ML24108A122

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LLC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information No. 10105 (RAI-10105) on the NuScale Standard Design Approval Application
ML24108A122
Person / Time
Site: 05200050, 99902078
Issue date: 04/17/2024
From: Fosaaen C
NuScale
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
RAIO-157891
Download: ML24108A122 (1)
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RAIO-157891 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360.0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com April 17, 2024 Docket No. 052-050 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738

SUBJECT:

NuScale Power, LLC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information No. 10105 (RAI-10105) on the NuScale Standard Design Approval Application

REFERENCES:

1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Request for Additional Information No. 10105 (RAI-10105), dated November 18, 2023 The purpose of this letter is to provide the NuScale Power, LLC (NuScale) response to the referenced NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI).

The Enclosure to this letter contain NuScale's response to the following RAI Question from NRC RAI-10105:

x 9.1.5-6 This letter makes no regulatory commitments and no revisions to any existing regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions, please contact Thomas Griffith at 541-452-7813 or at tgriffith@nuscalepower.com.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on April 17, 2024.

Sincerely, Carrie Fosaaen Vice President, Regulatory Affairs NuScale Power, LLC Distribution:

Mahmoud Jardaneh, NRC Getachew Tesfaye, NRC Greg Cranston, NRC : NuScale Response to NRC Request for Additional Information RAI-10105, nonproprietary Sincerely, Carrie Fosaaen

RAIO-157891 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360.0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com :

NuScale Response to NRC Request for Additional Information RAI-10105, nonproprietary

NuScale Nonproprietary Response to Request for Additional Information Docket: 052000050 RAI No.: 10105 Date of RAI Issue:11/18/2023 NRC Question No.: 9.1.5-6 REGULATORY BASIS GDC 1, 2 and 4 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 apply to the design, fabrication, and testing of SSCs important to safety to maintain quality standards, to the ability of structures, equipment, and mechanisms to withstand the effects of earthquakes, and to the protection of safety-related equipment from the effects of internally generated missiles (i.e., dropped loads), respectively.

ISSUE In SDAA FSAR Section 9.1.5.3, Safety Evaluation, the applicant indicates that the heavy load exclusion zones represent areas where heavy loads cannot travel without additional measures because a heavy load drop in the exclusion zones could potentially impact safe shutdown equipment, cause a release of radioactive materials, or a criticality accident that could cause unacceptable radiation exposures.

In SDAA FSAR Section 9.1.5.2.3, "System Operation," on page 9.1-44, the third paragraph states: "Heavy load exclusion zones and safe load paths" Figure 9.1.5-1, "Reactor Building Crane Safe Load Path," provides the safe load path only when moving the Nuclear Power Modules in the RXB. But figure(s) and clear discussions of "the heavy load exclusion zones and safe load paths," for each overhead heavy load handling system were not provided in Section 9.1.5 of the SDAA.

One example of a heavy load exclusion zone is the spent fuel pool (SFP). A dropped load on the SFP could potentially produce a radiation release, this is prevented by design and by the heavy load exclusion zones. The staff noted that the SFP is covered and protected by the refueling floor, but the NuScale design includes cranes capable of handling loads that could exceed the refueling floor design.

COL Item 9.1-5 instructs applicants that reference the NuScale Power Plant US460 standard design to provide a description of the program governing heavy loads handling (which includes a detailed description of the safe load paths for movement of heavy loads). However, the staff finds that this COL Item does not provide the future applicant with a reference to acceptable NuScale Nonproprietary

NuScale Nonproprietary methods of developing the heavy loads handling program. The staff notes that providing a properly crafted COL Item could be an acceptable path to address the staff's concerns related to the heavy load exclusion zones and safe load paths identified in this RAI.

INFORMATION REQUESTED The staff requests the applicant to update the FSAR Section 9.1.5, COL Item 9.1-5 or to add a new COL Item that provides guidance for future applicants to define the heavy load exclusion zones and safe load paths for each overhead heavy load handling system and refer to the applicable provision(s) of industrial code(s).

NuScale Response:

As shown in Table 9.1.5-1, the cranes of the overhead heavy load handling system (OHLHS) are designed as enhanced safety handling systems, meeting the design requirements of ASME codes endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.244. Therefore, heavy load exclusion zones are not necessary for these cranes to prevent travel over the spent fuel pool (SFP) or other areas of the reactor building.

