ML22024A447
| ML22024A447 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/16/2021 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| Widmayer, D, ACRS | |
| References | |
| NRC-1795 | |
| Download: ML22024A447 (755) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Future Plant Designs Subcommittee Docket Number: N/A Location: Teleconference Date: December 16, 2021 Work Order No.: NRC-1795 Pages 1-274 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433
1 1
2 3
4 DISCLAIMER 5
6 7 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 8 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 9
10 11 The contents of this transcript of the 12 proceeding of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 13 Commission Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 14 as reported herein, is a record of the discussions 15 recorded at the meeting.
16 17 This transcript has not been reviewed, 18 corrected, and edited, and it may contain 19 inaccuracies.
20 21 22 23 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 + + + + +
4 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 5 (ACRS) 6 + + + + +
7 FUTURE PLANT DESIGNS SUBCOMMITTEE 8 + + + + +
9 THURSDAY 10 DECEMBER 16, 2021 11 + + + + +
12 The Subcommittee met via Teleconference, 13 at 9:30 a.m. EST, David Petti, Chair, presiding.
14 15 COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
16 DAVID A. PETTI, Chair 17 RONALD G. BALLINGER, Member 18 VICKI M. BIER, Member 19 DENNIS BLEY, Member 20 CHARLES H. BROWN, JR. Member 21 VESNA B. DIMITRIJEVIC, Member 22 GREGORY H. HALNON, Member 23 WALTER L. KIRCHNER, Member 24 JOY L. REMPE, Member 25 MATTHEW W. SUNSERI, Member NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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2 1 DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:
2 DEREK WIDMAYER 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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3 1 CONTENTS 2
3 Opening Remarks.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 Staff Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5 Update on Part 53 Rulemaking Schedule.. . . . . . 10 6 10 CFR Part 53 - The Role of the PRA (Subpart C -
7 Requirements for Design and Analysis).. . . . . 28 8 Opportunity for Public Comment. . . . . . . . . 121 9 10 CFR Part 53 -- Staffing, Operator Certification, 10 Simulators, Etc. (Subpart F - Requirements for 11 Operations).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 12 Subcommittee Discussion.. . . . . . . . . . . . 137 13 Opportunity for Public Comment. . . . . . . . . 269 14 Adjourn.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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4 1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 9:30 a.m.
3 CHAIR PETTI: Good morning, everyone. The 4 meeting will now come to order. This is a meeting of 5 the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 6 Subcommittee on Future Plant Designs. I'm David 7 Petti, Chairman of the Subcommittee.
8 ACRS members in attendance are Vicki Bier, 9 Charlie Brown, Consultant Dennis Bley, Greg Halnon, 10 Joy Rempe, Ron Ballinger, Matt Sunseri, Vesna 11 Dimitrijevic --
12 MEMBER BLEY: Hey, Dave?
13 CHAIR PETTI: Yes?
14 MEMBER BLEY: I'm still a member until the 15 end of --
16 CHAIR PETTI: Oh, okay, great. Member 17 Bley. Great.
18 Derek Widmayer of the ACRS staff is the 19 Designated Federal Official for this meeting.
20 The purpose of this two-day meeting is to 21 discuss four subjects concerning preliminary rule 22 language for 10 CFR Part 53, Licensing and Regulation 23 of Advanced Nuclear Reactors.
24 The agenda for today includes discussions 25 on Subpart F, Requirements for Operations; NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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5 1 specifically, language on staffing, training, 2 personnel, and human factors; Subpart C, Requirements 3 for Design and Analysis; specifically, language 4 related to probabilistic risk assessments.
5 Tomorrow, the meeting will include 6 discussions on the technology-inclusive content of 7 application TICAP and the advanced reactor content of 8 application ARCAP documents, and presentation from 9 representatives of the Nuclear Energy Institute and 10 the U.S. Nuclear Industry Council on a comprehensive 11 set of comments submitted on the Part 53 rulemaking.
12 The Subcommittee will gather information, analysis all 13 the issues and facts, and formulate proposed positions 14 and actions, as appropriate.
15 This meeting is one in a series of 16 Subcommittee meetings being held to discuss Part 53.
17 There's a session scheduled for the February 2022 full 18 Committee meeting, at which the Subpart F requirements 19 for operations will be presented and discussed, and 20 the Committee plans on preparing a letter report on 21 this matter at that meeting.
22 The ACRS was established by statute and is 23 governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, FACA.
24 The NRC implements FACA in accordance with its 25 regulations found in Title 10 of the Code of Federal NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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6 1 Regulations, Part 7.
2 The Committee can only speak through its 3 published letter reports. We hold meetings to gather 4 information and to form preparatory work that will 5 support our deliberations at a full Committee meeting.
6 The rules for participation in all ACRS 7 meetings, including today's, were announced in The 8 Federal Register on June 13th, 2019.
9 The ACRS section of the U.S. NRC public 10 website provides our Charter, Bylaws, agendas, letter 11 reports, and full transcripts of all full and 12 subcommittee meetings, including slides presented at 13 the meetings. The meeting notice and agenda for this 14 meeting were posted there.
15 As stated in The Federal Register notice 16 and in the public meeting notice posted to the 17 website, members of the public who desire to provide 18 written or oral input to the Subcommittee may do so 19 and should contact the Designated Federal Official 20 five days prior to the meeting, as practicable.
21 Today and tomorrow's meeting is open to 22 public attendance, and we have received no requests to 23 make an oral statement at the meeting. Time is 24 provided in the agenda after presentations are 25 completed for this statement, as well as spontaneous NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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7 1 comments from our other members of the public 2 attending or listening to our meetings.
3 Today's meeting is being held over 4 Microsoft Teams, which includes a telephone 5 bridgeline, allowing participation of the public over 6 their computer using Teams or by phone.
7 A transcript of today's meeting is being 8 kept. Therefore, we request that meeting participants 9 on Teams and the bridgeline identify themselves when 10 they speak and to speak with sufficient clarity and 11 volume, so they can be readily heard. Likewise, we 12 request that meeting participants keep their computer 13 and their telephone lines on mute when not speaking to 14 minimize disruptions.
15 At this time, I ask that team attendees 16 make sure they're unmuted so we can commence the 17 meeting.
18 We'll now proceed, and I call on Steve 19 Lynch, Acting Branch Chief for the Advanced Reactor 20 Policy Branch of the Office of Nuclear Reactor 21 Regulation, for any opening remarks.
22 Steve?
23 MR. LYNCH: Great. Thank you so much.
24 Again, this is Steve Lynch, Acting Chief 25 of the Advanced Reactor Policy Branch.
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8 1 I really just want to thank the ACRS 2 members for meeting with the staff today to support us 3 in the continued development and iteration on the 4 preliminary proposed rule language for Part 53. It is 5 really valuable for us to get insights from the 6 members, so that we can ensure that we have a 7 rulemaking that is most responsive to industry needs, 8 as advanced reactors continue to be developed and 9 applications prepared and submitted to the NRC.
10 The topics today that we will be covering 11 are more technical in nature than tomorrow's topics.
12 In particular, as we go over the role of PRA with 13 Marty Stutzke, one of the things that we want to cover 14 with the ACRS is going beyond PRA. And for applicants 15 that wish to use a graded PRA or more deterministic 16 approach to analyze potential events at a facility, 17 how can they do that within the Part 53 framework, and 18 how has the NRC staff considered providing these 19 alternatives, either within Part 53 or in Part 50, or 20 even in another new part to the regulation, so that we 21 are making sure that we are given a full range of 22 options in performing analyses for advanced reactor 23 events?
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9 1 of advanced reactors from the current operating fleet 2 of large light water reactors, and how that impacts 3 potential considerations for operators at these 4 facilities. Bill Reckley will be leading this 5 discussion with support from Jesse Seymour and Jordan 6 Hoellman.
7 Tomorrow, we will focus more on one of the 8 most integral guidance documents that are being 9 developed to support advanced reactor application 10 development and implementation of Part 53. And that's 11 with the TICAP and ARCAP guidance.
12 Then, our focus tomorrow morning on these 13 guidance document developments will be on major 14 revisions that have occurred since the NRC staff last 15 met with the ACRS on this topic in July of this year.
16 And we have Joe Sebrosky and Eric Oesterle leading 17 these discussions.
18 So, again, we thank the ACRS members for 19 their time today and tomorrow and look forward to your 20 feedback. Thank you.
21 CHAIR PETTI: Okay. Marty?
22 MR. BEALL: Actually, Dave, this is Bob 23 Beall. I'm going to do a quick update of the Part 53 24 schedule.
25 CHAIR PETTI: Oh, I knew that, yes. Yes, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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10 1 sorry, go ahead.
2 MR. BEALL: Okay. Thank you, sir.
3 Good morning. My name is Bob Beall, and 4 I'm from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Material Safety 5 and Safeguards. I'm the Project Manager for the Part 6 53 rulemaking. I will be providing a status update of 7 the Part 53 rulemaking and an overview of the recent 8 changes to the rulemaking schedule.
9 This is the Part 53 framework slide that 10 the staff has used in many of our past meetings with 11 this Committee. It lays out our structure and 12 philosophy behind the Part 53 rulemaking and provides 13 a short overview of each of the Subparts A through J 14 and, also, conforming changes to other 10 CFR parts, 15 like Part 73 and 26.
16 Today, the staff will be discussing the 17 highlighted topics from Subpart C, Design Analysis 18 Requirements as It Pertains to the Use of PRA, and 19 Subpart F, Requirements for Operations, with an 20 overview of the subpart and a more detailed discussion 21 on staffing, operator certifications, and the use of 22 simulators.
23 Next slide, please.
24 This slide provides a snapshot of the 25 preliminary proposed rule language for the Part 53 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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11 1 rulemaking. By the end of 2021, all the major Part 53 2 subparts are scheduled to be issued for public 3 comment. This includes the release of preliminary 4 proposed rule language for Parts 73 and 26. A number 5 of these subparts are on their second or third 6 iteration of the preliminary proposed rule language, 7 and the staff will continue to release additional 8 iterations into 2022.
9 The two highlighted rules are related to 10 today's discussion. All of these documents are 11 available in ADAMS and on the regulations.gov website.
12 Next slide, please.
13 In late November, the Commission approved 14 a nine-month extension of the Part 53 rulemaking 15 schedule. The revised rulemaking schedule provides 16 additional time for the staff to continue our efforts 17 to reach alignment with external stakeholders on the 18 scope of the rulemaking and to further develop the 19 proposed Part 53 rule language. It will also allow 20 additional time for stakeholders and the ACRS to 21 participate in the Part 53 rulemaking process, and to 22 continue coordination with other NRC advanced reactor 23 activities and rulemakings.
24 The revised rulemaking schedule has the 25 staff continuing public outreach activities and the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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12 1 release of preliminary proposed rule language into 2 August of 2022. During this timeframe, we will also 3 have a public meeting that is oriented towards non-4 governmental organizations in early February.
5 The staff is scheduled to submit the draft 6 proposed rule to the Commission in February of 2023 7 with a projected publication of the Part 53 proposed 8 rule for public comment in June of the same year.
9 During the generation of the Draft Final 10 Rule, the staff will continue our public outreach 11 activities until May of 2024, which supports 12 submitting the Draft Part 53 Final Rule to the 13 Commission by December of 2024. The current scheduled 14 publication date for the Final Part 53 Rule is now 15 July 2025.
16 Next slide, please.
17 The staff activities related to Part 53 18 public outreach will continue into 2022. Some of the 19 key points will be the continuation of topical public 20 meetings and frequent meetings with this ACRS 21 Subcommittee. This includes meetings on Part 53 22 subparts that ACRS members want additional staff input 23 on.
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13 1 2022. This staff will also move away from releasing 2 the preliminary proposed rule language from a 3 discussion table format to having a consolidated Part 4 53 rule language document. The staff is projecting to 5 have this document available for public comment in 6 January of 2022.
7 Next slide, please.
8 The Part 53 staff has been and will 9 continue to coordinate with other advanced reactor 10 activities and rulemakings. For example, four 11 rulemakings that the staff is closely monitoring and 12 communicating with are the emergency preparedness for 13 small modular reactors and other new technologies; 14 physical security for advanced reactors; regulatory 15 improvements for production and utilization facilities 16 transitioning to decommissioning, and the alignment of 17 licensing processes and lessons learned from new 18 reactor licensing.
19 Each of these rules has proposed 20 requirements that may influence the rule language in 21 Part 53. In the case of the Part 50.52 lessons 22 learned rule, there are approximately seven issues, 23 ranging from severe accidents to environmental 24 assessments, that may require revisions in the future 25 to the proposed Part 53 requirements. The staff will NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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14 1 continue to monitor these activities and communicate 2 with the appropriate staff during development of the 3 Part 53 rule.
4 MEMBER REMPE: So, this is Joy, and I 5 guess if you're done with this slide --
6 MR. BEALL: Yes, ma'am.
7 MEMBER REMPE: -- I just wanted to bring 8 up, again, repeat a concern that's often been raised 9 by members.
10 I've been starting to prepare for our 11 discussions on the Part 50.52 alignment and lessons 12 learned activity. And I still am a little concerned 13 about the coordination, not just of the rule 14 languages, or the language in both rules, or proposed 15 rules, but also the guidance document and how that 16 coordination will occur. And just to be clear, it's 17 still possible for a non-LWR or an advanced small 18 modular LWR to go with either option in the future 19 here. A non-LWR can go with 50.52. The lines are 20 very fuzzy.
21 The staff's intent is to have a particular 22 guidance document that's applicable to both 53 and 23 50.52 alignment activities. And I'm having trouble 24 seeing how you're going to keep things coordinated and 25 deal with all the updates, as the texts are issued.
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15 1 And at some point, maybe either under a Part 53 2 discussion or a Part 50.52 discussion, it might be 3 worthwhile to go through some examples, to just give 4 me and other members a bit more confidence that this 5 coordination is happening as anticipated. I mean, it 6 just seems very convoluted to me.
7 MR. BEALL: Okay, we can do that in a 8 future ACRS meeting.
9 But, also, just for your information, 10 there are a number of staff that work on both of the 11 rulemakings, or, in fact, for at least four in here, 12 there's a lot of shared responsibilities that the 13 Working Group members would have in both Part 53 and 14 one or more of these other four that you see on this 15 slide here. So, there is a lot of communications 16 between each of the rulemakings. And my counterparts, 17 too, with the person who's running the Part 50.52 18 lessons learned rule, we communicate also on a regular 19 basis. So, there is a lot of crosstalk and a lot of 20 coordination between each of the Working Groups and 21 the rulemaking PMs.
22 MEMBER REMPE: So, I've heard that before, 23 too. Maybe just going through one example that was 24 very difficult and how staff quickly reacted to a 25 change, either in 50.52 that affected 53, or vice NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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16 1 versa, it would just add some confidence in future 2 discussions. And I'm bringing it up here just because 3 of some discussions I had a couple of weeks ago. It 4 would just help, one place or the other, to have that 5 discussion occur.
6 MR. BEALL: Okay, we can take that as a 7 takeaway, Joy.
8 MEMBER REMPE: Thank you.
9 MR. BEALL: No problem.
10 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Joy, this is Walt.
11 MEMBER REMPE: Yes?
12 MEMBER KIRCHNER: May I make a comment?
13 Yes, my concern would be that, as the 14 Agency goes ahead with 53, that it demonstrably 15 provides a level of assurance to the public with 16 regard to safety. And that gets into issues that 17 we've talked through before with the staff, things 18 like how the GDCs and quality assurance requirements 19 that are applicable 50.52 are matched in kind in some 20 way in 53, such that there's an assurance that there's 21 an equivalent level of safety achieved.
22 And that would apply to not just GDCs or 23 the advanced reactor design criteria and quality 24 assurance, but other things that we'll hear about 25 today, such as operator requirements, et cetera. So NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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17 1 that, as these packages come together, I wouldn't 2 expect them to be seamlessly compatible, but, 3 certainly, at some level, there has to be demonstrably 4 an equivalent level of safety assurance provided to 5 the public for 53 vis-a-vis 50.52.
6 That's more of a statement. And as you 7 say, some examples perhaps would certainly try to 8 flesh out these kinds of matters in --
9 MEMBER REMPE: Yes.
10 MEMBER KIRCHNER: -- checking out how that 11 alignment and the guidance is consistent across the 12 50.52-53 spectrum.
13 MEMBER REMPE: I agree. Just what I was 14 thinking about after the discussion I had to prepare 15 for the 50.52 meeting, I was just thinking, you know, 16 I've heard this a lot. I've heard that the same staff 17 is working on it. But I just, you know, keep seeing 18 areas of interaction that I just think some examples 19 that were difficult would help us. I mean, not easy 20 examples, but some things that were difficult, and how 21 the staff recognized it and addressed it, would give 22 us all a little more confidence.
23 And we have raised these issues in the 24 past, and we've heard the same answers. But we all 25 are still struggling with it when we look at what's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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18 1 coming down the pike.
2 Anyway, I think we've got the point 3 across. And so, hopefully, we can see those examples 4 and we can deal with it, or learn about it.
5 MEMBER BALLINGER: This is Ron Ballinger.
6 I would, actually, make it more formal and 7 produce a document.
8 CHAIR PETTI: Ron, that's a good -- I had 9 a question of Bob. We've all heard about trying to 10 make sure you have equivalent levels of safety 11 assurance to ensure that it's not -- that there isn't 12 a disconnect here. Is there some process? Will a 13 document be written? Will there be some sort of 14 review done to assure that this happens?
15 MR. BEALL: I guess the review that we 16 have for each of these individual rulemakings is going 17 through the committees and the management reviews 18 helps assure that they all have the same level of 19 safety. I mean, I'm struggling with what your actual 20 question was.
21 CHAIR PETTI: I mean, are you going to 22 somehow document sort of this? And I just think that, 23 from a legal perspective, there would be some sort of 24 requirement to say that you've done some due diligence 25 and you've gone through some sort of process, once NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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19 1 everything is almost final, to say, yes, we believe 2 that this level of safety assurance is the same or 3 similar.
4 MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes, this is Ron again.
5 I mean, I have no doubt that the staff 6 sits around the table sometimes and makes sure that 7 that's happening, at least in their judgment. But, 8 sometimes, the process of producing a formal document 9 that compares the two and assures this allows for the 10 kind of finding of maybe gaps that you weren't 11 thinking about earlier. And the review process by an 12 organization such as the one that you're speaking to 13 today might also contribute to that process as well.
14 MR. RECKLEY: Yes, Bob, this is Bill 15 Reckley. If I can?
16 I'm not sure we'll be producing sort of a 17 crosswalk document, but, as we do the Statement of 18 Considerations for -- I'll speak to Part 53 -- these 19 are areas where we will explain the content of Part 53 20 and, to some degree, we'll often parallel or explain 21 the correlation to existing requirements and why we 22 either kept them or Part 53 is providing an 23 alternative.
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20 1 looking for will be there, albeit, it might not be in 2 as crisp a crosswalk as what you might be hinting at.
3 MEMBER BALLINGER: Well, again, I come 4 down on the side of Walt for sure. There are at least 5 two parties that want to read this. One of them 6 happens to be the public, and that's very important 7 for them to understand that safety is maintained in 8 this effort.
9 MR. RECKLEY: Yes, and again, I agree with 10 you, and I think that is the narrative that we will be 11 providing in both the rule text and in the Statement 12 of Considerations.
13 CHAIR PETTI: You know, it might be worth 14 something, members to think about, that when we get 15 the Statements of Consideration and this gets close to 16 finishing, that we've raised this issue; we could 17 write a letter on this specific topic and affirm, 18 hopefully, you know, that, in fact, we agree with the 19 staff and kind of dot i's and cross t's. That might 20 be a useful letter down the road.
21 MEMBER BALLINGER: That would get my --
22 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Sorry, this is Walt.
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21 1 this set of considerations about level of safety 2 assurance, and so on.
3 CHAIR PETTI: Right, right.
4 MEMBER BLEY: Well, this is Dennis.
5 From what many folks have said, when Bob 6 said the rule would be ready to be issued in the 7 complete form at the end of this year -- that's pretty 8 soon -- does that include the Statements of 9 Consideration?
10 MR. BEALL: Yes, it will. The package 11 will be going to the Commission in February 2023, and 12 all of that will be complete, The Federal Register 13 notice, which includes the Statement of Consideration.
14 MEMBER BALLINGER: But the Statement of 15 Considerations is not necessarily a widely read or 16 widely announced document, is it? I mean, it's in The 17 Federal Register. So, if you go to The Federal 18 Register, you could read the thing, but it's not a 19 formal document in the sense that the public could 20 take a look at it, is it?
21 MR. BEALL: Yes, it will be made public, 22 because the Statement of Consideration is in the 23 beginning of The Federal Register notice, and the rule 24 text is in the second half of the document, the same 25 document.
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22 1 MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes, I just wonder how 2 many members of the public routinely read The Federal 3 Register.
4 MEMBER BLEY: Well, a great many, 5 especially the ones who listen into our meetings.
6 MEMBER BALLINGER: True, true.
7 MR. LYNCH: I'm sorry, this is Steve 8 Lynch.
9 I think that's a very good point, that 10 even if the Statements of Consideration and even the 11 rule language fell, it may not be redlined by (audio 12 interference), as produced in The Federal Register.
13 But I think one of the things that the NRC staff can 14 do to make sure that the contents of the rule language 15 and the Statements of Consideration are well 16 understood is to focus on our outward communication, 17 whether that's coming to the ACRS members and talking 18 through the Statements of Consideration. So that we 19 are clearly explaining the safety basis and comparing 20 that to Parts 50 and 52, as appropriate, and also, 21 conducting public meetings with external stakeholders, 22 whether those are vendors developing advanced reactor 23 technologies or NGOs that are interested in the 24 development of the rule, so that we can make sure that 25 we are explaining our thought process.
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23 1 Because I think, even when we release the 2 Statements of Consideration, sometimes it's helpful, 3 in addition to having something written, to explain 4 things verbally and provide additional context to the 5 NRC staff's thinking. So, I think that the note is 6 well-taken that, as we continue to develop the 7 Statements of Consideration over the next year, we are 8 going to need to make concerted efforts to present on 9 that and make sure that it is well-understood among 10 the advanced reactor community.
11 CHAIR PETTI: Oh, and I think as we get 12 closer, this could be a separate topic for a briefing 13 and a letter. Because I personally think a letter 14 from the ACRS on this topic would, of course, increase 15 the visibility from a public perspective. And I think 16 it would be something I would think a lot of the 17 members would support.
18 MR. LYNCH: Sure. Absolutely, and we can 19 work on finding an appropriate time to schedule that.
20 CHAIR PETTI: Yes.
21 MR. LYNCH: I just want to clarify that 22 the Statements of Consideration are not set to be 23 released right now with the remaining subparts this 24 calendar year with the consolidated rule language in 25 January, but it will be later in 2022, when we have NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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24 1 the Statements of Consideration ready. We are in the 2 early stages of just getting started in writing that 3 right now. So, I did want to clarify the timing of 4 that.
5 CHAIR PETTI: Okay. Thank you, Steve.
6 MEMBER BROWN: This is Charlie. Can I?
7 CHAIR PETTI: Yes.
8 MEMBER BROWN: I've remained quiet up 9 until now.
10 CHAIR PETTI: Okay.
11 MEMBER BROWN: I still have a hard time.
12 I know when I first got here and I started looking at 13 rules trying to figure out what the commercial world 14 did, I didn't go hunting for Statements of 15 Consideration. I looked in the rule for what the 16 safety bases were, what the general design criteria 17 were. And I don't see those in what we've got so far.
18 I'm just struggling, and I have been when I started 19 reading this again, with more of the changes.
20 So, I'm not a fan of Statements of 21 Consideration being used 5 years, 10 years after the 22 rule is issued. When this part is issued, that's 23 where you're going to explain why we're doing what 24 we're doing. If it's important, it ought to be in the 25 rule, and not in some other document or some other NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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25 1 part of the statement that people really don't 2 research and go back and look at years later. That's 3 my personal opinion.
4 MEMBER BLEY: Just for clarification, the 5 Statements of Consideration don't come after the rule.
6 They come at the same time.
7 MEMBER BROWN: Yes, I've been trying to 8 find them. I mean, you don't think about going back 9 to Statements of Consideration. I went and looked at 10 the rule for whenever we were reviewing something.
11 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg.
12 Having run several licensing departments 13 in the industry, I could assure you that the SOCs are 14 high on the list, especially when a new rule comes out 15 and you're trying to establish how you're going to 16 comply with it. So, I'm not sure I can set your minds 17 at ease, but I can tell you that, at least the 18 licensing organizations I've run, if the engineer 19 didn't read and understand the SOCs, then they were 20 not part of the organization for very long. So, it's 21 a high expectation in the industry to read and 22 understand the rule, and the SOCs are part of that 23 understanding.
24 MEMBER BROWN: Is that going to happen, 25 though, 15 years later from that, when a new plant NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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26 1 comes along and somebody's going to say, oh, my gosh, 2 I've got to go back and read the Statements of 3 Consideration?
4 MEMBER HALNON: Well, by 15 years into it, 5 hopefully, the rule language is well understood at 6 that point and precedences have been set. Yes, the 7 only problem is going back and retrieving, and that's 8 the only issue that we'll ever have with this.
9 MEMBER BROWN: If it's in the SOC, then, 10 like you say, it's going back and retrieving them. It 11 ought to be in the rule. I understand your point 12 about needing to understand everything, and you come 13 from a place that had to do it. I came from a 14 different world.
15 But it just seems to me -- I've said my 16 piece. I'm just uncomfortable with not having the 17 rule itself establish the safety basis for what we're 18 doing, whether it be general design criteria, or 19 whatever, which I'm still trying to figure out where 20 they are.
21 MR. LYNCH: Clear. And one thing, I'll 22 offer this again. It's Steve Lynch. One of the 23 staff's goals with developing Part 53 is to make sure 24 that the rule language is clear and concise and does 25 not exclusively rely on context from the Statements of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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27 1 Consideration for appropriate interpretation of the 2 rule language. While the SOCs are integral to 3 explaining the staff thought process in developing the 4 rule, we do want to make sure that our rule language 5 is clear and understood in how it should be 6 implemented, as supported by guidance documents and 7 additional context provided by the SOCs. But the 8 comment is well-taken that rule language itself should 9 be complete and well-understood.
10 CHAIR PETTI: Yes, Steve, I think one of 11 our previous letters had a recommendation to that 12 regard. So, it sounds like you're trying to make that 13 effort.
14 Derek, I just want to ask you to put this 15 issue of Statements of Consideration on our subject-16 specific topics sometime later in 2022, so I don't 17 forget about it.
18 MR. WIDMAYER: Yes, sir, note taken.
19 CHAIR PETTI: Okay. Thanks.
20 Bob?
21 MR. BEALL: Yes, sir, I think I'm done.
22 CHAIR PETTI: Okay, okay.
23 MR. BEALL: So, let's move on to Marty, I 24 think, for the next part.
25 CHAIR PETTI: Yes, Marty, please.
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28 1 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, good morning, everyone.
2 I'm Marty Stutzke from the Division of Advanced 3 Reactors and Non-Power and Utilization Facilities, 4 much easier summarized as DANU, in the Office of 5 Nuclear Regulation. And I want to talk to you today 6 about our initiative on graded PRA and the possible 7 licensing pathways.
8 So, next slide, please.
9 MEMBER BLEY: Marty?
10 MR. STUTZKE: Yes?
11 MEMBER BLEY: Can I ask you an 12 introductory kind of question? A few months ago when 13 we were talking about this, at least what I heard was 14 you expressed a feeling that you really didn't know 15 how to go about the graded PRA. Now it seems you've 16 changed your mind or you've found a good approach? If 17 there's any introductory remarks about that, I'd be 18 interested. Otherwise, we'll just hear your 19 presentation as it unfolds.
20 MR. STUTZKE: You will hear that, Dennis, 21 as part of my presentation.
22 MEMBER BLEY: That's good.
23 MR. STUTZKE: I'm just prepared to 24 introduce my winding road viewgraph of the overview, 25 as this effort has evolved considerably over the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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29 1 summer and earlier this fall like that.
2 To that end, I would point out it's not 3 just me, but there are three other people within 4 NRR/DANU that are involved in this effort. I have 5 three people from NRR Division of Risk Assessment 6 involved in this effort; one from the Office of 7 Research, Division of Risk Assessment; three attorneys 8 from the Office of the General Counsel, and last, and 9 not least, we have a consultant, Bob Budnitz. So, 10 this is a rather substantial effort to try to address 11 this graded PRA initiative like that.
12 I'll also speak a little bit to some of 13 the previous comments about coordination. In addition 14 to my serving on this Graded PRA Working Group, I'm 15 also a member of the Part 53 Rulemaking Working Group, 16 and I'm also a member of the Working Group that is 17 developing Reg Guide 1.247, which addresses non-light 18 water reactor PRA acceptability and endorsement of 19 industry standards.
20 So, with that kind of an introduction, 21 we'll lead into some viewgraphs here. I want to recap 22 the history of how this effort has evolved over the 23 past year or so, to give you an idea of where we're 24 coming from and where we think we're going to.
25 So, next slide, please.
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30 1 So, earlier this year, we formed this 2 Working Group to discuss how to grade or right-size 3 the PRA to support construction permit, operating 4 license, design certification, standard design 5 approvals, manufacturing licenses, and combined 6 licenses.
7 And we envision a three-phase process.
8 It's laid out here: to develop a graded PRA approach; 9 then, to craft guidance, and third, consider 10 alternatives to PRA that could achieve the same 11 underlying purposes of conducting the PRA.
12 So, with that, we started out -- on slide 13 11, please -- and evolved some working definitions 14 that you see here. And the idea was a graded PRA 15 approach was one that would use bounding, 16 conservative, and/or qualitative estimates to 17 establish the scope, the level of detail, the degree 18 of plant representation, and the level of peer review 19 commensurate with the licensing stage like this.
20 Jumping to the bottom definition, we 21 talked about dose consequence-based criteria that 22 would enable the use of a graded PRA approach. Again, 23 the idea is to make the underlying purposes of the 24 severe accident policy statement with this.
25 So, slide 12.
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31 1 We presented this at the advanced reactor 2 stakeholders' public meeting in May, and we learned 3 that industry was concerned at grading how the PRA was 4 to be used in the licensing, not grading the technical 5 content of the PRA itself. And there's a general 6 recognition from industry and within the staff that 7 the non-LWR PRA standard already offers opportunities 8 to grade the content of the PRA.
9 The little graphic on the bottom is trying 10 to indicate how you want to use the PRA should 11 determine its technical content, and vice versa. In 12 other words, the PRA always needs to be acceptable for 13 its intended application.
14 MEMBER BLEY: Marty?
15 MR. STUTZKE: Yes?
16 MEMBER BLEY: Yes, that's a good point 17 because I had forgotten that. That's a fair piece of 18 the standard, when you have to go to show that what 19 you're doing meets the needs of how you want to use 20 it. That's a whole separate section, right?
21 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, and I'll talk about 22 that in the next couple of slides, Dennis.
23 So, let's flip to slide 13, please.
24 The non-LWR PRA standard provides 25 opportunities for grading the technical content in a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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32 1 number of ways. The first obvious way is that it uses 2 qualifiers when it writes certain supporting 3 requirements, and you'll see some examples there. In 4 other words, the supporting requirements are prefaced 5 with phrases like for operating plants, then do this, 6 or for PRAs performed during the preoperable stage, do 7 that. And there are a number of supporting 8 requirements that have no qualifiers.
9 MEMBER BLEY: I'm sorry, you got me 10 thinking there. The second example is a good one, 11 kind of except that was written -- well, I guess not.
12 This was from the non-LWR PRA standard. So, for cases 13 where you're trying to use the PRA as a strong part of 14 your licensing process, whether it's preoperational or 15 later, you're going to need certain things in there to 16 make that possible.
17 I was going to say, you know, this was 18 written before we were planning to use the PRA 19 strongly in the licensing process, but that's not 20 really true. This was written when they were 21 considering that carefully.
22 Go ahead.
23 MR. STUTZKE: I think the Office of the 24 Standards were fully cognizant of the NRC licensing 25 processes. And I'll show you a little graphic in a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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33 1 while about how the PRA evolves through the licensing 2 process in a little bit.
3 But speaking to your earlier comment, 4 Dennis, it's on slide 14, where Section 3 of the non-5 LWR PRA standard provides a risk application process.
6 And I've tried to summarize it here briefly in the 7 graphic. But the idea is how do you establish the 8 capability of a PRA that's needed to support a 9 particular risk-informed application?
10 Now, remember, you know, a risk-informed 11 application, in general, was one that is using PRA to 12 help support that application. We normally think 13 about that in terms of risk-informed changes to the 14 licensing basis, such as in Reg Guide 1.174.
15 But I would also point out, the initial 16 licensing of a power plant, whether it's a 17 construction permit, a combined license, or any of the 18 other stages, are also risk-informed applications, and 19 the PRA needs to have certain capability in order to 20 support those applications.
21 So, the stages are laid out here; show you 22 how you characterize, for example, the plant life-23 cycle stage; what you need the PRA to do, et cetera, 24 et cetera; what to do if the standard is insufficient 25 and it doesn't have requirements that are relevant to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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34 1 the application, and a consideration or a comparison 2 of the PRA, then, against those requirements.
3 This is actually a rather elaborate 4 flowchart that's presented in the standard. I can't 5 show you that without violating the copyright notice.
6 So, you get to bear with me this way.
7 The other thing that I would point out is 8 that Reg Guide 1.247 speaks about non-LWR PRA 9 acceptability in general terms. It would apply to all 10 license cycle stages. But specific guidance for the 11 initial licensing has yet to be developed. There is 12 some discussion in ARCAP and intention to develop 13 further specific guidance on the scope and the level 14 of detail of a PRA that would support certain 15 licensing stages.
16 MEMBER BLEY: That's good. I think we're 17 going to get briefed on that in the next couple of 18 months, right?
19 MR. STUTZKE: Yes. In fact, they will 20 mention it tomorrow. They're in the TICAP/ARCAP 21 discussion to some extent.
22 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Marty, this is Walt.
23 Just quickly, does Stage A, B, C, D --
24 where does that fit in the life cycle of the licensing 25 activities?
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35 1 MR. STUTZKE: Well, those stages that you 2 see here, A through E, you would apply during each 3 life-cycle stage. So, in other words, you see the 4 first bullet under Stage A is define what life-cycle 5 stage you're in. And then, that is used, then, to 6 determine which supporting requirements should apply 7 and things like that.
8 MEMBER BLEY: Marty, if I may?
9 Walt, these are stages of the process for 10 deciding if your PRA is good enough for an 11 application.
12 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes, that's what I 13 thought. Okay. Fine. Thank you.
14 MR. STUTZKE: Right. Yes, so you're 15 always going through these stages.
16 Okay. Slide 15, please.
17 So, given this change in, we'll say, 18 understanding, where the staff was focusing on grading 19 the technical content of a PRA, and industry had 20 expressed their desire to grade the uses of the PRA, 21 we dug in and spent substantial effort trying to 22 understand how the PRA is used in the licensing 23 process; then, thinking, could we achieve those uses 24 and roles with other techniques or tools? In other 25 words, to achieve the same underlying purpose without NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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36 1 developing the full-scope PRA that's envisioned by the 2 standard like that.
3 And then, last and not least, this 4 understanding how that information fits into the 5 overall approach for licensing under the various 6 parts, Parts 50.52 and Parts 53. And generally, you 7 can subdivide the uses of the PRA into required uses 8 or expected uses. Required uses are things that are 9 explicitly stated in rules or have been proposed in 10 various rulemakings. That's different than the 11 expected uses, which are conveyed through Regulatory 12 Guides, various Commission Policy Statements, or Staff 13 Requirement Memorandum, the Standard Review Plans, and 14 even international documents like IAEA SSR-2/1. So, 15 it's very, very important that it's clearly understood 16 that things like Policy Statements and SRMs are not 17 requirements per se.
18 So, to that end, let's go to slide 16.
19 Going way back almost to the start of my 20 career, why do we do PRA? And I cite three references 21 here. One is an ACRS letter that was written shortly 22 after the accident at Three Mile Island, where the 23 ACRS stated we think it's time to place the discussion 24 of risk on as quantitative basis as possible.
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37 1 Report, which was the Presidential Commission to 2 investigate TMI. And again, notice the emphasis on 3 estimating probabilities and consequences of 4 accidents.
5 Finally, there was an internal study, the 6 Rogovin Report that emphasized the best way to look at 7 existing design, and to review them, is to rely on 8 quantitative risk assessment.
9 So, from that -- going to slide 17, please 10 -- you can see this following timeline that I've tried 11 to lay out and sort into regulations versus Policy 12 Statements.
13 Early in 1982, the Three Mile Island 14 requirements were added to 50.34(f), which requires 15 the performance of a PRA to seek improvements in the 16 reliability in containment heat removal systems.
17 A few years later, the Commission issued 18 its Severe Accident Policy Statement, which, 19 basically, required expect the use of PRA to search 20 for severe accident vulnerabilities.
21 Shortly after that was an Advanced Reactor 22 Policy Statement that cited the Severe Accident Policy 23 Statement and the forthcoming Safety Goal Policy 24 Statement. That followed a month or so later, where 25 the actual Safety Goal Policy was issued.
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38 1 Also around that time, Part 52 was issued.
2 And in there, the requirements indicated you needed to 3 meet the TMI requirements in 50.34(f) and submit the 4 PRA to the staff for review.
5 A small change to the Advanced Reactor 6 Policy Statement for the metrification.
7 Moving up to the actual PRA Policy 8 Statement itself in 1995 -- and we'll review each one 9 of these in just a few minutes -- a major revision to 10 Part 52 occurred in 2007, where applicants were no 11 longer required to submit the PRA, but, rather, a 12 description of the PRA and its results.
13 Shortly thereafter, a revision of the 14 Advanced Reactor Policy Statement, to its citing the 15 Severe Accident Policy Statement, the Safety Goal 16 Policy Statement, and the PRA Policy Statement.
17 In 2009, the Parts 50.52 lessons learned 18 rulemaking was initiated.
19 And in 2019, the Part 53 rulemaking was 20 initiated.
21 I would point with some interest to that 22 focus in the late 1980s. The other thing that 23 happened during that time was the NRC relocated from 24 its downtown Washington offices and Bethesda offices 25 to the White Flint complex. So, this was a high-NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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39 1 activity period.
2 Next slide, please.
3 So, starting from the most recent, the 4 Advanced Reactor Policy Statement -- and I've given 5 you The Federal Register notices, if you want to take 6 the time to look them up. I have also tried to 7 summarize a great deal of the content in the following 8 viewgraphs. So, if you don't have time or 9 inclination, you can at least see what the Policy 10 Statement says.
11 But there was a comment submitted by 12 Toshiba that said, gee, the Advanced Reactor Policy 13 Statement makes no mention about using PRA, and it 14 would be real helpful to have Interim Guidance of a 15 risk-informed, technology-neutral licensing framework.
16 To that, the NRC responded, well, we 17 already have requirements for the use of PRA in Part 18 52. We've also issued Policy Statements, PRA Policy 19 Statements, a (audio interference) Policy Statement.
20 So, no further action was taken to respond to 21 Toshiba's comment here.
22 Later on, in the Advanced Reactor Policy 23 Statement, it is the expectation that the Commission 24 expects advanced reactor design will comply with the 25 Safety Goal Policy Statement.
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40 1 Next slide, please.
2 So, here are quotes from the PRA Policy 3 Statement again about increasing the use of PRA 4 technology in a manner that complements the NRC's 5 deterministic approach and supports the NRC's 6 professional defense-in-depth philosophy. Notice PRA 7 in this case is always playing a complementary or 8 supporting role, and we'll talk about that in some 9 detail a little bit later on.
10 Generally, use PRA and associated analyses 11 in all regulatory matters, where practical, within the 12 state of the art.
13 PRAs should be realistic, meaning no 14 deliberately introduced conservatisms into the 15 analysis.
16 And last, and not least, consideration of 17 the uncertainties involved like that.
18 So, slide 20.
19 Again, from the Severe Accident Policy 20 Statement. So, this was intended to convey the 21 Commission's expectations on use or resolving Severe 22 Accident Policy Statements, which were perceived to be 23 as beyond design basis types of accidents here.
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41 1 is done to the reactor core, whether or not there are 2 serious offsite consequences.
3 And as I'll talk a little bit later in my 4 presentation, one of the challenges of the Graded PRA 5 Working Group is coming up with a technology-inclusive 6 definition of a severe accident, where in some designs 7 focusing on the reactor core may not be so easy. It 8 doesn't make technical sense.
9 However, okay, so continuing, the Severe 10 Accident Policy Statement says we expect you to comply 11 with existing regulations, and particularly points out 12 the TMI requirements in 50.34(f); addressing all the 13 unresolved safety issues; admitting high-prior generic 14 safety issues.
15 The third sub-bullet, complete a PRA and 16 consider the severe accident vulnerabilities. Okay?
17 This is where the need for a technology-inclusive 18 definition of severe accidents comes into play. When 19 you think about telling someone to go off and look for 20 severe accident vulnerabilities, you're obligated to 21 tell them, well, what are you looking for? What is a 22 severe accident and what would be a vulnerability to 23 that?
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42 1 and judgment complemented by the PRA.
2 So, continuing to slide 21, use of the 3 Safety Goal Policy Statement. So, quotes out of here.
4 Again, two qualitative goals. You judge 5 that you meet the qualitative goals by looking at the 6 quantitative objectives, sometimes known as 7 quantitative health objectives like this. So, the 8 risk to the individual in the vicinity of the plant, 9 which was defined as one mile of prompt fatalities 10 should not exceed 0.1 percent of prompt fatality risk.
11 The risk in the vicinity of the plant over 10 miles of 12 cancer fatalities should not exceed 0.1 percent of the 13 sum of cancer fatalities from other causes.
14 And the cyclical Policy Statement also had 15 a Commission recommendation that the staff should 16 consider a general performance guideline large release 17 frequency, and a suggested target for large release 18 frequency, that it should be less than 10 to the minus 19 6 per year of reactor operation.
20 We'll talk during the next slide a little 21 bit about this general performance guideline. But I 22 would emphasize now it's interesting in that it is 23 technology-inclusive. It doesn't require things like 24 core damage frequency, or whatever, and it enables you 25 to consider the design independently of the site.
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43 1 So, slide 22, please.
2 So, the interpretation of the QHOs is 3 shown in NUREG-0880. It says individual early 4 fatality risk should be less than 5 times seven to the 5 minus 7 per year, individual light and cancer risk 6 less than 2 times 10 to the minus 6 per year.
7 The staff has periodically reassessed 8 those numbers. One would expect medical technology is 9 better; people are generally more healthy. And so, 10 the risk of cancer should be decreasing over time, but 11 we've not seen it necessary to readjust these 12 numerical guidelines as of yet.
13 During the development of these risks, or 14 of these quantitative healths objectives, the staff 15 has always borne in mind that surrogate risk metrics 16 would be very handy to have. Rather than doing a PRA 17 that goes all the way out to consequences, it would be 18 useful to be able to zero-in on things like core 19 damage frequency and individual early fatality risk.
20 The derivation of those is actually shown on NUREG-21 1816, which was done decades after the safety goals 22 were originally written down.
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44 1 damage frequency, no large release frequency, and no 2 Large Early Release Frequency mentioned in that 3 standard.
4 We address the use of risk surrogates in 5 Regulatory Guide 1.247, and, in fact, actually 6 received a comment from industry saying that may not 7 be what you want to do, because, again, the standard 8 does not address it.
9 Slide 23, please.
10 So, recap of the history on large release 11 frequency. And as I had indicated before, the 12 Commission spoke through an SRM back in 1989 that says 13 the large release guidelines -- in other words, LRF --
14 should apply to all current and future reactor 15 designs. And they also reminded the staff that 16 adequate protection is a case-by-case finding. In 17 other words, that is the prerogative of the 18 Commission.
19 You may be curious, where did the 10 to 20 the minus 6 number come for the large release 21 frequency? And I found an email from Forrest Remick, 22 a former Director of the Office of Policy Evaluation, 23 who was tasked with developing the safety goals. Dr.
24 Remick later was an ACRS member and a Commissioner.
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45 1 the then-EDO, that explained where the 10 to the minus 2 6 came from. And apparently, it's an interesting 3 story to me that there was a deadlock between the ACRS 4 and the staff on the use of core damage frequency and 5 conditional containment failure probability. Where 6 the staff only wanted to include core damage 7 frequency, the ACRS also wanted a conditional 8 containment failure probability metric.
9 Unresolved, and so, Dr. Remick, 10 apparently, received a call from an assistant to the 11 then-Chairman Palladino that said, well, maybe we can 12 get out of this by dropping both CDF and CCFP and 13 substituting a Large Release Frequency guideline, 10 14 to the minus 6.
15 So, the logic was you assume 10 to the 16 minus 4 per year core damage frequency times a 17 conditional probability of vessel breach, what Dr.
18 Remick called core on the floor, of 0.1 times the 19 conditional containment failure probability, .1, and, 20 boom, you get 10 to the minus 6 per year. And that's 21 why it was incorporated under the Safety Goal Policy 22 Statement as it was.
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46 1 Frequency at the time of fuel load. And the 2 Commission approved that.
3 Later on, the Commission asked the staff 4 to develop a history of Large Release Frequency, and 5 I've referenced it there. What happened was, in the 6 early '90s, the staff tried to anchor or calibrate 7 that Large Release Frequency guidance to the QHOs, and 8 they were, basically, unable to do it. What they 9 found was that LRF was much more conservative. And 10 so, the conclusion and recommendation at that time 11 was, well, we can't do this; it's not really practical 12 to do it, and we don't need to do it for regulatory or 13 design purposes like that.
14 MEMBER BROWN: Marty?
15 MR. STUTZKE: Yes?
16 MEMBER BROWN: This is Charlie.
17 I'll look back at 22. And doesn't this, 18 the last two bullets down here, effectively, establish 19 a de facto surrogate --
20 MR. STUTZKE: They do, but --
21 MEMBER BROWN: -- for non-light water 22 PRAs?
23 MR. STUTZKE: Well, they do for large 24 light water reactor PRAs.
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47 1 please?
2 MEMBER BROWN: Where did I lose the 3 bubble?
4 MR. STUTZKE: Okay, but they only apply to 5 large light water reactor PRAs because they are based 6 on the results of NUREG-1150 analysis, which applied 7 to large light water reactors. So, in other words, if 8 one had a smaller reactor or a non-light water 9 reactor, less thermal power, in principle, the core 10 damage frequency could increase because the 11 conditional consequence is much lower.
12 MEMBER BROWN: Oh, but the non-light water 13 PRA standard doesn't say large or small. It just says 14 non-light water.
15 MR. STUTZKE: Right, but --
16 MEMBER BROWN: I still lost the bubble.
17 MR. STUTZKE: Okay. What the non-light 18 water reactor PRA standard is trying to emphasize is 19 we can't meaningfully define core damage for certain 20 non-light water reactor designs.
21 MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
22 MR. STUTZKE: In other words, in light 23 water reactors, we define core damage by things like, 24 gee, the peak clad temperature, or peak centerline 25 temperature exceeds 1800 degrees Fahrenheit --
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48 1 MEMBER BROWN: Yes. Yes.
2 MR. STUTZKE: -- before the core starts to 3 uncover.
4 MEMBER BROWN: Right. Okay.
5 MR. STUTZKE: That doesn't work well for 6 high-temperature gas cooled reactors. So, you would 7 have to have a technology-specific definition of these 8 various risk surrogates, things like CDF.
9 MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
10 MR. STUTZKE: The other thing is that the 11 non-light water reactor PRA standard was also 12 developed with an eye towards supporting the Licensing 13 Modernization Project, which requires the full Level 14 3 PRA. Remember, the frequency consequence curve was 15 plotting the frequency of releases on the Y-axis 16 versus the consequence on the X-axis.
17 MEMBER BROWN: Yes. Okay. All right.
18 So, there's nuances in there.
19 MR. STUTZKE: Yes. Yes.
20 MEMBER BROWN: You almost need a family 21 tree to go trace what goes with what, as opposed to 22 just the bullets.
23 All right. Thanks.
24 MR. STUTZKE: Yes. Surely.
25 Let's go to slide 24, please, in this.
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49 1 Okay. So, having been a little bit 2 thwarted about the definition of Large Release 3 Frequency units and its general conservatism when 4 applied to anchoring it to the QHOs, industry evolved 5 the concept of Large Early Release Frequency. And 6 that was done by the Electric Power Research Institute 7 in a PSA Applications Guide, as I've shown here.
8 And the idea is you could use qualitative 9 characteristics to identify sequences that were large 10 early releases. And the early in the sequence, in the 11 description, was added to convey the release occurs 12 before the effective protective actions could occur, 13 such as evacuation like that. But, again, the idea is 14 it avoids the need to do any source term work or 15 radiological consequence work. I would also like to 16 point out the lead author on that document is Doug 17 True, who's now the Senior Vice President at the 18 Nuclear Energy Institute.
19 So, staff adopted the concept of L-E-R-F, 20 or LERF, when it developed Reg Guide 1.147. And I've 21 provided a definition of L-E-R-F which is contained in 22 Reg Guide 1.200. The sum of the frequencies of 23 accidents leading to rapid unmitigated release of 24 airborne fission products occurring before the 25 effective implementation of emergency offsite NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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50 1 response. And notice the parenthetical phrase, that's 2 an example of the types of characteristics that are 3 used to identify large early release sequences.
4 MEMBER BIER: Marty?
5 MR. STUTZKE: Yes?
6 MEMBER BIER: Sorry. This is Vicki Bier.
7 I don't think this is exactly a question, 8 but you had mentioned that the LERF was designed to be 9 before any evacuation or relocation had taken place.
10 And I think one of the things we saw from Fukushima is 11 that relocation can acceptably contain dose, but 12 imposes large hardships on the population; that if you 13 get into a situation where you need relocation, the 14 utility or the plant owner is, essentially, relying on 15 the relocation of the population as almost like a 16 safety system, which is probably not what many people 17 in the population have in mind.
18 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, Vicki, I agree with 19 you. And it's interesting, I've had the benefit of 20 some discussions with our Canadian colleagues, and 21 some of them are oriented towards a measure of 22 societal disruption. So, just the fact that you have 23 a release that would necessitate an evacuation, or 24 worse, a relocation for long term, is a major impact 25 on people, even if there's no minimal radiological NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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51 1 hazard involved.
2 MEMBER BIER: Okay. Thanks.
3 MR. STUTZKE: Yes.
4 So, slide 25.
5 Now I want to refer to some definitions 6 that are used in risk-informed regulation. And the 7 primary source of this is a white paper that the 8 Commission issued in DRM SECY-98-144, where they 9 defined the risk triplet -- what can go wrong; how 10 likely is it; what are the consequences?
11 The risk triplet was actually invented 12 back in 1981 by Stan Kaplan and Big John Garrick in a 13 paper. I've given you the quote down there. And 14 what's interesting is the title of the paper is The 15 Quantitative Definition of Risk. So they had always 16 intended -- and, in fact, the paper is, in my opinion, 17 highly mathematical. I've given you in the inset box 18 there their equation for the risk triplet, including 19 all of the uncertainty distributions on the 20 frequencies and the consequences. I point that out 21 because people tend to think of the risk triplet more 22 qualitatively, but it's, in fact, a very precise 23 quantification that was supplied here.
24 But, continuing with that, again, the SRM, 25 the SECY-98-144, says, well, a risk assessment is just NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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52 1 a systematic method for addressing the risk triplet.
2 Notice that it doesn't say that it needs to be a 3 quantitative approach. And risk insights are results 4 that come from the risk assessments and a risk-5 informed approach, then, is based on risk insights 6 considered along with other factors like this.
7 That's in contrast to the definition of 8 PRA, shown on slide 26, please, where PRA, again, 9 you'll see a systematic method for addressing the risk 10 triplet. But notice the use of PRA to determine a 11 numerical estimate of risk. That definition is then 12 transferred over to Reg Guide 1.200 and Draft Reg 13 Guide 1.247, where it says an approach is considered 14 a PRA when it provides a quantitative assessment of 15 the risk -- again, in terms of scenarios admitting 16 specific technical elements.
17 So, according to this definition, 18 techniques like seismic margins analysis are not PRA 19 because they are not quantitative. They don't 20 estimate the risk. And that's specifically why those 21 definitions were added like they were like this.
22 Okay. Let's go to slide 27 then.
23 I had talked before where we were 24 considering within our Graded PRA Working Group about 25 the role of the PRA and how it's used in initial NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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53 1 licensing. And early in the spring, I had invented 2 the phrase PRA in a leading role and another phrase, 3 PRA in a supporting role.
4 And having carefully reread the PRA Policy 5 Statement, I came to the realization PRA is always 6 used to support and complement the deterministic 7 approach. So we relabeled the phrase PRA in a 8 supporting role as it's a traditional role. And what 9 we mean by that is PRA as it's been used in previous 10 design certification and combined license 11 applications.
12 And that specifically includes searching 13 for the severe accident vulnerabilities, as expected 14 by the Severe Accident Policy Statement; PRA used to 15 meet the TMI requirements in 50.34(f)(1)(i), which 16 applies to Part 52 applicants to perform a site-17 specific PRA. Again, notice the phrasing PRA in 18 there. Third sub-bullet, demonstrative quantitative 19 health objectives are met, required by the Safety Goal 20 Policy Statement, and using PRA in the design process 21 in the PRA Policy Statement.
22 So, we now can consider an enhanced role 23 of PRA, which is, basically, anything beyond its 24 traditional role. For example, as we indicate in the 25 preliminary rule text for Part 53, use of PRA to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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54 1 identify licensing basis events; classify system 2 structures and components; evaluating defense-in-3 depth.
4 The enhanced role of PRA, then, also 5 includes any voluntary risk-informed applications, 6 such as risk-managed technical specifications; risk-7 informed fire protection; risk-informed in-service 8 inspection, et cetera, et cetera.
9 So, I hope that this language clarifies it 10 a little bit. I will try to show you in a few more 11 slides how it plays out in possible licensing 12 pathways.
13 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Marty?
14 MR. STUTZKE: Yes?
15 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Hi. This is Vesna 16 Dimitrijevic.
17 As you already mentioned, there is a 18 public view of that, but I want to discuss the main 19 point I think you're trying to make, that the PMA 20 actually implies the quantitative results of the risk; 21 actually quantification of the risk. And that's 22 through the PRA quantifies the risk; there is no doubt 23 about that.
24 The one thing which I want to bring up is 25 the importance and use of those numbers. So, let's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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55 1 say that we look in the first, the PRA document, where 2 the PRA and everything becomes a public response. And 3 there is some generation of us which we remember the 4 response very well, and we look at this. But I bet 5 you that none of us actually remember what was the 6 core damage frequency presented then. What we mostly 7 remember is what that started to identify is important 8 contributors. And a small LOCA, which happened very 9 soon after what happened in Three Mile Island was 10 identified as one of the main risk contributors from 11 that study.
12 So, the point I was trying to make is that 13 those numbers were not used as absolutes, and the 14 values of the PRA was never, in my opinion, in 15 producing absolute numbers, but if anything comparison 16 or what are the important contributors to the risk?
17 And also, when you look at using PRA in the risk-18 informed application, it is also in the assessing 19 delta change in the risk measures.
20 So, it's that, you know, 5.34, 10 to the 21 minus 5, or 6.7, 10 to the minus 6, through the use of 22 the PMA becomes irrelevant. What becomes relevant is 23 to identify the plant vulnerabilities. And so, if the 24 point of the view is the numbers, the values in the 25 risk assessment is developing components which comes NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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56 1 out as an important contributor to the risk.
2 And the one other point which I want to 3 say, if anything, the actual number, it's just the 4 likely importance is just in the likelihood, then we 5 will leave it much more concentrated. Are we 6 producing mean values, I mean, providing point 7 estimates? Have an actual incentive? Let's say that 8 we really want to deal with the mean values. Then, 9 how would, actually, uncertainties quantify? You 10 know, is it independent or is it related the 11 components? So, there is so many more issues which 12 come up if we are just interested in the numbers and 13 not in the relative comparison of contribution to the 14 risk?
15 MR. STUTZKE: All right. I agree with you 16 wholeheartedly.
17 One of the beauties of PRA is its ability 18 to rank-order contributions to risk according to 19 various criteria. I'll just relay that was drummed 20 into my head when I was in graduate school. I'm a 21 student of Jerry Fussell. So, yes, I've always had an 22 infinity for importance measures like that.
23 But, that being said, you know, the Safety 24 Goal Policy Statement if fixated on the bottom-line 25 number. In other words, how safe is safe enough? So, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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57 1 in a certain way, it's providing a speed limit on the 2 overall risk of the plant.
3 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Yes, but you provide 4 it in such a large brackets, it's not really saying, 5 you know -- it's saying 10 to the minus 4 or 10 to the 6 minus 6 -- it's not saying some specific number. And 7 when you look in these large brackets, then it's much 8 easier to prove that that goal is met without doing 9 the detailed breakout.
10 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, I agree.
11 MEMBER BLEY: I'd like to jump in just a 12 little. I agree with most everything the two of you 13 have just said, except the complete dismissing of the 14 absolute value of risk and the importance of the 15 uncertainty treatment. And if you don't include that, 16 you don't know how important it is to deal with any of 17 those nicely ranked potential problems in the plants.
18 You can't do it without both, and I think both are 19 important. And I think that's where you're headed.
20 That's what it looks like.
21 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Right. That is, I 22 completely agree with that. I just want to say that 23 treatment of uncertainty is in the pioneering stage 24 anyway in regulation and Reg Guides. Because if the 25 treatment of uncertainty was done in the necessary NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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58 1 details, whenever somebody comes to you with a point 2 estimate, and meanwhile, you're equal, you will just 3 return that PRA, because that cannot be true.
4 MEMBER BLEY: Yes.
5 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: So, therefore, we 6 are still really in the infant stage of treatment of 7 uncertainties.
8 MEMBER BLEY: I kind of disagree. There's 9 been an awful lot of work over the last almost 50 10 years in that area and it's well done.
11 But I will admit, Marty, that your former 12 mentor in a public meeting once accused me, Stan 13 Kaplan, and John Garrick, of pulling off the greatest 14 hoax in the history of science by focusing on 15 uncertainty.
16 (Laughter.)
17 MR. STUTZKE: Yes. Let's say one of the 18 things -- and I think our Project Manager for this 19 Graded PRA Working Group has come to appreciate --
20 that managing PRA experts is like herding cats, and 21 there's a lot of very strongly held opinions by the 22 various practitioners. But what I would hope is that 23 we all, collectively, agree, you know, PRA provides a 24 very elegant framework for considering all of these 25 uncertainties. It's not perfect, but it's the best NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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59 1 that we know right now.
2 MEMBER BALLINGER: I'm told that dogs have 3 owners, but cats have staff.
4 (Laughter.)
5 MR. STUTZKE: Anyway, let's flip to slide 6 28 and continue this.
7 I had mentioned this before. This graphic 8 lays out the various life-cycle stages that are 9 recognized by the various parts. So, I've color-coded 10 my Part 50, 52, and 53.
11 Starting in the lower left corner, the 12 construction permit, where we actually know what site 13 we're going to build out, then feeds into the 14 operating license, as shown there. The design 15 certification, manufacturing licenses, standard design 16 approvals are independent of a site like this, and 17 they can feed into the combined license under Part 52 18 or Part 53, or they can be used to base a construction 19 permit on like that.
20 Once the operating license or combined 21 license is issued, the Fuel Load PRA can begin like 22 that. At that point in time, the plant is physically 23 constructed. So, you can walk it down and obtain the 24 information you need to refine the PRA models. In 25 addition, all the operating procedures are available, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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60 1 which is an important input to the human reliability 2 analysis. And finally, with commercial operations, 3 experience occurs, statistical data can be collected, 4 and the estimates of the probabilities can be refined 5 like that.
6 But the important thing I'm trying to 7 convey is, as the plant is constructed, goes through 8 the various life-cycles stages, as shown here, the PRA 9 is increasing its level of detail and its degree of 10 plant representation like that.
11 So, that needs to be borne in mind. You 12 know, not all of the uncertainty of the PRA shows up 13 as numerical, in the numerical results. There's 14 always the uncertainty about, gee, I'm applying 15 generic data to construct some permit stage because I 16 don't have any operating experience. And there's the 17 question of the exchangeability of that generic data 18 with the point you're actually trying to model. In 19 other words, is it truly representative?
20 So, I try to bear that in mind, as I think 21 about PRA and its uncertainties. Although, I admit, 22 I love the mathematics of uncertainty calculations and 23 all of that, it doesn't always get to the root of the 24 problem.
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61 1 bit, Marty.
2 The uncertainties are there in the real 3 world. PRA is just trying to quantify them in a way 4 you can see them and deal with them mathematically.
5 It doesn't make up the uncertainties.
6 MR. STUTZKE: That's true. I've been 7 accused of that before; it's only uncertain because 8 the PRA made it uncertain, and that's not the case.
9 MEMBER BIER: Marty, this is Vicki again.
10 I wanted to point out that there is other 11 differences between the various stages, in addition to 12 just plant-specific data. Hopefully, by the time of 13 a construction permit, you have a detailed design, not 14 just design certification stage, but there can also be 15 differences between the as-designed and the as-built.
16 And sometimes the waivers that approve an as-built 17 modification may not have thought through all the 18 implications that would show up in a PRA.
19 MR. STUTZKE: Yes and no. At the 20 construction permit, it's largely a conceptual design, 21 and that's why the importance of principal design 22 criteria stands out then. So, it's like when we go to 23 the detailed design process, these are the criteria 24 we're going to use to get down to the brass tacks of 25 the problem like that. Then, by the time the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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62 1 operating license comes around, that PRA would be 2 upgraded and refined to represent more detail. It's 3 in contrast to the combined license, which requires 4 an, essentially, complete design because it's a one-5 step license process.
6 MEMBER BIER: Got it. Thank you.
7 MR. STUTZKE: Yes.
8 To slide 29.
9 MEMBER REMPE: Oh, Marty?
10 MR. STUTZKE: Yes?
11 MEMBER REMPE: That may be true with Part 12 52. But, as we've seen with the experience with the 13 AP1000, there were ITAAC and there were changes. And 14 again, I'm thinking of this request for an example and 15 Walt's statement about equal levels of safety.
16 There's not a final review to make sure that the 17 cumulative changes that occur as one goes through the 18 construction process with Part 52 is, indeed, 19 conforming with what was intended when they got the 20 DC.
21 And as you go through the next couple of 22 slides, it seems to me that the risk assessment might 23 be the tool to assess the cumulative effects of 24 changes during construction with Part 52. And then, 25 I'm wondering how that example or how one will deal NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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63 1 with that in Part 53. Is what I'm saying kind of 2 making sense?
3 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, it certainly makes 4 sense, Joy. And, you know, the challenge the staff 5 faces is that we have to issue either a combined 6 license or an operating license, based on the 7 information that we have available at the time. Then, 8 you know, in the case of the combined license, then, 9 the plant construction actually begins and it's 10 inspected to ensure that it meets all of the 11 requirements, you know, the ITAACs, and things like 12 that. But they already have permission to build that 13 plant. There is a whole point where we decide 14 everything is good to go, and then, we grant 15 permission to load fuel like that.
16 So, the point is, you don't really know or 17 have the final set of PRA information up until you get 18 the fuel load, but you've already granted authority to 19 start up the plant by that time. So, there's always 20 this uncertainty involved.
21 MEMBER REMPE: Yes, the PRA would be a way 22 to -- I mean, you've got different inspectors saying, 23 yes, they met this ITAAC and that ITAAC. But the 24 accumulation of some minor variances -- yes, they met 25 the ITAAC, but are there some unintended small NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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64 1 changes? I know this has been a think that Harold Ray 2 used to bring up a lot. And so, again, I'm thinking 3 of Part 50.52 alignment issues.
4 And your subsequent slides really 5 emphasize where I think that the PRA, and how the 6 licensee braids the PRA in the Part 52 process, could 7 be a tool that would provide confidence that, yes, all 8 these changes as the ITAAC were met did, indeed, not 9 affect the safety of the plant. And then, again, as 10 you go back to what's happening with Part 53, that 11 type of insight ought to be retained.
12 MR. STUTZKE: Sure.
13 MEMBER REMPE: If that makes sense, what 14 I'm trying to get to?
15 MR. STUTZKE: I think I understand where 16 you are.
17 So, with that, let's move to slide 29.
18 CHAIR PETTI: Marty? Marty?
19 MR. STUTZKE: Yes?
20 CHAIR PETTI: It's close to our break 21 time. And we could either get through slide 31 and 22 break or we could break here. I'm thinking maybe 23 break here because, now, you're going to get into sort 24 of the details.
25 MR. STUTZKE: That would be fine with me.
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65 1 CHAIR PETTI: Okay. So, folks, let's take 2 a 20-minute break. Be back by 20 after the hour.
3 We're in recess. Thank you.
4 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 5 off the record at 10:59 a.m. and resumed at 11:20 6 a.m.)
7 CHAIR PETTI: Okay, it's 20 after.
8 So, Marty, continue.
9 MR. STUTZKE: Yes. So, moving to slide 10 29, currently, PRAs are not required for construction 11 permit or operating license applicants. The 12 Commission stated its expectation that the Severe 13 Accident Policy Statement and the other directions 14 related to the use of PRA would also apply to new Part 15 50 applications, consistent with how they currently 16 apply to Part 52. And that's one of the reasons why 17 the Part 50.52 lessons learned rulemaking was 18 undertaken, was to incorporate those PRA-related 19 requirements for CP and OL applicants like that.
20 So, slide 30, please.
21 This is a list of all the specific 22 regulations for Part 52 applicants -- design 23 certifications, combined license, standard design 24 approval, and manufacturing applicants.
25 And again, the requirement for COL NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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66 1 applicants that reference a standard design approval 2 or a design cert or a manufacturing license should 3 start with that PRA, and then, update it.
4 Again, two things that I would call to 5 your attention.
6 One is the description of the PRA in the 7 results, as opposed to the original Part 52 language 8 that said: submit the PRA to the staff.
9 The second, and perhaps more important, 10 aspect here is, you'll notice the rule language does 11 not tell you why you are submitting this. In other 12 words, what is the intended use for this? Hold that 13 thought in mind.
14 Go to slide 31, please.
15 These are the requirements that are for 16 Part 52 combined license holders that appear in 17 50.71(h). It says every COL holder needs to develop 18 a Level 1 and Level 2 PRA and address the initiating 19 events and modes and NRC-endorsed consensus standards 20 that exist one year prior to initial fuel load.
21 That last thing is kind of moot, in the 22 sense that the non-LWR PRA standard already addresses 23 all initiating events and all operating modes of the 24 plant. That's not the case for light water reactors, 25 where there are various tri-use standards initiated NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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67 1 for low power and shutdown, things like that.
2 Again, in 50.71(h)(2), requirements to 3 maintain and upgrade the PRA every four years.
4 And finally, by the time of license 5 renewal, if you haven't already addressed all the 6 modes and all the initiating events, you're now 7 required to do so. But, again, notice the language 8 here doesn't tell you why you are required to maintain 9 this PRA.
10 So, slide 32.
11 This is excerpts from the third iteration 12 of preliminary rule text for Part 53; specifically, 13 Section 53.450(a), required to have a PRA to identify 14 potential failure modes, et cetera. The area that 15 I've highlighted in yellow, that's telling you why.
16 That's a link back to the Severe Accident Policy 17 Statement, which is obliging the user to search, use 18 the PRA to search for severe accident vulnerabilities.
19 And again, the highlighted blue area 20 demonstrates that you meet the safety criteria in 21 53.220. Those are the QHOs. So, again, this language 22 is telling you why you're using the PRA.
23 And to respond earlier to Charlie's 24 comment, that obviates the need to go back to all of 25 these Statements of Considerations to figure out why NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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68 1 you're doing what you're doing. It's, in fact, 2 embedded into the rule language here.
3 Part 53 goes on, as shown in slide 33. It 4 has specific uses of the PRA are required. Selection 5 of the licensing basis events; classifying the system 6 structures, components, and human actions, and 7 evaluating defense-in-depth. And according to the 8 definitions I've given you before, those are required 9 enhanced uses of the PRA.
10 To the blue highlighted area, 11 Subparagraphs 4 and 5, basically, these lay out the 12 required scope of a PRA. All plant operating states; 13 uncontrolled releases of radioactive material, which 14 would imply you would need to look at all sources.
15 And that means not just the reactors, but you would 16 need to look at multi-reactor accidents. You would 17 need to look at non-reactor sources, like spent fuel, 18 et cetera.
19 Subparagraph 5 talks about the need to 20 look at all hazards, such as all the internal events 21 -- transients, loss of integrity -- as well as the 22 external hazards, like earthquakes, high winds, et 23 cetera, et cetera.
24 Okay. Slide 34.
25 MEMBER BIER: Marty?
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69 1 MR. STUTZKE: Yes?
2 MEMBER BIER: Before you move on, this is 3 Vicki again.
4 I have a couple of questions with regard 5 to, oh, I guess it's the first bullet point about 6 determining the licensing basis events.
7 First, my understanding is that would come 8 pretty early in the design process; that may be before 9 a complete plant design is available. Is that 10 correct?
11 MR. STUTZKE: That's correct.
12 MEMBER BIER: Okay. So, you know, on the 13 one hand, we saw with large break LOCA before PRA that 14 we weren't always good at choosing what events to 15 focus on when we didn't have risk guidance. But, on 16 the other hand, this will also be early enough in the 17 process that I assume this doesn't preclude later use 18 of the PRA in more of a confirmatory role after they 19 have these licensing basis events chosen?
20 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, that's also correct.
21 When you actually look at the O&P flowchart, there are 22 numerous feedback loops.
23 MEMBER BIER: Got it. Okay.
24 MR. STUTZKE: As the design is evolving, 25 the PRA is evolving, and you're constantly checking.
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70 1 MEMBER BIER: Okay. So, the other thing 2 I wanted to raise is, is it intended that the LBEs 3 were chosen by, say, the vendor of the plant designer, 4 or who's actually making that choice?
5 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, those are chosen by the 6 designer.
7 MEMBER BIER: Okay. Because the DBEs in 8 the olden days were chosen by the regulator, and the 9 designer had to meet them. I gather, obviously, there 10 will be some kind of review process, but it seems like 11 there are some tradeoffs.
12 On the one hand, the designer is, 13 obviously, going to have a much better understanding 14 of the design than NRC staff, especially, with this 15 proliferation of a zillion different new designs, that 16 the staff can't be 100 percent expert in every single 17 design that's coming down the pike. On the other 18 hand, it seems like there may be a risk of design, you 19 know, or AE firms deliberately choosing LBEs that are, 20 in a sense, going to be easy to address. And have you 21 thought about how to look for that in the review 22 process?
23 MR. STUTZKE: Yes. As you point out, the 24 process for selecting the LBEs is highly plant design 25 detailed. In other words, you know, it's not feasible NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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71 1 for us to a priori lay out, you know, this is the 2 definitive list of licensing basis events, because 3 some designer will always come up with a new twist on 4 a design, or something like that. So, LMP, in 5 general, spares that burden on the designer --
6 MEMBER BIER: Uh-hum.
7 MR. STUTZKE: -- through an iterative 8 process.
9 What I would say is we highly encourage 10 the pre-application interactions with the staff like 11 that. Once we get an application in the door, you 12 know, that list of design basis events is, more or 13 less, cast in stone, in the sense, they proposed it, 14 and it makes it very difficult to change people's 15 opinion at that late stage in the process like that.
16 MEMBER BIER: Right.
17 MR. STUTZKE: So, yes, pre-application 18 interactions are key, I think, to making this thing 19 work.
20 And the other thing is, during the design 21 processes, the design gets evolved and the PRA is 22 upgraded. The staff is not necessarily privy to that 23 process. We only get to see the final results.
24 MEMBER BIER: Yes.
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72 1 little bit more about some ideas that we've had to 2 provide further guidance on this in a couple of more 3 slides.
4 MEMBER BIER: Super.
5 MEMBER BLEY: Marty?
6 MR. STUTZKE: Yes?
7 MEMBER BLEY: Your statement that they 8 would be cast in stone at the application, that can't 9 really be true. Because if you find some initiating 10 event or scenario that could be a significant risk 11 contributor that they didn't have in their list, 12 they're going to have to deal with it. So, they're 13 taking on a risk, if they don't address these with you 14 ahead of time.
15 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, I understand that, and 16 maybe I'm being a little exaggerating. But the fact 17 is, you know, the application comes in and that's what 18 the applicant has proposed, and we need to react to 19 it.
20 The other thing is, once the application 21 comes in the door, you know, the staff is in a 22 reviewer type of role. One of the strong lessons I 23 learned early on in my career at NRC is the staff is 24 not here to provide engineering expertise to 25 licensees.
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73 1 MEMBER BLEY: Well, it certainly strikes 2 me that, if we're going to -- and there really isn't 3 much choice -- use the PRA as a stepping stone to 4 getting at the design basis events, you guys need to 5 do a little more than just review what's there. You 6 have to make sure that they've included what's 7 important, because, to me, that's a key role of the 8 regulator.
9 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, sure, and we do have 10 processes like requests for information, and things 11 like that, that we can go after it.
12 MEMBER BALLINGER: This is Ron.
13 I'm assuming you can get the peer review, 14 which I presume gets performed in the development of 15 the PRA by the applicant, right?
16 MR. STUTZKE: Yes and no. The standard 17 requires the peer review. We have not expected the 18 peer review to be done for design certs and combined 19 licenses as yet.
20 MEMBER BALLINGER: It may be that that's 21 something to consider, because it gets you one step 22 below. I mean, it helps to at least try to get at 23 what Dennis is referring to.
24 MR. STUTZKE: That's right.
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74 1 easy since the mid-sixties, because we had really lots 2 of different people and organizations that thought 3 through the kind of what could go wrong sorts of 4 scenarios and came up with a set for large LWRs. You 5 still need to double-check that you haven't missed 6 something important.
7 But this strikes me as, you know, we're 8 going kind of back to where we were in the late '50s.
9 At that time, this Committee was the regulator's 10 primary technical reviewer, and a lot of their effort 11 -- and if you read their old documents -- was going 12 through and seeing, could I break this thing somehow 13 that the applicant hasn't thought of, and if so, 14 they'd better consider it carefully. And I think that 15 role falls on you. Especially now if we're looking at 16 new designs, we can't rely on past applications and 17 expertise on very similar systems.
18 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, the one thing I would 19 add is that it's been our custom to do a PRA audit 20 prior to the application. So, not just relying on the 21 description of the PRA and its results, but going 22 onsite to an applicant's office and looking in detail 23 at all the PRA models and how it was constructed, and 24 things like that.
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75 1 although you haven't been asking them for the peer 2 review, my understanding of how these days utilities 3 and others are using peer review is, if they get 4 findings that say you're missing something, they have 5 to address those. And I would think NRC would at 6 least see a record that there had been a peer review, 7 and that all the relevant issues were resolved. Is 8 that true or is that a gap sitting there?
9 MR. STUTZKE: Yes. Yes, if they do a peer 10 review, we would expect them to describe it and 11 provide all the facts and observations, and how 12 they've been addressed.
13 MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes, what I'm trying to 14 get at is some means by which you can verify what the 15 process was or what they did to develop the PRA, you 16 know, the underlying documents, so to speak.
17 MR. STUTZKE: Right, and, you know, in 18 addition to that, those would also be summarized in 19 that description of the PRA as, what techniques did 20 you use? You know, what were the ground rules, that 21 sort of thing.
22 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: This is Vesna.
23 I just want to say like, since I was at 24 Framatome, we did a peer review of the EP audit. NRC 25 requested that we report all the findings.
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76 1 When it comes to that, so peer reviews are 2 not something which takes a long time. They're done 3 in, readily admitted, time of a couple of weeks. So, 4 therefore, they require high expertise of the people 5 who are performing this peer review.
6 And when we start dealing with the new 7 designs, it will take some time to develop expertise 8 in that area. So, it's not really clear how effective 9 peer reviews would be for the new designs in the 10 beginning of those designs being introduced, 11 especially, I mean, the new PRA. So, I don't know, 12 would the PRA review really help so much in these 13 situations?
14 MEMBER BLEY: Well, we'll certainly chase 15 that on any of these applications.
16 You're going to get to a slide in a couple 17 of slides that describes some places I hope we'll be 18 focusing your reviews. And one of those is the 19 comprehensive search for initiators and event 20 sequences. And that's kind of crucial, no matter 21 which of the pathways you're going to talk about that 22 are used. And I don't see any choice but you looking 23 at those with great care and looking at the process 24 that the applicant used to come up with those lists.
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77 1 minutes, I would expect.
2 MR. STUTZKE: Yes. Yes.
3 MEMBER BIER: So, another comment, and 4 then, I see Walt also has his hand up.
5 I think there's kind of two separate 6 issues of the kind of quality review of the PRA, but 7 if you look at, historically, with PRAs of the current 8 LWRs, it took a decade or more for the methodology to 9 really mature. So, you know, gee, we need a Fire PRA; 10 we didn't think about that. There's a whole period of 11 time to develop what a Fire PRA should look like.
12 Common cause was in WASH-14, but the way it was in is 13 not something that today would be considered 14 acceptable. It took a while before people figured 15 out, oh, there's better data-driven ways to do common 16 cause failure analysis, et cetera.
17 And so, you know, the process of reviewing 18 a PRA for a new reactor design, where we haven't yet 19 had that learning experience, you know, that there's 20 a magic answer. Not doing the PRA doesn't solve the 21 problem. But has the staff thought about how they 22 will try to address the novelty factor?
23 MR. STUTZKE: Not to any great detail. I 24 mean, we would certainly anticipate the state of the 25 art or the state of practice in PRA is going to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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78 1 evolve, as we see more and more non-LWR PRAs being 2 developed. And that could spur various research, 3 things like that.
4 The other thing that I would point out is 5 the requirements currently for COL holders to upgrade 6 the PRA, and those upgrades require peer reviews. And 7 then, the results of that would be reported to the 8 staff probably as an update to FSAR, and we could see, 9 oh, the PRA results are changing; why is that? And it 10 affords the opportunity to dig into it to decide, you 11 know, do we agree why the things are changing? Do we 12 understand, that kind of thing.
13 MEMBER BIER: Uh-hum.
14 MR. STUTZKE: So, yes, it will be an 15 evolutionary process; there's little doubt in my mind.
16 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Just to follow onto 17 Vicki's comments and Vesna's -- this is Walt Kirchner 18 -- my concern, Marty, is along these lines: if you 19 take this approach with sub-bullet 1 there, and you 20 determine the licensing basis events based on your 21 PRA, the next thing you do is in bullet 2. And so, 22 what are the quality assurance requirements for that 23 PRA? I mean, you are now determining your licensing 24 case, based on the PRA. Then, you classify systems 25 accordingly. That classification results in different NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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79 1 quality assurance requirements, whether they are 2 safety-related systems or not. It's all coming out of 3 this initial -- Dennis mentioned it -- you know, this 4 comprehensive search for what are these illuminating 5 events that comprise the design basis events?
6 And I think you said that, for example --
7 I wouldn't put my hat just on the peer review -- but 8 did you say that the peer review would not be required 9 at the initial stage of submittal?
10 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, currently, the staff 11 would waive the requirement to do the peer review at 12 early stages of the submittal, and that would be 13 replaced by the staff's own review of the PRA.
14 MEMBER KIRCHNER: that goes to the 15 comments that Dennis made then. But that, to me, is 16 of concern. If you're hanging your hat on the PRA, 17 why is it not peer-reviewed before you actually --
18 because they're going to, then, put these licensing 19 basis events in front of you, and then, they will go 20 systematically through, and then, classify their SSCs.
21 That will require determining which ones are, I'm 22 going to say, NQA-1 versus not, et cetera, et cetera.
23 If this is the approach, I would -- I'm 24 searching for the right words. I know the PRA can't 25 be complete so early on, so to speak; that it's a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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80 1 living document, if you will. But it seems to me it 2 has to, one, go under some kind of design and 3 configuration control, if, indeed, it's the basis for 4 the safety case.
5 It's not a question of just updating it as 6 you learn and go. It's got to be under design 7 configuration control.
8 MR. STUTZKE: Well, and the standard 9 requires the PRA to be under configuration control.
10 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Okay.
11 MR. STUTZKE: And that's one of the things 12 that would be checked, either under peer review or as 13 we would do it.
14 The other thing that I would point out, 15 you know, as far as identifying the LBEs and 16 classifying the SSCs, it's not a purely mechanical 17 process where you look at the results of a PRA, and if 18 it's falls into certain categories, boom, there's the 19 answer. It's supplemented by engineering judgment 20 from an integrated decision-making panel that the 21 applicant conveys.
22 MEMBER BLEY: And Walt's comments were 23 heavily focused on the PRA part of this, but we're 24 going to see shortly there are alternative approaches, 25 including a deterministic one. But, whichever way you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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81 1 go getting this list of initiators and events 2 sequences that can be damaged complete, this is 3 essential in having a structured process that can be 4 reviewed; it is crucially important. And that's not 5 a PRA issue. These ideas may have been developed 6 during work on PRA, but they're equally applicable if 7 you go the other way. And if wait a couple of slides, 8 maybe Marty can help clarify.
9 MR. STUTZKE: Charlie, you have your hand 10 raised?
11 MEMBER BROWN: Yes, I do, but I need to go 12 back a slide, when you're all finished. That's why 13 I've stayed quiet.
14 Marty, I guess my question comes -- you 15 referred to my earlier comment relative to how this 16 got incorporated. So, I appreciate that.
17 But it seems to me you've buried this --
18 and that's not a critical statement; I'm not trying to 19 be criticizing -- in Subpart C, Section 53.450. And 20 yet, when I go back and look at Part B, 53.2, you 21 define safety objectives. And it would seem to me 22 that this would be more appropriately placed as a (b) 23 under that, because you, then you refer to 53.220 and 24 .230 -- and that's just one observation -- as opposed 25 to buried in 53.4 somewhere.
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82 1 And the other point is that, why did you 2 leave out 53.210 for safety criteria for design basis 3 accidents? Are they precluded from being evaluated by 4 PRA?
5 MR. STUTZKE: Once the licensing basis 6 events have been identified, there's a process within 7 LMP to, then, select the design basis accidents, the 8 classic deterministic set of design basis accidents, 9 again, by use of engineering judgment and this 10 integrated decision-making panel.
11 Then, once those have been identified, 12 they are analyzed using the traditional conservative 13 techniques. So, it's no longer within the umbrella of 14 the PRA per se.
15 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. But your first lead-16 in sentence says requirement to have a probabilistic 17 risk assessment. Right up front --
18 MR. STUTZKE: Yes.
19 MEMBER BROWN: -- it sends that message 20 right away. And it just seems, once I get into the 21 safety objectives and stuff, that that ought to be 22 identified as one of the means right off the bat.
23 It's just an observation. We'll go forward; you guys 24 can do what you want. It's just that it seems to me 25 that ought to be -- it goes along with my thought NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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83 1 process that things that are really requirements ought 2 to be identified right up front, not somewhere down 3 the line.
4 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, point taken on it.
5 MEMBER BROWN: That's my comment.
6 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, I'll bring that back to 7 the Part 53 Working Group.
8 MEMBER REMPE: So, Marty, you had some 9 statements there that -- I'd like to just point out, 10 you said the traditional conservative methods with the 11 deterministic approach. How will one think about 12 what's traditional conservative assumptions for a non-13 LWR?
