description. This guidance describes the level of detail necessary within the FSAR, and it emphasizes information important to the understanding of the safety analysis, information that is important to presenting design bases functions, and information necessary within the safety evaluation report (SER).

As previously stated, SDAA Chapter 15 provides the initial conditions and parameters used in the safety analysis. A heat balance is not necessary to present US460 design bases. Regarding the safety evaluation, precedent provides useful insight; the US600 design certification application (DCA) did include a heat balance in Chapter 10.

However, the information provided was representative and, for both Chapters 10 and 15, this heat balance is not cited in the staffs technical evaluation of the US600 DCA SER.

Therefore, relevant guidance supports the exclusion of a representative heat balance from the SDAA.

As an example, NEI 98-03 allows for removal of information; that is not important to the description of the facility or presentation of its safety analysis and design bases, e.g., component details such as specific motor horsepower ratings for MOVs, or that, if changed during the life of the plant, would have no impact on the ability of plant systems, structures and components described in the UFSAR to perform their design basis function(s), e.g., specific HVAC equipment capacity and flow rate information for structures that do not contain equipment that performs design basis functions.

The heat balance calculations are an example similar to the NEI 98-03 example of HVAC equipment capacity. Final values will be site-specific and may require updating based on changing conditions, but must remain within established parameters. Inclusion of the feedwater heater cascading drain mass flow rate (lb/hr) is not important to the description of the US460 standard plant design, the safety analysis, or the design bases.

NuScale Nonproprietary

NuScale Nonproprietary This information would have no impact on the ability of SSC to perform the design basis function.

The Graded Approach to Review and the Standard Review Plan It is NuScales position that a representative heat balance is unnecessary in the SDAA.

Using the graded approach to review established in SECY-11-0024, select requirements (e.g., initial test program) are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the performance of the nonsafety-related and non-risk-significant SSC within the scope of SDAA Chapter 10.

Regulatory Background In 2010, the Commission issued staff requirements memorandum (SRM), Use of Risk Insights to Enhance the Safety Focus of Small Modular Reactor Reviews, COMGBJ 0004/COMGEA-100001 (ML102510405). This SRM directed the staff to provide a policy paper addressing several issues, including:

1. Development of a risk-informed framework, implementation strategy, and plans and schedules to integrate risk insights into pre-application activities and review of applications. This framework includes identification of SSCs that are risk-significant and contribute most to safety.

2. Alignment of review focus and resources to risk-significant SSCs.

3. Development of risk-informed licensing review plans for each review.

In 2011, the staff responded to this SRM in SECY-11-0024 (ML110620546). The staff developed a more risk-informed and integrated review framework pertaining to integral pressurized water reactor (iPWR) designs. Specifically, this framework provides a graded approach in review of SSC. The most important SSC (i.e., safety-related and risk-significant) receive the most detailed review, and each lesser classification receives a less detailed review. This framework also establishes the use of performance-based requirements into the SSC review process. Furthermore, this SECY establishes the creation of design-specific review plans. The SECY states, The framework provides a graded approach in which the staff would conduct the most detailed, in-depth review (analogous to the current review process) for SSCs determined to be both safety-related and risk-significant, and a progressively less detailed review would be applied to SSCs determined to be non-safety-related or not risk-significant. SSCs determined to be neither safety-related nor risk-significant would receive the least detailed review under this framework.

NuScale Nonproprietary

NuScale Nonproprietary One goal of this review framework is to enhance efficiency by improving integration of performance-based program requirements into the SSC review process. Specifically, the SECY states, The review framework, for review areas in which a correlation exists between specific performance-oriented acceptance criteria and performance-based program requirements, provides for identifying those program requirements as part of the SSC review. The framework would use tests or inspections to either augment or replace, as appropriate, technical analysis and evaluation techniques that the staff currently applies. It elaborates, For SSCs determined to be non-safety-related and/or not risk-significant, the framework relies increasingly on specific elements (e.g., tests or inspections) of programmatic requirements to satisfy performance-oriented acceptance criteria for such SSCs.

The Commission approved this risk-informed and integrated review framework in SRM-SECY-11-0024. This SECY received approval from all five Commissioners in the Commission Voting Record.

The Standard Review Plan and Design Specific Review Standard The aforementioned SECY includes the creation of Introduction - Part 2: Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: Small Modular Reactor Edition (ML13207A315). This section of the Standard Review Plan (SRP) further details the review framework established in SECY-11-0024. The overview section describes this risk-informed review framework, including three specific elements.

1. Element 1 incorporates a risk-informed review approach by considering safety classification and risk-significance of SSCs in order to determine the appropriate level of review.