Safe load paths are required to be defined by the COL applicant in the program governing heavy loads handling, as stated in COL Item 9.1-5. The method or code used to develop the heavy loads handling program will be defined by the COL applicant, and are not appropriate to be specified in a COL Item or the FSAR.

FSAR Section 9.1.5, Section 15.7.5, and Section 17.4 are updated to remove the wording regarding heavy load exclusion zones.

No change is made to COL Item 9.1-5.

NuScale Nonproprietary

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems NuScale US460 SDAA 9.1-42 Draft Revision 2 9.1.5.1 Design Bases Consistent with General Design Criterion 1, OHLHS components are designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to appropriate quality standards such that their failure does not impact the function of other safety-related or risk-significant systems.

General Design Criterion 2 is considered in the design of the OHLHS, including the ability of structures, systems, and components (SSC) in the RXB and OHLHS to withstand the effects of earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches. The OHLHS is located in the Seismic Category I portion of the RXB.

General Design Criterion 4 is considered in the design of the OHLHS. No safety-related or risk-significant SSC are affected by load drops because the individual components of the OHLHS are designed to meet the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) codes and standards specified in Table 9.1.5-1.

In addition, the OHLHS is protected from the effects of external missile hazards by being located inside the RXB.

General Design Criterion 5 is considered in the design of the OHLHS. The RBC is used to move each NPM for refueling. However, only one NPM can be moved at a time. The CFT, RFT, and module inspection rack are designed to hold a single NPM at a time.

9.1.5.2

System Description

9.1.5.2.1 General Description RAI 9.1.5-6 The OHLHS includes equipment designed to handle critical loads in areas containing safety-related equipment that could be potentially impacted by the drops of such loads. The design of the OHLHS equipment, in conjunction with procedures and safe load paths, ensures safe movement of critical loads.

Safe load paths for NPM movement minimize the potential for contact witha load drop on irradiated fuel in a reactor vessel or spent fuel pool (SFP), or withon safe shutdown equipment. The safe load path for NPM movement with the RBCthe movement of the OHLHS is shown in Figure 9.1.5-1.

The largest load handled is the fully-assembled NPM, with the maximum water height in the containment vessel (CNV), and fully flooded in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The RBC is designed to handle this load with no credit taken for buoyancy.

9.1.5.2.2 Component Descriptions Reactor Building Crane The RBC is designed for critical load handling and consists of a bridge, trolley, main hoist, and two auxiliary hoists as shown in Figure 9.1.5-2.

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems NuScale US460 SDAA 9.1-43 Draft Revision 2 The RBC bridge is supported by runway rails anchored to the RXB, more than 5.5 inches from the edge, and provides traveling motion across the length of the reactor pool, refueling pool, and dry dock. The RBC trolley is supported by the bridge and travels across the width of the pool on the bridge rails. The trolley supports and transfers the lifted load to the bridge via the main hoist.

The RBC main hoist is designed with a reeving system. Failure of any single rope in the reeving system can be tolerated without loss of control of the load.

The rope reeving system is designed to transfer the load to the remaining ropes without excessive shock in case of a failed rope.

Audit Question A-19.1-46 The hoist drive system includes dual gearboxes, a power braking control system, and redundant holding brakes. There are four hoist motor brakes, two on each gearcase input shaft. The hoisting brakes are automatically set when electrical power is off or mechanically tripped by overspeed or overload devices. The RBC hoist motors and brakes operate on three-phase alternating current power.

The RBC main hoist includes a load-weighing assembly to monitor the tension on the rope for slack rope when a load is lowered, for high loads due to too heavy of a load or hang up, and for a broken rope. The design of the assembly ensures a structural failure does not result in a dropped load. The main hoist monitors hook height and hard-wired limit switches as upper limit constraints.

RAI 9.1.5-6 The lower block assembly (LBA), located at the bottom of the main hoist, provides the connection method for the RBC to lift and carry the NPM from the operating bay to the refueling bay and dry dock, as shown in Figure 9.1.5-3.