14 And then, again, how do you assure an 15 equal amount of safety in a deterministic approach for 16 a non-LWR, whether it's this new option with 53 versus 17 the old way with 52, which the non-LWR -- or 50 -- the 18 non-LWRs are allowed to go Part 50?
19 And that's where, again, an example of how 20 this is all going to be connected together I'm 21 struggling with. That's what I was trying to get to 22 at the beginning of my questions today at the 23 beginning of the meeting.
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84 1 that we've used for decades for the large light water 2 reactors. In other words, specifically, for the 3 deterministic type of DBA calculations, one would 4 impose in 102 percent operation reactor power, add 2 5 sigma to the decay heat curve. All of those classic 6 assumptions, conservatisms, would be imported, then, 7 into the analysis of the DBAs like that.
8 MEMBER REMPE: So, if you don't have a 9 PRA, and you're going to use the deterministic 10 approach, how do you rule out a hypothetical core 11 disruptive accident for a sodium fast reactor?
12 MR. STUTZKE: Well, we'll get to that.
13 It's problematic; I understand.
14 MEMBER REMPE: Okay. Thank you.
15 MR. STUTZKE: Yes.
16 Let's get to slide 34.
17 This is my attempt to try to roll up the 18 review of uses of the PRA in a manner that makes them 19 a little bit more visible.
20 In the first column -- well, prior to 21 that, the thick horizontal line in the middle of the 22 table, everything above the line is a required use of 23 the PRA and everything below the line is an expected 24 use or a non-required use of the PRA. So, required 25 uses would include: submitting the description of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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85 1 PRA and its results; upgrading the PRA like that.
2 Moving over to the column under Part 50, 3 as I had said, there are no current requirements, but 4 they are being proposed in the Parts 50.52 lessons 5 learned rulemaking like that.
6 For Part 52 applicants, everybody is 7 required to submit a description, but the COL holders 8 are required to upgrade that PRA. And the required 9 use comes into the TMI requirements, as I've listed 10 there, 50.34(f)(1)(i) like that.
11 Moving down to the expected uses, again, 12 the search for severe accident vulnerabilities and 13 demonstration of the QHOs are met. Currently, 14 expectations in various Policy Statement, the use of 15 the PRA in design.
16 When you come over to what we're proposing 17 in Part 53, you would see everybody would be required 18 to submit a description of the PRA and its results, 19 and to upgrade that PRA, but now those expectations 20 have been moved into rule language itself, as 21 indicated by the arrows on the diagram. And that's 22 one of the significant differences between Part 53 and 23 what we currently have in 50 and 52, the codification 24 of uses of the PRA like that.
25 A little bit further down the page, of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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86 1 course, applicants are always free to voluntarily use 2 the PRA for a variety of purposes, as they see fit.
3 One thing that I haven't mentioned too 4 much are the staff leverages PRA information to focus 5 its review; to inform its development of ITAACs, COL 6 action items, the Design Reliability Assurance 7 Program, et cetera, et cetera. We also use the PRA to 8 support our oversight and inspections during 9 construction and operation like that.
10 So, with that --
11 CHAIR PETTI: Marty, this is Dave.
12 MR. STUTZKE: Yes?
13 CHAIR PETTI: I want to stop there. I 14 love this slide. Thank you.
15 MR. STUTZKE: Thank you.
16 CHAIR PETTI: This is the type of stuff 17 that really helps put it in context, because there's 18 lot of moving parts, as your previous slides have 19 showed.
20 I just had a question, two questions.
21 This idea of Commission expectations, if 22 you come in under Part 50 and Part 52 and don't meet 23 those expectations, applicants do have to, you know, 24 fix that, right, and deal with it, if the expectations 25 aren't met? Is that true?
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87 1 MR. STUTZKE: Yes. The burden would be on 2 them to show why they're not doing that.
3 CHAIR PETTI: Okay. And then, the thing 4 that strikes me, because we've talked a lot about this 5 previously in the language of Part 53, is this 6 evaluation of defense-in-depth. This is a real 7 benefit of the PRA, as a way to systematically look at 8 this. How is that done, if you're coming in it under 9 an advanced reactor and you want to come in under Part 10 50 or Part 52? Because, still, it's a fairly 11 important safety piece, right? I mean, the staff's 12 going to be looking at that.
13 MR. STUTZKE: Yes. I mean, if you're 14 coming in under 50 or 52, you know, defense-in-depth 15 philosophy is pretty well embedded in the various 16 prescriptive requirements, such as, throughout the 17 general design criteria or the advanced reactor design 18 criteria, the use of the single failure criteria, and 19 it's like that.
20 But that doesn't mean the staff will just 21 ignore that. They would also look at the design, 22 let's say, more or less, holistically, and say, gee, 23 there's something missing here.
24 CHAIR PETTI: So, it's based on 25 engineering judgment and sort of deterministic --
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88 1 MR. STUTZKE: Right. Yes, it has to be 2 informed by PRA results as well. And certainly, the 3 staff will look at whatever risk information is there.
4 CHAIR PETTI: Yes.
5 MEMBER BLEY: Marty, I'd jump in here. I 6 agree with Dave; I think one's very helpful. I think 7 the next few are especially helpful.
8 I want to go back to what Ron was asking 9 about another issue earlier. You guys have done a 10 great job pulling together a good historical record of 11 how we got here and where you think we're headed right 12 now.
13 Is there going to be a white paper or some 14 other document that goes with this at some point?
15 MR. STUTZKE: The short answer is yes.
16 I'll talk in a few more slides about our current plans 17 to develop the guidance to support these various 18 efforts.
19 MEMBER BLEY: Okay, good. Because this 20 is, for some people, in a way, this is kind of old 21 hat; for others, it's pretty new ideas. And I think 22 it will be important to have that guidance.
23 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, my comment, Dennis, is, 24 if I didn't have a white paper to write over the 25 holidays, I wouldn't know what to do with myself.
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89 1 (Laughter.)
2 MEMBER BLEY: Well, good. I'm glad you 3 have a project.
4 (Laughter.)
5 MR. STUTZKE: You know, last year, I was 6 writing the white paper on PRA acceptability about 7 this time.
8 Anyway, let's move on to slide 35, because 9 this is kind of the summation of this history lesson 10 that I presented throughout this morning.
11 The observation that you can be risk-12 informed, either by using a PRA, but also 13 qualitatively like that. I would point out PRA is not 14 currently used to support research and test reactors, 15 so the NPUFs and on-power production utilization 16 facilities. It's not to be found in the SRP for those 17 reactors and NUREG-1537.
18 And we've discussed it among DANU's staff.
19 Steve Lynch is our kind of management liaison with 20 this Graded PRA Working Group, and Steve is well-21 versed in RTR licensing and was the Project Manager of 22 the SHINE application for years. So, we have good 23 access that way.
24 Integrated Safety Analysis, ISAs are 25 required for certain licensees under Part 70. It's a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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90 1 risk-informed process, but doesn't require the 2 development of a PRA. And I've been in close contact 3 with Donnie Harrison over in NMSS about how they do 4 this. And as you'll see, I think there's a lot of 5 information they've developed that we should be able 6 to leverage like that.
7 And last, and not least, as I've showed 8 you on the previous table, the current preliminary 9 rule text for Part 53 builds on the traditional role 10 of PRA. It would put that into regulation, and it 11 adds certain requirements to use PRA in the enhanced 12 role.
13 So, rolling that up, it implies three 14 possible licensing pathways, what we'll call the 15 enhanced approach; the traditional PRA approach, and 16 then, a new approach, the technology-inclusive, risk-17 informed maximum accident, or TIRIMA, approach. And 18 I'll try to delineate those in the next slide here.
19 Let's go to slide 36, please.
20 So, this is a flowchart. I'd, again, 21 emphasize it is work-in-progress, as we try to think 22 through this. But, in boxes A and B are the 23 comprehensive search for initiators and definition of 24 event sequences. As Dennis had pointed out, those are 25 common to all the approaches. They're just absolutely NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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91 1 essential like this.
2 Entering box C on the diagram, there would 3 be entry conditions that say, well, maybe you could 4 use this TIRIMA approach or an applicant would elect 5 to, hey, I just want to do a PRA; in other words, 6 determining on which licensing pathway they're in.
7 Well, let's assume that they're going down 8 the PRA path. So, they would proceed from box C to 9 box K, and then, they would decide, do they want to 10 use enhanced PRA, yes or no? If yes, they go to box 11 L. If not, they could go to box M.
12 So, an example of the enhanced PRA 13 approach could be Part 53, or it could be an applicant 14 that comes in under Part 50 or 52, but they want to 15 implement LMP, something like that.
16 Otherwise, box M is representative of 17 situations where an applicant comes in under Part 52.
18 They want to do the normal PRA, but nothing beyond 19 that. So, it's like we always done for combined 20 licenses and design certifications, things like that.
21 But, returning to box C on this figure, 22 we're thinking very hard about considerations and 23 scoping assessments that would provide decision 24 guidance to applicants to decide if they want to 25 proceed down the TIRIMA pathway.
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92 1 But let's assume they decide to do that.
2 Then, boxes D, E, and F, the blue boxes, those are 3 steps out of NUREG-1537, which is the Standard Review 4 Plan for research and test reactors. So, there's a 5 process of selecting licensing basis events, doing the 6 consequence analysis, and culminating in an 7 identification of the maximum accident, which could 8 either be a maximum credible accident or a maximum 9 hypothetical accident, the difference being that the 10 MHA is not necessarily physically real.
11 MEMBER BLEY: So, for the people who have 12 been arguing at least for some of the smaller new 13 designs, we ought to be applying the research and test 14 reactor kind of approach. That's built in here in D, 15 E, and F?
16 MR. STUTZKE: Yes. One of the guiding 17 premises behind the development of this TIRIMA 18 approach was we should be able to license small power 19 reactors similar to the way we currently license 20 research and test reactors. That was kind of the 21 guiding premise going into the process.
22 MEMBER BLEY: Let me just think about this 23 a little out loud. If I were coming in with a new 24 reactor, and I thought, gee, we're probably bounded by 25 our consequences and don't need to do much, I could NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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93 1 take approach here, the TIRIMA approach, and if it 2 turns out well, everything's good. If not, I can go 3 back up and do something more thorough?
4 MR. STUTZKE: Correct. And that's the 5 purpose of the feedback loops coming out of boxes H 6 and I. So, the idea is that you would come down and 7 realize, whenever you license a research and test 8 reactor, there's not just the maximum accident, 9 whether it's an MCA or MHA. You're obliged by that 10 Standard Review Plan to look at a set of design basis 11 accidents, and from that, you pick the maximum one 12 like that.
13 But the idea here is, if I don't want to 14 do a PRA, can I use the source term from the maximum 15 accident to get an indication of what the risk ought 16 to be? So, I would insert that into some tool, such 17 as MAACS, and generate the conditional risk. And 18 then, I would say, well, I don't really know the 19 frequency of the accident, but, clearly, it's going to 20 be much lower than once per year, which is the normal 21 reactor trip frequency for LWRs. So, that would seem 22 to be reasonable.
23 And then, I'd demonstrate, I should be 24 able to demonstrate that I'd meet the QA chose. I 25 have done --
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94 1 MEMBER BLEY: But you can't just make up 2 a really simple maximum accident. You have to do A 3 and B to make sure you've thought of the things that 4 could lead to that maximum accident.
5 MR. STUTZKE: Oh, absolutely. And so, 6 what we are in the process of developing, you'll see 7 in the next couple of slides, is guidance on how to do 8 each one of these boxes. So, A and B, then you would 9 end with the set of initiators and event sequences, 10 and you begin, what we'll call, a funneling or a 11 winnowing process to get it down into a set of 12 licensing basis events that have similar 13 characteristics.
14 MEMBER BLEY: Hey, Marty?
15 MR. STUTZKE: Yes?
16 MEMBER BLEY: You mentioned that you have 17 Bob Budnitz on your team helping look at this. Have 18 you had interactions with potential applicants about 19 this? Or is this going to be all new to them today?
20 MR. STUTZKE: We have talked about this at 21 the November advanced reactor stakeholders' meeting.
22 But we've not had any subsequent interactions since 23 that time --
24 MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
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95 1 actually work.
2 MEMBER BLEY: And you haven't had any 3 hints of one of the outside organizations working on 4 guidance themselves and bringing it to you?
5 MR. STUTZKE: There was some discussion by 6 NEI that, you know, maybe they should develop guidance 7 that we could help them endorse. Our current plan is 8 to roll all this up into a white paper, let's say, by 9 the end of January to try to lay out the process and 10 the high-level thinking like that.
11 MEMBER BLEY: That's great, and I really 12 look forward to seeing that.
13 Go ahead.
14 MR. STUTZKE: Yes.
15 MEMBER REMPE: So, this is Joy.
16 And I think really helps. It answers the 17 question about they've got to look at a bunch of 18 challenges.
19 And then, I think you've answered my 20 question about the maximum or the core disruptive 21 accident. Because probably they would exceed the QHOs 22 and they would have to go back and do a PRA and show 23 that the frequency is low, is the answer to the 24 question, right?
25 MR. STUTZKE: Yes.
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96 1 MEMBER REMPE: Cool. Thank you.
2 MR. STUTZKE: I was going to say, I've 3 done a back-of-the-envelope calculation. I mean, this 4 is literally fiddling with equations on a piece of 5 paper, not computer simulation. That would suggest, 6 if you could meet the EPA PAGs with the maximum 7 accident -- so, that would imply there would be no 8 need to evacuate or to relocate population, which 9 gives me an idea of the dose -- and the exclusionary 10 radius was smaller than about 90 meters, you would be 11 able to demonstrate you had met the QHO.
12 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, Marty, this is Greg.
13 That kind of answered one of my questions.
14 We just went through the rulemaking on 5.160 for EP.
15 I assume that -- at least I'm keeping it in mind --
16 are they kind of monitoring what you're doing here to 17 help maybe answer some of the questions and comments 18 out of that rulemaking aspect?
19 MR. STUTZKE: Not yet, and it goes back to 20 the earlier concerns about getting coordinated among 21 all of these rulemakings. I appreciate that.
22 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, I think it's kind of 23 answering some questions. It may not be the final 24 answer, but it certainly is addressing some of the 25 issues.
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97 1 MR. STUTZKE: That's nice to hear. We're 2 trying to ask the right questions.
3 But, yes, so where we are now, moving over 4 to slide 37 --
5 CHAIR PETTI: Marty, just go back for a 6 minute.
7 MR. STUTZKE: Yes.
8 CHAIR PETTI: Just so I'm clear, so this 9 conservative risk estimate, you know, one takes the 10 doses, like you say, let's say the design can meet the 11 PAGs at a really tight site boundary. And they can be 12 somewhat -- well, cavalier is not the right word --
13 but generous in terms of frequency estimates because 14 the doses could be so far away from the regulatory 15 requirements. And just doing that sort of simple 16 math, there's a way to conservatively compare yourself 17 to QHOs?
18 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, with the caveat that 19 they need to -- or if they come in with an argument 20 that says, well, clearly, the maximum accident has a 21 frequency of 10 to the minus 2, I view that as they 22 need to justify that. Why 10 to the minus 2, or 10 to 23 the minus 3, or whatever? And that puts you back into 24 the PRA space.
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98 1 because that's the historical reactor trip frequency 2 for large LWRs. But anything that needs a tighter 3 frequency, you know, or a smaller frequency, in order 4 to lower that conservative risk estimate, you begin to 5 creep into the PRA space, which, then, leads me to 6 question, well, you ought to be inside the standard 7 and using all, meeting all the requirements like that.
8 So, the idea, again, behind box G is 9 merely to take the MHA or the MCA source term and 10 stick it in the MAACS, and look at the conditional 11 consequence. And if it's small enough, then you 12 should be allowed to proceed down the TIRIMA pathway.
13 Otherwise, you're going to have to develop the PRA.
14 And the purpose of the callout box, the 15 box C, is to generate some sort of guidance that 16 applicants could use to decide before they go down 17 this pathway, and they are surprised late in the 18 design process, oh, you know, I need a PRA, to be 19 aware of that up front.
20 CHAIR PETTI: Okay.
21 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Marty, this is 22 Vesna.
23 I could actually really struggle with this 24 better, you know, using any likelihood number 25 constitutes PRA. I mean, you know, a lot of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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99 1 initiators are not coming from PRAs. You know, the 2 earthquakes, the tsunamis, you know, those 3 frequencies. So, if you have an accident that you can 4 have these large releases that you are concerned about 5 only if you, for example, get hit by metal, you know, 6 that's not a PRA. That's a very low likelihood of 7 events, coming from the statistical, the events. Or 8 if you have a tsunami of 16-feet high.
9 So, I mean, my personal feeling is that 10 this part of the -- that's not really necessary that 11 it just has to be based on consequences. It can also 12 be based on likelihood, if you can show in the box A 13 and B that leading to those large releases, you need 14 some very unlikely combination of events. Obviously, 15 you don't need the PRA to prove that, you know.
16 MR. STUTZKE: Right. Yes, I understand 17 where you're coming from, and it's an active 18 discussion within our Working Group, not just to 19 demonstrate compliance with the QHOs, but look at box 20 I; do you need the PRA to do the SAMDA analysis? And 21 that's where we're finding we need to credit lower 22 frequency of the maximum accident, other than just 23 assuming once per year.
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100 1 accident occurred on every reactor trip? Would that 2 still be okay? And the answer is, well, if the 3 reactor is small enough, the consequences would be 4 very minimal, and you would be able to demonstrate you 5 meet the QHOs.
6 But I'll speak a little bit more about box 7 I and what we're doing in that area.
8 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: And one of the 9 things I was interested to see how would we do the 10 EENF (phonetic), you know, without the PRA inputs. We 11 have in here so many things which are very complex 12 because they're sort of a chicken-and-egg problem.
13 MR. STUTZKE: Right.
14 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: You know, you need 15 the licensing basis events to develop -- I mean, there 16 is so many things.
17 But you referenced that NUREG for the test 18 reactors, right, for that demonstration, how would 19 this, the blue boxes, be performed, right?
20 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, I will speak to that in 21 a couple of slides here.
22 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: All right.
23 MR. STUTZKE: Let's go to slide 37.
24 CHAIR PETTI: So, Marty, just one more 25 quick question on this white paper.
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101 1 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, sir.
2 CHAIR PETTI: I'm sure we want to write a 3 letter on this topic. I'm just trying to figure out, 4 would the white paper and our review of that white 5 paper, would it be the right time, you know, to come 6 back to us, so we can get a letter to you on that 7 topic, on this topic?
8 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, I think that would be 9 useful.
10 CHAIR PETTI: Okay. Just another on the 11 list.
12 (Laughter.)
13 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, let's move to slide 37, 14 please.
15 So, we're considering how to develop, what 16 we'll call, how to guidance to implement this 17 approach. And basically, all of the boxes on the 18 flowchart would have some sort of guidance developed 19 for it. To the extent possible, we would hope to 20 leverage existing guidance.
21 And I've listed some things there: the 22 ISA, Integrated Safety Assessment guidance document, 23 and 15.13, the SRP for fuel cycles, and 15.20, which 24 has very good guidance on process hazard assessment.
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102 1 of getting at the risk triplet. 15.37, the guidance 2 for research and test reactors. Another valuable 3 source would be OSHA regulations, 29 CFR 1910. There 4 is a whole set of handbooks and guidance on how to do 5 process hazard analysis, things like that.
6 I've listed this EPRI Topical Report, 7 Technical Report -- excuse me -- that they developed.
8 This one was developed by Vanderbilt University, and 9 it implements process hazard assessment for the molten 10 salt reactor experiment, as kind of beginning steps of 11 doing a PRA. It's part of their LMP pilot exercise 12 like that.
13 But the type of guidance that I'm 14 envisioning for this, for example, boxes A and B, 15 there are a number of techniques, and I'll try to 16 review them in the next slide. But we're not writing 17 a textbook on how to do this. Rather, we would 18 provide guidance that would contain pointers to 19 various references and authorities that could be used, 20 things like that.
21 Concerning box D and E, and primarily, box 22 D, the licensing basis event selection, let's assume 23 you don't have a PRA. What do you do? Well, we've 24 looked at the SRP for commercial reactors, NUREG-0800, 25 and the SRP for RTRs in 1537. And it is, in my NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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103 1 personal opinion, a little less than satisfying. They 2 talk about grouping accidents by their frequency and 3 by their type, you know, such as increase in heat 4 removal, decrease in heat removal, broad categories.
5 So, some high-level concepts there, and 6 then, they present the answer. For PWRs, this is the 7 list of licensing basis events. For BWRs, this is the 8 list. For certain types of RTRs, this is the list.
9 And it's as if the staff had gone through that 10 exercise and made that conclusion.
11 What we're trying to do here is, they're 12 recognizing that we need to address all types of non-13 LWRs. We're trying to put that burden onto the 14 applicant and provide appropriate high-level guidance 15 on how to do that, but more definitive than what you 16 will find currently in any of the existing SRPs. So, 17 it's a real challenge. It's a real challenge.
18 Slide 38.
19 A second thought on developing guidance.
20 In general, thoughts that we had had was this 21 admonition to start with a blank piece of paper, no 22 preconceived lists of design basis accidents or 23 scenarios, anything like that.
24 We're currently thinking you need to use 25 a combination of inductive and deductive methods. In NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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104 1 fact, process hazard analysis is a collection of 2 methods such as HAZOP and failure modes and effects 3 analysis, things like that. On the deductive side, 4 things like master logic diagrams, you know, sequence 5 diagrams, fault trees, event trees, all of that.
6 And again, that's why our guidance, right 7 now, I'm envisioning it as some high-level things with 8 pointers to various references, rather than this kind 9 of comprehensive textbook on how to do it.
10 The third sub-bullet there, when you 11 search, how do you know you've done enough looking?
12 How do you know you're finished? And there ought to 13 be some sort of stopping criteria.
14 What I have in mind is, there is a very 15 old paper that was written by a guy named Clifford 16 Beck back in the late '50s, and he talked about 17 identifying design basis accidents by postulating or 18 initiator and one or two subsequent failures. And his 19 conclusion was that doesn't really work very well 20 because you don't know that the failures are truly 21 independent of each other.
22 But it goes back to the original idea, 23 gee, if I can just add, you know, if I'm looking at 24 cut sets with single events, your double events, your 25 triple events, maybe that's some way to get your arms NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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105 1 around the problem.
2 The fourth bullet is the old admonition:
3 focus on how it actually works, not how it's supposed 4 to work. In other words, don't say oh, that's 5 incredible, that will never happen, because it 6 probably will.
7 Guidance on how to consolidate and group 8 similar items. What does it mean they have similar 9 characteristics?
10 And again, admonition, be very careful 11 when screening something out with the frequency 12 arguments or some sort of qualitative things.
13 MEMBER BLEY: Hey, Marty?
14 MR. STUTZKE: Yes?
15 MEMBER BLEY: This sounds so trivial, it 16 doesn't seem like it's worthwhile, but I assure it is.
17 If you put on there try to break the system, think how 18 I could sabotage or break this system, what would I 19 need to do, that flip of approaching the problem can 20 often find you things that you hadn't thought about.
21 MR. STUTZKE: Oh, absolutely.
22 MEMBER HALNON: So, Marty, this is Greg.
23 That last bullet there under initial 24 thoughts, I think, isn't that the -- I mean, we're all 25 pretty good at knowing how the plant works and how NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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106 1 design actually works, and all that grouping of items.
2 But that screening criteria is where the industry is 3 really driving for some kind of criteria, so that it's 4 not just everything is considered and nothing is 5 screened out discussion. So, I would just be very 6 focused on that screening criteria because I think 7 that's really the hitch pin in all this stuff.
8 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, I personally appreciate 9 that. I mean, I've got a pretty good history on the 10 definition of credible accidents that goes way back to 11 the '50s, but it is problematic when you begin screen 12 things away on frequency, and that frequency to say 13 appropriately or carefully estimated. So, it's an 14 open item, and I appreciate the sensitivity to that.
15 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, we went through that 16 with the 50.160, on what is a cutoff and what kind of 17 frequencies are we looking at. So, that was very keen 18 on the designer's list of concerns about how to get to 19 that source term and site boundaries.
20 MR. STUTZKE: Yes. Yes. Yes, I'm well 21 aware of it, but I can't offer you an answer right 22 now.
23 So, our guidance would, also, then, have 24 to address these process-related things. You know, we 25 need to have a multidisciplinary team looking at the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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107 1 issue, what we'll call an independent review, as 2 opposed to a peer review, and a peer review in the 3 context of the standard; get some fresh eyes looking 4 on it like that. The development of documentation, 5 again, that's not just -- we want to know or think 6 it's important to capture how you get to the final 7 answer. But I'm characterizing that as tell the story 8 in capturing the assumptions and the various decisions 9 that were made along the way, rather than as a fait 10 accompli, here's my list of design basis events.
11 So, slide 39.
12 This is a preliminary flowchart we've 13 worked out on the initiating event scenario search 14 like this, where we would identify initiating events 15 using well-established inductive and deductive 16 methods. As I've mentioned before, the use of HAZOP, 17 FMEA, master logic diagram, fault tree analysis, 18 human-induced events. You know, there's certainly 19 well-established human reliability analysis techniques 20 that could be used to go after that. Bouncing them 21 against operating experience to look for gaps or 22 anything that you may have missed, and then, begin 23 winnowing it down to a final set of initiating events.
24 Then, on to a scenario delineation and categorization 25 sort of process like that.
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108 1 MEMBER BLEY: Hey, Marty?
2 MR. STUTZKE: Yes?
3 MEMBER BLEY: Your step two, verification 4 against operating experience, that also includes 5 looking at the list of initiating events that were 6 developed for other reactor technologies?
7 MR. STUTZKE: Yes.
8 MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
9 MR. STUTZKE: But the crucial step is we 10 want you to do step one with a blank piece of paper, 11 and then, use step two to see that you got there. You 12 know, you didn't miss anything.
13 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. I like that, and some 14 others I think do, too.
15 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, don't reverse the 16 steps, even though it's hard, you know, if they were 17 to hire like you, Dennis or me, I mean, we already 18 know step two. But you have to try to approach it 19 with an open mind. As you say --
20 MEMBER BLEY: Right.
21 MR. STUTZKE: -- how can I break this 22 thing?
23 So, slide 40, please.
24 So, this is our preliminary outline for 25 how to go after the comprehensive search for NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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109 1 initiating events just as an outline. We're starting 2 to write text, to begin to fill out each one of these 3 points like that, with the caveat this may not work, 4 but we may shuffle the outline around a little bit.
5 We're trying to show you the comprehensive nature of 6 what we're looking at here.
7 Slide 41.
8 MEMBER BALLINGER: This is Ron. Can we go 9 back to that one slide? Back one?
10 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, please.
11 MEMBER BALLINGER: What I don't see here 12 is a section on the events that were not included. I 13 recently participated in a review, and anybody that 14 wanted to delete something, an event or a process or 15 a failure mode, had to sit there and defend why you 16 needed to eliminate that event.
17 So, it would be curious to have people go 18 through the events that are, obviously, not stupid, I 19 guess, but the events that were not considered and 20 why.
21 MR. STUTZKE: I like that. That's good.
22 I appreciate that.
23 MEMBER BALLINGER: It's just the mere 24 discussion of that sometimes makes a big difference.
25 MR. STUTZKE: Okay, I've got a note.
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110 1 Thank you.
2 MEMBER BALLINGER: Okay.
3 MR. STUTZKE: Okay. Slide 41, where we're 4 headed and the path forward.
5 We need to develop a way to incorporate 6 this TIRIMA approach into regulation, so that it could 7 be used. And the current thought is it could, for 8 lack of a better term, piggyback onto the 9 deterministic traditional option that was presented to 10 you all earlier, what we call Tip 50 or Part 5X. And 11 that is the more technology-inclusive Part 50 that 12 would allow use of, for example, IAEA SSR 2/1, like 13 that.
14 But what I have in mind is something as 15 simple as saying, instead of a requirement to develop 16 a PRA, then have a requirement to develop a risk 17 assessment. And that may sufficient to open the door.
18 Again, we have not written any preliminary rule text 19 or agreed upon, actually, how to go about that.
20 The other thing that that points to is, 21 where will Tip 50 ultimately end up in regulation?
22 Should it be under Part 50? Should it be in Part 53, 23 et cetera, et cetera? And these are very complicated, 24 technical issues; in other words, how we structure the 25 rule language to allow them. There are also very NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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111 1 complicated budget and schedule constraints that we're 2 laboring under like that. So, that decision will be 3 made in the near future, to my understanding, like 4 that.
5 The second bullet is pointing out an 6 order, actively developing the guidance to try to 7 implement this approach, and as I pointed out before, 8 lever whatever existing guidance we can find out 9 there.
10 And one thing I should amplify: it's not 11 just a matter of listing, gee, the fault tree 12 handbook, but we need to look at all of these things 13 and say, gee, is it still relevant; is it still 14 useful? Or do we not want to recommend it like that?
15 I had showed you the outline of the 16 guidance on how to search for the initiators, and we 17 need to develop for the rest of the entire guidance 18 document.
19 But there are three very challenging 20 technical issues that are still floating around there.
21 One is the technology-inclusive definition 22 of severe accident, and about working --
23 MEMBER BLEY: But -- oh, I'm sorry.
24 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, I'm working with Bob 25 Budnitz on how to do that.
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112 1 MEMBER BLEY: Your large release 2 frequencies seem a good place to start. I don't know 3 if that's where you are or if you're somewhere else.
4 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, we're somewhere else.
5 It's real curious, and one thing I'm glad you reminded 6 me, Dennis, was, do you recall back -- or you may 7 recall back in the early 1970s there was a tremendous 8 concern with anticipated transients without SCRAM.
9 MEMBER BLEY: Absolutely, yes.
10 MR. STUTZKE: And the staff wrote, at the 11 time this AEC staff, the Atomic Energy Commission 12 staff, wrote WASH-1240 on ways to deal with that ATWS 13 problem. And if you go in there, you'll find out they 14 had proposed that the frequency of exceeding the Part 15 100 limits should be less than 10 to the minus 6 per 16 year, coincidentally, the large release frequency 17 target that we currently use. So, that's in there, 18 that we're going with the definition of severe 19 accidents is you need to replace severe damage to the 20 core with something like severe damage to the machine, 21 broaden that out a little bit.
22 Another possibility that we uncovered 23 recently was from the UK regulator, where they talk 24 about the unplanned movement of radioactive material.
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113 1 multiple barrier and getting out into the environment.
2 And we'll have to have a good look at that one like 3 that.
4 MEMBER BLEY: Yes, this building it on 5 barriers kind of gets to your other one about severe 6 damage to the machine. If your barriers are all 7 intact, maybe you're okay. But if you've penetrated 8 some of them, you're more vulnerable. That seems a 9 good place to be working.
10 MR. STUTZKE: Yes.
11 CHAIR PETTI: And that's the primary 12 safety function, right, in Part 53?
13 MR. STUTZKE: Yes.
14 CHAIR PETTI: So, looking at it that way -
15 -
16 MR. STUTZKE: The problem is when you get 17 barriers and you mix it up with the idea of functional 18 containment. We're not clear yet on our thinking 19 about how that would all work like that.
20 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Well, in that case, 21 though, Marty, like you mentioned the HTGR. I mean, 22 the current definition probably works, because that 23 would be severe core damage, if you had large-scale 24 release of fission products on the TRISO particles.
25 That, effectively, is core damage.
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114 1 But I think what Dennis said is probably 2 -- you know, it's a combination of that and the 3 fission product barriers, especially for a liquid-4 fueled system.
5 MR. STUTZKE: That's problematic. Molten 6 salt reactors.
7 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes.
8 MR. STUTZKE: Yes.
9 So, the second sub-bullet there, again, I 10 had mentioned it before with that callout box to step 11 C on my figure, what we'll call guidance to applicants 12 to help them decide up front if TIRIMA will ever be 13 useful to them, or they should start right away 14 developing their PRA like that.
15 The third item on use of TIRIMA to support 16 SAMDA. The current way that we do SAMDA -- so, that's 17 severe accident mitigation design alternatives -- this 18 is part of the environmental review, not the safety 19 review, of the reactor. And SAMDA analyses are done 20 using cost-benefit studies. So, they tend to follow 21 the regulatory analysis guidance in NUREG/BR-0058, 22 which is a process where you go through various 23 alternatives and you, basically, monetize the risk-24 benefit achieved, and then, compare that to the price 25 or the cost of implementing that type of a fix.
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115 1 There's also NEI 05-01 that provides the process.
2 The challenge is, whenever you look at how 3 SAMDA is done, it implies you need a full Level 3 PRA.
4 So, in other words, you would have all of your event 5 sequences delineated with frequencies on them. You 6 would, then, have consequence evaluations using MAACS, 7 or something like this.
8 And your goal is to calculate conditional 9 risks, such as the population dose, person-rem per 10 event or offsite economic consequences, monetized 11 dollars. So, for property damage, the cost of 12 evacuation/relocation. Monetization of the onsite 13 worker risk, and things like replacement or cleanup of 14 the facility; replacement power costs, et cetera, et 15 cetera.
16 So, that whole framework exists, and 17 that's all well and good. But if you're trying to do 18 something like this TIRIMA approach, where you don't 19 have the benefit of all of the sequences of a PRA, and 20 all of the consequences, the question that arises is, 21 can you use the MHA or the MCA to bound it somehow and 22 make an argument that says up front we don't think 23 anything will ever prove to be cost-beneficial. So 24 we've been struggling with that for the last couple of 25 weeks. And I just wanted to tell you that's where we NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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116 1 stand right now.
2 So, I believe that concludes all of my 3 viewgraphs.
4 CHAIR PETTI: Okay. Thanks, Marty.
5 I want to say that this has been a really 6 informative set of slides. I'd just say the fog is 7 lifting, at least in my brain, on some of the 8 intersections of things and how some of the pieces fit 9 together.
10 Yes, you've still got some guidance that 11 has to be developed, but I like the structure; I like 12 the logic behind it. So, we'll look forward to the 13 white paper for sure.
14 Members, any other comments?
15 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Well, this is Vesna.
16 Me, too. Actually, I think that this is 17 a big step really forward. I didn't like how the 18 structures were getting along together. And now, 19 Marty, that you consider the regulation requires risk 20 assessment, that is, the PRA assessment, I think 21 that's a wonderful step. That's exactly what I think 22 you should be required.
23 I had a really strong opinion from the 24 beginning. And I think that this would be better if 25 the QHO are bounded. You know, they have been NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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117 1 introduced in the '80s, when we know very little. You 2 know, the PRAs were not really developed yet. There 3 was not too much experience in the industry.
4 And I thought of Virginia, since they're 5 trying to say we're going to build industry, which is 6 not going to present a high edition of this 7 interpolation. But now, this is like, you know, the 8 forty years, fifty years later. We have R&D. We have 9 experience with numerous PRAs. We saw how these risk 10 measures are coming, and what value.
11 We had the accidents. We have multiple 12 core damages. It depends on how you count Fukushima.
13 We had three big accidents. We can see in those 14 accidents that one of those accidents, Three Mile 15 Island, was without large release. And we can see 16 from that accident the connecting core damage 17 frequency. It's really a dubious proposition.
18 The second thing we also saw, the large 19 releases, and what is in the dose is like conditional 20 probability, giving these large releases of 21 fatalities. Early fatalities is also, you know, a 22 questionable proposition.
23 So, I think, given the experience with the 24 PRAs -- no, first, given the experience in the 25 industry, and given the experience with the PRAs, we NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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118 1 can say goodbye to clear goals in this moment, and 2 based on the dose experience proposed, the safety goal 3 is some sort of release. And what release is it? Is 4 it in dose? And what it is with associated frequency 5 or with the 10 to the minus 6?
6 So, we can say we want the new generation 7 of the nuclear plants to represent less risk than the 8 coolant or equal. I know that there is a lot of 9 discussion of they should be equal or smaller.
10 So, therefore, I think that, actually, 11 being brave enough to come up with some new safety 12 measures for the new generation will make this, you 13 know, all of these pieces easier falling in the place.
14 This is just my opinion.
15 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, I appreciate that. And 16 I'll quip, I don't think I can do that and meet Bob 17 Beall's schedule.
18 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: In my opinion, if 19 you have, like you're saying that releases of this 20 magnitude, then how's he going to define these 21 magnitude, this challenge? But the releases of this 22 magnitude should be less than 10 to the minus 6 or 10 23 to the minus 7, or whatever. And the frequency is 24 also something to be decided. That is much easier to 25 determine how to choose that, how to prove the plan to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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119 1 meet that safety goal without always the PRA, I mean, 2 instead of saying we are meeting that QHO, you know.
3 You know, we have so many of these 4 discussions, and now, everybody knows what is QHO.
5 So, you can go back to the PRA practitioners, and now 6 that they really know what this core damage frequency, 7 the large releases were based on this. So, if you 8 define some large release and use that as a safety 9 measure, it makes things much simpler and much less 10 complex.
11 MR. STUTZKE: Yes. Thank you.
12 Any other question?
13 CHAIR PETTI: Yes, other comments, 14 Members?
15 Wow. Okay.
16 So, Derek, do you want to wait until the 17 very end of today to do public comment or public 18 comment for a session?
19 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: And Dave? Dave?
20 CHAIR PETTI: Yes?
21 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Sorry, I just forget 22 to mention something, which I was also curious. There 23 was a lot of questions, I think like 14 questions were 24 imposed for public comments in the last year. And 25 there was a number of public comments. So, was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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120 1 wondering, the Working Group took a position on some 2 of those questions in this moment, actually? Or are 3 those still in consideration? Are they still floating 4 around?
5 Like, for example, on the score for the QA 6 or there is numerous points of those questions. I was 7 just curious to ask, did the Working Group, on 53, 8 that accepted some of the responses in this moment, or 9 this is still in floatation?
10 MR. STUTZKE: It's still under 11 consideration. We haven't made any firm decisions 12 yet.
13 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Okay. Thanks.
14 MR. WIDMAYER: Hey, Dave, it's Derek.
15 I think you could take advantage of the 16 time right now to get public comments just on this 17 particular part of the meeting.
18 CHAIR PETTI: Okay. I see Vicki's 19 unmuted. Vicki, did you have a comment?
20 MEMBER BIER: No. Sorry, I just forgot.
21 CHAIR PETTI: Okay. Okay.
22 Okay. So, let's see if there's any 23 members of the public that want to make a comment on 24 what we've heard this morning. *6 to unmute your 25 line. Tell us who you are and your comment.
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121 1 MR. BUDNITZ: This is Bob Budnitz. Can I 2 make a comment? Can you hear me?
3 CHAIR PETTI: Yes. Sure, Bob.
4 MR. BUDNITZ: Now, Marty pointed out that 5 I've been a consultant to his small staff Working 6 Group on this TIRIMA approach and the graded PRA. But 7 my comment is not related to that. This is I'm a 8 member of the public. Okay? I just want to make that 9 disclaimer.
10 The very first box in Marty's box slide --
11 and you don't have to go back to it because we all 12 understand it -- it begins by asking the designer to 13 do a comprehensive, complete search to identify all of 14 the initiating events. You understand that. And 15 that's for sure; you've got to do that. You can't get 16 into the rest of it without that.
17 And that search is something that the 18 designer has to do, especially if it's a reactor whose 19 design is not something that the whole community is 20 familiar with, I mean, as opposed to LWRs, you know, 21 some new design. They have to do that.
22 And I'm worried about how comprehensive 23 that can be and how much review it will get, both by 24 other members of the larger nuclear engineering 25 community -- we're talking about around the world --
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122 1 and then, the staff.
2 And I have a piece of history that will 3 explain my worry. I want you to imagine it's 1975 and 4 Rasmussen and Levine, and their colleagues, published 5 WASH-1400. And in WASH-1400, they identified an event 6 which people had known about, but which had been 7 dismissed. It was the interfacing systems LOCA. We 8 called it Event V, interfacing systems LOCA.
9 And I want to remind you of something.
10 When WASH-1400 was published, there were a couple of 11 hundred reactors, water reactors, running around the 12 world, operating in many different countries, and we 13 had 50 or 60 of them in the U.S. And all of them had 14 been running for a long time at that time, 20 years, 15 with a lot of experience. And no one had paid 16 attention to interfacing systems LOCA in the way we 17 now understand it needed to be attended to.
18 So, I want to ask the question, going 19 back, how in the world did the whole community all 20 around the world get into 200 reactors, whatever it 21 was that was running, and a bunch of years, and the 22 importance of that event -- they knew about it, but 23 they dismissed it -- had not been recognized?
24 Now that's a humbling experience. Because 25 now we take one of these new reactors from one of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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123 1 these unusual designs, and somebody might have run one 2 month someplace, and no one's really designed them and 3 run them for any length of time. How are we going to 4 get the confidence that all of those things have been 5 identified that are going to be important?
6 It seems to me that that's a major -- I'm 7 talking now as a member of public, not as a young 8 consultant to the staff -- it seems to me that a major 9 challenge that we, the nuclear engineering community, 10 the power reactor community around the world, has is 11 to ask ourselves how that confidence can be gained.
12 And the stuff that I was hearing in the 13 plans today, and not just here -- I've heard them from 14 the industry, too -- don't give me confidence that 15 there will be enough outside review, enough 16 comprehensive looking, enough imaginative work done, 17 to give people confidence that we've identified those 18 things. That troubles me.
19 And this whole process, the whole Part 53 20 process, not just this piece, is predicated on the 21 confidence that the analog of Event V, the neutral 22 thing, will have been identified and its importance 23 understood.
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124 1 one? I'll just leave you with that thought.
2 MEMBER BLEY: You brought up something 3 really interesting, Bob. I think one thing is, if we 4 look at the earliest designs and the reviews that went 5 on then, we have a lot more structured approach and 6 thinking about how things can go wrong than we really 7 had back then.
8 On the other hand, this idea of getting 9 broad international review for different types of 10 reactors on the things that can go wrong is -- it's 11 one I'm not sure anybody has been thinking hard about.
12 You know, there's no conferences on what can go wrong 13 in all these new designs that I've seen, and maybe 14 that's something we all ought to think about.
15 CHAIR PETTI: Good discussion.
16 Anybody else?
17 Okay. Well, then, I think we'll end this 18 part of our Part 53 discussion 10 minutes early.
19 We'll have lunch.
20 So, let's see, we'll come back at --
21 MEMBER BLEY: Dave, did you check and see 22 if you had any more public comments? Bob came in 23 and --
24 CHAIR PETTI: Yes, I thought I did.
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125 1 more comments?
2 MEMBER BLEY: Sorry to interrupt you. Go 3 ahead.
4 CHAIR PETTI: Okay. Not hearing any, 5 we'll come back to some of this, I think, when we hear 6 NEI's comments and USNIC's comments tomorrow 7 afternoon.
8 So, with that, let's go into recess and 9 come back at two o'clock Eastern time.
10 Thank you all.
11 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 12 off the record at 12:50 p.m. and resumed at 2:00 p.m.)
13 CHAIR PETTI: Welcome back, everybody, 14 from lunch. We're ready to resume the meeting.
15 Bill, are you taking over?
16 MR. RECKLEY: Yes, thanks, Dave.
17 CHAIR PETTI: Okay.
18 MR. RECKLEY: This is Bill Reckley. I 19 just have a few slides and then I'll turn it over to 20 Jesse Seymour to talk about the bulk of what we're 21 going to talk about today.
22 So, Liz, if you can go to 45.
23 Basically I was just going to refresh 24 people's memories on the broader requirements that we 25 included in Subpart F. And going back to our standard NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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126 1 slide that Bob shared this morning, we have organized 2 Part 53 into sub parts that generally align with the 3 life cycle of the facility. In Subpart F are the 4 requirements for operations.
5 And so the general layout of Subpart F is 6 into three primary segments. And I think I mentioned 7 last time the way I think about it is plant, people, 8 and programs. And so the plant is those things like 9 maintaining the capabilities and the availability of 10 structures, systems, and components, and this includes 11 technical specifications for safety-related equipment, 12 reliability assurance programs for non-safety-related 13 equipment that warrants special treatment. The 14 equivalent of the maintenance rule from Part 50 would 15 be in that part associated with the plant.
16 Then the second segment that we're going 17 to talk -- that we talked about at the last 18 Subcommittee meeting; we're going to continue that 19 discussion today, is on staffing and training.
20 And then the third segment of the 21 requirements for operations goes to programs, and 22 those are the things that -- actually if we just go to 23 the next slide, slide 46 -- are necessary to make sure 24 that the equipment and people are supported by the 25 broader organization and procedures and so forth NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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127 1 associated with key areas such as radiation 2 protection, emergency preparedness, security, those 3 things that are typically addressed by major programs 4 associated with an operating facility.
5 So that's kind of really all I wanted to 6 go over as a refresher before turning it over to Jesse 7 on the next slide which will start really a 8 continuation of the discussion that we had at the last 9 Subcommittee meeting.
10 So, Jesse?
11 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay. Thank you.
12 Yes, so my name is Jesse Seymour. And 13 just a quick background: I'm a human factors 14 technical reviewer and operator licensing examiner in 15 the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. And 16 as I mentioned during the last meeting, I'm one of the 17 staff members who has been working on developing the 18 preliminary proposed rule language that we discussed 19 at the earlier meeting, as well as the related white 20 paper that preceded that.
21 And today's presentation will be a 22 continuation of my earlier one given last month on 23 that preliminary proposed rule language, specifically 24 the language that covered their staff and training 25 personnel qualifications and human factors engineering NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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128 1 requirements. But the particular focus today will be 2 on topics that were provided by the Committee for 3 further discussion.
4 Since these topics build upon aspects of 5 the preliminary rule language that was presented last 6 month, what I'd like to do is begin the discussion of 7 each topic with a very brief recap of what the 8 preliminary rule language presently contains within 9 that area simply as a means of establishing context 10 and bridging the discussion to our earlier one. And 11 then following that short recap I'll provide material 12 is that is specific to the Committee's questions 13 within those areas.
14 I'll be going over the topics in the order 15 that's show on the slides, so we'll begin with the 16 shift technical advisor discussion area followed by 17 load following then certified operator considerations, 18 simulators and lastly training program review 19 guidance.
20 If we could go to the next slide, please?
21 Okay. So I'll begin the discussion of the shift 22 technical advisor topic with a short recap of the 23 preliminary requirements for staffing plans. And as 24 I discussed during the last meeting, 53.753(f) would 25 require a staffing plan describing the numbers and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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129 1 positions of licensed or certified operators.
2 Facilities requiring licensed operators, owing to the 3 greater operator role in safety at such facilities, 4 would also need to describe how the proposed staffing 5 would provide assurance that plant safety functions 6 can be maintained using human factors engineering 7 analyses and assessments.
8 So over the next few slides what I'll be 9 discussing are a few different potential approaches to 10 STAs out of Part 53, but the requirements that I'm 11 discussing here at the moment will factor centrally 12 into each one of those different approaches.
13 The Committee asked for an explanation on 14 the benefit of having a blanket elimination of the STA 15 under Part 5 versus having a licensee demonstrate that 16 STA functions are instead adequately addressed. At a 17 high level what we've considered are multiple 18 approaches in this area and at present we feel that 19 more than one option is technically justifiable while 20 all of the options do afford enhanced flexibility over 21 the current status quo.
22 And just to take a step back and be frank, 23 I think that -- I think we can make a case as to why 24 the STA may be unnecessary within a certain context, 25 but I think even when we do that we still have a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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130 1 remaining question regarding whether elimination is 2 prudent. And I think there is a distinction there.
3 And I think that it's an offshoot of the consequence 4 of the nature of this relatively unique advisory role 5 and I think more than anything else it serves to 6 highlight what ultimately the treatment of the STA 7 under Part 53 will entail matters of policy.
8 So I'd like to emphasize that we as the 9 staff are receptive to feedback from this Committee 10 regarding the best approach to take with this 11 rulemaking and we value the Committee's expertise. So 12 in light of that I'd like to go through and describe 13 three separate approaches beginning with what is 14 currently included within the preliminary rule 15 language.
16 If we can move onto the next slide, 17 please? Okay. So as discussed previously the staff 18 had preliminarily proposed not to require the STA 19 position for Part 53 applicants. In arriving at this 20 preliminary stance our thinking was partly informed by 21 the Commission's 1985 policy statement on engineering 22 expertise on shift which stated that the STA 23 requirement was an interim measure until goals and 24 included upgrading HSIs and operator training were 25 achieved.
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131 1 In considering the state of those goals 2 within the context of Part 53 there were several key 3 attributes of the preliminary rule that served to 4 shape our thinking regarding why a blanket elimination 5 of the STA would be justified within this Part 53 6 framework. And on the next slide I'll go ahead and 7 provide an overview of what those points were.
8 If we can move onto the next slide, 9 please? Okay. So and again we're talking about this 10 first alternative of a blanket elimination of the STA, 11 and this slide will go through some of that background 12 information regarding that point.
13 So first, Part 53 would establish licensed 14 operator training requirements or the operator 15 knowledge and abilities needed to maintain plant 16 safety functions. Building upon that regulatory basis 17 we intend that the Part 53 Examination Program would 18 have review criteria associated with it that would 19 confirm that testing of reactor theory, 20 thermodynamics, systems, and emergency operations were 21 required within the scope of licensing processes.
22 Second, Part 53 would require that state-23 of-the-art and human factors engineering would be 24 applied in all settings where operators are fulfilling 25 plant safety functions including both inside and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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132 1 beyond control rooms. Additionally, specific design 2 requirements for human system interfaces would require 3 that operators be provided with information on safety 4 parameters, safety system status, important component 5 status, and core damage states.
6 Third, proposed staffing plans for 7 facilities with licensed operators would need to be 8 supported with HFE-based analyses and assessments that 9 were sufficient to demonstrate how licensed operator 10 staffing levels would maintain safety functions and 11 support full range of tasks needed for safety 12 irrespective of the presence of an STA within the 13 staffing model.
14 And finally more broadly speaking with 15 regards to Part 53, Part 53 codifies defense-in-depth 16 principles under 53.250 and requires in part that the 17 use of defense-in-depth compensate for uncertainties 18 in both the state of knowledge and modeling 19 capabilities as well as in areas of personal 20 reliability and performance. In this regard we can 21 consider that having an STA within a staffing model 22 could potentially be one such defense-in-depth 23 measure, but there would be others and ultimately Part 24 53 would mandate that some degree of acceptable 25 measures be applied.
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133 1 If we could move onto the next slide, 2 please? Okay. So in this slide we present an 3 alternative. And so setting aside our discussion that 4 we just had which illustrated one approach for blanket 5 elimination, now what we're going to look at would be 6 a case-by-case treatment.
7 So now as an alternative to a blanket 8 elimination of the STA under Part 53 we've also 9 considered the alternative of codification of an STA 10 staffing requirement with a provision for justifying 11 case-by-case position omission built into the rule.
12 In such an approach the following definition or one 13 similar to it would be provided within 53.750(b),
14 which is a section where we currently have definitions 15 that are very specific to Subpart F.
16 And the definition that we propose would 17 read along the lines of shift technical advisor means 18 an individual possessing at least a bachelor in 19 physical science engineering or engineering 20 technology, or alternately a PE license, whose 21 function is to provide independent on-shift 22 engineering expertise and accident assessment 23 technical advice for licensed operators in nuclear 24 plants.
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134 1 aforementioned staffing plan requirement that we 2 discussed for 53.753(f) would be modified, and what we 3 would do is include the following additional 4 requirements for plants that require licensed operator 5 staffing. So they would be required to provide a 6 description of how the STA position as defined by the 7 definition we just went through will be implemented 8 during all plant conditions other than cold shutdown 9 or refueling while shutdown, or alternately shall 10 provide a justification for omission of the STA 11 position. That is supported by relevant human factors 12 engineering-based analysis and assessments.
13 So the justification for the omission of 14 the STA would be described in high-level language 15 within the rule, but at the level of guidance we 16 envision that the general criteria associated with 17 reviewing such a request would include considering 18 several factors in aggregate that go above and beyond 19 just those general criteria. And these factors would 20 likely include -- and again this is an illustrative 21 list. This is what we would have in mind for that 22 type of guidance. These factors would likely include 23 licensed operator qualification training, human system 24 interfaces, design features, factors associated with 25 the degree of reliance on human actions for safety, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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135 1 and automated capabilities specifically as they supply 2 additional defense-in-depth, and also serve to reduce 3 workload.
4 So again, here we have another alternative 5 that we've thought through, another way that we feel 6 could be an acceptable approach here where in lieu of 7 a blanket elimination of the STA under Part 53. The 8 presumption would initially be that you require the 9 STA until you can prove otherwise, but in doing this 10 what we think we would ultimately achieve is we would 11 provide clarity regarding the ST requirement. It 12 would be very explicit that you need to have the STA 13 unless you go through a relatively well-structured 14 process for justifying its absence.
15 And if we could move onto the next slide, 16 please? Okay. So on this slide we provide a third 17 route. And again this one is a bit more generic in 18 nature than the previous two, but what this third 19 track would potentially entail is that we would 20 instead require that the proposed staffing plans that 21 we discussed would need to account for the means by 22 which on-shift engineering expertise would be 23 provided.
24 And such an approach would likely be 25 accomplished by modifying the requirements of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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136 1 53.753(f) that we discussed such that the staffing 2 plans that were submitted would need to describe both 3 how the numbers and positions of licensed operators 4 provide assurance that plant safety functions can be 5 maintained as well as how on-shift engineering 6 expertise would be provided the down shift crew. And 7 again what this would do is allow for some flexibility 8 in the mechanism by which that is achieved. It may 9 not being a distinct individual. It could be a 10 combination of experience and training requirements 11 that are committed to and so forth. But again, just 12 a third alternative that's there.
13 And so in light of those three 14 alternatives what I'd like to emphasize is that our 15 current perspective remains that any such STA position 16 requirement would only apply to plants that require 17 licensed operators. So again, when we talk about 18 codification of the STA requirement, we envision that 19 as still only applying to a plant that requires 20 licensed operators. And that perspective is based on 21 our current approach and what that centers around is 22 the fact that we have technological criteria that 23 we've proposed under 53.755(b) for determining which 24 plants do and potentially do not require licensed 25 operator staffing. Again, we see that those criteria NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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137 1 would serve as a high safety bar for STA omission 2 within that context.
3 So again, that rounds out the STA part of 4 the slides that I have prepared, so I just wanted to 5 pause and see if there were specific questions 6 regarding those points.
7 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, so this is Greg 8 Halnon. I'll start off with just a -- I guess I'd 9 like to know if you don't do the blanket elimination 10 did the staff have a preference on which alternative 11 you guys would go with?
12 MR. SEYMOUR: I think that based on -- and 13 again, I'll qualify this by saying that some of this 14 reflects my own perspectives. Again, I don't want to 15 speak for the entirety of the organization, but I 16 think within our working groups that have been 17 addressing this problem I think that we're comfortable 18 potentially with any of those alternatives. I think 19 the one that we have the most experience with would be 20 the codification of the STA because again we do have 21 experience with doing that case-by-case review and 22 determining on a case-by-case basis whether there is 23 justification to omit that role.
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138 1 that there can be a lot to be said for having that 2 extra person representing accident analysis and 3 engineering expertise available to help offset some of 4 those uncertainties, especially until there's a good 5 body of operating experience that's been developed for 6 a design.
7 MEMBER HALNON: Right. Okay. Well, I'll 8 go -- I'll walk through my opinions and then we'll let 9 the other members jump in, but as -- going through it 10 I didn't have a preconceived notion that somebody --
11 there had to be an extra body. I really was 12 interested in making sure that the expertise was 13 available to the operators in order to -- especially 14 with the new technologies that we have. And as we get 15 more operating experience it may prove that it's not 16 as necessary as we might think right now.
17 But certainly I thought this last 18 alternative was -- would satisfy from the standpoint 19 that the staffing plans would explain how they would 20 provide that on-shift experience, whether it's 21 somebody who lives down the road or somebody that's 22 actually in shift. I'm not looking necessarily for a 23 specific dedicated body, although I think that we've, 24 like you said, proven the effectiveness and the value 25 of having someone like that.
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139 1 So I think that we're not -- at least I'm 2 not comfortable with the blanket elimination only 3 because since we're doing such a wide band of 4 technologies and some of it we haven't even probably 5 conceived of yet, I don't think that we should start 6 with none and force the staff to justify why you need 7 one as opposed to the other way around. The licensee 8 should be able to -- if one is certainly not needed, 9 then they should be able to justify why one is not 10 needed.
11 This last bullet does give me pause 12 though. And I'm not trying -- I'm not attempting to 13 diminish the value of a GED, but theoretically you 14 could have a shift of operators handling an issue at 15 a plant that you have no advanced degree beyond a high 16 school education, granted albeit probably a good 17 training program because that's approved by the NRC, 18 but I'm not sure why you would just limit to that 19 where you have required for licensed operators.
20 Now maybe it's not as necessary to have 21 one on shift or maybe it's not as necessary to have 22 one within an hour or two hours away, but why would 23 you not think that some of this technology even though 24 it's not required for design-basis-type accidents or 25 response or defense-in-depth -- why would you all not NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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140 1 think there needed to be something on these other new 2 technologies that may not require license, but 3 certainly have a lot of maybe control manipulations 4 and other things going on?
5 MR. SEYMOUR: So the current perspective 6 shaped by primarily there is the criteria that we've 7 been proposing that would screen plants that don't 8 require licensed operators. There's a few different 9 layers to those, and there are two distinct proposals 10 to probably go about doing that, but a key theme 11 that's imbedded in both is that there isn't a 12 pronounced operator role in the safety outcome for 13 that facility. So --
14 MEMBER HALNON: But that doesn't make the 15 plants any less complex from a physics perspective 16 though.
17 MR. SEYMOUR: No. No, and that is a point 18 that we definitely agree with. The thing that I would 19 say is that some of our thinking with the Certified 20 Operator Program was built out of our thought process 21 regarding how we would address an autonomous reactor.
22 So part of your thinking was derived from if you have 23 a facility that theoretically could run autonomously, 24 right, that can meet these criteria and show that it's 25 safe, if you could remove everyone from the equation NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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141 1 except for someone who's there to handle 2 administrative functions and maybe start the thing up 3 initially, then why wouldn't you also remove the shift 4 technical advisor within a context as well. And that 5 was part of the factor that shaped our thinking.
6 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, I don't disagree with 7 that, but then again going back to the previous 8 blanket elimination versus not, it would be a simple 9 case to justify technically why I wouldn't need one as 10 opposed to the same way I justified I wouldn't need an 11 operator. So I don't see why you would remove that 12 requirement to at least put the onus on the licensee 13 or the applicant to explain why this is so technically 14 simplistic. I don't need to have anybody with an 15 engineering or physics degree available to the 16 operators.
17 MR. SEYMOUR: I'd like to add that as I 18 mentioned before we're completely open to feedback on 19 this. And that insight that perhaps is not 20 appropriate to go with that line, that's something 21 that we're definitely open to considering. As I 22 mentioned, this is our current perspective on 23 potential ways we could address the STA position and 24 where we would draw that line. It would be --
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142 1 with you on this. To think that operating a multi-2 megawatt, even though it's a small inherently safe 3 autonomous whatever, machine that we haven't built or 4 no operational experience with, et cetera, et cetera, 5 that it's -- that you would have -- you wouldn't have 6 someone who had some technical knowledge of how this 7 particular facility works -- to treat a operating 8 power-producing reactor as an administrative function 9 instead of a -- I don't get it -- where you wouldn't 10 have someone who knows how this thing actually from a 11 physics standpoint works. I'm with you Greg. I would 12 think that it would be a tall bar to say you just turn 13 this over to some administrator, a 10-megawatt 14 reactor, and it's just somebody who has no technical 15 background, no understanding of the physics of the 16 reactor system. I don't find that credible even.
17 So I would -- I'm with you, Greg. I would 18 --
19 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, I think it --
20 MEMBER KIRCHNER: I'm really dumbfounded 21 to think that --
22 MR. SEYMOUR: Well, I think it goes with 23 the original thought about becoming certified 24 operators. But I think when you add in the -- what 25 you said, first of a kind could still be technically NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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143 1 complex only because you can add a bunch of systems 2 and complexities to prevent having had licensed 3 operators. In other words, you prevent having to have 4 operators respond to things. But again, the physics, 5 one, it's probably not a traditional reactor core like 6 many people have in their minds.
7 But secondly, the physics of fission and 8 releases and sort of thing still is there. So you 9 still have to have, like you say, knowledge of physics 10 and whatnot.
11 MEMBER HALNON: So I think that's some 12 feedback for you Jesse. I think overall I think that 13 we probably would like to not see a blanket 14 elimination in any case. And this other piece, what 15 we just talked about, I think it would take some more 16 thought behind whether or not we would be willing for 17 that.
18 I'd like to see if there's any other 19 members that had a thought. Dennis, you've got 20 something I'm sure.
21 MEMBER BLEY: Yes. Yes, I'm got a couple 22 things. I certainly agree with everything Greg said.
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144 1 specialized by the applicant just seems backwards to 2 me. So I don't think that's a good idea.
3 The other thing is I'm kind of all alone 4 on this; and Jesse Ebersole formerly of this Committee 5 40 years ago was alone as well and neither the 6 Committee nor the staff nor the Commission quite 7 agreed with it, but the value of an independent set of 8 eyes that you can get through an STA, if it's an 9 independent position, can be invaluable. And unless 10 there is substantial simplicity in the thermal 11 hydraulics, the -- the ability to reach stable shut 12 down, having that capability seems to me still very 13 important. But that's all I had to add in.
14 PARTICIPANT: Sounds like there's a hot 15 mic.
16 MEMBER BROWN: It's not mine. Somebody 17 muted me. It's Charlie. But that was not me. I 18 wanted to chime in. The other person is gone now.
19 PARTICIPANT: Yes, they're gone.
20 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. I totally agree with 21 Greg and Walt. I can't see this falling to a default 22 that you justify having an operator as an -- or an 23 STA.
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145 1 simple, so safe that you can walk away and ignore 2 them. I mean, it just -- I'm getting a little bit 3 upset by hearing this all the time. And then have 4 this idea the requirement only applies to plants that 5 require licensed operators. I mean, all these plants 6 have systems that have to be controlled and the most 7 sophisticated automation in the world is not going to 8 cover you for everything.
9 And I know that from personal experience.
10 And I can't tell you the details, but a very 11 sophisticated we put in to -- it was working 12 beautifully and all of a sudden we had an 13 unanticipated multiple component failure. And if it 14 hadn't been for the manual backups and the operators 15 to be able to take control of a couple of key systems 16 we'd have been screwed. Pardon my French. It would 17 have been terrible.
18 And I just -- we should not go in that 19 direction in my thoughts anyway. Any changes or any 20 decision to not have operators or an STA should be 21 based on them justifying it and convincing, not giving 22 it away in the first place. That's -- it's just --
23 I'm appalled by even the thought process. Excuse me 24 for being emphatic.
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146 1 move through the slides, I will provide a recap of the 2 criteria that we're proposing as a bar that determine 3 which plants do or don't require licensed operators.
4 So again, we're not just providing a blanket out in 5 all cases with these proposals. Again, even where 6 were tie things in with licensed operators, if the STA 7 criteria were linked to that boundary, then there's 8 still a test that would have to be passed from a 9 design standpoint.
10 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, we'll get to the 11 certified operators here in a few minutes because 12 that's a little bit of a different topic, but I think 13 what Charlie was saying, and I think Walt as well as 14 myself, is that the inherently safe reactors that 15 don't need an STA don't necessarily mean that they're 16 inherently non-complex or simple in that respect.
17 So I think we've made our points. I don't 18 know if anyone else wants to jump in there, but I 19 think those are the main points for STAs.
20 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Well, I wanted to 21 add something I just recently talked about that -- and 22 it's that we cannot -- the new initiated to the 23 control staff, we can -- that will be like world-size 24 epidemic which affect the multiple crews. And we have 25 never considered that as a risk because we never have NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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147 1 those cases with operating plants and things. So I 2 thought that will be interesting given our colleague 3 situation. So in the general I should -- think there 4 should be some requirement the plants can be put in 5 the same shutdown without operators in the control 6 rooms.
7 MEMBER BROWN: I don't disagree with that, 8 Vesna. Our systems out to be able to do that, but 9 they won't always do that.
10 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay. Well again, I 11 appreciate the feedback. And I just want to highlight 12 that the approach, like the underlying intent here in 13 laying out these options and explaining the thought 14 process behind them was to get exactly this type of 15 feedback from this body, so I do appreciate that. And 16 we'll take the notes from this discussion. And again, 17 we put out our first iteration of the rule language, 18 but we're taking all this and bundling it together for 19 how we approach our next iteration, so I do appreciate 20 the feedback and the insights.
21 If it's okay with the Committee I'd like 22 to go ahead and move into the next topic, if that's 23 okay.
24 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, go ahead, Jesse.
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148 1 onto -- okay, we're on slide 53. Great.
2 Okay. So the next topic that I'd like to 3 move into is load following, and I'd like to begin 4 again with a short recap of the preliminary 5 requirements that are under discussion. The 53.755(c) 6 would restrict who is allowed to manipulate the actual 7 facility controls; and again these are the actual 8 reactivity controls, to only licensed or certified 9 operators.
10 In tandem with that 53.755(e) would 11 require the operators -- would require the operations-12 assigned actual control manipulations that affect 13 reactor power level only occur while plant conditions 14 are being monitored by a licensed or certified 15 operator. Now we would build into 53.755(e) another 16 layer though. So load following would be permitted 17 provided that certain conditions are met such that 18 demands from the grid operator could be immediately 19 refused and they would either challenge state of 20 operation or when precluded by plant equipment 21 conditions such as might be the case if you have a 22 technical specification action statement that allowed 23 power level.
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149 1 automatic protection system, an automated control 2 system, or by a licensed or certified operator. And 3 so Committee has asked for more discussion how this 4 would be accomplished and what I'm going to do on the 5 next slide is step through how we presently envision 6 important elements of this playing this out as we 7 further refine our requirements and guidance in this 8 area.
9 Move onto the next slide, please?
10 MEMBER HALNON: Hey, Jesse, before you 11 move on; this is Greg, at least in my training in the 12 past we kind of broadly define reactivity 13 manipulations. So if somebody was adjusting a 14 feedwater control, we would -- and it changed reactor 15 power, we would call out at least an indirect 16 reactivity change. So I'm having a struggle between 17 the conflict between (c) and (e). Could you spend a 18 little time on what you meant by other than control 19 manipulations that change reactor power that not 20 necessarily falls under the broad definition of (c)?
21 MR. SEYMOUR: So the type of manipulation 22 that you just described is something that would fall 23 under 53.755(e) which is itself derived from -- it's 24 modified from an existing 50.54 requirement. And what 25 this means is that when you're dealing with item (c),
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150 1 which again mirrors the similar 50.54 requirement, 2 you're talking about a very narrowly-defined set of 3 reactor controls, right? So traditionally these would 4 be things like manipulating for boiling water reactor 5 recirculation pumps. These could be rod control 6 switches, the actual boration or dilution controls, 7 those types of things.
8 Now when you start getting out to the 9 balance of plant and you start dealing with the types 10 of things that you're talking about -- this could be 11 feedwater, this could be turbine controls, this could 12 be things like steam generator blowdown, things that 13 are going to change the efficiency of a secondary and 14 cause a power change. Now you're talking about things 15 that are indirect but still have an effect on reactor 16 power.
17 So the current wording of 50.54 talks 18 about knowledge and consent. Here we've made a change 19 to that and we've changed it to monitoring to allow it 20 to work better in tandem with the load following 21 requirement but still maintain the overall requirement 22 for someone to be watching while this is happening.
23 MEMBER HALNON: So the grid operator, what 24 would they be manipulating to change power or 25 megawatts out if they're not changing reactivity in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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151 1 some direct or indirect way?
2 MR. SEYMOUR: Well the thing about the 3 grid operator is that that would be an indirect power 4 change, so -- by the grid operator sending a demand 5 signal to the turbine. And that demand signal may be 6 trying to accomplish more than one thing, right? You 7 could -- maybe you're trying to adjust voltage 8 control, right? So perhaps you're going to change the 9 bar output of the generator. Perhaps you're trying to 10 add frequency support for the grid so you're going to 11 go ahead and raise the actual load-out of the machine 12 and so forth.
13 But those turbine control signals --
14 functionally what would be happening there is really 15 no different than a current licensed operator going up 16 to the turbine controls of the plant, changing the 17 speed of the machine. And then over on the primary 18 side you now have the actual plant response to that, 19 again indirect in that you're not actually using, 20 again if it was the BWR, the recirculation pumps to 21 cause that change. But again, functionally you're 22 accomplishing the same thing. So in many ways what 23 you're allowing for is this grid operator to fulfill 24 the type of function that formerly would have 25 restricted to balance of plant operator or anybody in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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152 1 any case through indirect manipulation is doing some 2 with knowledge and consent --
3 MEMBER HALNON: Okay.
4 MR. SEYMOUR: -- which is part of the 5 reason we built in the requirements that we did.
6 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, I think that context 7 was important to understand going forward, so thanks 8 for the explanation.
9 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay. So, yes, if we could 10 move onto the next slide, I'll go through and I'll 11 expand upon these points here.
12 Okay. So to begin with this area is one 13 where we currently envision high-level regulatory 14 requirements like what I showed on the previous slide 15 being elaborated upon by guidance. And in near term 16 our current intent is to locate guidance of this type 17 within an ARCAP ISG. And that particular approach 18 serves a dual objective of facilitating not only this 19 work for Part 53, but also lays groundwork in case we 20 encounter exemption requests outside of Part 53 as 21 well. So again helps us to establish a framework for 22 that type of thing that would remain an encounter for 23 a advanced reactor application.
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153 1 right now, but I don't want to give the impression 2 that we've exhaustively vetted this out yet. But what 3 I'll do is I'll step through a few items that take the 4 rule language that we've discussed and show how at a 5 guidance level that type of thinking would start to 6 expand out.
7 So first, load following -- and again, 8 this is our current perspective here. Load following 9 should be restricted to power levels where plant 10 automation can support plant operations that are 11 needed. And the key there is that you need to be able 12 to provide a level of support that's sufficient to 13 avoid initiating plant transience due to attempting 14 the load change. And the underlying principle there 15 is that from a risk standpoint we don't want to have 16 routine load following creating initiating events.
17 That shouldn't be something that we're seeing on a 18 routine basis. And I'll provide an example of what we 19 mean by this.
20 So let's say that a plant has multiple 21 trains of feeding condensate. And again, if we're 22 talking about any type of a large design there's a 23 break point where you'll start seeing more than one 24 train of that, but it's a useful example. So let's 25 say that you have more than one feeding condensate NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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154 1 train on the secondary. And at this plant we'll say 2 that it's running at 80 or 90 percent power and you're 3 going to do a power reduction. So as you reduce power 4 around the 50 percent point you need to secure one of 5 those trains of feeding condensate.
6 If the automation couldn't handle that 7 type of secondary plant operation; perhaps the nature 8 of the controls, perhaps those valves out in the 9 field, so and so forth; and again, I just this as an 10 example, then that restraint, that 50 percent would 11 become the bottom of the allowable load following 12 envelope, right? You don't want to initiate a plant 13 transient.
14 Now from a practicality standpoint; and 15 again, when we start talking about automation on these 16 designs, this can get complex. So there might be ways 17 around that. So perhaps the plant is designed such 18 that it's going to transition over to steam dumps at 19 some minimum power and thus keep itself above the 20 point where the automation wouldn't be able to handle 21 going lower without human intervention and essentially 22 you'd be idling at the bottom of that envelope waiting 23 for -- to pick back up. Not great for efficiency.
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155 1 band.
2 The bottom line is that from our 3 perspective right now if someone wants to credit a 4 control system to approach this, then that control 5 system needs to be able to manage and enforce the need 6 to band in a reliable way.
7 And second, let's say that a facility were 8 to opt to go with reliance -- and again these could be 9 combined, right? Some of these may be combined in 10 their approach. But let's say the facility were to 11 opt with going for the actuation of an automatic 12 protection system and using that to truncate or 13 terminate load following.
14 From the standpoint of conservatism any 15 such protective set points associated with that scheme 16 would reasonably not be the same as those credited for 17 core protection. And in our perspective those types 18 of set point should be more restrictive than those 19 that are being credited for safety purposes. And 20 again, the underlying principle there is that our 21 current perspective is that load following would be an 22 allowance being made to facilitate economic 23 considerations and safety system set points should not 24 be expected to be challenged as part of achieving 25 that.
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156 1 Also let's keep in mind that the top of an 2 allowable power band might be reduced by something 3 like technical specification action statements. And 4 again, I use the example of perhaps due to flux 5 distribution or something like that you get yourself 6 into an action statement where instead of 100 percent 7 power you're restricted to 75 percent power. The key 8 thing is that those types of set point schemes would 9 need to be able to adapt to match any such operating 10 constraints.
11 And again, as I go through these what I 12 guess the underlying thing I'd want to illustrate is 13 as we worked through this problem we had ultimately 14 ascertained what the guiding principle would be, and 15 we would take that and then use that to create the 16 technology-inclusive framework to where we may see 17 advanced technology that doesn't necessarily fit 18 something that we've dealt with before, but we would 19 apply this type of thinking to determine if what was 20 being proposed was reasonable.
21 MEMBER BLEY: Vicki and Dennis both want 22 to make comments.
23 Vicki, you've been waiting.
24 MEMBER BIER: Yes, that's okay.
25 So I assume that the enforcement of those NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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157 1 bands like not load following below 50 percent would 2 be on the plant side, not on the grid side because the 3 plant can't rely on the grid to enforce the level of 4 safety and cybersecurity that it needs to maintain?
5 MR. SEYMOUR: That's absolutely correct in 6 our thinking.
7 MEMBER BIER: Yes.
8 MR. SEYMOUR: These features would be a 9 function of the plant's license, so this would be 10 something that would have to be done on the plant 11 side.
12 MEMBER BLEY: The question I had, will 13 your language in any way preclude designs that allow 14 safety set points to be adjusted based on your current 15 operating power?
16 MR. SEYMOUR: From o what we're proposing 17 here, no. And again, what I want to emphasize here is 18 that what we're not trying to do is trying to in any 19 way override or supersede any other I&C types of 20 requirements that may deal with reactor protection 21 systems and safeguards actuation systems and things of 22 that nature here.
23 I think the key point is that if we were 24 to think about what are the set points that end up in 25 tech specs, what we're talking about is that's the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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158 1 actual safety-related box, if you will, operating box.
2 We would want to be more conservative with that. And 3 that would be the underlying principle here is that 4 what's being in this arena should be more conservative 5 and should in no way interfere with the actual safety 6 set points.
7 MEMBER KIRCHNER: It seems to me -- this 8 is Walt Kirchner. It seems to me, Jesse, this would 9 require a lot of -- you would want to stay within tech 10 specs, a lot of the tech specs, and not challenging 11 the safety limits or core protection, as you say it 12 here in the second bullet, sub-bullet. This would be 13 a pretty sophisticated system because, as Dennis I 14 think was pointing out, it's a rather dynamic thing.
15 It depends -- and rate is another factor in all this.
16 Rate of power change often through reactors is a 17 critical matter in terms of cool down, heat up.
18 Depends what the technology is.
19 But it would seem to me you would have to 20 have a protection system -- not a protection system, 21 a control system that ensures if you -- if you let 22 someone drive the plant based on the load from the 23 back end, then you would have to have a system that 24 kept you well within your tech specs and your 25 operating envelope, and a lot of that currently for NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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159 1 the large plants is done by the operators.
2 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes, and the international 3 operating experience that we drew upon when we were 4 working through this, that was the solution that we 5 saw there, was that there was direct operator 6 oversight of this and the operator retained the 7 ability to override it.
8 We're trying to be flexible and 9 performance-based with what's allowed for here, but in 10 all honestly the third bullet; which I was going to 11 talk about that one next, where we simply have the 12 operator that's there maintaining that continuous 13 oversight, having the ability to take control, that is 14 from the operating experience kind of the clean way to 15 do it.
16 In the absence of that the other cleaner 17 way to do it is, if we look at that first bullet, 18 where you've got an automated control system perhaps 19 the operator sets a band, right? The operator is 20 responsible for knowing the technical specification 21 action statements that are in effect, what the plant 22 limitations are, and they simply program in an allowed 23 band that meets that. And that's where I say certain 24 combinations at least on this could be used. But 25 again, it would be -- the onus would be on the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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160 1 applicant if they wanted to use any of these options 2 to show how they were able to do it.
3 MEMBER KIRCHNER: I think you need some 4 more -- well, you're suggesting that you would 5 supplement with guidance, but I think I'm having a 6 problem with the word even transients. Every time you 7 chase the load with a reactor you're in a transient 8 mode of operation. So it's not that you want to avoid 9 transience. You want to avoid getting the reactor 10 outside of its operating envelope. But load following 11 is a transient, and that's what the operators do.
12 I'll think some more about this, but I --
13 the load following envelope that you approve should be 14 defined such that you don't challenge the safety 15 systems, that you don't go outside our operating 16 envelope as per tech specs, et cetera. So yes, I 17 think this needs much more guidance. And I think some 18 of it could be rather more -- not guidance, but 19 regulatory, worded in regulatory space rather than 20 guidance. I mean you don't want an automated load 21 following event to take you outside your tech specs 22 envelope.
23 MR. SEYMOUR: No, and to be honest --
24 MEMBER KIRCHNER: And that doesn't mean --
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161 1 you're not challenging the safety basis of the plant.
2 I didn't say that very well.
3 CHAIR PETTI: Isn't that if it's designed 4 --
5 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Your critical set point.
6 CHAIR PETTI: I mean, Walt, if it's 7 designed to be able to be load follow -- I think of it 8 as these multiple boxes. There's a safety envelope.
9 That's a big box. Then there's a design envelope that 10 includes, quote, nominal steady state plus any load 11 following space. And then below that would be what we 12 call maybe the conventional -- if it just always ran 13 steady state like U.S. plants do.
14 And so isn't it just an issue of making 15 sure it's designed to be able to handle it? Because 16 this is done in Europe. And so Jesse I think has 17 answered my question, which was did -- were you 18 informed by how this is done in Europe in terms of 19 thinking about it from a regulatory perspective?
20 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes, there is an IAEA report 21 that we reviewed as part of drafting the white paper 22 that we in turn informed this with. And that --
23 CHAIR PETTI: That's what I thought I 24 remembered, yes.
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162 1 coming back to the point about the analogy of boxes, 2 because again that's a central theme that's here is 3 load following -- and again, just to be honest for it 4 to be frank, load following is something that's more 5 of an economic nice to have, right? And that should 6 in no way be allowed to challenge safety.
7 And that would be the key thing that --
8 whether it's high-level regulatory wording or perhaps 9 more prescriptive regulation, that's the underlying 10 goal that we've seen that would need to achieved here 11 is that you're managing that and controlling that in 12 such a way that that safety box that the plant is 13 operating within is not the limiting --- what's 14 happening is you're actually being bounded by more 15 restrictive controls that are inside there.
16 And again, the human operator that's 17 credited to take control, that's one possible way to 18 do it. Another thing is a combination of human and 19 machine where the human is using settings that are 20 being input into automation and kind of working in 21 tandem with a control system.
22 From what I've heard and what I've picked 23 up here and there I perceive that as probably being 24 the most likely application that we would see of this, 25 but again our current thinking is, at least on this NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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163 1 first iteration, to try to be as flexible as 2 reasonably possible and hence the allowance for the 3 set points and so forth.
4 CHAIR PETTI: So to me the other 5 application -- I don't whether I'd claim it; it's sort 6 of economic, but these micro-reactors on micro-grids 7 in remote locations where an area has its own grid and 8 the load follow is just to deal with the cyclic demand 9 over time, morning versus evening, winter versus 10 summer, as opposed to being connected to a really 11 large grid in a major metropolitan area. And I think 12 there things are a little different in terms of how 13 all it works in the -- whatever technology you 14 selected is important, but I've seen some analyses to 15 suggest that this is doable for the micro-reactors.
16 MEMBER HALNON: Dave, that's helpful for 17 me because I've got this paradigm I'm thinking the 18 large light water reactors and how difficult it is to 19 operate those when someone else is moving your 20 reactor.
21 CHAIR PETTI: Yes, well, some of these use 22 open-air Brayton cycles --
23 MEMBER HALNON: Yes.
24 CHAIR PETTI: -- and the reactors -- you 25 can do a lot with de-coupling the secondary side from NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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164 1 the primary, stuff that we just don't do in the --
2 with water reactors. There's a lot of design space 3 out there, so it will be interesting to see what comes 4 forward.
5 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, because the poisons 6 that build in like xenon over time when you're moving 7 power around is huge in a light water reactor, so I'm 8 not as versed obviously in the smaller ones that maybe 9 not be as big a problem, but you'd certainly have to 10 -- the frequency of moving the power around, if it's 11 the reactor power or power coming from some kind of 12 nuclear fuel, you have to be mindful of the frequency 13 of moving and the magnitude of moving that power 14 around as well.
15 CHAIR PETTI: Yes. Yes.
16 MEMBER HALNON: One other question I had 17 is -- and I -- if we're saying that the operators have 18 got to be standing right there watching this and being 19 able to reduce it, with the way the U.S. grids are 20 done -- and I got what Dave just said about the micro-21 reactors, but right now the dispatch calls the 22 operator and the operator changes the control or 23 changes the reactor power. Why not just stick with 24 that? I mean, is it because we're trying to catch all 25 the cases just as what Dave just mentioned or is that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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165 1 just a very unique case?
2 MR. SEYMOUR: Again, some of the features 3 that we have proposed within Part 53 are derived from 4 -- and during the last meeting I kind of illustrated 5 our thinking with the hypothetical autonomous reactor, 6 that someone's able to build a reactor that has enough 7 inherent safety to where it was allowed to operate 8 without having a human operator overseeing it 9 directly.
10 And within that framework, within that 11 construct we extended that thinking out and we started 12 saying, okay, well what are the other things that 13 would have be accounted for? And one of them 14 obviously was the fact that if there's no one there to 15 control it, that design would by definition have to 16 load follow, right? There wouldn't be someone 17 controlling its generator output.
18 So in terms of the model of -- if you have 19 a control room that's staffed and you have people that 20 are there and those people are licensed to operate 21 that facility, then from what I can tell looking at 22 the international OpE, the current status quo was that 23 there wouldn't be an huge difference from you're 24 talking -- and I'm familiar with the type of operation 25 that you're talking about.
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166 1 You're there; you get a call from the grid 2 dispatcher. Maybe it's a planned change on a 3 schedule, perhaps it's something emergent, and you're 4 asked to take your output and change it. And so you 5 go ahead and you do that. It's performed by the 6 licensed operators that are there at the facility.
7 They'll probably have a reactivity change plan or else 8 they'll come up with one soon that shows them when the 9 expected xenon transience will occur and when to 10 borate the loop, pull rods, so on and so forth.
11 What really challenges our thinking and 12 causes us to try to account for this is if we take the 13 advanced reactor themes that we're thinking through 14 and we run them out to the extreme and we start 15 thinking about that autonomous reactor, right? And I 16 think that's really where you get into this.
17 Now I could see applications larger plants 18 that still have control room staffing and so on and so 19 forth take advantage of this, most likely being 20 through a combination of automation and operator team, 21 as I was talking about. But again, that autonomous 22 reactor paradigm that's really what I think kick 23 started thinking down this road.
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167 1 for new reactors. I mean, what if an SMR came in and 2 did a license under Part 50 or 52? Would this be 3 available to them?