2. Element 2 builds upon the previously discussed review approach to allow specific elements (e.g., tests or inspections) of programmatic requirements to satisfy performance-oriented acceptance criteria for such SSCs. It includes several examples for requirements that can be used for this purpose. These selected requirements include, but are not limited to, the initial test program (ITP), environmental qualification, Technical Specifications (TS), code qualification, and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC).

As described, the selected requirements may be used to demonstrate satisfaction of design-based acceptance criteria for SSC with low risk significance.

NuScale Nonproprietary

NuScale Nonproprietary

3. Element 3 establishes that the integrated review approach (i.e., the graded approach based upon safety classification) is documented in the Design Specific Review Standard (DSRS).

As described, this framework is applicable to the review of SSC. Figure 1 of this SRP section further clarifies the graded approach:

NuScale Licensing Basis Chapter 10 of the SDAA includes the classification of steam and power conversion SSC. For the turbine generator, Table 10.2-2 identifies that SSC are categorized as nonsafety-related and non-risk-significant (i.e., B2). For the main steam system, Table 10.3-4 identifies that SSC are categorized as B2. For the other features of the steam and power conversion system, Table 10.4-4 identifies that SSC are categorized as B2.

Therefore, the SSC within the scope of SDAA Chapter 10 fall within the lowest level of review in accordance with the graded approach. This graded approach also allows for the utilization of the selected requirements mentioned above (e.g., ITP) when satisfying SRP or DSRS acceptance criteria.

NuScale Nonproprietary

NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Application of the Graded Approach In RAI 10.1-1, the staff generically cites 10 CFR 52.137(a)(2) as the basis for requiring a secondary-side heat balance within SDAA Chapter 10. However, the staff does not identify a specific section of the SRP or DSRS, nor associated acceptance criteria.

NuScale has not identified specific SRP or DSRS acceptance criteria that directly applies to the inclusion of a secondary-side heat balance. However, assuming there are relevant SRP or DSRS acceptance criteria, application of the graded approach described above can satisfy the staffs concerns.

The staff expresses concerns that power conversion system and component design must take into account the conditions established by the secondary side heat balance in order to ensure safety-related components can perform their functions. As identified above, the SSC within the scope of the power conversion system are nonsafety-related and non-risk-significant. As discussed above, the design parameters that apply to specific safety-related SSC are provided elsewhere in the SDAA. The RAI specifically mentions the capability of the turbine bypass and main condenser heat removal capacity. Section 14.2 of the SDAA provides the test abstracts within the scope of the initial test program. There are several tests relevant to these capabilities:

1. Preoperational tests:

a. Test #7 tests the air cooled condenser system, including several component level tests to verify components perform their function.

b. Test #25 tests the condensate and feedwater system, including several component level tests to verify components perform their function.

c. Test #29 tests the turbine generator system, including several component level tests to verify components perform their function. System level test 29.02.01 includes verification that the system automatically controls turbine bypass flow to the main condenser.

2. Startup tests:

a. Test #86 requires recording the heat balance data at various power levels.

b. Test #94 tests ramp changes in load demand at several power levels.

The acceptance criteria include verification the plant automatically maintains plant parameters within design limits during and following the transient. These parameters include feedwater heater level, steam generator (SG) superheat, SG pressure, SG inventory, gland seal temperature, outlet temperature of the turbine bypass desuperheater, among others.

NuScale Nonproprietary

NuScale Nonproprietary

c. Test #95 tests step changes in load demand at various power levels. This test includes acceptance criteria similar to Test #94.

d. Test #96 tests a loss of the high-pressure feedwater heater during power operation. This test includes acceptance criteria similar to Test #94.

e. Test #97 performs a 100 percent load rejection. The acceptance criteria include verification the plant automatically maintains plant parameters within design limits during and following the transient. These parameters include feedwater heater level, steam generator (SG) superheat, SG pressure, SG inventory, gland seal temperature, outlet temperature of the turbine bypass desuperheater, among others. This tests the full capability of the turbine bypass and main condenser heat removal capability.

The graded approach includes TS as applicable selected requirements under element two of the framework. Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.1.1 requires performance of a channel check in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. This check includes the main steam pressure channels, steam superheat channels, among other operational channels (e.g., high power range linear power). Section 3.6.2 of the TS applies to the containment isolation valves (including the MSIVs). The TS serve as further assurance the plant is operating safely and within operational limits, and the TS serve as additional select requirements under the graded approach.

It is NuScales position that a representative heat balance is unnecessary within the SDAA. Using the graded approach established in SECY-11-0024, other selected requirements (e.g., the initial test program) serve as reasonable assurance of SSC performance for these nonsafety-related and non-risk-significant SSC.