The LBA is designed with load paths consisting of cleviseslifting arms that interface with the lifting lugs on the TSS of the NPM. The pins that engage the TSS lifting lugs are engaged with actuators. The engagement is confirmed by travel limit switches and visual indication. Design and capacity requirements for the RBC main hoist and LBA are specified in Table 9.1.5-1.

A removable sister hook is connected to the LBA by a single, large-diameter pin. Design and capacity requirements for the sister hook are specified in Table 9.1.5-1.

RAI 9.1.5-6 Two auxiliary hoists mounted on the RBC provide low-capacity lifting for equipment in the RXB. The RBC auxiliary hoists are underhung-monorail type hoists. The auxiliary hoist rail is mounted off the outer surface of each bridge girder. The auxiliary hoists ensure a failure of athe load path single component does not result in an uncontrolled load. The auxiliary hoists also contain a load-weighing assembly that monitors for slack rope, high loads, and broken ropes. Design and capacity requirements associated with the RBC auxiliary hoists are specified in Table 9.1.5-1.

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems NuScale US460 SDAA 9.1-45 Draft Revision 2 The LRLTT is used for assembly and disassembly of the lower riser assembly (LRA) in the lower RPV, and for lifting and removing the lower riser from the lower RPV. The LRLTT is classified as nonsafety-related, non-risk-significant.

The LRLTT is operated attached to the RBC with the AWH to remotely unbolt and remove the LRA from the RPV, and place the LRA on a stand located on the RXB pool floor. Following the refueling operations, the LRLTT is used to reinstall the LRA onto the lower RPV.

The LRLTT is designed to the applicable requirements of ASME BTH-1 (Reference 9.1.5-1). Additionally, the LRLTT is designed to the requirements of ASME NML-1 (Reference 9.1.5-2) for lifting devices for critical lifts.

Other Refueling Devices The CFT is located at the bottom of the refueling pool adjacent to the SFP in the RXB. The CFT is used to assemble and disassemble the lower parting flange on the CNV. The RBC is used to place the NPM in the CNV support stand and remains connected to the NPM. The lower CNV remains in the CFT once unbolted. The upper NPM including the reactor vessel is then moved to the RFT.

The RFT is located at the bottom of the refueling pool adjacent to the CFT.

The RBC moves the NPM from the CFT to the RFT and remains connected to the NPM. The RFT supports the lower portion of the reactor vessel containing the core during refueling operations. The RFT performs closure bolt installation and tensioning for assembly and disassembly of the RPV lower parting flange.

The module inspection rack is a permanently-mounted work platform located in the dry dock of the RXB used to support the NPM for inspection and maintenance. It supports the NPM in the vertical orientation. The RBC moves the upper CNV with the upper reactor vessel from the RFT to the module inspection rack.

9.1.5.2.3 System Operation Reactor Building Crane Operation The RBC is used to lift and move equipment within the RXB to support normal operations, maintenance, receipt of new equipment, and to assist in refueling operations. The crane is designed to withstand the RXB environmental conditions and to operate during all modes of plant operations.

The RBC transfers an NPM from its installed operating position in the reactor pool to the refueling pool and back. Travel paths are determined and attributes are entered into the RBC control system. Each task is specified and scheduled by the crane operator.

RAI 9.1.5-6

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems NuScale US460 SDAA 9.1-46 Draft Revision 2 RAI 9.1.5-6 Heavy load exclusion zones and sSafe load paths are defined in operating procedures and equipment drawings. This restriction reduces the probability of a heavy load drop that could result in safe shutdown equipment damage or result in a release of radioactive material that could cause unacceptable radiation exposures.

RAI 9.1.5-6 The position control system assists in aligning the RBC with the NPM for engagement before performing lifting operations. The RBC control system is capable of load-dependent travel restrictionsHeavy load exclusion zones are dependent on the load on the RBC hoist. The travel path is chosen to accommodate this information. Repeatability, proper load path, and proper locations are ensured by semi-automatic crane operation.

Refueling Operations Refueling operations for an individual NPM are independent of the operating status of the remaining NPMs because only one NPM can be moved at a time.

This section presents the process of moving an NPM from the operating bay to the refueling pool and preparing the vessel for fuel movement. Section 9.1.4 presents the process of moving fuel assemblies into an open reactor vessel.