4 MR. SEYMOUR: So what I was mentioning 5 earlier about how we foresee this guidance initially 6 appearing in an ARCAP ISG, one of our thought 7 processes behind that had been that the ARCAP is 8 designed in part to handle near-term applicants that 9 come in under Part 50 and 52 and want to do things 10 that we would see within kind of the same sphere that 11 we're looking at within Part 53 as well. So our 12 intent is to supplement the ARCAP guidance to address 13 Part 53 once we get to a suitable point.
14 But by locating that guidance there that 15 would be one of its functions as well, too, is should 16 we see that application that's requesting exemption, 17 right, because again that would have to go through the 18 exemption process; you'd need actually a couple 19 different exemptions under 50.54 just off the top of 20 my head -- what would happen is we would have to look 21 at that exemption. We would have to say is it legal?
22 Can we do that? And once it cleared that hurdle we 23 would have the other 50.12 criteria that we would have 24 to get through and we would use this framework to help 25 guide our thinking in processing that exemption.
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168 1 MEMBER HALNON: Okay. Yes, that makes 2 sense. Okay. Thanks.
3 MEMBER BIER: Hi, Vicki Bier again. It 4 seems like not so much just on this one topic of load 5 following, but kind of more generally there is sort of 6 a philosophical decision that has to be made between 7 -- of how flexible this should be. And it sounds like 8 the staff is putting a lot of effort into thinking of 9 these edge cases like what about an unmanned reactor 10 or whatever.
11 And I'm kind of torn because on the one 12 hand I know that bureaucracies can be very inflexible 13 and that if you put in an inflexible rule first and 14 say well, we'll allow changes by petition, exemptions, 15 and whatever, it may never come to pass that the 16 agency actually approves those once the rule is in 17 place. But it also means having the less-flexible 18 rule up front also kind of gives more opportunity to 19 learn from experience before some of those decisions 20 have to be made.
21 So I don't have a clear recommendation on 22 that, but just wanted to kind of flag that as a 23 general issue.
24 MR. SEYMOUR: I appreciate that insight, 25 and that's something that we've thought about, too, is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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169 1 if we draw a line somewhere and we say we're not going 2 to try to accommodate all the possible edge cases, 3 then perhaps when we do see that edge case come along 4 it's reasonable to say if it shows up, we'll handle it 5 with an exemption. And then we work towards having 6 the guidance thought through and so forth to lay the 7 groundwork how we would handle the exemption.
8 One of our goals with Part 53 and part of 9 the reason why we made such a deliberate effort in 10 this portion of it to consider as many edge cases as 11 possible was simply kind of the overriding principle 12 that regulating by exemption isn't desirable. If 13 there's a better way to do it, try to have a framework 14 in there. So our bias coming in was to try to cast a 15 wide net and try to have a framework that would handle 16 as many of those edge cases as possible.
17 MEMBER SUNSERI: Hey, this is Matt. I had 18 a couple of comments or a question here. So I've been 19 sitting back listening to this whole conversation and 20 it reminds me of something somebody said to me 21 recently in that complexity is impressive, but 22 simplicity is genius. It seems to me like we're 23 making this very complicated to try to fit any 24 possible situation that we can imagine coming forward 25 with these advanced designs.
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170 1 And when I think about the current 2 regulation for licensing operators, it follows the 3 systems approach, right, to qualification, which means 4 you look at the tasks and equipment that those 5 operators are supposed to be doing for the design of 6 the facility they're going to be operating and you 7 customize the training to that activity and the 8 qualification to those activities. And it seems to me 9 that model would fit very well with whatever comes to 10 the future. So that's a simple process. I guess it 11 gets complex in implementation and the details, but so 12 do any of these things that we're talking about here.
13 Why do we feel the need to move away from 14 that straightforward process? I mean, I saw the 15 benefits that this is proposing, but licensees can 16 already write their licensed operator exams as long as 17 they're approved by the NRC. If a particular facility 18 doesn't need a simulator, then it -- don't require 19 one. So any comment? I mean --
20 MR. SEYMOUR: I think we'll get into I 21 think more on those points here on the coming slides, 22 so outside of this topic I've got other slides that 23 will address the -- kind of the relative merits and 24 pros and cons of having the certified operator track 25 some of what we're looking to do with training and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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171 1 additionally specifics on the simulator discussions.
2 I think a little bit later on in this presentation I 3 could probably flesh out some of those questions.
4 If I could I just wanted to go through the 5 remaining bullets on this slide because we've kind of 6 been talking about the operator aspect of it and I 7 just want to kind of get that point out there, if I 8 could, and then obviously continue fielding questions 9 on it. But we've kind of been going around this one 10 particular item, and the third bullet that's on here, 11 right, talks about crediting operators if you wanted 12 to take that route.
13 And if that approach was taken, again our 14 thinking there is that you'd be crediting the operator 15 to arrest load following when needed. And in our mind 16 that would warrant showing that those operators would 17 be available to immediately take control of those load 18 changes if you're going to challenge limits or 19 challenge plant reliability, and that's a given within 20 the existing Part 50 framework. And I think we were 21 talking about that earlier, how that framework -- yes, 22 you have a control room and yes, you have a certain 23 number of operators as they are pre-scripted.
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172 1 consider how the different flexibilities and potential 2 outcomes would look, Part 53 allows for substantially 3 greater flexibility of staffing including 4 flexibilities that could mean that a traditional at-5 the-controls operator isn't necessarily present at all 6 times. And that might be the case with a highly-7 automated plant that lacks a control room.
8 So when we get to that third bullet 9 talking about crediting operators take control, I just 10 want to emphasize that part of the reason why we're 11 emphasizing that is because based on the concept of 12 operations for that facility and the degree of 13 automation and safety and how operators are credited 14 you may not necessarily have that person right there 15 at that point in time. So this would be a more 16 stringent application of the staffing requirement that 17 if you wanted to take that route that would ensure 18 that. And again, irrespective of what else might be 19 required in the staffing model, if they were going to 20 take that route we would want to see that they have 21 the capacity for an immediate assumption of human 22 control.
23 And then another point that I wanted to 24 raise, too, and -- because we've kind of been talking 25 about technologies, but I just want to clarify that we NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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173 1 don't currently foresee restrictions envisioned on the 2 facility types in a strict sense provided that an 3 adequate design could demonstrate it. So again, the 4 onus would be on the applicant to show how they can do 5 this, how they can meet the criteria, how they can do 6 it safely. We wouldn't necessarily say only micro-7 reactors can do this or something like that. It would 8 be here's the criteria; they're performance-based; 9 show us how you're going to do this safely.
10 And I think there was another question 11 that the Committee had posed about would we envision 12 the use of certified operators potentially within this 13 context? And our current thinking is that if the 14 plant was -- if a plant met the criteria for the use 15 of certified operators and they elected to do that, 16 that that would be acceptable, that you could do this 17 at a plant that had certified operators.
18 And the basis there is ingrained in the 19 regulation that we would propose for certified 20 operators would also be the need for them to 21 demonstrate competence in conducting radioactivity 22 manipulations. That is part of their training and 23 evaluation. And then also that they would be 24 authorized to conduct reactivity manipulations per the 25 preliminary rule language.
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174 1 So again, I appreciate your patience. I 2 just wanted to kind of get those other points out here 3 since we were talking about several of them.
4 MEMBER BROWN: This is Charlie.
5 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay.
6 MEMBER BROWN: I just wanted to follow up.
7 I kind of agreed with Matt; I just didn't speak up 8 earlier, relative to we're trying -- and Vicki as well 9 dealing with all these outlier edge circumstances, 10 which is complicating and confusing in terms of what 11 your reasonable -- what you're trying to put together, 12 whether it be operator training or whether it be what 13 the level of automation is or et cetera. And the idea 14 that you can't deal with exceptions within the rules, 15 we deal with exceptions within the rules as they exist 16 today. And it's already happened on at least one of 17 the plants we've reviewed where they changed what was 18 required and it was run through the system and it was 19 approved.
20 So I mean, the idea that you -- the way I 21 always operated was if you didn't have exceptions, you 22 wouldn't need rules. But the rules ought to be pretty 23 clear. Tell people what you expect. And then if the 24 circumstances dictate otherwise, let them tell you 25 why. I think you really ought to recast some of these NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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175 1 instead of trying to just cover the waterfront.
2 That's my personal opinion. I think I'm a little bit 3 in concert with Matt. Probably not all the way, but 4 in some circumstances. So that's -- just give you 5 another thought from one other member who's listening 6 to this.
7 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay. Yes, I appreciate 8 that.
9 MEMBER BROWN: This is Charlie Brown, by 10 the way.
11 MR. SEYMOUR: I just wanted to, you know, 12 highlight that we agree that, at least within the 13 portion of the project that we're working on for Part 14 53, that there is a reasonable cut off to where you 15 could say if this ever shows up we'll just deal with 16 it before exemption. It's probably unlikely to 17 happen, you know, in the foreseeable future.
18 Again, kind of for our first preliminary 19 shot on putting this together, that kind of high level 20 goal was, you know, if you can avoid regulating by 21 exemption to try to do so.
22 So that was our first type of -- you know, 23 again, we do appreciate the value of having that 24 perspective, but there are certain edge cases that, 25 frankly, make things too complex and too convoluted NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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176 1 trying to account for, especially when we don't see 2 them on the radar in the foreseeable future.
3 And at that point, you know, my 4 perspective is that, yes, it's probably most efficient 5 to say if that shows up we'll handle an exemption 6 space.
7 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, and one way you can 8 deal with type of stuff is to --- and this just popped 9 into my head, so don't ask me any questions --- is you 10 can put in the regulatory language saying if you 11 desire to have load following, submit a load following 12 plan to the NRC for approval and then, in a guidance 13 document, put your expectations in what that load 14 following plan would have. And that would at least 15 key somebody in saying that you're open to an 16 exemption in this area or a portion of an approved 17 plan.
18 So just a thought off the top of my head, 19 and I think that could probably be applicable in many 20 areas that we actually got through this type of 21 language, just to make it more simple.
22 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay. Yes, I appreciate 23 that. Another question from ---
24 (Simultaneous speaking.)
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177 1 load following. There are a lot of plants that are 2 operating in this country, not commercially, that are 3 load following, and I mean significantly load 4 following.
5 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Exactly, Charlie, yes.
6 MEMBER BROWN: You can design these plants 7 to be load following, and there are ways to put limits 8 of on, you know, what you can do. Admittedly, they're 9 not connected to a grid where, for instance, a total 10 loss of part of the grid can really slam a bunch of 11 plants with a load demand.
12 But you can cover that. And whether it 13 results in a shutdown or whether it results in just a 14 tripping of the main turbine generators, or whatever 15 it is, you can do load following. And it's not really 16 all that hard, and you can do it. And you're still 17 going to have to have an operator somewhere, but you 18 can do it even so that the plant compensates for that 19 reactivity-wise.
20 So, I mean, this is --- we're making this 21 awfully complex. It's my own thought process.
22 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay. Were there other 23 questions on this topic? Or else I'll go ahead and 24 move on to the next topic which is going to get into 25 the certified operator program.
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178 1 Okay. If we can move on to the next 2 slide, please.
3 Okay. So now I'd like to transition into 4 our certified operator related discussion topics. And 5 again, because this discussion will reference the 6 reverse requirements associated with those operators, 7 I'd like to provide a brief recap of some of those 8 items over the next couple of slides.
9 And again, I won't spend, you know, more 10 than a minute or two just kind of rehashing some of 11 those high level requirements. And then what we'll do 12 is go ahead and get into the committee's questions.
13 And so to begin with, so 55.755(a) would 14 require facility licensees to have licensed operators 15 unless they can meet the criteria of (b) for using 16 certified operators instead. And (b) currently 17 contains two different staff proposals for those 18 criteria, for what they could be.
19 So the first proposal that we currently 20 have out there says that we would require any such 21 facility to not rely on human actions for event 22 mitigation in meeting the safety criteria of Sub-part 23 B, for fulfilling safety functions, or for defense in 24 depth.
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179 1 the evaluation criteria for event sequences could be 2 met without operator mitigation as well as the 3 response to licensing basis events not relying on 4 human actions to ensure the performance of system 5 structures in performance.
6 The second proposal would instead require 7 that the design basis accident safety criteria of Sub-8 part B would need to be able to be met without 9 operator action for mitigation, or reliance on active 10 engineering features, or passive design features, 11 except for those passive features that can both 12 survive licensing basis events and not be defeated by 13 credible human errors. So then that's currently what 14 we have in the way of criteria for those two items.
15 Can we move on to the next slide, please?
16 Okay. So 53.755(i) provides specific requirements for 17 plants using certified operators. Certified operator 18 administrative responsibilities would include 19 compliance with technical specifications, operability 20 determinations, maintenance, and configuration 21 controls, compliance with radioactive release limits, 22 any responsibilities under the facility's emergency 23 plan that may be assigned to them, and also making 24 notifications as required.
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180 1 provide continuity of responsibility for facility 2 operations during the operating phase. And this would 3 entail the continuous monitoring of fueled units and 4 having the capabilities to receive plant data, 5 initiate rapid shutdown, dispatch operations 6 maintenance personnel, implement any emergency plan 7 responsibilities, as well as conducting reactivity 8 manipulations.
9 Can we move on to the next slide, please?
10 Okay. And again, just two more slides for this 11 overview, and then we'll get into the committee's, you 12 know, items that were provided to us for discussion.
13 So 53.774 addresses requirements for the 14 issuance of certificates by facilities having licensed 15 operators. And those requirements would include there 16 will be certified operators and other people being 17 issued the certifications by the facility licensees, 18 would need to have a high school diploma or GED, they 19 would need to complete an initial training program, 20 pass an initial certification exam. They would need 21 to demonstrate confidence in performing reactivity 22 manipulations, and they would also need to meet 23 medical condition requirements.
24 We can move onto the next slide. Okay, 25 this is the last overview slide. So lastly, 53.775 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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181 1 would address conditions that facility licensees would 2 need to ensure are met, re-certification-met issues to 3 operators.
4 These conditions would include only 5 performing duties where they're certified at, 6 continuing training participation, completing re-7 qualification examinations, having biannual medical 8 exams, and also maintaining proficiency. So again, 9 that's the overview of the requirements.
10 Could we move on to the next slide? And 11 then I'll start going through some of the specific 12 topics for discussion.
13 MEMBER BROWN: Can I ask another question?
14 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes.
15 MEMBER BROWN: This is Charlie again. I'm 16 trying to wrap my head around -- it probably got 17 covered and I missed it, but a certified operator then 18 doesn't have to really understand plant 19 thermodynamics, reactor physics, et cetera, et cetera, 20 if I just look at what's required for qualifications.
21 A GED certainly doesn't fall in that category. And no 22 amount of training, unless you've gone to college and 23 gotten a degree is going to compensate for that.
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182 1 that's why I'm asking, I presume has a much higher 2 level of academic and engineering background than a 3 certified operator. Is that also correct?
4 MR. SEYMOUR: So that's not the case 5 within the Part 53 construct that we currently have 6 laid out for licensed operators and certified 7 operators. Both groups actually have fairly similar 8 regulatory requirements for what their training 9 programs and initial licensing has to be able to 10 demonstrate. And that is they have to be able to, you 11 know, have the knowledge and abilities needed for the 12 safe operation of the facility.
13 There is a difference in that, because 14 licensed operators also, you know, being credited with 15 operator action for safety of those facilities, that 16 those operators have additional requirements to go 17 above and beyond that to deal with fulfilling and 18 maintaining plant safety functions.
19 But fundamentally, you know, again this 20 exists outside of the rule language, because this is 21 something that we've been developing for, you know, 22 guidance. But currently, the way that we've worked 23 through and preliminarily established what we look to 24 currently be putting into guidance for those areas, 25 certified operators and licensed operators would both NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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183 1 have requirements for fundamentals.
2 So there would be requirements for the 3 training, you know, and examination of those 4 operators, particularly the examination. Because, you 5 know, again, that's an important point. But the 6 examination, whether it be a licensing or 7 certification exam, would have to be inclusive of, you 8 know, reactor theory, thermodynamics components.
9 And then above and beyond that, you know, 10 if you start getting into the specific job tasks 11 associated with those operators, again both sets of 12 operators would have reactivity management, right, 13 built into those programs as well.
14 But then, if you're talking about the 15 licensed operators, you know, they may have more to do 16 when you get into emergency operations, right, because 17 of the nature of those facilities. So at that point, 18 that's where you really start seeing the differences 19 in training program content and so forth.
20 But just in terms of fundamentals of, you 21 know, reactor theory, and ensuring principles of 22 thermodynamics, and also being able to safely conduct 23 reactivity manipulations, right now we see those as 24 being a common track between both of those programs.
25 MEMBER KIRCHNER: So, Jesse, this is Walt.
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184 1 Going back to Matt's point, I'm sitting in my dining 2 room. So I'm not in my library, and I can't look at 3 my license. But I always thought that NRC licenses, 4 mine's an AEC license, so I'm dated, but the license 5 is for a specific plant, is it not?
6 MR. SEYMOUR: It is, yes.
7 MEMBER KIRCHNER: So why not, as Matt was 8 suggesting, why create this certified alternative?
9 Why not just put in place the --- have the same 10 fundamental requirements for theory, reactor physics, 11 thermohydraulics, and then design a training program, 12 a simulator if needed, et cetera, for the facility 13 that the person's being licensed to operate?
14 It seems to me we're creating competing 15 tracks that somehow --- it would be nice to see 16 tabulated side by side what's required of a licensed 17 operator versus a certified operator.
18 CHAIR PETTI: That's coming up.
19 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Coming up, yes.
20 MEMBER BLEY: Let's wait to see that, 21 because I had some questions there.
22 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes, okay.
23 (Simultaneous speaking.)
24 MEMBER KIRCHNER: If we get to that, I'll 25 hold my comments to then, sorry. Thank you.
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185 1 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay. Yes, and that's why 2 I'd recommend if, you know, the Committee's amenable 3 to it is, you know, once I get through this slide and 4 the two that come after that, that'll put a bit more, 5 you know, kind of substance on the table to go through 6 and parse this out.
7 But before we get into that, what I just 8 want to reinforce is that it could have spilled upon 9 our last, you know, discussion that we had. You know, 10 we are very aware that if you draw a Venn diagram that 11 there's a point of overlap between, you know, the 12 licensed and the certified, even within this 13 construct. And that's an offshoot of how we thought 14 through, you know, the development of the two 15 programs.
16 And that is something that we are 17 receptive to feedback on, and we are still actively 18 thinking through. It is, you know, and I'll go 19 through, and I'll explain how got to certified 20 operators here in a moment.
21 But something that we are receptive to, to 22 work through future iterations of this, is perhaps 23 better to just now, for the licensed operator program, 24 you know, be able to scale through, you know, kind of 25 those very, simple and safe facilities and so forth, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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186 1 and be able to accommodate that and not to have a 2 separate track.
3 So that is an outcome that you know, 4 again, we're very receptive to feedback there. But to 5 my point though, what drives us to considering how a 6 non-licensed operator pathway like this in the first 7 place?
8 MEMBER HALNON: Hey, Jesse, just to be 9 clear for Charlie, the education requirements for 10 RO/SRO and certified operators are the same. There's 11 no advantage that we required for licensed operators 12 unless you're going through the instant SRO route.
13 MEMBER BROWN: Yes. It's the STA that has 14 the degree requirements, if I remember correctly.
15 Isn't that right?
16 MEMBER HALNON: That's correct. Yes.
17 MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
18 MEMBER HALNON: Yes. The STA and the 19 instant SRO.
20 MEMBER BROWN: Yes. I went back. Is the 21 senior RO, senior reactor operator, does he have to 22 have an engineering or some type of background in 23 engineering --
24 MEMBER HALNON: Not for ---
25 MEMBER BROWN: -- or just the STA?
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187 1 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, just the STA, not the 2 traditional SRO.
3 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. That's what I 4 thought. But --
5 (Simultaneous speaking.)
6 MEMBER BROWN: -- the training for the 7 Navy guys, they go through the Naval nuclear program 8 training. And they're not, you know, they're high 9 school graduates.
10 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, there is a --
11 (Simultaneous speaking.)
12 MEMBER HALNON: There is the path to the 13 SRO they call instant SRO that you have to have.
14 That's when you don't become an RO first. But if 15 you're an RO and then upgrade to SRO, there's no 16 advanced degree required.
17 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. That's what I 18 thought. Thank you.
19 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes, that's exactly the 20 case. You know, with SROs, there is a little bit of 21 nuance to how you can get there. And it's either 22 going to be through having experience, a certain 23 amount of experience in the RO position before you go 24 up. Or you can have, you know, a degree and then come 25 up through that track as well.
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188 1 So, again, in the case of a person who, 2 you know, they hire in as an equipment operator at the 3 plant, they get the requisite experience, they get the 4 reactor operator license, and then get the requisite 5 experience, and then get the senior reactor operator 6 license, you can have a senior reactor operator with 7 a high school diploma working at a plant.
8 And my understanding of the research and 9 test reactor requirements, I think that for the non-10 powered, I think that it's similar and that you can 11 have someone with a high school diploma that's 12 working.
13 And really, the place where we see the 14 degree coming in as one of the possible tracks to meet 15 the requirements to be an SRO and also, you know, we 16 see it embedded in the shift technical advisor 17 requirement.
18 But nominally, the way the training 19 programs are configured, you know, there's 20 fundamentals that are built into those training 21 programs. The reactor operators, senior reactor 22 operators and so forth, in the course of going through 23 their training programs, do get trained in reactor 24 theory, thermodynamics, and so forth.
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189 1 if they only have a high school diploma, someone 2 that's coming out of an RO or SRO training program 3 should be able to pick up, for example, a Mollier 4 diagram and with the isenthalpic change of a leaking 5 PRV and, you know, calculate what the tailpipe factor 6 should be and so forth.
7 So again, just to clarify, there are, 8 obviously there's, you know, there's a lot of 9 knowledge that you would gain through an engineering 10 degree that modern licensed operator training programs 11 do have sub-sets of that, that are embedded in there.
12 And again, it's mostly the practical, kind of, hands-13 on applications of some of that. But again, I just 14 want to clarify that there is training on that.
15 So getting back to where I was at, so why 16 do we consider having this non-licensed operator 17 pathway in the first place?
18 Simply put, if a given facility were 19 sufficiently designed such that there were no 20 significant operator roles in the plant's safety 21 performance, and again, this might be the case with, 22 you know, a hypothetical, inherently safe, and 23 autonomously operated design, a key factor that would 24 have warranted the federal licensing of those 25 individuals would then be absent.
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190 1 And to put that in other words, if 2 circumstances are such that operator performance would 3 no longer have a credible influence on public health 4 and safety outcomes then, you know, in our mindset 5 what becomes the logical consequence of when we start 6 thinking about, you know, the relative degree of 7 independent assurance that we would need to have on 8 those operator's abilities, and also for their overall 9 level of qualification.
10 And so again, I put that out there to 11 illustrate the type of thinking that got us kind of 12 working down this road. And as we approach that issue 13 within, you know, that context, regardless of whether 14 operators are or are not individually licensed by the 15 NRC, another thing to keep in mind too is that the 16 facility itself was similarly licensed by the NRC and 17 its regulated programs with the subjected oversight 18 thereafter.
19 So again, I put that out there just to, 20 you know, provide some of the data points that kind of 21 framed our thinking as we first started navigating 22 this. And as we worked through the process of 23 answering those questions, we then have to contend 24 with the reality that important administrative job 25 tasks would still need to be performed by adequately NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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191 1 qualified personnel.
2 But if we look at those administrative 3 jobs tasks ---
4 MEMBER BLEY: Let me interrupt you just --
5 -I'm just thinking about first of the kinds. We do a 6 paper design where we calculate, and we don't see 7 anything where an operator is required to save the day 8 with any high enough likelihood to worry about it.
9 But at least in the first few, if we don't 10 require prototypes, there's going to be things turn up 11 that operators have to do that we didn't think about.
12 And I don't know how you cover that, but I would hope 13 when the first licenses come through using this 14 process there's a learning period of a few years, that 15 is kind of like we'd get from a prototype, to make 16 sure we've not been too sanguine about what people 17 have to do to interact with these machines.
18 MR. SEYMOUR: On a later slide, I will 19 talk at length about, you know, the possibility that 20 a plant is built, and then we have something that 21 changes, you know, changes the underlying analyses 22 that comes up. Again, what I'll also talk about here 23 is kind of a long view that we're taking with this 24 language. And we'll get to that, I think, on the next 25 slide.
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192 1 MEMBER KIRCHNER: So, Jesse?
2 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes.
3 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Can I ask you a question 4 here? It's a more rhetorical, philosophical question.
5 I actually was proposing an autonomous reactor design 6 in my earlier career.
7 But we always judged that there would be 8 an operator role in that reactor design, such that if, 9 for whatever reason the reactor was not functioning 10 correctly and following its -- it wasn't shutting 11 itself down, if it was outside of safety parameters, 12 et cetera, that an operator would then initiate a safe 13 shutdown, and monitor that reactor to make sure it had 14 achieved safe shutdown, and decay heat was being 15 removed, et cetera, et cetera, all those things that 16 you achieve when you try to get to a safe shutdown 17 condition.
18 And that involves an operator. And often, 19 as Dennis was saying, for a first of a kind in 20 particular, you don't know necessarily where this 21 reactor is going. You think you do, you think you've 22 designed it for every contingency. But until you get 23 significant operating experience, I just can't connect 24 the dots here to not requiring a licensed operator.
25 MR. SEYMOUR: Could we go back to Slide 56 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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193 1 real quick?
2 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes.
3 MR. SEYMOUR: All right, if we could jump 4 back there. Because one thing that I wanted to show 5 is that what you just brought up has weighed on our 6 mind as we've been navigating through this.
7 And, you know, one thing that I know was 8 in broader discussions early on in Part 53 9 development, talking about is it good enough that the 10 plant has been there at a low power. What does it 11 mean to be in a safe fail state, you know, and 12 achieving sub-criticality, and so forth?
13 And we put our own spin on that here. And 14 what we said is this, right. You know, there's no 15 outcome in the proposed scheme that we have here where 16 there's just nobody overseeing that plant.
17 And even in the case where we go to the, 18 you know, the least restrictive outcome when you're 19 allowed to use the certified operator, these items 20 that I have pulled up, these last few bullets, talk 21 about the things that these certified operators would 22 need to be able to achieve at all times, right.
23 And what we see here is the ability to 24 immediately initiate reactor shutdown. And in 25 conjunction with that, also the ability to receive NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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194 1 operating data from the plant, you know, the ability 2 to also implement any emergency plant responsibilities 3 that they may have.
4 So in our thinking through this, we 5 reached what I think is probably a somewhat similar 6 line of thinking that, you know, even if you've gone 7 through and you've said there's no way that this 8 reactor would end up in the state where it's just not 9 shutdown, you know, you would never have an ATLAS on 10 this thing, and so forth. You know, we said, okay, 11 that's fine. You still need to have someone receiving 12 this.
13 And something too that I want to say about 14 the way that we have the HSI design requirement 15 structure with our proposed Part 53, there's no 16 gradation of those requirements for licensed versus 17 non-licensed operator plants.
18 And what that means is that the 19 requirements to have things like, you know, safety 20 parameter display system type of plant safety function 21 data coming in, the information about the state of 22 important system structures and components, core 23 damage related information, and so forth, that would 24 all have to be provided to, you know, the certified 25 operators as well.
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195 1 So again, what we found in our eyes was 2 that that was the lowest point that we're willing to 3 go to in terms of, you know, removing restrictions and 4 so forth. There would still have to be someone who 5 has an adequate training program, right, someone that 6 is proficient, that is trained to have access to the 7 right information.
8 And even if that plant can show that they 9 have no human role in safety, we still want someone 10 there with the ability to turn it off and to start 11 making the notifications that need to be made if 12 things go wrong from there.
13 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes, that was my point.
14 These bullets are good. That's what's in my thinking.
15 Even if it is an autonomous plant, you still need 16 someone. We can debate whether it's certified or 17 licensed operator, but you need someone to be able to 18 do all these functions, even for an autonomous plant.
19 I mean, when I was doing this many, many 20 years ago, we went through the same list of issues.
21 We were looking at the autonomous plants on the north 22 warning system to power radar stations that would be 23 remote and autonomous.
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196 1 the operation of the facility who's monitoring, is 2 getting the plant data, can affect a safe shutdown, 3 can dispatch people to do whatever is needed to 4 mitigate a potential release, et cetera.
5 So I had a problem with the --- now go 6 back to the slide you were working on, just that to me 7 it was a philosophical disconnect.
8 MR. SEYMOUR: So I guess, you know, just 9 to clarify the issues here just so that I understand, 10 with what we were discussing previously, even for our 11 autonomous reactor, the hypothetical, we still would 12 see that you would have that requirement there, right.
13 There will always be a certified operator, 14 even if the reactor itself was running autonomously, 15 there would still be someone, you know, with that 16 rudimentary level if monitoring and controllability 17 that would be there to turn it off, right.
18 So even though that person may not have to 19 do very much outside the administration with that 20 facility, you know, again, that certified operator 21 with those capabilities would be mandatory, even for 22 the so-called inherently safe autonomous reaction.
23 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Well, maybe I just 24 misread this view graph thing. So the key driver for 25 wording federal licensing of individuals is removed.
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197 1 But you would still have a certified operator.
2 MR. SEYMOUR: That's right, yes. And the 3 certified operator ---
4 MEMBER KIRCHNER: And that certified 5 operator would be, quote, unquote, certified by the 6 NRC.
7 MR. SEYMOUR: They would be certified by 8 the facility. The facility would have an NRC approved 9 program that they would be using to certify their own 10 operators. But those certified operators would be 11 non-licensed. That being said, they would have a 12 fairly highly regulated training program that they 13 would be subject to.
14 MEMBER KIRCHNER: All right. I missed 15 that nuance then in my looking at all of your 16 materials in advance. I thought that a certified 17 operator would be certified by the NRC, not by the 18 Applicant.
19 MEMBER BLEY: And that's probably the 20 major difference, right?
21 MEMBER BROWN: Slide 61 shows that whole 22 certification process when we get to it.
23 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes. And when I get to 24 Slide 61, I'll go through and I'll show it. Because 25 again, you know, when we discussed what's the benefit, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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198 1 you still have this fairly, comparatively --- if you 2 think about, like, and equipment operator, compared to 3 what an equipment operator has to do, this would be a 4 fairly heavily regulated program. So what would be 5 the advantage for someone to pursue that? And that's 6 what I'll get to in our main slides.
7 And if I could just wrap this one up, so 8 we can, you know, get to that information, because I 9 think that will help to clarify.
10 So again, we talked about the 11 administrative responsibilities that remain. And 12 again, one of the things that shaped our thinking is 13 that, you know, we do have precedent and experience 14 with certain non-licensed roles that do perform 15 important administrative tasks, like the certified 16 fuel handlers.
17 And then also, another matter that we've 18 had to consider is, you know, what would we do if we 19 see that there's ever an acceptable time where someone 20 without a license could conduct reactivity 21 manipulations? Because that would be part of the 22 certified operator alternative.
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199 1 those plants would have to meet, that it would be 2 reasonable to allow these certified individuals to 3 conduct them.
4 And our thinking in getting to that point 5 has been that, you know, we approach that from 6 thinking about the safety and also the risks posed by 7 human error in conducting those manipulations.
8 And our perspective at the moment has been 9 that, if a design can meet those stringent criteria, 10 that one of the offshoots of meeting those criteria 11 for using certified operators in the first place is 12 that the consequences of such actions, right, such 13 human errors, you know, people getting things wrong 14 during a reactor startup and so forth, that those 15 consequences could be bounded by the design.
16 And that, in conjunction with appropriate 17 qualification requirements, right, you know, at the 18 end of the day, you know, the training and experience 19 requirements with regard to reactivity manipulations 20 looking very, very similar between those two programs, 21 that that coupled, you know, together would yield an 22 adequate assurance of safety, irrespective of whether 23 that person is licensed by the NRC or certified by the 24 facility under an NRC approved program.
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200 1 please. Okay. And again ---
2 MEMBER BALLINGER: This is Ron Ballinger.
3 I have a question. And that is where does the buck 4 stop? In a commercial plant, there is somebody in 5 that control room who, if that person feels that they 6 need to shut the plant down, they have the 7 responsibility to do that.
8 Who has that similar responsibility in 9 your scenario? In other words, who has the 10 responsibility for the safe operation of the plant and 11 can shut it down irregardless of what anybody else 12 says?
13 MR. SEYMOUR: So this is where there is a 14 difference in accountability that occurs between, you 15 know, the licensed operator facility and the certified 16 operator facility. And this is an important point of 17 discussion that, you know, that we've had in getting 18 to our current thinking.
19 Because when you talk about --- and 20 actually here, I think on this slide or one after this 21 one, we'll talk about aspects of that accountability.
22 But what you see with licensed operators is that you 23 have an individual who's licensed by the NRC and also 24 a facility licensee, right.
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201 1 gets into, you know, certain issues of safety culture 2 and so forth, and what happens if you have kind of the 3 Chernobyl scenario of people being coerced into taking 4 the wrong action, and moving in the wrong direction, 5 and so forth.
6 You know, one of the merits of licensed 7 operators is that, because they are the ones who hold 8 the authority to implement certain operations within 9 that plant, that essentially gives them the ability to 10 say no to, you know, management under those 11 conditions, right. Because the person that would be 12 telling you to do that doesn't have authority to 13 implement it. So it is a powerful thing, right.
14 In our thinking with certified operators, 15 what we've considered is that, you know, that level of 16 accountability really rests with the facility licensee 17 in that case. They would have certified operators, 18 right, that are trained and qualified to operate those 19 systems and so forth.
20 But, you know, the potential does exist 21 that a certified operator may not carry the same 22 ability to push back, right, because they are not 23 holding that license that's independent of a plant's 24 license. So how do we think through that, right?
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202 1 the reason why we've been very careful and tried to be 2 very rigorous with how we've approached the criteria 3 for those plants.
4 And in thinking about the safety criteria 5 that a plant would need to have to justify that, one 6 of things that we've taken into consideration is what 7 do you need to do to minimize the likelihood that 8 things like people restoring systems to serve when 9 they're inoperable, and people committing operational 10 errors, and so on and so forth. You know, what are 11 the types of design considerations that need to be 12 there to still give you a reasonable assurance in 13 those contexts.
14 And that's why when we look at, and I'll 15 give an example, right, when we look at the criteria 16 of 53.755(e), again we propose two potential 17 alternatives.
18 Well, the second one, you know, speaks to 19 reliance on passive safety features, but it also 20 amplifies those passive safety features, you know, 21 can't be subject to being defeated by credible human 22 errors of omission and commission, right.
23 And the reliance there is, you know, what 24 that's really doing is it's pointing to the fact that 25 we don't want to have a capability for people NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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203 1 restoring systems to service when the technical 2 specifications aren't met. You know, perhaps there's 3 valves that closed going to a heat exchanger.
4 But these really need to be very robust, 5 very simple, you know, passive safety features. Or 6 they just need to be things that are more inherent in 7 nature. Because what we're doing as part of, you 8 know, requiring that, is we're starting to remove 9 where some of those dead organizational decisions can 10 start, you know, removing the safety considerations 11 from that plant.
12 And I think a good example is this, right.
13 Let's say that you've got a plant that's coming out of 14 an outage. You've got an operator that is verifying 15 that conditions are met to change modes and start the 16 plant up.
17 And let's say that we have some 18 hypothetical management that will imagine this is a 19 bad scenario, that's imagining that management is 20 coercive, and they pressure the operator to go in and 21 call the systems back into service when they're not 22 operable, and then to go ahead and start the facility 23 up and move into the higher mode.
24 You know, again, that's a situation to 25 where we have to ask that question. What if we have NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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204 1 a certified operator, and they don't hold a license, 2 and they don't have that same weight to push back, 3 right.
4 And at that point, the way that we've 5 thought about that, at least in our preliminary 6 thinking that we have right now, is that by having a 7 very high bar that that plant design has to get over 8 in the first place, and the types of safety features 9 and human roles that it's allowed to have to even be 10 in that theoretical situation in the first place, that 11 that would tend to mitigate the consequences from, you 12 know, those types of issues.
13 But again, it is an important question.
14 There is more to the fact that these individuals are 15 licensed than just the fact that, yes, the NRC is 16 coming in independently certifying their knowledge, 17 and abilities, and so forth. There's also that 18 authority that was granted by virtue of having a 19 federal license. And it's a complex issue.
20 MEMBER BALLINGER: You know, I guess I'm 21 just not sure I got an answer. I'll, in deference to 22 Charlie, default back to the Admiral. The Admiral had 23 to identify a single person for a single area that he 24 could call, no matter what time of the day, if 25 something went wrong. It was very important for him NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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205 1 to know who's responsible.
2 And I think the same goes for this case.
3 We had six or a dozen fission batteries operating in 4 a steel plant in the middle of a steel mill. And the 5 administrative function is 150, 200 miles away, and 6 something goes wrong, who is responsible for that 7 system?
8 MR. SEYMOUR: So as a function of the 9 plants with a facility license, and again, Bill, I'll 10 definitely turn to you if you can add to this, but 11 within the framework that we're working within, we 12 still envision having plants, obviously technical 13 specifications. You would still have Section 5, the 14 administrative section of technical specifications.
15 And we still would have guidance for the acceptable 16 content.
17 And one thing that we see embedded in 18 Section 5 of technical specifications are the 19 organizational responsibilities. And within that 20 framework, you know, if we're talking about the 21 facility licensee, what you'll see within that 22 framework is still people in management positions or 23 corporate officers that are specifically called out as 24 having certain responsibilities for that facility as 25 well.
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206 1 So again, even in this case where if we 2 kind of disassociate, you know, the single point of 3 accountability from being the operator, I don't know 4 that we would necessarily say that it becomes, you 5 know, this nameless, faceless corporate entity at that 6 point.
7 I think that when we look at the way that, 8 you know, the administrative section of the tech specs 9 are structured, and I think -- and, Bill, please 10 correct me, but I think even the way that we currently 11 envision it still functioning under ARCAP is that, you 12 know, we would have those administrative reporting 13 chains and specific, you know, management and 14 corporate responsibilities delineated in the technical 15 specifications.
16 But, Bill, maybe you can answer that?
17 MR. RECKLEY: Yes, that's right. And 18 basically, the parallel, and Jesse had pointed it out 19 in some previous slides, once a facility enters 20 decommissioning, we move to certified fuel handlers in 21 fuel cycle facilities, or materials licensees. We are 22 licensing entities, but not licensing individuals.
23 And so I think you would look to those 24 types of licenses to see how and who, if it's 25 important, well, it is always important, but who we NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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207 1 would hold accountable. There would always be an 2 entity that would be accountable.
3 And as Jesse mentioned, the challenge here 4 is in what we were trying to do in defining some 5 criteria, and we gave it a shot with our first 6 iteration, would be to try to say this particular 7 opportunity to have certified versus licensed 8 operators, it's a tall hurdle to have that 9 opportunity.
10 And it would be limited to facilities that 11 we thought would be more comparable to the 12 radiological hazard of some of those other licensees 13 than current light water reactors, for example.
14 So we are trying to thread a needle here, 15 and we understand some of the concerns. Much of the 16 discussion you're having, we've had internally many 17 times, I can assure you. And so that's what we're 18 trying to do in this proposal. But again, it's just 19 ---
20 MEMBER BLEY: Bill?
21 MR. RECKLEY: Go ahead, Dennis.
22 MEMBER BLEY: Yes. There's one thing 23 about this that the others were hitting on that kind 24 of nags at me. You always say there's an entity 25 responsible. We need a person, a real human being --
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208 1 MR. RECKLEY: No, it doesn't ---
2 MEMBER BLEY: -- responsible, a particular 3 one. And that's a place where, you know, I don't go 4 back to Reckoner stuff very much, but if you got out 5 of having the submariners, and you go to, say, an 6 aircraft carrier, the executive officer and the CO had 7 to be nuclear trained. Even though you had a key guy 8 down in the plant who owned it, the head boss on that 9 ship had to have that nuclear background. So it needs 10 to hook to individuals. But you were about to tell me 11 it does.
12 MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes. And he or she now 13 would be the one that gets canned.
14 MR. RECKLEY: And as Jesse mentioned, the 15 company or entity always has an officer, right. And 16 so that's, I think, who we would ---
17 MEMBER BROWN: That's 200 miles away, 18 Bill. It could be, could be 1,000 miles away. I 19 mean, can you imagine what this would do to the 20 nuclear program if one of these, quote, autonomous 21 plants operated in this manner, started going haywire, 22 and it just kept on perking along, perking along, 23 until all kinds of other things happened? It would be 24 destroyed. It would be over with, just like TAI 25 destroyed the whole program here.
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209 1 MR. SEYMOUR: If I can clarify though, I 2 just want to, you know, kind of draw that line between 3 talking about the corporate responsibility, the 4 management responsibility, and designated corporate 5 officers, and the fact we still go back to those other 6 requirements.
7 But we're saying, you know, whether we're 8 talking about the certified operator, and we can 9 debate licensing versus certification, but we would 10 still be mandating that this well trained individual 11 would have plant parameters and would have the ability 12 to shut that plant down.
13 And then, you know, even despite the 14 analyses that said that it was okay not to have that 15 person there, it's like they're still there to go out 16 and shut everything down. And I should say, despite 17 the analysis that said that, you know, it's 18 permissible to not have a licensed operator and use 19 the certified operator instead. This person would 20 still shut things down.
21 And, you know, depending on, again, the 22 plants, there's different ways that they could 23 approach emergency preparedness and so forth. But in 24 all likelihood, you would have this person also in a 25 position with the plant parameters to go ahead and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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210 1 start, you know, moving the emergency preparedness 2 framework along.
3 MEMBER BROWN: So if it's not an 4 emergency, well, how do you keep it, how do you know 5 it's going to stay shut down? So he shuts it down and 6 puts the rods -- whatever the facility is, who's going 7 to keep it shut down. How do you know it will stay 8 shut down, based on whatever's going on?
9 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg. Let me just 10 ---
11 MEMBER BROWN: I'm out of this.
12 MEMBER HALNON: Yes. Let me just put this 13 --- even if you made the argument that, from a 14 knowledge and proficiency perspective, the licensed 15 operator is equal to the certified operator, and vice 16 versa, I think the delta of not having NRC 17 accountability personally on the person that's moving 18 controls is the holdup.
19 So let's just assume they're exactly equal 20 from a capability perspective and training 21 perspective. That personal accountability, which is, 22 I think, one of the questions we sent, is important.
23 And I know, Jesse, you're in the control 24 room. And that, I mean, I don't know if you were ever 25 put up against that pressure of starting up an outage NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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211 1 like you mentioned.
2 I was put up personally trying to keep the 3 plant running when it should be shut down. And I shut 4 it down. And I felt very emboldened to do that, 5 because I had an NRC license, not a certification that 6 I could probably lose my job. I knew I wasn't going 7 to lose my job. So I think that that's where the 8 discomfort's coming from, even if you just equal 9 everything else across the board.
10 (Simultaneous speaking.)
11 MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes. You just never 12 want to get into a situation where somebody has to 13 pick up the phone and call the corporate office before 14 they do anything. That happened somewhere in Japan 15 one time not too long ago.
16 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes. And it gets back to 17 the point that was just made about the unique nature 18 of that authority and trying to think through those 19 types of situations where that authority is really the 20 thing that makes or breaks whether things turn out 21 well or turn out poorly.
22 And again, that was an example that came 23 to my mind. You know, you have those -- typically the 24 things we'll read about, it's during safety culture 25 training where you have these toxic environments and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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212 1 people being coerced to do the wrong thing. And that 2 operator license does grant unique authority to push 3 back against that.
4 And that's been one of the, you know, one 5 of the thresholds. And Bill and I have had many 6 discussions about this debating the various 7 approaches.
8 But one of the thresholds that we've kind 9 of commonly agreed on is technologically, you know, 10 the plant design -- and again, not going so far as to 11 say that nothing can go wrong, and these plants are 12 absolutely safe, and so forth, but any plant design 13 where you would allow, you know, that plant to forego 14 the individual license you have for operators, would 15 have to have to have a very high safety bar.
16 Because you would have to be able to 17 envision the plant design in its robustness being able 18 to weather those types of situations. So again, this 19 is a place where we're open to feedback. And as we've 20 gone through, this process, we've debated, you know, 21 should we have the certified operator track, should it 22 just be gradations of a licensed operator.
23 And as we've moved through, you know, and 24 we've kind of taken kind of a modular 25 compartmentalized approach to this with an eye towards NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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213 1 a future iteration, if we just went to only having a 2 licensed operator program that could be scaled and 3 graded, what would that look like and so forth? So 4 we've already done a lot of thinking along that line 5 as well too.
6 So again, I don't want anyone to think 7 that we're not open to feedback or, you know, changing 8 our thinking on this, or taking a different approach.
9 MEMBER BLEY: So, Jesse, before we go to 10 the next slide, we're getting close to our break time.
11 I just, you know, you guys have said over and over 12 again, it's a high bar. I keep envisioning that there 13 just is not that much difference between the licensed 14 operator and the certified operator in terms of the 15 training. In terms of the administration of this, 16 there's differences.
17 But, you know, the question that's still 18 in my mind is, is it worth it if, in fact, it's such 19 a high bar, you know, what's it really buy you in the 20 end? So --
21 (Simultaneous speaking.)
22 MEMBER BIER: If I can --
23 MEMBER BLEY: Vicki, sure.
24 MEMBER BIER: Sorry. I can make one quick 25 comment before we go on break. FAA has dealt with NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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214 1 that in the past. They certified pilots at airlines 2 to give check rides for other pilots at the same 3 airline.
4 And at one point, they found that pilots 5 were certifying check rides that had never been given.
6 And so that's another problem besides the individual 7 not feeling kind of empowered is that, you know, there 8 may be a culture where, at some plants, the person 9 gets 12 tries to pass the test or whatever it is. So 10 that's another issue.
11 I would say if you are set on going in 12 this direction, I would look at the experience at FDA, 13 sorry, FAA, whether they're still doing that, if so, 14 how it has changed over time?
15 MR. SEYMOUR: I appreciate that point.
16 And I mentioned this before --
17 (Simultaneous speaking.)
18 MR. SEYMOUR: Oh, sorry.
19 CHAIR PETTI: Go ahead, Jesse.
20 MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes. I don't want to 21 beat a dead horse again, but I don't care whether it's 22 a certified operator, a reactor operator, or whoever, 23 whatever you call it, who has the ultimate 24 responsibility for the operation of the plant that can 25 shut it down, regardless of what anybody else says.
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215 1 MEMBER BROWN: And keep it down.
2 MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes, okay. Well, first 3 things first, I guess.
4 MR. SEYMOUR: So I guess just to close out 5 the first item, and I'll address that, you know, I was 6 mentioning that, with regards to the point about exam 7 integrity and issues there, I spent five years doing 8 operator licensing exams prior to what I'm doing now.
9 And something that we were always very 10 respectful of and appreciative of doing that is that, 11 with the NRC's process, even if a training program was 12 completely deficient, even if there were things like, 13 you know, rampant integrity issues and so forth, to 14 where, you know, you give the example of a check ride 15 where people weren't actually doing what they were 16 supposed to do, there was still that final safeguard 17 at the end of that.
18 And that is that the NRC would review and 19 approve an exam and then they would come in and 20 independently administer that. And no matter how 21 deficient that training program had been, there was an 22 independent safeguard at the end of that so that you 23 would have some final backstop against that.
24 So again, it's a good point that we've 25 brought up as well too. If you have the same entity NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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216 1 responsible for, you know, cradle to grave, what are 2 the potential vulnerabilities that you could get into 3 with that.
4 And then with regards to the other point 5 about accountability, the simple straight forward 6 answer is this, right. If we're talking about a 7 licensed operator plant, the ultimate accountability 8 for what's going on there could generally fall in one 9 of two places. It could fall on the licensed 10 individual, the licensed operator, right. Or it could 11 fall on the facility licensee.
12 And again, there are certain positions 13 that aren't situated in the tech specs and so forth as 14 having certain responsibilities. So they may fall 15 against the licensee generally or there could be 16 certain organizational individuals.
17 When we're talking about the certified 18 operator facilities, because the operators themselves 19 aren't licensed, then that type of structure you would 20 probably be looking at either the plant generally or 21 with individuals. It's probably going to be like a 22 plant manager or someone with that type of authority 23 that's spelled out in technical specifications that 24 would have accountability.
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217 1 of development of rule and guidance, that's where I 2 would foresee that accountability falling on that 3 certified operator plant. You probably would be 4 targeting that to, like, a plant manager type of 5 organizational individual.
6 MEMBER BLEY: I think I asked you about 7 this at one of the most recent meetings. But two 8 related things, one is have you gotten any feedback 9 from INTO about this idea of certified operators? And 10 do we have any idea whether these new, especially the 11 smaller designs, the licensees are likely to belong to 12 INTO?
13 MR. SEYMOUR: So we have not currently had 14 any engagements with INTO directly on these matters.
15 And again, we do have a memorandum of, you know, 16 agreement that guides how we have those interactions 17 with them.
18 We have, as a courtesy, provided them 19 information regarding the rule language that we're 20 working on and then, you know, upcoming opportunities 21 for public engagement and so forth. But beyond that, 22 we generally have to wait for them to kind of meet us 23 in the middle on those types of interactions.
24 MEMBER BLEY: Kind of where I'm hanging 25 up here, if I'm a designer, and I think I've got a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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218 1 client who doesn't think they need insurance because 2 this thing is so safe that they'll never be 3 challenged, they might not have the motivation to join 4 INTO. And I'm just wondering if you've heard from 5 potential applicants anything about this or not.
6 Because that would give me personally a 7 little more confidence in how this is going to work if 8 they were almost sure they're going to go the INTO 9 route. I mean, you still have the responsibilities 10 people are talking about, but that's a different 11 layer.
12 MR. SEYMOUR: So to my knowledge, in terms 13 of formal correspondence that we've received that 14 would spell that out, I don't know that we've received 15 anything that's, you know, stated a formal intention 16 to forego accreditation.
17 When we get later on in the presentation, 18 I'll talk about our preparations that we're making 19 should we have to do the review of the training 20 program on the end of things.
21 But, you know, more broadly speaking, INTO 22 membership and so forth, I don't have an answer other 23 than to say that, you know, me personally, I have not 24 seen anything that has been formally submitted to us 25 in terms of correspondence or anything.
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219 1 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. And that kind of 2 means that if they don't go that way things that 3 you've been willing to accept from INTO, you're going 4 to have to be doing rather than monitoring.
5 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes. And we'll get to that 6 on a later slide. And again, if it's okay with the 7 Committee, what I'd like to do is just go ahead and 8 I'll get through this slide and the next one which 9 should bring us to near the end of our certified 10 operator discussion.
11 Or, you know, I know you mentioned wanting 12 to take a break. I didn't know if you wanted to take 13 that break now or wait until we're done with that?
14 CHAIR PETTI: Well, keep going. Let's get 15 through Slide 61.
16 MR. SEYMOUR: Okay. So another factor 17 that we have here is, you know, we're endeavoring to 18 create a durable rule. And by that I mean a framework 19 that remains adequate over the decades to come. So 20 part of that foresight, I think, requires us to 21 account for the possibility of future advancements in 22 safety.
23 And I would just pose a hypothetical that, 24 even if we have no near term applicants that could 25 even meet the criteria for using certified operators NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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220 1 because of the high bar, that doesn't mean that would 2 continue to be the case a few years down the road.
3 And, for example, the types of innovations, we may see 4 the fusion reactors and so forth, because it would be 5 a game changer. We just don't know yet.
6 Now, this does leave the question of how 7 it might be simpler to instead rely upon gradations 8 within the licensed operator process, versus having 9 two distinct tracks for operators, as has been 10 proposed, and as we're discussing.
11 And this next portion of my discussion 12 will, I think, help shed some light on the potential 13 advantages of having those two distinct categories.
14 And I'll begin, before we go to the table on the next 15 slide, I'll say that, in fact, if you could just 16 advance the slide to 61. I'll just pull that up one.
17 I'm going through this.
18 So while the framework for certified 19 operators parallels that for licensed operators in 20 many respects, there would still exist significantly 21 less regulatory interface and more flexibilities 22 within certified operator programs.
23 And what that would ultimately equate to 24 would likely be a meaningful cost savings on the part 25 of facility licensees. And those cost savings would NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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221 1 tend to manifest themselves more significantly during 2 the operating phase, you know, as you got past the 3 application into the operations.
4 Our experiences with current industry 5 burden estimates that we have to do for, you know, 6 information collection and so forth, give us insights 7 into the types of fee-billable hours that are 8 associated with different administrative pieces and 9 parts of this process.
10 And so, you know, when we look at this 11 table without scribing numbers to it, what I can say 12 is that our experience tells us that this equates to 13 money on the part of facilities.
14 And going through, what this table is 15 showing is it's considering certain components of both 16 the operator licensing and certification programs.
17 And as discussed, the proposed license and certified 18 operator processes parallel each other at a 19 fundamental level. But once you get past the initial 20 NRC review and approval that's common to both 21 programs, a number of differences become apparent when 22 the administrative features of those programs are 23 considered 24 And just stepping through these items 25 again and going past, you know, the initial review and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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222 1 approval there, and kind of these items that are in 2 red, kind of focus on those, while both programs would 3 have initial examinations, for example, operator 4 certification exams would not require the NRC to 5 review each exam prior to administration, right. So 6 it's one difference that we currently have that's 7 built in there.
8 While both programs would have operator 9 requirements people would have to meet in order to be 10 eligible for the licensing or certification, and that 11 includes medical exams, that's common between the two, 12 certified operator programs would not require 13 submittal of and approval by the NRC of the various 14 forms that are associated with those applications and 15 not certifications.
16 So again, a difference there where, 17 fundamentally, something similar is happening, but 18 there's less regulatory interface associated with it.
19 Both programs would have regulatory 20 requirements for the use of simulators within operator 21 training and examination, if certified operator 22 programs would not require the initial approval of 23 their simulator by the NRC. So again, you know, 24 another difference there, that one being more towards 25 the application phase.
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223 1 Another example, both programs would have 2 requirements associated with license or certificate 3 termination, but only the license would require 4 reporting to and also processing by the NRC of that 5 termination, again, in a license context.
6 For certified operators there would be no 7 equivalent of either license renewal, or the 8 termination, you know, would be something that would 9 be handled internally as part of the program.
10 Additionally, for the initial operator 11 examinations, the waiving of the examination 12 requirements, when that's justified by appropriate 13 circumstances, would not require correspondence with 14 and approval by the NRC. And that would, you know, be 15 the case with those certification programs. For 16 licensed operator programs, that all has to get routed 17 through us.
18 And then a last point, while the licensed 19 operator programs would retain the current, you know, 20 status quo of having a two-year requirement for 21 training cycles and exam periodicity, facilities with 22 certain operators would be provided the flexibility to 23 potentially propose longer periodicities, provided, 24 and this is an important condition here, why they 25 could justify and adequately support requesting that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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224 1 longer periodicity.
2 So again, if we look at these points, you 3 know, this is where we start to see that even though 4 you're doing fundamentally similar things, you know, 5 a lot of the regulatory interface, and you're talking 6 about significant numbers of hours and so forth, and 7 resources, what that's really being accommodated by 8 is, you know, there's still what we envision to be a 9 robust approval of the program that's being used to do 10 this.
11 And there would still be, you know, 12 continuing oversight thereafter, most likely in the 13 form of an ongoing inspection program, but not the day 14 to day, you know, kind of back and forth that you have 15 with the License program.
16 MEMBER BLEY: Two or three things real 17 quickly. Some of these, when you look at them you 18 say, oh my God, that kind of lets things slip out of 19 control a bit, depending on if you have somebody who 20 is not the top of the industry's operations or 21 somebody who is, somebody, some organization who is 22 over confident.
23 But to get into using certified operators, 24 as I recall, your safety analysis has to show you 25 don't need human actions to survive any design basis NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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225 1 accident, maybe there is more, and is there an limit 2 on consequences for things beyond a design basis?
3 MR. SEYMOUR: So that's a good question.
4 When we look at the criteria to be able to use 5 certified operators in the first place, again, we do 6 have those two sets of criteria that we proposed.
7 And in both cases, right, you know, talk 8 about consequences, right. In both case, whether 9 you're talking about Option A or Option B, what you're 10 pointing to are the safety criteria of Subpart B.
11 So, when you talk about safety criteria 12 that have been established, in the case of Option A, 13 right, it points to the safety criteria for design 14 basis accidents, and also for licensing basis events.
15 The alternative criteria points, I believe, 16 exclusively to the design basis accident criteria.
17 But again, you have a direct tie to the 18 consequences of that facility. So, if you want to 19 justify not having licensed operators, what you're 20 going to have to show, in part, is that the 21 consequences associated with that facility are able to 22 meet those criteria without human action for 23 mitigation of events, right.
24 And there is more layered on top of it 25 than that. But that's the fundamental idea is that, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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226 1 if the operators aren't credited to take action, that 2 you're still not going to exceed those consequence 3 criteria. At least with regards to the human aspect 4 of things.
5 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. And if they do go 6 this route, although they don't have to get approval 7 for you for this check list of things, they are still 8 under the possibility of audits I assume, is that 9 right?
10 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes. And so, what we 11 currently envision is that there would be an 12 inspection program associated with this. And again, 13 I don't want to speak to that in any great detail 14 because that's another stage of built beyond where 15 we're at right now.
16 But what we've been crafting into the rule 17 are record retention requirements. You know, touch 18 points where the NRC has to be given the opportunity 19 presence and so forth. Even within the certified 20 operator context.
21 Such that what we've currently envision is 22 that we would have the ability to come in and watch a 23 certification event. You know, to sample that for 24 inspection purposes. That we would be coming in and 25 doing the continued training inspections. You know, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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227 1 very similarly to what we do with operator licensing.
2 In the event that a facility wasn't 3 accredited, that they didn't have an accredited 4 training program, we would be going deeper than that 5 because it would actually be digging a lot more into 6 the mechanics of how the training program was 7 functioning and so forth.
8 But again, to summarize, yes, we do see, 9 we do see that this would be a closely overseen 10 process. But the difference is, what we would be 11 focusing on is that a satisfactory process is being 12 used to make this happen by being the entity that's 13 actually doing the true certification of a post.
14 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. And I would just say, 15 I think probably for some of my colleagues on the 16 committee, and probably for some elements of the 17 public who will watch this, the structure of an 18 inspection program are going to be pretty important to 19 gaining confidence that this thing is going to work.
20 MEMBER HALNON: And they're probably would 21 not be, more than likely, a full-time resident 22 inspector at many of these places. So you have to 23 factor that in, that these would be periodic 24 inspections, not continuous like we have now.
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228 1 regard to renewals and terminations, obviously plants 2 have a very strict fitness for duty requirement, as 3 far as like drug and alcohol abuse or whatever.
4 But you can also just get other mental 5 health or cognitive decline kind of issues that you 6 would want to make sure that they get caught 7 eventually.
8 MEMBER BLEY: Have you looked at, and I'm 9 sure you have in the past, in how the U.K. does its 10 regulation?
11 One of the key things they have is that 12 there is a group of, I'll call them inspectors, a 13 group of people who have a warrant from the government 14 that says, if I show up at your door, you got to open 15 the door and I can look at anything I want.
16 And, it goes further there. If I find 17 something I think is unsafe, I can actually shut you 18 down. These things that are kind of riding with much 19 less oversight than we're used to, I'm hypothesizing, 20 things we saw with air systems in the past is, even 21 though you had a design people kept modifying things.
22 And some kind of modifications might 23 change the safety analysis here. But that ability to 24 just walk in the door and see what's going on, might 25 be the kind of thing that can also lend credibility to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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229 1 this process.
2 MR. DENNIS: And we all, this is Bill 3 Dennis, we always have that. We always have 4 unfettered access.
5 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes, I appreciate that 6 clarification, Bill, because that's what I was going 7 to point to as well.
8 If I could, if we can just go on to Slide 9 62. I just want to go through these points. This is 10 the final thing that I have in the certified operator 11 discussion.
12 But again, this kind of touches upon some 13 things that we've been talking about. I think this 14 may kind of add to some of the questions that are 15 currently pending.
16 So, some specific items that the committee 17 raised, and to speak to those points, and I appreciate 18 providing, there were a lot of specifics there so I 19 appreciate that.
20 So, certified operators, right, again, 21 they would be trained to conduct reactivity 22 manipulations. We've talked about that aspect of it.
23 But due to their unlicensed natured, a consequence of 24 that is the facility licensee would retain ultimate 25 accountability for operations.
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230 1 And again, just to highlight that point 2 that there is another layer to that as well. And that 3 really has to do with the organizational 4 responsibilities.
5 So, again, the answer that I current 6 provide to that question is that we would still see 7 that there would be an individual, probably in the 8 order of like a plant manager that would have that 9 type of organizational responsibility.
10 And the other thing I point out too, when 11 we're talking about unfettered access, which is kind 12 of a higher level work principle.
13 Another thing too is that when we talk 14 about accountability and so forth, when we're talking 15 about individual enforcement actions, by and large, if 16 we're going to take enforcement action against an 17 individual, a lot of times we're thinking about 18 licensed operators. But if we're talking about 19 willful misconduct, we'll take enforcement action 20 against, routinely, people who aren't licensed.
21 And so, again, something to keep in mind 22 is if you end up with a rogue certified operator that, 23 operating outside of these approved regulated 24 processes that we have established for a facility 25 licensee, we still have every ability to go in there NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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231 1 and take individual enforcement action against them.
2 Particularly in that willful conduct type of 3 situation. Willfulness conduct I should say.
4 And we've got a track record of doing that 5 when it's been appropriate. And again, we're talking 6 about like wrongdoing types of situations.
7 MEMBER HALNON: Jesse, that comment 8 spawned from the section on condition of licenses 9 where the licensed operator were specifically called 10 out that you must comply with any other conditions the 11 Commission may impose to protect the health and safety 12 of the public. That same provision is not in the 13 certified operator conditions.
14 So, there is just a delta between not 15 owning the license, having a license, but also in the 16 way the regulation calls out personnel accountability 17 of the operators. Certified operators you take credit 18 for all the other regulations and requirements, but 19 for the license you specifically call it out. So that 20 was where that comment got spawned from.
21 MR. SEYMOUR: I appreciate the 22 clarification. And it's a good point. When you're 23 talking about these individuals, again, we're still a 24 licensing facility. There is a point where if they 25 stray too far outside of the facility's processes then NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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232 1 they're on their own. Again, those willful misconduct 2 type situations.
3 But by and large, you do end up with a 4 situation where the enforcement actions start being 5 directed against the facility, vice the individual, 6 because you will act that type of a condition that's 7 based on a license that is held individually.
8 MEMBER HALNON: Right. And again, just 9 the language somewhat diminishes the accountability, 10 or that's maybe not the right word, but certainly 11 dilutes it. Having the same words in the certified 12 operator would be powerful.
13 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes. Yes, and I appreciate 14 that. And again, this last point, and I appreciate 15 the patience in kind of getting to this point, this 16 question came up earlier and I said, well, a point 17 later on to address it.
18 But this really gets to, what happens if 19 we get to the finish line on this and we still have 20 training for certified operators and a plant gets 21 licensed with a facility licensed use certified 22 operators and later on it comes to light that there is 23 some issue that calls that into question to where it 24 would no longer have been sufficient to license that 25 plant with certified operators.
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233 1 Now there is a, and some sort of 2 accredited human role and safety to where licensed 3 operators would call for.
4 So, something to, I guess put out there as 5 a hypothetical is, let's say that they have this 6 plant, they meet these criteria of 53.755(b), and we 7 find out, you know, once the plant is up and running 8 that a safety issue exists. If that happens, right, 9 at a very high level, and this isn't the cleanest of 10 answers, but at the very highest level the NRC would 11 have, if a safety issue truly exists, right, to where 12 reasonable assurance no longer exists within that 13 context, then the NRC would have authority to take 14 action.
15 And that could include modifying the 16 facility's license to impose additional conditions, 17 issuing an order, things of that nature. Within the 18 context of such a situation, what I want to emphasize 19 is that accrediting human actions for safety, which 20 would be a most likely driver of why this would be 21 called up, called into question in the first place, 22 this potential shift to licensed operators, that's 23 only one possible outcome of how such a safety issue 24 might be resolved.
25 It's quite possible that, and I'll give NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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234 1 this example, that the facility licensee could elect 2 to make changes to plant equipment instead. And in so 3 doing, address the issue via means that obviates that 4 need for alliance on human action to address the 5 issue.
6 So, again, we say here's this safety 7 concern that exists, and how do you address that 8 safety concern. There may be more than one way to 9 address it.
10 In the end, it's going to be incumbent on 11 the licensee to figure out how they want to address 12 it. Unless we tell them that it has to be a certain 13 way.
14 But what I want to keep in mind is that if 15 we're talking about something that just suddenly 16 created a human action that needs to be taken to 17 mitigate an accident, then perhaps there is an 18 equipment change or something else to be made in the 19 facility that would obviate the need for that.
20 So, again, that's one possible outcome 21 that could be there. It's a complex issue.
22 Ultimately, if there is no other recourse 23 than the imposition of the requirement for licensed 24 operators, than what we expect is that the parallelism 25 that exists between the licensed and certified NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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235 1 operator programs, would tend to make such a 2 transition a viable possibility to converting a 3 licensed, a certified program to a licensed program.
4 Although still, and again, this isn't a 5 clean, neat answer. The interim state plan 6 operations, if that plant was allowed to continue 7 operating pending that, it would be something that 8 we'd have to very careful consider and perhaps 9 condition as necessary to give us that assurance.
10 So, again, not a neat, clean answer, but 11 again, I just wanted to go through and explain the 12 mechanics that are there.
13 And with that being said, the next slide 14 will take us into the simulator discussion, so I 15 didn't know if there were further questions or if we 16 wanted to break.
17 CHAIR PETTI: Let's break. So, why don't 18 we break and return at 40 minutes after the hour.
19 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 20 off the record at 4:22 p.m. and resumed at 4:40 p.m.)
21 CHAIR PETTI: Okay, welcome back everyone.
22 Let's continue. Jesse, the floor is yours.
23 MR. SEYMOUR: Well thank you, I appreciate 24 it. Okay, so here we are on Slide 63. I appreciate 25 that.
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236 1 So, now to transition to the topic of 2 simulator scope. And again, after this we'll stop at 3 training topics so, I know we're getting near the end 4 of time, but there is too much further to go.
5 As before, I'd like to provide a quick 6 review of what's presently being proposed, and then 7 we'll get into the specific questions that the 8 Committee had.
9 So 53.765(e) establishes simulation 10 facility requirements for plants required to have 11 licensed operator staffing, while 53.773(e) separately 12 establishes less stringent simulation facility 13 requirements for plant and certified operators.
14 Key aspects of both though, whether 15 licensed or certified, include the following. And 16 I'll point out where there's a difference here.
17 The full-scope simulators are not 18 mandated, and partial-scope simulators may be 19 acceptable providing that the scope is adequate to 20 meet the intended usage. Alternative simulators usage 21 are possible as well.
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237 1 requirements or for initial order of qualification 2 examinations.
3 Likewise though, or I should say 4 separately, similar approval would not be required for 5 the certified operator facilities. That's not to say 6 there wouldn't be regulatory requirements that they 7 would have to meet, and those will be enforceable.
8 But again, that would fall more on the 9 ongoing inspection and maintenance of the facility 10 thereafter, not necessarily the initial approval.
11 Such would be the case with a licensed operator 12 program.
13 And then the last point, facilities must 14 demonstrate that the accurate simulator scope is 15 provided to support human factors engineering analyses 16 and assessments in order to use that simulation 17 facility for conducting those analyses or assessments.
18 So again, for the intended usage, you 19 know, going to support your staffing plan by doing 20 staffing plan analyses on a simulator. And one of the 21 things that you have to be able to do is reproduce the 22 required situations of input to the crew and workload 23 and tasking. Then that would be another driver that 24 would require an adequate simulator scope.
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238 1 have current proposed, but I'm going to talk more 2 about these points on the next slide and really going 3 to dig into the details.
4 We're going to move on to Slide 64. Okay.
5 So now, how did we get to proposing awarding of the 6 applicant. In developing the preliminary rule 7 language, we start by reviewing Section 306 of the 8 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as well as the 52 Federal 9 Register 9453.
10 And what the references, it's from 1987 as 11 I recall. And I believe that was when the Commission 12 was first taking the simulator relayed wording of 13 Nuclear Waste Policy Act and turning that into 14 regulations.
15 So, again some of the underlying thinking 16 is embedded in those statements of consideration. At 17 least at the time when we first implemented this.
18 One key observation was that flexibilities 19 were historically provided to allow for the potential 20 use of a plant itself. And/or a plant reference 21 simulator.
22 Or perhaps some other type of simulation 23 device. And examples that were called up back then 24 were part task or even a basic principles simulator.
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239 1 conduct of the simulator portion of the operating 2 task.
3 Another key observation was that the NRC 4 stated intents at that point, had been to not permit 5 the initiation of transients on the plant itself if 6 the plant was going to be used as a simulation 7 facility, rather the use of plant was envisioned as an 8 option that might be used in conjunction with another 9 simulation device, or devices, in lieu of a plant 10 referenced simulator.
11 So again, we look back at those historical 12 treatments that the agency made as it interpreted the 13 Nuclear Waste Policy Act and formulated its simulator 14 based requirements.
15 And the current perspective that we came 16 away with from that is that the Nuclear Waste Policy 17 Act, and what's required of us, what it's mandating is 18 not necessarily that we establishment requirements for 19 the plants that have simulators per say, but rather 20 that it's requiring us to establish regulations that 21 address the use of simulations in training. And I 22 know it's kind of parsing up the words, but there is 23 a distinction to be more there.
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240 1 to allow the use of the actual plant to simulate tasks 2 for training, and operating task purposes, without 3 having a separate simulation facility.
4 And to give an example of this, Part 50, 5 I should say Part 55, covers the non-power reactors as 6 well. And the research of test reactors do not have 7 simulators generally, right, so, how are they able to 8 do that.
9 And it was actually through this track 10 they were essentially grand fathered and allowed to 11 use their actual facility as a simulation facility.
12 So, again, I think that provides some historic 13 concepts. And we use that to shape some of our 14 thinking as we went through this.
15 If we can move up to the next slide 16 please. Okay. So the philosophical basis behind the 17 preliminary rule language is that overall the staff 18 feel that, and again, I can't overstate this, the 19 staff feel that plant reference full-scope simulators 20 remain the preferred approach and would represent the 21 best route for meeting Part 53 requirements. I think 22 that is undeniable.
23 Even with the flexibilities that have 24 preliminary afforded, we still expect the majority of 25 Part 53 applicants would go that route. And by that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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241 1 I mean, having full-scope plant referenced simulators.
2 Because what it would give is a high 3 degree of regulatory certainty. And also, something 4 to keep in mind too is, with technological advances, 5 the costs, we envision the costs coming down to build 6 these types of facilities.
7 If you're familiar with the legacy plants 8 that are out there where you have hard simulators and 9 you'll have a large chunk of the training building 10 dedicated to replicating all of the switches and 11 meters and panels and so forth, and the upkeep that's 12 required because of those physical devices and so 13 forth.
14 And then you look at, for example, like an 15 AP1000 or like a NuScale or new designers where you're 16 talking about having digital displays used far more 17 extensively, and you kind of plot that on a trend 18 line, what you'll see is that the future designs, by 19 and large, when they build simulator in the control 20 room it's going to be very heavy most likely. And the 21 use of soft controls, right. You know, glass top type 22 simulation displays and so forth.
23 And so, you're not having to go and 24 actually install all the micro-switches and meters and 25 so on and so forth to replicate that. So, we see the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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242 1 cost burden coming down from having that. At the same 2 time too, you'll, you know, a higher regulatory 3 certainty for doing that.
4 And as a point of comparison, to be fair, 5 the existing regulations that we have now at 55.46 do 6 not strictly mandate plant referenced full-scope 7 simulators either. Because of how we allow for the 8 alternative of having a commissioned approved 9 simulator.
10 And in theory someone could, in theory, 11 come through that commission approved route and end up 12 with something coming out of it that isn't necessarily 13 a plant referenced full-scope simulator. But with 14 that being said, we still see that full-scope plant 15 referenced simulators were adopted, universally, by 16 the current power reactors that are out there in the 17 fleet.
18 So again, just to clarify that even with 19 flexibilities that, in our mind, really don't extend 20 beyond what historically has been envisioned. We 21 think that the clearly preferable route is going to 22 remain in the normal remaining plant referenced full-23 scope simulators.
24 The Part 53 rule language use alternatives 25 of simulator usage. You know, whether they be full-NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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243 1 scope or otherwise. But the important thing is that 2 the burden would be on the applicant to demonstrate 3 how a number of areas are supported.
4 So if they want to go with the route of 5 using maybe a partial-scope simulator augmented by 6 using the facility itself for certain portions of 7 their approach, they will have to demonstrate how 8 they're going to accomplish these areas in an 9 acceptable manner.
10 And that would include their licensed or 11 certified operator training in exams, the simulators 12 that they're going to use. If they're using a 13 partial-scope simulator would have to have sufficient 14 scope and fidelity for operators to acquire and 15 demonstrate knowledge and abilities, via for the job 16 duties. So that would place constraints on how 17 minimal that scope could be.
18 Additional experience requirements. So 19 very important. If you want to get individuals 20 licensed before you've actually constructed the 21 facility, we don't envision that being off of the 22 requirements mandate experience of conducting 23 reactivity manipulations.
24 So however you're going to do that, if you 25 don't have a plant that's been constructed, well, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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244 1 you're going to use a simulator. And again, we can 2 follow that logic through to impose those types of 3 requirements.
4 And then lastly, human factors engineering 5 analyses and assessments. And the associated human 6 system interface design test spec needs for facility 7 would need to be counted for as well too.
8 And granite, there are various HFE 9 technics that could be used to potentially find ways 10 to get around a simulator. Most likely if you're 11 talking about a very small micro-reactor facility.
12 Perhaps you're going to, and again, just 13 examples, perhaps you're going to use things like 14 mock-ups, table tops, walkthroughs, that type of 15 thing. But again, the burden would be on the 16 Applicant to show how they're able to do that in an 17 acceptable way.
18 And these, you know, getting to one of the 19 points that the Committee raised in the written 20 questions that I received, these considerations extend 21 to accident analyses and transient analysis 22 considerations as well too. And to clarify, I'm 23 making a distinction here between pure computer 24 modeling and simulation facilities. So, keeping in 25 mind that there is a distinction there.
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245 1 But that said, if an applicant chooses to 2 means rather than a full-scope plant referenced 3 simulator to support their safety case, then the 4 burden is going to rest on them to do so using 5 different means and to be able to show how they're 6 able to cobble that together in an acceptable problem.
7 That's what information that I have 8 prepared for the simulator discussions. But I'd just 9 like to pause and deal with any questions.
10 MEMBER HALNON: So, Jesse, I assume that, 11 I think one of the issues that we were talking earlier 12 on the last meeting was just, the approval process for 13 partial-scope simulators for specific reasons.
14 Does the staff have any experience in 15 approving the use of those?
16 I know that there is, it's not too far 17 behind specific models and how they might approve 18 those, but is there a thought process on how you would 19 go about approving maybe a partial simulator?
20 MR. SEYMOUR: And so, within the framework 21 of the existing 55.46 there are elements of that, that 22 would send a guide, you know, send a data approach 23 there. And in general, things that we glean from that 24 are, we would want to see descriptions of how that 25 would play out, how things would be supported, what NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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246 1 would be represented by the partial-scope simulator.
2 We would also want to see the performance 3 testing associated with that. What the plans are for 4 that testing and so forth.
5 And again, I don't have 55.46 in front of 6 me, but there are aspects of how you would go through 7 the Commission approved simulator process that would 8 have lend themselves to that type of approach.
9 In terms of any recent experiences with 10 doing a partial-scope simulator, I can't speak to 11 anything that's been done recently that was of that 12 nature. What we do have are Commission approved 13 simulator circumstances. But that was more in like an 14 instruction environment.
15 So in terms of anything different than 16 kind of the end thought being a full scale plant 17 referenced simulator, I can't say that we have that 18 outside of, really our experiences with the RTRs.
19 And with the RTRs, again, really what 20 they're doing there is they're using the plants as a, 21 the facility I should say, not the plant. But they're 22 using the facility as a simulation facility.
23 And they're structuring, you know, they're 24 operating tests around having to either do hands on 25 evolutions, perhaps for reactivity and so forth, or NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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247 1 having to do what we call job performance measures.
2 And having ones that are a bit more integrated. You 3 know, to where you're kind of walking through that 4 response and so forth.
5 MEMBER HALNON: Yes.
6 MR. SEYMOUR: To my understanding. And 7 again, that's a little bit outside my area of 8 expertise.
9 MEMBER HALNON: Okay. 50.34 and the 10 addition TAI step talks about a simulator. Does that, 11 does the fact that we have full-scope simulators --
12 (Audio interference.)
13 MR. SEYMOUR: I think your audio dropped 14 out, I apologize.
15 MEMBER HALNON: Oops, I'm sorry. Yes, I 16 touched the wrong mute button.
17 50.34 has some discussion of simulators 18 and post-TAI, or additional TAI, requirements. Did 19 you guys look at that delta here and determine that it 20 wasn't necessary or, I guess go back to the issue at 21 hand, is the simplicity of things expected to be such 22 that you don't need to worry about the post-TAI 23 requirements?
24 MR. SEYMOUR: So we did an analysis for 25 post-TAI requirements when we brought them over.
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248 1 Again, there is a few data points that we looked at in 2 crafting some of the requirements.
3 There's been an analysis that was done by, 4 actually, by Bill and some of this counterparts, that 5 involved looking at regulatory applicability for non-6 light water reactors. And there was a treatment of 7 post-TAI requirements that was embedded in that.
8 MEMBER HALNON: Okay.
9 MR. SEYMOUR: So, we did look at that.
10 And to my recollection, I think that there had been an 11 analysis of, consideration of that particular 12 requirement within there. My memory is a bit rusty on 13 that point.
14 MEMBER HALNON: Yes.
15 MR. SEYMOUR: But one of the things that 16 we did in the course of developing this is we did 17 import over a number of post-TAI requirements. And 18 again, we did a lot of changes there.
19 One of the things that we did is we said 20 that the simulator requirements that we would place 21 here, in our perspective, would tend to be covered, 22 right. So the simulator requirement that we would 23 have here would tend to cover the post-TAI 24 requirement.
25 Now, what that leaves though is the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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249 1 possibility that someone could go through and they 2 would make a justification to say, well, I can 3 accomplish all these things just using my plants, and 4 perhaps a partial-scope simulator. And where does 5 that leave the underlying post-TAI requirements via 6 the mindset.
7 And I think, and again, I don't have that 8 regulation in front of me, but to my mind set I think 9 one of the things that was required in there was the 10 ability to model of loss of coolant accidents, for 11 example, in the post-TAI requirements.
12 So again, what you're talking about there 13 is the ability of those operators to train in the 14 response to those events, right?
15 MEMBER HALNON: Right.
16 MR. SEYMOUR: When we look at the training 17 and examination requirements, one of the things that 18 we're establishing is that, especially for the 19 examination requirements, right, because that's where 20 you start seeing the link to the operating test of how 21 you're doing the operating test and how you're 22 accomplishing that.
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250 1 functions. So, in order to make the case that I can 2 do an operating test and you continuing training for 3 these operators, without having this full-scope 4 simulator that maybe models like this loss of coolant 5 accident, or that situation, again, the burden would 6 be on the applicant to show how they're going to be 7 able to test on the knowledge and abilities needed to 8 maintain plant safety functions, right. And then part 9 of my core cooling there, right, and how they're able 10 to accomplish that with something short of a full-11 scope simulator.
12 So when we look at, again, this is a place 13 where it's kind of a web of regulation and so forth, 14 but when we look at how they interact with one another 15 and how they kind of tie in and balance one another 16 out. We said, if that situation were to arise, then 17 there would be a hurdle here that would have to be 18 cleared. There would be an interlock in the process.
19 MEMBER HALNON: Yes. Well, when I first 20 saw this I was kind of taken aside by it. But after 21 I thought about it some more with the boundaries 22 you've put on it and the fact that it's got to be 23 justified in a couple of different ways, I became okay 24 with it.
25 I think the guidance that you put out for NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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251 1 approving partial-scope should have some, at least 2 some minimum standards that you would look to, to make 3 sure that what we've learned up to this point, with 4 the large light water stuff, that we don't lose that.
5 Like, the human factors, the alarm locations, the 6 ability to multitask and those types of things.
7 So, I'm okay with this. I think that, 8 again, some of the details was down the road. And 9 most people will probably, like you say, go to the 10 full-scope, just so they can get through the training 11 process and initial proving of the technology and the 12 ability to operate it.
13 MR. SEYMOUR: Thank you. I appreciate 14 that. And I capture a note regarding the guidance 15 content. I appreciate that feedback.
16 MEMBER KIRCHNER: And then, Jesse, then 17 the, this is Walt, would the intention then be to 18 essentially lift the functional requirements so to 19 speak out of 55.46?
20 MR. SEYMOUR: So, the wording that we 21 current have in the preliminary rule language, it used 22 55.46 as a starting point. And what we did is we took 23 the Part 50.52, lessons learned rulemaking, that's 24 ongoing. We took some improvements to the language 25 that are being considered for there, and we took the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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252 1 55.46 language and we used that.
2 So in terms of what does a simulator need 3 to be able to do in terms of performance testing and 4 what does that need to be able to demonstrate. There 5 are requirements that are embedded in there. And 6 again, for the specifics I will actually have to pull 7 those up and take a look.
8 But again, I can talk a little bit more 9 about what that actually reads like. But yes, we 10 still do maintain performance testing requirements.
11 And again, record retention. The ability 12 for us to come in and look at that and certify that 13 it's being done in an acceptable way.
14 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Thank you.
15 MR. SEYMOUR: Were there any other 16 questions regarding simulator? The last topic is 17 training, so if there I no further questions I'll move 18 into that.
19 And actually, before I do though, just to 20 read. Some of the wording that we actually have built 21 in for simulator testing requirements. And I'll just 22 skim through these real quick.
23 What we say is that the simulator must be 24 of sufficient scope and fidelity for individuals to 25 require and demonstrate the necessary knowledge and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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253 1 skills and abilities to safely perform licensed 2 operator and senior licensed operator duties.
3 The simulator must utilize models relating 4 to nuclear and thermal hydraulics to replicate the 5 most recent core load, or the intended core load if 6 you're under construction.
7 And then in terms of performance testing, 8 again, there are requirements associated with that.
9 So we want to maintain that ability to come and look 10 at things. So, we have a section on continue 11 assurance of simulator fidelity.
12 So, facility licensees that maintain a 13 similar facility have to meet certain requirements.
14 So that includes conducting performance testing 15 throughout the life of the simulation facility.
16 And what we do is we say the results of 17 those performance tests must be retained for four 18 years, right. Which is derived from 55.46. Or until 19 superseded.
20 And also, we build in that they, you know, 21 there is a need to promptly correct modeling and 22 hardware discrepancies and so forth. So, again, we do 23 also make that link kind of similar to how 55.46 24 currently does.
25 Okay. Yes, so we can move on to the next NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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254 1 slide, which should be on training. Okay.
2 And so, what I'm going to do is, just very 3 quickly I'm just going to recap the places where SAT-4 based training comes into play with Part 53. And what 5 this will do is highlight the need for why we have 6 this guidance. And then I'll go through what we plan 7 to do with it.