NuScale Nonproprietary

NuScale Nonproprietary

((2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary

NuScale Nonproprietary ((

                                      }}2(a),(c)

NuScale Nonproprietary

NuScale Nonproprietary ((

                                      }}2(a),(c)

NuScale Nonproprietary

NuScale Nonproprietary ((

                                      }}2(a),(c)

NuScale Nonproprietary

NuScale Nonproprietary Impact on US460 SDA: There are no impacts to US460 SDA as a result of this response. NuScale Nonproprietary

RAIO-155263 : Affidavit of Carrie Fosaaen, AF-155264 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330, Office: 541.360.0500, Fax: 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com

NuScale Power, LLC AFFIDAVIT of Carrie Fosaaen I, Carrie Fosaaen, state as follows:

1. I am the Vice President, Regulatory Affairs of NuScale Power, LLC (NuScale), and as such, I have been specifically delegated the function of reviewing the information described in this affidavit that NuScale seeks to have withheld from public disclosure, and am authorized to apply for its withholding on behalf of NuScale.

2. I am knowledgeable of the criteria and procedures used by NuScale in designating information as a trade secret, privileged, or as confidential commercial or financial information. This request to withhold information from public disclosure is driven by one or more of the following:

a. The information requested to be withheld reveals distinguishing aspects of a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.) whose use by NuScale competitors, without a license from NuScale, would constitute a competitive economic disadvantage to NuScale.

b. The information requested to be withheld consists of supporting data, including test data, relative to a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.), and the application of the data secures a competitive economic advantage, as described more fully in paragraph 3 of this Affidavit.

c. Use by a competitor of the information requested to be withheld would reduce the competitor's expenditure of resources, or improve its competitive position, in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality, or licensing of a similar product.

d. The information requested to be withheld reveals cost or price information, production capabilities, budget levels, or commercial strategies of NuScale.

e. The information requested to be withheld consists of patentable ideas.

3. Public disclosure of the information sought to be withheld is likely to cause substantial harm to NuScale's competitive position and foreclose or reduce the availability of profit-making opportunities. The accompanying Request for Additional Information response reveals distinguishing aspects about the process by which NuScale develops its NuScale Power, LLC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI No. 10083) on the NuScale Standard Design Approval Application.

NuScale has performed significant research and evaluation to develop a basis for this response and has invested significant resources, including the expenditure of a considerable sum of money. The precise financial value of the information is difficult to quantify, but it is a key element of the design basis for a NuScale plant and, therefore, has substantial value to NuScale. If the information were disclosed to the public, NuScale's competitors would have access to the information without purchasing the right to use it or having been required to undertake a similar expenditure of resources. Such disclosure would constitute a misappropriation of NuScale's intellectual property, and would deprive NuScale of the opportunity to exercise its competitive advantage to seek an adequate return on its investment. AF-155264

4. The information sought to be withheld is in the enclosed response to NRC Request for Additional Information RAI 10083 Chapter 10.1-1. The enclosure contains the designation "Proprietary" at the top of each page containing proprietary information. The information considered by NuScale to be proprietary is identified within double braces, "(( }}" in the document.

5. The basis for proposing that the information be withheld is that NuScale treats the information as a trade secret, privileged, or as confidential commercial or financial information. NuScale relies upon the exemption from disclosure set forth in the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 USC § 552(b)(4), as well as exemptions applicable to the NRC under 10 CFR §§ 2.390(a)(4) and 9.17(a)(4).

6. Pursuant to the provisions set forth in 10 CFR § 2.390(b)(4), the following is provided for consideration by the Commission in determining whether the information sought to be withheld from public disclosure should be withheld:

a. The information sought to be withheld is owned and has been held in confidence by NuScale.

b. The information is of a sort customarily held in confidence by NuScale and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, consistently has been held in confidence by NuScale.

The procedure for approval of external release of such information typically requires review by the staff manager, project manager, chief technology officer or other equivalent authority, or the manager of the cognizant marketing function (or his delegate), for technical content, competitive effect, and determination of the accuracy of the proprietary designation. Disclosures outside NuScale are limited to regulatory bodies, customers and potential customers and their agents, suppliers, licensees, and others with a legitimate need for the information, and then only in accordance with appropriate regulatory provisions or contractual agreements to maintain confidentiality.

c. The information is being transmitted to and received by the NRC in confidence.

d. No public disclosure of the information has been made, and it is not available in public sources. All disclosures to third parties, including any required transmittals to NRC, have been made, or must be made, pursuant to regulatory provisions or contractual agreements that provide for maintenance of the information in confidence.

e. Public disclosure of the information is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of NuScale, taking into account the value of the information to NuScale, the amount of effort and money expended by NuScale in developing the information, and the difficulty others would have in acquiring or duplicating the information. The information sought to be withheld is part of NuScale's technology that provides NuScale with a competitive advantage over other firms in the industry.

NuScale has invested significant human and financial capital in developing this technology and NuScale believes it would be difficult for others to duplicate the technology without access to the information sought to be withheld. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on December 27, 2023. Carrie Fosaaen AF-155264}}