The RBC is moved to the operating bay containing the NPM that is shutdown for refueling. When the RBC is within a predefined position, the lower block assembly is lowered over the NPM lifting lugs. The LBA is manipulated until its lugs are fully engaged with the NPM lifting lugs. Verification of pin position is achieved by sensor feedback on the LBA and visual indicators. The LBA is raised until the load sensing system detects load, indicating NPM lifting lugs are fully engaged with the LBA. The NPM is raised to a pre-defined elevation and moved through the predefined path to the CFT in the refueling pool.

Once the RBC is aligned over the CFT, the NPM is lowered onto the stand of the CFT. With the LBA still attached to the NPM, the CFT de-tensions and removes the CNV flange closure bolts. The RBC lifts the upper CNV, with the RPV attached, from the lower CNV and transfers it into location over the RFT.

The lower CNV remains in the CFT during the remaining refueling process.

The RBC lowers the upper CNV with the RPV onto the stand in the RFT. With the LBA still attached to the upper CNV, the RFT de-tensions and removes the RPV flange closure bolts. Once the bolts are removed, the RBC lifts the upper CNV with the upper RPV and transports it to the module inspection rack in the flooded dry dock. The RBC lowers the upper NPM into the module inspection rack. The NPM is confirmed to be properly seated in the module inspection rack and the LBA is disconnected from the module.

The process is performed in reverse to reassemble the NPM and move it back into the operating bay.

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems NuScale US460 SDAA 9.1-47 Draft Revision 2 9.1.5.3 Safety Evaluation The heavy load handling system includes features to minimize the potential for a load drop and for the safe handling of heavy loads. The design includes enhanced safety handling systems, mechanical stops, electrical interlocks, safe load paths, established load handling procedures, and a plant configuration that provides redundancy to minimize the probability of a load drop. The components designed to handle critical loads support the load during and after a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).

Audit Item A-9.1.5-1, Audit Item A-9.1.5-2 The underhung cranes within the OHLHS conform to ASME NUM-1 Type IA requirements, as stated in Table 9.1.5-1. The design standards in Table 9.1.5-1 provide the design criteria, redundancy, seismic, and quality assurance criteria to ensure that a credible failure of a single component does not result in the loss of capability to stop and hold a critical load. The application of this standard provides an enhanced safety handling system basis, and as a result, postulated load drop analysis is not required to assess radiological consequences.

The RBC design conforms to the ASME standard specified in Table 9.1.5-1 so a credible failure of a single component does not result in the loss of capability to stop and hold a critical load. The use of this standard precludes the need to perform load drop evaluations, and as a result, accident analysis is not required to assess radiological consequences of an NPM drop accident.

Audit Question A-9.1.5-1, Audit Question A-9.1.5-2 RAI 9.1.5-6 Seismic category I or II cranes in Table 9.1.5-1 are designed toThe design of the RBC main hoist and the seismic analysis ensures SSC are able to withstand the SSE and not drop the load. Large components are analyzed to ensure they do not become a missilecome loose during a seismic event and potentially damage other equipment.

The RBC is designed to ensure the system retains its load throughout an SSE. At the onset of an earthquake, a seismic switch disconnects power. The trolley, bridge, and hoist stop, and the brakes set. Earthquake restraints keep the trolley on the bridge and the bridge on the runway. If power cannot be restored, the brakes can be released manually, and the crane and suspended load can be safely positioned.

The CFT and the module inspection rack are designed to ensure their structural failure or interaction cannot degrade the functioning of Seismic Category I SSC during or after an SSE.

Other plant cranes are designed in accordance the applicable design codes for each crane specified in Table 9.1.5-1. Cranes are designated as Type I, II, or III based on their requirement to handle critical loads and their seismic design criteria.

RAI 9.1.5-6

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems NuScale US460 SDAA 9.1-48 Draft Revision 2 The OHLHS is protected from the effects of external missile hazards by being located inside the RXB. Dynamic effects associated with missile impact are provided in Section 3.5. In addition to being designed as an enhanced safety handling system, the RBC iscranes are designed with a system of interlocks that prevents movement in heavy load exclusion zonesrestricts hook travel to prevent impacts.