8 So, as a recap, 53.765(a) requires initial 9 licensed operator training programs to be based upon 10 a systems approach to training. And that be approved 11 by the Commission requiring the use. That's also the 12 case with pre-qualification training as well for 13 licensed operators.
14 And if we can move on to the next slide.
15 Okay. So for certified operators we have something 16 similar in that we would require that the initial 17 training program for certified operators be based upon 18 the systems approach to training. And also approved 19 by the Commission.
20 And then likewise, we would have similar 21 requirements for their continuing training as well.
22 So again, both of those, for licensed and certified 23 operators would be reliant upon a systems approached 24 training.
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255 1 categorized plant personnel, so this is our 2 equivalence of the 51.20 training rule, we would have 3 specific training qualification requirements there as 4 well that are articulated.
5 And really what that amounts to is that 6 there is other categories where personnel decides 7 licensed and certified operators also have to have a 8 SAT-based training program.
9 So if we move on to the next slide, we'll 10 talk about the implications of this slide because we 11 mentioned earlier in our discussion about what happens 12 if a plant decides to forego a training program with 13 accreditation. They choose not to join INTO, whatever 14 the case may be.
15 So as we saw, there is a broader reliance 16 upon SAT-based training programs within 53, that's 17 where we currently have it, preliminarily written, 18 with some programs needing initial approval by the NRC 19 and others may be not needing the initial approval, 20 but needing the means of ongoing verification of 21 their, you know, applying the SAT process in an 22 acceptable way.
23 So while at present, training program 24 accreditation can serve as a means of meeting those 25 requirements. And the same thing, comparable manner NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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256 1 to how it does under Parts 50 and 55.
2 We recognize a possibility that some 3 applicants may elect to forego accreditation of their 4 training programs. So, under that type of 5 circumstance, what that would necessitate the NRC 6 Staff to do, is to directly determine the 7 acceptability or proposed training programs.
8 It would require us to assess the ongoing 9 conformance of facility licensee training programs 10 with applicable regulatory requirements. And also, to 11 conduct inspections of those other training programs 12 with other personnel. And by that, technicians, 13 equipment operators, right, those types of 14 individuals.
15 So for these reasons, the Staff will need 16 guidance to support making those types of 17 determinations. And specifically, regarding whether 18 a systems approach training is being adequately 19 applied.
20 However, and this was, I think alluded to 21 in the Committee's questions, and we discussed this 22 during the last meeting as well, existing guidance.
23 Which is something that we are cognizant of, existing 24 guidance is primarily NUREG-1220. That document is 25 dated. And update to it is warranted.
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257 1 So what are we doing to address that? So, 2 a working group that is comprised of individuals with 3 a good mix of operator licensing and commercial 4 training experience has been established to develop 5 that guidance.
6 And our objective is to develop guidance 7 that can kind of seamlessly tackle either looking at 8 training within in an initial training context or the 9 initial review and approval of a program, or going in 10 on an ongoing basis looking at that program. So 11 again, something that down the road can lend itself to 12 an inspection program if so needed.
13 So basically, how do you look at that 14 program to make sure that it was set up correctly 15 initially, and then how do you look at it to make sure 16 that it's functioning once it's up and running. And 17 our current objective is to have interim staff 18 guidance developed no later than 2024 to support the 19 Part 52 rulemaking.
20 However, we are actively working to 21 accelerate development of that guidance in order to 22 support near-term applicants that may come in under 23 Parts 50 and 52, should that prove to be necessary.
24 Again, it's one of those things that could 25 happen at any time. Even in the existing fleet. It's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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258 1 theoretically possible that INTO could withdraw their 2 accreditation of a training program.
3 And if that were to happen, then we would 4 have to directly go in and inspect that. So, the 5 underlying idea that that could happen is something 6 that does exist in the present day.
7 But we recognize that an advance reactor 8 could come in under Part 50 and 52 and request to do 9 this. And so, for that reason we're working on a more 10 aggressive timeline in 2024 to try to have that ready 11 as a goal. But in any case, no later than 2024 to 12 support the rulemaking.
13 And most likely, the guidance would 14 initially be used in the form of an NRC Staff guidance 15 document that would be part of ARCAP. And again, down 16 the road its permanent home could potentially be a 17 NUREG. The same thing as NUREG-1220.
18 So, again, I'm not sure if that answers 19 the question from the Committee that I was provided or 20 if there is more discussion that we'd like to --
21 MEMBER HALNON: No, that answers it, 22 Jesse. We were interested in what your plans were to 23 update those documents. Since we talked about last 24 time relying on some of the data guidance in those.
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259 1 go on to Slide 69. That's the end of the prepared 2 portion of my presentation, so I just wanted to go 3 ahead and open things up and see if there was any 4 further questions or general discussion.
5 MEMBER BROWN: Yes. This is Charlie 6 Brown. Can you go back to your other slides for a 7 second? 68.
8 I'm trying to understand. I've got a 9 bullet that says that applicants don't have to have a 10 training program accreditation. I presume that's by 11 the NRC?
12 MEMBER HALNON: It's INTO.
13 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes, so training program 14 accreditation is, that happens through the National 15 Academy of Nuclear Training. But our stance on that 16 is that it's one acceptable way to meet certain 17 training requirements.
18 So, again, it's not mandatory and it's not 19 something that we do, we just, we look at that through 20 our memorandum of understanding with INTO as being an 21 acceptable way.
22 MEMBER BALLINGER: This is Ron. I look at 23 that --
24 (Simultaneous speaking.)
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260 1 let me finish. But you followed up with another 2 bullet that talks about determining whether the SAT is 3 adequately applied. Are those two different thoughts, 4 they don't apply to each other?
5 MR. SEYMOUR: So, as part of that training 6 accreditation would be, part of that process would 7 entail making sure that the SAT process is being 8 applied, right. So again --
9 MEMBER BROWN: And that's for INTO as 10 well?
11 MR. SEYMOUR: Well, again, if we treat 12 their process as being a package, if you will, one of 13 the things that falls within that package would be 14 making sure that the facility is implementing a SAT-15 based training process.
16 MEMBER BROWN: Right.
17 MR. SEYMOUR: So we look at it that if 18 INTO maintains the accreditation of that plant, that 19 those requirements would be met through that means.
20 And that's how we perceived that.
21 Now, if INTO goes and withdraws their 22 accreditation from a facility, now we have to go in 23 and directly determine that. So INTO withdrawing 24 their accreditation would not necessarily, it doesn't 25 automatically mean that a plant is not meeting the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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261 1 regulation, what it means is that we need to directly 2 determine whether or not the regulations are being 3 met.
4 So that's currently the mechanism that we 5 work through.
6 MEMBER BROWN: I got out of the first two 7 slides that you all provide the accreditation with 8 those first, from Slide 66 and 67, and then you pop 9 over to 68 where now we go to INTO as the certifier, 10 or the accreditor?
11 And then the second bullet, I'm still lost 12 on who is who in the zoo here. Does INTO do all of 13 the accreditation or are you all actively involved in 14 the accreditations under the, what your comments were 15 on Slides 66 and 67?
16 MR. SEYMOUR: So we have. We, as the NRC, 17 have nothing that correlates to an accreditation 18 process. For us everything is based on the evaluation 19 if you meet the regulations or not.
20 But similar to how we will issue a 21 regulatory guide that shows an acceptable way of 22 meeting the regulation, it's kind of a comparable 23 analogy that you can use with the training program 24 accreditation, right?
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262 1 INTO. The National Academy of Nuclear Training. And 2 they have a training accreditation process.
3 And what we've done in the matter of 4 what's comparable to how we would think about our reg 5 guide type of processes which said, if you're using 6 that accreditation process, then there is certain 7 training program requirements that we'll say that 8 you're meeting through an acceptable way.
9 And so, when I refer on the earlier slides 10 to, you know, we would need to look at, review the 11 training program and make sure that they're defined 12 SAT, and things of that nature, that's akin to what 13 the regulation says. What --
14 MEMBER BROWN: Jesse, I'm still lost. I'm 15 really sorry to be obtuse, okay.
16 Slide 66 requires initial licensed 17 operator programs to be based on, and then you go 18 through a litany. And facilities establish a pre-19 qualification goes through a litany. Are those done 20 by NRC or by INTO?
21 MR. SEYMOUR: So, at a high level those 22 are done by NRC where the INTO accreditation training, 23 you know, where those points really come to play is 24 this. When you get to specific aspects of how those 25 things are being met as we go from, we look at things, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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263 1 there is certain points that you can reach within that 2 process where you'd say, how are they meeting this 3 aspect of it, right? And accreditation would be an 4 acceptable way to meet that.
5 So, again, if we get to a point in that 6 process where the question that we're asking is, are 7 they implementing a SAT-based training program and we 8 see that they're going to achieve accreditation, you 9 know, their training process, then we would say, okay, 10 that piece is met.
11 There is other pieces to that that we 12 would still need to look at. So again, it's kind of 13 a total, kind of a total picture where accreditation 14 forms an acceptable way to meet certain requirements 15 that are there.
16 But as part of the initial review, we need 17 to look at all the requirements to see that, one way 18 or another, there is some means that's being used to 19 mean all of those.
20 MEMBER BROWN: I am totally lost. I'm 21 just trying to figure out who puts the Betty Crocker 22 Seal of Approval and stamp on their foreheads.
23 MEMBER HALNON: So, Charlie, this is Greg, 24 let me see if I can help. You got two choices in your 25 training program.
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264 1 You're a member of INTO and you get your 2 program accredited through the academy, which is INTO.
3 MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
4 MEMBER HALNON: The NRC doesn't inspect 5 your training program.
6 MEMBER BROWN: That's what I was asking.
7 So INTO can be the surrogate for the Betty Crocker, 8 Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval?
9 MEMBER HALNON: In essence, to a degree, 10 yes. But not necessarily. You know, the exam process 11 and the licensing process still is oversaw by NRC, 12 like we've already talked about.
13 So if you don't have that academy 14 accreditation, much like the college accreditation, 15 then you have to have your program inspected by the 16 NRC. And that inspection will determine whether or 17 not it is adequate to get into a licensing situation.
18 MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
19 MEMBER HALNON: That's choice number two.
20 So all the light water --
21 (Simultaneous speaking.)
22 MEMBER BROWN: Go ahead.
23 MEMBER HALNON: Yes. The light water 24 plants are all accredited.
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265 1 have an accreditation from INTO, what, oh no, let me 2 start over again.
3 If they have an accreditation for INTO, 4 does that release NRC from doing anything?
5 MEMBER HALNON: Well not anything, but 6 yes, from the inspection that determines whether or 7 not the training program is adequate, yes. But they 8 don't have to do the inspection for that.
9 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. So they rely on INTO 10 in that case?
11 MEMBER HALNON: Correct.
12 MEMBER SUNSERI: Well, there's still, 13 excuse me, Greg, but there is still an NRC inspection 14 periodically done on the recall program. There is 15 still an inspection by NRC done on the simulator 16 fidelity.
17 So, the NRC does not wash their hands of 18 the training program just because it's accredited, 19 there is several tentacles into, and a lot of 20 oversight.
21 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, they still have 22 oversight, inspection oversight, but the adequacy of 23 the program, initially is, and there's an inspection 24 procedure, 41500, that they don't have to do. Which 25 is the one that says, if the program meets 10 CFR 55.
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266 1 MR. SEYMOUR: I appreciate the summary of 2 kind of the touch points that we have. Even with that 3 memorandum of understanding it's important to keep in 4 mind that we didn't just give up the farm, right.
5 What we do is, we still have certain touch 6 points. We still come in independently and administer 7 the initial licensing examinations. We still come out 8 periodically and conduct inspections of the re-9 qualification training program which doesn't need --
10 MEMBER BROWN: I think --
11 MR. SEYMOUR: -- simulator inspection.
12 MR. SEYMOUR: I think you're back onto the 13 table. So the licensed operators. I was thinking 14 about to the table, that's what I'm trying to 15 understand.
16 The table showed you all really being, 17 doing all that licensing process in that left-hand 18 column. For the licensed operators.
19 Because, yes, Slide 61. So there you all 20 are all involved, and the accreditation is a separate 21 piece.
22 MR. SEYMOUR: That's right. When you look 23 at that very first block that's up there and, you 24 know, you see where it says, NRC approval training and 25 examination programs.
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267 1 MEMBER BROWN: Yes.
2 MR. SEYMOUR: Where for both of these 3 we're coming in and we're doing that. Accreditation 4 could form part of the pie for how that initial --
5 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. I'm good, Jesse. I 6 just, I've got a better, I understand. It just seemed 7 to be a disconnect to me.
8 I understand what you're saying. And 9 thanks to Greg and Matt's input also. So thanks.
10 I'll stop now.
11 MR. SEYMOUR: Thank you.
12 MEMBER HALNON: So then, Jesse, that did 13 bring up another question. That ISG, I assume, will 14 follow through with an inspection procedure. 41500 is 15 pretty dated as well.
16 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes. And that's one of our 17 thought processes again with, when we think about what 18 is the inspection program going to look like for these 19 reactors, I mean, that's another developmental stage 20 down the road. But, again, we're thinking towards 21 that.
22 And one thing that we've already mapped 23 out is that our guidance should direct a multi-tool 24 that can be used within that application as well too.
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268 1 points that we still maintain with training, one of 2 them is performance based. So if there is significant 3 events that happen at a plant, we still have the 4 ability to come in and, irrespective of whether that 5 training program is accredited, it's like thinking 6 about opening up the hood on the car, you know. We 7 can still come in there and pop the hood and start 8 looking, doing like a deep dive, into aspects of the 9 training program.
10 And that's really what 41500 lets us do.
11 So, in part of maintaining that toolkit we want to 12 make sure that our guidance is also suitable to that 13 type of application as well.
14 Should we have to come in, you know.
15 Again, the plant may have accreditation, but if there 16 are significant plant events that are happening and we 17 think there's a training nexus, we need to maintain 18 that capability. Go in their independently, look at 19 it ourselves and see if we think that the SAT process 20 is being applied.
21 Where there other questions on anything 22 or, again, I was at the end of the prepared portion.
23 CHAIR PETTI: Members, any other comments?
24 Okay. Well, let's turn to public input.
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269 1 to make a comment, *6 to unmute yourself. State your 2 name and make your comment.
3 Okay, not hearing any, I see a hand 4 raised. Dennis, do you want to make a comment?
5 MR. HENNEKE: Yes, I do.
6 CHAIR PETTI: Okay. Go ahead.
7 MR. HENNEKE: Yes, this is Dennis Henneke 8 with GE Hitachi. I'm a senior probabilistic risk 9 assessment engineer here at GE Hitachi working on 10 versatile test reactor and interim PRAs, as well as 11 ATRIUM.
12 I thought the conversation on the 13 certified versus licensed operator got a little off 14 track and I just wanted to bring it back to what I 15 think the Staff was presenting in the beginning.
16 The reason for the simplified approached 17 for licensees is that many of the advance reactors, 18 like our southern reactors that we're analyzing, show 19 that the PRA had found no risk significant or safety 20 significant operator actions. And the differentiation 21 being, risk significant being a significant 22 contributor to overall risk and the safety significant 23 being defense actions.
24 And so we have people who have determined 25 walkaway safe plants wherein the operator really NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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270 1 doesn't perform the safety function. It's not to say 2 the operator won't be doing anything.
3 Our reactor has a molten salt primary with 4 an ATRIUM reactor with a secondary assigned with 5 molten salt storage. And it gets to be a complicated 6 operation of the balance of plant side, but again, no 7 safety implication for the operator with regard to 8 post-accident actions.
9 So if you were to setup a training program 10 or setup emergency procedures. The thought of risk 11 informed guidance is they really, there's not much to 12 put into those that are required in order to meet the 13 safety goals.
14 So, the simplified approach is perfect for 15 a risk informed approach where we can reduce burden 16 where needed based on the overall risk. And if a 17 plant doesn't, has operator action that are required 18 for safety then they wouldn't be able to go down that 19 pathway with a certified operator.
20 So, I just want to clarify, we see a very 21 positive role in this process. And the reason is 22 because of the limited importance of post-initiator 23 operator actions. So appreciate it.
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271 1 analyzed is actually correct and there are no unknown 2 unknowns.
3 MR. HENNEKE: I think that's true with 4 existing reactors and existing --
5 MEMBER BROWN: Yes, but they have been in 6 operation for 50 or 60 years so there's a lot more of 7 those hidden unknowns have been eliminated. That's 8 the only point.
9 MEMBER HALNON: I would make one other 10 point that I've seen a lot of exam failures for NRC 11 licenses on the secondary side being complicated, so 12 that's just one data point that I have in my head.
13 MR. SEYMOUR: It's a very interesting 14 discussion, and it's one that's very complex. There 15 is a commenter, you know, what we were trying to 16 capture with our thinking was thinking through those 17 types of changes, general role and so forth.
18 But again, the point that was also made 19 about secondary plant initiators and the types of 20 complexities that you can see, you know, it's 21 complicated, right. If we think about Three Mile 22 Island, where did Three Mile Island begin.
23 I mean, the ultimate initiator, as I 24 remember the operating experience, really came from 25 honestly polishing. I think there is a perturbation NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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272 1 there that kind of kick started everything. And the 2 other is a chain of dominos.
3 But really we're talking about something 4 that began all the way over on, you know, a part of 5 the secondary we really don't think about that often.
6 And propagate it, propagate it from there.
7 So again, something that, I think 8 irrespective of whatever the end state is of a 9 proposed rule when we finally solidify it, something 10 that we're definitely sensitive to on our end is that 11 if there is an allowed outcome where the individuals 12 aren't licensed, the safety criteria needs to be 13 robust to get there.
14 So, again, that's not something that we 15 treat lightly. Kind of irrespective of where we end 16 up just even entertaining that possibility, it's a 17 high bar in our eyes.
18 CHAIR PETTI: Okay. Any other comments 19 from members of the public?
20 MEMBER REMPE: And, Dave --
21 CHAIR PETTI: Yes.
22 MEMBER REMPE: -- I'd like to remind all 23 of us that these are just comments from members of the 24 public, even though we know Dennis and whoever else 25 maybe is speaking, but we don't usually engage like I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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273 1 just heard with the responses to members of the public 2 who provide comments. We appreciate them and we take 3 them into consideration, but that's it.
4 MEMBER BROWN: Sorry about that, Joy.
5 MR. WIDMAYER: There's a hand up from 6 Cyril Draffin.
7 CHAIR PETTI: Ah, okay. I didn't see 8 that. Cyril, go ahead.
9 MR. DRAFFIN: Thanks. Just to kind of 10 follow-up on what Mr. Henneke said. There is a number 11 of companies that are also considering this. There is 12 was a discussion on certified operators about edge 13 cases.
14 And Part 53 will be, hopefully used for 15 decades. And so these educations may be more common 16 in the future. And so I think there is other 17 developers that have some of the same analysis done 18 that suggest that they may have safety that would 19 enable some of the criteria that was being discussed 20 today to be used.
21 The second point would be, we do 22 appreciate the forward thinking about the NRC Staff 23 thinking about our concept of operations. You know, 24 I think a logical systemic approach for looking at 25 that is important.
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274 1 And the criteria for assessing certified 2 operators finds a solves point for perspective 3 applicants. The options for simulators and training 4 programs allow tail-end of the training approach.
5 So, thinking through these concept 6 operations with these new systems is appropriate, and 7 we appreciate the discussion today.
8 CHAIR PETTI: Okay, thank you. Any more 9 comments?
10 Okay, well, then with that I really want 11 to thank all the presenters today. Very illuminating 12 day. And we will see everyone tomorrow for part two 13 of our discussions on Part 53. So we're recessed for 14 today, and we will be back tomorrow at 9:30 Eastern 15 Time. Thank you all.
16 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 17 off the record at 5:27 p.m.)
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1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 + + + + +
4 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 5 (ACRS) 6 + + + + +
7 FUTURE PLANT DESIGNS SUBCOMMITTEE 8 + + + + +
9 FRIDAY 10 DECEMBER 17, 2021 11 + + + + +
12 The Subcommittee met via Teleconference, 13 at 9:30 a.m. EST, David Petti, Chair, presiding.
14 15 COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
16 DAVID A. PETTI, Chair 17 RONALD G. BALLINGER, Member 18 VICKI M. BIER, Member 19 DENNIS BLEY, Member 20 CHARLES H. BROWN, JR. Member 21 VESNA B. DIMITRIJEVIC, Member 22 GREGORY H. HALNON, Member 23 WALTER L. KIRCHNER, Member 24 JOY L. REMPE, Member 25 MATTHEW W. SUNSERI, Member NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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2 1 DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:
2 DEREK WIDMAYER 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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3 1 CONTENTS 2
3 Opening Remarks.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 Update on TICAP/ARCAP Guidance Document 5 Developments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 Industry Representatives Presentation: U.S. Nuclear 7 Energy Institute and U.S. Nuclear Industry Council 8 Letter of November 5, 2021 and Attachments:
9 Comprehensive Comments on Part 53.. . . . . . 124 10 Subcommittee Discussion.. . . . . . . . . . . . 125 11 Adjourn.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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4 1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 9:30 a.m.
3 CHAIR PETTI: I have 30 minutes past the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. So we can reconvene the second day of our 5 meeting on Part 53, and turn it over to the staff to 6 hear about TICAP and ARCAP.
7 I guess there's some opening remarks, 8 though. Is Steve going to do that or?
9 MR. BEALL: Hi, Dave. This is Bob Beall.
10 CHAIR PETTI: Oh, okay, Bob.
11 MR. BEALL: Yes, there's no opening 12 remarks today. So we have our staff ready to go into 13 the presentation.
14 CHAIR PETTI: Good. Let's get going then.
15 MR. SEBROSKY: Good morning. My name is 16 Joe Sebrosky. I'm a Senior Project Manager in the 17 Advanced Reactor Policy Branch in the Office of 18 Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
19 And I will be presenting, along with my 20 colleague Eric Oesterle, on the advanced reactor 21 content of application project and the technology-22 inclusive content of application project, the white 23 paper guidance documents that we've issued to date.
24 So can you go to the next slide, please?
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5 1 Subcommittee is to give you an overview of both the 2 ARCAP and TICAP guidance document developments since 3 the last Subcommittee briefing in July. And if you go 4 back to the previous briefings, we, essentially, just 5 outlined the structure of the ARCAP and TICAP guidance 6 documents. For the purposes of this meeting, we hope 7 to highlight some of the key draft white paper 8 guidance, with particular attention to portions of the 9 guidance that we think may be of interest to the ACRS.
10 On the bottom of slide 73, you see a link 11 to where the key documents that we're going to be 12 talking about can be found on our public web page.
13 Next slide, please.
14 So just a reminder, we provided high-level 15 briefings on ARCAP and TICAP to the ACRS Subcommittee 16 on March 17th and July 21st. The high-level purpose 17 of both ARCAP and TICAP is to develop technology-18 inclusive, risk-informed, and performance-based 19 application guidance.
20 The guidance that we're developing can be 21 used to support a Part 50, 52, or Part 53 application.
22 If you look at the first sub-bullet under that, you'll 23 see that the near-term need is to develop guidance to 24 support expected advanced reactor 50 or 52 25 applications using the Licensing Modernization Project NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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6 1 process.
2 One of the things that Bob Beall talked 3 about yesterday was the overall schedule for Part 53.
4 At a very high level, that's slipped a little bit per 5 discussions. From our perspective, the item that is 6 actually driving the ARCAP and TICAP schedules are the 7 near-term construction permit applications that we 8 expect from applicants that are going to use -- they 9 have told us during robust pre-application meetings 10 that they intend to use the LMP. So the driver for 11 the schedule for ARCAP and TICAP is 50 and 52 in the 12 near term, not Part 53.
13 As another reminder, TICAP, fundamentally, 14 relies on the LMP process, which is endorsed in Reg.
15 Guide 1.233 and references NEI 18-04.
16 We are targeting ARCAP and TICAP guidance 17 for 1552, as I said, but we have an eye on Part 53 18 proposed rule language, and we intend to adjust the 19 ARCAP and TICAP guidance documents as the Part 53 20 proposed rule language is adjusted. One of the 21 fundamental assumptions is that Part 53 will allow the 22 use of the LMP process to meet the underlying 23 requirements.
24 Next slide, please.
25 MEMBER BLEY: Let me ask you a question.
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7 1 It's Dennis Bley.
2 If you're going to be able to adapt the 3 language, how are you planning to release these in the 4 interim to be used for 1552? Is it going to be ISG or 5 something?
6 MR. SEBROSKY: Correct. And we'll walk 7 through that, Dennis. Right now, to solicit 8 stakeholder interactions or to support stakeholder 9 interactions, we've issued a guidance that we're going 10 to be talking about today in draft white paper form, 11 TICAP in a draft white paper Reg. Guide form and ARCAP 12 in Interim Staff Guidance forms. So the idea is, by 13 providing that early indication of what we're 14 thinking, it allows us to engage stakeholders prior to 15 formalizing the document in an ISG and asking for 16 public comment.
17 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. All the things you 18 just said will probably help with respect to Part 53, 19 having the guidance more complete when we look at it.
20 So good. Go ahead.
21 MR. SEBROSKY: Slide 75, please.
22 So the next couple of slides just provide 23 kind of a high-level background, and then, I'll talk 24 in more detail about highlights of the ARCAP white 25 paper Interim Staff Guidance that we've issued to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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8 1 date. And then, Eric will be doing an overview of the 2 TICAP guidance.
3 So this slide is just a background that 4 the TICAP guidance is based on the LMP, the Licensing 5 Modernization Project process. LMP, fundamentally, 6 does three things. It provides an approach to select 7 your licensing basis events; develop a structure 8 system and component categorization; identifies 9 special treatment for SSCs, and ensures defense-in-10 depth accuracy.
11 Industry is developing key portions of the 12 TICAP guidance for NRC endorsement, and the industry's 13 TICAP guidance will be supplemented by the NRC staff-14 developed guidance as necessary.
15 ARCAP is broader in nature than TICAP and 16 is intended to cover guidance for small modular 17 reactors and non-light water reactor applications for 18 a combined license under Part 52; construction permit 19 or operating license under Part 50; design cert, 20 standard design approval, or manufacturing license 21 under Part 52.
22 ARCAP encompasses TICAP and provides 23 supplemental and additional guidance for Safety 24 Analysis Report and application requirements beyond 25 the Safety Analysis Report, or SAR.
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9 1 Slide 76, please.
2 So this is just a high-level overview that 3 shows how ARCAP and TICAP work. If you look at the 4 green-backgrounded material, the first eight chapters 5 of the SAR, in the upper left-hand corner you'll see 6 licensing basis evaluation analysis in Chapter 3 of 7 the proposed SAR structure. You see safety 8 classification for SSCs, safety-related SSCs, in 9 Chapter 6; non-safety-related with special treatment 10 in Chapter 7. The integrated evaluation chapter, or 11 Chapter 4, is where you'll find defense-in-depth 12 information. And as I indicated previously, Eric 13 will be going over what's in those chapters later on 14 in the presentation.
15 What I'm going to be touching is the ARCAP 16 guidance that references TICAP for the first eight 17 chapters of the SAR, and then also provides guidance 18 for chapters outside of the SAR, outside of the first 19 eight chapters of the SAR and also outside of the SAR.
20 So if you look in blue in the left, you see Chapters 21 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the SAR content, which is outside 22 the scope of TICAP. TICAP does not address normal 23 operations by its nature. So that's why you see the 24 need to provide guidance for SAR material for items 25 outside of the TICAP scope.
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10 1 MEMBER BLEY: Two quick questions.
2 MR. SEBROSKY: Go ahead.
3 MEMBER BLEY: One's kind of silly. I've 4 been hearing TICAP for months and months, and now it's 5 TICAP. Is there any deep meaning to that?
6 MR. SEBROSKY: No.
7 MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
8 MR. SEBROSKY: Internally, within our 9 Branch, we use TICAP and ARCAP. Some in industry call 10 it TICAP and ARCAP.
11 MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
12 MR. SEBROSKY: But you're going to hear 13 Eric and I refer to it as TICAP and ARCAP.
14 MEMBER BLEY: I think I heard you say that 15 ARCAP includes or encompasses TICAP?
16 MR. SEBROSKY: It does. And when you look 17 at the ARCAP roadmap ISG, all it does, really, is it 18 says, for the first eight chapters of the SAR, go see 19 the TICAP --
20 (Simultaneous speaking.)
21 MEMBER BLEY: Oh, okay. Thanks.
22 MR. SEBROSKY: So if you look to the 23 right, there's additional portions of the application 24 that are outside the SAR that are, obviously, 25 important, technical specifications being one of them.
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11 1 So I'll be talking about some of the guidance that 2 we're developing using an LMP-based approach for 3 things like technical specifications that fall outside 4 the SAR. I'll also be touching on fire protection for 5 operations and in-service inspection and in-service 6 testing.
7 Next slide, please.
8 So slides 77 and 78 just provide, in 9 tabular form, the draft white papers that we've issued 10 to date that we've used to engage stakeholders in 11 public meetings that we've had on ARCAP and TICAP.
12 One of the most important documents I'll 13 be talking about in the upcoming slides is what we 14 refer to as the roadmap, the ARCAP ISG roadmap. So 15 you see a date of December 2nd, 2021, and the ML 16 number associated with it. I'll go over, at a high 17 level, what's in that roadmap and why we consider that 18 to be an important document.
19 Other ISGs that we've issued for ARCAP 20 that are outside the scope of TICAP include Chapter 2 21 for site information; Chapter 9 for control of routine 22 plant radioactive effluents, plant contamination, and 23 solid waste; Chapter 10 for control of occupational 24 doses; Chapter 11 on organization and human systems 25 considerations; Chapter 12 on post-construction NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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12 1 inspection, testing, and analysis.
2 And as I indicated before, you see at the 3 bottom of slide 77 references to the tech spec ISG, 4 the fire protection for operations ISG, and the 5 ISI/IST ISG.
6 Next slide.
7 So slide 78 are the key TICAP guidance 8 documents. And what you see in this slide is NEI 9 provided Revision 0 of NEI 21-07 on TICAP on August 10 30th. There's the ML number for that. And then, we 11 issued an updated Reg. Guide draft white paper based 12 on that August 30th version of the NEI 21-07 on 13 December 2nd.
14 And at the bottom of slide 78, what you 15 see is a note that the TICAP guidance document is 16 being revised based on continuing interactions with 17 stakeholders. We had a public meeting just earlier 18 this week where we discussed NEI 21-07, Rev. 0-B, and 19 there's the ML number for that.
20 And what Rev. 0-B did is provided changes 21 to the NEI 21-07 based on a public meeting that we had 22 with NEI and Southern back in November. As I 23 indicated, we're continuing iterations on the Reg.
24 Guide and NEI 21-07, Rev. 0-B, and we're planning for 25 another public workshop in mid-January.
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13 1 Next slide, please.
2 So what I just presented was kind of the 3 high-level overview on how ARCAP and TICAP fit 4 together. What I'm going to be talking about next is 5 the ARCAP guidance; that draft white paper on SGs; 6 provide a high-level overview, and identify areas that 7 we think may be of interest to the ACRS.
8 Next slide, please.
9 So the next three slides -- slide 80, 81, 10 and 82 -- are dedicated to the ARCAP, what we refer to 11 as the ARCAP roadmap ISG. This is the document that 12 we put together that, essentially, provides the staff 13 and applicants a structure for where you would find 14 guidance to put together a complete application.
15 So as I showed in the previous slide, it 16 proposes a 12-chapter SAR guidance structure. The 17 first eight chapters, it simply references to the 18 TICAP guidance document. Chapters 9, 10, 11, and 12 19 point to individual ISGs developed for each of the SAR 20 chapters. And it also provides pointers to draft 21 white papers, guidance that's under development, or to 22 be developed for portions of the application outside 23 of the SAR.
24 So examples of guidance that the staff has 25 developed outside of the SAR include tech specs, the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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14 1 risk-informed ISIs; fire protection for operations.
2 Examples of high-level guidance that is embedded in 3 the roadmap include guidance for developing the 4 Technical Requirements Manual, the Quality Assurance 5 Plan, fire protection for the design, and then, the 6 offsite dose calculation model.
7 Examples of guidance where we simply say 8 it's being developed is security, emergency planning, 9 material control and accounting, financial 10 qualification, and cybersecurity.
11 Next slide, please.
12 CHAIR PETTI: So just a question.
13 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Joe, this is Walt 14 Kirchner.
15 Just a question. It's more of maybe a 16 process question than technical.
17 So one of the drivers here is that there 18 are several advanced reactor concepts out there that 19 may come into the NRC seeking a construction permit, 20 or whatever. With the current 10 CFR 50 and 52, there 21 are existing requirements for content of application.
22 Is there a convenient tabular or cross-reference to 23 what is currently required versus what ARCAP is going 24 to replace and/or -- I think everything's there, but 25 it's hard to see, since you're changing the structure NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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15 1 from the previous format for SARs. Is there some kind 2 of tabular or table lookup that says, okay, you've got 3 the current requirements and SAR chapters, and now, we 4 have ARCAP and its content? Is there some cross-5 referencing table or document that shows that ARCAP 6 covers all the bases that are required currently for 7 a 50-52 application?
8 MR. SEBROSKY: The short answer is, no, we 9 haven't developed that table. The long answer is we 10 believe ARCAP will provide guidance on how, using the 11 LMP process, you can address all the requirements 12 embedded in 50 and 52 that are applicable to non-light 13 water reactors.
14 So when you look at some of the example 15 ARCAP roadmap ISGs that we've issued, it lists the 16 underlying requirements for Part 50 or 52 that apply.
17 So we have not developed a cross-reference table.
18 CHAIR PETTI: But it's fair to say that 19 it's, say, more risk-informed than the --
20 MR. SEBROSKY: Yes, absolutely. So for 21 this, Marty Stutzke yesterday talked to the ACRS about 22 the TIRIMA approach, the Technology-Inclusive, Risk-23 Informed Maximum Accident Approach. And he indicated 24 that he's working on a paper and, eventually, that 25 type of guidance would end up in ARCAP, in some form NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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16 1 or fashion. That is down the road.
2 What the ARCAP roadmap ISG and the TICAP 3 guidance, fundamentally, assume is an applicant is 4 going to be using the LMP processes. So that's our 5 first iteration on the guidance, and it is definitely 6 risk-informed and technology-inclusive. And another 7 key aspect is performance-based.
8 CHAIR PETTI: Right. Thank you.
9 MEMBER KIRCHNER: So going back to Marty's 10 presentation from yesterday, his presentation showed 11 a way to, essentially, check the box that's currently 12 required in 50-52 to postulate a maximum hypothetical 13 accident, and then, have a source term blah, blah, 14 blah. Go through all that. So I get it; the LMP 15 approach is a more risk-informed way for checking that 16 box. And Marty had a nice diagram yesterday to show 17 that.
18 But the reason I ask the question is, what 19 about all the other things? I don't have the current 20 format for SARs memorized, but I'll pick something 21 randomly. Chapter 10 on electrical systems -- I think 22 I got it right -- where does that fit into the ARCAP 23 kind of structure? Or you say it's not a risk --
24 MR. SEBROSKY: Well, so at a very high 25 level -- I mean, we're going to be talking about this NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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17 1 in a little bit -- but, at a very high level, I think 2 what you might be referencing is NUREG-0800, SRP 3 Chapter 8, on electrical power.
4 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes. Sorry, I misspoke.
5 MR. SEBROSKY: No, no, that's all right.
6 So if you look at Chapter 8 of the SRP, it 7 is, obviously, based on large light water reactor 8 technologies. So there's guidance on offsite 9 electrical power, and there's guidance on safety-10 related diesels, AC power. There's guidance on DC 11 power.
12 What you see out of the LMP process is the 13 LMP process will identify the licensing basis events 14 and the design basis accidents. And the outcome of 15 that process is the SSC categorization.
16 So if there is a need for safety-related 17 AC power, you're going to see that identified as part 18 of the LMP process, and then, the safety-related AC 19 power would be described in Chapter 7 of the 20 structure, or Chapter 6 is where safety-related goes.
21 And then, if you had important offsite power, the non-22 safety-related with special treatment coming out of 23 the LMP process, that would show up in Chapter 7. So 24 that's how that would work.
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18 1 thing about the instrumentation and control system.
2 If the LMP process identifies the need for safety-3 related I&C, that would go in Chapter 6, and non-4 safety-related with special treatment in Chapter 7.
5 So that's, in a nutshell, kind of how it 6 would work. As you know, there are some applicants 7 that believe they can demonstrate to the NRC's 8 satisfaction and to the ACRS's satisfaction that they 9 don't have a need for safety-related AC power or a 10 need for safety-related I&C.
11 MR. OESTERLE: Hey, Joe, this is Eric, 12 Eric Oesterle from the staff. If I may add, you know, 13 in response to the question?
14 So we expect that -- and I'll get into 15 this in my presentation on TICAP -- we expect that, 16 under the 12-chapter SAR guidance structure, that 17 Chapters 6 and 7 will provide the bulk of the system 18 descriptions and discussions of structures, systems, 19 and components, and their design requirements that 20 have, traditionally, been the focus of different 21 chapters in the traditional FSAR structure.
22 And with respect to doing a cross-23 referenced table between TICAP and ARCAP and the 24 typical FSAR structure, 19-, 20-, 21-chapter FSAR 25 structure, it's a bit of a challenge because there are NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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19 1 a set of regulations that we are looking at for 2 applicability to non-LWRs. So how you organize your 3 information and where you put the information into the 4 FSAR depends largely upon the applicability of the 5 regulations to your design. So at this point in time, 6 it's a bit of a challenge to put together a cross-7 referenced table like what was suggested or asked for.
8 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Okay. I kind of get 9 that. I expected the answer that Joe gave, that a lot 10 of those topical matters that may be important to 11 safety -- and let me phrase it like that, "may be" 12 important to the safety case -- would show up in 13 Chapters 6 and 7 in your TICAP.
14 I'm just wondering -- again, it's more of 15 a process question -- say an applicant comes in who is 16 an advanced LWR. Can they use the LMP and do 50-52?
17 I'm a little concerned about this non-LWR dichotomy 18 that you're creating. If it's technology, 19 essentially, neutral or technology -- what's the 20 current phrase that you use all the time? --
21 inclusive --
22 MR. SEBROSKY: Inclusive.
23 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes. It seems to me 24 that, as you go forward in this, the best way to test 25 everything is with the knowledge base we have with the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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20 1 LWR technology. And I could see an advanced LWR 2 wanting to come in and use your structure. So could 3 they do that?
4 MR. SEBROSKY: The short answer is yes.
5 There's nothing that precludes a small modular light 6 water reactor to use the LMP process and use the 7 ARCAP/TICAP guidance or, for that matter, a large 8 light water reactor.
9 MEMBER KIRCHNER: So just an observation 10 in terms of terminology. This is just one member 11 speaking. But you consistently, I think, have done a 12 good job in trying to make what you're doing 13 technology-inclusive, but you consistently label 14 everything that we see non-LWR.
15 MR. SEBROSKY: Yes, and I will take that 16 back. I think that's a legitimate comment.
17 MEMBER REMPE: So this is Joy.
18 And I'd like to add to Walt's comment, 19 because I'm curious if all of the staff believes this.
20 For example, we heard, oh, we're very well coordinated 21 with the Part 50-52 folks, the same people. But, yet, 22 I've heard in informal discussions, when I was asking 23 about how well are things coordinated, I've heard, 24 well, the 50-52 is for the LWRs and the 53 is for the 25 non-LWRs. So I'm not sure that everyone on the staff NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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21 1 has that viewpoint.
2 MR. SEBROSKY: I understand the comment.
3 And I'd just point to Part 53 in the current format.
4 It is not restricted to non-light water reactors.
5 MEMBER REMPE: And conversely, 50 and 52 6 can be used by non-LWRs, right?
7 MR. SEBROSKY: Yes, absolutely. And what 8 you'll see in a slide on 81, slide 81, is one of the 9 appendices that we're going to include in the ARCAP 10 roadmap ISG, as applicability of regulations to non-11 light water reactors.
12 But, at the end of the day, if somebody 13 comes in under a 50 or 52 application, they're going 14 to have to demonstrate that they meet all the 15 applicable underlying requirements.
16 MEMBER REMPE: So out of curiosity, then, 17 back to another comment that Walt made yesterday, if 18 I'm a design developer, and I always want to try to do 19 things as economically as possible, which way would be 20 easier for me to get through the hoops and get my 21 plant up and running? And Walt had mentioned we want 22 to make sure we have the same level of safety, and we 23 want to convey to the public we still are as safe. Is 24 there something that, you know, have you thought 25 about, well, is there a way that somebody that's very NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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22 1 clever will know I could get through one path a little 2 easier with less expensive safety systems?
3 MR. SEBROSKY: So to answer your question, 4 I don't believe that -- a designer is going to have to 5 look at their design and say, what regulatory path do 6 I think is best for me? Either using the LMP process 7 or a more deterministic process, as Marty outlined 8 yesterday. So I don't think one path is necessarily 9 easier.
10 If you look at the LMP-based process, it, 11 obviously, heavily relies on PRA. And you heard from 12 the discussion yesterday with Marty that some 13 designers believe that their designs are of a nature 14 that developing a detailed PRA does not make a lot of 15 sense.
16 So to answer your question, the framework 17 that we're developing is meant to be able to 18 demonstrate that all the existing applicable 19 regulations are met for either 50 or 52 and down the 20 road for 53.
21 MR. LYNCH: Joe, this is Steve Lynch.
22 If I can augment some of what you're 23 saying for some background on the Part 50-52 24 rulemaking and the Part 53 rulemaking, and the 25 existing requirements and ease of path and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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23 1 coordination?
2 So with respect to coordination, we do 3 have weekly meetings where the cognizant Branch Chiefs 4 or the various rulemakings associated with advanced 5 reactors do meet to coordinate and make sure that we 6 are on the same page and understand the status of 7 these rulemakings at the working level. We do have 8 additional plans to add further coordination, touch 9 points, on a biweekly basis, starting in the new year, 10 to make sure that any rulemakings that could impact 11 our path forward on Part 53 are identified and 12 addressed, and any potential inconsistencies are 13 identified and we can resolve those promptly.
14 Also with respect to ease of licensing, 15 one thing I do want to note, that our existing 16 regulatory requirements for nuclear power reactors are 17 very much tailored to existing large light water 18 reactors; namely, PWRs and BWRs. And one of the 19 reasons for crafting Part 53 is to reduce the need for 20 exemptions that may be needed on advanced reactor 21 technologies that may come under the existing 22 regulatory requirements.
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24 1 with the current requirements and the other 2 rulemakings under development, that we can definitive 3 answer on what is easier. The idea is that, when we 4 finish the rulemakings that we are currently working 5 on, that we will have -- you know, all of these 6 pathways will meet the technology and design needs of 7 the industry. So that, regardless of the path they 8 choose, they will be able to have predictable 9 requirements that they can follow for their designs, 10 and use the types of analyses that meet the needs of 11 their technology.
12 MEMBER REMPE: So I appreciate that, but 13 I think, again, I liked what Marty had yesterday with 14 his little diagram on slide 36. But I think, as we 15 move forward, understanding the conservative estimates 16 that are used not only for the frequency, which I get 17 that one, but how they estimate the consequences might 18 play into what path a person picks and how much 19 conservatism is left in the design that they propose 20 to go forward with. But, you know, we'll just have to 21 see.
22 MR. SEBROSKY: Yes, absolutely, agree with 23 you completely.
24 Can we go to slide 81, please?
25 So getting to some of the discussion that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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25 1 we just had, the ARCAP roadmap ISG includes several 2 appendices. And I'm going to jump to Appendix D, 3 which is just a placeholder for now. But this is 4 where you would find the applicability of regulations 5 to non-light water reactors. Now that appendix is 6 going to be based on a white paper that has been 7 discussed during advanced reactor public stakeholder 8 meetings. And the ML number for that white paper is 9 provided at the bottom of this slide.
10 And the purpose of placing that white 11 paper in Appendix D is to capture that guidance in a 12 product that will benefit from a formal public comment 13 period. Obviously, Appendix D, as Steve had indicated 14 or alluded to, the idea behind Part 53 is a non-light 15 water reactor would not need to use that Appendix D 16 because built into Part 53 would be a process that 17 would allow the use of LMP without the need for 18 exemptions from regulations.
19 Appendix C is embedded in the ARCAP 20 roadmap ISG. It's based on pre-application white 21 papers that have been discussed during advanced 22 reactor stakeholder meetings. It stresses the need 23 for pre-application engagement. And again, we're 24 proposing to capture that important white paper in the 25 ARCAP roadmap ISG in order to allow it to benefit from NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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26 1 a public comment process that's embedded in an Interim 2 Staff Guidance document.
3 Next slide, please.
4 So on slide 82, another one of the 5 appendices that you'll see in the ARCAP roadmap ISG is 6 Appendix Echo, or E, which provides construction 7 permit guidance. It consists of three parts. There's 8 a common portion that's applicable to both light water 9 reactors and non-light water reactors. It's in 10 italicized format in that appendix currently.
11 Our sister Division, the Division of New 12 and Renewed Licenses, just issued a Federal Register 13 notice for light water reactor construction permit 14 Interim Staff Guidance that includes a 45-day comment 15 period. And that ISG, the light water reactor CP ISG 16 is scheduled to be discussed at an advanced reactor 17 stakeholder meeting in January. We will update the 18 common portion of Appendix E with whatever comes out 19 of the light water reactor construction permit ISG, 20 which also includes that common part.
21 The other information that you'll find in 22 Appendix E is portions of the construction permit 23 that's applicable to the LMP-based approach, and it 24 points to the TICAP construction permit guidance, and 25 then, portions of a construction permit guidance that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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27 1 is outside the scope of TICAP. So that's what's 2 embedded in Appendix E of the ARCAP roadmap ISG white 3 paper.
4 Next slide, please.
5 MR. WIDMAYER: Hey, Joe, this is Derek.
6 MR. SEBROSKY: Yes, Derek?
7 MR. WIDMAYER: Yes, a question on slide 8 82. We saw the light water reactor construction 9 permit ISG when it came out, and we were thinking 10 about having a meeting. Should we wait until all of 11 Appendix E is prepared? Would that make more sense?
12 MR. SEBROSKY: My short answer would be, 13 no, Derek.
14 MR. WIDMAYER: Okay.
15 MR. SEBROSKY: That light water reactor 16 construction permit ISG is meant to be a standalone 17 document.
18 MR. WIDMAYER: Okay.
19 MR. SEBROSKY: From our perspective, the 20 common portion of that document, we intend to take 21 advantage of what our sister Division is doing and 22 copy it, copy and paste it into Appendix E.
23 MR. WIDMAYER: Okay, great.
24 MR. SEBROSKY: So does that answer your 25 question?
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28 1 MR. WIDMAYER: Absolutely, yes. Thank 2 you.
3 MR. SEBROSKY: Can we go to slide 83, 4 please?
5 So the next several slides kind of went 6 over the ARCAP roadmap ISG and what's in it, and why 7 we believe it's important. The next several ARCAP 8 slides are dedicated to the ARCAP ISG white papers 9 that we've issued on several topics.
10 And again, just highlighting within those 11 chapters what we think may be of interest to the ACRS.
12 So for ARCAP Chapter 2, for site information, that 13 falls outside TICAP. It supplements the information 14 in the SAR that is outside the scope of the Licensing 15 Modernization Project.
16 One of the intentions that's described in 17 that ARCAP Chapter 2 is to limit the amount of the 18 information in SAR Chapter 2 to what is necessary for 19 establishing the safety-significant design parameters.
20 So the concept is similar or uses the approach that's 21 been taken for the current operating fleet, where much 22 of Chapter 2 is considered historical information.
23 The idea is that information, in order to 24 make our safety findings, would be available via 25 audit, but only the supporting basis and the key NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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29 1 parameters necessary for establishing the safety-2 significant design parameters would be embedded in the 3 SAR.
4 One of the other things that you'll see in 5 SAR Chapter 2 that you need is Section 2.6. It 6 includes a process for establishing the ground motion 7 response spectra using the SSHAC process, or the 8 Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee process. So 9 2.6 is a little different than what you would find 10 otherwise in the current guidance.
11 ARCAP Chapter 9 and 10, this is normal 12 effluents and occupational doses. Going back to an 13 earlier question about risk-informed, it's technology-14 inclusive, risk-informed, and performance-based. So 15 using the performance-based approach, the level of 16 detail of information in the SAR for these two 17 chapters is proposed to be smaller than what you would 18 typically get. Again, information available via 19 audits, and then, key information in the SAR that 20 supports our safety finding, but the performance-based 21 approach relies on the ongoing, underlying 22 requirements that would be applied to both normal 23 effluents and occupational doses, once the plant is up 24 and running.
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30 1 this? I'm a little confused. First of all, ARCAP 2 Chapter 2 is not TICAP Chapter 2?
3 MR. SEBROSKY: So we called it ARCAP 4 Chapter 2 for site information. And one of the 5 reasons that we did that is, as part of the LMP 6 process, you look at key parameters from a particular 7 site to ensure that your design is robust enough that 8 it could handle flooding, seismic, that kind of thing.
9 So when we say ARCAP Chapter 2, we could just call it 10 site information.
11 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Well, it supplements 12 what would be required in the TICAP, which is really 13 going through the LMP process.
14 MR. SEBROSKY: Correct.
15 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Why not just do away 16 with TICAP and call everything ARCAP? That's just an 17 observation.
18 But let me go to my more substantive 19 question. Let me test you. So ARCAP Chapters 9 and 20 10, occupational dose, why would a performance-based 21 approach have less information in the SAR for 22 occupational dose analysis than the current approach 23 that's used?
24 MR. SEBROSKY: So for the occupational 25 dose, if you look at the ARCAP guidance, it, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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31 1 fundamentally, presumes that, under a performance-2 based approach, there will be a continuing need to 3 ensure that the occupational dose requirements are 4 met, once the plant is up and running. So there's 5 heavy reliance on that.
6 MEMBER KIRCHNER: What's new? That's 7 required now.
8 MR. SEBROSKY: Excuse me?
9 MEMBER KIRCHNER: That's already required 10 now. So what lesser amount of information would be 11 provided under a performance-based approach to address 12 the staff's review on occupational dose?
13 MR. SEBROSKY: Yes, so if you go to a 14 typical recently-issued chapter, the analogous 15 chapters in the SRP are Chapter 11 and Chapter 12 for 16 normal effluents --
17 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Right.
18 MR. SEBROSKY: -- and occupational doses.
19 It's quite voluminous. And that information is not --
20 it demonstrates that you can meet, from a design 21 standpoint, you have enough shielding to meet the 22 occupational -- you have confidence that you'll meet 23 the occupational dose requirements.
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32 1 and the occupational doses, the design of the plant is 2 such that you'll be able to meet the underlying 3 requirements in order for us to make our safety 4 finding.
5 But the amount of material that is placed 6 in the SAR is proposed to be limited to key 7 information associated with the design of the plant, 8 and not necessarily voluminous --
9 MEMBER KIRCHNER: But I'm having a hard 10 time figuring out why 0800 wouldn't be adopted for 11 this. Now, if you're saying 0800 requires too much 12 information, well, that suggests you could edit 0800.
13 But I don't get this performance-based approach 14 requires less information.
15 MR. SEBROSKY: I understand. I understand 16 your point. We chose not to revise 0800. We chose to 17 provide the new Chapters 9 and 10.
18 But, certainly, the underlying performance 19 of --
20 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Again, it would be an 21 interesting exercise for you to do a comparison.
22 Let's just pick on occupational dose for a minute or 23 effluents, one or the other. And just develop a table 24 that explains why you need less information to get a 25 performance-based assurance that the workers are NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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33 1 protected.
2 MEMBER BLEY: But, Walt, this is Dennis.
3 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes?
4 MEMBER BLEY: I missed something along 5 this train of discussion. I don't see where they say 6 it requires less information, which is what you're 7 asking them about. Did I miss it? Did they talk 8 about that?
9 MR. SEBROSKY: Yes, what we say is, if you 10 look at that, if you look at Chapter 9 and 10, we're 11 proposing less level of information in the SAR. But 12 the information, if you go back -- can we go back to 13 slide 76?
14 So one of the fundamental concepts that 15 we're using in ARCAP and TICAP, it's they're 16 performance-based. And in the middle you see audit 17 inspections of applicant records; calculations 18 analysis; P&IDs; system descriptions; design drawings; 19 procurement specs, and the PRA. That level of 20 information is proposed to be available to the staff, 21 and then, key information that is necessary is either 22 elevated to the SAR or to some other product.
23 MEMBER BLEY: I'm still missing a little 24 bit of the thread here. The reason one would prefer 25 performance-based criteria is that, instead of a fixed NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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34 1 line in the sand, sometimes fairly arbitrary, you're 2 looking at actual performance and do they meet a 3 performance standard. And that isn't directly related 4 to more or less or a higher- or lower-level of 5 information. So I'm confused where this discussion is 6 going.
7 MR. OESTERLE: This is Eric.
8 Let me just add that, Dennis, you're on 9 the right track there. You know, for this area, 10 there's a combination of design features, and then, 11 programs that are relied upon to ensure these doses.
12 And in this area, there's a greater 13 reliance on programs. And we do point to already 14 established guidance for developing approved programs 15 for these areas that were also developed for new 16 reactors. And so that's really the gist of this.
17 It's a less prescriptive approach, but the approach, 18 we believe, still provides the same level of assurance 19 and protection of workers with respect to dose.
20 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. We're back to where 21 Walt was headed. And, Walt, you have to fix me if I'm 22 not saying this right.
23 I think he's asking, what specific areas 24 under various criteria here will be different, and how 25 will they be different? And I have heard anybody NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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35 1 really talk to that. And you could stick with 2 occupational dose just for discussion.
3 MEMBER KIRCHNER: My own opinion is that 4 currently is performance-based. I mean, yes, there 5 are prescriptive limits that you can't exceed, but the 6 actual design, you know, how the designer goes about 7 providing the necessary shielding, et cetera, to 8 protect, say, the control room operators or staff, 9 it's the methodologies are going to be very similar.
10 So the presumption that you need less 11 information to do this, or at least the assertion, I 12 was just wondering how that comes about. Maybe the 13 existing requirements for 0800 require more 14 information than is useful to do a performance-based 15 evaluation. If so, one could go back and think about 16 revising 0800.
17 But, basically, with the current fleet, 18 that's a performance-based kind of analysis that you 19 do to demonstrate that the control room occupants 20 aren't, you know, that you're maintaining their 21 exposure levels below the 10 CFR 20 limits.
22 MR. SEBROSKY: So I would encourage -- we 23 understand the feedback. We'll take a look at Chapter 24 9 and 10. But if you go back to the fundamental 25 reason for the briefing, it's to outline what we have NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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36 1 in the different ISGs in areas that may be of interest 2 to the ACRS.
3 MEMBER KIRCHNER: No, that's fine, Joe.
4 I wasn't criticizing. I'm just trying to understand 5 why the suggestion that you would need less 6 information to do an occupational dose kind of hazard 7 analysis because you're doing it on a performance-8 based level --
9 MR. SEBROSKY: So I guess what we're 10 suggesting is there would still need to be a 11 demonstration and calculations provided to the staff 12 that allow us to make a determination for the design, 13 that the design will meet the -- that we have 14 confidence that, once it's up and running, the design 15 will meet the underlying requirements.
16 How much information from that analysis 17 gets placed in the SAR is what we were revisiting in 18 those chapters.
19 CHAIR PETTI: Right. Then, instead, you 20 might audit things as opposed to having them in the 21 SAR per se?
22 MR. SEBROSKY: Correct.
23 CHAIR PETTI: Okay.
24 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Okay. Fair enough. I 25 didn't mean to hold you up, Joe.
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37 1 MR. SEBROSKY: No, that's okay.
2 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Joe, thank you.
3 MR. SEBROSKY: It's a good question.
4 So slide 84.
5 Chapter 11, so there's two slides on 6 Chapter 11, which is organization and human systems 7 consideration.
8 Yesterday, Jesse Seymour walked through 9 the concept of operations for some of the potential 10 designs that may be coming our way. This ARCAP 11 Chapter 11, fundamentally, assumes a control room 12 design that has operators and looks more like a 13 traditional control room design.
14 We have near-term construction permit 15 applicants that intend to use the LMP process. So 16 what we did, kind of as a stop gap, is say, okay, what 17 do we need to support those designs that are using an 18 LMP process in the human factors engineering area?
19 With the idea that, as Jesse indicated yesterday, once 20 the Part 53 language is developed, we will include 21 updates in either this ARCAP ISG or another ARCAP ISG 22 for some of the items that were discussed yesterday.
23 So when it comes to human factors 24 engineering, what we see coming out of the TICAP 25 process, the Licensing Modernization Project process, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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38 1 is identification of human factors insights that would 2 be fed into a human factors engineering program.
3 So TICAP or the LMP process provides 4 limited guidance on what to include in the SAR in this 5 area. So that's why ARCAP Chapter 11 takes the 6 insights from the LMP and provides guidance on how 7 those insights might be used to develop an HFE 8 program. And it supports the ideas that would support 9 that information would support the necessary 10 information for us to make our findings when it comes 11 to the human factors engineering program.
12 Slide 85.
13 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Joe, this is Walt again.
14 Sorry to hold you up.
15 MR. SEBROSKY: No, it's all right.
16 MEMBER KIRCHNER: I'm having trouble 17 again. And the reason I'm having trouble is LMP has 18 -- let's just put aside LMP for a moment and just talk 19 about reactor design.
20 Now, I'm the advanced reactor concept 21 designer. I'm trying to probably rely on inherent 22 passive characteristics in my design and try to take, 23 as much as I can, take the human out of the loop.
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39 1 a lot of experience with HFE programs and such. So 2 where I'm struggling is, what would change?
3 Obviously, you would tailor the HFE 4 program for the specific design, but the basics don't 5 change from what is being done currently. It just may 6 mean that we have less operators, maybe no operators.
7 That's a different conversation, and so forth. But 8 that doesn't really have anything to do with LMP.
9 That's all about how you design the system and how you 10 design the human interface with the system, and what's 11 required to safely operate the plant.
12 And I'm having a little problem to see why 13 you need to supplement guidance. It just doesn't make 14 sense. It has nothing to do with LMP. It has 15 everything to do with the design. So why would the 16 human factors engineering program change from what 17 you're currently doing in Chapter -- now don't hold me 18 to this -- 17?
19 MR. SEBROSKY: Well, yes. So NUREG-0800, 20 Chapter 18, is where you find --
21 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Sorry.
22 MR. SEBROSKY: No, that's all right.
23 That's where you find human factors 24 engineering. What we did is we looked at that at a 25 high level. We looked at what was proposed in TICAP NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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40 1 and in the 12-chapter SAR content. And we believed we 2 needed to pull over some of that SRP human factors 3 engineering over into ARCAP Chapter 11.
4 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Okay. So you're 5 tailoring 18 --
6 MR. SEBROSKY: Yes.
7 MEMBER KIRCHNER: -- to your needs here?
8 Fine. That's good. Thank you.
9 MR. SEBROSKY: Correct. Jesse, is there 10 anything you wanted to add?
11 (Simultaneous speaking.)
12 MR. SEYMOUR: Yes, Joe, if I could for 13 just a moment. I just wanted to kind of just 14 articulate really what we were shooting for in the 15 addition that we made for HFE in ARCAP Chapter 11, and 16 there's two layers to it: There is the design layer 17 and by and large there we're still pointing to the 18 existing guidance that we have. So we have NUREG-19 0711, which has a very comprehensive human factors 20 engineering process that's spelled out there. And 21 that part hasn't changed. So again, we still are 22 pointing to guidance that's out there in those areas.
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41 1 against the specific requirement of 50.34(f)(ii), and 2 that's the requirement to apply the state-of-the-art 3 human factors engineering in the control room design.
4 So for example, if we were to have some 5 advanced reactor design that came under the Part 50 6 and 52 -- and we'll take this to the extreme and say 7 perhaps they don't have a control room, a conventional 8 control room in that design, an exemption would need 9 to be involved in order to ascertain the details of 10 okay, where is -- where will these functions be 11 accomplished from and so forth? So again, there would 12 understandably be a need to navigate exemptions within 13 that. And that's part of what we do.
14 But more broadly -- and this is really the 15 crux of the matter is we've got a higher level of 16 effort to take our (audio interference). We've got 17 higher level effort in place to take our human factors 18 engineering reviews and to make those scalable in 19 nature. So the current approach that we take under 20 the NUREG-0711 process is very regimented. I think 21 there's 330 give or take discrete criteria that are 22 within that, and based upon the nature of these 23 advanced reactor designs not all of that may be 24 necessary to achieve a reasonable assurance of 25 adequate safety.
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42 1 So what we have with our scalable HFE 2 review process is an ability to come in and conduct 3 activities associated with characterization and 4 targeting and scoping to go through and figure out 5 from a safety perspective what are the things that we 6 need to look at and to craft a tailored review that is 7 appropriate to that facility? And part of the change 8 that we incorporated into Chapter 11 is basically to 9 make that link with that program so that when it's 10 available we'll be able to apply that not only to the 11 Part 53 applicants, but also to applicants coming in 12 under Parts 50 and 52.
13 So again, our actual change isn't very 14 wordy. It's really just kind of one concise block, 15 but it's really meant to address those three layers.
16 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Okay. Thank you, Jesse.
17 MR. SEBROSKY: So this is Joe Sebrosky 18 again. Can we go to slide 85, which is a 19 continuation?
20 One of the things that you see in ARCAP 21 Chapter 11 is a discussion of operator licensing.
22 There's a recognition within the ARCAP chapter that 23 the guidance that's proposed goes beyond the guidance 24 that we expect to see in an application. And the 25 reason -- what we tried to do is in that chapter is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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43 1 provide a holistic approach for how one might go about 2 qualifying a simulator or the use of a simulator for 3 operator training, experience, and examination, and 4 also operator licensing issuance prior to fuel load.
5 So we think providing information that 6 goes beyond what would be expected in an application 7 in this area is beneficial to both the staff and 8 applicants to look at these particular areas that 9 could end up being in the critical path for getting a 10 plant up and running.
11 As far as the operator staffing guidance, 12 it includes areas such as an option for providing a 13 technical basis for control room staffing in 14 conjunction with the control room configuration and it 15 would potentially provide the technical basis that 16 could support a future exemption. 50.54(m) and 17 50.54(k) go to the staffing requirements for senior 18 reactor operators and reactor operators in a control 19 room.
20 Next slide, please? So ARCAP Chapter 12.
21 This is a post-construction inspection, testing, and 22 analysis program for Part 50 applicants. There are 23 requirements for post-construction inspection for Part 24 52 applicants. You find this information also 25 imbedded in the requirement for ITAAC, inspections, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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44 1 test, analysis and acceptance criteria.
2 So this chapter provides high-level 3 guidance for post-construction testing, both per-4 operational testing prior to initial fuel load and 5 then also initial startup testing obviously after fuel 6 load. And as the ACRS knows ITAAC ended fuel load, so 7 there's still a need for guidance for 50 and 52 8 applicants that would cover startup testing after fuel 9 load.
10 Next slide, please? So the tech spec 11 guidance. This is outside the SAR. And when you look 12 at this ARCAP ISG, the white paper, the reason that we 13 developed the white paper guidance is to provide a 14 nexus between the requirements in 50.36 where you find 15 the regulation for tech spec content. And the 16 information that you get from the LMP approach, that 17 would be helpful in -- from the LMP approach for 18 developing safety limits, limited safety system 19 settings, and limited condition for Operations 20 Criteria 1 through 3.
21 So what you see in this ARCAP ISG is again 22 a nexus between the text in 50.36 and the outcomes 23 from an LMP process from NEI 18-04, which gives you 24 the required safety functions. NEI 18-04 gives you 25 the required safety functions, the safety-related NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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45 1 SSCs, frequency consequence targets, and assurance 2 that you're meeting the underlying 10 CFR 50.34 dose 3 limits. So the ISG just tries to tie those two 4 concepts together.
5 Next slide, please? Fire protection for 6 operations. One of the things I alluded to earlier 7 was Appendix D, the ARCAP roadmap ISG eventually, 8 including a list of applicable regulations for non-9 light water reactors. So what you see imbedded in the 10 white paper that's been issued is 50.48 applies for 11 fire protection; 50.48(a) applies for fire protection; 12 50.48(b), which is for fire protection, refers you to 13 Appendix R for light water reactors; and 50.48(c), or 14 Charlie, points you to NFPA 805 again for light water 15 reactors.
16 So 50.48(a) applies. And what this ARCAP 17 ISG does is it leverages the information from NFPA 805 18 for a risk-informed approach to meet -- to demonstrate 19 you can meet the underlying requirements imbedded in 20 10 CFR 50.48(a), which does apply to non-light water 21 reactors.
22 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Can we test this again, 23 Joe? I'm just being your nemesis today. Don't take 24 it personally.
25 MR. SEBROSKY: No, that's okay. Go ahead.
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46 1 MEMBER KIRCHNER: So why would 805 not 2 apply to a non-LWR?
3 MR. SEBROSKY: It flat out says as a 4 requirement that it only applies to light water 5 reactors. The underlying requirement is limited to 6 light water reactors. 50.48(b) and 40.48(c) are 7 limited to light water reactors.
8 MEMBER KIRCHNER: No, I'm wondering --
9 MR. SEBROSKY: 50.48(a) is not.
10 MEMBER KIRCHNER: -- why the NFPA 11 standard, the standard itself -- why would you not use 12 that standard?
13 MR. SEBROSKY: So what the ISG says is we 14 think there are -- if you have a risk-informed 15 approach, and LMP does look at fire protection --
16 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Right.
17 MR. SEBROSKY: -- and you have results 18 from that, that we believe there's concepts from NFPA 19 805 coming out of the LMP process that can be 20 utilized. That's what that ISG is all about.
21 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Okay. So you're still 22 going to use -- how should I -- I think this would be 23 a concern I would raise across the board, not just 24 here in fire protection. A lot of these -- a lot of 25 what you have in the current regulation obviously has NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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47 1 been developed because of the experience with the LWR 2 fleet, but the overall concept of fire protection and 3 such for a nuclear power plant applies to any concept.
4 And then so when you go into something 5 like NFPA 805, which I will admit I'm not intimately 6 familiar with, then in this ISG you're going to look 7 at the underlying, how should I say, concepts and 8 intent that would be applicable to a non-LWR system.
9 Is that the approach you're using when you say --
10 MR. SEBROSKY: Yes, I guess I would take 11 it just a step further. Fire protection is looked at 12 as part of the LMP process. There's an operations 13 aspect and there's a design aspect. So you're 14 certainly going to have risk information from the LMP 15 process that will factor into the design.
16 But when it comes to operations, as you 17 indicated, we think that -- even though 50.48(c) does 18 not apply to non-light water reactors we think using 19 a technology-inclusive, risk-informed, performance-20 based approach that certainly there's concepts that 21 can be used out of 805 to demonstrate that you meet 22 the applicable requirement, which is 50.48(a) when it 23 comes to operations. And that's what this -- if you 24 look at the ISG, that's what it attempts to do, is tie 25 this together.
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48 1 MEMBER BLEY: Yes, where Walt's coming 2 from I think, and at least where I take it, is what 3 you're pointing out about 48(c) is that definitionally 4 it's not applicable, but functionally or on an 5 engineering or analysis basis I don't know any 6 particular reason why we would say that's true.
7 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes, thanks, Dennis.
8 Functionally. That's a better way to look at it 9 rather than intent. Thank you.
10 MR. SEBROSKY: So I think we might be 11 saying the same thing. We believe that the concepts 12 imbedded in 805 can be used functionally to 13 demonstrate that you meet the underlying requirement 14 that is applicable to non-light water reactors, which 15 is 50.48(a).
16 MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
17 MR. SEBROSKY: I think we might be saying 18 the same thing, but that's the reason that we 19 developed the ISG for operations is for that exact --
20 the underlying concern that when it comes to 21 operations what guidance are we going to provide 22 knowing that Appendix R and 50.48(c) does not apply to 23 non-light water reactors? So that's -- we attempted 24 to fill that hole with that ISG.
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49 1 design phase, you see imbedded in the ARCAP roadmap 2 ISG staff's thoughts on how the LMP process can be 3 used to inform the design phase and then also current 4 regulatory guides for fire protection design that we 5 think are useful again for demonstrating the 6 underlying requirements for fire protection. So fire 7 protection designs --
8 MEMBER KIRCHNER: I've observed, too, Joe, 9 that some of the new -- some of these advanced designs 10 are using -- well, let's just for an example, liquid 11 metal systems that present fire hazards and risk that 12 go way beyond an LWR.
13 MR. SEBROSKY: That's correct. And that's 14 why you'll see in the ARCAP roadmap ISG mention of 15 that for the design phase. Specifically mentions the 16 types of coolants that may present a fire risk that go 17 beyond what we have in our current guidance. So 18 you'll see that type of language in the -- for the 19 design phase, in the fire protection section for the 20 design phase in the ARCAP roadmap ISG.
21 We didn't see the need for pulling that 22 out and developing a separate ISG. We think the 23 guidance imbedded in that roadmap is a pretty good --
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50 1 saw the need to have a separate ISG.
2 Next slide, please? So when it comes to 3 when of the last items that I'm going to be covering 4 is the ISI and IST risk-informed ARCAP guidance that 5 we came up with. There's two slides on this. And the 6 ISG that we developed can be used for both advanced 7 light water reactors and for non-light water reactors.
8 One of the things that it references is ongoing work 9 associated with ASME Section 11, Division 2, which is 10 the Reliability and Integrity Management Program for 11 Nuclear Power Plants.
12 So if you go to the next slide?
13 Fundamental to the concept is if you're using an LMP-14 based approach, you will have a PRA, and you can use 15 that PRA to develop both a non-light water reactor and 16 service test programs and in-service inspect programs.
17 And for the IST if -- for non-light water 18 reactors you have the potential for active valves, 19 pumps, and to dynamic restraint devices like you see 20 in large light water reactors, but what that ISG also 21 looks at is passive components with active safety 22 functions that may need to be included in the IST 23 Program.
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51 1 needed for that particular feature when it comes to 2 IST. So when you look at that document, ARCAP ISG on 3 ISI and IST, it's 31 pages in length and it goes into 4 quite a level of detail for both light water --
5 advanced light water reactors and non-light water 6 reactors.
7 So this concludes my presentation on 8 highlights of the -- what you find in the ARCAP 9 roadmap ISG and also what you find in ARCAP ISGs 10 outside of the SAR structure. And with that, I'd like 11 to turn it over to my colleague Eric Oesterle to 12 continue the presentation.
13 CHAIR PETTI: So, Joe, just a question.
14 When you add up all the piece parts ARCAP sounds like 15 it's going to be a bigger document than TICAP. Is 16 that true?
17 MR. SEBROSKY: Certainly. Just looking at 18 the ARCAP roadmap ISG with all the appendices in it, 19 it's heading north of 100 pages.
20 CHAIR PETTI: Yes. Okay.
21 MR. SEBROSKY: So the ARCAP roadmap ISG by 22 itself is a rather -- it's going to be a rather large 23 document. And then if you add up all the different 24 ARCAP ISGs that we've issued to date, some of which 25 are 30 pages in length, yes, it's a larger volume of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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52 1 information than what you would find in the NEI 21-07 2 and the TICAP Reg Guide.
3 CHAIR PETTI: Yes.
4 MEMBER BROWN: Before we -- is that -- are 5 you done, Dave?
6 CHAIR PETTI: Yes.
7 MEMBER BROWN: Can I ask a real simple-8 minded question? We talk about the SAR for the TICAP 9 And SAR for the ARCAP. Are those -- does that mean a 10 new plant designer has to have two SARs?
11 MR. SEBROSKY: No, I guess --
12 MEMBER BROWN: One covering the ARCAP and 13 one covering TICAP in addition to whatever other 14 licensing document they need from the LMPs?
15 MR. SEBROSKY: So the short answer is no.
16 Can we go back to -- I'm looking for the slide. Can 17 we go back to slide 76?
18 MR. OESTERLE: Hey, Joe, I can hit that 19 further in my discussion.
20 MR. SEBROSKY: Okay. I guess I was just 21 to show -- I thought this figure would demonstrate to 22 Mr. Brown what we envision. The first --
23 MR. OESTERLE: It does, and I'm going to 24 refer to that.
25 MR. SEBROSKY: Okay. So --
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53 1 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. That's fine. I just 2 -- I saw -- when I -- I went back as you were going 3 through this in these discussions with Walt and looked 4 at the definition of chapters that would be in each of 5 these TICAP and ARCAP configurations, and it hadn't 6 dawned on my before based on the other discussions at 7 previous meetings. How many SARs are we going to have 8 associated with -- where is the basic fundamental 9 licensing document that covers everything? So that 10 was my question.
11 MR. SEBROSKY: Yes. So the short answer 12 is that an applicant only needs to submit one safety 13 analysis report with their application, however the 14 development of that SAR will need to rely on both 15 TICAP and ARCAP guidance, especially if they're using 16 the LMP process to develop major portions of their 17 SAR.
18 MEMBER BROWN: But the chapters are 19 different. They appear to be different.
20 MR. SEBROSKY: So the first eight chapters 21 under ARCAP, you refer back to the TICAP guidance.
22 Yes, the chapters are different between the TICAP and 23 ARCAP versus the traditional FSAR organizational 24 structure, but it was deliberately organized in that 25 way.
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54 1 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. I understand it back 2 on what today's stuff is under Part 50 and 52. When 3 I look at this diagram I see an outline of a SAR and 4 it -- that is an SAR, right? Is that the SAR that an 5 advanced reactor -- is that the format that it would 6 be used --
7 MR. SEBROSKY: Yes. Yes.
8 MEMBER BROWN: -- in the LMP process? Is 9 that correct or not?
10 MR. SEBROSKY: Yes, that's correct.
11 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. Now where is --
12 MR. SEBROSKY: The first eight chapters 13 come from TICAP, and the 9, 10, 11, and 12 come from 14 ARCAP. And all ARCAP does --
15 MEMBER BROWN: Oh, okay. I see it says 16 outside the scope of TICAP. I got it.
17 MR. SEBROSKY: Right. Yes, so all ARCAP 18 does, the ARCAP roadmap ISG, when you look at it, it 19 says for the first eight chapters of the SAR go see 20 TICAP.
21 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. And for the 22 subsequent chapters, 9 through 12, it would be --
23 MR. SEBROSKY: It points --
24 MEMBER BROWN: -- from ARCAP?
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55 1 ISG points to the individual ARCAP chapters that I 2 just talked about, ARCAP ISG Chapter 9, 10, 11, and 3 12.
4 MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
5 MR. SEBROSKY: So the roadmap --
6 MEMBER BROWN: All right. That's fine.
7 MR. SEBROSKY: Yes.
8 CHAIR PETTI: So just a follow-on then.
9 The orange box, how does that get submitted? It's 10 separate individual documents potentially?
11 MR. SEBROSKY: Yes.
12 CHAIR PETTI: Okay.
13 MR. OESTERLE: So if we could go to I 14 think it's slide 90 or 91. Thank you.
15 MR. WIDMAYER: Hey, Eric?
16 MR. OESTERLE: Yes.
17 MR. WIDMAYER: This is Derek. I think 18 aren't some of the applicants like providing topical 19 reports and stuff like that to provide the information 20 in that orange box?
21 MR. OESTERLE: Yes, in fact some 22 applicants are providing topical reports that are --
23 will end up being referenced in the individual 24 chapters of the safety analysis report as well.
25 MR. WIDMAYER: Okay. Thanks.
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56 1 MR. OESTERLE: Sure.
2 MEMBER BROWN: Can I ask one other 3 question?
4 MR. OESTERLE: Sure.
5 MEMBER BROWN: Back up to 75 again. And 6 this was relative to that. I understand your point 7 about how the chapters separate, but then I see this 8 stuff back here. It says industry is developing key 9 portions of TICAP guidance for NRC endorsement. Is 10 that in addition to the NRC-developed TICAP guidance 11 in the whatever TICAP document we have in the LMP 12 process?
13 MR. OESTERLE: Yes, I'll --
14 MEMBER BROWN: Is that another document?
15 MR. OESTERLE: -- be getting into that in 16 my presentation --
17 MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
18 MR. OESTERLE: -- Member Brown.
19 MEMBER BROWN: I'll pass.
20 MR. OESTERLE: Okay.
21 MEMBER BROWN: Thank you.
22 MR. OESTERLE: Sure. So if we can move to 23 slide 91, please? All right. Great. Thank you.
24 So thanks for the turnover, Joe, and good 25 morning everyone. As Joe mentioned --
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57 1 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Are we --
2 MR. OESTERLE: Yes?
3 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Eric, this is Walt.
4 MR. OESTERLE: Yes. Can you hear me?
5 MEMBER KIRCHNER: May I interrupt you?
6 Before you get going, Mr. Chairman, can we have a 7 break?
8 CHAIR PETTI: I was just looking at that.
9 Their agenda wanted us to go another 30 minutes. I 10 have a feeling this could take us a little longer than 11 that based on the level of interest. So do you have 12 a problem if we do the break now?
13 MR. OESTERLE: I do not have a problem.
14 CHAIR PETTI: Okay.
15 MR. OESTERLE: As you wish.
16 CHAIR PETTI: Okay. Let's do a 20 minute 17 break. Come back at 20 after.
18 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 19 off the record at 10:58 a.m. and resumed at 11:20 20 a.m.)
21 CHAIR PETTI: Okay. It's 20 after the 22 hour2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />, so let's reconvene here.
23 Eric, the floor is yours.
24 MR. OESTERLE: Yes, I'm ready to go.
25 Okay. Thank you.
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58 1 Good morning again. My name is Eric 2 Oesterle and I'm also a senior project manager in the 3 Advanced Reactor Policy Branch in NRR and working with 4 Joe on this important effort. This morning I'll 5 provide an update on the staff's efforts to develop 6 guidance as part of the Technology-Inclusive Content 7 of Application Project, of TICAP. We like TICAP.
8 Next slide, please? So the goal of the 9 TICAP effort is to develop guidance for preparing 10 major sections of the safety analysis report portion 11 of an application using a technology-inclusive, risk-12 informed, performance-based approach. For reference 13 Joe provided a visual representation of the major 14 portions of the safety analysis report addressed by 15 TICAP on slide 76, which we were just recently on.
16 The scope of the TICAP guidance is 17 governed by the Licensing Modernization Process, or 18 LMP, which is documented in NEI 18-04 and endorsed by 19 the NRC in Reg Guide 1.233. The LMP process provides 20 a robust, integrated, and iterative design process 21 which identifies licensing basis events; determines 22 safety classification of structures, systems, and 23 components; establishes special treatments for SSCs; 24 and ensures adequate defense-in-depth.
25 As Joe mentioned earlier industry and the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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59 1 NRC have been working together to develop TICAP 2 guidance. The industry TICAP team has developed 3 proposed TICAP guidance in NEI 21-07 and the NRC is 4 reviewing this guidance for the purposes of 5 endorsement in a regulatory guide. It should be noted 6 that the baseline guidance in NEI 21-07 is for a 7 combined license application under 10 CFR Part 52 and 8 includes supplemental guidance for construction permit 9 applicants and design certification applicants if 10 different than for a COL applicant.
11 The TICAP guidance will be updated to 12 provide greater applicability to Part 53 as the rule 13 language for that proposed rule is finalized. We 14 recently held a public meeting on December 14th to 15 discuss comments on the TICAP guidance and we continue 16 to work together towards resolving issues that may 17 otherwise be identified as exceptions or 18 clarifications in the NRC's endorsing regulatory 19 guide. Later during this presentation I'll provide 20 you with an update on one of the guidance issues that 21 was discussed at the December 14th meeting.
22 Next slide, please? Okay. We're on slide 23 93 and over the next few slides I'll walk you through 24 the eight-chapter SAR structure discussed in the TICAP 25 guidance.
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60 1 Chapter 1 provides a general plant and 2 site description at a high level and provides a high-3 level summary of the safety case made throughout the 4 rest of the SAR. It is similar in comparison to what 5 you see in FSAR Chapter 1 for operating plants and 6 includes items such as those identified in this 7 bullet. Certain analyses in analytical tools or 8 methodologies are used in the identification of 9 licensing basis events, the evaluation of the 10 consequences of such events, or assessing the 11 performance of SSCs.
12 Chapter 2 of the SAR presents information 13 on some of those analyses in analytical tools such as 14 the PRA, the design-basis accident analytical methods, 15 and source term analysis. It is intended primarily 16 for cross-cutting information or evaluations that 17 support multiple LBEs or SSCs and providing that 18 information or evaluation up front in one place is 19 intended to make the documentation that follows in 20 subsequent chapters more efficient and concise. There 21 will be pointers to other sections and chapters where 22 the results and insights from these analyses are used 23 in the design process.
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61 1 the nature of the facility and the safety case. These 2 may include, for example: civil and structural 3 analysis; piping analysis; electrical load analysis; 4 thermal hydraulic analysis; criticality analysis; and 5 environmental qualification analysis.
6 Beyond the methodologies and analyses 7 discussed in the TICAP guidance it is expected that 8 development of the Chapter 2 information will also 9 serve as the location for other SAR material addressed 10 by ARCAP guidance. This would include summaries of 11 the site-related information and an analyses used to 12 develop the design-basis hazard levels that would be 13 documented in Chapter 6. So the development of the 14 Chapter 2 information really needs to be integrated 15 through use of both the TICAP and the ARCAP guidance.
16 Next slide, please? Moving onto the SAR 17 Chapter 3 guidance; we're on slide 94 now, Chapter 3 18 documents the selection and evaluation of licensing-19 basis events using the LMP process as described in NEI 20 18-04. In addition to conventional single-unit 21 reactor events, the LBEs include event sequence 22 families that may involve multiple reactor units and 23 non-reactor core radionuclide sources. The initiating 24 events associated with LBEs include those caused my 25 internal and external hazards reflected in the PRA as NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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62 1 well as those hazards addressed deterministically.
2 Chapter 3 will identify and describe the 3 abnormal operational occurrences, AOOs, design-basis 4 events, DBEs, and beyond-design-basis events, BDBEs, 5 as determined from the evaluation of events sequence 6 families. It is expected that these events are 7 identified, tabulated, and categorized as AOOs, DBEs, 8 and BDBEs and plotted on the frequency consequences 9 target curve and show the data point uncertainties to 10 demonstrate risk significance of the events.
11 The derivation of design-basis accidents, 12 or DBAs, from the set of DBEs (audio interference).
13 Someone needs to put their mic on mute, 14 please.
15 Again, the derivation of DBAs from the set 16 of DBEs determined for the design will also be 17 provided in this chapter. The descriptions of the 18 licensing basis events provided in this chapter will 19 be in sufficient detail to indicate the PRA safety 20 functions involved in the prevention and mitigation of 21 the LBEs such that the safety classifications for the 22 specific SSCs performing these functions, including 23 associated required human actions, can be determined.
24 And those classifications will be determined in 25 Chapter 5.
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63 1 Just as a refresher the analysis of DBAs 2 using the LMP process is performed in a conservative 3 deterministic manner much the same way as currently 4 done for Chapter 15 analyses for LWRs, meaning that 5 DBAs credit only safety-related SSCs. The analysis 6 for the non-DBA licensing-basis events using the LMP 7 process is performed using best-estimate methods in 8 accordance with the non-LWR PRA standard.
9 Safe stable end states are a key element 10 of the reactor safety case and should be defined in 11 Chapter 3. In LWR safety analysis reports it is 12 generally understood how safe stable end states are 13 defined, however for advanced non-LWRs the safe stable 14 end states, including success criteria that are needed 15 to achieve them, need to be defined for the specific 16 technology and design. The plant parameters used to 17 define the end states: core reactivity, reactor power, 18 fuel temperatures, et cetera, will be in the chapter.