RAI 9.1.5-6 The heavy load exclusion zones represent areas where heavy loads cannot travel without additional measures because a heavy load drop in the exclusion zones could potentially impact safe shutdown equipment, cause a release of radioactive materials, or a criticality accident that could cause unacceptable radiation exposures.

RAI 9.1.5-6 Physical limits and administrative controls are included to ensure safe handling of critical loads. Thus, the design of the OHLHS, in conjunction with safe load paths and heavy load exclusion zones, allows for moving an NPM or other equipment without impacting the operation of the other NPMs, including safe shutdown and cooldown.

RAI 9.1.5-6 The process of accepting and receiving a new NPM into the dry dock while the plant is operating is performed using the module assembly equipment discussed in Section 3.8. The module inspection rack is part of the module assembly equipment used, not only in initial receipt of the NPM, but also during refueling. In addition, the RBC is used during initial delivery of an NPM. Because only one NPM can be moved at a time, the receipt of a new NPM cannot occur when the RBC is being used for other lifting or during an NPM refueling. In addition, the safe load paths apply to the initial delivery of an NPM. Therefore, the operation of other NPMs is not affected by the receipt and delivery of a new NPM.

COL Item 9.1-5:

An applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant US460 standard design will provide a description of the program governing heavy loads handling. The program should address operating and maintenance procedures.

inspection and test plans.

personnel qualification and operator training.

detailed description of the safe load paths for movement of heavy loads.

9.1.5.4 Inspection and Testing The RBC is inspected and tested in accordance with ASME NOG-1 (Reference 9.1.5-3). Tests include operational testing with 100 percent load to demonstrate function and speed controls for bridge, trolley, and hoist drives, and proper functioning of limit switches, locking, and safety devices. A rated load test is performed with a 125 percent load.

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems NuScale US460 SDAA 9.1-49 Draft Revision 2 Audit Question A-9.1.5-1, Audit Question A-9.1.5-2 RAI 9.1.5-6 In-process inspection and testing of the RBC auxiliary hoists, the auxiliary wet hoist, the ATJC, the dry dock jib crane, the MAP jib crane, and the TJC is performed in accordance with ASME NUM-1 (Reference 9.1.5-4).

Testing of the permanently installed NPM top support structure is conducted per ANSI N14.6 requirements for dual-load-path devices (Reference 9.1.5-5). A rated load test is performed with a 150 percent load, and includes non-destructive examination and dimensional checks.

The methodology and approach utilized to develop related Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria is addressed in Section 14.3.

Preoperational testing of the RBC is addressed in Section 14.2.

9.1.5.5 Instrumentation and Control Audit Question A-19.1-46 The RBC utilizes a programmable logic controller (PLC) based digital control system for control, operation, and monitoring. The control system consists of limit switches for boundary zone and over-travel definition. The RBC digital control system uses position feedback devices such as motor encoders, cameras, and laser measurement devices. Load sensing and handling are controlled with devices such as load cells and inclinometers.

Audit Question A-19.1-46 Software interlocks prevent collisions with other SSC, operation outside of the equipment design capabilities, and initiation of automated sequences for which all prerequisites have not been met. Zone controls provide speed, hoist positioning, and load control.

Audit Question A-19.1-46 Normal operation of the RBC includes automated bridge and trolley motions, including hold points and way points specified in the load path. Manual control of these motions is also permissible at reduced speed. Interlocks and boundary zones can be bypassed through specific operator action that requires a key and is administratively controlled. In the event of a power failure, direct mechanical control of system drives is available.

Audit Question A-19.1-46 RAI 9.1.5-6 Positioning and weighing capability ensures the RBC does not travel within heavy load exclusion zones.

The RBC limit switches and interlocks include:

End of travel limit switches, including slow limit switches, are used for bridge, trolley, and LBA rotate motions.