19 Chapter 4 documents the integrated 20 evaluations that focus on overall plant risk 21 performance and the incorporation of defense-in-depth.
22 Overall plant risk performance is to be evaluated 23 against the three cumulative risk metrics: the 24 exclusion area boundary dose, EAB early fatality risk, 25 and latent cancer risk.
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64 1 Chapter 4 will also document the 2 assessment of the adequacy of defense-in-depth for the 3 plant design and will address the three focus areas 4 for defense-in-depth. And they are: plant capability; 5 programmatic capability; and integrated risk-informed 6 performance-based defense-in-depth adequacy.
7 The baseline defense-in-depth adequacy 8 evaluation results identified in this chapter and 9 other SAR chapters are to be documented in sufficient 10 detail to assure that proposed future changes to 11 physical, functional, operational, or programmatic 12 features of the facility can be effectively evaluated 13 for their potential for reduction of defense-in-depth 14 before proceeding with plant modifications.
15 Next slide, please? Okay. We're on slide 16 95. Chapter 5 documents the required safety 17 functions, required functional design criteria, or 18 RFDC, and principle design criteria, PDC, derived 19 using the LMP process for the plant design. The 20 required safety functions are identified as those 21 necessary to prevent and mitigate unplanned 22 radiological releases from any source with the plant.
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65 1 determined as either: safety-related; non-safety-2 related with special treatments; or non-safety-related 3 with no special treatments.
4 In addition, this chapter will include the 5 proposed principle design criteria for the plant 6 design, develop and/or derived using the LMP process.
7 Specific details and guidance for proposing PDC and 8 the scope of PDC for non-LWR applicants under Part 50 9 and 52 has been a source of differing views among both 10 industry and staff and there have been several PDC 11 discussions during public meetings on the TICAP 12 guidance. I'll have more to say about recent NRC 13 insights and positions on PDC provided at our public 14 meeting that took place on Tuesday of this week.
15 There has been however no disagreement that there is 16 a requirement for applicants to propose PDC for their 17 designs under Part 50 and 52.
18 Yes, Member Brown?
19 MEMBER BROWN: You talked about the three 20 categories. You said safety-related, safety -- SSCs 21 with special --
22 MR. OESTERLE: Treatment. Yes, I'll go 23 over those again. Safety-related.
24 MEMBER BROWN: Yes.
25 MR. OESTERLE: First is safety-related.
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66 1 The second is non-safety-related with special 2 treatment.
3 MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
4 MR. OESTERLE: And the third is not 5 safety-related without special treatment.
6 MEMBER BROWN: Is this special treatment 7 category similar to the RTNSS that we dealt with on 8 the existing plants?
9 MR. OESTERLE: I would say that there are 10 similarities between those two, yes.
11 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. I'm just trying to 12 relate them from one -- what we did before and to what 13 we're doing now. Is the RTNSS-type thought process, 14 in other words, non-safety-related but -- I've 15 forgotten what the RTNSS means now, so --
16 MR. OESTERLE: Oh, regulatory treatment.
17 MEMBER BROWN: Yes, right. Okay. Of non-18 safety systems or something like that.
19 MR. OESTERLE: So, yes, the concepts are 20 similar, but the implementation details may be a 21 little bit different. Under LMP there are some 22 discussions of the types of things that are considered 23 special treatments. One that jumps out at me is the 24 actual inclusion of an SSC in tech specs with 25 associated limiting conditions of operation is a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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67 1 special treatment, a form of special treatment.
2 MEMBER BROWN: I'm kind of parochial since 3 I do instrumentation and controls, so let me ask a 4 question relative to my specific interests and how you 5 would categorize. If a licensee categorized their 6 plant such that their instrumentation control systems 7 were not safety-related --
8 MR. OESTERLE: Yes.
9 MEMBER BROWN: -- would they be then 10 considered under the non-safety but with special 11 treatment? I have a hard time seeing if these things 12 get tossed off as a FM radio sitting off on the side 13 that people can listen to.
14 MR. OESTERLE: Yes.
15 MEMBER BROWN: I'm being a little humorous 16 when I say that, but --
17 MR. OESTERLE: No, I appreciate the 18 question. So no, there's not a correlation, a direct 19 correlation that way. You really have to determine 20 the function of your SSC first, and as a part of that 21 function and/or its risk significance or contribution 22 to defense-in-depth will determine its classification.
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68 1 treatments. And then the -- depending upon the 2 required function and its support requirements to 3 other SSCs would help determine the extent of special 4 treatments applied to that equipment.
5 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. Thanks.
6 MR. OESTERLE: You're welcome.
7 So next slide, please? So we're on slide 8 96. Chapter 6 provides further detail on the criteria 9 and capabilities of all safety-related SSCs determined 10 using the LMP process. This further detail includes:
11 safety-related design criteria, reliability and 12 capability of performance-based targets, and special 13 treatment requirements to provide sufficient 14 confidence that the performance-based targets intended 15 in the design will be achieved in the construction of 16 the plant and maintained throughout the licensed plant 17 life.
18 Chapter 6 also summarizes design 19 requirements for non-safety-related SSCs that provide 20 confidence that the non-safety-related SSCs will not 21 adversely impact the ability of safety-related SSCs to 22 support required safety functions in the event that a 23 hazard occurs at the design-basis hazard level.
24 Yes, Member Brown?
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69 1 your hand up from before?
2 (Pause.)
3 MR. OESTERLE: Oh, thank you.
4 Chapter 6 --
5 MEMBER BROWN: I forgot to take it down.
6 And I forgot to un-mute my mic, so --
7 MR. OESTERLE: No worries.
8 Chapter 6 will include the design 9 requirements associated with the design-basis external 10 hazards as well as the overall design requirements for 11 SSCs necessary to perform their functions. These 12 would include things like SSC materials in 13 construction, seismic and industry code 14 classifications and design codes; for example, ASME, 15 IEEE, et cetera, electric power support and interface 16 requirements, control and instrumentation 17 requirements, equipment qualification, et cetera.
18 Chapter 6 also identifies the special treatments 19 identified as necessary for safety-related SSCs to 20 perform their functions.
21 Chapter 7 provides similar detail as 22 Chapter 6, but focuses on the non-safety-related with 23 special treatment SSCs and non-safety-related without 24 special treatment SSCs; that is, the design criteria, 25 reliability and capability targets, and special NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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70 1 treatments.
2 It is expected that Chapters 6 and 7 3 provide the bulk of design information, system 4 descriptions, and design requirements for structures, 5 systems, and components of the plant, and the fact 6 that we manage to include both Chapter 6 and 7 on one 7 slide here has no bearing on the volume of information 8 expected in these chapters.
9 Next slide, please? So we're on slide 97 10 now. Chapter 8 provides an overview of plant programs 11 relied upon to support the LMP-based safety case.
12 This set of plant programs includes those used for 13 special treatments for safety-related or NSRST SSCs, 14 the non-safety-related with special treatment SSCs, as 15 described in Chapters 6 and 7, respectively, that 16 provide reasonable assurance that: (1) reliability and 17 performance targets are achieved throughout the plant 18 lifetime; and (2) safety-significant uncertainties are 19 effectively addressed as part of defense-in-depth.
20 In addition to programs supporting special 21 treatments Chapter 6 also identifies and provides an 22 overview of the program or programs that document SSC 23 reliability and capability targets -- I'm sorry, 24 Chapter 8 identifies and provides those reliability 25 and capability targets for those SSCs described in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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71 1 Chapters 6 and 7. The discussion of plant programs 2 would address the different plant lifetime phases; 3 i.e., design, construction, testing, and operations, 4 as applicable.
5 Examples of possible program topics 6 include quality assurance programs, startup testing, 7 in-service testing, in-service inspection, equipment 8 qualification, performance monitoring, reliability 9 assurance, conduct of operations programs, et cetera.
10 Detailed guidance for developing these programs 11 typically reside in other referenced guidance 12 documents and this chapter would point to those.
13 Plant programs that do not support the 14 LMP-based safety case; for example, as discussed 15 earlier programs for normal operations such as 16 ensuring occupational radiation exposure, they're 17 addressed in separate ARCAP guidance which Joe went 18 over this morning. Again, as Joe mentioned, the 19 reason for this is that the LMP process focuses on 20 off-normal plant scenarios; that is, AOOs, DBEs, and 21 BDBEs. In general guidance for addressing normal 22 operation will be addressed in or referenced in the 23 ARCAP guidance.
24 So this concludes my discussion on the 25 overall TICAP guidance. In the next few --
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72 1 CHAIR PETTI: So, Eric --
2 MR. OESTERLE: Yes?
3 CHAIR PETTI: -- I have a question before 4 you move onto the design criteria. So the old Chapter 5 15 stuff, is that in the chapter called Integrated 6 Assessment?
7 MR. OESTERLE: So it is -- yes, part of it 8 is in there. Part of it is in Chapter 3; part of it 9 is in Chapter 2.
10 MEMBER BLEY: And why is that split up?
11 MR. OESTERLE: Well, the -- so as you 12 recall the analyses in Chapter 15, those are the DBAs.
13 And so there are more -- so the tools and the analysis 14 methodologies and techniques for DBAs are discussed I 15 believe we said in Chapter 2. Also the other tool 16 used, the PRA, is discussed in that chapter as well.
17 And so the results of those analyses are utilized in 18 establishing design requirements and really discussed 19 further in other chapters that focus more on those 20 topics.
21 MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
22 MEMBER BROWN: I have a -- relative to 23 that thought process of being split up, I mean today 24 we've been reviewing on some of the new plants 25 chapter-by-chapter basis just to speed up the process NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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73 1 before every chapter is complete. And it seems to me 2 that if -- and I'm just hypothesizing here, that with 3 these analysis pieces broken up between different 4 areas that that's going to hinder the ability --
5 you're going to almost have to wait for the entire SAR 6 to be completed before you can review it. Some of it 7 is because a lot of these are interrelated to some 8 extent.
9 CHAIR PETTI: I'm not sure that's true, 10 Charlie. I'm looking at the -- I'm back on those 11 slides.
12 MEMBER BROWN: Yes.
13 CHAIR PETTI: I didn't read them carefully 14 enough. So I thought three was just the 15 identification of the LBEs, but it's also the 16 analysis. So they're going to identify them, kind of 17 justify them, and show you the results. So it might 18 actually be more efficient. I mean, I think that's 19 the goal. I think it remains to be seen when we see 20 one, but --
21 MR. OESTERLE: Yes, that is one of the 22 goals.
23 CHAIR PETTI: Yes. I mean, as I look at 24 the details here, the words -- there's lots of words, 25 but it strikes me that it may make it more efficient NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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74 1 for --
2 (Simultaneous speaking.)
3 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: And, Dave, I'm not 4 really -- I see what you're saying and I see what 5 Charlie is saying and I am totally confused how this 6 is going to work. Because let's say that we describe 7 the PRA in the Chapter 2 of the methodology. I mean, 8 and I'm not sure in what details and how, but you can 9 see it's actually being fully applied everywhere from 10 there. You cannot select license basis events without 11 the PRA because those are event sequences from the 12 actually PRA.
13 CHAIR PETTI: Right.
14 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Then you come to the 15 -- so now suddenly are we reviewing event sequences up 16 to the level 3 in that Chapter 3? I mean, I am 17 totally confused here.
18 CHAIR PETTI: I just think -- when I look 19 at it it looks more -- organizationally you'd read 20 from Chapter 1 to Chapter 2 to Chapter 3, whereas 21 before the PRA was Chapter 19 long after the Chapter 22 15 events. This looks like it flows in a -- at least 23 in a thought process that -- I mean, it follows LMP, 24 but it sort of makes sense that you have to start with 25 the PRA because that's the central part of the LMP.
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75 1 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: But are you -- when 2 do you start with the PRA? I mean, you start what 3 with PRA? You don't have a plant yet, you know? The 4 things are building on the license-basis event on the 5 safety structures and things like that. Suddenly we 6 are start -- I am so confused I cannot even ask the 7 questions. I mean, I have to see how this -- I always 8 ask for the -- some really high-level example how that 9 -- then we come to the safety classification where 10 this is -- special treatment category is purely base 11 on the importance of those things for the risk. So 12 that is totally based on the PRA.
13 And I mean, this is this importance of 14 these components is changing since the PRA is being 15 completed. There's more data then as more as we know 16 or -- yes, I'm just going to signed off here and just 17 hope for the best.
18 MS. CUBBAGE: This is Amy Cubbage, NRC 19 staff. I want to make it clear that the development 20 of the SAR is going to clearly be an iterative process 21 as design information is made -- becomes available, as 22 the designer is developing the design, as they're 23 developing their PRA. But once it comes to us it's 24 final design information.
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76 1 the nail on the head is that we intentionally put the 2 chapters in these orders to have a more logical 3 sequence of information and also recognizing that 4 everything can't be first. Some chapters have to be 5 first, but trying to put it in a logical sequence.
6 MR. OESTERLE: Yes, thank you very much 7 for that, Amy. And I'll add that the focus of this 8 guidance is on what information needs to go in the 9 application. And the layout of the guidance and the 10 organizational structure is driven by an applicant 11 that is using PRA in a leading type of application to 12 inform its design as we go.
13 And as Amy said, once we get the 14 application in, there's going to be a high level of 15 certainty on the -- let's say the design and the 16 licensing-basis events, and we would say -- we would 17 expect that the majority of, if not all of the 18 iterations that you go through using the LMP process 19 for your design will have been done by the time -- or 20 before we get the application. So that will -- we 21 will see a final product.
22 As far as how the -- how we would move 23 forward in engaging the ACRS with reviews of 24 applications, I think the structure and format of this 25 SAR will change the nature of how that was done in the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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77 1 past on new reactors, I think where we came to the 2 ACRS on a chapter-by-chapter basis. So we'll have to 3 take a look at that as we continue moving forward.
4 CHAIR PETTI: SO I was just --
5 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: So this is --
6 CHAIR PETTI: Go ahead, Vesna.
7 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Yes, exactly what 8 you just said important. This assume PRA in the 9 leading role. That's true. And also assume that PRA 10 is done, I mean, basically. You have it. It's 11 structural. It's ready to go. So therefore, it seems 12 to me like you assume that this work will be done and 13 then presented. It's not really the -- so therefore 14 -- but however, for review -- so when would they 15 review the PRA? It's not going to be review under 16 Chapter 2, which is just methodology --
17 MR. OESTERLE: Right.
18 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: -- is it, before it 19 goes in the next chapter. So this is where all this 20 sort of like --
21 MR. OESTERLE: Yes, so thank you for that 22 question. I think there's a couple of important 23 points to bring out as a part of the review of this 24 information. If we could, if we scroll all the way 25 back to slide 76, the actual PRA is not being NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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78 1 submitted for NRC review. It would be available for 2 audit. I believe the PRA standard requires a peer 3 review. And it's those results and insights from the 4 PRA that drive the design. And the establishment of 5 the LBEs and the safety classification of the SSCs and 6 determination of technical specifications and adequacy 7 of defense-in-depth are those things that we will see 8 in the SAR.
9 MEMBER BROWN: Well, the PRA is not --
10 MEMBER KIRCHNER: But, Eric, let me ask 11 you a question: Let's go back to the current fleet 12 and Chapter 15, which plays such a central role in 13 your review. You review pretty much all of the 14 methodologies that are used to do Chapter 15 analyses 15 typically through topical reports. Did I hear you 16 correctly saying that you weren't going to review the 17 PRA when the PRA is foundational to the whole 18 application you're receiving?
19 MR. OESTERLE: No, if I said that, I 20 apologize. I misspoke.
21 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Okay.
22 MR. OESTERLE: What I said was that the 23 PRA is not going to be submitted to the NRC. It will 24 be available for audit by the staff.
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79 1 it not submitted?
2 MR. OESTERLE: It's not a requirement.
3 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Wait a minute. Wait a 4 minute. You're basing this entire process on the PRA 5 and you're not requiring them to submit it?
6 MR. OESTERLE: So --
7 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Yes, that's great.
8 MR. OESTERLE: So the --
9 MEMBER KIRCHNER: It's almost stretches 10 one's credibility. Come on. The whole thing is based 11 on the PRA.
12 MR. OESTERLE: So if we go back to, you 13 know, the Part 50 and 52 regulatory framework, you 14 know, this among others, are some of the challenges 15 that we see in fitting the LMP process into the 16 established Part 50 and 52 regulatory framework.
17 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Wait a minute, wait a 18 minute, wait a minute. 50 and 52, that's a 19 supplemental thing to put a PRA on the table.
20 That's, what we're doing here is 21 completely different. We're starting with the PRA as 22 the whole entire licensing basis. Completely 23 different.
24 The licensing basis primarily for 50 and 25 52, is Chapter 15.
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80 1 MR. OESTERLE: Right. And so I'll 2 reiterate that the design basis accidents for an LMP 3 based application, are performed using the 4 conservative, deterministic approach that is the same 5 as what was done under Chapter 15.
6 It's the other non-DBA licensing basis 7 events, that are evaluated using the best estimate 8 methodologies of the PRA.
9 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes, but you're using, 10 let's pick on something --
11 (Simultaneous speaking.)
12 MEMBER BLEY: Hey, Walt --
13 MEMBER KIRCHNER: -- specific. You're --
14 MEMBER BLEY: -- Walt? Could I --
15 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes?
16 MEMBER BLEY: -- jump in and say something 17 and then --
18 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes, you can go.
19 MEMBER BLEY: -- you go ahead with your 20 questions.
21 Because submitting the PRA given its 22 complexity, and is problematic. And what I mean is 23 they can write a report, well right now they do write 24 a summary report, which is the Chapter 19.
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81 1 trees if that's the methodology they're using for the 2 PRA. And the best way to review it is to sit down 3 with them and exercise the model, and look into the 4 details, and chase down various scenarios.
5 Staff does that through these audits. And 6 we've done it before through the same kind of auditing 7 approach.
8 To get a hard copy of it to submit isn't 9 the best way to do the review. So I'll let them talk 10 more about it, but I just wanted to get that across.
11 They have it; it's available to look 12 through to exercise with them to make sure all of the 13 pieces fit together; look at their data sources; and 14 look at the whole model, and make sure it's 15 reasonable.
16 Not just reasonable, but it doesn't have 17 errors throughout the fault trees and event trees, if 18 that's the way you're doing it.
19 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: And it doesn't 20 reflect reality then. The question is not how do you 21 do review, the question is when. And, you know, and 22 do you start the review of all of SAR without PRA 23 audit?
24 It doesn't matter how you review it. Even 25 question is do you review it, because Walter is right.
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82 1 All, everything, the basis of the type of hydraulic 2 analyzes selection of sequences, selection of the 3 safety systems, selections of the special treatment.
4 Everything is based on the PRA suddenly.
5 It's not the PRA based on reality. Reality is based 6 on PRA.
7 Things have you know, become a very 8 complex and what just said, call for the best, which 9 I want to say maybe in the end, that will all work 10 together somehow good.
11 But in this moment, it is confusing for 12 me, so.
13 MS. CUBBAGE: This is Amy Cubbage, NRC 14 staff.
15 We also don't want to lose sight of the 16 fact that we are working on endorsing a non-LWR PRA 17 standard, and maybe Marty Stutzke could chime in on 18 that activity.
19 We also highly encourage applicants to 20 engage with us during pre-application, on their 21 probabilistic risk assessment.
22 Certainly if they're not planning to 23 follow the Perry standard, they need to be talking to 24 us very early on, on how they intend to demonstrate 25 that their PRA is technically adequate for the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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83 1 application at hand.
2 And we're also encouraging that the PRA be 3 made available to audit to the NRC staff in advance of 4 the application, because it is so central to the 5 development of the other parts of the application.
6 So with that, Marty, did you want to chime 7 in?
8 MR. STUTZKE: No, I mean I basically agree 9 with what you say, and remember that Reg Guide 1.247 10 will be out for trial use in a couple of months, like 11 the (audio interference).
12 That's it.
13 MR. OESTERLE: Thank you, Marty, thank you.
14 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: There was just some 15 short comment.
16 This standard tells them what needs to be 17 done, not how to do it. So they have to choose how to 18 do it.
19 Did they make that selection, that's not 20 what that standard tells then. Standard only tells 21 them this what you need to be, to do to have a good 22 PRA. Not how to do it.
23 MS. CUBBAGE: Right. And the NRC staff 24 will be auditing the PRA. And if it's determined to 25 be insufficient, then it would not be sufficient to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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84 1 support the application.
2 So we need to recognize that the NRC will 3 have an oversight role here.
4 MEMBER BROWN: But you also have to have a 5 plant design under, that's covered under Chapter 5, 6, 6 and 7, I think it's 7, so that you can even develop 7 the sequences that you need under a PRA.
8 MS. CUBBAGE: That's right.
9 MEMBER BROWN: I'm kind of lost. I --
10 (Simultaneous speaking.)
11 ` MS. CUBBAGE: This is --
12 MEMBER BROWN: Chapter 1 is site 13 evaluations, and earthquakes, and tornadoes, and 14 hurricanes, and all that stuff. You can do that 15 similar to what we do today.
16 But it seems to me that for instance, the 17 principle design criteria, there aren't any. They'd 18 have to be developed with part of Chapter 5, according 19 to the structure that you laid out. That's on slide 20 96, or 95, excuse me.
21 So it's whereas existing plants today 22 start with a set of general design criteria, and this 23 makes it look like there are none. You have to look 24 at the plant, and then figure out what they are.
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85 1 you've got to have a plant design to figure out what 2 you're design criteria are going to be, or what's 3 required.
4 MS. CUBBAGE: Yes, all of that needs to be 5 done. We need a design, we need a PRA, we need 6 principle design criteria, and there will be an 7 interactive process by which the developer comes up 8 with that.
9 Ideally with some level of re-application 10 engagement with the NRC staff, to make sure they're 11 headed in the right direction. But yes, this is not, 12 this is not easy. It's not trivial.
13 MR. OESTERLE: Well, all of the plants have 14 a reactor, all of them have a cooling system of some 15 kind.
16 All of them have monitoring and 17 instrumentation. All of them have various other types 18 of systems that support the shutdown, or operation, or 19 criticality control.
20 And all of those are wrapped up in Chapter 21 5, where a lot of them were kind of separated if you 22 look at it, in the older system.
23 I'm just, I'm like Vesna. I'm having a 24 little bit of difficulty how this, we're going to do 25 piece parts of the Chapter 5 and 6, before they're NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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86 1 complete?
2 MS. CUBBAGE: So I think if the concern is 3 just the organization of it, you know, maybe we can 4 take that back and figure out a way to explain it 5 better.
6 But you know, at the end of the day, we're 7 trying to make sure that all of the appropriate 8 technical topics are covered, in order to support the 9 ability of the staff to make a finding. A reasonable 10 assurance of adequate protection once the application 11 is submitted.
12 MR. OESTERLE: So, Amy, I --
13 (Simultaneous speaking.)
14 MEMBER BLEY: I think there's some 15 confusion here --
16 MR. OESTERLE: Yes.
17 MEMBER BLEY: -- about what, when an 18 applicant will submit and what will be here. And I 19 think maybe the staff can explain that.
20 When they submit their application, will 21 all these chapters be in it, and I --
22 (Simultaneous speaking.)
23 MS. CUBBAGE: Yes.
24 MEMBER BLEY: -- and the answer is yes.
25 MS. CUBBAGE: Yes, yes, you have to. Yes.
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87 1 MEMBER BLEY: Sounds like we're thinking 2 that won't be what happens.
3 MR. OESTERLE: Absolutely, yes.
4 MEMBER BLEY: And it really is.
5 MS. CUBBAGE: So you have to have all of 6 the chapters of an FSAR, addressing all of the 7 regulations at the time of submittal, in order for an 8 application to be docketed as sufficient for the NRC 9 staff review.
10 MEMBER BLEY: So this iterative process you 11 described will go on by the designer, and with, we 12 expect with interactions with the staff, before a 13 formal application is submitted?
14 MS. CUBBAGE: Yes. The iterative process 15 is developing the design, and in turn, developing the 16 application that is submitted to the NRC in its 17 entirety.
18 MR. OESTERLE: Yes, and I would add --
19 (Simultaneous speaking.)
20 MEMBER BLEY: So --
21 MR. OESTERLE: -- I would add that the, 22 you know, we would expect that the iterative process 23 that the designer goes through in the design, and in 24 the PRA, is completed before this, the application is 25 finished and submitted to the NRC.
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88 1 So the iterative process is not between 2 the designer and the NRC. Most of that iteration 3 takes place in the designer's house.
4 CHAIR PETTI: Right. And is there any 5 plans by industry to provide sort of a, some sort of 6 higher level example in an appendix or something of 7 TCAP?
8 MR. OESTERLE: Yes, so great question, 9 thank you.
10 There are some examples in, I believe it's 11 appendix, one of the appendices to NEI 2107, that show 12 the level of detail that would be provided for the 13 different types of licensing basis events.
14 There's one for an AOO. There's one for 15 a DBE. There's one for a BDBE, and I believe there's 16 one for a DBA, as well.
17 So the answer is yes.
18 In addition to that, there were you know, 19 several table top exercises performed with, on 20 implementing the TCAP guidance and before that, the 21 LMP with several, several advance reactor developers 22 to test drive the process.
23 CHAIR PETTI: Yes, so let me just. I 24 wasn't on the committee.
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89 1 of the results of the table tops, to kind of take this 2 from the abstract to the more specific?
3 MEMBER BLEY: We had briefings on at least 4 one, and maybe two of the table tops, that were you 5 know, partial exercises of the process.
6 We received copies of the reports of maybe 7 four or five of them. Not all of them carried the 8 process all the way through.
9 But as far as briefings, they came as we 10 were looking at LMP I think, as part of those 11 presentations by the industry. Maybe somebody on the 12 staff remembers better than I do of those.
13 But we do have records of that in our 14 minutes, and in the reports that were submitted. And 15 Derek maybe can help us on that, too.
16 CHAIR PETTI: Okay, no, that's what I 17 thought happened.
18 MR. OESTERLE: Yes, we do have links, links 19 to those table top exercise reports on our public 20 webpage under the advance reactors, and the licensing 21 modernization project page.
22 MS. CUBBAGE: Yes. Yes, to add to that 23 Eric, just to make sure it's clear and I think Dennis 24 got to the point that there were table tops on LMP, 25 which were discussed with the committee --
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90 1 MR. OESTERLE: Yes.
2 MS. CUBBAGE: -- and then there have been 3 table tops on TCAP more recently.
4 MR. OESTERLE: Correct, correct.
5 CHAIR PETTI: So the question, one question 6 that I still have, and again, I don't, you don't have 7 to answer it now but be something to think about.
8 Is the three pathways that Marty talked 9 about yesterday, versus TCAP and RCAP being so LMP 10 focused. Is there a hole there now if someone wants 11 to go with PRA not in the leading role? Or the 12 maximum accident?
13 Does the SAR look the same, does it look 14 different? Are all these stuff in the orange box 15 still required?
16 That's the only thing that to me, I 17 haven't been able to close in my mind.
18 MR. OESTERLE: Yes, that a good question, 19 and thanks for that.
20 So we are closely coordinating with Marty 21 on guidance development going forward you know, with 22 the TIRIMA approach. So I think it's too early to 23 answer your question.
24 MR. OESTERLE: Right, but there's 25 something, there could be another iteration coming, is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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91 1 what you're saying potentially.
2 MR. OESTERLE: Right, right.
3 MR. OESTERLE: Okay. Go ahead, I see lots 4 of hands. Vicki, your hand's been up for a while.
5 MEMBER BIER: Yes, I just want to kind of 6 reiterate, and maybe put words in people's mouths a 7 little bit, based on what I was hearing.
8 The question that I have is do you feel 9 that submitting the PRA is really unnecessary and not 10 beneficial, or do you feel that ideally, you would 11 prefer to have people submit the PRA, but your hands 12 are tied by current regulation so that you can't 13 require it?
14 MR. OESTERLE: So I'm not quite sure how to 15 answer that question without separating a personal 16 opinion from staff position. So I will defer to 17 others.
18 MS. CUBBAGE: Maybe I'll chime in. This is 19 Amy Cubbage.
20 In the original Part 52, it was required 21 that the PRA be submitted. I was the project manager 22 for ESBWR, some 10,000 pages of information was 23 submitted.
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92 1 the submittal of the PRA. However, the staff was 2 still able to reach the same findings, and had access 3 to all the information it needed to make those 4 findings.
5 That said, as we move forward to Part 53, 6 it's still under development as to what information 7 will be submitted.
8 But I surmise it will be similar to the 9 current requirements under Part 50, where the 10 applicant will submit a description, and provide the 11 insights, and describe how it's been used.
12 So from my personal opinion, it's 13 certainly not a matter of hands being tied.
14 MEMBER BIER: Thanks.
15 CHAIR PETTI: Oh, sorry, Ron? Go ahead.
16 MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes, now I'm thinking 17 more along the lines of what Walt has been saying.
18 I heard Amy use two phrases. Available 19 for audit, and will be audited. And this is the nub 20 of the problem because now the, because the PRA is so 21 central, the adequacy of the PRA will be a very strong 22 function of the extent of the review now by the 23 applicant.
24 In other words, the peer review, if you 25 want to use that term.
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93 1 And so I think we need to be very careful 2 in this case, which is it? Available for audit, or 3 will be audited?
4 MR. OESTERLE: Thanks, Member Ballinger, I 5 appreciate that distinction and the question. And so 6 I'll reach out to Marty Stutzke to see if he has any 7 comment on the adequacy of the PRA, and its 8 determination through peer review. Or NRC audit.
9 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, my first impression is 10 if the PRA has not undergone a peer review, then we 11 will do an audit, an on sight audit to the level that 12 we need to, to confirm the acceptability of that PRA.
13 On the other hand, if a peer review is 14 done, and they submit all the facts and observations 15 and the resolutions, that audit may not be necessary.
16 MEMBER BALLINGER: But it would seem to me 17 that now the review should include an audit, if you 18 will, of the peer review. Because that's what the 19 whole foundation of the thing is predicated on that 20 peer review being performed adequately.
21 MR. STUTZKE: Yes, and we would expect to 22 do that. Moreover, we may observe the actual peer 23 review process.
24 MEMBER BALLINGER: Ah, okay. So maybe is 25 that codified anywhere in any of these documents?
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94 1 MR. STUTZKE: No, not yet.
2 MEMBER KIRCHNER: I would submit, Marty, 3 this is Walt.
4 With all due respect to peer reviews, 5 there are problems in doing peer reviews to the 6 extent, well, one, these are, these designs by and 7 large, are going to be proprietary. That presents a 8 whole set of problems.
9 The people who are chosen for the peer 10 review, one would hope they're a very diverse group 11 with all kinds of expertise, et cetera, et cetera.
12 I haven't looked at the standard to see 13 what the requirements are for the peer reviewers, but 14 it's not being done in the open.
15 So my, given the fundamental nature of the 16 PRA to this entire approach, I would expect at a 17 minimum, you would audit the adequacy of the PRA.
18 Which is a little different than, in other 19 words, to make sure it really does conform with the 20 standard, and then as Dennis suggested to me, and I 21 appreciate Dennis' point. The description, I think 22 the current requirements in 52 are description and 23 insights, if I remember it correctly.
24 I may not be, but you had a chart, Marty, 25 that said what was required. I get it. That's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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95 1 probably the best way for the staff to start the 2 review of the actual results of the PRA, and how they 3 filter into making all these decisions about LBEs, and 4 then classification of equipment as such.
5 But given the fundamental role of the PRA, 6 I just, I think at least that audit would be a 7 requirement.
8 MEMBER BLEY: I'd like to jump in on that, 9 Walt.
10 And I don't disagree with that, I think 11 that's important. But Amy triggered a memory.
12 Back when we did ESBWR, they had submitted 13 a printed version of the PRA, and on if you want 14 1,000, we also had access to a printed version.
15 And one of the problems we ran into, and 16 I'm sure the staff hit the same problems, was we'd 17 look through the model and start raising questions 18 about, you know, if this logic isn't right.
19 And as soon as we'd start, the applicant 20 would say, you are absolutely correct and we corrected 21 that. But it wasn't in the current printed version.
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96 1 about it, and work through it.
2 And that kind of audit works very well.
3 The trying to deal with a printed version while things 4 are in flux, is, was very, very difficult. It didn't 5 work well.
6 MEMBER BALLINGER: I'm thinking that the 7 ultimate review was on the APR1400 where we actually 8 were down, well, not we, but somebody, a member, was 9 down at their office working through it and --
10 (Simultaneous speaking.)
11 MEMBER BLEY: We did that on three of them, 12 Ron.
13 MEMBER BALLINGER: Oh, okay. I was more 14 familiar with the APR1400.
15 MR. OESTERLE: It looks like there are 16 other hands up as well.
17 CHAIR PETTI: Yes, Joy?
18 MEMBER REMPE: Sure. I can appreciate as 19 a regulator saying okay, you guys do your PRA, iterate 20 on the design, get it where it needs to be, and then 21 come in and see us.
22 But I'm wondering how the design 23 developers are taking this. Because you know, I've 24 already seen other documents where there's concern 25 about they can't get any sort of regulatory approval NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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97 1 early on to. And my take on it is that's how they 2 secure additional funding from their investors.
3 And this is really going to require front 4 load funding on their part. Are they taking this 5 well?
6 MS. CUBBAGE: Actually, Joy, this is Amy 7 Cubbage.
8 To the contrary, we are strongly 9 encouraging those pre-application engagements, and 10 would gladly provide feedback to someone who wanted to 11 engage with us during the pre-apps.
12 So I wasn't quite following your thought 13 there.
14 MEMBER REMPE: Pre-app's one thing, but 15 when you start coming in with topical reports, or 16 chapters --
17 (Simultaneous speaking.)
18 MS. CUBBAGE: Well, that's what I mean --
19 MEMBER REMPE: -- and --
20 MS. CUBBAGE: -- topicals.
21 MEMBER REMPE: Yes, well, that's a little 22 more. That's a more substantial review.
23 But I guess I'm just thinking that it's 24 going to take a lot more funding on their part to get 25 their design finalized.
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98 1 Because I know with a lot of the other 2 plants, we'd see design changes in process because of 3 comments, as we went through the chapters.
4 And after they've spent all the money to 5 get their PRA, and get their design finalized and then 6 come in, I guess my question, and maybe I'm wrong, is 7 that this is going to require more front load funding 8 on their part. But you don't think it will. So maybe 9 I'm wrong.
10 MS. CUBBAGE: Yes, I'm not quite following.
11 I can't. Okay.
12 MR. OESTERLE: Well, so I'll jump in.
13 So I think some of the insights on that 14 can be gleaned from the fact that during the, and I 15 think you've heard this, that during our stakeholders' 16 discussions on Part 53, some of the feedback that we 17 got from industry was, you know, don't require as part 18 of Part 53, that a PRA be, is necessary because some 19 of the designs may be very simple, and not complex and 20 that a PRA is not you know, worth sinking the money 21 and time into.
22 So there are various opinions about PRAs 23 out there in the, to aspects of necessity for the 24 design. Or the flexibility and insights that it 25 provides, as part of the iterative design process.
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99 1 MEMBER REMPE: So years ago when I was 2 working for a gas cold reactor design that came up 3 with a preliminary safety information document, we 4 used to, some of the workers would laugh about having 5 a transient design, because the PRA would identify 6 something, the design would change. And we'd go back 7 and forth.
8 But we were bankrolled by a Department of 9 Energy funding source. I'm just thinking if some of 10 these designs aren't, I'm not sure if they'll have the 11 funding to accommodate this approach, is I guess my 12 gut feeling when I first hear this.
13 But I'm just curious about it.
14 MS. CUBBAGE: Yes, at the end of the day, 15 these are not easy things to do. Many of the 16 developers are receiving substantial DoE funding.
17 And for those that don't have enough 18 funding to develop a safety case, then they're 19 probably in the wrong business.
20 MR. RECKLEY: But Joy, this is Bill 21 Reckley.
22 Just to your point, this is really, I mean 23 and what you describe is, is really a designer trying 24 to pick a fairly linear design process, or an 25 iterative design process.
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100 1 And there's pros and cons to both of 2 those. The linear tends to be a simpler process, but 3 even those if you want to say that the current Part 50 4 structure with the general design criteria and so 5 forth, is a fairly linear process, I think all of us 6 who have lived through this would understand that all 7 of the designs even that went through that process, 8 went through quite a few iterations, as you start to 9 introduce other factors like cost, and changes into 10 the energy sectors, and so forth.
11 So just as Charlie mentioned earlier, even 12 in an iterative process you have to start somewhere, 13 right? And they have designers are basically going to 14 have some significant aspects of their design, kind of 15 decided upon when they enter into the process.
16 So, yes, it's complicated as Amy said.
17 And our ability to accommodate I think, either that 18 linear design process, or a more iterative process, is 19 what we're, is what we're now kind of settling in on 20 through these various options that we talked about 21 over the last two days.
22 MEMBER REMPE: Again, I don't have all the 23 answers, I just was curious what some of the design 24 developers are saying and if they're --
25 (Simultaneous speaking.)
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101 1 MR. RECKLEY: Well --
2 MEMBER REMPE: -- receiving this well.
3 MR. RECKLEY: And as Amy said, we're 4 hearing a mix, right? The advance reactor 5 demonstration programs, are using this kind of 6 approach.
7 Now, those designs are benefitting from, 8 from you know, relatively long history, and I'll, and 9 many years of iterations associated with both gas 10 cooled, and sodium cooled reactors.
11 There are other designers as Eric 12 mentioned. Especially some of the smaller ones who 13 think a more linear process might work for them.
14 So, you know, part of our problem is we're 15 not hearing a single voice on this. There are 16 different parties with different preferences on how 17 this will go forward.
18 And it's understandable from different 19 designer standpoint, they're just coming up with 20 different conclusions, and different preferences.
21 MEMBER REMPE: Well, our only concern is 22 safety, and you can get there with this approach. I 23 just was curious.
24 MR. OESTERLE: Yes, and I'll add to that.
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102 1 minimum set of information included in the application 2 necessary for the staff to do its review, and arrive 3 at its findings on safety and reasonable assurance.
4 And that the audits do play a part in that 5 process. And some of what has happened in the past is 6 that the audits of applicant information, has resulted 7 in additional information being included in the 8 application.
9 CHAIR PETTI: So, Vicki, you have your hand 10 up. Is that from before, or do you have another 11 question?
12 MEMBER BIER: No, sorry, that's from 13 before.
14 CHAIR PETTI: Eric, I mean given we're kind 15 of slipping behind the schedule, why don't we move on 16 to the principle design criteria?
17 MR. OESTERLE: I'm okay with that. I 18 believe we're on slide 98.
19 Okay, thank you very much.
20 So like I had mentioned earlier, the 21 development of guidance for an LMP based approach for 22 proposing principle design criteria, or PDC, has been 23 the subject of ongoing stakeholder interactions.
24 The most recent discussion on this topic 25 occurred during our December 14 TCAP public meeting.
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103 1 And we talked about the applicability of 2 the general design criteria in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, 3 to non-light water reactors.
4 We talked about what guidance is out there 5 for developing proposed PDCs for advanced reactors.
6 And the possible need for exemptions from regulations, 7 when developing PDC for advanced reactor applications 8 using the LMP process under Part 50 and 52.
9 So I'll provide a summary of these 10 discussions on these points in the next few slides.
11 So if we could go to the next slide, please.
12 So we're now on slide 99. And as you can 13 see here, there's a list of requirements in the 14 regulations, where PDC are required to be proposed by 15 applicants under Part 50 and Part 52.
16 It should be noted that the NRC is 17 considering including other regulatory constructs in 18 the Part 53 rulemaking, to ensure that appropriate 19 functional design criteria are developed through which 20 an NRC finding could be made.
21 Based on the regulatory history, PDC are 22 a means to meet the requirements of the Atomic Energy 23 Act, Section 182, for inclusion in license 24 applications of, and they quote from the specific 25 characteristics of the facility, and such other NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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104 1 information as the commission may, by rule or 2 regulation, deem necessary in order to enable it to 3 find that utilization or production of special nuclear 4 material will be in accord with the common defense and 5 security, and will provide adequate protection to the 6 health and safety of the public.
7 So next slide, please.
8 So the discussions that we had on PDC and 9 GDC, what we said were that the general design 10 criteria in Appendix A to Part 50, are applicable to 11 LWRs as minimum requirements. However, they provide 12 guidance to applicants for other types of nuclear 13 power units.
14 We also discussed the fact that there are 15 advanced reactor design criteria that were developed 16 and endorsed, in the NRC Reg Guide 1.232, that were 17 intended to provide insight into the staff's views, on 18 how the underlying safety bases for the GDC could be 19 applied to address non-LWR design features.
20 And as noted in that Reg Guide, the 21 development of the ARDC was an important first step to 22 address the unique characteristics of non-LWR 23 technology.
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105 1 criteria, and determining the role of such criteria 2 within a new regulatory framework.
3 Next slide, please.
4 So we're now on slide 101.
5 During our stakeholder interactions on 6 TCAP guidance, a question was asked as to whether the 7 description of the highlighted statement that appears 8 in the introductory section of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, 9 applies to advance non-light water reactors.
10 And so it really was, is that description 11 a printable design criteria part of the regulation, is 12 it a requirement.
13 And we determined that, the NRC determined 14 a position on the requirement for proposed PDC is that 15 it includes the scope of PDC described in the 16 regulations, and it's also described in the regulatory 17 history. And it's that italicized statement.
18 And we highlighted certain portions of it 19 as we used that to define the scope of PDC.
20 So we believe that PDC are particularly 21 important for construction permit applicants. Of 22 course, they're important for other applicants as 23 well.
24 But the focus on CP applicants here, is 25 that PDC were more important because there were fewer NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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106 1 overall requirements for CP applicants, comparatively 2 speaking. And those requirements that were there only 3 called for preliminary information as a minimum.
4 This second bullet does not mean that CP 5 applicants need to provide less information for their 6 PDCs.
7 This comparison just highlights the 8 significance placed on the PDC, for a construction 9 permit.
10 And as such, it follows that proposed PDC 11 play a significant role in supporting the NRC's 12 finding that there is reasonable protection, sorry, 13 reasonable assurance that safety questions will be 14 satisfactorily resolved, and that the proposed 15 facility can be constructed, and operated at the 16 proposed location, without undue risk to the health 17 and safety of the public.
18 CHAIR PETTI: Eric?
19 MR. OESTERLE: Yes?
20 CHAIR PETTI: Just a question on the 21 concern that was raised. Was the concern that they 22 didn't think one needed PDCs or --
23 (Simultaneous speaking.)
24 MR. OESTERLE: No --
25 CHAIR PETTI: -- was it something about the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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107 1 particular language? I mean, I read it and go, well, 2 of course, you know?
3 ELL: Well, no, great question, great 4 question.
5 So there was never a, any kind of a 6 difference of opinion as to the requirement to 7 proposed PDC.
8 The question was on, once we agree that 9 PDC are required to be proposed, what do those PDC 10 need to include? You know, what are the scope of 11 those PDC?
12 CHAIR PETTI: Okay.
13 MR. OESTERLE: And so our position was that 14 well, the PDC need to address the necessary design, 15 fabrication, construction testing, and performance 16 requirements for SSEs important to safety.
17 CHAIR PETTI: Thanks.
18 MR. OESTERLE: Thanks for the question.
19 So I think we're ready to move to the next 20 slide, please.
21 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Just a minute, Eric.
22 MR. OESTERLE: Yes.
23 MEMBER KIRCHNER: So it seems to me on the 24 PDC discussions, do you envision that this would be 25 one of the primary, no, poor choice of words, one of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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108 1 the first major items that you would do a pre-2 application interaction with the applicant on?
3 MR. OESTERLE: Yes. In fact, we have 4 already seen that at work. We've already had some 5 pre-application interactions with applicants on their 6 proposed PDC.
7 And I can refer to Kairos as being one of 8 those in which they submitted a topical report, and we 9 reviewed it and performed a safety, issued a safety 10 evaluation report for their proposed PDC.
11 So, yes, we do anticipate that this would 12 be one of those you know, say you know, leading 13 variances --
14 (Simultaneous speaking.)
15 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes, it would seem to me 16 that if you can't get to closure on this, then it 17 would be tough sledding --
18 MR. OESTERLE: Yes.
19 MEMBER KIRCHNER: -- for the rest of the 20 application. Ditto things like quality assurance that 21 --
22 MR. OESTERLE: Yes.
23 MEMBER KIRCHNER: -- would be -- come 24 after the PDC delineation.
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109 1 right on in that respect.
2 So if we could go to the next slide, 3 please.
4 Thanks.
5 So we're on slide 102.
6 Proposed PDC determined to be necessary 7 for a non-LWR, and submitted in an application under 8 10 CFR Part 50, or 52, should be as comprehensive in 9 scope as the GDC and ARDC.
10 And that is the scope as we defined 11 previously, establish the necessary design, 12 fabrication, construction testing, and performance 13 requirements.
14 So we kind of look at this as like a two-15 step process. First, you determine which PDCs are 16 necessary for the required safety functions, that you 17 need to ensure in your design.
18 Then, once you've established those, you 19 look for those SSCs that perform those functions, and 20 ensure that the scope of the PDC then cover those 21 necessary areas, design, fabrication, construction 22 testing, and performance requirements.
23 Yes, Member Brown, I see you have your 24 hand up.
25 MEMBER BROWN: Yes, when you, that first NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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110 1 bullet when you talk about as comprehensive in scope 2 as the GDCs, I presume you're talking about Appendix 3 A?
4 MR. OESTERLE: Yes, I am.
5 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, just it wasn't 6 specified. I didn't know that was more generic, 7 that's why I asked the question.
8 MR. OESTERLE: Okay, thank you.
9 MEMBER BROWN: I asked the question because 10 when we were doing this back in some of the earlier 11 meetings, I went back since I'm, since I'm not as 12 versed in the commercial world, and looked at all the 13 GDCs and it appeared to me that all, like two-thirds 14 or more of them would apply to any design you came up 15 with, because they were so generic in terms of safety 16 implications.
17 So that's, I've been emphasizing that 18 along the way.
19 MR. OESTERLE: Yes.
20 MEMBER BROWN: So I just wanted to make 21 sure they were still included as part of the stuff to 22 be considered.
23 So thank you.
24 MR. OESTERLE: Yes, yes, thank you.
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111 1 identify in our discussions, is that the guidance 2 should say that applicants should look at the GDC and 3 ARDC, as guidance in developing their proposed PDCs.
4 And, in fact, the development of ARDCs, 5 which was endorsed in Reg Guide 1.232, in fact, did 6 that very exercise.
7 So the --
8 (Simultaneous speaking.)
9 MEMBER BROWN: I remember that, thank you.
10 MR. OESTERLE: You're welcome.
11 So --
12 (Simultaneous speaking.)
13 MEMBER KIRCHNER: So from a process 14 standpoint, Eric, do you envision --
15 (Simultaneous speaking.)
16 MR. OESTERLE: Yes.
17 MEMBER KIRCHNER: -- do you envision that 18 once you had reviewed the applicant's PDCs, then you 19 would use those much like you used the GDCs, and 0800 20 as a fundamental, what should I say, foundational 21 basis for reviewing the --
22 MR. OESTERLE: Yes.
23 MEMBER KIRCHNER: -- that specific part of 24 the application?
25 MR. OESTERLE: Yes, that's correct.
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112 1 MEMBER KIRCHNER: It's system.
2 MR. OESTERLE: That would be our, yes, 3 those would be those, the approved well, approved 4 proposed PDC would become then the foundational 5 benchmarks for which the NRC, then would establish its 6 findings in the safety valuation report.
7 And there's even been some discussion 8 about for construction permit applications, including 9 those approved proposed PDCs in, in the construction 10 permits as license conditions.
11 Member Brown, your hand is up. Is that do 12 you have a new question, or is that from before?
13 MEMBER BROWN: I just forgot.
14 MR. OESTERLE: Okay.
15 MEMBER BROWN: Thank you, thank you.
16 MR. OESTERLE: No worries.
17 So we also discussed that our position 18 that non-LWR applicants proposing PDC, that do not 19 fully address the scope of PDC as shown there in the 20 parenthesis, will need to request exemptions from the 21 applicable regulations.
22 And, again, those regulations were on a 23 previous slide. And the discussion around that 24 centered on well, is it a full exemption, or is it a 25 partial exemption?
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113 1 And I think we landed on that it was just 2 a partial exemption. Because no one is arguing the 3 fact that there is a requirement to propose PDC.
4 Non --
5 (Simultaneous speaking.)
6 CHAIR PETTI: So Eric, just a question.
7 MR. OESTERLE: Yes.
8 CHAIR PETTI: So if an applicant came in 9 and wanted to do a prototype, would some of the 10 testing and performance requirements sort of be 11 exempted, in terms of having to have it done, you 12 know, before the CP, but committing to doing it 13 somehow during operation?
14 MR. OESTERLE: You know that's an 15 interesting question and gosh, I don't have a lot of 16 insights on the requirements for a prototype, so --
17 (Simultaneous speaking.)
18 MS. CUBBAGE: I would --
19 MR. OESTERLE: -- I would defer.
20 MS. CUBBAGE: Yes, I can chime in, Eric.
21 MR. OESTERLE: Thanks.
22 MS. CUBBAGE: I think these are different 23 types of tests.
24 So no matter whether it's a prototype, a 25 test reactor, or whatever the case may be, there's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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114 1 certain SSEs that we're relying on to make our safety 2 conclusions that that facility is protective of public 3 health and safety. And that the PDCs would have tests 4 to demonstrate those features.
5 For a prototype, what we're doing is we're 6 making a finding that the facility is safe within the 7 constraints of what we're approving, with the 8 understanding that that facility could be used to 9 generate additional data, that then could be used to 10 further expand the operating conditions later on.
11 It's a whole larger conversation on 12 prototypes. But ultimately, we're going to make a 13 safety finding that a prototype reactor is safe, and 14 that whatever SSEs are relied upon to ensure safety, 15 would have appropriate testing requirements through 16 the PDCs.
17 I don't know if that helped, but we could 18 have a whole other conversation.
19 CHAIR PETTI: Yes, I mean it's probably a 20 much larger conversation at another time.
21 MEMBER BROWN: Dave, just for 22 amplification, all of, I can't speak for S1W, I don't 23 know what happened with that one, but all of the 24 Navy's subsequent prototypes actually underwent a 25 review. They were all, underwent a review with the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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115 1 AEC, and then NRC subsequently. So before they were 2 put in service.
3 So there's been a history of prototypes 4 for big reactors, light water reactors --
5 (Simultaneous speaking.)
6 MS. CUBBAGE: Yes.
7 MEMBER BROWN: -- of being --
8 MS. CUBBAGE: And there were --
9 MEMBER BROWN: -- fully reviewed, fully 10 approved before they went into service.
11 MS. CUBBAGE: Yes, yes.
12 So the word prototype has been used in 13 different contexts, in different arenas. But you 14 know, whatever the NRC licenses, be it a prototype or 15 a non-prototype, we will be making a full safety 16 finding on that facility.
17 MEMBER BROWN: And that's good to hear.
18 Thank you, Amy.
19 CHAIR PETTI: Keep going, Eric, sorry.
20 MR. OESTERLE: Okay, thanks, yes, no 21 problem.
22 So non-LWR applicants must provide 23 supporting information that justifies to the NRC, how 24 their design meets their proposed PDC, and how their 25 proposed PDC demonstrate reasonable assurance of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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116 1 safety.
2 And so this bullet gets to the question 3 that Member Kirchner asked, that the approved proposed 4 PDC would kind of be the benchmark for the NRC's 5 finding.
6 NRC believes that it is feasible for 7 applicants for construction permits, COLs, design 8 certifications, SDAs, and MLs, to provide 9 justification for an exemption, or partial exemption 10 from PDCs when ensuring that the elements of the PDC's 11 scope, not fully addressed in their proposed PDC, are 12 included elsewhere in their application.
13 And I would add that it may be more 14 challenging for CP applicants as there are fewer 15 overall requirements for CP applicants, as previously 16 mentioned, that could be relied up. And those only 17 asked for preliminary information.
18 But having PDC provides both for a 19 flexible, and a structured licensing approach for 20 construction permits, such that having basic criteria 21 against which to judge the application, moves the 22 application review beyond opinion to a structured an 23 orderly process.
24 So next slide, please, and this will be my 25 last slide.
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117 1 The TCAT guidance document 2107, proposed 2 an approach to supplement PDC, that were focused 3 strictly on safety related SSEs with proposed 4 complimentary design criteria that focused on the non-5 safety related with special treatment SSEs.
6 And in looking at that approach, this is 7 one of those areas, that we felt like it was one of 8 those challenges in fitting the LMP process into the 9 existing Part 50 and 52 regulatory framework, that 10 only addresses principle design criteria.
11 And we determined that both PDC and CDC, 12 would need to be relied on by the NRC in making its 13 regulatory finding.
14 We suggested that a two-tiered PDC 15 approach could work. And we are anticipating further 16 stakeholder interactions on this topic and others, at 17 the next public workshop in January.
18 And so I apologize, this is not my last 19 slide, but it was my last slide on the principle 20 design criteria discussion.
21 If we go to the last slide, this will 22 complete it.
23 So these are the next steps that we're 24 looking at.
25 Updating the draft guidance documents.
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118 1 We're working on that this month. We are continuing 2 our discussions on drafting exceptions clarifications 3 and additions, to the NEI 2107 guidance document. And 4 we're working to resolve as many of those as possible.
5 We anticipate another public workshop on 6 TCAP with industry next month, and in the interim, 7 we'll be exchanging information to try to continually 8 make some progress on these moving forward.
9 So with that, that concludes the TCAP and 10 RCAP discussion.
11 CHAIR PETTI: Thank you, Eric. I have two 12 questions.
13 MR. OESTERLE: Sure.
14 CHAIR PETTI: One for you, and one for my 15 colleagues.
16 One, do you anticipate coming back to us 17 with sort of another round on where you are after 18 these industry interactions, and you actually have the 19 documents issued for public comment?
20 MR. OESTERLE: So this is how I would 21 answer your question is that we, as part of the 22 process for turning these white paper guidance 23 documents into formal draft guidance documents that we 24 would issue for public review and comment, there is a 25 part of that process, an opportunity for the ACRS to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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119 1 review those.
2 And if you and the subcommittee desire to 3 do so, you can reach out to us through Derek.
4 MR. WIDMAYER: So this is Derek. Hey 5 David, those are already on the potential schedule.
6 CHAIR PETTI: Okay, I mean I remember 7 knowing that we had put something out there. That's 8 what that was for.
9 MR. WIDMAYER: Yes, we may be having to 10 adjust, depending on how the staff does with meeting 11 their schedules. But, they are actually already 12 scheduled right now.
13 CHAIR PETTI: Okay, okay.
14 And so the comment to my colleagues is, 15 this is a pretty large set of documents and it covers 16 a heck of a lot of stuff.
17 Initially, I thought we'd want a letter on 18 this. But I'm getting less convinced of that just 19 given the breadth and depth of it, that it could be 20 quite a task for us. And I just wanted to get some 21 feedback from colleagues here.
22 MEMBER BLEY: Well, I'll jump in, Dave.
23 I suspect we need some kind of letter but 24 you're right, it is a broad set, and maybe an overview 25 and is you know, identifying if there's anything we NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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120 1 think is significantly missing, or kind of wrong-2 headed.
3 And the other would be identifying 4 particular pieces of this guidance that we might want 5 to do a deep dive on, and like particular letters.
6 And I don't know I think you're going to 7 need a session sometime just to talk through that with 8 the group.
9 CHAIR PETTI: Yes, okay.
10 MEMBER BROWN: Would it be, this is 11 Charlie. Would it be, I mean we're covering some Part 12 53 stuff and earlier, and now we've got the key 13 CAP/RCAP summary of where they stand today.
14 Is this a three-piece or two-piece type 15 letter? I'm trying to struggle like you are, as to 16 how we would put that together now --
17 (Simultaneous speaking.)
18 CHAIR PETTI: Yes, so --
19 MEMBER BROWN: -- because that's more 20 public.
21 MEMBER BLEY: And remember this applies to 22 both 5052, which license change we're going to be 23 dealing with soon, and to Part 53.
24 CHAIR PETTI: Yes, yes.
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121 1 my sense. At best, we'd probably do an overview, and 2 then just highlight anything that we think is an issue 3 given the breadth here.
4 But yes, and Charlie, our future if we 5 write Part 53 letters, they will be topic focused. So 6 everything we heard yesterday on the training will be 7 a letter.
8 I think there will be something on this 9 three phase approach/PRA that Marty presented, but 10 we're going to wait until we get the white paper. I 11 think that will be the trigger for us to decide then 12 to put pen to paper, if you will. Because those are 13 important.
14 So I just wanted to get people's sense, 15 so. You know, I've been taking great notes so I, you 16 know, I've got it in my head. So I just want to make 17 sure that others agree that that's worth doing.
18 And I think the 5052 nexus here, is 19 another important reason probably to do this because 20 of its applicability.
21 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: And, Dave, what then 22 is also mention I will support that we have a sub-23 group, you know, meet internal among us meeting, too.
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122 1 questions for folks?
2 I'm going to thank you, Eric and Joe. It 3 was a good, good discussion this morning.
4 As I knew the whole part 53, we're really 5 getting to the nuts and bolts and it's been a really 6 valuable two days, I think, where we are.
7 Given how close we are, we're behind the 8 agenda, and how close we are to lunch, I don't think 9 it's fair to ask NEI to start, only to quit in 15 10 minutes.
11 So I'm thinking that we just pause here 12 and just have a little bit longer lunch, and be back 13 at 2:00 o'clock Eastern to start with NEI.
14 MEMBER KIRCHNER: And, Dave?
15 CHAIR PETTI: Yes?
16 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Is there a need to ask 17 for public comments?
18 CHAIR PETTI: Oh, yes, right. Gosh, we're 19 doing it in pieces, yes.
20 Yes, if we have any public comments. So 21 if member of the public has a comment, *62, unmute 22 yourself and tell us who you are, and your comment.
23 Okay, not hearing any. I guess --
24 MR. WIDMAYER: Hey, Dave?
25 CHAIR PETTI: Yes?
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123 1 MR. WIDMAYER: Yes, it's Derek. Can we get 2 acknowledgment from the representatives from NEI and 3 NIF that this is okay with them?
4 CHAIR PETTI: Yes.
5 MR. WIDMAYER: Because they're probably, 6 yes.
7 CHAIR PETTI: Yes, Marc, are you out there?
8 MR. NICHOLS: That's right here, Derek, 9 Chairman Petti. This is Marc Nichol, NEI. I think 10 Cyril Draffin from U.S. NIC is on as well. We're 11 going to tag team the presentation.
12 Yes, your plan to go for a break is great 13 with us. We could start before 2:00 o'clock if you 14 wanted to do that, but it's completely up to you.
15 CHAIR PETTI: Are we allowed to start 16 earlier, Derek?
17 MEMBER BLEY: For subcommittees you can, I 18 think.
19 MR. WIDMAYER: Yes, you're all right for, 20 yes.
21 MR. DRAFFIN: This is Cyril Draffin. We 22 have a reasonable amount of material, so a little 23 earlier stat would probably be helpful --
24 (Simultaneous speaking.)
25 CHAIR PETTI: Okay, so --
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124 1 MR. DRAFFIN: -- rather than stretch out 2 the afternoon.
3 CHAIR PETTI: Okay, so let's just pause for 4 one hour, and come back at 1:45 Eastern then. That'll 5 work. Thank you everybody.
6 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 7 off the record at 12:45 p.m. and resumed at 1:45 p.m.)
8 CHAIR PETTI: Okay, I have 45 minutes 9 after the hour so I guess we can reconvene. Marc, are 10 you there?
11 MR. NICHOLS: I am, thank you, Chairman 12 Petti, and thank you other Members of the ACRS Future 13 Planning Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity 14 to be able to speak with you all today.
15 I'm going to be joined by my colleague 16 from the Nuclear Industry Council, Cyril Draffin, and 17 there's a series, I'll go to it in the next slide.
18 There's a set of topics we want to cover and we've 19 divided them up.
20 These topics come out of a joint letter we 21 sent to the NRC on November 5, 2021. We called it the 22 comprehensive industry comments on Part 53, 23 comprehensive because it now includes the full scope 24 of the Part 53 rule that the NRC has issued.
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125 1 a lot more details than we've provided before. Almost 2 all of the comments that we submitted are not new.
3 They are perspectives that we've presented to the NRC, 4 some of the topics for more than a year.
5 And so we'll discuss a lot of those.
6 We're not covering every single item from that letter.
7 In the interest of time, I've cut out some of the 8 issues and tried to focus on some of the more 9 important ones.
10 We do recognize that the NRC Staff has 11 made some changes to Part 53, some of those changes 12 based on comments that we've made.
13 But at the same time, we also recognize 14 that some of our more significant comments, the topics 15 we're going to present today, the NRC has not made 16 changes to and has not provided us a reason why 17 changes are not going to be made in these areas.
18 And so we do think it's important for you 19 all to understand where we stand on those. So 20 generally, our agenda, I think we plan on trying to 21 end about the same time, so we'll try to be efficient 22 in going about this.
23 MEMBER BLEY: Given your introduction, 24 Marc, has the Staff told you that they're not going to 25 incorporate these things, or they just haven't reached NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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126 1 that point yet?
2 MR. NICHOLS: For some of them they've 3 told us that they're not going to incorporate our 4 changes. For example, in relation to QHOs, they told 5 us that's something we're just going to have to 6 disagree about.
7 Some of the others were not as clear as to 8 whether they planned to address those.
9 MEMBER BLEY: Thanks.
10 MR. NICHOLS: Let me begin with the topic 11 of risk-informed licensing approaches. This involves 12 the topic of QHOs, the role of the PRA, the specific 13 PRA requirements. It also brings in design 14 requirements.
15 It brings in the difference between Part 16 53 and Part 5X, as well as the TIRIMA that you all 17 heard about yesterday. It tends to be one of the most 18 important issues from the industry's perspective.
19 I'll explain why. It's obviously been a 20 topic that you all have been discussing in great 21 detail these past two days, and the Commission as well 22 in their December 9th Commission briefing had a lot to 23 discuss about this.
24 So I'll begin with what are the overall 25 goals for risk-informed licensing approaches in Part NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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127 1 53? And there's two areas where we have goals, one is 2 usefulness of Part 53 and the other is Part 53 that is 3 risk-informed.
4 In terms of usefulness, we want a Part 53 5 where all licensing approaches are viable. The NRC 6 has one vision of how to achieve that, we have a 7 different vision, and I'll explain our vision and some 8 of the details behind it.
9 MEMBER BLEY: Marc?
10 MR. NICHOLS: Yes?
11 MEMBER BLEY: Either for you or Cyril, if 12 you can and if you can't that's okay but I'm 13 interested, are you getting any indications of, and I 14 guess there's a difference between designers and 15 potential Applicants, I'm hinting at the Applicant 16 side, which of them are likely to become members of 17 EPRI, NEI, and already in the NIC?
18 I'll leave it with that because we don't 19 have the other group here.
20 MR. NICHOLS: In terms of the industry 21 companies, nearly all of the advanced reactor 22 developers, these would be technology companies like 23 NuScale, X-Energy, they're members of both NEI and 24 U.S. NIC.
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128 1 owners, operators, almost them are members of NEI. I 2 know that at least some of them are members of U.S.
3 NIC, the utilities are also members of EPRI and some 4 of the developers are members of EPRI.
5 MR. DRAFFIN: This is Cyril Draffin from 6 the U.S. Nuclear Industry Council.
7 We've talked actively to developers and we 8 did a survey in the middle of this year with 17 of the 9 developers, which really represent all of the major 10 people that have gotten the DOE awards to get their 11 reactions to Part 53.
12 And basically, they think Part 53 is very 13 important but they are not happy with where it is now, 14 or at least where it was in the middle of the summer.
15 And an important comment was that about a third of 16 them like LMP and really wanted to pursue that.
17 And therefore, they like it risk-based and 18 two-thirds did not.
19 So there is a difference, as was mentioned 20 earlier today, in terms of developers, but in terms of 21 what we're presenting today, it really represents 22 cohesion from the developers on the major aspects that 23 they pretty much all agree with.
24 MEMBER BLEY: Okay, so in your opinions, 25 it sounds like you believe you are speaking for at NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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129 1 least the far majority of the industry here?
2 MR. NICHOLS: Correct.
3 MR. DRAFFIN: And there's bound to be 4 people with some outliers as there is in most 5 organizations, but yes, we have reviewed it, we have 6 a Part 53 Work Group that everybody is welcome to be 7 involved with.
8 And the last call was 15 people from 9 different developers who were actively involved in 10 commenting including in the group setting today.
11 MEMBER BLEY: Okay, thanks, that gives me 12 a little perspective.
13 MR. NICHOLS: Absolutely, and everybody 14 feel free to chime in when you have a question. So in 15 terms of usefulness, all licensing approaches are 16 valuable. It's less burdensome over the lifecycle of 17 activities.
18 Guidance then will be important to explain 19 how to meet the regulations because this implies that 20 we're going to performance-based regulations, and so 21 some guidance will be important there, especially as 22 there may be differences in different types of 23 approaches.
24 Within the risk-informed goal, first, we 25 look at the NRC's PRA policy statement and we think NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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130 1 that it's still applicable to Part 53, that it doesn't 2 need to be amended.
3 But specifically, there's a lot of in 4 there to focus on but we want to reference here the 5 use of PRA to the extent it is practical. And that 6 gets to what I'll talk about in a little while on four 7 examples of different licensing approaches.
8 The NRC's Part 53 currently has one way to 9 use PRA. We'd like it to be more flexible and I'll 10 talk about that.
11 Part 53 should allow for the variety of --
12 MEMBER BLEY: Since you brought that up, 13 I believe you were here yesterday and you heard Marty 14 Stutzke's presentation. They're beginning to look at 15 PRA not as a monolithic thing but as something that 16 can be adapted.
17 Is that reaching close to what you're 18 thinking about or is it far away? I know you're going 19 to give us details later.
20 MR. NICHOLS: So he talked about two 21 different things.
22 He talked about the role of the PRA in the 23 licensing basis and that's what we're focused on, and 24 then he talked about a graded approach to the actual 25 technical performance of the PRA itself, which I think NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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131 1 is where the NRC is focused on.
2 Now, Marty did talk about the TIRIMA, 3 which is a licensing approach. I will touch on TIRIMA 4 in a little bit, so rather than discuss it here I'll 5 wait to touch on that.
6 They're complementary work. I would say 7 it's not exactly the same things but they do 8 complement each other.
9 MEMBER BLEY: And I assume you will be 10 continuing to interact with the Staff. We just saw 11 slides so as they develop a report to go with that, 12 there will be continued interactions I'm sure.
13 MR. NICHOLS: That's correct. So with 14 this various of roles and uses, generally there's been 15 a lot of talk about leading and confirmatory roles.
16 Marty yesterday talked about traditional and enhanced 17 roles.
18 I think those are two sets of terms to 19 mean the same thing, and so we think Part 53 should 20 allow for both of those. The primary expectation, we 21 do expect that Applicants will have a PRA.
22 I know that there's been a lot of 23 discussion about, well, the industry is asking for 24 deterministic and that gives the connotation that we 25 don't want to do PRAs, and that's not what we've been NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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132 1 asking for.
2 We've been asking for more options for the 3 role of PRA, I'll go into those details, but I just 4 want to make sure that people are clear that industry 5 expects to perform PRAs under Part 53.
6 We do recognize some cases, an alternative 7 to a PRA may provide equivalent benefits, I'll cover 8 that a little bit later. Generally, that might 9 require some exemption if you could justify it.
10 We're not right now advocating that the 11 rule has to allow for a non-PRA option. We do have 12 concerns on the Part 53 rule language related to its 13 ability to meet those goals for the licensing 14 approaches.
15 So the NRC has stated that the 16 performance-based design requirements, and I'll cover 17 what those are, that's the safety criteria design 18 features, they're not dependent on how a PRA is used.
19 We've had that view for a while and we've 20 been trying to articulate that to the NRC. Finally, 21 the NRC in an October 28th meeting made that 22 statement, which was very good to hear that they had 23 that recognition as well.
24 However, the NRC has still stated that 25 only LMP and other methods that used PRA and a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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133 1 licensing role can use Part 53.
2 They've also said that they don't know of 3 any other methods that could do that so today LMP is 4 the only known method that could use Part 53.
5 So a little bit of contradiction, if the 6 use of performance-based design requirements is not 7 dependent on the PRA, why can only one type of PRA use 8 Part 53? I'll go into some thoughts on that.
9 The NRC has stated that the use of PRA in 10 a leading role is required in Part 53 because QHOs are 11 in the rule. I don't see why that has to be the case 12 but nonetheless, we noticed that the NRC has not 13 explained why QHOs must be in the rule.
14 I'll go into great evaluation on the pros 15 and cons on putting the QHOS in the rule and where 16 we've ended up in that question. And then finally, 17 the NRC has stated that they're developing the Part 53 18 effects in response to industry's request to use other 19 risk-informed approaches.
20 The NRC has actually said we've requested 21 deterministic approaches and I think that's a misnomer 22 for what Part 5X is. Part 5X is a risk-informed rule, 23 it's not a deterministic rule.
24 However, we've never requested Part 5X.
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134 1 to Part 53 that would accomplish the same goal as what 2 they're trying to do with Part 5X.
3 It's really two changes, one is to the 4 QHOs, one is to the PRA requirement itself. I'll talk 5 about how we see those as being possible and done, the 6 details are in our November 5th comments.
7 And there may be some other confirmatory 8 changes but there's primarily just two changes to 9 address that.
10 So before I begin in talking about this, 11 because the first question would be, well, if Part 53 12 is developed for the leading role, LMP, approach, and 13 if you don't use that approach you could use Part 50, 14 52 or NRC's developing Part 5X, why isn't that okay?
15 And so it's important to know that despite 16 all of our comments about the challenges in the 17 viability of the Part 53 rule language, there is some 18 really good benefits in the current Part 53 rule that 19 the NRC has developed.
20 And so what we're trying to do is get 21 access to the benefits for all of the risk-informed 22 licensing approaches. I call it NRC is locked behind 23 this paywall, all of these great benefits and the 24 payment is to use LMP in a leading PRA role.
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135 1 don't need that paywall because you can do 2 performance-based requirements that would allow all 3 these risk-informed approaches to be used.
4 So what are these benefits? It's 5 primarily in the performance-based design 6 requirements. I mentioned this a minute ago.
7 The best benefit of this is that all of 8 these requirements related to the design are all 9 focused back to their relevance to the safety 10 criteria. This is 53210 and 53220.
11 These performance-based design 12 requirements, they're an integrated framework that the 13 NRC has put together. I'm going to go to the next 14 slide because the NRC has a graphic on this and you've 15 seen it before but it has the radiological hazard in 16 the middle.
17 It's got all these events that perturb the 18 hazard and then it's got all of these design features, 19 human actions, and programmatic controls that are 20 utilized to help protect the public.
21 And while this says licensing 22 modernization project on it in that yellow box, we 23 think the other risk-informed approaches can achieve 24 the same outcome as LMP with PRA used in different 25 roles.
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136 1 This is the good stuff of Part 53 we're 2 trying to get access to. In terms of these 3 performance-based acceptance criteria, I give some 4 examples here of why we think they're well written as 5 performance-based.
6 I will note the entire language is not 7 performance-based. There's a few things that we made 8 comments on in terms of specific wording that could be 9 improved that's not the most important comment to make 10 here at this time.
11 But in terms of the dose, 53210, it says 12 the dose to the individual at the EAB exclusionary 13 boundary will not exempt 25 rem TEDE.
14 So this is the driving goal, this provides 15 a lot of clarity in terms of what protection of the 16 public, acceptable protection of the public means, and 17 then from here you have a hierarchy or maybe it's more 18 like a Christmas tree.
19 These are ornaments of design requirements 20 that connect back to that main dose criteria. That is 21 in 53230, you have safety functions that are required 22 and there are a few spelled out, that's okay.
23 But it also gives a lot of flexibility to 24 the design to be able to identify the safety functions 25 that apply to them. This is very important in terms NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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137 1 of achieving this technology-inclusive approach that 2 is needed for Part 53.
3 In 53240, the licensing basis events must 4 be identified, it gives some general requirements in 5 terms of what aspects of LBEs must be addressed in 6 terms of combinations of malfunctions, human errors, 7 external hazards.
8 It gives the range of LBEs, but it doesn't 9 specify the methodology or anything like that. So 10 this would be an example of performance-based. 53400 11 it says design features must be provided to satisfy 12 the criteria.
13 Again, it doesn't specify what these 14 design features are, it's not saying you need an 15 emergency core cooling system, it's not saying you 16 need this system or that system, it's just saying that 17 the application needs to provide them such that they 18 satisfy the safety criteria.
19 And then finally, 53410, the FDC, the 20 functional design criteria, must be defined and they 21 must demonstrate compliance. Again, performance-22 based, they're not prescribed ahead of time, the 23 Applicant figures out what they are, they present them 24 to the NRC.
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138 1 independent assessment of whether they agree that 2 design, in order to meet that safety criteria of 25 3 rem, has identified the right safety functions, 4 events, design features, and design criteria.
5 So we think that you can do all of that in 6 a variety of ways of using the PRA and that to do that 7 is not dependent on one single way of using the PRA.
8 So we're going to talk more about that but 9 this is why we think the good part, the benefits of 10 Part 53 should be accessible to all risk-informed 11 licensing approaches.
12 Moving on, risk-informed approaches 13 desired by the industry, we've been asking for this 14 for over a year. This has been one of the most 15 important things.
16 We've been asking for part 53 requirements 17 to be more inclusive and what we've found as the NRC's 18 requirements related in these areas have been very 19 detailed and prescriptive what's equivalent in Part 50 20 and 52.
21 And because we don't think it's necessary, 22 we want them to just be on an equivalent basis to 50 23 and 52 in terms of the prescription and detail that's 24 required here.
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139 1 frameworks, actually, this would avoid the need for 2 multiple frameworks, namely, Part 53 for LMP, Part 5X 3 for everybody else, TIRIMA for people who don't want 4 to use PRA.
5 So we think this would also reduce 6 confusion, make it simpler to use in all of those 7 things. So, finally, the NRC should be focusing on 8 the criteria that demonstrates safety and not 9 requiring specific methods for design and analysis.
10 I'm going to touch on this again in a 11 slide coming up. So with all of this, we don't agree 12 with the NRC that only LMP and other methods using PRA 13 and a leading role should be the only ones to be able 14 to use Part 53.
15 We think the other risk-informed 16 approaches that we'll talk about in upcoming slides 17 should also be able to use it. I'm going to get into 18 two slides that talk about what is a risk-informed 19 approach?
20 And this does line up with traditional 21 enhanced that Marty talked about yesterday, the 22 traditional being on top and the enhanced on the 23 bottom.
24 And what it really is is in both 25 approaches, whether you're doing LMP or TCAP or NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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140 1 whether you're doing an approach that had been used 2 before and is being used today, they both are risk-3 informed.
4 They both have some deterministic elements 5 and they both have some PRA elements. The traditional 6 one is more predicated on the deterministic aspects of 7 it and the LMPT cap with NRC is required in Part 53 is 8 more predicated on the PRA.
9 And so the next slide will show in a 10 better visual the spectrum of how a design and 11 application might actually use a PRA in conjunction 12 with deterministic. And so what we have is this 13 speculate here.
14 The green is the amount of I'll say the 15 safety basis that relies on deterministic approaches, 16 the green is the amount of the safety basis that 17 relies on the PRA, and you've got the left-hand side, 18 which is primarily deterministic.
19 This might be your bounding analysis, your 20 MCA approach, and then you've got on the right-hand 21 side, primarily it's based on PRA. This would be part 22 of what Part 53 is requiring, the LMP and TCAP 23 approach.
24 Interestingly, the Part 5X that the NRC is 25 developing, while it could be used by everybody, it NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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141 1 wouldn't incentivize the use of PRA beyond what is 2 minimally required because you don't get much benefit 3 out of the PRA beyond using it in a minimal place.
4 Now, as we overlay that, the NRC is 5 proposing Part 53 that is on the right side in Part 5X 6 on the left side, but in the middle is where the 7 developers actually design and analyze their plants in 8 terms of the role of the PRA.
9 And it's an interactive process and so the 10 problem that the NRC is creating by saying Part 53 11 we're not going to change it, we're going to create 5X 12 rather than making Part 53 more inclusive is that 13 you've got this big missing middle, where the actual 14 plants are designed.
15 And so, Joy, I think you mentioned a 16 comment which is, well, design developers actually 17 have a bunch of ways in which they want to develop 18 this.
19 MEMBER BLEY: We lost him.
20 MEMBER BROWN: Is he gone?
21 MR. DRAFFIN: I think so but until he 22 comes back, this is Cyril.
23 So I think it is important to recognize 24 that when talking to our developers they really 25 planned on having a speculate of the way they would NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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142 1 use PRA and deterministic.
2 And some people will use the LMP but not 3 the full risk-based one, and so you find a spectrum of 4 companies both based on design but also in terms of 5 the balance between quantitative and bounding, but I 6 think they tend to use both, the deterministic and the 7 risk insights.
8 Let's see if Marc comes back.
9 MR. NICHOLS: Can everybody hear me?
10 MR. DRAFFIN: Now, we can.
11 MR. NICHOLS: My computer had a problem, 12 I'm calling in by phone so bear with me one minute.
13 Can you see slides or can somebody else share them?
14 MR. DRAFFIN: I'll see if I can share it.
15 MEMBER BLEY: And Marc, your volume is a 16 lot lower than when you were online so if you can 17 speak up a little that will help.
18 MR. NICHOLS: Is this a little bit better?
19 I moved my microphone closer.
20 MEMBER BLEY: It is.
21 MR. DRAFFIN: Can people see Slide 10?
22 MEMBER BLEY: Yes, but if you go to full-23 screen mode it will be better.
24 MR. NICHOLS: And I don't know where I 25 left off. Did I start talking about how the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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143 1 developers actually design and analyze reactors?
2 MEMBER REMPE: You were talking to me, you 3 mentioned my name and so it caught my attention.
4 MR. NICHOLS: Sorry about that, Joy. Joy, 5 I was reflecting on your comment I think even earlier 6 today, which is developers have a lot of options in 7 terms of how they design and analyze a reactor.
8 And so now turning back to my words, what 9 we would like the NRC to do is define the performance-10 based acceptance criteria for safety and not prescribe 11 the methods of designing and analyzing a reactor in 12 the regulations so that we have more flexibility to do 13 it the way that makes sense for the different designs.
14 So that's the point of that slide. Let me 15 move on to Slide 11.
16 MEMBER REMPE: Since you mentioned my 17 name, yes, I have a question for you? What they were 18 talking about today, that minimizes, perhaps, the 19 regulator cost, which often industry complains 20 about.
21 Where you leave it more widely open and 22 less defined, you'll have a lot of cost because the 23 path is not so easy to follow. And of course, I'm 24 sensitive to people complaining about the cost of the 25 regulator.
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144 1 So have you considered that?
2 MR. NICHOLS: We did, and that's where I 3 think the role of guidance comes in.
4 So Part 53 will at a minimum have guidance 5 for LMP and TCAP, however, there's guidance already 6 and actually, there's precedent and experience with 7 using some of these other licensing approaches.
8 And so we think there's still clarity 9 there, however, in addition to that, NEI is already 10 beginning to work on guidance for Part 53 that would 11 work for what we're proposing as an inclusive Part 53 12 that would provide guidance on how all of the whole 13 spectrum of risk-informed approaches could meet the 14 requirements to provide that clarity.
15 Moving on to Slide 11, NEI sent a paper 16 to the NRC in September and it was technology-17 inclusive, performance-based and risk-informed 18 approaches for assessing the safety adequacy of the 19 design.
20 So in our conversations with the NRC when 21 we kept asking for a Part 53 that allowed for more 22 risk-informed approaches beyond just LMP and TCAP, the 23 NRC said, well, we don't know what other approaches 24 exist.
25 And so we set about putting together four NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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145 1 examples of different risk-informed licensing 2 approaches and so that was the whole point of that, to 3 show that multiple examples exist to described them in 4 a way that you could start to figure out how to craft 5 Part 53 requirements in a more inclusive manner.
6 And so if you go to Slide 12, the process 7 we used for that paper is we basically started with 8 the NRC's Part 53 requirements and so here, I don't 9 list the requirement numbers here but here are about 10 6 areas where there is Part 53 requirements.
11 So there are the limits for protecting 12 public health and safety, that's the safety criteria, 13 safety functions, identifying LBEs, defense in-depth, 14 design features, functional desire criteria and safety 15 categorization.
16 And we said let's focus on those 17 requirements and show how all of these risk-informed 18 approaches can meet those requirements, although 19 recognizing there were the QHOs and the prescriptive 20 nature of the PRA were two of the limitations to being 21 able to use more than LMP under Part 53.
22 So that would be something we'd have to 23 just consider. And so if you go onto Slide 13 --
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146 1 safety criteria that one needs to consider, right?
2 So all the stuff you're going to talk 3 about, all these different options all have these key 4 features. They may be different in how they are 5 addressed but they're all there?
6 MR. NICHOLS: That's right, absolutely, 7 that's exactly right. And we put it in the Part 53 8 framework but we also based it in the underlying 9 principles of LMP.
10 So LMP itself had, these are the 11 fundamental things that LMP is going to achieve from 12 a safety case perspective.
13 And we addressed all of those but we just 14 put it into the Part 53 framework since that's our 15 focus.
16 Slide 13 takes those fundamental elements 17 and it talks about how do we frame these in terms of 18 principles? They're not exactly criteria in terms of 19 being able to decide, yes, you've met this criteria, 20 but they're the things that must be provided.
21 And so they do have some characteristics 22 of criteria. I'll read these just for completeness.
23 The plant has to meet the established limits for 24 adequate protection of the public health and safety.
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147 1 features and functional design criteria relied upon to 2 meet the safety criteria are established. We put all 3 those together because that frames what I call the 4 performance-based requirements around the design.
5 I should mention it here. We use the term 6 functional design criteria. In Part 53 it's the 7 equivalent as a principle design criteria, if you look 8 at it how it's defined and used.
9 So we're using Part 53 terminology but the 10 functional design criteria is essentially the 11 principal design criteria that we're familiar with.
12 Number 3, the systematic selection of LBEs 13 adequately cover the range of hazards that a specific 14 design is exposed to. We've really embraced the 15 ACRS's conversation that the identification of 16 initiating events has to be systematic, it has to be 17 rigorous.
18 Marty's presentation yesterday in terms of 19 what rigorous and systematic means are things that 20 resonate with us, and so we want to make sure that 21 everybody is aware there is a systematic and rigorous 22 selection of LBEs in all of these risk-informed 23 approaches.
24 Now, some use PRA to a very late extent to 25 do that, some use PRA much less to do that. And as NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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148 1 Marty said yesterday, you can be risk-informed without 2 actually quantifying things.
3 So that is one of the distinguishing 4 factors between the four examples we'll get into in a 5 minute. Then the SCCs are categorized according to 6 their safety significance.
7 The design reflects the application of an 8 appropriate philosophy of defense in-depth. Defense 9 in-depth actually happens to be something that each of 10 the examples handles in different ways, but we think 11 are all appropriate to the methodology and designs 12 they can be applied to.