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems NuScale US460 SDAA 9.1-53 Draft Revision 2 Audit Question A-19.1-46 RAI 9.1.5-6 Figure 9.1.5-1: NuScale Power ModuleReactor Building Crane Safe Load Path SAFE LOAD PATH FOR NPM GEOMETRIC CENTER WHILE TRANSPORTED BY RBC RBC MAIN HOIST TRAVEL AREA RBC AUXILLARY HOIST TRAVEL AREA RBC RAIL RBC RAIL POOL WALL

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Radioactive Release from a Subsystem or Component NuScale US460 SDAA 15.7-2 Draft Revision 2 RAI 9.1.5-6 Section 9.1.5 provides additional information regarding the RBC system design and capabilities, including a description of system interlocks, and safe load paths., and load exclusion zones.

Chapter 19 provides a description of the low power and shutdown (LPSD) probabilistic risk assessment. All stages of a nominal refueling outage are included in the LPSD probabilistic risk assessment, including movement and disassembly of an NPM during refueling. An NPM drop event is also evaluated in the LPSD probabilistic risk assessment in Section 19.1.6.

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Reliability Assurance Program NuScale US460 SDAA 17.4-8 Draft Revision 2 Audit Question A-19.1-46 RAI 9.1.5-6 Table 17.4-1: Design Reliability Assurance Program Structures, Systems, and Components Functions, Categorization, and Categorization Basis System Function Function Category (A1 & B1)

SSC Required to Perform System Function Basis for Function Categorization Containment System (CNTS)

  • Provides a barrier to contain mass, energy, and fission product release by closure of the containment isolation valves (CIVs) upon containment isolation signal
  • Provides a sealed containment and thermal conduction for the condensation of steam that provides makeup water to the reactor coolant system (RCS)
  • Provides safety-related signals A1 CNTS SSC with the exception of the following:
  • CIV close and open position sensors:

- Containment evacuation system, inboard and outboard

- Containment flooding and drain system (CFDS),

inboard and outboard

- Chemical and volume control system (CVCS) inboard and outboard pressurizer (PZR) spray line

- CVCS, inboard and outboard RCS discharge

- CVCS, inboard and outboard RCS injection

- CVCS, inboard and outboard high-point degasification

- Reactor component cooling water system, inboard and outboard return and supply

- Main steam system (MSS) and MSS backup

  • CVCS discharge air operated valve close and open position sensors
  • CFDS piping inside containment
  • Containment air resistance temperature detectors
  • Piping from systems (containment evacuation system, CFDS, CVCS, condensate and feedwater system, MSS, reactor component cooling water system) CIVs to disconnect flange (outside containment)

Determination by expert panel and informed with input from PRA, deterministic, and other methods of analysis

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Reliability Assurance Program NuScale US460 SDAA 17.4-14 Draft Revision 2 Reactor Building Components

  • Provides safety-related anchorage and structural support to the NPM A1
  • Over-pressurization vents
  • NPM supports
  • Steam gallery blow off panels
  • CVCS high energy line break blow off panels Determination by expert panel and informed with input from PRA, deterministic, and other methods of analysis
  • Provides nonsafety-related anchorage and structural support to handling equipment B1
  • Reactor Building crane runway rail support Determination by expert panel and informed with input from PRA, deterministic, and other methods of analysis Reactor Building Crane
  • Provides structural support and movement to the NPM while moving from refueling, inspection and operating bay
  • Limits motion of an NPM or spent fuel cask containing nuclear fuel, to within predefined safe load paths and outside of exclusion zones B1
  • Reactor Building crane
  • Reactor Building control cabinet
  • Reactor Building power cabinet Determination by expert panel and informed with input from PRA, deterministic, and other methods of analysis Control Building
  • Houses safety-related, risk significant equipment and facilities pertinent to the operation and support of the reactor module(s)
  • Provides anchorage and support for safety-related, risk significant equipment and facilities pertinent to the operation and support of the reactor module(s)
  • Protects safety-related, risk significant equipment and facilities from natural phenomena and externally generated missiles A1
  • Control Building Determination by expert panel and informed with input from PRA, deterministic, and other methods of analysis
  • Protects operators from natural phenomena and externally generated missiles B1
  • Control Building Determination by expert panel and informed with input from PRA, deterministic, and other methods of analysis Table 17.4-1: Design Reliability Assurance Program Structures, Systems, and Components Functions, Categorization, and Categorization Basis (Continued)

System Function Function Category (A1 & B1)

SSC Required to Perform System Function Basis for Function Categorization

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