13 Special treatment for SCCs as well as 14 associated programmatic controls in human actions 15 provide reasonable assurance that the SCCs will 16 perform the safety functions for which they're relied 17 upon in the design.
18 And then finally, the scope and level of 19 detail for the design and analysis of the plant and 20 the licensing basis information adequately describes 21 the safety case.
22 Now, we didn't address that in our paper, 23 that's Item 7, it's really the topic of TCAP and so 24 they we said to ourselves the NRC can formulate Part 25 53 based on LMP, this really gets to it's not what NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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149 1 work needs to be done, it's just what work needs to be 2 documented in what fashion to submit to the NRC.
3 That wasn't an urgent need so we can 4 address that at a later time.
5 So moving on to Slide 14, these are the 6 four examples we evaluated.
7 Example A was LMP, the licensing 8 modernization project, NEI 1804 and it has been 9 mentioned and I will say there are many an industry 10 that want to use LMP and TCAP the way they're being 11 developed.
12 NEI is very supportive of those documents 13 because obviously, there are guidance documents. We 14 never intended them to be required for use for all 15 advanced reactors and we never intended it to be the 16 sole basis for Part 53.
17 And so that's why it's important for us to 18 preserve the ability to use other risk-informed 19 approaches. There are others in industry that down to 20 use LMP and TCAP for whatever reason.
21 They see that they can develop the safety 22 case and demonstrate safety much more efficiently with 23 other design and analysis methods and part of that may 24 just be particular to their design, part of it may be 25 particular to just how they're used to doing work.
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150 1 But that's why it's important for all of 2 these options to be available.
3 So Example B is actually using LMP but the 4 PRA is in a complementary role and so you do all of 5 the same analysis but when it comes to providing the 6 documentation, where are you hanging your hat on the 7 safety basis?
8 The PRA is no longer a leading role, it's 9 a complementary role in that. The NRC has approved a 10 topical report for Kairos Power for Example B where 11 1804 is used with PRA in a complementary role.
12 Example C is an approach compatible with 13 EA safety standards. This is a point of confusion.
14 The NRC has said that Part 5X in large part is so that 15 people can use the IAEA approach and that we've asked 16 for that.
17 I think it was a miscommunication. What 18 we were trying to say is that we want a licensing 19 approach or a safety basis that's compatible.
20 Compatible means that when we take our 21 design outside the United States to places where 22 they're going to impose the IAEA safety standards, 23 there's minimal changes to the design and analysis and 24 safety basis of that.
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151 1 some IAEA safety standard concepts in an NRC 2 regulatory framework. Example D is a bounding 3 analysis, some people call it a maximum credible 4 analysis or accident or maximum hypothetical accident, 5 that's the concept here.
6 Oklo has used that type of approach in 7 their application that's in front of the NRC right 8 now. So the conclusions from that white paper is that 9 all utilized PRA, some use it a little, some use it a 10 lot.
11 All of those approaches that use the PRA 12 are able to demonstrate safety, especially that safety 13 criteria which is the most important but also those 14 principles that, David, you and I just talked about on 15 a previous slide.
16 They can all meet Part 53 design 17 requirements and even less prescriptive versions of 18 the PRA requirements and we'll talk about the changes 19 to the requirements that we think are necessary.
20 They can all utilize the frequency 21 consequence curve, that's one of the things that's 22 coming out of LMP. In fact, in the examples, all of 23 them do utilize or we explain they would utilize the 24 frequency consequence curve.
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152 1 not use the frequency consequence curve when it's 2 appropriate to do so. And what we found is specific 3 uses of those really relate to how the designer wishes 4 to approach the design and analysis of the plant.
5 So that's why it's important to have this 6 flexibility. I'll move onto Slide 15 and this gets 7 into the safety criteria and the QHOs. And in my 8 opinion, there's been little discussion of whether the 9 QHOs are appropriate in policy or in the rule.
10 And I think that's the most important 11 question to ask and that's what we've been trying to 12 discuss with the NRC since January and have not had 13 much success in that.
14 So one of the things the NRC has said is 15 the QHOs must be in the rule and even in the December 16 9th Commission briefing the NRC was saying if the QHOs 17 aren't in the rule then what should be in the rule?
18 And in my opinion, I think this is really 19 the wrong way to frame the considerations of where to 20 put QHOs and how to address beyond-design-basis 21 events.
22 The right framing, I should start out by 23 saying, is why should the QHOs be in the rule at all?
24 And the reason I'm saying that's the right 25 framing, that's the question we should be asking, is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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153 1 because the QHOs have been in the policy statement for 2 decades and we've not had any issues with that.
3 And the new plants that are being licensed 4 under 50 and 52, they'll meet how to QHOs as a policy 5 statement matter and the NRC yesterday said the QHOs 6 were in guidance. That's not quite correct.
7 If QHOs are in the policy statement, 8 that's a higher level more impactful place for them to 9 be. And so we've not had any issues under License 50 10 and 52. You're meeting the QHOs, there's not much 11 issue there.
12 And then the second part is the QHOs are 13 in the rule, my understanding is, to address beyond 14 design basis events. And so the question would be, in 15 the past and today, the beyond design basis events are 16 addressed by mitigation requirements.
17 This is the recent 50.155 mitigation and 18 beyond design basis event rule.
19 And so I'll in fact come back to that rule 20 in several places because it's relatively new and the 21 NRC Commission has weighed in on a lot of the things 22 that the NRC is trying to put in Part 53 related to 23 beyond design basis events and PRQ requirements and 24 said, no, those shouldn't be in the rule.
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154 1 should the QHOs be in the rule? I think there's three 2 things to ask.
3 Is there a problem that we're solving by 4 putting the QHOs in the rule? I don't see any problem 5 being solved, as I just mentioned.
6 Are there benefits to putting QHOs in the 7 rule? Certainly, there are, the next slide goes 8 through the advantages and disadvantages so I'll hold 9 off on that.
10 And the last question is are there 11 disadvantages and risks? And again, there are, of 12 putting the QHOs in the rule.
13 If so, are those disadvantages and the 14 risks reasonable, are they being mitigated and are 15 they far outweighed by the benefits of having QHOs in 16 the rule?
17 This is the discussion I think we should 18 be having, this is the discussion we tried to have at 19 the NRC in our January meeting and we were not 20 successful in getting the NRC to engage with us in 21 that conversation.
22 Like I said, they've not provided a basis 23 on why the QHOs should be in the rule. So on Slide 24 16, this is our evaluation of the advantages and 25 disadvantages of putting the QHOs in the rule.
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155 1 We provided this to the NRC back in 2 January in a public meeting and we submitted it to 3 them in which in our February 11th comment. And so 4 there are some advantages and there are some 5 disadvantages.
6 So the first advantage, it enhances 7 regulatory stability by making it harder for the NRC 8 to change the limits, the QHOs specifically, or make 9 arbitrary judgments related to that.
10 So there is a stability benefit there, 11 however, including the QHOs in the rule also increases 12 regulatory uncertainty. The reason is because they're 13 establishing requirements without specifying the 14 consequence limits.
15 The phrasing of it, if I can get it right, 16 is something like 5e to the minus 6 probability. I'd 17 say the risk is less than 5e to the minus 6 for prompt 18 fatalities, and then we have I think 1e to the minus 19 7 for latent cancers.
20 That's an overall risk number and 21 certainly we could figure out probabilities and 22 frequencies because there are cut-off frequencies for 23 beyond design basis events.
24 So we can figure out events that we're 25 considering under there but the question is what are NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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156 1 the dose limits that lead to those consequences? And 2 when I've asked the experts on where are they?
3 They're not in the rules, they're not in 4 guidance, they're not in any standard, what I find is 5 that those consequence limits are in the computer code 6 of MAACS itself, the severe accident consequence 7 codes.
8 And so I asked can you show me a table of 9 all those consequence limits that the code is using so 10 at least we can point to that?
11 Well, we don't really have it and so now 12 you're looking at this and saying, okay, you're going 13 to meet a regulatory requirement without knowing what 14 those dose consequences are.
15 And you're going to have to point to a 16 computer code, and those consequence limits that give 17 you that answer are very deep inside of that and you 18 have no paper documentation to reference it.
19 MEMBER BLEY: Marc, let me interrupt you 20 for just a second.
21 I don't want an answer now but the Staff, 22 as you listen to this, when these guys are done with 23 their presentations, I'd be interested in hearing from 24 you about this last point that was pointed out by 25 Marc.
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157 1 MR. NICHOLS: Thank you, I'll keep going.
2 MEMBER REMPE: Sorry to interrupt you, why 3 wouldn't you just use the PAGs because the advanced 4 design developers don't want to have emergency 5 planning.
6 So why wouldn't they just say, yes, the 7 QHOs are for me for fatalities but it seems like the 8 PAGs would be a more limiting thing?
9 MR. NICHOLS: Yes, the PAGs would be more 10 limiting and you could do that, that would be 1 rem 11 and so 1 rem for a beyond design basis event is going 12 to be very limiting.
13 If you look at the LMP frequency 14 consequence curve for some of the beyond design 15 events, you can get allowable doses up to 200 to 700 16 rem. So that would be a huge, I'd say, penalty to 17 take.
18 MEMBER REMPE: Especially if you do the 19 curve once per year, which is what was propose 20 yesterday for avoiding the PRA. Because I would think 21 the frequency would be difficult without a PRA.
22 And you had said in your comment about, 23 well, we can get the frequencies of the advances? If 24 you don't have a PRA I don't even know how you get the 25 frequency.
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158 1 MR. NICHOLS: That's why the NRC has said 2 that the PRA requirements in Part 53 are the way they 3 are, because the QHOs are in the rule. I make that in 4 a later slide but you're exactly right.
5 If you have the QHOs in the rule, then 6 there's no way around having a full PRA that is the 7 basis for regulatory legal compliance. And I actually 8 have a slide that talks about the complications of 9 that.
10 (Simultaneous speaking.)
11 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Marc, I have a 12 question for you here because I think your advantage 13 and disadvantage are totally contradicting each other.
14 How can you have regulatory stability 15 based on that latent and the immediate fatalities if 16 you don't know the dose?
17 There is no stability there, you can 18 change those rules. What you're saying for 19 disadvantages is totally right in my opinion, it 20 increases uncertainty so, therefore, you cannot have 21 advantage to that.
22 (Simultaneous speaking.)
23 I understand what you mean.
24 MR. NICHOLS: No, I exactly understand 25 what you mean and you're correct. What you're NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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159 1 pointing out is the complexity of this issue, of 2 putting the QHOs in the rule.
3 This frustrates me a little bit when the 4 NRC tells us we've already decided QHOs are in the 5 rule, this is non-negotiable, we're just going to 6 disagree on this. And we've presented this 7 information to them.
8 It's a very complex issue, it's not so 9 simple as saying, yes, the QHOS are in the rule, we're 10 good to go. You can see this, there are advantages 11 where there's some stability, clarity, but then 12 there's disadvantages that reduce stability and 13 clarity.
14 And so it's not a very simple decision.
15 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: What is in your 16 opinion stability implied? That's what I fail to see.
17 What is the stability quality with QHOs?
18 MR. NICHOLS: The stability would be that 19 the QHOs would not change. The number 5e to the minus 20 7 and 1e to the minus 6 would not change. That's what 21 I meant by stability.
22 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Yes, but those are 23 related to -- these are related to something which we 24 don't know. It's for that latent example, the cancer, 25 or to the risk presented to the latent cancer, which NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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160 1 we don't know what that is.
2 So of course it's complex but we are sort 3 of staying on this level that we actually don't know 4 facts. So we are basing this on something we totally 5 don't really understand and we don't know the facts.
6 That cannot be stability so that's a point 7 which I really feel very strongly about. So we can 8 just really pretend to keep our eyes closed and say 9 the adjusted risk has always been there and we 10 understand what that means, but we actually do not.
11 We do not know the days, the essential 12 days for example, and until we can specify those, 13 which we will never be able to do, we cannot really 14 know the base.
15 MR. NICHOLS: Thank you, I appreciate 16 that. I'll keep going here unless, Vesna, you had a 17 question. It didn't sound like a question.
18 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: No, it was just a 19 comment, it wasn't a question. The question was how 20 can you claim that there is advantages because the 21 disadvantage actually totally negates the advantage?
22 MR. NICHOLS: We tried to be objective 23 here and show advantages and disadvantages in this 24 slide, and in the next slide I'll show you we came 25 down in our position on this.
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161 1 So there's some other things, I'll just do 2 the advantages and come back to disadvantages rather 3 than back and forth. So there are specific limits, 4 quantitative limits in the regulations.
5 That had some advantages to it. The risk 6 levels in the regulations are now exactly the QHOs 7 from policy statement so there's some consistency 8 there.
9 QHOs by nature of being quantified are a 10 little more understandable to the public, even if the 11 understanding of how you get there is much more 12 complex. And the QHOs really do define the maximum 13 acceptable consequences.
14 And they can avoid more conservative 15 surrogate requirements. So, for example, CDF and LERF 16 are more conservative surrogates.
17 They have the potential to eliminate the 18 need for some other requirement, so if you had the 19 QHOs in the rule you wouldn't need to have a 20 requirement to mitigate beyond design basis events.
21 I'll note the NRC still includes a 22 requirement to mitigate beyond design basis events so 23 that advantage is not achieved by the NRC's proposal.
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162 1 instead of policy goals. And so I think this reduced 2 stability is what you just mentioned, Vesna, so it's 3 two sides of the same coin.
4 It is also counter to the Commission's 5 intention that the QHO is our goal and not limits 6 themselves. I'll talk a little bit more about the PRA 7 policy statement in that.
8 And so this would be a completely 9 different approach and it's not to say the NRC can't 10 take a different approach to Part 53, but I think we 11 should all acknowledge that and that should be a 12 conscious decision.
13 Not having consequence limits that I just 14 mentioned before and the complexity of demonstrating 15 the QHOs, which I think was your comment, Vesna, 16 increases the licensing risk in terms of knowing what 17 would be acceptable.
18 If there are any changes to societal risks 19 because these are all related back to societal risks, 20 that could change the requirements and that could 21 force changes in the facility design because these are 22 now regulatory requirements rather than applied 23 through the policy statement.
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163 1 compliance. I have another slide on this but this is 2 a big deal.
3 Right now, meeting the QHOs and using your 4 PRA, this is used in, I'll just say, a complementary 5 manner but it's not the primary decision for safety.
6 It's supporting the decision, it's one of many things.
7 The primary decision of safety is based on 8 other things, not meeting the QHO. If QHO is the 9 primary decision for safety, the analysis you just 10 used legal compliance with the requirements now have 11 a different role.
12 And I'll just address that later. There 13 is a risk that QHOs would need to be revised. The NRC 14 discontinued its efforts to revise the QHOs the year 15 2000 and to update those safety goals.
16 The reasons given at that time was because 17 they needed to have more experience with significance 18 in incorporating experience with risk-informed 19 decision-making.
20 And so there is a question on whether the 21 QHOs would need to be -- the Commission would decide 22 that the QHOs need to be updated if they're going to 23 be included in the regulations.
24 I'll move on to Slide 17 to continue our 25 conversation on QHOs. So in our opinion, the QHOs in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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164 1 the rule did not improve safety but they do create 2 complications.
3 This is where we've come down on the 4 advantages and disadvantages. This is the large 5 majority of the our members.
6 I will mention there's at least one of our 7 members that think the advantages of QHOs outweigh the 8 disadvantages, but as an official NEI position it is 9 to keep QHOs in the policy statement and not include 10 them in the rule.
11 Because the safety is the same, whether 12 the QHOs are in the rule or whether QHOs are in the 13 policy statement, the safety is exactly the same. In 14 both approaches or both locations, you have to 15 demonstrate the QHOs are met.
16 I talked about currently you do that, I'll 17 call it off on the side under what Part 53 is 18 proposing. If you do it front and center, it is part 19 of your compliance. The application's design and 20 analysis are exactly the same.
21 We've already said that industry is saying 22 we're going to use PRAs in this and we do want to meet 23 the QHOs and demonstrate they're met.
24 The NRC's scope of review is exactly the 25 same, whether the QHOs are in the rule language or NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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165 1 policy statement, the NRC is still going to verify 2 those QHOs are met.
3 So that's why we say the safety is exactly 4 the same. The difference is in this legal compliance 5 and this is really important stuff.
6 So if the QHO is in the policy statement, 7 like I said, the Staff confirms the Applicant's 8 conclusion, the QHOs are met, this is done.
9 I'll say it's off to the side, but it's 10 still done as part of the application process and 11 review. It's just one part and not the primary part 12 of the safety determination.
13 Well, if the QHOs are in the rule, it 14 takes a different effect. So now the Applicant must 15 demonstrate legal compliance with that regulation.
16 Well, if I have to demonstrate legal 17 compliance with QHOs and my PRA is the only way to 18 demonstrate legal compliance with that, everything 19 that's in that analysis and supporting justification 20 for meeting the QHOs is now subject to hearing 21 contention.
22 There was a question earlier today about 23 whether the PRA needs to be submitted to the NRC and 24 I'm not going to provide my own thoughts on whether 25 that should or shouldn't be but it would be much more NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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166 1 difficult to argue the PRA should not be submitted for 2 NRC review and on that docket if the QHOs are in the 3 rule, especially if an intervener wanted to challenge 4 that PRA.
5 If they do wish to challenge that PRA, 6 they're not just challenging the methodology, they're 7 challenging every assumption and input to that PRA.
8 And so they can say, well, we disagree that your 9 assumption for failure of this component is accurate.
10 And now you're going to have that as a 11 hearing contention. Whether it gets accepted or not 12 is a different question.
13 Or they could come back and say, well, we 14 don't think you have enough testing and validation to 15 justify this type of thing or you haven't considered 16 this or that in your PRA.
17 And so what we worry about is that with 18 that, you've now taken something that is not improving 19 safety by having the QHOs in the rule and you're now 20 creating a lot of licensing risk.
21 That was the basis for one of my points 22 earlier. So the NRC has stated that the QHOs in the 23 rule requires a leading PRA approach. That's another 24 problem because we want to use multiple licensing 25 approaches in Part 53.
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167 1 I would say the leading PRA approach, 2 while we do support it as one option, it's never been 3 used in a licensing application and approved by the 4 NRC or any regulator.
5 And so some of those other examples we 6 asked for earlier have precedent and they have been 7 used to license advanced reactors before.
8 And so what the NRC is creating is a Part 9 53 that is based solely on a licensing approach that 10 has never been I'll just say run-tested through a 11 regulatory approval of an application.
12 And it is precluding all of these other 13 licensing approaches that have been proven to 14 demonstrate safety. And so that just seems to not be 15 the most prudent course of action.
16 And the QHOs in the rule, the NRC has said 17 it's just an evolution of the PRA policy statement but 18 we don't believe so. We believe including the QHOs in 19 the rule far exceeds the envisioned application of 20 them.
21 So I'll refer back to the SECY 89102 for 22 that. And that says that while the QHOs really are 23 just to evaluate the adequacy of requirements to 24 achieve acceptable risk to the public.
25 These are the requirements themselves.
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168 1 This isn't even evaluating the adequacy of the design, 2 this is adequacy of the requirements. So is this 3 design requirement adequate?
4 Do we need another design requirement, 5 that sort of thing? The QHOs were intended to be 6 objective, not to be used as requirements.
7 That specifically said in that policy 8 statement, that's why we think that if QHOs are in the 9 rule it needs to be explicitly and thoughtfully 10 decided because it's not consistent with that previous 11 decision.
12 But it would be useful as a basis for 13 guidance. Now, it would also be useful in a generic 14 sense in making regulatory decisions for an Applicant.
15 If you go into that, the generic sense 16 means it's not the primary basis for making that 17 regulatory decision, it's just one piece of it. And 18 that's the confirmatory role of that.
19 This is why we think the QHOs and the rule 20 don't make sense.
21 Next slide, 18, if there's no questions on 22 that. Slide 18, what do we think should be done for 23 the QHOs in Part 53 to achieve this acceptable risk to 24 the public?
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169 1 the safety goal policy statement and apply QHOs as a 2 policy and not as requirements.
3 We do think the NRC should ensure Part 53 4 requirements, achieve acceptable risk to the public 5 and we think that they have done that in the other 6 requirements they've created.
7 So the dose to the public for normal 8 operations is 1 rem, occupational exposures is less 9 than 5 rem, AOOs, if the NRC want --
10 So the thing the QHOs do is they create 11 something for things that are not design basis 12 accidents or normal operations. So that's AOOs and 13 beyond design basis events, it puts a little category 14 box for safety criteria there.
15 So we think they can do two things. One 16 is they can put mitigation for beyond design basis 17 events, similar to 50.155, and I have a discussion 18 later this afternoon in beyond design basis on how to 19 do that.
20 The other is AOOs, we don't think Part 53 21 needs an AOO requirement, Part 50 and 52 don't, but if 22 the NRC thought it was necessary you could create a 23 requirement and set the limit at 1 rem.
24 Design basis accidents of course have 25 their 25 rem and we think that part of this is really NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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170 1 important to establish the requirement for systematic 2 search of events.
3 The QHOs would inform the basis for 4 guidance to establish risk metrics so QHOs would be 5 used directly for comparison as an LMP or for other 6 methods. You could use QHOs to develop surrogates 7 with core damage frequency.
8 I'll move on to Slide 19. So that's Item 9 1 and the two requirements that need to change in 10 order to allow all those risk-informed approaches, 11 keeping QHOs in the policy statement is Item 1.
12 Item 2 is making the PRA requirements 13 performance-based. Right now, they're very 14 prescriptive. This is looking at Part 52 15 requirements, it has a high-level requirement of 16 Applicant providing a description of plant-specific 17 PRA.
18 For time reasons I'm not going to go 19 through the details of this slide, I think everybody 20 is familiar with how the practical uses of PRA and 52, 21 not the required uses.
22 So let's go to Slide 20.
23 This is the Part 53 PRA requirement and so 24 the gray is in the Part 53 requirement that is 25 equivalent to the Part 52 requirement, red is in the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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171 1 Part 53 requirement that has no equivalent over in 2 Part 50 and 52.
3 So in Part 53, consider events to the 4 challenge plant control and safety. We agree with 5 that, conform with generally accepted methods. We're 6 okay with that.
7 Be maintained and upgraded, however, every 8 two years is what Part 53 says. We think it should be 9 every four years consistent with Part 50 and 52. The 10 other things the NRC prescribes in here, let me put 11 that in --
12 MEMBER BLEY: Excuse me? Don't the 13 existing rules require every four years but sooner if 14 there's a major change to the plant?
15 MR. NICHOLS: It could be, the detail 16 escapes me at the moment, yes.
17 MEMBER BLEY: To me, that's the important 18 thing. If you change the plan around you ought to 19 really bring it up to that.
20 MR. NICHOLS: We would be fine with the 21 provision that's in 50 and 52. I want to address two 22 areas of where the NRC is including more prescriptive 23 uses of PRA and Part 53 beyond what is required for 50 24 and 52.
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172 1 Marty Stutzke's slide yesterday, I think it was Slides 2 32 and 33. Slide 32, he said one area where the NRC 3 is increasing PRA requirements in Part 53 is that 4 we're including the practical uses of PRA, the slide 5 I just showed.
6 Which, one, is for severe accidents, we're 7 using PRA for severe accident policy statement, boom, 8 all right, we're going to include that in the rule.
9 The other is for I think it was the safety goal policy 10 statement.
11 You need PRA to be able to do that, 12 primarily for the QHOs that I just mentioned. So 13 we're going to plop that as a requirement in the Part 14 53.
15 So on the surface, that sounds logical, 16 it's in the safety goal policy, we're writing a new 17 rule, I guess we probably just forgot to do that and 18 we should include it in the regulations.
19 But I don't see it that way. If you go 20 back the timeline and Marty's Slide 17 -- and I think 21 Marty did a great job on his presentation and I really 22 appreciate how he simplified a lot of this stuff in 23 his slides.
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173 1 goal policy was established 1986 the severe accident 2 policy statement 1985 already established the need for 3 the PRA to be able to do that.
4 Part 52 came in in 1989 and then finalized 5 in 2007. They had an opportunity to require t PRA to 6 be used to meet those policy goal statements but it 7 didn't, as you know from Part 52, include those 8 requirements.
9 The question is why?
10 I haven't had a chance to go back to the 11 same statements of consideration for that rule, that 12 would give us the most clarity on whether it was a 13 conscious decision, they actually evaluated it and 14 decided, no, those are policy statements, we're not 15 going to include those as requirements.
16 In fact, I'll come later and I'll talk 17 about severe accidents, and the Miti BeDe rule, the 18 NRC Commission provided direction back to the Staff 19 that severe accidents should not be requirements.
20 They should continue to be handled the 21 question they are today.
22 And so that gives a clear indication to me 23 that, yes, it was probably for a reason that the 24 required uses of PRA to meet those policy goal 25 statements was not included in Part 52.
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174 1 Again, we have to read the statements of 2 consideration to know exactly. The second area on 3 this Slide 33, he said we're going to include all 4 these other requirements for use of PRA and these also 5 establish the PRA must be used in a leading role.
6 These are all the ways it's used in LMP, 7 and that's fine for LMP, that's how they want to use 8 it, but the other risk-informed approaches would not 9 use PRA in this manner.
10 And so this is what excludes those other 11 risk-informed approaches from using Part 53 and the 12 question is why do you need those in there? The NRC 13 has said we need those in there because the QHOs are 14 in the rule.
15 I just made the argument on why the QHOs 16 shouldn't be in the rule, so if the QHOs aren't in the 17 rule based on the NRC logic, all of these can be 18 removed. Now, even if the QHOs were in the rule, I 19 still don't think all of these requirements need to be 20 prescribed.
21 This is really getting into locking in a 22 single way of designing and analyzing a plant, which 23 works for some but doesn't work for others. There are 24 areas that we think would be problematic.
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175 1 for a second? Coming from a PRA perspective myself, 2 this is Vicki Bier, many of the things at least that 3 show as red on that list sound like things that I 4 would think would be just good practice for achieving 5 safety.
6 So can you give me one or two examples of 7 things that you think may not be necessary to do under 8 certain design philosophies or safety philosophies, 9 and why not?
10 MR. NICHOLS: I would agree with you, all 11 of these things need to be done and if you go back to 12 my slide on the September white paper, all of these 13 things are done for each of the methods.
14 The difference is that the PRA is not used 15 in a leading role for all of these, the PRA would 16 still do many things but it would be used more in 17 confirmed the decisions that you would have done all 18 of these things with a deterministic method or some 19 combination of deterministic and PRA.
20 MEMBER BIER: So, for example, you need 21 some method for determining licensing basis events but 22 that might be an input to your PRA, not an output from 23 your PRA? Is that what you're saying?
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176 1 just escaped me, sorry.
2 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: A perfect example of 3 what the classification of ISCs, that's a good example 4 of that PRA being supported because you always start 5 with the deterministic safety, whether there's no 6 safety, and then you have the risk-important or not 7 risk-important.
8 MR. NICHOLS: Absolutely, thank you.
9 So we'll go to Slide 21 next. What did we 10 propose for the Part 53 requirement? We do propose 11 that Part 53 needs a requirement.
12 We actually even proposed more verbiage in 13 Part 53 for the PRA requirement than what's in Part 14 52.
15 So we're not opposed to PRA requirements, 16 we're opposed to PRA requirements that only allow one 17 way to analyze a plant. And so we're proposing a 18 performance-based analysis requirement.
19 And so in analyzing the LBEs and 20 systematically identifying event sequences with 21 demonstrating the safety criteria that you can do 22 these with a mixture of deterministic and PRA.
23 You can certainly do it leading PRA, like 24 the NRC is requiring, or as those other three examples 25 that I mentioned, you might use the deterministic NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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177 1 methods and then confirm them with your PRA, the 2 traditional way that Marty talked about yesterday.
3 And what role or scope does that leave in 4 the PRA requirement itself? The PRA requirement would 5 say you must perform a PRA and you must incorporate 6 the risk insights from that PRA into the design.
7 We believe that is important. We would 8 say the requirement should say the PRA completeness 9 should be commensurate with the completeness of the 10 design.
11 This gets to Marty's slide that says, 12 well, at the construction permit stage you might have 13 less completion of your PRA. By the time you get to 14 operations, you'd have more completeness of your PRA.
15 And again, it must be maintained and 16 upgraded every four years, so we think that provides 17 the level of confidence that risk insights from the 18 PRA are going to be utilized in the safety case in a 19 way that avoids all of the complications that we just 20 mentioned before.
21 Now, if people want to do more PRA, that's 22 perfectly fine but the complications here primarily 23 being not allowing other risk-informed approaches.
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178 1 prescriptive requirements in terms of rigor and 2 confidence and ultimately, the level of safety and the 3 design, they're inclusive to combine all roles of the 4 PRA.
5 And one of the important things is we 6 really believe the NRC's rule they've put out on Part 7 53, even the QHOs and the PRA requirements we just 8 talked about as well as other things we're going to 9 talk about, it will achieve safety.
10 There's no question in our minds it will 11 achieve safety.
12 The question that industry is looking at 13 is, yes, we can achieve safety and we can get there 14 through multiple different pathways and we want a Part 15 53 that allows people to pick the most efficient 16 pathway for their design.
17 So that's where we're coming from. Let me 18 go to Slide 22 and some discussion about the NRC's 19 prescriptive requirements for PRAs.
20 I've talked about our concern with QHOs in 21 the rule and the more prescriptive requirements might 22 lead the NRC to required more of the PRA to be 23 submitted in the licensing basis.
24 So the NRC has heard those concerns at the 25 December 9th Commission briefing. The NRC Staff told NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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179 1 the Commissioners that is not their intent, to require 2 the PRA to be submitted to the NRC and reviewed by the 3 NRC.
4 So we support this intention.
5 We don't think the NRC should be part of 6 the licensing basis. We think it should be available 7 for the NRC inspection just like it is today, however, 8 we see in the rule language that's not the outcome, 9 the intention has not been achieved by the rule 10 language.
11 So if you look at 531185, it has a 12 requirement that states and I've paraphrased it here 13 to fit on the slide, the safety analysis report must 14 include an analysis of LBEs to determine compliance 15 with 53220 and it must address all of the elements in 16 43450E and F.
17 Well 53220 at the QHOs, 53450E and F is 18 the PRA requirement, and both of those that I just 19 talked about were problematic. And it says you must 20 include the analysis that determines compliance.
21 And so the only analysis I know of that 22 determines compliance with those things is your PRA.
23 And so this requirement, whether the NRC intended it 24 or not, does require the PRA to be submitted as part 25 of the licensing basis, in fact as part of the SAR.
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180 1 In the May 27th meeting, we were talking 2 about the NRC and we talked about these risk-informed 3 approaches. The NRC had made a comment suggesting 4 that the PRA would need to be submitted to the NRC for 5 review as part of the LMP method.
6 I know that's been a question the ACRS has 7 asked the NRC today and yesterday. I am still not 8 sure what the NRC's position is on that. I think I 9 heard them say no, it doesn't, and then I think I 10 heard them say, yes, is it.
11 So I'm not really clear on where they 12 stand on that but I do understand the intention they 13 made to the Commission on December 9th.
14 I would also note that in the NRC's 15 endorsement of TCAP, that methodology licensing basis 16 must include more PRA details in the SAR than is 17 currently required by the NRC. That is specifically 18 the reliability and capability targets.
19 Now, it's incorporated by reference so 20 it's not actual pages in the SAR but incorporated by 21 reference brings with it the same regulatory controls 22 as if it was in the SAR directly.
23 And mainly, that means that if you have to 24 or need to make any changes to those reliability and 25 capability targets, you have to go through the 5059 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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181 1 process to determine whether you need prior NRC 2 regulatory approval.
3 And if you do, you need to submit a 4 license amendment request. And so those three things 5 are evidence that the intention that the NRC has in 6 relation to the PRA being submitted is not being 7 achieved by the rule.
8 Next slide, please, 23. So this slide 9 gets to -- this is my last slide in all of this risk-10 informed licensing basis -- what is the path forward 11 from here? How do we move forward?
12 I mentioned before the NRC 's path forward 13 to solve this issue is very different to what we think 14 the NRC should be doing and specifically, the NRC has 15 proposed to leave Part 53 as it is.
16 And they've said Part 53 is only available 17 for LMP and they've said Part 5X is available for 18 everybody else. And they're maybe this TIRIMA 19 approach that would be developed if people don't want 20 to use any PRA at all.
21 So I think that approach is inefficient, 22 I actually think it increases confusion and the 23 industry's proposal for a single inclusive framework 24 of Part 53 would be much preferable.
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182 1 approach? I just talked about Part 53 and the 2 or 3 2 frameworks and how they're divided up and you have to 3 pick different ones, and how Part 53 with LMP is the 4 only one that is able to utilize the benefits of the 5 performance-based design requirements.
6 Part 5X doesn't allow that. I think I 7 remember an earlier ACRS conversation on Part 5X and 8 there was a comment that, wow, this just seems almost 9 impossible, significant effort, complex, and we would 10 agree with that.
11 The industry is saying, well, there's only 12 two real changes that need to be made, one is put the 13 QHOs in the policy statement, achieve the same safety 14 and avoid all the complications, and the second is to 15 remove the prescriptive details in the PRA requirement 16 that we don't think is needed, is not there in 50 and 17 52.
18 And then you allow all these risk-informed 19 approaches under a single inclusive framework. I 20 think that is a lot easier to do. There are 21 confirmatory changes to other requirements.
22 So for example, I referenced that one for 23 the SAR, you would not need a requirement to submit a 24 PRA in that SAR. There's a couple of others where you 25 just have to make conforming changes.
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183 1 So with that, I think that if the NRC were 2 to adopt this idea of a single inclusive Part 5, they 3 could do that with much less effort and much less time 4 and so that's what we're recommending, they should do 5 that and abandon Part 5X to support that.
6 Because we understand the NRC does not 7 agree with our proposal but nonetheless, we think 8 that's the best path forward.
9 So industry has already started to develop 10 guidance that would show how multiple risk-informed 11 approaches could meet this single inclusive Part 53, 12 one that doesn't have QHOs and one that has a less 13 prescriptive PRA requirement.
14 And we intend to share the first draft of 15 that guidance with the NRC next year. I don't know if 16 it will be March or May but certainly, that's the 17 timeframe we're looking at providing that guidance 18 document to the NRC.
19 I know there was a question earlier about 20 are we working with the NRC on the guidance that Marty 21 Stutzke has talked about. We probably should have a 22 conversation with the NRC because there is some 23 overlap in scope there.
24 So we'd like to benefit or synergize the 25 two efforts so that each benefit from each other.
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184 1 That's everything for risk-informed 2 licensing approaches. Are there any questions?
3 CHAIR PETTI: So, Marc, just a question, 4 is this the last time we're going to talk about the 5 QHOs?
6 MR. NICHOLS: There's one more slide on 7 QHOs related to how they are the reason that the 8 beyond design basis events are being included in the 9 design basis.
10 CHAIR PETTI: I was just wondering if we 11 ought to let the Staff respond to Dennis' claim now or 12 wait until the end of the whole presentation while 13 this is all fresh in the Members' minds.
14 (Simultaneous speaking.)
15 MEMBER BLEY: Dave, if we do it now, I'd 16 further ask the Staff because I hadn't thought about 17 this idea that it was not really intended to be used 18 in licensing.
19 But the arguments that led to those words 20 in the original safety goal memorandum, and Dave 21 Okrent was the guy who really developed that for ACRS.
22 The situation that existed back in the 1970s and 1980s 23 is a lot different than it is now.
24 But if that's in fact so and if in fact 25 the Staff's going to continue with the QHOs in the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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185 1 rule, it would seem they would need to or ought to 2 take a policy issue to the Commission.
3 I'd be interested in their thoughts about 4 that as well. Let's see if they want to address 5 anything that was brought up earlier.
6 MR. RECKLEY: Dave, Dennis, this is Bill 7 Reckley. The nature of the rulemaking is it includes 8 policy issues that will be taken to the Commission.
9 MEMBER BLEY: Touche.
10 MR. RECKLEY: So that is in and of itself 11 taken care of.
12 As you mentioned, the reason in the 1980s 13 that the policy statement said what I said, there were 14 various reasons for not imposing it at the time, 15 including what the risk profiles were for individual 16 plants and whether it would be used for backfitting 17 and so forth.
18 We've moved on since then, operating 19 plants have been able to show without much difficulty 20 for the most part that the QHOs can be satisfied. The 21 reason we have included it in the iterations of the 22 preliminary text that we've released thus far is to 23 provide a performance metric.
24 And the importance of this, it gets kind 25 of convoluted in the discussions, however, we need in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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186 1 the end to have rules that are specific enough that in 2 the totality of the rules, we are confident they 3 provide the reasonable assurance of adequate 4 protection finding that we need to make.
5 And in our first iteration, we had 6 proposed to revisit actually coming close to defining 7 that. And for various reasons and interactions, we 8 moved away from that and back to the position that 9 adequate protection is in the Atomic Energy Act.
10 It's enabling legislation for us to do 11 this and other rulemakings, as is Section 161 on 12 minimizing danger to life and property.
13 But as opposed to defining those 14 numerically, which was always a challenge, we'd move 15 back and we'd describe this in the second and third 16 iterations of the text, that they were important but 17 not to be defined.
18 So you need metrics and so what you have 19 in the existing framework is largely what was derived 20 in the 1970s and then supplemented over the years 21 through the GDC and then other requirements, and I'll 22 say for both de-prevention and mitigation of beyond 23 design basis events.
24 And that total work over the years and the 25 experience enables us to make that finding.
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187 1 So when you move over and say you're going 2 to use a probabilistic, more risk-informed approach, 3 more systematic review starting from scratch as 4 opposed to based on the Light Water Reactor construct, 5 you need performance goals.
6 And so as we said from the very beginning 7 of this, there have been a lot of work over the years 8 in developing the LMP methodology and it seemed to 9 provide that framework that we could build on.
10 So that includes looking at individual 11 events and it also importantly looks at cumulative 12 risk measures the most prominent of those, which are 13 the QHOs. So that is the rationale.
14 MEMBER BLEY: Let me sneak in two things 15 here.
16 The first one, if the Commission votes yes 17 under the role, that's a de facto policy issue 18 clarification but I'm remembering that 15, 20 years 19 ago when there was a proposed rulemaking associated 20 with the then-technology-neutral framework.
21 And they thought they had a place to apply 22 it, there were six or seven policy issues that were 23 taken to the Commission early on before they took the 24 whole rule up so that they wouldn't get surprised at 25 the end.
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188 1 You wouldn't want to be surprised at the 2 end if that turned out to be a problem. That's number 3 one. Number two, Marc made some points to some of the 4 information needed to pin down how you do this.
5 It's hidden away in the NRC codes. Can 6 somebody clarify that? Because that doesn't seem to 7 make sense.
8 MR. RECKLEY: Currently, the most common 9 way to assess the meeting of the QHOs is through the 10 codes like MAACS that includes within it models based 11 on isotopes and organs and data that's available on 12 health effects or life-threatening levels associated 13 with those various organs and isotopes.
14 So I'm not an expert in that but, yes, it 15 is within the codes, it's not necessarily specific 16 TEDE numbers like 1 rem because it's divided up 17 depending on the organs.
18 But again, we've been doing this for 19 years. If that needs to be elevated up to regulatory 20 guidance, I think we're probably at a point where we 21 could look at that if that's important.
22 MEMBER BLEY: That seems to make sense, I 23 know would have reviewed any of these things 24 specifically that I recall and if it is a problem for 25 some potential Applicants in figuring out how to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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189 1 design to that, it might be helpful.
2 I hadn't really thought or heard about 3 this until today so I haven't thought it through yet 4 but thanks Bill, that's all I had. I see Vicki?
5 CHAIR PETTI: Yes, Vicki, you have your 6 hand up?
7 MEMBER BIER: I have a general question 8 about the Type A and B or whatever of the four 9 different approaches that you laid out and the pluses 10 and minuses, confirmatory versus whatever the first 11 one is called, I forget.
12 They would go. So it seems to me there 13 really are some very different pluses and minuses 14 between the two.
15 In theory, I understand that using PRA 16 earlier in the design process and as a leading 17 contributor to design may avoid some problems, more 18 sensible choice of licensing basis events, all of that 19 kind of thing.
20 But since we don't have a lot of 21 experience with PRA used at such an early stage, I 22 wonder in my own mind whether it's really the best 23 place to use it.
24 First of all, we've seen over the years 25 that PRA is good at finding problems that were not NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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190 1 identified in the design stage, and if we put it 2 earlier do we lose that confirmatory role?
3 And more specifically, at least for 4 current LWRs, maybe some of the new designs are simple 5 enough that this may not be quite the same but for 6 current LWRs, the design process really is very 7 compartmentalized.
8 You're assigned to design a particular 9 system or your group is assigned and then you have 10 some boundary conditions, what electric power you 11 have, what flow rate you're supposed to provide or 12 whatever else.
13 But it's really almost blinders on about 14 how that subsystem interacts with other things that 15 may be going on in the plant, and the fact that the 16 PRA integrates across all the subsystems can find 17 places where those boundary conditions maybe don't 18 always hold or were chosen conservatively or whatever 19 else.
20 So I don't know if you guys have any 21 thoughts on the pluses and minuses of Types A and B or 22 just that you think they should both be available and 23 people should be able to use whichever they wish?
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191 1 methods and they should all be allowable. I think 2 you point out a lot of good pluses and minuses.
3 Which method is best for you probably depends on 4 what does your design look like?
5 How confident are you in either the 6 deterministic approach or probabilistic approach to 7 doing certain things within this? You did ask the 8 difference between Example A and B.
9 Now, for non-LWRs both would use the ANS 10 ASME ANLWR PRA standard. So they would both meet that 11 PRA standard. The primary difference is I think 12 you're familiar with 1804, the leading role, where PRA 13 is doing all of these things.
14 They're demonstrating compliance with the 15 limits, they're establishing the safety functions in 16 PDC, the PRAs selecting the LBEs and making the 17 categorization, and even doing the defense in-depth is 18 all PRA-based.
19 Whereas Example B, which would be that 20 same method but the PRA is confirmatory, would have 21 more deterministic things.
22 So for example, in meeting the safety 23 limits it would be a more deterministic analysis, 24 which means you're using conservative rather than 25 realistic assumptions in those analyses.
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192 1 Where you're doing the design criteria, 2 PDC, those are coming from things like ARDC rather 3 than being defined by the PRA.
4 Similarly, for identifying LBEs or 5 something, that might be deterministic based on 6 engineering principles and understanding how the 7 design works rather than just using a PRA to develop 8 that information.
9 So those are some of the differences. But 10 in terms of the analysis work, it's all the same. It's 11 just which part are you hanging your hat on and saying 12 I have confidence in safety?
13 MR. DRAFFIN: This is Cyril Draffin from 14 U.S. NIC. Just to reiterate, the developers think the 15 PRA is important and they'll be doing it. They don't 16 want to have to pick from the three categories that 17 NRC has or the four examples listed here.
18 They'd like to be able to craft it to be 19 more effective for covering the safety for their 20 technologies. And so they're looking for that 21 spectrum of use rather than picking one versus another 22 one.
23 Because frequently it's a blend.
24 MEMBER BIER: Thanks.
25 MR. NICHOLS: And we do have slides at the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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193 1 very end that explain the different examples, Slide 72 2 to 75 in our September paper. We can give it to you 3 if you don't have a copy, but our September paper goes 4 into a lot of detail on how those work.
5 There actually is a small section in the 6 back which is a here's where each of these might work 7 better than others.
8 CHAIR PETTI: We got the paper, Marc, 9 thanks. Let's just keep on going.
10 MR. NICHOLS: Cyril, you're next with the 11 standards.
12 MR. DRAFFIN: Sure, I'll pick up on this 13 and by the way, you have a hard copy and for those 14 listening in, the slides have been posted in ADAMS 15 ML21350A212.
16 The topic here was discussed really back 17 in the February timeframe when the NRC changed their 18 approach for standards.
19 And so we'd like to just talk about the 20 standards for the Atomic Energy Act. And again, my 21 name is Cyril Draffin, I'm Senior Fellow for Advanced 22 Nuclear at U.S. Nuclear Industry Council.
23 The statutory requirements in the Atomic 24 Energy Act in Section 182 and 161 are well known to 25 you, and as a matter of fact, Bill referred to that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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194 1 just a few moments ago.
2 In the NRC first iteration of the 3 preliminary rule language, they tied back to the AEA 4 standards for Part 53.
5 However, in the second and third 6 iterations of the preliminary rule language, we think 7 they reduced clarity because they came up with 8 different standards that do not clearly relate back to 9 the Atomic Energy Act and seemed to have no regulatory 10 precedent.
11 The language it used limited the 12 possibility of immediate threat to the public health 13 and safety considering potential risks to public 14 health and safety.
15 So we'll look at first the written 16 comments that NRC made and then the verbal. So this 17 is out of the second iteration of Subpart B. The ones 18 in yellow are just highlighting things we might want 19 to discuss or at least mention on the way by.
20 The change revised the first objective 21 from getting away from a reasonable assurance of 22 adequate protection to a new terminology and this new 23 language generally aligns with the standard of the 24 Commission that has been used to determine the 25 content.
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195 1 And it also revises the public health and 2 minimized degree to something different. And the 3 purpose of these objectives is clarified because I 4 needed to explain the purpose by saying it will be 5 carried out by meeting the safety criteria.
6 So if you meet the criteria then you meet 7 the new language because it hasn't been used before.
8 And again, this is quotes from the discussion the NRC 9 provided.
10 This change resulted from stakeholder 11 comments and internal NRC discussions regarding 12 difficulties in this act as a basis for their two-13 tiered safety criteria framework.
14 So instead of the use of adequate 15 protection, it's presumed that through the compliance 16 of the NRC regs, and the particular sections of 182, 17 161 will not be cited just as standard legislation but 18 not tied to safety objectives or tiers.
19 Then during the public meeting, I think it 20 was around April 8th, in discussing this change the 21 NRC Staff explained that because the entirety of Part 22 53 satisfies the Atomic Energy Act, the new standards 23 don't have to be referenced in Part 53 and NRC could 24 establish new standards defining requirements.
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196 1 change was made in support of a two-tier structure and 2 that has now been dropped responsive to ACRS and 3 industry comments.
4 It also refers to stakeholder input and 5 I'm not exactly sure what that is. Industry was 6 supportive and still is supportive of tying it back to 7 adequate protection and so it wasn't U.S. NIC or NEI 8 that was recommending this change.
9 So it might be the NRC's internal 10 activities. And the approach seems inconsistent with 11 the long-standing practice of the NRC and appears to 12 not follow the decades of Commission precedent and 13 hasn't really provided a compelling benefit or an 14 indication that Commissioners have supported that.
15 We also have some concerns regarding the 16 new approach, that it will take some extra resources, 17 that you will have to invest the Staff to ensure 18 consistency with AA. And it doesn't help in terms of 19 regulatory clarity or efficiency.
20 There's no clear connection between these 21 requirements and the standards in the act, there's no 22 equivalency in Part 50 or 52. There doesn't seem to 23 be any regulatory precedent.
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197 1 existing reactors without any breaches in safety. It 2 appears to be a regulatory overreach and there is no 3 explanation of what the new standards mean and we rate 4 to all parts of Part 53 other than just changing some 5 of the language.
6 So we raised this as a concern and this 7 lack of clarity on how the requirements tie back, and 8 the industry is a strong supporter of adequate 9 protection.
10 There are some questions on exactly how to 11 interpret it but there has been lots of precedent and 12 decisions made and clarifying memos that have really 13 given pretty good understanding of the case law and an 14 understanding of how it works.
15 And if you move to this new language, you 16 might have some iterations and challenges to be 17 exacerbated in trying to tie it back to these new 18 standards as we go down the road.
19 So we're recommending that the NRC goes 20 back to the first iteration and keep the connection 21 with the Atomic Energy Act. Certainly, we haven't 22 heard from the NRC on this since but the NRC may 23 benefit from ACRS's perspective on this.
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198 1 to hear them. If not, then the next section would be 2 on regulatory burden. Go ahead.
3 MR. NICHOLS: Thanks, Cyril.
4 So what we're going to cover is a couple 5 of the areas we identified. practically is increasing 6 regulatory burden as compared to Part 50 and 52 but 7 without increasing the commensurate level of safety.
8 And this gets to the point where both Part 9 53 and 50 and 52 get you to the equivalent point of 10 safety. It's a matter of how you get there more 11 efficiently.
12 And while certainly, we're not advocating 13 that Part 50 and 52 is what you have to base it on, it 14 is helpful to know, well, is it done in 50 and 52?
15 And if it's not done there, why would it need to be 16 done in Part 53?
17 There may be a valid reason for doing that 18 but at least it should be discussed and decided 19 deliberatively. Let's go to the next slide, Cyril.
20 And so this is our overview.
21 I don't want to spend a lot of time, I 22 know we're running behind and I'm going to get into 23 the details behind this, but it's basically saying 24 we're looking for the most efficient Part 53 possible.
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199 1 industry that is going to choose do I license under 50 2 and 52, or do I license under Part 53?
3 By the time we get to Part 53 believe 4 available in 2025, we will have licensed non-LWR and 5 other advanced reactors under 50 and 52, we will know 6 how to process exemptions based on technology-specific 7 things in Part 50 and 52.
8 We'll be really good at that. And so when 9 you look at Part 53, the only incentive 2 use Part 53 10 over 50 and 52 is if it's more efficient, either in 11 the licensing, the time, the cost of licensing, or in 12 the oversight, or in the cost of the design itself.
13 And so you're getting to the same level of 14 safety. And so if Part 53 is not more efficient in 15 getting to safety, there's not a lot of expectation 16 that it's going to be used.
17 So let's go onto the next slide. I want 18 to cover four areas, ALARA being a design requirement, 19 beyond design basis event in the design basis, a 20 proliferation of redundant and unnecessary programs 21 and then finally, safety program as part of that.
22 Let's go to the next slide and start with 23 ALARA as the design requirement. So we do support 24 ALARA, we think ALARA is a very important part of the 25 operation of a nuclear power-plant and we think it has NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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200 1 great benefit.
2 However, we recognize Part 53 does not 3 need to have any requirement for ALARA. ALARA as a 4 requirement already exists in Part 50, sorry, Part 20.
5 And regardless of any ALARA requirements in Part 53, 6 that Part 20 ALARA requirement will apply to all plans 7 licensed under Part 53.
8 So boom, ALARA is already covered so the 9 question is what benefit would there be in providing 10 any requirement related to ALARA in Part 53? Now, it 11 could give clarity that, hey, you need to go meet a 12 Part 20 ALARA requirement, that would be fine.
13 But that's not what is in the NRC's Part 14 53 rule text as it stands. Let me start with what the 15 Part 20 ALARA requirement is today, and that is you 16 must use, to the extent practical, procedures and 17 engineering controls to achieve ALARA.
18 And so those are radiation protection 19 programs.
20 You must implement a radiation protection 21 program to ensure compliance with Part 20 and it's 22 noted that there are no requirements for the design to 23 consider ALARA within all of the Part 20, however, 24 this is what NRC's Part 53 requirements have for 25 ALARA.
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201 1 They're in 53260B and 53270B. I want to 2 point out we have no problem with 53260A and 53270A 3 which basically points to the dose limits for normal 4 operations to the public and for occupational workers.
5 The B provisions unfortunately do have 6 some problems with them. So it essentially says 7 design features and programmatic controls must be 8 established.
9 So right there it's establishing a design 10 feature for ALARA in conjunction with programmatic 11 controls, which is your radiation protection program.
12 270B says the same thing. It goes a 13 little bit further and says as required by Subpart B 14 of Part 20, that would be an incorrect statement 15 because Subpart B of Part 20 as I showed just above 16 does not require design features on the programmatic 17 controls.
18 So this establishes that Part 53 is 19 requiring design features as it stands. Next slide, 20 please.
21 CHAIR PETTI: Marc, before we go there, 22 when I read this, I think of some advanced reactors as 23 having some design features that might obviate some 24 programmatic controls, if there's a trade-off here 25 that doesn't exist in LWRs.
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202 1 They have features that may make it much 2 easier from a radiation protection standpoint for 3 workers, for instance, and that you'd want to be able 4 to get some relief on purely the programmatic control 5 side because I've got these cool design features.
6 My favorite is NHTGR. You could have 7 stood on the top of Fort St. Vrain without a film 8 badge, that's how the low the dose was. They had to 9 have a film badge by law, by requirement, but that's 10 what I thought this meant.
11 So I'm thinking maybe it should have been 12 or in 260B, but there's that feature there that I 13 think might be important and give some flexibility if 14 you will.
15 MR. NICHOLS: Right, it is important and 16 I'll address it either in the next slide or the slide 17 after this. I'll show how Part 20 already allows that 18 flexibility. But yes, I agree that flexibility is 19 important.
20 Next slide, please.
21 So, first, in ALARA design requirements 22 it's not consistent with passed Commission decisions 23 and I reference here the Federal Register notice. I 24 think those are all statements of considerations for 25 the rule.
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203 1 So some of the statements that are in 2 there, direct quote, the ALARA concept is intended to 3 be an operating principle rather than an absolute, 4 which Part 20 is consistent with that today.
5 I don't think the Part 53 requirement as 6 proposed is consistent with that. The ALARA can be 7 achieved solely through implementation of the 8 licensee's radiation protection program required by 9 Part 20, that's a paraphrasing of what is said.
10 But it basically says the radiation 11 protection program is fine, you don't need a design 12 requirement for ALARA.
13 And here it says expressly intended that 14 the level of this program, the radiation protection 15 program, and efforts to document it are commensurate 16 with the size of the license facility and the 17 potential hazards from radiation exposure and the 18 intake of radioactive materials.
19 And David, I think this gets to your 20 point, which is the Part 20 ALARA requirement already 21 had this envisioned, which is the programmatic 22 controls for ALARA are to the extent it's needed for 23 that design.
24 If you have a design like the one you just 25 mentioned, maybe all you have are those badges you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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204 1 talked about. If you have a different design, let's 2 just talk about our operating reactors right now, you 3 have a radiation protection program that's in place 4 for those.
5 So it allows for different approaches to 6 ALARA based on the aspects of your design.
7 So with that, the ALARA as a design 8 requirement would increase the regulatory burden 9 without a safety benefit because you're already 10 achieving ALARA or you can achieve ALARA through the 11 radiation protection program alone.
12 But having a design requirement in there 13 is an increased burden. Why? Well, there's no 14 practical endpoint for these additional measures.
15 It's less of a negotiation between the NRC and the 16 designer and the application review stage.
17 So the designer comes in and says here's 18 my design, and I meet the dose requirements, the 1 rem 19 for the public, the 5 rem for the occupational, and 20 I've got a radiation protection program.
21 And the NRC says, well, wait a second, 22 I've got this requirement that says you need to design 23 for ALARA and I want to see where you've designed for 24 ALARA. And the Applicant says, well, I've got these 25 walls and doors and other things.
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205 1 And the NRC says, yes, well, that's not 2 ALARA to me. The designer says, well, it's ALARA to 3 me.
4 And so the question is where is that 5 objective criteria that you can say, yes, ALARA has 6 been met? It's in the eye of the beholder, it's very 7 subjective.
8 And so in the radiation protection 9 program, not an issue, we know how to deal with that 10 in terms of programmatic controls. In the design, a 11 big issue because what the NRC could say is it's not 12 all ALARA enough for me.
13 That wall that is X feet wide, you need to 14 make it wider. And the designer says, okay, I'll make 15 it wider. There is a cost to that in terms of the 16 cost of the plant because concrete is cost.
17 But what if you get to a practical 18 limitation where it says, wow, okay, to do that is 19 going to impact my ability to construct the plant 20 because I had all these things lined up in terms of 21 room sizing and onsite mobilization of the onsite 22 construction workforce.
23 It has tentacles that progress far beyond 24 just the application review and the subjectivity of 25 what is ALARA for this application, recognizing that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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206 1 all of that complication is not necessary because 2 ALARA has been effectively addressed through programs 3 for decades.
4 We think because of all that, it's really 5 inconsistent with the development of a risk-informed 6 performance-based and the efficient regulatory 7 framework for advanced reactors, which Part 53 should 8 be.
9 Next slide, please.
10 MEMBER HALNON: Marc, this is Greg. There 11 is a place, though, in the design and I would say more 12 in the plant layout for consideration of radiological 13 issues.
14 I'd go back to a point where I was 15 designing once or helping design and there was a 16 certain activity an operator had to do but it was in 17 the end impossible because of the dose rates.
18 So the plant layout is still important.
19 Where do we deal with that? Because if we don't do it 20 in the design process, you talk about expense, 21 changing the plant after the fact is even worse.
22 MR. NICHOLS: No, I agree that changing 23 the plant after the fact is worse and I don't know the 24 specific details of the example you just provided. I 25 would point, though, that there's already a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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207 1 requirement for occupational workers of 5 rem.
2 And so the Applicant is going to have to 3 show that the workers can accomplish all of the tasks 4 they have to do still below 5 rem.
5 And then beyond that you take a radiation 6 protection program and say, well, how can we get it 7 below 5 rem? How can we get them down to 1 rem or 0.1 8 rem? So you would still meet the regulatory 9 requirement within the application review and the 10 design would have to do that.
11 What we're saying is beyond that, beyond 12 5 rem, which the NRC by the nature of its requirements 13 has said is an acceptable dose for workers, to go even 14 lower than that we think the design isn't where you 15 focus, it's the radiation protection program where you 16 focus.
17 MEMBER HALNON: I agree. There's a place 18 for it in the design but we need a bright line to 19 design to and I've got that, thanks.
20 MR. NICHOLS: Absolutely, that's what I 21 was trying to say. Next slide.
22 So the NRC at the Commission briefing on 23 December 9th told the Staff told the Commission it's 24 not their intent to elevate the ALARA as a design 25 requirement, and we appreciate that. We're glad to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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208 1 hear that.
2 The statement was well perhaps the design 3 requirement for ALARA is going to be an option during 4 the design and that provides flexibility, I think I 5 talked about why that flexibility is not needed but 6 let me go into some more detail here.
7 I do believe the Part 53 requirement that 8 I mentioned, the 260B and 270B, they don't achieve the 9 NRC's intention, as I discussed, because they do 10 require design features programmatic controls that 11 doesn't allow an option that is a requirement.
12 But it is also unclear, how would an 13 option for ALARA, if you have a design requirement, 14 the way it's phrased, the NRC has it now where even if 15 they were to change it, there was basically a design 16 element required as part of ALARA, how would it work?
17 Here are some questions I thought through.
18 If the Applicant meets the requirement for design to 19 achieve ALARA and the NRC says yes, that design 20 achieves ALARA, would the NRC then say you do not need 21 to consider ALARA in your radiation protection 22 program?
23 If the NRC is saying that then, okay, 24 that's something we should be talking about. I can't 25 imagine the NRC would say you've met ALARA in the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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209 1 design, you don't need to consider ALARA in your 2 radiation protection program.
3 But they could be saying that, we don't 4 know.
5 The second question I'd ask is, well, if 6 you have this voluntary design requirement for ALARA, 7 you don't have to meet a design requirement but it's 8 voluntary, and if you do meet that voluntary design 9 requirement for ALARA, you still have to achieve ALARA 10 in the radiation program, who would want to do that?
11 You'd have to both design for ALARA and 12 then have a radiation protection program for even more 13 ALARA when we already know that the radiation 14 protection program is enough for ALARA. So I can't 15 imagine very many people would want to do that.
16 So now I'm getting to your point, Dave, 17 which is having that flexibility is important. Even 18 without a design requirement for ALARA, the developer 19 can still optimize their design for addressing the 20 ALARA.
21 So the developer can still say, well, I've 22 got this high radiation dose in this room and if I 23 don't do something in design space, then the radiation 24 protection program is just going to look very 25 convoluted and complex.
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210 1 And so let's add in these design things so 2 that we can minimize the scope of the radiation 3 protection program for ALARA. Part 20 already allows 4 that. We don't need a requirement in Part 53 to allow 5 that.
6 So the question would be is there really 7 any flexibility that an ALARA design requirement could 8 provide above what we have today?
9 I don't believe it could so I think the 10 best solution is just to delete the ALARA requirement 11 completely from Part 53, we don't need it at all, by 12 specifying in 260A and 260B that you have to meet the 13 dose requirements and you have to meet Part 20, 14 already by extension you need to meet ALARA.
15 If the NRC wanted to retain ALARA for some 16 reason, I suppose they could include a requirement in 17 the operations program section specifically pointing 18 to a radiation protection program that needs to meet 19 ALARA.
20 That would be consistent with Part 20 but 21 certainly nothing in the design section. So let me 22 see if there's any questions before I move on to the 23 next topic.
24 MEMBER BROWN: This is Charlie Brown.
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211 1 discussions in my old program and I'm trying to 2 understand the difficulty of meeting dose -- I mean 3 the concept of meeting dose requirements.
4 But meeting dose requirements requires 5 shielding from the standpoint that you've got a 6 reactor and you've got to shield it, you then have to 7 have exclusionary areas or zones where people walk 8 into and they can't go into there when the reactor is 9 operating, or they can.
10 And it doesn't matter what kind of reactor 11 you've got, we've always got fissionable material in 12 there fissioning away. So a program doesn't achieve 13 dose requirements, shielding achieves dose 14 requirements.
15 And the ALARA things, from what I remember 16 dealing with was when you were doing maintenance or 17 other types of operations, you had a program to 18 minimize the radiation exposure of the people doing 19 the work, the maintenance, where they were doing their 20 monitoring for operations and things like that.
21 So I'm having a little bit of difficulty, 22 and I'm trying to balance what you're saying about the 23 ALARA being a design requirement because where do you 24 draw the line on ALARA?
25 But you've got the dose requirements and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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212 1 I don't see how you can get away the way in which 2 meeting dose requirements without designing a plant to 3 meet those requirements, which is a lot of shielding 4 in a lot of different areas based on where you want to 5 work and why.
6 MR. NICHOLS: We agree with that 7 statement, that you have to design to dose 8 requirements and you're going to have to have 9 shielding to achieve those dose requirements.
10 Those are accomplished by 260A and 270A.
11 That's what we're saying, you've already 12 accomplished those dose requirements, you're already 13 showing through your design that you're meeting the 14 dose requirements.
15 What the NRC is requiring here, which 16 they've never done before, is requiring an unending 17 search for ALARA within the design. And so the 18 question is you've already met the dose requirements 19 that are acceptable in the design, why do you have to 20 design for even more?
21 Because it's more difficult to address it 22 through the design than it is to address it through 23 the radiation protection program. You can put up 24 temporary shielding in certain places if that makes 25 sense in order to achieve ALARA.
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213 1 MEMBER BROWN: But you're not arguing that 2 -- I lost my thought here. This is what happens when 3 you get old.
4 You're envisioning that regardless of dose 5 requirements, they should be designing to meet dose 6 requirements lower than the required dose 7 requirements?
8 You're saying that's the way it could be 9 argued by the NRC?
10 MR. NICHOLS: Correct.
11 MEMBER BROWN: So the dose requirements 12 become meaningless if somebody is always jacking you 13 down a little farther?
14 MR. NICHOLS: Exactly, that's exactly what 15 we're saying.
16 MEMBER BROWN: I don't know how to balance 17 that, I used to stand right next to the shield when I 18 was doing submarines sea trails and I walked away 19 after 35 years of 15 sea trials, 2 carrier sea trials 20 standing by the reactor compartment walls, and I only 21 had 235 millirem over my lifetime.
22 So I'm trying to balance what I saw in our 23 program. Of course, we had sailors living right next 24 to us constantly. So it's a bit of a different 25 circumstance from the commercial world.
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214 1 I'll quit asking, I just wanted to see 2 what your understanding was. I understand your point 3 about putting it in would something like there's 4 always a jack that somebody could be putting on you as 5 opposed to meeting the dose requirements.
6 I'll stop there.
7 CHAIR PETTI: Marc, I think the first 8 bullet on the slide is very important. It seems that 9 was not their intent, so you may see some movement 10 here.
11 MR. NICHOLS: Thank you, and Dave, can I 12 ask --
13 (Simultaneous speaking.)
14 MEMBER BROWN: I agree with you on that 15 standpoint, that's an important line. Thank you, 16 Dave.
17 CHAIR PETTI: What was that, Mike?
18 MR. NICHOLS: I know we're around the time 19 we were supposed to end our presentation. I'd like to 20 be able to present on beyond design basis events in 21 the design basis at least.
22 I don't know if we have additional time 23 granted to us or not?
24 CHAIR PETTI: I think we're okay because 25 this is all we have on the agenda, right, and then NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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215 1 discussion time?
2 MR. WIDMAYER: That's correct.
3 CHAIR PETTI: I'd say we've been going at 4 it for an hour, so we might want to do a break. Let's 5 get through this and then...how many slides on BBBE?
6 MR. NICHOLS: I think there's about six.
7 Let me see, no, four, there's only four.
8 CHAIR PETTI: It's showing me five slides 9 in all.
10 MR. NICHOLS: I see that. I would 11 recommend trying to get through beyond design basis 12 events before the break. That would be my 13 recommendation.
14 CHAIR PETTI: That sounds good, let's do 15 that.
16 MR. NICHOLS: So industry had a concern 17 that for Part 53, the NRC is expanding the design 18 basis to include the beyond design basis. Now, we 19 recognized and agree that beyond design basis needs to 20 be part of the licensing basis.
21 There's a big difference between being 22 part of the licensing basis and being part of the 23 design basis. So design basis means you need to 24 design to the beyond design basis events.
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216 1 able to address beyond design basis events, typically 2 in mitigation. So again, in the December 9th 3 Commission briefing, the NRC Staff stated, well, the 4 Part 53 benefit is that you do more upfront and you 5 get downstream flexibility.
6 And I think that was in response to the 7 beyond design basis event requirements. But the Staff 8 also said it wasn't the intent to include the beyond 9 design basis event in the design basis, so that was 10 good to hear.
11 We are encouraged by that. They did say 12 within Part 53 beyond design basis events created the 13 same way it is today and specifically, the beyond 14 design basis event doesn't need to rely on safety-15 related SSCs.
16 I'll explain why I disagree with the first 17 point, which I think Part 53 treats beyond design 18 basis differently than today. But I would agree with 19 the second point, that you don't have to meet it with 20 safety-related SSCs.
21 So as a reminder, Part 50 and 52 requires 22 the mitigation for the beyond design basis events.
23 You do have to identify the beyond design basis events 24 but then you have to mitigate for them.
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217 1 against them or design for them. That's in 50.155.
2 It's a recent rulemaking in the NRC.
3 So Part 53 requirements I don't believe 4 achieve the NRC's intention that they described to the 5 Commission on Part 53. So first of all, Part 53 does 6 require mitigation for a beyond design basis events.
7 And so that would be consistent with Parts 8 50 and 52 and that's all you need to do in order to be 9 consistent with the way they're treated today.
10 However, Part 53 goes beyond that and 11 actually, as I'll talk about, it's the QHOs in the 12 rule that is the door through which the beyond design 13 basis events is included in the design basis.
14 Because Part 53 also includes requirements 15 for designing for the beyond design basis events. So 16 specifically 53400 requires design features for 20, 17 requires functional design criteria, for 40 it 18 establishes design requirements, for 60 requires 19 special treatment.
20 And that special treatment, the way it's 21 described, it's described exactly the same way as it's 22 described for safety-related SSCs.
23 We have a whole other issue that we didn't 24 put in our presentation today about concern about the 25 NRC's elevation of non-safety-related to be treated as NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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218 1 safety-related in the way the rule is written up.
2 And all of that relates back to the QHOs 3 in the Rule 220. I'll point out we don't make a lot 4 of comments on Part 5X but Part 5X also includes 5 beyond design basis events in the design basis.
6 Again, the NRC said that's not their 7 intention but that is the effect of the rule, as we 8 see it. Next slide, please.
9 So we believe that including the beyond 10 design basis events in the design basis is 11 inconsistent with Commission decisions, that it should 12 just be in the licensing basis.
13 So this is the mitigation of the beyond 14 design basis event pool that I talked about. The 15 Commission directed the Staff to remove representation 16 requirements for the beyond design basis events for 17 new reactors that the Staff had proposed in that 18 rulemaking.
19 In doing so the Commission recognized that 20 the NRC's ability to provide oversight for mitigation 21 was sufficient to address beyond design basis events 22 for nuclear reactors.
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219 1 which is mitigation, is preferred over design 2 requirements for beyond design basis events.
3 And finally, the advanced reactor policy 4 statement has led to designs that reduce reliance on 5 human actions. We think it's already providing the 6 incentives that are needed.
7 That was actually a statement of the 8 Commissioners, rejecting the new requirement for new 9 reactors to include beyond design basis in the design 10 basis in that MIDI Bede rule.
11 Because it says it allows the Applicant or 12 new reactor to provide innovative solutions, 13 mitigation does that. Regulatory requirements should 14 not impose unnecessary burden or divert attention from 15 more important safety objectives.
16 That is certainly occurring here.
17 When the beyond design basis now comes 18 into the design basis and if you look at this previous 19 slide, all of those requirements for design features 20 and functional design requirements and design 21 requirements are the same things that are required for 22 design basis events.
23 And so it really blurs the line between 24 you're doing the exact same thing for beyond design 25 basis as you are for design basis.
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220 1 The only difference being that the beyond 2 design basis events don't have to rely on safety-3 related equipment and what's the difference between 4 safety-related and non-safety-related with special 5 treatment?
6 According to Part 53, there's not a whole 7 lot of difference and we can go into that in another 8 meeting. Next slide. So what is the solution for 9 this?
10 Keeping the QHOs in the policy and not 11 putting them in the rule since they drive the beyond 12 design basis event design basis requirement. We 13 already talked earlier about putting QHOs in the 14 policy.
15 I'm going to reflect on the NRC's feedback 16 because I found it to be a bit circular logic.
17 When we ask them why are there 18 prescriptive PRA requirements, you have to do a 19 leading role in Part 53, this was at the October 28th 20 meeting, they said, well, you have to do PRA that way 21 because we have QHOs in the rule.
22 When the ACRS just asked the NRC why do 23 you have to have QHOs in the rule, the response was we 24 have to have QHOs in the rule because we are 25 prescribing how you have to use the PRA in your NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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221 1 licensing basis and therefore, we need a metric to 2 compare them to.
3 I find it circular, one feeds the other.
4 You need one to have the other and you need the other 5 to have the one. So I find that particularly 6 troubling.
7 If that's truly the logic, I think there's 8 a good reason you can take them both out and not lose 9 anything within the rules we've described earlier. So 10 what would our solution be?
11 The earlier question is, well, if QHOs 12 aren't in the rule, what do you do in the rule?
13 And so this particularly focuses on beyond 14 design basis events. I mentioned this briefly 15 earlier, for AOOs you can put a 1 rem requirement if 16 you want.
17 For beyond design basis events, the 18 Commission has been very deliberate not to put in dose 19 limits or I'd say metrics for beyond design basis in 20 the rule. One, it drives you to having to design to 21 those.
22 And so the solution, which I think works 23 very well for the operating fleet and would work 24 equally well for advanced reactors in Part 53, would 25 be to continue rely on mitigation of beyond design NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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222 1 basis events.
2 And in our comments on November 5th, we 3 proposed a more technology-inclusive version of 50.155 4 for beyond design basis events.
5 And this is the requirement that we had 6 proposed to replace the QHOs and that is that each 7 Applicant or licensee shall develop, implement or 8 maintain mitigation strategies capable of being 9 implemented sitewide.
10 Now, I will say I'm about to read through 11 this and these are performance metrics. They may not 12 be quantified but they are performance metrics and I 13 think that's really important to note.
14 The question now becomes, the NRC previous 15 said, we have to have a numerical performance metrics.
16 What we're saying here, the industry is proposing that 17 qualitative performance metrics are the right approach 18 for beyond design basis events.
19 So what are those performance metrics?
20 Well, the mitigation strategies must be able to 21 maintain or restore the safety functions necessary to 22 meet the safety criteria in 53210, that's 25 rem.
23 So as you identify your beyond design 24 basis events, as you identify the plant response to 25 that, you might do it all with a PRA leading or you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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223 1 might do it with a PRA confirmatory.
2 As you do that, you have to identify, 3 well, here are the safety functions I might lose under 4 this beyond design basis event that would cause me to 5 exceed the 25 rem.
6 And so now I have to develop mg8 7 strategies that give confidence that I would be able 8 to maintain or restore those safety functions and not 9 exceed 25 rem.
10 Now, we think that provides the bulk of 11 the benefit for beyond design basis events consistent 12 with 50.155 and we think the right way to go about it.
13 The second criteria would be you'd have to 14 be able to acquire and use offsite assistance and 15 resources to support the capabilities of A. So this 16 is building in some redundancy in defense in-depth, 17 not just onsite systems, you've got offsite systems, 18 FLEX, for those that are familiar with it.
19 And then finally, the strategy and 20 guidance that you're providing for that Capability A 21 have to be capable of I'll say handling the 22 circumstances associated with loss of large areas of 23 the plant due to explosions, fire, minimized 24 radiological releases.
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224 1 things as you develop the mitigation. I think that 2 provides a lot of confidence in how an advanced 3 reactor would address the beyond design basis events.
4 And so that is why the QHOs would not be 5 needed in the rule because you're already addressing 6 it adequately with this. Was that the last slide or 7 was there one more, Cyril?
8 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Mike, this is Walt 9 Kirchner. Let me ask you a rhetorical question.
10 I've got the advanced reactor policy 11 statement in front of me and one of the things it's 12 looking for is designs that minimize the potential for 13 COP accidents and their consequences, providing 14 sufficient and inherent safety, reliability, 15 redundancy, diversity, and independence in safety 16 systems with an emphasis on minimizing the potential 17 for accidents over mitigating the consequences of such 18 accidents.
19 Now, you're talking about mitigation. So 20 how do you see the industry?
21 We hear a lot of good things about these 22 reactors but what do you see in 10 CFR 53 driving you 23 to provide the emphasis on prevention rather than 24 mitigation?
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225 1 about the advanced reactor policy statement, is the 2 Commission intended it to be a policy to encourage 3 these things but not a requirement for those things, 4 as a way of encouraging innovation.
5 And I would say that's been the effect.
6 If you look at the advanced reactors and the designs 7 they're look at, they're look at putting in features 8 that would minimize and prevent the potential for an 9 accident, even a severe accident.
10 And so if you look at TRISO fuel or if you 11 look at other things that operate at atmospheric 12 pressure, simplification of systems, smaller source 13 terms, they're headed in that direction to do that 14 naturally.
15 So you asked, well, what do we see in Part 16 53 that requires it? I would say that the Commission 17 never did Part 53 to require what's in the advanced 18 reactor policy statement.
19 But what I would say is as we look at how 20 does Part 53 ensure safety, first and foremost, it 21 focuses heavily on the design basis events and 22 ensuring that those are adequately designed for and 23 protected against, and that you are less than 25 rem.
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226 1 are even included in there. And then the big question 2 which I think this is all related to is, well, what 3 about beyond design basis events?
4 And so I would think our view is this 5 requirement that's on Page 39 is the appropriate way 6 to do that.
7 QHOs would not be appropriate because it 8 brings all of that stuff into the beyond design basis, 9 it brings it all into the design basis inconsistent 10 with the Commission direction as what the Staff said 11 December 9th, inconsistent with their intent for Part 12 53.
13 And so if you've already assured that 14 through this, why do you need the other QHOs? I would 15 say you bring up an interesting point that if these 16 advanced reactors are designed so that there are fewer 17 potential accidents, the consequences of the accidents 18 are a lot less.
19 There's a lot less reliance on human 20 actions to even mitigate accidents, even beyond design 21 basis events.
22 The mitigation strategies would reflect 23 that and so you would probably see mitigating 24 strategies that are slightly different from what the 25 operating plants have today.
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227 1 MEMBER REMPE: Along those lines, you may 2 need something different than the standard FLEX 3 equipment for some of these designs, right?
4 MR. NICHOLS: That's right, absolutely.
5 Depending on the design, you may have a completely 6 different strategy.
7 MEMBER REMPE: And so that'll have to be 8 something that's thought about? I don't know, in your 9 paper did it mention that point?
10 MR. NICHOLS: Yes, I think we mention 11 that, absolutely, and I would say even in the NRC's 12 version of Part 53, they do require mitigation of 13 beyond design basis events.
14 So that issue about, well, it's a new 15 design and so what does mitigation strategies look 16 for, for a new design the NRC hasn't considered, it's 17 true whether you go with our approach, which is 18 replace QHOs with this EBBE requirement or if you go 19 with the NRC's current version.
20 MEMBER REMPE: And so when I say the 21 equipment, I just don't mean the equipment on the 22 site, I mean the regional centers. They may not have 23 exactly what's needed for the beyond design basis 24 accident mitigation strategy.
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228 1 forward and start to build this thing, as part of 2 their licensing approach they'll have to say yes, 3 we're going to have X, Y, and Z equipment added to the 4 regional center to address our particular design.
5 MR. NICHOLS: That would be one solution, 6 I won't foreclose on other solutions but that would be 7 one.
8 MEMBER REMPE: Because I don't think I saw 9 that in your paper is what I was speaking about.
10 MR. NICHOLS: We didn't get down to those 11 details, that's right.
12 MEMBER BALLINGER: This is Ron Ballinger.
13 As long as they achieve the top-level goals, how they 14 do it, who cares?
15 MEMBER REMPE: True, but it's something 16 the Staff needs to look at.
17 MR. NICHOLS: I would say the Staff and 18 the design are here but in terms of the requirements 19 in the regulations, it should be indifferent to the 20 particulars of the strategy. It's focused on the 21 performance criteria.
22 MEMBER BALLINGER: Remember, FLEX was 23 implemented after the fact.
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229 1 couldn't pass the cost-benefit criteria for backfits.
2 So they need think about that.
3 CHAIR PETTI: Any other comments, Members, 4 before we take a break? Hearing none, let's break 15 5 minutes, so 25 after the hour. Thanks.
6 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 7 off the record at 4:11 p.m. and resumed at 4:20 p.m.)
8 CHAIR PETTI: Okay, go ahead.
9 MR. NICHOLS: Okay. All right, the last 10 area I want to cover are operational programs in Part 11 53, and that includes the facility safety program.
12 And we presented this, the next set of slides, to the 13 NRC, I think it was in the October timeframe.
14 But one of the things we kept hearing 15 (audio interference.)
16 Somehow my cellphone was muted, but I, 17 fortunately I'm still on the -- a computer.
18 So one of the things that we heard in the 19 feedback from the NRC on operational programs is -- or 20 design requirements. All the stuff we just went 21 through, they said, well, you got a more up-front 22 regulatory burden on design, but you're going to reap 23 the benefits in less regulatory burden on operations.
24 And so when they came out with their 25 operational requirements for programs, we found that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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230 1 that didn't appear to be an accurate claim. So what 2 we find, here's just some statistics here that we 3 think the NRC needs to reassess the entire set of 4 program requirements for Part 53.
5 We have 11 program areas that have 6 equivalents in Part 50 and 52. Thirteen areas, 7 program areas, in Part 53 don't have Part 50 and 52 8 equivalents, or they just duplicate others.
9 Now, it's not to say that just because 10 there's no program in Part 50 or 52 it doesn't deserve 11 a program in Part 53. It might, but to recognize that 12 there are more program areas without a 50 and 52 13 equivalent than there are with 50 and 52 equivalent 14 really -- really shows that something's out of -- out 15 of balance.
16 And then there's over 20 instances of an 17 open-ended requirement for programmatic controls where 18 there's no performance criteria and there's really no 19 -- nothing in the requirements that could limit with 20 the NRC would ask for under there. So let me go to 21 the next slide. All right, thanks.
22 We evaluated all of the program areas that 23 are being required in Part 53. Again, it's, well, 24 asking you the question is there a 50 or a 52 25 equivalent. And if not, is there a need for Part --
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231 1 for that program in Part 53. So the first set of 2 lists is on the left are Part 53 program areas that 3 are required. And Part 50/52 or equivalents we found 4 that for many of them, there are one for one 5 correlations.
6 Now, what the details of the program 7 requirements, we didn't get into the analysis here.
8 They could be different. But at least from whether 9 the program areas require it at all is consistent in 10 these 11 areas. Next slide, please.
11 What we found is that there are a lot of 12 program requirements in Part 53 that are essentially 13 duplicating the Q&A program requirements out of 14 Appendix B. Now, the NRC did split up QA requirements 15 across Part 53, and we've recommended they consolidate 16 all them together. I think they are doing that, and 17 so that will be helpful in its own way.
18 But nonetheless, even when they do that, 19 there are some requirements -- design QA requirements 20 tend to be one where I think there's three or four 21 individual requirements all related to the --
22 achieving the same exact thing, design control 23 quality. And so we recognize that these requirements 24 could be simplified and replaced with just a single QA 25 requirement. Next slide, please.
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232 1 This is the list of all the programs that 2 are required in Part 53 that have no equivalent in 50 3 and 52 and a summary of our analysis on whether it's 4 needed or not needed. In all cases we've determined 5 that it's not needed, usually, because it duplicates 6 another program that was already required by the 7 previous two slides.
8 And so that -- and then there -- the one 9 -- there's, two, especially, that don't have any 10 duplications or requirements. One is the facility 11 safety program.
12 So we looked at that, and it essentially 13 duplicates all other programs. It is a way that -- of 14 performing a periodic safety review, which the NRC has 15 made Commission decisions in the past that that is not 16 something that would be adopted in the United States.
17 It's more akin to what they do in Europe.
18 And by way of implementing that period 19 safety review, which is not every ten years, based on 20 that facility safety program it's every two years 21 because it's tied to the frequency of updating the 22 PRA. So every two years, as you update your PRA, you 23 need to reevaluate the plant and make plant 24 modifications based on your findings there.
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233 1 evaluate. But outside of those cost metrics, it 2 actually circumvents the backfit protection because 3 you're required to do it, and so you just get around 4 the backfit protection.
5 We think because it duplicates all those 6 programs and has all those other challenges, the 7 facility safety program needs to just be thrown out 8 altogether in Part 53. In fact all of these programs 9 here need to gotten rid of, because they're adding 10 programmatic burdens and operations without any safety 11 benefit in Part 53. Next slide, please.
12 So with that, my personal assessment of 13 how the NRC went about programs is sort of a one here, 14 a one there, sort of this sounds good and put it in.
15 I don't think -- it doesn't reflect a very systematic 16 and process of thinking through what programs should 17 be in Part 53 and why they should be there at all.
18 It's a dramatic expansion of the regulatory footprint.
19 This slide here shows those 20 20 requirements that are for programmatic controls, and 21 it says basically whatever the NRC might ask for in a 22 review, and so that is very open-ended, and it's not 23 certain why you need additional programmatic controls 24 outside of the program areas already being required.
25 Next slide, please.
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234 1 So we've proposed to the NRC that they 2 should take a more systematic, thoughtful approach to 3 the role of programs to define which programs are 4 needed. So in our assessment, as you look at what the 5 nuclear power plant has, we've bunched some things 6 together, called them the technical aspects of the 7 plant to protect the public.
8 So the technical aspects are the design 9 features. So this the systems, structures, 10 components. This the physical stuff. And then you 11 have human actions, and then you have programs.
12 And so what is the role of the program?
13 Well, the role of the program is to make sure that the 14 design features that you've got built into your design 15 basis approved by the NRC and those human actions 16 which are being credited in the safety -- safety basis 17 will actually perform how they're expected to perform 18 in the licensing basis. They'll actually perform that 19 way in operations.
20 So that should be the role of the 21 programs. It shouldn't be every good thing that we 22 think we could control at the licensee's operational 23 programs should be included as a requirement. And 24 I'll go through a couple of examples of these.
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235 1 requirements are in effect even after the NRC issues 2 a license. So just because you have a requirement for 3 something doesn't mean you need a program for it. You 4 need to be thoughtful and say well, do I actually need 5 a program to give me reasonable assurances this is 6 going to be performed.
7 The NRC has oversight and inspection 8 program to ensure compliance. And so that is another 9 key tool that the NRC needs to recognize that is in 10 their -- their quiver for assuring reasonable 11 assurance.
12 And we also know, we should actually start 13 with the understanding that the QA program itself 14 provides a lot of the assurances that we're looking 15 for here. Next slide, please.
16 So what is the systematic approach? Well, 17 we've looked at, we actually put together our thoughts 18 and went through a systematic thought process of well, 19 this is the role of the programs. What programs might 20 you need. We looked at it as well each stage has its 21 own purpose. So you need programs in the design stage 22 to provide reasonable assurance to plant design as in 23 accordance with the license and regulations.
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236 1 those -- that the constructed and fabricated SSCs are 2 in accordance to the license and regulations.
3 And maintenance and operations, you need 4 programs to provides reasonable assurances that the 5 SSCs are capable of performing their intended 6 functions, that's maintenance, and that the plant is 7 operating according to the license and regulations.
8 So those are the purposes for programs 9 that we established. And then the next would be well, 10 what are the criteria for such programs. They should 11 be graded so that if you need more in your program, 12 you have more. If you don't need so much, you don't 13 have so much. And then they go to the next slide.
14 I won't spend a lot of time on these.
15 There's four slides where we actually did the effort.
16 So at the top here you'll see the -- the purpose of a 17 program in the design phase. And then there's -- here 18 there's four performance criteria for what those --
19 whatever programs you're going to require, what those 20 programs must achieve to provide that reasonable 21 assurance.
22 So I'll go through design but I won't --
23 actually, I'll go through operations because that's 24 the most interesting. So let's go down to operations, 25 next slide. Actually one more, yeah.
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237 1 So in operations, if the purpose of 2 programs and operations is to provide reasonable 3 assurance the plant is operated according to the 4 license and regulations. So what are the performance 5 criteria? Well, the plant has to stay within the 6 license conditions for operations. The administrative 7 controls provide reasonable assurance that human 8 actions credited for protection of public health and 9 safety will be performed when needed.
10 Humans relied on for our -- sorry. Humans 11 relied upon are trained and capable of performing 12 their assigned functions.
13 So within this we looked and we didn't put 14 together Part 53 requirements, we just looked at what 15 are the Part 50 programs that fall in and fulfill that 16 area. So you've got technical specifications, 17 training and re-qualification, operating plans, fire 18 protection, radiation protection, emergency planning, 19 security, and environmental protection.
20 Now, the degree that you need those will 21 depend on your plant. Is it possible a particular 22 design might be able to say well, for us we don't need 23 a security plan because security's not an issue for 24 us. Maybe, but as -- these are sort of the nominally 25 expected programs for which we would expect to see NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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238 1 requirements.
2 On the far right are programs that are in 3 this operational area where the NRC doesn't need 4 approval, they don't need approval today and we don't 5 think they need approval to review and approve it for 6 Part 53. The effluent release program, worker safety 7 program, OSHA programs, procedures for operations and 8 emergencies, event reporting, none of those things 9 need requirements or program areas.
10 So we do -- we do show here that there are 11 administrative controls that are in the operations 12 area that you are going to have at the plant, but they 13 don't need to be required by the NRC, they don't need 14 to be reviewed and approved by the NRC. That's the 15 key distinction here. So I think that was -- no 16 actually, one last slide.
17 So we've presented all that to the NRC.
18 There's the date, September 15. We didn't get much 19 response from the NRC at the meeting. They did say 20 you can't compare Part 53 requirements with 50 and 52 21 requirements. As I mentioned before, an applicant is 22 going to look at 50 and 52 versus 53 and choose the 23 one that's most efficient.
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239 1 me that it's probably going to be more efficient.
2 The industry, this was their response, we 3 don't understand that the NRC requirements are 4 reducing regulatory burden. We'd like to be 5 enlightened if that's the case, but it was -- it was 6 true that it's not apparent to us.
7 And they said that well, the regulatory 8 burden within each program is less, so we shouldn't 9 really be concerned that there are more programs. I 10 think their point was mainly based on there's fewer 11 safety-related components, therefore the scope of SSCs 12 to which the programs apply will be less.
13 Well, that may be true and certainly 14 that's a goal, to reduce the amount of safety-related 15 SSCs for advanced reactors. But just because the 16 designer is being innovative to reduce the amount of 17 safety-related SSCs that they need doesn't mean that 18 the NRC should -- should double the number of programs 19 which apply to those -- even when those -- especially 20 when those programs aren't needed for a reasonable 21 assurance of safety and duplicate or are redundant 22 with other programs.
23 So with this, we're not sure -- the NRC 24 has not yet provided a basis for requiring any of the 25 programs. We do recognize that several of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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240 1 programs are going to need to be required.
2 We're not -- we're not disputing that 3 programs will be required. It's just especially for 4 those redundant programs and ones that don't have an 5 equivalent in 50 and 52, we think the NRC has a burden 6 of describing why those programs must be in Part 53.
7 With that, I'll end. And if you have any 8 questions for me before we transition to Cyril.
9 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Could you go back to --
10 this is Walt Kirchner -- to quality assurance and 11 design and construction phases.
12 MR. NICHOLS: Is it this one or the 13 earlier slide?
14 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yeah, I'm, yeah -- well, 15 maybe this is for a rhetorical --
16 MR. NICHOLS: Slide 52 was QA requirements 17 as well.
18 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yeah. Is it basically 19 your position that the equivalent of Appendix B would 20 only apply to safety-related equipment structures and 21 systems?
22 MR. NICHOLS: That's right. Yeah, we 23 would assert that Appendix B should only apply to 24 safety-related SSCs. It is -- I didn't mention this, 25 but in Part 53 the NRC does extend many of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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241 1 Appendix B equivalent QA requirements to non-safety 2 related special treatment requirements, which we 3 commented would -- should not -- is not necessary and 4 should not be done.
5 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Okay, thank you.
6 MR. NICHOLS: Cyril.
7 MR. DRAFFIN: Okay, the next topic is 8 technology inclusive, and I'll cover that quickly so 9 we can spend a little bit more time on goals for 10 regulatory efficiency.
11 The key point here is that NRC has said 12 they intend to revise the preliminary language to not 13 restrict Part 53 to be only used for advanced 14 reactors, and we agree with that intention. We think 15 the Part 53 should allow all types of technologies and 16 not have different rule frameworks for them.
17 We also think that it should apply to all 18 developers and applications, including for electricity 19 or process heat, hydrogen production. And it doesn't 20 have to be necessarily limited in scope and could pick 21 up utilization and production facilities covered under 22 Sector 103, or even medical facility in RD in Section 23 104.
24 I won't go into the language for NEIMA, 25 but I guess to cover just a couple points. NEIMA did NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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242 1 not limit the framework to only advanced reactors.
2 And they provided other types of flexibility for 3 applications.
4 And the second point would be, which is 5 really the third bullet, the NRC does not need to come 6 up with additional limits or definitions or screening 7 criteria to handle additional inherent or passive 8 safety features, because that's really going to create 9 a moving target over time, which could disrupt 10 regulatory stability.
11 So having other screening criteria is not 12 necessary. And it seems that NRC is moving just to 13 make it open to anybody who wants to choose Part 53 14 and then of course can meet these safety criteria in 15 them.
16 I did want to use this visual. I think 17 visuals are good. I think Marty did a great job 18 yesterday of presenting some lucid figures for us to 19 understand. This came out of a presentation to the 20 NRC Commissioners on December 9, and it basically 21 makes the point that Part 53 has a technology 22 component that leads to requirements and new methods.
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243 1 environment maybe for any technology that's 2 performance-based, and many methods, maybe not all 3 methods, but many methods.
4 And what you see here is kind of a visual 5 representation that NIA had, the Nuclear Innovation 6 Alliance, on you know, what they thought of currently 7 the Part 53, which shows it's pretty technology-8 inclusive, which we agree with. That it has 9 requirements are kind of balanced between prescriptive 10 and performance-based.
11 We like to see, as you've heard today, 12 more performance-based, less prescriptive. But that 13 the methods are over on the prescribed side. They, 14 you know, not just for PRA but for other things and 15 facility safety we just heard about.
16 And you know, the -- as they do the next 17 iterations, moving over to something closer to a 18 flexible regulatory framework would be recommended.
19 And so I thought this was a helpful just kind of 20 snapshot of looking at the characteristics of Part 53.
21 In looking at goals for regulatory 22 efficiency, there's a number of different aspects 23 we'll look at, maybe, you know, three to five. First 24 two slides to adjust complexity.
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244 1 licensing, NRC needs to have a high-level plan on how 2 Part 53 will integrate all aspects of the regulations, 3 including rules, guidance, staff interpretations and 4 oversight. And you know, you were also looking for 5 some high-level perspectives as well.
6 The second is on the guidance. To date 7 it's been limited, other than, you know, TICAP, as we 8 heard about this morning. And without guidance, it's 9 really not possible to fully assess what they have in 10 mind.
11 They provided a list of needed guidance 12 and the nine-month delay offers time for them to 13 prepare that.
14 And you've heard that the NEI and NRC are 15 going to be working on some of those guidance 16 components, which is important. Primarily associated 17 with regulations, but it's also important to have 18 clarity on how to have timely reviews of the process 19 and to avoid submission of unnecessary information in 20 the applications under Part 53, the process side.
21 And there's been limited clarity so far on 22 the scope and extent of inspections during operations.
23 So those are things to consider as we go forward.
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245 1 delineated the, you know, extra, you know, ten-plus 2 programs that we just reviewed. But the more you have 3 those overlapping programs and requirements, it makes 4 it harder for staff to approve applications. And the 5 goal is to focus on safety-significant parts of the 6 technology and not be distracted by the kind of minor 7 issues.
8 And also as you get a scale-up, if you --
9 if the vision of having multiple reactors and having 10 nuclear make a big difference in the United States, 11 and there's lot of reactor applications, the more you 12 have -- the more you have simplicity, the better, and 13 the more you have overlapping requirements and 14 confusion, the worse.
15 So with that in mind, I wanted to spend a 16 little time on what kind of internal goals for 17 regulatory efficiency might be considered. With the 18 potential order of magnitude increase in applications, 19 NRC needs to be -- needs metrics to judge their 20 internal regulatory efficiency. There have -- made 21 some steps, they've talked about it, but more is 22 needed, particularly in terms of metrics.
23 So for instance, we need shorter and 24 predictable timeframes, you know, how many months.
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246 1 a predictable manner, but can you shorten the 2 schedules while still ensuring that the NRC conducts 3 a thorough safety environmental review.
4 For instance, for the commercial non-power 5 reactors and medical isotopes, the space is, you know, 6 18-24 months. And especially as you have smaller 7 sizes of these advanced reactor facilities, they also 8 should be able to have a time schedule like that. And 9 that has been achieved by the SHINE facility in 10 Wisconsin.
11 So the NRC can do it, and, but for the 12 smaller sizes, you know, a schedule that's much 13 shorter has merit. And the current estimate of, you 14 know, maybe three years for the construction permit, 15 another three years for an operating license until you 16 get a safety evaluation report, and then there's some 17 administrative activity. So if it's six to seven 18 years, that's a long time for these reactors that can 19 be done we think a lot faster, and that'd be useful.
20 Second topic is topical reports, how to 21 use them, how to effectively utilize them. Also how 22 NRC's going to consider documentation done by, let's 23 say the Canadians or the UK regulatory authorities.
24 Using that effectively for different applications is 25 valuable.
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247 1 On lessons learned, you know, there's some 2 activities underway for 50/52, but we have experience.
3 And it was, you know, NuScale, for instance put in a 4 letter on February 19 with five recommendations of how 5 things could be done, and NRC was going to get back to 6 us in a stakeholders' meeting, but every month they've 7 kind of delayed it another month. So you know, we 8 want to understand how NRC is considering the lessons 9 learned that NuScale and others have had and 10 incorporate that.
11 Regarding the RAIs, some groups have 12 suggested you might be able to get it down to two 13 cycles, and we certainly don't want the number of RAIs 14 required for, let's say the NuScale application, which 15 was very large. So how can you reduce the requests 16 for additional information, and especially for non-17 safety significant matters?
18 So there ought to be some metrics there 19 that the NRC could develop for themselves about how to 20 have an efficient process and how to review that. Now, 21 of course, you want to have an effective, high quality 22 applications from the designers, but it's a two-way 23 street, and we want to make this a more efficient 24 process.
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248 1 talked about as being beneficial.
2 MEMBER BLEY: Well, can I interrupt you 3 there?
4 MR. DRAFFIN: Of course, of course.
5 MEMBER BLEY: What are you folks doing to 6 make sure that the applications that come in will have 7 addressed the potential technical issues that, you 8 know, in itself would reduce the number of RAIs 9 substantially?
10 MR. DRAFFIN: Well, I think each developer 11 has that responsibility, but you want to look at what 12 are the questions that NRC has asked before. What 13 kind of -- what kind of history has there been for 14 anything like their reactors.
15 There's probably a recognition on the 16 applicant's part that they probably understand the 17 technology better than the people reviewing it. So 18 it's the applicant's responsibility to explain the 19 piece part, to show the logic, and not just assume 20 it's good just because they submitted it.
21 And so thinking through how they can 22 explain it, thinking through the questions the NRC 23 have asked, and prepare that, I think the -- is the 24 responsibility applicants have. We have a -- NIC has 25 not a, you know, a training program to do that, if NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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249 1 that's -- but it is a part of the teamwork effort.
2 MEMBER BLEY: Okay, well, if you do, 3 that'd be really interesting to see how you're doing 4 it, because, you know, if we looked at the -- at the 5 history of life extension efforts, we went from 6 applications that -- well, the industry itself trained 7 itself on how to submit applications that have many 8 fewer questions, and that was very helpful.
9 MR. DRAFFIN: At the American Nuclear 10 Society meeting about a week ago or so in Washington, 11 there was a number of the CEOs of the various 12 companies were together. And one of the points that 13 they made was limit the size of what you're 14 submitting. You know, the applications should be 15 limited in terms of number of pages, you know, 500 not 16 10,000.
17 And then have background material that's 18 available for staff review and point them to that 19 direction. And so that's a little bit of focus on 20 what's really the most important aspects that are 21 really most important to safety and hone in on them.
22 So that was one of the messages that a couple of the 23 CEOs made.
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250 1 topical reports where they are doing things in smaller 2 pieces where it's an approach to methodology instead 3 of the methodology with the validation data that you'd 4 see with light water reactor topical report 5 submittals.
6 And so it -- I mean, I guess the good side 7 if you're a design developer is you can say I have ten 8 approved SERs from the staff. But what the progress 9 is toward getting to final license is a lot smaller 10 with those ten approved SERs.
11 And is there any effort by your 12 organization to try and, or at least to recognize that 13 that's going to cost more with respect to schedule and 14 you know the staffing resources are limited? Has that 15 come up at all in your discussions?
16 MR. DRAFFIN: We've had discussions. Some 17 of the material, you know, they consider somewhat 18 confidential and don't want to share just yet when 19 they're going through NRC processes.
20 The -- there has been some frustration 21 with the pre-application process because they may have 22 discussions and then the staff varies and there's --
23 it's not as -- and then at the very end they don't 24 clarity on it's going to be lasting. They may have a 25 different set of reviewers who are going to review the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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251 1 application after they've spent, you know, a number 2 of, in some cases years on the pre-application.
3 And so the pre-application process has 4 some issues in terms of what kind of benefit they get 5 out of it relative to the costs. And so there's a 6 tradeoff between -- the advantage of the topical 7 report is you get some clarity to it, some definition 8 that is lasting in contrast to a pre-app.
9 So I think there's a balance there, and 10 that could be one of the reasons why a couple have 11 chosen to do smaller topical reports rather than 12 relying just on pre-applications, which is not as 13 definitive. Over time I think you may find some 14 bigger ones, but I think in some ways that's a 15 licensing strategy each company has. But I think 16 we're -- I think we're comparing notes, but I --
17 MEMBER REMPE: Yeah, I mean, we've having 18 -- everyone acknowledges in this example, and I'm 19 guessing we'll see more of them. Still, one topical 20 report review, you're going to at least have two, 21 maybe more. And anyway, that's just a concern I have 22 when you -- because ultimately it'll come back that 23 the NRC schedule of cost was so much but it's because 24 of the process they've chosen.
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252 1 process the applicant's chosen and how quickly NRC 2 responds and how definitive their analysis is. And 3 some people have said that NRC staff is -- in pre-4 application will listen carefully, but they don't say 5 as much. They don't give clarity in terms of what to 6 do, and that can be frustrating too.
7 So I think it's an issue for both sides to 8 become more efficient.
9 MEMBER REMPE: But it's important for both 10 sides to recognize that something is a bit different 11 here.
12 MR. DRAFFIN: Agreed.
13 MEMBER HALNON: So I -- this is Greg, I'm 14 kind of confused. Are you looking for the Part 53 15 rule language to correct these problems or issues that 16 you have? It just seems premature to be talking about 17 them when Part 53's not even established yet.
18 MR. DRAFFIN: No, we're not asking it in 19 the rule, we're just saying that for the rule to be 20 used and useful, I mean, this is some ways a 21 competition between 50 and 52. You need to think 22 through the entire plan from the regulations to the 23 implementation and the -- and the application.
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253 1 be mindful of in terms of the process they use in the 2 application to make it a better outcome for all.
3 MEMBER HALNON: Okay, because I just heard 4 that during the operational programs that the NRC does 5 not need to approve licensing controls related to 6 compliance, and I think these are good bullets, but 7 I'm not sure that you're in a position to tell the NRC 8 how to review a topical report. Especially if the 9 topical report quality is not where it needs to be or 10 any other kind of pre-app process.
11 So anyway, they're good bullets, but I'm 12 not sure why we're spending time on them.
13 MR. DRAFFIN: We're encouraging NRC, and 14 perhaps if you have comments on it, to come with 15 metrics through this, to come up with ways of really 16 judging this. Because I think these are important 17 topics, and I'm not going to go through each one 18 individually, but --
19 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Cyril, this is Walt. I 20 would say it's a two-way street. And unfortunately 21 because of the competitiveness and the proprietary 22 nature of each of your members' concepts, it's 23 probably hard to collaborate as well as the industry 24 with license renewals and subsequent license renewals 25 in terms of lessons learned and of making the process NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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254 1 more efficient.
2 I guess the first thing, though, I wanted 3 to mildly object to is your rather blanket statement 4 that the length of the review is going to scale with 5 the power. That, if we take aside for the moment 6 micro-reactors, which are more in the category of test 7 and research reactors, that's -- that's not a 8 necessarily proven or even wise conclusion to draw.
9 A first-of-a-kind reactor with a novel 10 technology without an extensive operational database, 11 without any reliability or minimal reliability kind of 12 numbers to feed to a PRA, I can go on and on. It 13 doesn't -- I think it's -- I think it would be a 14 mistake to assume that should -- that the review 15 should be shorter just because it's a smaller reactor.
16 A lot of these designs are going back to 17 technologies that were tried decades ago and with 18 cause were dismissed. Now, we can say well, we have 19 new innovative ways of looking at these particular 20 technologies and etc., we have better computer codes, 21 all that.
22 But I wouldn't jump to the conclusion that 23 a 100-megawatt reactor should have a shorter review 24 than an LWR, a large LWR. I think that would be a 25 mistake. And it depends on the maturing of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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255 1 technology, the amount of prototypical experience that 2 is out there than can be drawn upon.
3 It depends on what coolant you're using.
4 If it's a liquid-fueled reactor you've got much more 5 complicated reactivity, insertion accident concerns.
6 I could go on and on.
7 But it doesn't -- I think it would be 8 wrong to assume that just because it's a smaller 9 reactor -- and I'm talking about reactors now of size 10 that would have an impact on climate change. I'm not 11 talking about micro-reactors. And those, I think 12 that's -- that's not a substantiated conclusion that 13 a new concept should have a shorter review period.
14 And then I think maybe Dennis was going 15 way. I mean, a lot of this is going to depend on the 16 quality and maturity of the application and the 17 material to back it up. But I do think you could look 18 at the experience of several of your, I think they're 19 your members or however you refer to them.
20 And probably look at what the sticking 21 points were in the pre-application interactions with 22 the NRC. And then probably draw from that at least, 23 as you say here, key policy issues. I won't -- I 24 won't call them policy issues, I'll call them design 25 issues, sticking points, where the sticking points may NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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256 1 be. Like on source term definition, quality 2 assurance, general design criteria, etc.
3 I think there's work that you could do on 4 your side based on recent experience to improve that 5 interaction and engagement with the staff and not just 6 hang it all on their shoulders. That's probably 7 enough, I think you get my drift.
8 MR. DRAFFIN: I do, and I agree with both 9 points. I wasn't implying that, you know, 200 and 10 larger reactors, particularly for the first of a kind, 11 hopefully they'll be more efficient in future 12 applications. I was thinking more in terms of 13 differentiation. The example I gave would be the 14 smaller sizes, the heat pipes, the micro-reactors, 15 where it should have a different timing.
16 And on your second point, yes, I --
17 sharing those lessons learned not at the end of the 18 process but during the process is -- would be 19 valuable.
20 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Thanks, thank you.
21 MR. DRAFFIN: Sure. So I think we've 22 covered enough, you can read the rest. I'd just point 23 out at the bottom that NEI a couple days ago put out 24 a report on promoting efficient NRC licensing reviews 25 that might be of interest to you, and they had a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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257 1 number of recommendations.
2 For -- we are encouraging that --
3 MEMBER BLEY: Can I just ask our senior 4 scientist, Derek, are we aware of that, do we have 5 that document Cyril just pointed to?
6 MR. WIDMAYER: No, but I'll get it. I 7 don't have it yet.
8 MEMBER BLEY: Okay, thanks.
9 MEMBER REMPE: I think what's on the slide 10 is correct, and some of us received a copy of it. I 11 think what you said was NEI, but I believe what's on 12 the slide --
14 MEMBER REMPE: Yes. And we do have a copy 15 of it that I got, but I'm not sure how widely it got 16 distributed.
17 MR. DRAFFIN: Good. It was helpful. And 18 it has some specifics and some details on a number of 19 different cases. So this was the nuclear. Okay. And 20 so it's worth your attention. The clear vision -- and 21 you can just go to the NEI website, and you'll find it 22 pretty quickly from there.
23 So we need to look at a clear vision and 24 specific goals. You talked about that yesterday. We 25 agree with that, you know, systemic approach.
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258 1 Back in July, industry has five utilities, 2 seven developers, a couple trade associations. All 3 came up with a unified industry position that it's 4 available for all technologies and risk-informed 5 licensing, that it's less burdensome over the 6 lifecycle. And again, we're stressing the lifecycle.
7 And it has clear and objective acceptance criteria, 8 how much is enough in terms of the review.
9 It's important because, you know, we do 10 hope that there will be escalating deployments of 11 light reactors and SMRs in the 20s and 40s for 12 addressing the clean energy sources in our country and 13 around the world.
14 So hopefully, there will be a number of 15 these applications. And so you want to have a vision 16 for that. And you also want to have an efficient 17 process to how you can handle that both from the 18 industry and from the NRC.
19 Just to point out that we've been 20 providing input to the staff for a long time. Over 21 two and a half years ago we provided, you know, 22 details on what should be considered principles 23 focused on technical requirements and administrative 24 requirements, eliminating, streamlining requirements 25 that are overly prescriptive or not relevant, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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259 1 simplicity in the final safety analysis with the 2 right-size FSAR to reflect safety significance.
3 A fixed time period, once you've gotten 4 the initial reactors approved, because as we've talked 5 about, the first one is going to take longer as the 6 staff thinks through it, but once you've gotten 7 through the first one, how can you replicate that 8 quickly, how can you keep the core teams in place.
9 So I just mention this as something that, 10 you know, we've been engaged with for a year plus.
11 Path for exemptions, clearly we want, and 12 everybody thinks there are going to be fewer 13 exemptions in Part 53 for the non-light water reactors 14 versus 50/52. But we still need a smooth process for 15 Part 53 exemptions.
16 It was raised at the last Commissioner's 17 meeting on December 9th that there's going to be many 18 applications, and the NRC could make the process 19 easier in Part 53 and maybe proactively recommend 20 exemptions, because even as mentioned yesterday, there 21 may be exemptions in 53. And you might as well make 22 that as smooth as possible for all parties.
23 And coordination with other rulemakings, 24 they're underway for emergency planning, security, 25 GEIS, environmental reviews, Part 50/53 lessons, 52 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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260 1 lessons learned, and so to try to integrate those 2 along with siting and deal with the upgrades and 3 updates over time.
4 You know, we talked about it yesterday.
5 And I just reemphasize that that's important to do.
6 And I won't go into some of the details for lack of 7 time. But we'll just, we'll stop there.
8 I thought it would be interesting to at 9 least try to discuss there's a diversity of opinion 10 among ACRS members and among the industry, but on a 11 couple areas where we think there's similarities to 12 the way ACRS and the industry has approached 53. And 13 obviously, you might have comments or additional items 14 that you want to add.
15 The first one is dropping the two tier 16 structure. We both recommended that. And that has 17 happened.
18 We like I think the flow of objectives and 19 the safety criteria and safety functions. That's a 20 good logic. And overarching design principles in one 21 place is good. We would encourage the decoupling 22 between the, from the first iteration, normal 23 operations. And I think this has been done.
24 The next one's really, we kind of touched 25 upon this morning and, by Marc, that, you know, we all NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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261 1 want to not rely just upon the LMP approach. You're 2 open to considering other ones. It could be 53. It 3 could be methodology neutral and if the PRA language 4 could be modified to enable PRA in ways an applicant 5 expects to use the tool. It's a tool. It's a very 6 useful tool.
7 And that there's a spectrum of how 8 applicants use between risk-based and deterministic, 9 and that 53 shouldn't be risk-informed. And you want 10 flexibility and a PRA graded approach.
11 The last one is a broad interpretation of 12 credible events. They're standards. We've talked 13 about and you've talked about in previous meetings 14 there ought to be boundaries, you know, how far is 15 enough in terms of the evaluation for what's credible.
16 The next slide and the last of this is the 17 -- I think we both agree you need to add requirements 18 for safe, stable end conditions, end state conditions, 19 that unifying QA requirements rather than just 20 scattering about Part 53 is beneficial, that a 21 coherent and detailed explanation of the integrated 22 intent of the rule is important.
23 There may be some duplication in the 24 language. More guidance is needed to clarify 25 regulations. We both, you've obviously have heard NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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262 1 we've questioned whether ALARA should be in the rule.
2 We also think it's important to have 3 flexibility to address the broad range of 4 technologies. I think there's agreement there.
5 And I think there's agreement that you 6 need a systemic search for hazards, initiating events, 7 and accident scenarios.
8 So I just mention this as, you know, 9 potential areas where I've -- and just in listening to 10 the conversations, there seems to be agreement.
11 If you have, and I'll pause in case 12 anybody has a question or wants to add more.
13 Two other topics, one is QA. The simple 14 point is that we want to have it in one location. It 15 gives a chance to have a fresh look of how you, 16 alternatives to NQA-1, ways of using commercial 17 components, add quality programs, use of broad 18 standards, the ISO 9000 series.
19 We want to make sure there's a strong 20 supply chain base that can, both domestically and 21 internationally. And approval of more universally 22 recognized standards outside of NQA-1 I think is 23 beneficial.
24 And I think the NRC has mentioned this.
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263 1 have language to support this and heading in this 2 direction. So I think that's good.
3 Also NEI is developing guidance on using 4 ISO-9001 to meet the Appendix B QA standards, which 5 will be available to operating fleets, new reactors 6 license under 50/52 and for 53, assuming that the 53 7 QA requirements are consistent with Appendix B. So I 8 just wanted to mention QA.
9 And then the last slide for the day, and 10 there were some backup slides, is to just reiterate 11 that we provided our letter back in November to 12 provide clarity and detail on the perspectives 13 provided to the NRC meetings and letters over the 14 year, especially in areas where NRC has not addressed 15 our concerns or described why they aren't addressing 16 our concerns.
17 Attachment A has 22 pages of comments by 18 specific topical areas and addresses the positive and 19 the challenges. Some of those are, most of those have 20 been presented before to the NRC staff, but it's kind 21 of providing them in one spot and augmenting a bit.
22 Attachment B has detailed comments on 23 nearly all the preliminary Part 53 rule. It's 24 regulation by regulation. There's specific proposed 25 revisions, some of which Marc referred to today. So NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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264 1 it's an opportunity for you to read it in more detail 2 and for the NRC staff to consider them.
3 We had, both NEI about a year and the U.S.
4 Nuclear Industry Council had offered suggestions for 5 language changes on Subpart B, for instance, back in 6 the February timeframe. We got no response in any of 7 the public meetings.
8 So at least we wanted to get this on 9 record because we think it is important, and whether 10 (audio interference) today it's an opportunity for the 11 NRC to, staff to consider these and perhaps make the 12 changes that make sense. And if the ACRS sees benefit 13 in some of them, they may, you may want to consider 14 that, making statements in that regard.
15 Finally, on the, as you see, it's just a 16 wrap-up of here's the 40 submissions we've made since, 17 in the last couple years.
18 MEMBER BLEY: So just a comment, 19 individual member comment. I read the letter. And I 20 read the attachments. When I read the cover letter, 21 it was like Part 53 is a piece of crap, there's so 22 much wrong with it, it's -- you almost thought it was 23 irretrievable.
24 Then I go and I read the comments, and I 25 get a really different flavor. You guys provided NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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265 1 specific word changes and the like. And I think the 2 same thing happened in the Commission briefing, which 3 I listened in to.
4 I left the Commission briefing thinking 5 that a lot of this was communication, that there 6 wasn't intent by the staff, but you read intent into 7 it, or at least the words meant something different to 8 you. I think this is part of the iterative process.
9 I just worry that inflammatory cover 10 letters may not be helpful in the latter process. But 11 that's just my personal comment.
12 MR. DRAFFIN: A couple reactions. One is 13 the details, we tried to be thorough in terms of being 14 professional and focused in our attachments. So 15 hopefully they stand alone as being helpful and clear.
16 In terms of the letter, I think there is 17 some frustration. I think there's a belief that Part 18 50 and Part 52 can work with exemptions for non-light 19 water advanced reactors and is working, and that the 20 purpose of Part 53 was to make the process more 21 efficient, not to add regulatory burden and if Part 53 22 is not, not really needed unless it's really better.
23 And so I think one of the aspects of the, 24 that's reflected in the letter and maybe some of the 25 statements that you might, you know, some people might NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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266 1 interpret as inflammatory is, look, to really point 2 out that what we've seen may not be used and, 3 therefore, take some of our comments seriously and, 4 you know, not, and see what makes sense, because you 5 really do want Part 53 to be, you know, better and 6 more efficient or it won't be used.
7 And so I think that probably causes people 8 to be, what some people would say, well, forthright 9 and other people might use other words. So --
10 MEMBER BLEY: And again, I just want to 11 make it clear the Committee I think agrees with the 12 objectives you guys have. We want something that's 13 efficient and useful. And, you know, that's why we 14 had you guys come for the whole afternoon to hear your 15 comments, you know, in a condensed form. So I 16 appreciate that.
17 MR. DRAFFIN: And we appreciate the time.
18 CHAIR PETTI: Ron, you got a question.
19 MEMBER BALLINGER: Yeah, I have. One 20 person's opinion, I, too, read the letters, both the 21 September one and the November 5th one. And I tried 22 to follow the string through the issues related to the 23 QHOs. And I thought I had, but then I realized that 24 I haven't.
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267 1 Henley. He once said there's three sides to every 2 story, yours, mine, and the cold, hard truth.
3 And after listening to today's 4 presentations about the issues related to the QHO and 5 the admonition that the staff had basically said, 6 sorry, we're not going to address your comments in the 7 QHOs, I'd like to hear a response from the staff to 8 the individual comments that were made today related 9 to the issues with the QHOs.
10 You know, again, I'm just a metallurgist, 11 just so I'm a little obtuse sometimes. But I just 12 couldn't follow it. And today's presentation piqued 13 my interest a lot.
14 CHAIR PETTI: Bill, want to try that?
15 (Simultaneous speaking.)
16 MR. RECKLEY: I think that's a two-hour 17 discussion --
18 CHAIR PETTI: Oh, okay, okay.
19 MR. RECKLEY: And we will --
20 MEMBER BALLINGER: I agree.
21 MR. RECKLEY: We will be --
22 PARTICIPANT: It's a big time discussion.
23 CHAIR PETTI: Okay.
24 MR. RECKLEY: Yeah, and we will be back as 25 we go through the sections and, as we mentioned, the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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268 1 statements of consideration where we lay out our 2 logic.
3 Again, from our point of view, if you're 4 going to have a performance based approach, you need 5 metrics. You need something that you can come back 6 and compare it to. And we thought, as we started 7 this, that one thing that we adopted early on was we 8 weren't going to try to invent new things.
9 And so when we looked at what metrics were 10 available for risk-informed approaches, the QHOs were 11 a logical place to start. So they've been in use now 12 for 30 years and have been used in a variety of 13 applications. The staff routinely uses them in terms 14 of performing regulatory analyses and so forth. So we 15 just, again, we thought it was a logical place to 16 start.
17 I understand the thought that you might be 18 able to use qualitative kind of measures. What we 19 have said previously is our fear for qualitative 20 measures is you give up predictability because the 21 measures themselves are qualitative. So that's all I 22 would offer. And then as we come to you next year, 23 we'll provide a different rationale.
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269 1 suggest that the members, when you, or if you're going 2 to be thinking about ALARA, you know, we have in the 3 past and continue to take issue that considering ALARA 4 in the design stage is new.
5 I would point the Committee members to 10 6 CFR 50.34(a) and have you read it. And then you can 7 look at the associated regulatory guides like 8 Regulatory Guide 1.109 and Regulatory Guide 8.8 that 9 all go to considering ALARA at the design stage. And 10 as some of you have brought up, it makes sense to do 11 it at the design stage.
12 And again, given -- just another 13 correction I would like to offer is on the design 14 basis discussion and that including design basis 15 events into the design basis of the facility, I know 16 the terminology is awkward, but that that is a new 17 concept.
18 I would refer the Committee back to 19 Regulatory Guide 1.86, which endorsed NEI 97-04, which 20 has specific discussions about how design basis events 21 such as ATWS and station blackout are incorporated 22 into the, quote, design basis, the 50.2 definition, 23 into the plants.
24 And so some of this, whether it be 25 misunderstanding or whatever, I'm not, it's, I'm a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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270 1 little baffled sometimes when these things are called 2 new requirements when they've been around for --
3 ALARA's been around since the creation of the Nuclear 4 Regulatory Commission. And design basis goes all the 5 way back to the mid-'90s and how it's incorporated 6 into the design basis.
7 So anyway, but you asked about QHOs, and 8 I went off on a tangent. So --
9 MEMBER BALLINGER: Yeah, let me circle 10 back to those, well, you know, to use a term, let me 11 circle back on that, the QHOs.
12 I mean, it sounded to me like there are 13 unintended consequences that need to be at least 14 looked at and discussed. And so I think that the back 15 and forth today on QHOs was a very valuable 16 discussion.
17 But I think we need to get, I personally 18 would like to get some closure on this where we can 19 look at the staff's part of the story, if you will, 20 maybe not response.
21 MR. RECKLEY: Okay. Well, and we will do 22 that. And given the primary or a primary concern 23 ended up being a legal concern more than a technical 24 one, we'll also talk to our Office of General Counsel 25 about those implications.
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271 1 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: And I would like 2 just to make a small correction to something you said.
3 You said that this industry was using those QHOs for, 4 you know, like say from '80, so that would be forty 5 years.
6 I actually beg to differ. I don't think 7 those -- those QHOs were set as the basis for the risk 8 metrics in safety goals. And those were used for 9 forty years, that correspondence within those.
10 So I don't want to say the plants were 11 reviewed based on the, what would we say, like the 12 individual risk of latent times in (phonetic) facility 13 is 2 to E minus 6 plant -- for plant life. They were 14 reviewed based on core damage frequency less than 10 15 to minus 4 per year. And correspondence within those 16 two numbers nobody ever considered in this forty 17 years.
18 So I think that's true what I'm saying, 19 and I will stand behind that. So we cannot really say 20 that this industry was regulated based on those QHOs 21 for forty years. That's not in my opinion true, sir.
22 MEMBER KIRCHNER: If you go back and look 23 at the safety policy, the Commission at the time it 24 was revised and then issued, what, circa '88 or so, 25 the actual quantitative numbers were described as NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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272 1 aiming points but not as regulatory criteria.
2 So maybe, Dave, it might be beneficial to 3 revisit this discussion where the participants have a 4 little more time, including ourselves, to prepare for 5 --
6 CHAIR PETTI: Yeah, yeah, no, I agree. I 7 think this is just sort of on our tickler list for 8 when we meet again or the time after that or whatever.
9 But I think we should, you know, just have 10 some time in one of our subcommittee meetings, you 11 know, response to NEI concerns, NEI and NIC.
12 MEMBER KIRCHNER: And I might make another 13 observation. I'm not a lawyer. But since it was 14 suggested by NEI that if these QHOs are used as 15 proposed they would be subject to legal contention in 16 a hearing, I would suggest that then the actual 17 quantitative QHOs as well might be subject to a legal 18 contention.
19 And that may open a Pandora's box that --
20 it's just an observation I make. As long as they're 21 goals, they're currently, they are policy, it's in the 22 policy statement and it's a goal, which is much 23 different than being a requirement.
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273 1 to the way it was worded is interesting. We can go 2 into it sometime.
3 Dave, I think this is a time we go around 4 the table. And if that's so, I'd make a couple 5 summary statements.
6 CHAIR PETTI: Yeah, I think so. Go ahead.
7 MEMBER BLEY: You know, yesterday and this 8 morning I learned an awful lot, and I was very pleased 9 by a lot of what I learned. This afternoon I got a 10 lot of information.
11 My reading of a lot of it was the staff 12 and the industry are pretty darn close together on a 13 lot of things. There's kind of a catalog of specific, 14 I don't know, if misunderstandings, places people are 15 reading the same thing differently that kind of get 16 piled on.
17 One thing that was brought up I thought 18 interesting and I want to say something about and that 19 was the presentation about programs. And the part of 20 it I liked. You know, parts of it I didn't like so 21 much because it kind of looked like we were arguing to 22 have the old ad hoc approach that got us to where we 23 are enshrined.
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274 1 them and what they should be seems something that fits 2 very well within the staff's overall structure that 3 all of us I think liked for Part 53.
4 And having that kind of structure would 5 help us all understand the programs and why they're 6 here and whether they should be here better.
7 And I don't know if that, that probably 8 doesn't go in the rule language. But this document 9 we've all been hoping to get our hands on that tells 10 us how all this fits together would be a good place to 11 explain that.
12 Anyway, some of these things are worth 13 further delving into, because I think on QHOs there's, 14 it would be interesting to hear from the staff again 15 and a little more clarity on some of the pieces, 16 because I think there are things we all interpret a 17 little differently that need to get aired out before 18 we're all done with this. But now we have a little 19 bit more time to think it through.
20 Anyway, sorry for the long ramble. But I 21 was kind of pleased by the overall result of today and 22 yesterday.
23 CHAIR PETTI: Yeah, it's been information 24 dense but also very, very valuable I think. Anybody 25 else comments?
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275 1 MEMBER HALNON: Yeah, Dave, this is Greg.
2 You mentioned dense. And sometimes I feel that way 3 with all this information.
4 But first I wanted to compliment the 5 industry and U.S. NIC. I think that they've put a lot 6 of thought, a lot of work into their comments.
7 And I think we need to really look at, 8 hard at the implementers who have to do a lot of work 9 before it even gets to the table of the NRC to review.
10 And I think that's part of the issue here 11 is that the designers who need to have criteria to 12 design against has to be, I've mentioned this before, 13 a bright line so that they can do their calculations, 14 do their design, do their plant layouts so that they 15 know that they're providing the NRC, one, a quality 16 product but, two, one that meets the regulatory 17 requirements.
18 So I think that I'll go through that 83 19 page of comments and look at them. But I would really 20 encourage the NRC staff to look at the comments and 21 assure that the goals are being met by the regulatory 22 language but also keep the implementers in mind, 23 because the quality of the product to get to review is 24 going to be directly related to how clear the 25 designers are to meet criteria that you want.
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276 1 So I'm not sure that was real clear. But 2 I think what I'm trying to say is that to meet the NRC 3 goals of adequate protection, the implementer's 4 language, if it does meet that goal, then we really 5 should look hard at those comments.
6 So, again, I was very pleased with the 7 last couple days. I learned a lot. Unfortunately, I 8 don't think it's going to sink in as much as it needs 9 to. But I got a lot of reading to do. So we'll go 10 from here. Thanks.
11 MEMBER BLEY: Hey, Dave, one thing I 12 didn't say that you might have wanted us to talk 13 about, I don't think we're at a point for a letter 14 again.
15 CHAIR PETTI: Oh, correct, no, I agree 16 with you. Yep. Vicki, your hand is up.
17 MEMBER BIER: Yeah, thanks. I wanted to 18 just come back to sort of a rambling point I made 19 before about leading role or confirmatory role for 20 PRA.
21 Given that all of our past experiences 22 really PRA on a confirmatory role, I'm very 23 sympathetic to the idea that the regulatory framework 24 at least should not prevent that. There may be 25 advantages to using PRA even earlier in the process.
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277 1 But I worry a little that a very early PRA 2 that's kind of more coarse or, you know, simplified 3 assumptions without all of the detail may sort of just 4 get passed along and ratified at later stages.
5 So once you have the detailed design and 6 then the site-specific and whatever, are people really 7 going to take as thorough a look at it if they're 8 starting with an existing PRA that already got through 9 an NRC approval process rather than if they're 10 starting, you know, de novo from scratch, blank piece 11 of paper, what do we think the risks are here and how 12 can we quantify them?
13 So I just wanted to say, first of all, I 14 had a lot more doubts and skepticism yesterday. And 15 I really liked Marty's presentation. A lot of my 16 doubts and questions I think were resolved through his 17 comments.
18 But that's one of the ones that kind of 19 lingers is I like the industry proposal of at least 20 allowing confirmatory use.
21 CHAIR PETTI: Okay. Thanks. Charlie?
22 MEMBER BROWN: Yeah, a somewhat different 23 flavor on the observation, the industry made several 24 comments and the staff did also.
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278 1 all this is to achieve a more efficient form of a 2 regulation in order to get, reduce the time it takes 3 to get through these design developments and get on 4 into really building some plants.
5 And one of the things I didn't hear or 6 maybe I missed it was, at least what I observed, I've 7 been through four -- and Dennis was here for these 8 also. I don't know that he would echo me. But we've 9 been through four new applications from 2008 until 10 now.
11 And I can only give my perception of the 12 general areas which I was most detailed involved in 13 was that we achieved a lot of efficiency and quick 14 responses and completion because the applicants 15 submitted a far higher quality technical documents 16 which we got to review that didn't have to have a lot 17 of handwringing on them.
18 And I think a lot of the efficiency has to 19 be if you get a good detailed design submitted with 20 well documented it will go much more rapidly.
21 The fear I have is that part of Part 53, 22 do we add too much back in or, you know, and the 23 industry is making an argument that we have, or the 24 other aspect is are we taking stuff out that still 25 should be in there. So it's a balance all the way NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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279 1 along the line.
2 But I think the quality of the application 3 and the detail design information that's provided for 4 their systems is a key element in getting them done 5 quickly and efficiently. So that's just an 6 observation on my part based on 12, 13 years' worth of 7 reviews.
8 CHAIR PETTI: Okay. Other members' 9 comments?
10 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Yeah, I just would 11 like to add that those were excellent meetings. And 12 actually I think that this is, myself I made some, you 13 know, qualitative jump of the understanding how the 14 things, you know, will fit. And then so, and the 15 presentations were very, very good. So thank you for 16 that. At least I am now confused on a much higher 17 levels. So --
18 CHAIR PETTI: Well, I know when we had set 19 up the agenda, Derek and I, I mean, I was very excited 20 about it because I really thought it was going to be 21 good. And I'm glad that members see that. Walt.
22 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yeah, just, Dave, thanks 23 to all the presenters. I thought these two days were 24 very useful and informative.
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280 1 the top of my head, looking for ways for both the 2 industry and the applicants to be more effective as 3 measured probably in cutting down the number of RAIs 4 and time lost in dealing with those.
5 The work that's being done for RCAP, I 6 think it's Appendix D, which will address, you know, 7 essentially looking at 50 and 52 and sorting through 8 what requirements would be applicable and not may be 9 a very useful thing for both the staff and the 10 applicants, potential applicants who are coming in 11 with non-LWR designs.
12 But it doesn't work well if the applicants 13 come in and just say, well, all this stuff doesn't 14 apply to me because I've got a better design and, 15 therefore -- I'm exaggerating, of course.
16 But getting to quick resolution on things 17 like general design or principle design criteria or 18 functional design criteria, whatever they're called, 19 source term and quality assurance and matters like 20 that, I think will make that, those initial 21 interactions between applicant and staff much more 22 productive and perhaps cut down on the number of RAIs.
23 So I think there are ways that both sides 24 could make improvements. But I thought that RCAP, I 25 think it's Appendix D, will be a very useful document.
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281 1 And thank you to all the presenters.
2 CHAIR PETTI: Okay. Anyone else? Okay.
3 Then let's do one final ask. If there's any members 4 of the public that have a comment, they can unmute 5 themselves, star 6, tell us who you are, and give us 6 your comment. I don't hear anything, but I see Marc's 7 hand up. Yep.
8 MR. NICHOLS: Yeah, thanks. I just wanted 9 to offer a clarification. I know the NRC said ALARA 10 is already in the design for Part 50. And they 11 pointed to 50.34(a).
12 If you actually go look at that, it's not 13 ALARA for the entire design of the plant. It's very 14 specific what it applies to. And specifically what it 15 applies to is the equipment in high radiation areas.
16 And so, you know, if that carried through 17 to Part 53, you know, I don't see any issues to that.
18 But it's very specific in what it does. It's not the 19 way that Part 53 would apply, hey, here is ALARA you 20 have to apply to the entire design. So I did want to 21 provide that clarity.
22 CHAIR PETTI: Okay. Well, with that, I 23 want to wish everyone happy holidays. And we'll see 24 folks in the January subcommittee week. And with 25 that, I guess we are adjourned. Thank you all.
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282 1 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 2 off the record at 5:36 p.m.)
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Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS)
Future Plant Designs Subcommittee 10 CFR Part 53 Licensing and Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Reactors December 16-17, 2021 1
December 16th Agenda 9:30am - 9:40am Opening Remarks & Staff Introductions 9:40am - 10:00am Update on Part 53 Rulemaking Schedule 10:00am - 1:00pm Graded PRA and Possible Licensing Pathways 1:00pm - 2:00pm Lunch Break 2:00pm - 5:00pm Staffing, Operator Certification, Simulators
[Subpart F - Requirements for Operations]
5:00pm - 5:30pm Discussion 2
NRC Staff Plan to Develop Part 53 Subpart B Subpart C Subpart D Subpart E Subpart F Subpart G Project Life Cycle Design and Siting Construction Operation Decommission Requirements Definition Analysis
- Safety Objectives External Configuration Funding
- Safety Criteria System Hazards Construction/ Control
& Component Manufacturing Termination
- Safety Functions Design Site Surveillance Characteristics Ensuring Maintenance Analysis Capabilities/
Requirements Environmental Reliabilities Staffing &
Considerations Human Factors Safety Change Control Categorization
& Special Environmental Programs Treatment Considerations Security, EP Facility Safety Program Other Plant/Site (Design, Construction, Configuration Control)
Clarify Subpart A General Provisions Analyses (Prevention, Mitigation, Compare to Criteria) Controls and Subpart J Admin & Reporting Plant Documents (Systems, Procedures, etc.) Distinctions Between Other 10 CFR Parts LB Documents (Applications, SAR, TS, etc.) Subparts H & I 3
Current Status Subpart Description Status Subpart A General Requirements Released 1st iteration, including initial definitions (April 2021)
B Safety Criteria Released 3rd iteration (August 2021)
C Design and Analysis Released 3rd iteration (August 2021)
D Siting Released 1st iteration (April 2021)
E Construction Released 1st iteration (April 2021)
Manufacturing Released 1st iteration (April 2021)
F SSCs Released 1st iteration (April 2021)
Personnel Released 1st iteration (October 2021)
Programs Released 1st iteration (April 2021)
G Decommissioning Under development (Planned release December 2021)
H Licensing (LWA, ESP, SDA, Released 1st iteration (August 2021)
DC)
Licensing (ML, CP/OL, COL) Released 1st iteration (October 2021)
I Maintaining Licensing Basis Released 1st iteration (August 2021)
J Reporting & Financial Released 1st iteration (August 2021)
Part 5X Deterministic Alternative Released 1st iteration (October 2021)
Part 73 Physical Security Released 2nd iteration (November 2021)
Cyber Security Released 2nd iteration (November 2021)
Access Authorization Released 2nd iteration (November 2021)
Part 26 Fitness-for-duty Under development (Planned release December 2021)
Other Technology-Inclusive, Risk- Under development Informed Maximum Accident Approach Conforming Changes Under development Statements of Consideration Under development Regulatory Analysis Under development 4
Revised Part 53 Rulemaking Schedule Key Rulemaking Milestones Activity Date(s)
Public Outreach & Generation of Proposed Rule Package July 2020 to August 2022
- NGO Public Meeting February 2022 Submit Draft Proposed Rule to Commission February 2023 Commission Review March 2023 to May 2023 OMB and OFR Processing May 2023 Publish Proposed Rule June 2023 Public Outreach & Generation of Final Rule Package June 2023 to May 2024 Submit Draft Final Rule to Commission December 2024 Commission Review January 2025 to April 2025 OMB and OFR Processing April 2025 to June 2025 Publish Final Rule July 2025 5
Other Key Milestones &
Activities
- Continuation of topical public meetings, as needed.
- Continuation of frequent ACRS meetings o Focus of the meetings will be topics ACRS members want to discuss in more detail
- Continuing to publicly release preliminary proposed rule text o In January 2022, the staff will release a section of the preliminary FRN with all of the Part 53 subparts in one document
Coordination with Other Rulemakings
- Emergency Planning for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and Other New Technologies (ONTs)
- Limited Scope Physical Security
- Decommissioning
- Part 50-52 Lessons Learned o Severe Accidents (add to Part 50) o Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) (add to Part 50) o Three Mile Island (TMI) Requirements (add to Part 50) o Fire Protection Requirements (align Parts 50 and 52) o Operating Licensing (revise simulation, walkthrough requirements) o Licensing Processes (eliminate need to renew design certifications (DCs) and standard design approvals (SDAs))
o Environmental (allow reference to DC environmental assessment)
Graded PRA and Possible Licensing Pathways Marty Stutzke Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power and Utilization Facilities Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation December 16, 2021 8
Overview Technology-Inclusive, Risk-Informed Maximum Accident (TIRIMA) Approach Three Possible Licensing Pathways A Change in Direction Identification and Review of PRA Uses in Initial Licensing Graded PRA Initiative 9
Graded PRA Working Group
- In the spring of 2021, a working group was formed to develop viable options to grade (right-size or customize) the PRA developed to support initial license applications (construction permits (CPs), operating licenses (OLs), DCs, SDAs, manufacturing licenses (MLs),
combined licenses (COLs)).
- The staff originally envisioned a three-phase process:
Phase 1 Develop a graded PRA approach Phase 2 Craft guidance Phase 3 Explore alternatives to PRA 10
Spring 2021 Working Definitions Graded PRA approach
- A process that uses bounding, conservative, and/or qualitative assessments to establish a PRAs scope, level of detail, degree of plant representation, and/or level of peer review commensurate with the licensing stage (which dictates the level of detail and finality of the information used to develop the PRA) and how the PRA will be used in risk-informed decision-making.
Graded PRA
- A PRA of appropriate degree of scope, level of detail, plant representation, and technical adequacy to support a specific advanced reactor licensing application.
- Note: Graded should not imply that a design is not yet complete -acceptance of a graded PRA could only be considered if a design is well understood and conservatively modeled.
Dose/consequence-based criterion
- A potential entry condition to enable a graded PRA that uses bounding, conservative, and/or qualitative assessments of the doses or consequences arising from potential unplanned release scenarios, without consideration of the release scenario likelihood.
This approach is being considered as a specific criterion for developing a graded PRA to adequately demonstrate that an applicant meets the intent of the Commissions Severe Accident Policy in an efficient and effective manner.
11
A Change in Direction
- Based on feedback during the Advanced Reactor Stakeholders public meeting held 5/27/2021, the staff learned that industry concerns were largely directed at grading how PRA was used in the licensing process, rather than grading the technical content of the PRA itself.
- There was general recognition from industry that the non-light water reactor (non-LWR) PRA standard already offers opportunities to grade the content of the PRA.
Uses of Technical the PRA Content 12
Grading PRA Technical Content:
Use of Qualifiers
- The non-LWR PRA standard (ASME/ANS RA-S-1.4-2021) uses qualifiers to indicate when certain supporting requirements (SRs) apply.
- Examples:
o For operating plants, o For PRAs performed during the pre-operational stage,
- SRs without qualifiers apply to all life cycle stages.
13
Grading PRA Technical Content:
The Risk Application Process Section 3 of the non-LWR PRA standard (ASME/ANS RA-S-1.4-2021) provides a process to grade the PRA:
- Describes required activities to establish the capability of a PRA to support a particular risk-informed application.
- Designed to be used during all life cycle stages.
Stage A Stage B Stage C Stage D Stage E
- Characterize plant
- Determine if PRA
- Determine if PRA
- Determine if PRA
- Use PRA to life cycle stage scope, level of standard has sufficient support the and PRA detail, and risk requirements are capability to application application metrics are sufficient for support application
- As needed, use
- Define site sufficient to application.
- If not, determine if supplementary characteristics support the
- Determine if deviations are analyses and
- Select PRA scope application insufficient significant to the requirements to and level of detail
- Upgrade PRA as requirements are applicant support the
- Select risk needed relevant to the
- Upgrade the PRA application significance application. as needed criteria
- Determine Capability Staff will provide PRA-related guidance for initial Category needed to for each part of licensing in TICAP and/or ARCAP guidance.
the PRA needed to support the 14 application
Focus on Understanding How and Why PRA is Used
- Since the May 2021 Advanced Reactor Stakeholders public meeting , the staff has further explored the scope of the PRA and how it is used in initial licensing.
- Significant effort has been invested in thoroughly understanding:
o The uses and role of the PRA in the licensing process, o Whether those uses and role could be adequately addressed with other tools/techniques/bounding assessments, and o How that information fits into the overall approach to licensing under Part 50, Part 52, and preliminary Part 53.
Required Uses Expected Uses
- Regulations
- Regulatory guides (RGs)
- Rulemakings
- Commission policy statements
- Commission staff requirement memoranda
- Standard review plans
- IAEA SSR-2/1 15
Why PRA? Post-TMI Recommendations
- ACRS letter* (May 16, 1979) o The ACRS believes that it is time to place the discussion of risk, nuclear and non-nuclear, on as quantitative basis as possible.
- Kemeny Report* (October 30, 1979) Recommendation #4:
o The [Presidential] Commission recommends that continuing in-depth studies should be initiated on the probabilities and consequences (on-site and off-site) of nuclear power plant accidents, including the consequences of meltdown.
- Rogovin Report* (NUREG/CR-1250, January 1980),
Recommendation #8:
o The best way to improve the existing design review process is by relying in a major way upon quantitative risk analyses, and by emphasizing those accident sequences that contribute significantly to risk.
- Available from the Idaho National Laboratory Knowledge Management Library for the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Accident of 1979 at https://tmi2kml.inl.gov/HTML/Page1.html 16
Advanced Reactors and PRA Regulations and Rulemakings Policy Statements 2019: Part 53 rulemaking 2009: Parts 50/52 lessons learned rulemaking; propose to add PRA requirements for CP and OL applications 10/14/2008: Rev. 2 to ARPS; cites SAPS, SGPS, and PRAPS 8/28/2007: Part 52 revised with requirement to submit a description of the PRA and its results 8/16/1995: PRA policy statement (PRAPS) 7/12/1994: Rev. 1 to ARPS; added reference to 4/18/1989: Part 52 issued with requirements metrification policy statement to meet § 50.34(f) and submit PRA 8/21/1986: Safety goal policy statement (SGPS) 7/8/1986: Advanced reactor policy statement (ARPS); cites SAPS and the forthcoming SGPS 8/8/1985: Severe accident policy statement (SAPS);
1/15/1982: TMI requirements added in § 50.34(f); use PRA to search for severe accident vulnerabilities perform PRA to seek improvements in the reliability of core and containment heat removal systems 17
Advanced Reactor Policy Statement (73 FR 60612; October 14, 2008)
- Comment labeled Toshiba-3 (pp. 60613-60614):
o Comment:
- Policy statement makes no mention of the use of PRA.
- Helpful to provide advanced reactor designers with interim guidance regarding NRC efforts for a risk informed, technology neutral licensing framework.
o Response:
- The NRC has established specific requirements related to the use of PRA in licensing new nuclear power plants, such as 10 CFR 52.47 and 10 CFR 50.71(h).
- The Commission has also issued policy statements on:
- Use of PRA in regulatory activities (PRAPS)
- Severe accidents regarding future designs and existing plants (SAPS)
- Page 60616: The Commission also expects that advanced reactor designs will comply with the Commissions SGPS.
18
PRA Policy Statement (60 FR 42622; August 16, 1995)
- The use of PRA technology should be increased in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the art in PRA methods and data and in a manner that complements the NRC's deterministic approach and supports the NRC's traditional defense-in-depth philosophy.
- PRA and associated analyses (e.g., sensitivity studies, uncertainty analyses, and importance measures) should be used in regulatory matters, where practical within the bounds of the state-of-the-art, to reduce unnecessary conservatism associated with current regulatory requirements, regulatory guides, license commitments, and staff practices.
- PRA evaluations in support of regulatory decisions should be as realistic as practicable and appropriate supporting data should be publicly available for review.
- The Commission's safety goals for nuclear power plants and subsidiary numerical objectives are to be used with appropriate consideration of uncertainties in making regulatory judgments on the need for proposing and backfitting new generic requirements on nuclear power plant licensees.
19
Severe Accident Policy Statement (50 FR 32138; August 8, 1985)
- Describes the policy the Commission intends to use to resolve safety issues related to reactor accidents more severe than design basis accidents (DBAs).
o Main focus is on the criteria and procedures the Commission intends to use to certify new designs for nuclear power plants.
o Severe nuclear accidents are those in which substantial damage is done to the reactor core whether or not there are serious offsite consequences.
- Policy for new plant applications:
o Comply with current regulations, including the TMI requirements in 50.34(f) o Demonstrate technical resolution of all applicable Unresolved Safety Issues and the medium- and high priority Generic Safety Issues, including a special focus on assuring the reliability of decay heat removal systems and the reliability of both AC and DC electrical supply systems.
o Complete a PRA and consider the severe accident vulnerabilities the PRA exposes along with the insights that it may add to the assurance of no undue risk to public health and safety.
o Complete a staff review of the design with a conclusion of safety acceptability using an approach that stresses deterministic engineering analysis and judgment complemented by PRA.
20
Safety Goal Policy Statement (51 FR 28044; August 4, 1986 as corrected and republished at 51 FR 30028; August 21, 1986)
- Qualitative goals o Individual members of the public should be provided a level of protection from the consequences of nuclear power plant operation such that individuals bear no significant additional risk to life and health.
o Societal risks to life and health from nuclear power plant operation should be comparable to or less than the risks of generating electricity by viable competing technologies and should not be a significant addition to other societal risks.
- Quantitative objectives o The risk to an average individual in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant [one mile] of prompt fatalities that might result from reactor accidents should not exceed one-tenth of one percent (0.1 percent) of the sum of prompt fatality risks resulting from other accidents to which members of the U.S. population are generally exposed.
o The risk to the population in the area near a nuclear power plant [10 miles] of cancer fatalities that might result from nuclear power plant operation should not exceed one-tenth of one percent (0.1 percent) of the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from all other causes.
- Proposed general performance guideline (large release frequency - LRF):
o Consistent with the traditional defense-in depth approach and the accident mitigation philosophy requiring reliable performance of containment systems, the overall mean frequency of a large release of radioactive materials to the environment from a reactor accident should be less than 1 in 1,000,000 per year of reactor operation.
21
Large LWR Risk Surrogates
- NUREG-0880, Rev. 1, May 1983 (ML071770230),
provides numerical interpretation of the quantitative health objectives (QHOs):
o Individual early fatality risk (IEFR) 5E-7/ry o Individual latent cancer fatality risk (ILCFR) 2E-6/ry
- NUREG-1860, Vol. 2, December 2007 (ML080440215),
derives surrogate risk metrics for large light water reactors (LWRs):
o IEFR: Large early release frequency (LERF) 1E-5/ry o ILCFR: Core-damage frequency (CDF) 1E-4/ry The non-LWR PRA standard (ASME/ANS RA-S-1.4-2021) does not use risk surrogates such as CDF, LRF, or LERF!!!
22
Large Release Frequency
- SRM-SECY-89-144, June 5, 1990, ML051660712:
o Within a particular design class (e.g., LWRs, LMRs, HTGRs) the same subsidiary objectives [risk surrogates] should apply to both current as well as future designsHowever, the Large Release Guideline relates to all current as well as future designs.
o The Commission believes that "adequate protection" is a case by case finding based on evaluating a plant and site combination and considering the body of our regulations.
- According to Forrest Remick (former Director of the Office of Policy Evaluation, ACRS member, and Commissioner), LRF was proposed to break a deadlock between the ACRS and the staff over the use of CDF and conditional containment failure probability (CCFP) as safety goals (see ML051660709):
o Staff wanted to only include CDF; ACRS wanted to also include CCFP.
o Dr. Remick received a call from the Executive Assistant to the then Commission Chairman [Palladino]. [H]e asked me what I thought of getting out of the deadlock by eliminating both the CDF and the idea of a CCFP by substituting a Large Release Guideline of 10-6 per reactor year as a surrogate. In response, I laid out the following steps: if one assumes a CDF of 10-4, a conditional probability of "core on the floor" of 10-1 (a probability still not accurately known), and a CCFP of 10-1 (which was bandied about at the time), then a Large Release Guideline of 10-6 per reactor year appeared to be a reasonable surrogate.
- SRM-SECY-12-0081, October 22, 2012, ML12296A158: The Commission has approved the staffs recommendation (Option 2C) to transition from large release frequency to large early release frequency (LERF) at or before initial fuel load and discontinue regulatory use of large release frequency (LRF) and conditional containment failure probability thereafter.
- SECY-13-0029, March 22, 2013, ML13022A207:
o The Commission acknowledged that analyses indicated that the cancer fatality QHO was not the more controlling objective and that, if the prompt fatality QHO is met, the cancer fatality risk generally would be much lower than the cancer fatality QHO.
o Recognizing that the prompt fatality QHO is more controlling, the staff worked to develop a large release definition that focused on LRF being a surrogate for the prompt fatality QHO.
o In 1993, the staff concluded that defining large release beyond a simple qualitative statement related to its 106 per reactor year release frequency (such as is currently contained in the safety goal policy statement) was neither practical nor required for regulatory or design purposes.
23
- The concept of LERF was originally developed by the Electric Power Research Institute, PSA Applications Guide, TR-105396, August 1, 1995.
o Use qualitative characteristics to identify large early release sequences o Avoids the need to perform source term and radiological consequence calculations
- Adopted by the NRC when RG 1.174, An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, was developed in the late-1990s.
- Current definition provided in RG 1.200, Acceptability of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities, Rev. 3, December 2020:
o Large early release frequency (LERF) is defined as the sum of the frequencies of those accidents leading to rapid, unmitigated release of airborne fission products from the containment to the environment occurring before the effective implementation of offsite emergency response and protective actions such that there is the potential for early health effects. (Such accidents generally include unscrubbed releases associated with early containment failure shortly after vessel breach, containment bypass events, and loss of containment isolation.)
24
Risk-Informed Regulation Definitions (1 of 2)
- Risk triplet (Kaplan and Garrick*, SRM-SECY-98-144**):
o What can go wrong?
o How likely is it? , ,
o What are the consequences?
- Risk assessment (SRM-SECY-98-144): A systematic method for addressing the risk triplet as it relates to the performance of a particular system (which may include a human component) to understand likely outcomes, sensitivities, areas of importance, system interactions and areas of uncertainty.
- Risk insights (SRM-SECY-98-144): The results and findings that come from risk assessments.
- Risk-informed approach (SRM-SECY-98-144): A philosophy whereby risk insights are considered together with other factors to establish requirements that better focus licensee and regulatory attention on design and operational issues commensurate with their importance to public health and safety.
- Kaplan, S. and Garrick, B. J., On the Quantitative Definition of Risk, Risk Analysis, Vol. 1, Issue 1, March 1981.
- NRC, Staff Requirements - SECY-98-144 - White Paper on Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Regulation, February 24, 1998, ML003752593.
25
Risk-Informed Regulation Definitions (2 of 2)
- PRA o NRC online glossary*: A systematic method for assessing three questions that the NRC uses to define "risk." These questions consider (1) what can go wrong, (2) how likely it is, and (3) what its consequences might be. These questions allow the NRC to understand likely outcomes, sensitivities, areas of importance, system interactions, and areas of uncertainty, which the staff can use to identify risk-significant scenarios. The NRC uses PRA to determine a numeric estimate of risk to provide insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the design and operation of a nuclear power plant.
o RG 1.200**: An approach is considered to be a PRA when it (1) provides a quantitative assessment of the identified risk in terms of scenarios that result in undesired consequences (e.g., core damage or a large early release) and their frequencies and (2) comprises specific technical elements in performing the quantification.
o Draft RG 1.247: A risk assessment approach is considered to be a PRA when it (1) provides a quantitative assessment of the identified risk in terms of scenarios that result in undesired consequences (e.g., releases of radioactive material, radiological consequences) and their frequencies and (2) comprises specific PRA elements for quantifying risk.
- NRC, Acceptability of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities, RG 1.200, Rev. 3, December 2020, ML20238B871.
NRC, Acceptability of Probabilistic risk Assessment Results for Advanced Non-Light Water Reactor Risk-Informed Activities, draft trial use RG 1.247, September 3, 2021, ML21246A216. 26
Role of the PRA in Initial Licensing
- Searching for severe accident vulnerabilities (SAPS)
- TMI requirement § 50.34(f)(1)(i), which under Part 52 requires LWR applicants to Perform a plant/site specific probabilistic risk assessment, the aim of which is to seek such improvements in the reliability of core and containment heat removal systems as are significant and practical and do not impact excessively on the plant.
- Demonstrating that the QHOs are met (SGPS)
- Enhanced role o Any use of PRA beyond its traditional role o Includes, but not limited to:
- Certain proposed required uses of PRA in preliminary 10 CFR Part 53 rule text (e.g.,
identifying licensing basis events (LBEs); classifying systems, structures, and components (SSCs); evaluating defense-in-depth (DID))
- Voluntary risk-informed applications (e.g., risk-managed technical specifications (TS), risk-informed fire protection) o Previously referred to as PRA in a leading role 27
28 PRA Requirements for Part 50 CP and OL Applicants
- SRM-SECY-15-0002, ML15266A023: The Commission has approved the staffs recommendation to confirm that the Commissions guidance given in the "Policy Statement on Severe Reactor Accidents Regarding Future Designs and Existing Plants" and other Commission direction identified by staff apply to new 10 CFR Part 50 power reactor applications in a manner consistent with 10 CFR Part 52 design and license applications.
- The Part 50/52 lessons learned rulemaking (NRC-2009-0196; RIN 3150-AI66) proposes to add PRA-related requirements for CP applicants, OL applicants, and OL holders like the PRA-related requirements for Part 52 applicants and COL holders.
29
PRA Requirements for Part 52 Applicants
o § 52.79(c)(1) requires COL applicants that reference an SDA to use and update the PRA information for the SDA to account for site-specific design information and any design changes or departures.
o § 52.79(d)(1) requires COL applicants that reference a DC to use and update the PRA information for the standard DC to account for site-specific design information and any design changes or departures.
o § 52.79(e)(1) requires that COL applicants that reference an ML to use and update the PRA information for the ML to account for site-specific design information and any design changes or departures.
30
PRA Requirements for Part 52 COL Holders
- § 50.71(h)(1) requires that:
o Each COL holder shall develop a Level 1 and a Level 2 PRA, and o The PRA must cover those initiating events and modes for which NRC-endorsed consensus standards on PRA exist 1 year before the scheduled date for initial loading of fuel.
- § 50.71(h)(2) requires that:
o Each COL holder shall maintain and upgrade the PRA o The upgraded PRA must cover initiating events and modes of operation contained in NRC-endorsed consensus standards on PRA in effect 1 year before each required upgrade, and o The PRA must be upgraded every 4 years until the permanent cessation of operations under 10 CFR 52.110(a).
- § 50.71(h)(3) requires that each COL holder shall, no later than the date on which the licensee submits an application for a renewed license, upgrade the PRA required by 10 CFR 50.71(h)(1) to cover all modes and all initiating events.
31
Subpart C-Design and Analysis Requirements
§ 53.450 Analysis Requirements (3rd iteration preliminary rule text)
(a) Requirement to have a probabilistic risk assessment. A probabilistic risk Traditional use assessment (PRA) of each commercial of the PRA nuclear plant must be performed to identify potential failures, susceptibility to internal Severe accident and external hazards, and other contributing policy statement factors to event sequences that might challenge the safety functions identified in 53.230 and to support demonstrating that Safety goal policy each commercial nuclear plant meets the statement safety criteria of 53.220.
32
Subpart C-Design and Analysis Requirements
§ 53.450 Analysis Requirements (3rd iteration preliminary rule text)
(b) Specific uses of analyses. The PRA, other generally accepted risk-informed approach for systematically evaluating engineered systems, or combination thereof must be used:
(1) In determining the licensing basis events, as described in 53.240, which must be considered in the design to determine compliance with the safety Enhanced criteria in Subpart B of this part.
use of the (2) For classifying SSCs and human actions according to their safety significance in accordance with 53.460 and for identifying the PRA environmental conditions under which the SSCs and operating staff must perform their safety functions.
(3) In evaluating the adequacy of defense-in-depth measures required in accordance with 53.250.
(4) To identify and assess all plant operating states where there is the PRA potential for the uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the scope environment.
- All sources (5) To identify and assess events that challenge plant control and safety
- All hazards systems whose failure could lead to the uncontrolled release of
- All modes radioactive material to the environment. These include internal events, such as human errors and equipment failures, and external events, such as earthquakes, identified in accordance with Subpart D of this part.
33
Uses of the PRA 34
Observations
- A risk-informed approach may be based on risk insights developed from:
o A PRA (i.e., quantitative), or o A qualitative risk assessment
- PRA not used to support non-power production and utilization facility licensing:
o Not addressed in NUREG-1537, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors o Discussion with NRR/DANU staff
- Integrated safety analysis is required by 10 CFR Part 70 for certain licensees:
o Risk-informed process, but does not require development of a PRA
- The current preliminary rule text for Part 53:
o Builds on the traditional role of the PRA o Adds requirements that use PRA in an enhanced role Three potential licensing pathways
- Enhanced PRA approach
- Traditional PRA approach
- TIRIMA approach 35
Three Licensing Pathways 36
Development of How-To Guidance for the TIRIMA Approach (1 of 2)
- The staff intends to develop guidance for:
o Box A: Comprehensive search for initiating events o Box B: Comprehensive definition of event sequences o Box C: Decision guidance and entry conditions o Box D: Licensing basis event selection o Box E: Licensing basis event consequence analysis o Box F: Maximum accident identification o Box G: Conservative risk estimation
- Leverage existing guidance and studies such as, but not limited to:
o NUREG-1513, Integrated Safety Analysis Guidance Document o NUREG-1520, Standard Review Plan for Fuel Cycle Facilities License Applications o NUREG-1537, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors o Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations (29 CFR 1910.119),
standards, handbooks, and guidance o EPRI TR 3002011801, Program on Technology Innovation: Early Integration of Safety Assessment into Advanced Reactor Design - Preliminary Body of Knowledge and Methodology 37
Development of How-To Guidance for the TIRIMA Approach (2 of 2)
- Initial thoughts:
o Start with a blank sheet of paper o Use a combination of inductive and deductive methods o How much searching is enough? How do you know when you are finished?
o Focus on how plant design actually works vs. how plant design is supposed to work o Consolidate/group similar items o Be (very) careful when screening
- Process:
o Multi-disciplinary team effort o Independent review o Documentation
- Tell the story
- Capture assumptions and decisions 38
Initiating Event and Scenario Search (Mitigation Scenarios vs. Prevention Scenarios; MCA or MHA)
Step 1 Initiating Event Identification Step 1A Inductive Methods Quality Control Well-Established (AOO, DBA, BDBA, DBE, BDBE)
Methods Scenario Analysis HAZOP Categorization FMEA Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 1B Verification Candidate Initiating Deductive Methods Operating Initiating Event Well-Established Experience Events Grouping Methods Analysis MLD FTA Step 1C Design/
Human-Induced Events Configuration Control Well-Established Method HRA 39
Initiating Events Analysis Preliminary Table of Contents
- 1. Introduction 4. Completeness of Initiating Event Lists 1.1 Background 4.1 Operating Experience Analysis 1.2 Purpose 4.2 Review of Generic Initiating Event Lists 1.3 Scope 4.3 Discussions with Knowledgeable
- 2. Acceptable Approach for Searching Design Personnel for Initiating Events 5. Interfacing with Configuration Management,
- 3. Identification of Initiating Events Quality Assurance, and Control Processes 3.1 Internal Hazards 5.1 Analysis Team Composition 3.2 External Hazards and Qualification 3.3 Concurrent Hazards 5.2 Independent Review 3.4 Definition of Initiating Events 5.3 Documentation 3.5 Categories of Initiating Events 6. Grouping of Initiating Events 3.5.1 Internal Plant Caused Initiators 6.1 Principle for Grouping 3.5.2 External Plant Caused Initiators 7. Determination of Initiating Event Frequencies 3.5.3 Human-Caused Initiators 7.1 Approaches to Quantification 3.5.4 Special Common-Cause Initiators 3.6 Methodology for Identifying Initiating Events 3.6.1 Systematic Approach 3.6.1.1 Inductive Methodologies 3.6.1.2 Deductive Methodologies 3.6.2 Human Reliability Analysis 40
Path Forward
- Revise preliminary rule text developed for the deterministic option to allow use of the TIRIMA approach
- Develop guidance to implement the TIRIMA approach:
- Leverage existing guidance to the extent possible
- Outline of guidance to conduct the systematic and comprehensive search for initiators (Box A) has been developed
- Developing outline of the entire guidance document
- Challenging technical issues:
- Technology-inclusive definition of severe accident
- Providing guidance to help applicants decide up-front if TIRIMA is a viable licensing pathway (TIRIMA entry conditions - Box C)
- Using TIRIMA to support SAMDA analysis 41
TIRIMA Approach Discussion 42
MEETING BREAK Meeting to resume in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 43
Subpart F - Requirements for Operation 44
Subpart F - Requirements for Operation
- Operational objectives
- Transition from construction/manufacturing to operation
- Maintaining capabilities and availability of SSCs
- Maintenance, repair, and inspection programs
- Design control
- Staffing, training, personnel qualifications, human factors requirements
- Programs 45
Subpart F - Programs
- Radiation protection
- Security programs
- Quality assurance
- Integrity assessment programs
- Fire protection
- Inservice inspection/inservice testing (ISI/IST)
- Criticality safety program
- Facility safety program (FSP) 46
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Overview of Topics for Discussion
- Shift Technical Advisor (STA) Position
- Load Following
- Certified Operators versus Licensed Operators
- Simulator Scope
- Training Program Review Guidance 47
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Shift Technical Advisor Position - Background
§ 53.753(f) requires a staffing plan describing numbers, positions, and qualifications of licensed operators and senior licensed operators, or certified operators, across all modes
- Must describe personnel providing support in plant operations, equipment surveillance and maintenance, radiological protection, chemistry control, fire brigades, engineering, security, and emergency response.
- Must also describe how the proposed licensed operator staffing, for plants requiring licensed operators, will be sufficient to assure that plant safety functions can be maintained; this must be supported by human factors engineering (HFE) analyses and assessments.
o Guidance for evaluating these staffing plans is being developed by the staff in the form of interim staff guidance (ISG) to be used in conjunction with NUREG-1791 48
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Shift Technical Advisor Position
- Staff have considered various approaches to the STA role under Part 53 and several alternatives will be discussed here
- Staff are receptive to feedback on different approaches as further iterations of preliminary rule language are developed
- In developing preliminary Part 53 requirements, the staff considered that the 1985 Policy Statement on engineering expertise on shift (50 FR 43621) stated that the STA was an interim measure until goals that included upgrading human-system interfaces (HSIs) and operator training were achieved o Current perspective is that the upgrades to HSIs and operator training envisioned within this Policy Statement will be the norm under Part 53 and driven by regulatory requirements
- Staff recognize that this represents a policy issue and intend to use the Part 53 rulemaking process for Commission engagement 49
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Shift Technical Advisor Position (contd)
Generic Part 53 elimination of STA could be justified on following bases:
- Licensed operator training requirements on knowledge and abilities to maintain plant safety functions; review criteria would confirm testing of reactor theory, thermodynamics, systems, and emergency operations
- State-of-the-art HFE required in all settings where operators are fulfilling plant safety functions; design requirements for HSIs requiring operators be provided with information on safety parameters, safety system status, important component status, and core damage states
- HFE-based analyses and assessments required to demonstrate how licensed operator staffing levels will maintain safety functions and support full range of tasks needed for safety (irrespective of an STA)
- Part 53 codifies DID principles under § 53.250 and requires (in part) DID use compensates for uncertainties in state of knowledge and modeling capabilities, and for personnel reliability and performance 50
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Shift Technical Advisor Position (contd)
Staff have also considered alternative of codification of an STA staffing requirement, with provision for justifying case-by-case position omission:
- In such an approach, the following definition would be provided in § 53.750(b):
Shift technical advisor means an individual possessing at least a baccalaureate in physical science, engineering, or engineering technology (or, alternately, a Professional Engineering license) and whose function is to provide independent on-shift engineering expertise, accident assessment, and technical advice to licensed operators at nuclear power plants.
- The staffing plan requirements of § 53.753(f) would be modified to include the following additional requirement for plants requiring licensed operator staffing:
A description of how the shift technical advisor position, as defined by § 53.750(b),
will be implemented during all plant conditions other than cold shutdown or refueling while shutdown or, alternatively, shall provide a justification for omission of the Shift Technical Advisor position that is supported by relevant human factors engineering-based analyses and assessments.
51
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Shift Technical Advisor Position (contd)
- Another alternative considered by staff would require that proposed staffing plans for facilities with licensed operators account for how on-shift engineering expertise will be provided o Such an approach would likely be accomplished by modifying the requirements of § 53.753(f) such that facilities requiring licensed operators would need to describe (in part) within staffing plans:
- how the numbers and positions of licensed operators provide assurance that plant safety functions can be maintained, and
- how on-shift engineering expertise will be provided for the on-shift crew
- Overall, the staff perspective currently remains that any STA position requirement would only apply to plants that require licensed operators 52
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Load Following - Background
§ 53.755, Conditions for Operations Staffing for Operating or Combined Licenses under this Part
- § 53.755(c) restricts control manipulations to licensed or certified operators.
- § 53.755(e) requires that operations (other than control manipulations) affecting reactor power level only occur while plant conditions are being monitored by a licensed or certified operator.
o However, load-following is permitted if one of the following can immediately refuse demands from the grid operator when they could challenge safe operation or if precluded by equipment conditions:
the actuation of an automatic protection system, an automated control system; or a licensed or certified operator.
53
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Load Following (contd)
- Current intent is to supplement rule with guidance (e.g., ARCAP ISG)
- While preliminary, the following illustrates general staff perspectives:
o Load following should be restricted to power levels where automation supports needed plant operations in order to avoid transients (e.g., if one feedwater train must be secured as part of reducing power <50% and automation cannot accomplish this, then 50% becomes the bottom of the load following envelope) o If the actuation of an automatic protection system will be relied upon to truncate/terminate load following, then any such protective actions should not be the same as those credited for core protection and should use more restrictive setpoints than those credited for safety purposes (avoids challenging limits) o Crediting operators requires an immediate capacity to take control o No restriction envisioned on facility types if an adequate design is demonstrated; usage of certified operators could be acceptable 54
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Certified Operators - Background
- § 53.755(a) requires facility licensees to have licensed operators unless they can meet criteria of § 53.755(b) to use certified operators
- § 53.755(b) contains the requirements that must be met in order to justify not using any licensed operators as a part of facility staffing o Two current proposals for criteria o The first proposal would require the following:
No human actions for event mitigation required to meet safety criteria, achieve safety functions, or provide DID PRA demonstrating the evaluation criteria for each event sequence can be met without human action for mitigation; LBE response not needing human action for SSCs to perform o The second proposal would require the design-basis accident safety criteria to be met without mitigation by human actions, active engineered features, or passive design features (except for only those passive features that can survive LBEs and not be defeated by credible human errors) 55
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Certified Operators - Background (contd)
- § 53.755(i) contains specific requirements for plants using certified operators o Certified operator are responsible for specified administrative functions.
o Certified operator staffing must always ensure continuity of responsibility for facility operations during the operating phase.
o Continuous monitoring of fueled units with the following capabilities:
- receiving plant operating data and parameters
- ability to immediately initiate a reactor shutdown
- ability to promptly dispatch ops/maintenance personnel
- the ability to implement any emergency plan responsibilities
- conducting reactivity manipulations that require human action 56
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Certified Operators - Background (contd)
- § 53.774, Issuance of Certificates (for Certified Operators) o Requires that facility licensees ensure that individuals to be certified:
complete either a high school diploma or GED complete the approved initial training program pass an initial operator certification examination demonstrate competence in conducting control manipulations meet medical condition requirements 57
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Certified Operators - Background (contd)
- § 53.775, Conditions of Certificates (for Certified Operators) o Requires facility licensees to ensure that certified operators:
only perform duties at facilities for which they are certified complete a continuing training program pass periodic continuing training examinations Complete biennial medical examinations maintain proficiency in accordance with the facility program 58
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Purpose of Certified Operator Alternative
- If a facility lacks an operator role in safety (e.g., an autonomous reactor design), then a key driver warranting federal licensing of individuals is removed (i.e., operator performance would not have a credible influence on public health and safety outcomes within that context) o Regardless of whether the operators were licensed, the facility itself would still be licensed by the NRC
- Important administrative job tasks that would remain still need to be accomplished by adequately qualified personnel.
o Precedent shows that similar administrative tasks have been fulfilled by non-licensed personnel, such as Certified Fuel Handlers 59
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Purpose of Certified Operator Alternative (contd)
- Staff are endeavoring to create a durable rule; part of this is accounting for the possibility of future advancements in safety
- While the framework for certified operators parallels that for licensed operators, there is less regulatory interface and more flexibilities; this brings with it the potential for cost savings on the part of the industry o Current industry burden estimates for staff fee-billable hours suggest such differences may reduce costs 60
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Certified Operators versus Licensed Operators Comparison of licensed and certified operator program components:
Program Component Licensed Operator Certified Operator NRC approval of training & Yes Yes exam programs required?
NRC approval of exams Yes No prior to administration?
NRC approval of operator Yes No applications & medical?
NRC approval of simulators Yes No for use in training & exams?
Required submittal of Yes No renewals & terminations?
NRC approval of Yes No examination waivers?
Flexibility for requalification No Yes training & exam periodicity?
61
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Certified Operators versus Licensed Operators (contd)
- Certified operators would be trained to conduct reactivity manipulations as part of their initial training program
- Due to the non-licensed nature of certified operators, the facility licensee retains ultimate accountability for operations o In contrast, licensed operators are individually accountable o Certified operators have a reduced operator safety role due to facility safety characteristics
- § 53.753(e) requires an operating experience program; staff envision guidance for licensed and certified operator training programs will include the incorporation of operating experience
- There are no known industry initiatives for maintaining Part 53 programs consistent within facility classes; staff are working to ensure compliance with Atomic Energy Act (AEA) requirements
- If a facility licensed with certified operators was determined to later need licensed operators (e.g., the § 53.755(b) criteria were no longer met), a safety issue may exist; NRC would have authority to modify the facilitys license as necessary 62
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Simulator Scope - Background
- § 53.765(e) establishes simulation facility requirements for plants with licensed operators and § 53.773(e) establishes less stringent simulation facility requirements for plants with certified operators o Full-scope simulators are not mandated; partial scope simulators may be acceptable, provided that the scope is adequate to meet intended usage; alternatives to simulators are possible as well o Simulation facilities for plants with licensed operators must be approved by the Commission if the facility licensee will rely upon them for training, experience requirements, or for initial or requalification examinations
- Equivalent approval not required for certified operator facilities o Must demonstrate that adequate simulator scope is provided to support HFE analyses/assessments in order to use a simulation facility for conducting these analyses/assessments 63
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Simulator Scope
- In developing preliminary rule language, staff reviewed Section 306 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) and 52 FR 9453 which discussed implementation of the Acts simulator-related provisions:
o Flexibilities were historically provided to allow for potential use of the plant itself, and/or a plant-referenced simulator, and/or some other type of simulation device (such as a part-task or basic-principles simulator) for the conduct of the simulator portion of the operating test o The NRCs stated intent was not to permit the initiation of transients on the plant itself if used as a simulation facility; rather, the use of the plant was envisioned as an option that might be used in conjunction with another simulation device or devices, in lieu of a plant-referenced simulator
- Current perspective is that NWPA does not mandate NRC to require that plants have simulators, but instead requires regulations address the use of simulations in training; flexibility exists to allow the use of the actual plant to simulate tasks for training and operating test purposes without having a separate simulation facility (e.g., simulator) 64
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Simulator Scope (contd)
- Philosophical basis behind preliminary rule language is:
o Plant-referenced, full-scope simulators remain the preferred approach and would represent the best route for meeting Part 53 requirements
- Staff expect majority of Part 53 applicants will have them due to regulatory certainty and technology lowering the associated costs o Existing regulations do not strictly mandate plant-referenced, full-scope simulators either, but still adopted by all current power reactors o Part 53 rule language leaves alternatives to simulator usage (full-scope or otherwise), but the burden will be on the applicant to demonstrate how the following are supported:
- Licensed or certified operator training and exams; simulators used require sufficient scope and fidelity for operators to acquire and demonstrate knowledge and abilities needed for job duties.
- Experience requirements (i.e., reactivity manipulations)
- HFE analyses/assessments and HSI design testbed needs 65
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Training Program Review Guidance - Background
- § 53.765(a) requires initial licensed operator training programs to:
o Be based upon a systems approach to training (SAT) o Ensure that license applicants at the facility will possess the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to:
- protect the public health, and
- maintain design-specific plant safety functions o Be approved by the Commission prior to use
- § 53.765(c) requires facilities to establish requalification training programs for licensed operators. These programs must:
o Be based on SAT o Ensure that reactor operators and senior reactor operators maintain knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to protect the public health and maintain those plant safety functions specific to the facility design.
o Be conducted for continuous period not to exceed 24 months.
o Be approved by the Commission.
66
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Training Program Review Guidance (contd)
- § 53.773(a) requires initial operator certification training programs to:
o Be based upon SAT o Ensure that certified operator trainees will possess the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to protect the public health o Be approved by the Commission prior to use
- § 53.773(c), requires continuing training programs for certified operators to:
o Be based upon SAT o Ensure that certified operators maintain the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to protect the public health o Be approved by the Commission prior to use
- §§ 53.780-781 addresses training requirements for other plant personnel o § 53.781, Training and Qualification Requirements Requires use of SAT Requires the training and qualification of supervisors, technicians, and other appropriate operating personnel to be provided for 67
Subpart F - Staffing, Training, Personnel Qualifications, and Human Factors Requirements Training Program Review Guidance (contd)
- Applicants might forgo training program accreditation, requiring:
o Staff to determine acceptability of proposed training programs o Staff assessment of ongoing conformance of facility licensee training programs with applicable regulatory requirements; o Staff inspections of other training programs required by § 53.781
- Staff will require guidance to support determinations regarding whether SAT is adequately applied; existing guidance (e.g., NUREG-1220) is dated o Working group established to develop this guidance for both initial and continuing training with objective to have an ISG developed no later than 2024 to support Part 53 rulemaking
- Effort underway to accelerate development to support near-term applicants applying under Parts 50/52 if needed 68
Subpart F - Requirements for Operation Discussion 69
Final Discussion and Questions 70
December 17th Agenda 9:30am - 9:35am Opening Remarks 9:35am - 11:30am Update on TICAP/ARCAP Guidance Document Developments 11:30am - 11:45am Break 11:45am - 1:00pm U.S. Nuclear Energy Institute / U.S. NIC Presentation: Letter of November 5, 2021 and Attachments 1:00pm - 2:00pm Lunch Break 2:00pm - 3:50pm U.S. Nuclear Energy Institute / U.S. NIC Presentation (continued) 3:50pm - 4:30pm Discussion 71
Advanced Reactors Overview of ARCAP Roadmap ISG and TICAP DG White Papers
Purpose
- Provide the ACRS Future Plant Designs Subcommittee an update on the Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project (ARCAP) and Technology Inclusive Content of Application Project (TICAP) guidance document developments since the last Subcommittee briefing in July of 2021
- Highlight some of the key draft white paper guidance with particular attention to portions of the guidance that maybe of interest to the ACRS
- Key documents associated with this presentation are available on NRCs Advanced Reactor ARCAP/TICAP public webpage (see:
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/advanced/details.html#advRxContentAppProj) 73
ARCAP/TICAP
Background
- Previous ACRS Subcommittee briefings provided:
March 17, 2021, and July 21, 2021
- ARCAP/TICAP o Purpose is to develop technology-inclusive, risk-informed and performance-based application guidance o Developed to support 10 CFR Part 50, Part 52, and Part 53 applications Near-term need to develop guidance to support expected advanced reactor Part 50/52 applications using the licensing modernization project (LMP) process LMP process endorsed in RG 1.233, Guidance for a Technology-Inclusive, Risk-Informed, and performance-based Methodology to Inform the Licensing Basis and Content of Applications for Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Non-Light-Water Reactors ARCAP/TICAP guidance will be revised as Part 53 proposed rule language is adjusted 74
ARCAP/TICAP
Background
- TICAP guidance o LMP process is used to define guidance for the content of major portions of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR)
LMP process uses risk-informed, performance-based approach to select LBEs, develop SSC categorization, identify special treatments for SSCs, and ensure DID adequacy o Industry developing key portions of TICAP guidance for NRC endorsement o Industry TICAP guidance will be supplemented by NRC staff-developed guidance as necessary
- ARCAP guidance o Broader in nature than TICAP and intended to cover guidance for SMR and non-LWR applications for a COL, CP, OL, DC, SDA, or ML.
o Encompasses TICAP guidance and provides supplemental and additional guidance for SAR and application requirements beyond the SAR.
75
ARCAP and TICAP - Nexus Outline SAR - Based on TICAP Guidance Additional Portions of Application
- 1. General Plant Information, Site
- Technical Specifications Description, and Overview of the Safety
- Technical Requirements Manual Case
- Quality Assurance Plan (design)
- 2. Methodologies and Analyses
- Fire Protection Program (design)
- 3. LBE Analysis
- Quality Assurance Plan
- 4. Integrated Evaluations (construction and operations)
- 5. Safety Functions, Design Criteria, and
- Emergency Plan SSC Safety Classification
- Physical Security Plan Audit/inspection of Applicant Records
- 6. Safety-Related (SR) SSC Criteria and
- Calculations Capabilities physical protection program
- Analyses
- 7. Non-safety-related with special treatment
- SNM material control and
- System Descriptions
- 8. Plant Programs
- Design Drawings
- Cyber Security Plan
- Design Specs
- Fire Protection Program Additional SAR Content -Outside the Scope
- Procurement Specs (operational) of TICAP
- Radiation Protection Program
- 9. Control of Routine Plant Radioactive
- Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Effluents, Plant Contamination, and Solid
- Inservice inspection/Inservice Waste testing (ISI/IST) Program
- 10. Control of Occupational Doses
- Environmental Report
- 11. Organization and Human-System
- Site Redress Plan Considerations
- Exemptions, Departures, and
- 12. Post-construction Inspection, Testing and Variances Analysis Programs
- FSP (under consideration for Part 53 applications)
- SAR structure based on clean sheet approach
- Additional contents of application outside of SAR are still under discussion. The above list is draft and for illustration purposes only. 76
ARCAP/TICAP
Background
Review of Risk-Informed, Technology-Inclusive Dec 2, 2021 ML21336A702 Advanced Reactor Applications - Roadmap Chapter 2, Site Information July 6, 2021 ML21189A031 Chapter 9, Control of Routine Plant Radioactive July 6, 2021 ML21189A033 Effluents, Plant Contamination and Solid Waste Chapter 10, Control of Occupational Doses July 6, 2021 ML21189A035 Chapter 11, Organization and Human-System Nov 5, 2021 ML21309A020 Consideration Chapter 12, Post Construction Inspection, Testing and Oct 21, 2021 ML21294A266 Analysis Program Licensing Modernization Project-based Approach for May 10, 2021 ML21133A490 Developing Technical Specifications Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Sept 10, 2021 ML21253A134 Program (for Operations)
Risk-Informed ISI/IST Programs Aug 4, 2021 ML21216A051 77
ARCAP/TICAP
Background
- Status of TICAP Guidance Documents TICAP Title Date Accession No.
NEI 21-07, Revision 0, Technology Inclusive Aug 30, 2021 ML21250A378 Guidance for Non-Light Water Reactors Safety Analysis Report Content for Applicants Utilizing NEI 18-04 Methodology RG Draft White Paper, Guidance for a Technology- Dec 2, 2021 ML21336A697 Inclusive Content of Application Methodology to Inform the Licensing Basis and Content of Applications for Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Advanced Reactors
- TICAP guidance documents being revised based on continuing interactions with stakeholders
- December 14, 2021, public workshop
- During this meeting, NEI 21-07, Revision 0-B was discussed (ADAMS Accession No. ML21343A292)
- Planning for another public workshop in mid-January 2022 78
Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project - Overview 79
ARCAP - High Level Overview
- ARCAP Roadmap ISG
- Proposes a 12-chapter SAR guidance structure
- Guidance for first 8 SAR chapters references the TICAP guidance
- Includes pointers to draft white papers, guidance under development or to be developed for portions of the application outside the SAR
- Examples of guidance that the staff has developed: TS, Risk Informed ISI/IST, and Fire Protection for Operations
- Examples of high-level guidance embedded in the Roadmap ISG:
Technical Requirements Manual, Quality Assurance Plan, Fire Protection (design), and Offsite Dose Calculation Model
- Examples of guidance being considered: security, emergency planning, material control and accountability, financial qualification and cyber security 80
ARCAP - High Level Overview
- ARCAP Roadmap ISG (continued)
- Includes several appendices:
- Appendix C on preapplication engagement guidance
- Based on white paper discussed extensively during advanced reactor public stakeholder meetings
- Purpose of Appendix C is to capture the white paper guidance in a durable product that will have the benefit of a formal public comment period
- Appendix D on Analysis of Applicability of NRC Regulations to non-LWRs (plan to include later)
- Based on white paper discussed extensively during advanced reactor public stakeholder meetings (ADAMS Accession No. ML21175A287)
- Purpose of Appendix D is to capture the white paper guidance in a durable product that will have the benefit of a formal public comment period 81
ARCAP - High Level Overview
- ARCAP Roadmap ISG (continued)
- Includes several appendices (continued):
- Appendix E on CP guidance
- Three parts to draft CP guidance
- Common portion applicable to both LWRs and non-LWRs
- Portion applicable to LMP based approach - point to TICAP CP guidance
- Portion applicable to CP guidance outside the scope of TICAP 82
ARCAP - High Level Overview
- ARCAP Chapter 2: Site Information
- Supplements information in the SAR that is outside the scope of LMP.
- Intent is to limit the amount of material in SAR Chapter 2 to what is necessary for establishing safety significant design parameters and for performing the safety analysis, along with its supporting bases.
- If necessary, additional supporting information (e.g., historical records, geological data, etc.) could be documented in a separate report available for audit.
- Section 2.6 includes a process for establishing the ground motion response spectrum using the Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee guidance
- ARCAP Chapters 9 and 10: Normal Effluents and Occupational Dose
- Applies a performance-based approach for level of detail of information provided in the SAR 83
ARCAP - High Level Overview
- ARCAP Chapter 11: Organization and Human-System Consideration
- Developed to support near-term Part 50 and 52 applications with a more traditional concept of operations
- Guidance will be updated later to include concepts discussed as part of the Part 53 proposed rulemaking effort
- Human Factors Engineering
- NRC staff identified a need to provide guidance in this area to supplement LMP and the associated pending TICAP guidance
- LMP provides human factors insights but provides limited guidance on how to develop a HFE program
ARCAP - High Level Overview
- ARCAP Chapter 11 - Organization and Human-System Consideration (continued)
- Operator Licensing
- Proposed guidance extends beyond what would be expected in an application
- Centrally located guidance to provide a holistic approach to operator licensing
- May eventually split out guidance not specifically associated with the content of an application
- Guidance includes areas such as:
- Description and qualification of simulator used to administer initial operator licensing examinations
- Use of simulator for operations training experience and examinations during construction
- Operator license issuance prior to fuel load
- Operator Staffing guidance includes areas such as:
- Option of providing technical basis for control room staffing in conjunction with control room configuration that would support capturing the requirements necessary in a DC rulemaking
- Provide technical basis that could support a future exemption from §§ 50.54(m) and/or 50.54(k) requirements 85
ARCAP - High Level Overview
- ARCAP Chapter 12 - Post Construction Inspection, Testing and Analysis Program
- Intended to provide guidance to the NRC staff regarding application content that would support making the finding that the applicant has met the applicable Part 50 and Part 52 regulations
- ISG differentiates between 10 CFR Part 52 applicants that must include inspections, tests, analysis and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) and 10 CFR Part 50 applications that are not required to include ITAAC.
- Requirements to describe preoperational testing and initial operations in OL and COL applications are contained in 50.34(b)(6)(iii) and 52.79(a)(28), respectively.
- Provides guidance for:
- post-construction inspection, preoperational testing (i.e., tests conducted following construction and construction-related testing, but prior to initial fuel load), analysis verification, and
- initial startup testing (i.e., tests conducted during and after initial fuel load, up to and including initial power ascension).
86
ARCAP - High Level Overview
- ARCAP TS Guidance
- The text in the 10 CFR 50.36 regulations for TS content require adaptation to correlate to the analysis and outputs of the risk-informed LMP approach described in NEI 18-04.
- 10 CFR 50.36 requirements for safety limits, limited safety system settings, and limiting condition for operations Criteria 1 through 3 involve challenges to the integrity of a fission product barrier.
- To evaluate the acceptability of risk-informed TS for advanced reactors, this ISG correlates the 10 CFR 50.36 text with appropriate NEI 18-04 process analysis/outputs. These analysis/outputs include:
- required safety functions
- SR SSCs
- frequency-consequence (F-C) target
- 10 CFR 50.34 dose limits 87
ARCAP - High Level Overview
- ARCAP Fire Protection for Operations
- 10 CFR 50.48(a) requires that each operating nuclear power plant have a fire protection plan that meets the requirements of either 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 3 for LWRs or the applicants proposed principal design criteria (PDC) that have been deemed acceptable by the NRC.
- Although 10 CFR 50.48(c) - NFPA 805 - does not apply to non-LWRs concepts associated with this risk-informed approach are included in the draft ISG
- The scope of this ISG addresses the review of the application content regarding the fire protection program for operations including application descriptions of:
- Management policy and program direction and the responsibilities of those individuals responsible for the program/plans implementation.
- The integrated combination of procedures and personnel that will implement fire protection program activities.
88
ARCAP - High Level Overview
- ARCAP Risk-Informed ISI/IST
- ISG purpose is to facilitate the review of advanced reactor applications that use a risk-informed approach to developing their ISI/IST programs
- ISG guidance requires the use of risk information from a plant-specific PRA that is in conformance with an NRC endorsed PRA standard
- For advanced LWRs, guidance on how to risk-inform ISI/IST already exists (RG 1.175, and 1.178) and is used in the ISG
- 10 CFR Part 50 contains only general requirements (e.g., 50.34(b)(6)(iv))
related to non-LWR ISI/IST programs, although ASME has recently issued Section XI, Division 2 - NRC has reviewed and issued DG-1383 for public comment on endorsement of ASME Section XI, Division 2
- For non-LWR ISI, applicants are expected to use the risk information from their plant-specific PRA to identify the piping, reactor coolant boundary, pressure retaining and passive components and their supports to be included in the program, along with other components whose failure could prevent a safety function from being accomplished 89
ARCAP - High Level Overview
- ARCAP Risk-Informed ISI/IST (continued)
- For non-LWR IST, applicants are expected to use the risk information from their plant-specific PRA and associated design reviews to identify the active valves, pumps and dynamic restraint devices and the passive components with active safety functions to be included in the program.
- For non-LWR ISI, the ISG is based upon the applicant using the requirements in ASME Section XI, Division 2, Requirements for Reliability and Integrity Management (RIM) Programs for Nuclear Power Plants (which is the subject of draft RG-1383).
90
Technology Inclusive Content of Application Project - Overview 91
TICAP - High Level Overview
- TICAP guidance
- Goal is to develop technology-inclusive guidance that proposes an optional formulation of advanced reactor application content that is based on a risk-informed, performance-based approach for demonstrating that plant safety meets the underlying intent of the current requirements
- Guidance is intended to increase efficiency of developing and reviewing an application
- Scope is governed by the LMP process to facilitate a systematic, technically acceptable, and predictable approach for developing key portions of a designs SAR
- LMP provides process for identifying LBEs, determining SSC categorization, establishing special treatments for SSCs, and ensuring DID adequacy 92
TICAP - High Level Overview
- TICAP SAR Structure
- Chapter 1 - General Plant and Site Description, And Overview of The Safety Case
- The information in this chapter should allow the reviewer to obtain a basic understanding of the overall facility, such as the type of permit, license, certification or approval requested, the number of plant units, a brief description of the proposed plant location, and the type of advanced reactor being proposed.
- Chapter 2 - Methodologies and Analyses
- An important part of the design process for reactor designs is the identification of events that could challenge key safety functions and layers of defense against the release of radioactive materials.
Therefore, a key part of the review of an advanced reactor application is the selection of LBEs.
93
TICAP - High Level Overview
- TICAP SAR Structure
- Chapter 3 - Licensing Basis Events
- The information in this chapter should describe the systematic and reproducible process and methodology used to select the LBEs, and the specific analysis and evaluation of the selected LBEs for the proposed design. The analysis in this section is primarily described in terms of event sequences comprised of an initiating event, the plant response to the initiating event (which includes a sequence of successes and failures of mitigating systems) and a well-defined end state. The consequences from LBEs are expressed as dose at the exclusionary boundary and compared to the F-C curve in LMP documentation.
- Chapter 4 - Integrated Evaluations
- The information in this chapter should describe the integrated risk of all LBEs selected for the proposed design and evaluated against three cumulative risk targets and the DID evaluation.
94
TICAP - High Level Overview
- TICAP SAR Structure
- Chapter 5 - Safety Functions, Design Criteria, and Systems, Structures, and Components Classification
- As part of the LMP process, LBEs are generally defined in terms of successes and failures of SSCs that perform safety functions and are modeled in the PRA. Therefore, the PRA safety functions are those functions responsible for the prevention and mitigation of an unplanned radiological release from any source within the plant.
- The information in this chapter should describe the proposed PDC necessary to ensure that the important to safety SSCs provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public
- The information in this chapter should describe the approach for designating SSC classifications 95
TICAP - High Level Overview
- TICAP SAR Structure
- Chapter 6 - Safety-Related Systems, Structures, and Components Criteria and Capabilities
- The information in this chapter should leverage the analysis performed for the SR SSCs in Chapter 5 of NEI 21-07 and describe in further detail the criteria, capabilities and special treatment of all SR SSCs.
- Chapter 7 - Non-Safety-Related Special Treatment (NSRST) Systems, Structures, and Components Criteria and Capabilities
- The information in this chapter should describe the regulatory design and special treatment requirements for SSCs classified as NSRST. NSRST SSCs are relied upon to perform risk-significant functions. Risk-significant SSCs are those that perform functions that prevent or mitigate any LBE from exceeding the F-C target or make significant contributions to the cumulative risk metrics selected for evaluating the total risk from all analyzed LBEs. SSCs considered necessary for ensuring DID adequacy are also categorized as NSRST.
96
TICAP - High Level Overview
- TICAP SAR Structure
- Chapter 8 - Plant Programs
- The information in this chapter should provide information on those plant programs relied upon to provide special treatment to SR and NSRST SSCs that are part of the affirmative safety case. The information should provide an overview of the special treatment programs, addressing the purpose, scope, and performance objectives as well as applicability to SSCs. The information for the programs should provide reasonable assurance that 1) reliability and performance targets are met, and 2) safety-significant uncertainties are addressed. Program areas could include human factors, quality assurance, startup testing, and equipment qualification, among others.
97
TICAP - High Level Overview
- TICAP - PDC
- Development of an LMP-based approach for developing proposed PDCs has been a subject of ongoing stakeholder interactions with the most recent occurring at the 12/14 TICAP public workshop
- Issues discussed include:
- Applicability of General Design Criteria (GDC) in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix A, including their scope, to non-LWR advanced reactor applicants
- Additional guidance available to advanced reactor applicants for developing proposed PDC
- The possible need for exemptions to applicable regulations for proposed PDC developed using the LMP methodology 98
TICAP - High Level Overview
- Summary of TICAP - PDC Discussions
- PDC are required to be proposed by applicants for the following:
10 CFR 50.34(a)(3) for CPs 10 CFR 52.79(a)(4) for COLs 10 CFR 52.47(a)(3) for DCs 10 CFR 52.137(a)(3) for SDAs 10 CFR 52.157(a) for MLs
- PDC are a means to meet the requirements of the AEA, Section 182 for inclusion in license applications of the specific characteristics of the facility, and such other information as the Commission may, by rule, or regulation, deem necessary in order to enable it to find that the utilization or production of special nuclear material will be in accord with the common defense and security and will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public.
99
TICAP - High Level Overview
- Summary of TICAP - PDC Discussions (continued)
- GDC are applicable to LWRs (minimum requirements) and provide guidance to applicants for construction permits in establishing principal design criteria for other types of nuclear power units.
- Advanced Reactor Design Criteria (ARDC) developed by the NRC in RG 1.232 are intended to provide insight into the staffs views on how the underlying safety bases for the GDC could be applied to address non-LWR design features. As noted in RG 1.232, the development of the ARDC was an important first step to address the unique characteristics of non-LWR technology but the NRC recognizes the future benefits to risk-informing the non-LWR design criteria and determining the role of such criteria within a new regulatory framework.
100
TICAP - High Level Overview
- Summary of TICAP - PDC Discussions (continued)
- The NRC position on the requirement for proposed PDC is that it includes the scope of PDC described in the regulations as well as in the regulatory and judicial history.
The principal design criteria establish the necessary design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements for structures, systems, and components important to safety; that is, structures, systems, and components that provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
- PDC are particularly important for CP applications since CP applicants are required to provide less information, comparatively speaking, and the information that is provided is preliminary.
- Proposed PDC play a significant role in supporting the NRCs finding that there is reasonable assurance that safety questions will be satisfactorily resolved and that the proposed facility can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. 101
TICAP - High Level Overview
- Summary of TICAP - PDC Discussions (continued)
- Proposed PDC determined to be necessary for a non-LWR design and submitted in an application under 10 CFR Part 50 or Part 52 should be as comprehensive in scope as the GDC and ARDC (i.e., establish the necessary design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements).
- Non-LWR applicants proposing PDC that do not fully address the scope of PDC (i.e., design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements) will need to request exemptions from the applicable regulations.
- Non-LWR applicants must provide supporting information that justifies to the NRC how their design meets their proposed PDC and how their proposed PDC demonstrate reasonable assurance of safety.
- NRC believes that it is feasible for applicants for CPs, COLs, DCs, SDAs and MLs to provide justification for an exemption by ensuring that the elements of the PDC scope not fully addressed in their proposed PDC are included in their application.
102
TICAP - High Level Overview
- Summary of TICAP - PDC Discussions (continued)
- TICAP guidance document NEI 21-07 proposed an approach to supplement PDC focused on SR SSCs with proposed Complementary Design Criteria (CDC) that focus on NSRST SSCs.
- In fitting the LMP approach to developing PDC and CDC into the Part 50 and Part 52 regulatory framework, the NRC concluded that both PDC and CDC would need to be relied on the NRC to make its regulatory finding.
- NRC suggested that a two-tiered PDC approach would comply with the regulations (i.e., PDC Type A for functions performed by SR SSCs and PDC Type B for functions performed by NSRST SSCs).
- NRC expects further stakeholder interactions at the next TICAP public workshop in January 2022.
103
Next Steps - Future Milestones TICAP Near-Term Milestones Target Date Update of NRC Draft Guidance Early December 2021 Documents Continuation of Discussion of NRC TBD draft Exceptions, Clarifications, and Additions (possibility of future draft industry or staff documents)
NEI 21-07, Revision 1 TBD Issuance of TICAP draft RG and Early Calendar ARCAP ISG for public comment Year 2022 104
TICAP/ARCAP Guidance Document Development Discussion 105
MEETING BREAK Meeting to resume in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 106
Nuclear Energy Institute /
U.S. Nuclear Industry Council Presentation 107
Final Discussion and Questions 108
Acronyms and Abbreviations ACRS Advisory Committee for Reactor Safeguards Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-DANU Power Production and Utilization Facilities Agencywide Documents Access and ADAMS Management System DBA Design basis accident AEA Atomic Energy Act DBE Design basis event ANS American Nuclear Society DC Design certification AOO Anticipated operational occurrence DG Draft regulatory guide Advanced Reactor Content of Application DID Defense-in-depth ARCAP Project D-RAP Design reliability assurance program ARDC Advanced reactor design criteria EP Emergency preparedness Advanced reactor policy statement (Policy EPRI Electric Power Research Institute ARPS Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Reactors; 73 FR 60612; October 14, 2008) ESP Early site permit ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers F-C Frequency-consequence BDBA Beyond design basis accident FMEA Failure modes and effects analysis BDBE Beyond design basis event FR Federal Register CCFP Conditional containment failure probability FRN Federal Register Notice CDC Complementary design criteria FSAR Final safety analysis report CDF Core damage frequency FSP Facility safety program CFR Code of Federal Regulations FTA Fault tree analysis COL Combined license GDC General design criteria CP Construction permit 109
Acronyms and Abbreviations HAZOP Hazard and operability LWA Limited work authorization HFE Human factors engineering LWR Light water reactor HRA Human reliability analysis MCA Maximum credible accident HSI Human-system interface MHA Maximum hypothetical accident HTGR High temperature gas cooled reactor ML Manufacturing license IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency MLD Master logic diagram IEFR Individual early fatality risk NEI Nuclear Energy Institute ILCFR Individual latent cancer fatality risk NFPA National Fire Protection Association ISG Interim staff guidance NGO Non-governmental organization ISI Inservice inspection non-LWR Non-light water reactor IST Inservice testing NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspections, tests, and acceptance ITAAC NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation criteria LB Licensing basis NSRST Non-safety-related special treatment LBE Licensing basis event NUREG U.S. NRC technical report designation LERF Large early release frequency NWPA Nuclear Waste Policy Act LMP Licensing Modernization Project OFR Office of the Federal Register LMR Liquid metal cooled reactor OL Operating license LRF Large release frequency OMB Office of Management and Budget 110
Acronyms and Abbreviations ONT Other new technology SECY Office of the Secretary P&ID Piping and instrumentation diagrams Safety goal policy statement (Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants; PDC Principal design criteria SGPS 51 FR 28044; August 4, 1986; as corrected PRA Probabilistic risk assessment and republished at 51 FR 30028; August 21, 1986)
PRA policy statement (Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods SMR Small modular reactor PRAPS in Nuclear Regulatory Activities; 60 FR SNM Special nuclear material 42622; August 16, 1995)
Supporting requirement (NLWR PRA PSA Probabilistic safety assessment SR standard)
QHO Quantitative health objective SR Safety-related RG Regulatory guide SRM Staff requirements memorandum RIM Reliability and Integrity Management SSC Systems, structures, and components RIN Regulation identifier number SSR Specific safety requirement (IAEA)
Severe accident mitigation design STA Shift technical advisor SAMDA alternative Technology Inclusive Content of Severe accident policy statement TICAP Application Project (Severe Reactor Accidents Regarding SAPS Technology-inclusive, risk-informed, Future Designs and Existing Plants; 50 TIRIMA FR 32138; August 8, 1985) maximum accident SAR Safety analysis report TMI Three Mile Island SAT Systems approach to training TR Technical report SDA Standard design approval TS Technical specifications 111
Background Slides 112
First Principles See: SECY-18-0096, Functional Containment Performance Criteria for Non-Light-Water-Reactors, and INL/EXT-20-58717, Technology-Inclusive Determination of Mechanistic Source Terms for Offsite Dose-Related Assessments for Advanced Nuclear Reactor Facilities 113
Integrated Approach Siting near densely populated Functional areas EP for SMRs Containment and ONTs Licensing Modernization Project Insurance and Liability Environmental Reviews Consequence Based Security 114
Background
- Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA; Public Law 115-439) signed into law in January 2019 requires the NRC to complete a rulemaking to establish a technology-inclusive, regulatory framework for optional use for commercial advanced nuclear reactors no later than December 2027 o (1) ADVANCED NUCLEAR REACTORThe term advanced nuclear reactor means a nuclear fission or fusion reactor, including a prototype plant with significant improvements compared to commercial nuclear reactors under construction as of the date of enactment of this Act, 115
Severe Accidents
- Severe Accident Policy Statement o Although in the licensing of existing plants the Commission has determined that these plants pose no undue risk to public health and safety, this should not be viewed as implying a Commission policy that safety improvements in new plant designs should not be actively sought. The Commission fully expects that vendors engaged in designing new standard (or custom) plants will achieve a higher standard of severe accident safety performance than their prior designs.
- 10 CFR 52.47(a)(23) o For light-water reactor designs, a description and analysis of design features for the prevention and mitigation of severe accidents, e.g., challenges to containment integrity caused by core-concrete interaction, steam explosion, high-pressure core melt ejection, hydrogen combustion, and containment bypass
- NUREG-1226 (Development and Utilization of the NRC Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Power Plants; Executive Summary) o (4) While the Final Policy Statement encourages innovative reactor designs and safety criteria, the review of advanced reactor designs will still require satisfactory consideration of the Commission's regulations, regulatory guides and other guidelines, such established and developing criteria as the defense-in-depth philosophy, standardization, the Commission's safety goal and severe accident policies, and applicable industry codes and standards.
116
Backup Slides
Technology-Inclusive Content of Application (TICAP) and Advanced Reactors Content of Application (ARCAP)- Nexus to Part 53 Part 53- Proposed Structure Subpart H - Licenses, Cert, and Approvals This subpart is envisioned to address requirements for initial applications for licenses, certifications, or approvals. The A- General Provisions subpart will support the licensing processes available under the Part 50 and Part 52 frameworks. Assessment and update of manufacturing licenses is possible.
B- Tech-Incl Safety Requirements C- Design and Analysis Req.
D- Siting ARCAP-Guidance for Content of Application Guidance (Roadmap)
E- Const. and Manufacturing TICAP - LMP-based Guidance under F- Operations portions of FSAR that are Development examples:
related to:
- Fuel Qualification
- G- Decommissioning
- Safety classification ASME Section III, Division 5
- Defense in Depth
- EP rulemaking H- Licenses, Cert, and Approvals
- Security ARCAP specific chapter Rulemaking guidance - examples:
I- Maintaining/Revising LB Info
- Site information Existing
- ARCAP chapters 9, Regulatory 10, 11, and 12 Guidance J- Administrative requirements Note: The illustrated content structure for Part 53 (including Subpart H) is part of ongoing work and subject to change. 118
Industry-led TICAP NRC-led TICAP
- Focused on portions of the
- NRC plans to issue a RG license application Safety endorsing TICAP that also Chapters 1-8 Analysis Report (SAR) for non- focuses on providing exceptions LWR designs related to the and/or clarifications on TICAP.
TICAP Licensing Modernization Project (LMP)-based affirmative safety
- Include supplemental TICAP case. guidance for areas outside of the LMP for the first 8 SAR chapters. Examples includes FSAR site information, ASME Section III, Division 5 Chapters 9-12 NRC-led SAR Guidance ARCAP*
- Focused on remaining portions of the license application Safety Analysis Report (SAR) not related to LMP.
- ARCAP ISGs under development that include an overall roadmap ISG and separate ISGs for FSAR Chapters 2, 9, 10, 11, and 12 Additional
- For example:
Contents of o Technical Specifications, o QA Plan, o Fire Protection, etc.
Application
- Staff plans to issue an ARCAP Roadmap ISG that would provide pointers to various guidance documents developed/issued.
119
Key Part 53 Guidance by Subpart Subpart A: General Provisions Existing / Ongoing Guidance Additional Guidance N/A Subpart B: Safety Criteria Existing / Ongoing Guidance Additional Guidance Further explanation of criteria and N/A structure in the Statements of Consideration Subpart C: Design and Analysis Existing / Ongoing Guidance Additional Guidance NEI 18-04 & RG 1.233 (LMP)
ANS/ASME-RA-S-1.4 (Non-LWR ISG on PRA for Initial Licensing PRA Standard)
RG 1.247 Endorsing Non-LWR PRA Industry PRA Peer Review Guidance Standard and NEI Peer Review for Non-LWRs (NEI 20-09)
Guidance ANS/ASME Standards (ASME III-5, Application of Analytical Margins ASME XI-II)
Treatment of Chemical Hazards Fuel Qualification (NUREG-2246)
RG 1.232 (ARDCs)
Subpart D: Siting Requirements Existing / Ongoing Guidance Additional Guidance SECY-20-0045/RG 4.7 External Hazard Updates N/A Risk-Informed Seismic Design; ANS 2.26 120
Key Part 53 Guidance by Subpart Subpart E: Construction and Manufacturing Existing / Ongoing Guidance Additional Guidance Manufacturing Guidance N/A QA Alternatives Subpart F: Operations SSCs Existing / Ongoing Guidance Additional Guidance Technical Specifications Special Treatment NEI 18-04 & RG 1.233 (LMP)
Maintenance, Repair & Inspection Facility Safety Program Personnel Existing / Ongoing Guidance Additional Guidance DRO Paper/preliminary ISG Concept of Operations Programs Existing / Ongoing Guidance Additional Guidance Emergency Preparedness EPZ Draft Final Rule, RG 1.242 Security Programs (e.g., FFD, Access Radiation Protection (ARCAP) Authorization, Cyber Security)
Integrity Assessment Program 121
Key Part 53 Guidance by Subpart Subpart G: Decommissioning Existing / Ongoing Guidance Additional Guidance N/A N/A Subpart H: Licensing Existing / Ongoing Guidance Additional Guidance TICAP Manufacturing Licenses ARCAP Subpart I: Maintaining Licensing Basis Existing / Ongoing Guidance Additional Guidance 50.59 Equivalent N/A FSAR/PRA Updates Subpart J: Administrative/Misc.
Existing / Ongoing Guidance Additional Guidance Reporting Requirements N/A Financial/Liability 122
Part 53 Rulemaking:
Industry Perspectives ACRS Future Plant Subcommittee December 17, 2021 Marc Nichol, NEI Senior Director, New Reactors Cyril Draffin, USNIC Senior Fellow, Advanced Nuclear
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute
Agenda Risk-Informed Licensing Approaches (NEI) 11:45 AM
- September white paper Lunch 1:00 PM Standards and Atomic Energy Act (USNIC) 2:00 PM Increasing Regulatory Burden without Commensurate Safety Increase (NEI) 2:20 PM
- ALARA design requirement
- BDBE in design basis
- Redundant Programs Improving Clarity and Efficiency (USNIC) 3:10 PM
- Technology-inclusive
- Goals for Regulatory Efficiency
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 2
Risk-Informed Licensing Approaches Marc Nichol, NEI 3
Risk-informed Licensing Approaches Overview of Industry Goals for Part 53 Usefulness
- All licensing approaches are viable
- Less burdensome over the lifecycle of activities
- Guidance will be important to explain how to meet the regulation Risk-Informed
- Part 53 should allow a variety of roles and uses of the PRA
- Allow for both leading and confirmatory/supporting roles
- Primary expectation is that decisions are informed by the use of a PRA
- In some cases alternatives to a PRA may provide equivalent benefits
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 4
Industry Concerns on Part 53 Rule Language Subsequent slides present details of industrys perspective on these concerns
- 1. NRC has stated that performance-based design requirements are not dependent on how PRA is used, but NRC has stated that only LMP and other methods using PRA in a leading role can use Part 53
- 2. NRC has stated that use of PRA in leading role is required because QHOs are in the rule, but NRC has not explained why QHOs must be in the rule
- 3. NRC has stated they are developing Part 5X in response to industrys request to use other risk-informed approaches, but Industry has requested straightforward changes to Part 53 to accomplish this goal, and industry did not ask for a parallel Part 5X ©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 5
Benefits of Part 53 Why Part 53 benefits should be available for all risk-informed licensing approaches Benefits of Part 53 - performance-based design requirements
- All requirements are focused back to their relevance to safety criteria
- Integrated framework of design requirements (see NRCs graphic on next slide)
- Performance-based acceptance criteria (examples):
53.210 - {dose} to individualat EAB {will not exceed} 25 rem TEDE {for DBA}
53.230 - primary safety function is limiting release of radioactive materialadditional safety functionsmust be defined 53.240 - LBEs must be identifiedmust address combinations of malfunctionshuman errorsexternal hazards{ from AOO to very unlikely}
53.400 - design features must be provided {that}...satisfy the safety criteria 53.410 - FDC must be definedto demonstrate compliance with safety criteria We agree with NRC that Part 53 performance-based requirements for plant design are not dependent on how PRA is used
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 6
NRCs Integrated Framework
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 7
Risk-informed Approach Desired by Industry Why Part 53 must be inclusive in how PRA is used in the design and analysis NEI/USNIC has been asking for a rule that accommodates all risk-informed approaches since mid-2020
- We wanted Part 53 requirements to be more inclusive, with guidance to address details where necessary
- We did not want multiple parallel frameworks of requirements in order to enable flexibility
- Currently Part 50 and 52 requirements achieve inclusiveness through a single design/analysis framework without a reduction in predictability
- We believe NRC should establish criteria that demonstrates safety, and does not need to require specific methods for design and analysis We do not agree with the NRC that only LMP and other methods using PRA in a leading role should be able to use Part 53
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 8
Accomplishing Risk-informing Benefits of Risk-informing
=
- Integrated approach of PRA Deterministic Risk Risk- complements deterministic Criteria Information Informed
- Characterize the overall residual risks of a design
- Can help focus on issues of
=
safety significance Risk Deterministic Risk-Information Criteria Informed
- Should yield greater operational flexibility after licensing
©2020 Nuclear Energy Institute 9
Spectrum of Risk-informed Approaches Parts 53 and 5X dont align with how plants are actually designed and analyzed How Nuclear Plants Part 5X Incentivizes are Actually Designed Part 53 Requires Risk-informed Continuum
©2020 Nuclear Energy Institute 10
NEI September 2021 Paper Technology-Inclusive, Performance-Based and Risk-Informed Approaches for Assessing the Safety Adequacy of the Design for Part 53 Goals:
- Advance discussion of how different approaches may fit under Part 53
- More clearly illuminate the role of PRA and risk information Approach:
- Establish an inclusive framework of principles for a sufficient safety case
- Build on elements of a TI-RIPB process for assessing safety adequacy
- Present four examples across the spectrum of potential approaches
- Demonstrate how each example meets the guiding principles
- Each example has a different balance between deterministic safety analyses and risk information in what is always a risk-informed process
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 11
Key Elements of Part 53 Addressed Limits for protecting the public health and safety Safety functions Licensing basis events Defense-in-depth Design features Functional design criteria Safety categorization Notes
- The paper does not imply an endorsement of the NRC preliminary rule text, but acknowledges that these key elements are important to the safety case
- Other Part 53 elements are important to the licensing basis, but are not included since they do not have a primary effect on the TI-RIPB process
- It is envisioned that the TI-RIPB process in the paper will inform future changes to
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 12 the Part 53 requirements
Principles for TI-RIPB Process
- 1. The plant meets the established limits for the adequate protection of the public health and safety.
- 2. The safety functions, design features and functional design criteria relied upon to meet the safety criteria are established.
- 3. The systematic selection of LBEs adequately cover the range of hazards that a specific design is exposed to.
- 4. The SSCs are categorized according to their safety significance.
- 5. The design reflects the application of an appropriate philosophy of defense-in-depth.
- 6. The special treatment for SSCs, and associated programmatic controls and human actions, provide reasonable assurance that the SSCs will perform the safety functions for which they are relied upon.
- 7. The scope and level of detail for the design and analysis of the plant in the licensing basis information adequately describes the safety case. (Not addressed at this time) ©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 13
Examples of Risk-Informed Licensing Approaches Four Examples evaluated
- A: Licensing Modernization Project (NEI 18-04)
- C: Approach compatible with IAEA safety standards
- D: Bounding Analysis
Conclusions:
- All utilize PRA, some use it a little, some use it a lot
- Use of the PRA in all examples is able to demonstrate safety
- All can meet Part 53 design requirements, and less prescriptive versions of the PRA requirements
- All can utilize the Frequency-Consequence curve
- Specific use of PRA is related to how the designer wishes to approach the design and analysis of the plant
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 14
Safety Criteria and QHOs There has been little discussion of whether QHOs are more appropriate in Policy or the Rule NRC has said QHOs must be in the rule, and asked if not the QHOs, then what?
- This is the wrong way to frame the consideration of QHOs and BDBE The right framing is why should QHOs be in the rule?
- What problem is solved by having QHOs in the rule?
- Are there benefits to QHOs in the rule?
- Are the disadvantages and risks, of QHOs in the rule, reasonable and being mitigated?
The NRC has not provided a basis for having QHOs in the rule
- We provided an assessment of QHOs in rule vs. Policy Statement as early as January 2021, but did not receive any feedback from NRC
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 15
Quantitative Health Objectives (1/3)
Industrys Evaluation of advantages/disadvantages of putting QHOs in the rule Advantages Disadvantages
- 1. Enhances regulatory stability by making it harder for the NRC 1. Increases regulatory uncertainty by establishing requirements to change the limits, or make arbitrary judgements. without specifying the consequence limits (i.e., dose for immediate fatalities and latent cancers).
- 2. Enhanced clarity by providing specific limits of acceptable risk 2. Reduces regulatory stability since changes to the to the public for beyond design basis events (BDBEs). consequence limits (i.e., risk for immediate fatalities and latent cancers) will now be regulatory limits instead of policy goals.
- 3. Ensures that regulations explicitly result in risk levels that 3. Is counter to Commissions intent that the QHOs are goals, comply with the QHO limits. and not limits.
- 4. The QHOs are more understandable to the public because 4. Not having consequence limits, and the complexity of they are expressed in terms of public health effects. demonstrating the QHOs are met, increases licensing risk.
- 5. The QHOs are the maximum acceptable consequences, and 5. Changes to societal risks can result in changes to the therefore avoid more conservative surrogate requirements. requirements that can force changes to the facility design.
- 6. Potential to eliminate the need for some other requirements 6. Analyses and calculations related to demonstrating the QHOs (e.g., mitigation of beyond design basis events). are met are now used for legal compliance with requirements.
- 7. Risks a revision to the QHOs. The NRC discontinued its efforts circa 2000 to update the safety goals so that improvements can be more significant and incorporate experience with risk-informed decision making.
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 16
Quantitative Health Objectives (2/3)
QHOs in the rule do not improve safety, but do create complications Safety is the same whether QHOs are in Rule language or the Policy statement
- Both approaches demonstrate that design meets the QHOs
- The applicants design and analysis are the same
- The NRC scope of review is the same The difference is in the legal compliance
- QHO in rule: applicant must demonstrate legal compliance, subject to hearing contention NRC stated that QHOs in the rule requires a leading PRA approach QHOs in the rule is not an evolution of the PRA Policy Statement, but far exceeds the envisioned application of them (SECY 89-102):
- Evaluate adequacy of requirements to achieve acceptable risk to the public
- Objectives not to be used as requirements, but useful as basis for guidance
- Useful, in a generic sense, in making regulatory decision for an ©2021 application Nuclear Energy Institute 17
Quantitative Health Objectives (3/3)
Industrys Proposal for QHOs in Part 53 to Achieve acceptable risk to the public Apply consistent with the Safety Goal Policy Statement Ensure requirements achieve acceptable risk to the public
- Dose to the public less than 1 rem (§53.260)
- Occupational exposures less than 5 rem (§53.270)
- Anticipated Operational Occurrences: can set 1 rem limit (if necessary)
- Design Basis Accidents, dose less than 25 rem (§53.210)
- Beyond Design Basis events: Mitigation similar to 10 CFR 50.155 (§53.220)
- Establish requirements for systematic search for events (§53.240, 53.450)
Inform basis for guidance to establish risk-based metrics
- Can use QHOs directly for comparison (as in LMP)
- Can use QHOs to develop surrogates (e.g., core damage frequency)
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 18
Performance-Based Requirements for PRA Why NRC prescriptive use of PRA in the Rules is not necessary
- NRC Part 52 requirement:
- Applicants to provide a description of the plant-specific PRA and its results.
- Practical use of the PRA in Part 52:
- Identify and address potential design and operational vulnerabilities (e.g., assumed individual or common-cause failures could drive plant risk to unacceptable levels with respect to the Commissions goals)
- Demonstrate how risk compares against the Commissions Policy Goals (e.g.,
QHOs)
- Demonstrate whether RTNSS is sufficient
- Support regulatory oversight
- Support development of specifications for ITAAC, TS, etc.
- Scope: Level 1 and 2 including internal and external events and all modes
- Risk insights: SSC most effective at reducing risk, major contributors of risk and uncertainty ©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 19
Prescriptive Requirements for PRA Why NRC prescriptive use of PRA in the Rules is not necessary
- NRC Part 53 PRA requirements (red are not in Part 50/52 rule language):
- Consider events that challenge plant control and safety (internal and external)
- Conform with generally accepted methods
- Be maintained and upgraded every two years
- Identify potential failures, degradation mechanisms, susceptibility to internal and external hazards, other contributing factors to unplanned events that might challenge safety functions
- Determine licensing basis events
- Used for classifying SSCs and human actions according to safety significance, and environmental conditions
- Evaluate adequacy of defense-in-depth measures
- Assess all plant operating states where there is a potential for uncontrolled release ©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 20
Industry Proposed Requirements for Part 53 Why NRC prescriptive use of PRA in the Rules is not necessary
- Performance-based analysis requirements:
- Analyses of licensing basis events must be performed
- Must systematically identify event sequences from initiation to safe stable end state
- Must demonstrate compliance with safety criteria
- May perform a single of multiple bounding analyses
- Performance-based PRA requirement:
- Must perform PRA to incorporate risk insights into the design, as appropriate
- PRA completeness commensurate with completeness of design
- Be maintained and upgraded every four years
- Performance-based requirements achieve same outcome as NRCs prescriptive requirements (e.g., rigor, confidence)
- They are also inclusive to accommodate all roles of the PRA
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 21
NRCs Prescriptive Requirements for PRA Concern that NRC will require more of the PRA to be submitted as part of licensing basis
- Industry concern has been that QHOs in the rule and more prescriptive PRA requirements will lead to NRC requiring more of the PRA to be submitted in the licensing basis
- NRC stated at December 9, 2021 Commission briefing, that it is not their intent to require the PRA to be submitted to and reviewed by the NRC
- We support this intention and do not think the PRA should be part of the licensing basis, but is available for NRC inspection
- However, the preliminary rule language and staff statements have not reflected this intention
- 53.1185: The SAR must includean analysis of {all} LBEsto determine compliance with53.220 {QHOs}must address elements in 53.450(e) and (f)
{PRA requirements}
- NRC statement at 5/27/21 meeting that NRC would need to review PRA
- NRCs endorsement of TICAP must include more PRA details (e.g., reliability
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 22 and capability targets for SSCs)
A Part 53 Inclusive of All Licensing Approaches Why pursuit of Part 5X is not necessary, inefficient and increasing confusion NRCs Approach Industrys Proposal Approach to include all risk- Two+ Rigid frameworks (53, Single inclusive framework (Part informed approaches 5X, maybe MA) 53)
Proposal for Part 53 Only allowed for LMP and Straightforward changes to QHO leading PRA role and PRA requirements to allow all risk-informed approaches Proposal for Part 5X 80%-90% of Part 50/52 Delete and abandon requirements, attempt to make tech-inclusive Proposal for TIRIMA Considering whether to Potential use for guidance, may include need exemptions to Part 53 Level of effort and clarity Significant effort needed, Very little effort needed, clear complex and confusing and straightforward
- NRC should revise Part 53 to be inclusive of all risk-informed approaches, abandon Part 5X
- Industry is developing guidance that would implement the inclusive Part 53 recommended
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 23 in 11/5/21 comments
Standards and AEA Cyril Draffin, USNIC 24
Standards and AEA - NRC Iterations Standards in statutory requirements in Atomic Energy Act
- Section 182, adequate protection to the health and safety of the public
- Section 161, to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property.
NRC 1st iteration of preliminary rule language established the AEA statutory standards identified above as basis for Part 53 (ML20311A004) for 53.200 NRC 2nd & 3rd iteration of preliminary rule language reduces regulatory clarity
- Current version replaces AEA language with different safety standards that do not clearly relate back to the AEA and have no regulatory precedent
- 53.200, limit the possibility of an immediate threat to the public health and safety and considering potential risks to public health and safety 25
Standards and AEA - NRC Perspective - written (in NRC Discussion of 2nd Iteration of Subpart B,
§ 53.200 Safety Objectives)
The change is to revise the first objective from providing reasonable assurance of adequate protection to limiting the possibility of an immediate threat to the public health and safety. This language generally aligns with standards the Commission has used for determining the content of technical specifications. The change also revises the second objective from protect public health and minimize danger to as may be appropriate when considering potential risks to public health and safety. The purpose of these objectives is clarified by adding the statement that they will be carried out by meeting the safety criteria identified in this subpart (§§ 53.210 and 53.220).
This change resulted from stakeholder comments and internal NRC discussions regarding the difficulties in using the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) Sections 182 and 161 authorities as the safety objectives for part 53, and in turn as the bases for the two-tier safety criteria framework. Instead, the use of adequate protection is expected to be used in its traditional role as an NRC regulatory finding, which is presumed through compliance with NRC regulations including part 53 or other license requirements. While Sections 182 and 161 of the AEA will be cited as enabling legislation within the rule package (e.g., in the Federal Register Notice), the staff does not foresee incorporating language from the AEA into the safety objectives or tiers in part 53.
26
Standards and AEA - NRC Perspective -verbal During public meeting discussing change in safety objectives, NRC staff explained that because entirety of Part 53 satisfies the AEA, AEA standards do not need to be referenced in Part 53, and NRC thus should establish new standards to frame the Part 53 requirements.
27
Standards and AEA - Observations NRC change seemed to be in support of two tier structure - that has now been dropped responsive to ACRS and Industry comments NRC refers to stakeholder input Approach inconsistent with longstanding practice of NRC and appears to reject decades of Commission precedent, with no compelling benefit or indication of Commissioners approval 28
Standards and AEA - Concerns with 3rd Iteration New approach requires extra resources
- NRC would need to invest significant resources in defining these new standards, to ensure consistency with the AEA New approach reduces regulatory clarity and efficiency
- No clear connection between the Part 53 requirements and the AEA safety standards.
- No equivalent in Parts 50 and 52, no regulatory precedent Could greatly expand NRCs regulatory control beyond what is in place for existing reactors without increase to safety
- Appears to be regulatory overreach that contravenes longstanding safety policy embraced by the Commission for decades consistent with safety standards established by AEA
- No explanation on what new safety standards mean, how they can be met, or how they relate to all requirements in Part 53 29
Standards and AEA - Lack of Clarity Lack of clarity on how requirements relate back to AEA safety standards
- Even after decades of implementing standard of adequate protection NRC had to issue multiple recent memos to staff to avoid misapplication of this standard in application reviews (ML19015A290, ML18240A410, and ML19260E683)
- Such challenges will be exacerbated in Part 53 if it introduces new standards rather than providing clarity on how requirements relate back to AEA standards NRC should utilize the safety standards from the AEA, as done in 1st iteration, rather than creating new standards (2nd/3rd iterations) 30
Increasing Regulatory Burden without Commensurate Increase in Safety Marc Nichol, NEI 31
Achieving Safety More Efficiently Overview of Industry Goals for Part 53 Usefulness
- Less burdensome over the lifecycle of activities
- Performance-based requirements with clear/objective acceptance criteria
- Guidance will be important to explain how to meet the regulation Efficiency
- Achieve equivalent level of safely more efficiently than Parts 50 and 52
- Reduced cost and schedule in licensing and oversight
- Do not include requirements that Part 50/52 have shown are not needed to protect the public
- Do not include new requirements that are not needed to protect the public Recognize confidence in licensee controls
- NRC imposes requirements that are effective even after the NRC issues a license
- Licensee is competent in fulfilling their responsibility to meet programmatic requirements
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 32
- NRC oversight and inspection to ensure compliance
Industry Concerns on Part 53 Rule Language Subsequent slides present details of industrys perspective on these concerns ALARA design requirement BDBE in design basis Proliferation of Redundant and unnecessary Programs Facility safety program
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 33
As-Low-As Reasonably Achievable (1/3)
NRC including design requirement, beyond the currently requirement program requirement Part 53 doesnt need to have any requirement for ALARA
- Must use, to the extent practical, procedures and engineering controls to achieve ALARA
- No requirement for design to consider ALARA NRCs Part 53 requirement for ALARA is clearly expanding to include design :
- 53.260(b): Design features and programmatic controls must be established such that the TEDEare ALARA in accordance with Part 20
- 53.270(b): As required by Subpart B of Part 20, design features and programmatic controls, to the extent practical, be based on RP principles to achieve occupational doses that are ALARA. ©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 34
As-Low-As Reasonably Achievable (2/3)
ALARA design requirements not consistent with past Commission decisions*
- the ALARA concept is intended to be an operating principle rather than an absolute.
- ALARA can be achieved solely through the implementation of the licensees radiation protection program, required by Part 20
- expressly intended that the level of this program and efforts to document it are commensurate with the size of the licensed facility and the potential hazards from radiation exposure and the intake of radioactive materials.
ALARA as a design requirement increases regulatory burden without a safety benefit
- No practical endpoint for additional measures, and it is left to negotiation between the NRC and the designer as to how much is good enough
- Addressing ALARA through programs has been effective for decades
- Inconsistent with the development of more risk-informed, performance-based and efficient regulatory framework for advanced reactors
- See: Standards for Protection Against Radiation; Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 23359, 23366, 23367 (May 21, 1991)
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 35
As-Low-As Reasonably Achievable (3/3)
NRC stated in December 9, 2021 Commission briefing on Part 53
- Not intent to elevate ALARA as a design requirement
- Perhaps more of an option during the design, provides flexibility Part 53 requirements do not achieve NRC intention
- 53.260(b) and 53.270(b) require design features and programmatic controls for ALARA, they dont allow an option It is unclear how an option for ALARA design requirement would work
- If applicant meets requirements for design to achieve ALARA, would they not be required to consider ALARA in their radiation protection program?
- Who would want to meet a voluntary design requirement for ALARA if they are still required to meet ALARA in RP program?
- Without ALARA design requirement: Developer can still optimize design for addressing ALARA in RP program.
- What flexibility does an ALARA design requirement provide?
Best solution is to delete the ALARA requirement from Part 53 ©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 36
Beyond Design Basis in the Design Basis NRC expanding requirements for BDBE NRC stated in December 9, 2021 Commission briefing on Part 53
- Part 53 benefit is more up front {BDBE requirements}, downstream flexibility
- Not intent to include BDBE in design basis
- Treated the same as today, BDBE doesnt need to rely on safety-related SSCs Part 50/52 requires mitigation for BDBEs - 10 CFR 50.155 Part 53 requirements do not achieve NRCs intentions
- Part 53 requires mitigation for BDBEs in 53.450(g)(3)
- Part 53 also establishes requirements for BDBE design through QHOs in the rule 53.400 requires design features to meet 53.220 53.420 requires functional design criteria to meet 53.220 53.440 establishes design requirements to meet 53.220 53.460 requires special treatment for NSRST similar to SR to meet 53.220 53.220 includes BDBE through QHOs in the rule Part 5X also includes BDBE in design basis ©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 37
Beyond Design Basis in the Licensing Basis BDBE in design basis is inconsistent with Commission decisions to treat through mitigation Commission directed the staff to remove design requirements for BDBE for new reactors in the Proposed Rulemaking for Mitigation of Beyond Design Basis Events in SRM-SECY-15-0065 (ML15239A767).
- Commission recognized the NRC ability to provide oversight for mitigation Commission specifically noted that requirements should not establish a separate standard for new reactors
- A more flexible approach for new reactor applicants [mitigation] is preferred Advanced reactor policy statement has led to designs with reduced reliance on human actions
- this rule allows an applicant for a new reactor licenseto provide innovative solutions to address the need to effectively prioritize event mitigation and recovery actions
- regulatory requirements should not impose unnecessary burden or divert attention from more important safety objectives ©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 38
Beyond Design Basis in the Licensing Basis Industrys proposal for a more technology-inclusive mitigation requirement Keep QHOs in Policy, do not include in rule, since they drive the BDBE design basis requirements, Replace 53.220 with the following (technology-inclusive version of 50.155):
For BDBEs, each applicant or licensee shall develop, implement, and maintain mitigation strategies and guidance that are capable of being implemented site-wide and must include the following:
(a) The capability to maintain or restore the safety functions necessary to meet the safety criteria in 53.210.
(b) The acquisition and use of offsite assistance and resources to support the functions required by paragraph (a) of this section indefinitely, or until sufficient site functional capabilities can be maintained without the need for the mitigation strategies (c) Strategies and guidance to provide the capabilities in (a) under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant impacted by the event, due to explosions or fire, to minimize radiological releases.
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 39
Operational Programs Overview of industrys perspective NRCs prior assertions that: increased design and analysis burden would lead to a reduction in operational burden does not appear accurate NRC needs to reassess the program requirements in Part 53
- 11 program areas have equivalents in Part 50/52
- 13 program areas do not have a Part 50/52 equivalent or duplicate others
- Over 20 instances of open ended requirements for programmatic controls NRC needs to establish a regulatory philosophy for Part 53 that defines the regulatory purpose of programs
- Having clarity on why programs are needed will ensure that the program requirements are efficient NRC should ensure needed programs are performance-based, graded and appropriately scoped with entry criteria
- Some programs (with Part 50/52 equivalents) are more burdensome, without increasing safety, than Parts 50/52 ©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 40
Evaluating NRC Proposed Part 53 Programs Programs with a Part 50/52 Equivalent Required in NRC Part 53 Preliminary Language Part 50/52 Equivalent Requirements 53.710(a)* - Initial Startup Testing 50.34(b)(6(iii) 53.870 Inservice Inspection/Inservice Testing 50.55a 53.730 Maintenance, repair, and inspection programs 50.65 - although some elements may not have Part 50/52 counterpart 53.720 Maintaining capabilities and availability of SSCs 50.36 and 50.69 53.710(b)* - Training (Expected in future Subpart F requirements 50.2, Part 55, 50.120 on human actions) 53.710(c)* - Operating Plans (Expected in future Subpart F 50.34(b)(6)(iv and v) requirements on human actions) 53.860 Fire Protection 50.48 53.810 Radiation Protection Part 20 53.820 Emergency Preparedness 50.47 or 50.160 (in development) 53.830 Security Programs Part 73 (73.54, 73.55, 73.56) and Part 26 53.550 Environmental Considerations - Points to Part 51 50.36b - Points to Part 51 (if applicable)
- Note that at the time this slide was developed the NRC has not yet released the Subpart F regulations for human actions, which could include duplicative requirements
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 41
Evaluating NRC Proposed Part 53 Programs Programs that duplicate the Quality Assurance Program Required in NRC Part 53 Preliminary Language Part 50/52 Equivalent Requirements 53.840 Quality Assurance Most of Appendix B QA Program 53.480 Design Control Quality Assurance None - Duplicates QA Program 53.610(a)(1&7) and 53.620(a)(1&6) Construction and None - Duplicates QA Program Manufacturing Quality Assurance 53.490 Design and Analyses Interfaces None - Duplicates QA Program 53.740 Design Control None - Duplicates QA Program 53.620(b)(1)(IV)(vii) - Manufacturing, Manufacturing Activities None - Duplicates QA Program NRC should eliminate requirements that duplicate the QA Program NRC should put all of the QA Requirements together similar to Appendix B
- Preserve the ability to use Appendix B QA program for those that wish to
- Enable the use of ISO-9001 and other commercial QA standards NRC does not need to specify QA requirements for non-safety-related but safety significant SSCs
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 42
Evaluating NRC Proposed Part 53 Programs NRC Required Programs without any Part 50/52 equivalent Required in NRC Part 53 Preliminary Language Part 50/52 Equivalent Requirements 53.700 Operational Objectives None - Duplicates most other operational programs 53.800 Operational Programs None - Duplicates most other operational programs 53.850 Integrity Assessment Programs None - Duplicates Maintenance, ISI/IST, Technical Specifications, and creates an aging management program from Day 1 53.890, 53.892, and 53.894 Facility Safety Program, Criteria and None - Duplicates other programs, codifies periodic Plan safety review, and circumvents backfit protection 53.880 Criticality Safety Program None - Not necessary to require a program for compliance with each requirement. 50.68 is a better model for Part 53 requirement.
53.610 (a)(2-5), (c&d) and 53.620(a)(2-4), Construction and None - Not necessary for NRC to approve the Manufacturing Organization and Procedures organization and plan during construction and manufacturing 53.1225 PRA Maintenance Program for 53.450(c) None - Not necessary for NRC to approve the controls for updating the PRA 53.460(c) Human Action Performance Program None - Duplicates the training and other operational programs related to performance of human actions NRC should eliminate all of these programs as they are not needed for reasonable assurance of adequate protection ©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 43
NRC Approach to Programs in Part 53 An unstructured approach is inefficient and creates unintentional challenges NRCs approach to administrative controls results in:
- Dramatic expansion of NRC regulatory footprint over licensee controls
- An unclear and unbounded set of programmatic information subject to NRC approval Part 53 requires more programs and administrative controls be approved by the NRC, as compared to Parts 50/52 Part 53 requires approval of programmatic controls not required by Part 50/52
- Programmatic controls mean administrative procedures that govern the actions of equipment and personnel of an advanced nuclear plant.
- Required in 53.210, 53.220, 53.230, 53.240, 53.250, 53.260, 53.270, 53.400, 53.410, 53.420, 53.425, 53.430, 53.440, 53.460, 53.470, 53.490, 53.500, 53.510, 53.540, 53.610, 53.1225, etc.
- Typically stated as Design features and programmatic controls must be provided for - Not performance-based, clear or predictable
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 44
Programs Need to be Created with the Broader Regulatory Framework in Mind Programs work together with design features and human actions to for the technical basis for protecting the public
- The role of programs is to provide reasonable assurance that the design features and human actions will perform the actions described in the licensing basis
- Not all of the programs used by the licensee need to be required to be approved by the NRC The NRC imposes requirements that are effective even after the NRC issues a license for a new reactor
- NRC has an oversight and inspection program to ensure compliance
- NRC does not need to approve licensee controls related to compliance The licensee is competent in fulfilling their responsibility to perform administrative controls
- QA Program permeates the plant at each stage; comprises all those planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system, or component will perform satisfactorily in service
- Very little need for NRC approval of other administrative controls to achieve reasonable assurance that design features and human actions will perform functions in the licensing basis ©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 45
Performance-Based Approach to Part 53 Programs Leads to a clear, predictable and flexible regulatory framework Recognize that the QA Program provides substantial assurance that design features and human actions will perform functions in the licensing basis Establish the purpose for programs (e.g., by stage)
- Design - Provide reasonable assurance that the plant design is in accordance with the license and regulations.
- Manufacturing and Construction - Provide reasonable assurance that the plant is constructed and manufactured according to the license and regulations.
- Maintenance - Provide reasonable assurance that the SSCs are capable of performing their intended functions described in the SAR.
- Operations - Provide reasonable assurance that the plant is operated according to the license and regulations.
Establish performance criteria for each program, and entry criteria (graded)
Evaluate suitability of historical programs required by Part 50/52 Identify historical administrative controls not required to have NRC approval
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 46
Performance-Based Approach to Part 53 Programs Leads to a clear, predictable and flexible regulatory framework Performance Criteria Part 50 Programs Programs not needing Requiring NRC Approval NRC Approval Design Provide reasonable assurance that the plant design is in
- Criterion III - Design
- Change Control accordance with the license and regulations. Control (Appendix B) (50.59)
- 1. Applicable regulatory requirements and the design
- Records, reports and basis specified in the license are correctly translated
- FSAR Update (50.71) into specifications, drawings and procedures.
- Reliability Assurance
- 2. The design process used appropriate quality Program (SRM-standards, selected materials, parts and processes, SECY-95-132) controlled interfaces among participating
- Environmental organizations, suitable to the safety significance of Qualification the SSCs, and provided for verifying the adequacy of (50.49(a))
the design.
- 3. Performance characteristics of SSCs that serve as the basis for the design and analyses are supported by validation data.
- 4. Design changes are subject to the same design control measures and approved by the same design organization used for the original design.
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 47
Performance-Based Approach to Part 53 Programs Leads to a clear, predictable and flexible regulatory framework Performance Criteria Part 50 Programs Programs not needing Requiring NRC Approval NRC Approval Manufacturing Provide reasonable assurance that the plant is
- Criteria IV, VI thru XV -
- NSR SSC - Any and constructed and manufactured according to the license for safety-related SSCs commercial quality Construction and regulations (Quality Assurance - program
- 1. As-built SSCs are consistent with their as-designed Appendix B)
- Procurement program specifications.
- Defined by Applicant - for
- Receipt and verification
- 2. The applicable regulatory requirements are non-safety related but risk programs referenced in the procurement documents. important (50.69
- Turnover and routine Augmented Quality) startup program
- 3. Procured material, equipment and services conform
- Initial startup testing
- Reporting of Defects to the procurement specifications.
program (50.34(b)(6(iii)) and Nonconformances
- 4. As-built SSCs, prior to operation, are capable of (Part 21) performing the functions described in the license.
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 48
Performance-Based Approach to Part 53 Programs Leads to a clear, predictable and flexible regulatory framework Performance Criteria Part 50 Programs Requiring Programs not needing NRC Approval NRC Approval Maintenance Provide reasonable assurance that the SSCs are capable
- Maintenance
- FLEX Equipment -
of performing their intended functions described in the Monitoring Program if applicable SAR. (50.65) (50.155)
- 1. SSCs, during operations, continue to be capable of
- ISI/IST (50.55a)
- Maintenance performing the functions described in the license.
- Material Surveillance procedure
- 2. SSCs, for which the code or regulations require Program - if applicable development periodic inspection or testing, are confirmed to have (Part 50 Appendix H) not experienced unexpected degradation.
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 49
Performance-Based Approach to Part 53 Programs Leads to a clear, predictable and flexible regulatory framework Performance Criteria Part 50 Programs Requiring NRC Programs not needing Approval NRC Approval Operations Provide reasonable assurance that the plant is
- Technical specifications (50.36)
- Effluent release operated according to the license and
- Training and Requalification program regulations. Programs for Operators, Fuel
- Worker safety
- 1. Plant stays within the licensed conditions Handlers and Other Identified training programs of operations. Positions (50.2, Part 55, 50.120) and effectiveness
- 2. Administrative controls provide
- Operating Plans, Normal and assessments reasonable assurance that human actions Emergency (50.34(b)(6)(iv and v))
- OSHA worker credited for protection of public health and
- Fire Protection Plan (50.48) safety safety will be performed when needed.
- Radiation Protection (Part 20)
- Procedure
- 3. Humans relied upon are trained and
- Emergency Planning (50.47 or development for capable of performing assigned actions as 50.160) operations and described in the license.
- Security (Physical, cyber, access emergencies and FFD) (Part 73, Part 26)
- Event Reporting
- Environmental Protection - if (50.72/50.73) applicable (51.50)
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 50
Operational Programs NRC creating duplicative and unnecessary programs Industry presented the preceding to NRC on September 15, 2021 NRC response during the meeting
- Cant compare Part 53 requirements with Part 50/52 requirements
- Industry doesnt understand that NRC requirements are reducing regulatory burden
- Regulatory burden within each program is less, so shouldnt be concerned that there are more programs NRC has not provided a basis for requiring any of the programs in Part 53 that duplicate other programs or have no equivalent in Parts 50/52
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 51
Improving Clarity and Efficiency:
Technology Inclusive Cyril Draffin, USNIC 52
Technology Inclusive - All types of reactors
- During October 26, 2021 NRC Part 53 public meeting, NRC stated that they intend to revise preliminary language so that Part 53 is not restricted to only being used by advanced reactors
- We agree this should be the intention
- Part 53 allows all types of nuclear reactor technologies
- Avoid parallel rule frameworks for different technologies
- Have separate guidance if necessary
- Exclusion of any nuclear plant that is not considered advanced might unnecessarily exclude technologies that could meet Part 53 safety 53
Technology Inclusive - All developers
- Apply to all reactor developers and applications
- Part 53 requirements are screening criteria determining if developer would use (and applicant would meet relevant safety requirements)
- May be used for electricity, process heat, hydrogen production, and other applications
- Part 53 does not need to be limited in scope, and rule could easily be applicable to all production and utilization facilities licensed under AEA Section 103 or 104 54
Technology Inclusive - Consistent with NEIMA
- While NEIMA defined advanced nuclear reactor when it provided statutory requirements for NRC to develop Technology-Inclusive Regulatory Framework, it did not limit such framework only to advanced reactors, but rather stated that it should be flexible and practicable for application to a variety of reactor technologies
- NRC should not limit use of Part 53 to facilities according to features defined as advanced nuclear reactor in the NEIMA (B thru H), such as lower levelized cost of electricity, increased thermal efficiency and ability to integrate into electric and nonelectric applications, because these fall outside NRCs authority of regulating nuclear safety
- NRC should not limit use of Part 53 to reactors that have additional inherent or passive safety features because that establishes a moving target for applicability that could disrupt regulatory stability
- No benefit for NRC to create artificial screening criterion to compare Part 53 applicants use of inherent or passive safety features in design to significant improvements compared to commercial nuclear reactors under construction as of the date of enactment of this Act. If proposed design can meet Part 53 requirements for safety, that should be sufficient justification for utilizing Part 53
- Creating screening criterion to use Part 53 based on increased use of inherent or passive safety features is unnecessary, and is contrary to NRCs Advanced Reactor Policy Statement, which encourages but does not 55 require enhanced safety of advanced reactors
Part 53 regulations can balance certainty and flexibility across multiple characteristics Technology Single Technology Any Technology Technology Requirements Requirements Prescriptive Performance Based Methods Prescribed Method Any Method Methods Existing LWR regulation Released NRC Part 53 draft text Goal for a flexible regulatory framework source: Nuclear Innovation Alliance, 9 December 2021 presentation to NRC Commissioners 56
Goals for Regulatory Efficiency Cyril Draffin, USNIC 57
Complexity Creates Problems - guidance might help resolve (1/2)
- For effective licensing, NRC needs to have high-level plan on how Part 53 will integrate all aspects of regulation o Including rules, guidance, staff interpretations, and oversight during operations o To date, Part 53 guidance limited (other than TICAP designed for Part 50/52)
- Without guidance (e.g. for change control) not possible to fully assess NRC preliminary approach
- NRC provided list of needed guidance earlier in 2021, and 9 month delay offers time o Limited clarity on how to have timely reviews and avoid submission of unnecessary information in applications under Part 53 o Limited clarity on scope and extent of inspections during operations, and what operational flexibility will be allowed 58
Complexity Creates Problems - guidance might help resolve (2/2)
- Without clarity, overlapping requirements and programs may make it harder for NRC staff to approve applications and implement rule o Goal is to focus on safety significant aspects of technology, and not be distracted by minor issues with very limited impact on safety o Rapid scale up of advanced reactor applications could challenge the staff's ability to make timely regulatory decisions 59
NRC Internal Goals for Part 53 Regulatory Efficiency
- With potential order of magnitude increase in applications, NRC needs metrics to judge their internal regulatory efficiency o Shorter and predicable timeframes (e.g. number of months) to review license applications o Effective use of prior Topical Reports and other approvals (include documentation submitted and approved by other regulatory organizations) o Lessons learned o RAIs (reduce requests for additional information, especially for non safety-significant matters) o Benefits of pre-application reviews focused on key issues; early escalation of key policy issues o Effectiveness of core teams for licensing reviews of FOAK and subsequent applications o Constraints on unnecessary oversight reviews and inspections o Long term regulatory stability o Develop scalable process o Eliminating inefficiency and making best use of NRC staff resources (importance of both efficiency and effectiveness)
NIA Dec 2021, Promoting Efficient NRC Advance Reactor Licensing Reviews to Enable Rapid Decarbonization 60
Clear Vision and Specific Goals for Final Rule (1/2)
- Encourage NRC to establish clear vision and specific goals for the final Part 53 rule, and to utilize systematic approach to developing rule
- From Unified Industry Position (letter dated July 14, 2021) re Part 53
- 1. Available for use by all technologies and risk-informed licensing approaches
- 2. Less burdensome over the lifecycle of activities (e.g., licensing, construction, operations, oversight), than regulating under the existing Parts 50 and 52
- 3. Built upon performance-based requirements that define clear and objective acceptance criteria
- Vision, goals and systematic approach are important to ensure that the final rule will be successful o Rule to effectively accommodate large number of reactor applications o Provide different pathway for new reactor designs 61
Clear Vision and Specific Goals for Final Rule (2/2)
Industry has proposed Principles in Adopting New Part 53 as far back as 10 October 2019 NRC public meeting-- USNIC 10CFR Part 53: Ideas for Risk-informed, Technology Inclusive Regulatory Framework for Advanced Reactors Rulemaking
- New Part 53 should be focused on technical requirements and should minimize administrative requirements inconsistent with efficient licensing
- Eliminating or streamlining requirements that are overly prescriptive or not relevant will reduce need for future exemptions
- Need to avoid putting too much detail in FSAR - simplicity is the key
- Revisit content of application requirements to right-size FSAR to reflect safety-significance of systems, structures or components (also applies to operational programs like maintenance rule, QA, radiation protection, in-service inspection, startup)
- Consider required reviews in fixed period of time (e.g. 2-3 years for Small Modular Reactors; 6 months for micro-reactors) once initial SMRs and micro-reactors have been approved
- Commission needs to address ongoing policy questions associated with security and emergency planning zone requirements to recognize the reduced source term and size of these designs, in order to avoid potential conflicts in a future Part 53 62 and NEIs October 21, 2020 letter - ML20296A398
Path for Exemptions in Part 53
- For non-LWRs, substantively fewer Part 53 exemptions likely to be required vs. Part 50 & 52
- But smooth process for Part 53 exemptions also may be needed o Many potential applications might be presented to NRC (with different coolants, fuels, technology designs and sizes) o NRC could make process easier in Part 53, and proactively recommend exemptions 63
Part 53 Coordination with other Rulemakings Important contemporaneous efforts underway:
- Emergency planning
- Security
- GEIS (Environmental reviews)
As appropriate, NRC should better integrate safety, security, EP, and siting 64
Similar ACRS and Industry Input Cyril Draffin, USNIC 65
Similar ACRS and Industry input on Part 53 (1/2)
- Drop two tier structure
- Flow of objectives, safety criteria, safety functions
- Decouple requirement for normal operation
- Not require or rely on just LMP approach or IAEA approach
- Part 53 can be methodology neutral, and PRA language should be modified to enable use of PRA in ways applicants expect to use the tool
- Applicants use spectrum of risk-based and deterministic approaches
- Part 53 should be risk-informed not risk-based
- Broad interpretation of credible event increases regulatory uncertainty 66
Similar ACRS and Industry input on Part 53 (2/2)
- Add requirements for safe, stable end state conditions
- Unify QA requirements (allow broader set of codes and standards)
- Provide detailed explanation of the integrated intent of the rule
- Duplication in draft
- More guidance is needed to clarify regulations
- Questioned ALARA in rule 67
Other topics Cyril Draffin, USNIC 68
Quality Assurance Requirements
- Unify all QA references in single location in Part 53
- Opportunity for fresh look at alternatives to NQA-1 o Commercially available components quality may meet/exceed nuclear standards with reduced artificial burden o Rule should require quality control program, but not specify approach
- Guidance should support broad standards and approaches, e.g., ISO 9000 series, IAEA, commercial dedication o Reduce barriers to commercial competition, and facilitate licensing abroad- recognizing greater supply chain base can improve quality o International acceptance of a single approval could be important in international marketability o Guidance should show ISO standards and IAEA approaches meet requirements o Guidance could address topic of universal acceptance of codes and standards (mechanical, electrical)
- NEI is developing guidance on using ISO-9001 to meet Appendix B QA requirements o Available to operating fleet, new reactors licensing under Parts 50/52, and for Part 53 (if Part 53 QA requirements consistent with Appendix B) 69
5 November 2021 NEI/USNIC letter & attachments Goal for Part 53 consolidated industry comments:
Provide clarity and detail on perspectives provided to NRC in meetings and letters over the past year, especially in areas where NRC has not addressed our concerns or described why they arent addressing our concerns
- Attachment A: Comments by specific topical areas; addresses beneficial features and significant challenges (22 pages)
- Attachment B: Detailed comments on nearly all of preliminary Part 53 rule language, regulation-by-regulation; specific proposed revisions provided (83 page table)
- Attachment C: Prior submissions made by USNIC/NEI since 2019 (4 pages; 40 submissions) 70
Backup or reserve slides Example A: NEI 18-04 (Leading Role)
TI-RIPB Principle Approach to Meet Principle in Example A
- 1. Meet established limits for adequate
- PRA frequencies and consequences ensure LBEs are within the F-C protection curve, and QHOs are not challenged
- 2. Establish the safety functions, design PRA delineates the relevant safety functions, which define safety features and functional design criteria features, which are used to select functional design criteria for each type of LBE
- 3. Selected LBEs adequately cover the
- PRA is the primary component of an iterative process to select the range of hazards LBEs in a systematic and comprehensive manner
- 4. SSCs are categorized according to PRA is used to categorize SSCs according to the roles they play in their safety significance satisfying the safety functions
- 5. Design reflects the application of an PRA is used to establish DID through systematic evaluation of LBEs, with appropriate philosophy of defense-in- systematic determinations of adequacy, including the need to account for depth uncertainties
- 6. Special treatment for SSCs,
- PRA input to integrated decision-making panel to identify special programmatic controls and human treatment beyond safety-related SSCs actions are appropriate
- Quantitative reliability targets set for significant SSCs
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 72
Example B: NEI 18-04 (Confirmatory Role)
TI-RIPB Principle Approach to Meet Principle in Example B
- 1. Meet established limits for adequate
- Deterministic analyses determine the limits are met protection
- 2. Establish the safety functions, design
- Deterministic analyses systematically establish safety functions, features and functional design criteria safety features and functional design criteria (e.g., use of ARDC)
- PRA confirms or identifies vulnerabilities to address
- 3. Selected LBEs adequately cover the
- Deterministic methods are primary component of iterative and range of hazards systematic process to select the LBEs
- PRA supports deterministic methods in iterative process
- 4. SSCs are categorized according to
- Deterministic methods used to categorize SSCs according to the their safety significance roles they play in the DBA analysis
- 5. Design reflects the application of an
- Deterministic methods systematically establish DID and adequacy, appropriate philosophy of defense-in- including the accounting for uncertainties depth
- 6. Special treatment for SSCs,
- Categorization establishes need for special treatments programmatic controls and human
- PRA input to integrated decision-making to identify ST for SSCs other actions are appropriate than SR
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 73
Example C: IAEA TI-RIPB Principle Approach to Meet Principle in Example C
- 1. Meet established limits for adequate
- Deterministic analyses determine the limits are met protection
- PRA searches for cliff-edge effects, and can be used to confirm F-C curve and the QHOs are not challenged
- 2. Establish the safety functions, design
- Deterministic assessments and requirements establish safety features and functional design criteria functions, principal technical requirements and design requirements (equivalent to NRC)
- PRA is used to confirm deterministic results
- 3. Selected LBEs adequately cover the
- Deterministic methods establish LBEs (Normal, AOO, DBA, and range of hazards BDBE) and characterize plant response
- PRA informs through systematic search and perspective on frequencies
- 4. SSCs are categorized according to
- Deterministic assessments are primary means of categorizing SSCs their safety significance and are informed by PRA insights
- 5. Design reflects the application of an
- Deterministic assessment of DID adequacy through formal framework appropriate philosophy of defense-in-
- 6. Special treatment for SSCs,
- Deterministic engineering analyses and judgement programmatic controls and human
- PRA insights to confirm and inform actions are appropriate ©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 74
Example D: Bounding Analysis TI-RIPB Principle Approach to Meet Principle in Example B
- 1. Meet established limits for adequate
- Deterministic analyses determine the limits are met protection
- Risk information* provides perspective on the margin and demonstrates that the QHOs are not challenged
- 2. Establish the safety functions, design
- Deterministic analyses systematically establish safety functions, features and functional design criteria safety features and functional design criteria (e.g., use of ARDC)
- Risk information in limited role to confirm most challenging accidents included
- 3. Selected LBEs adequately cover the
- Deterministic methods identify and confirm adequacy of events (one range of hazards or small set) with bounding consequences
- Risk information in limited role confirm events are bounding
- 4. SSCs are categorized according to
- Deterministic assessments conservatively categorize SSCs their safety significance
- 5. Design reflects the application of an
- Deterministic methods systematically and conservatively establish appropriate philosophy of defense-in- DID and adequacy depth
- Risk information provide additional assurance of DID adequacy
- 6. Special treatment for SSCs,
- Deterministic engineering analyses programmatic controls and human actions are appropriate