IR 05000293/1997009

Insp Rept 50-293/97-09 on 970827-28.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Access Authorization Program

ML20216G818
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	09/04/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20216G810	List: ML20216G806 ML20216G818
References
50-293-97-09, 50-293-97-9, NUDOCS 9709160058
Download: ML20216G818 (7)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,

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REGION I

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- Docket No:' '50 293 -;

p Report No:; 50 293/97 0 :

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l Licensee:'~ Boston Edison Company-: ,

.i Facility:- Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station =

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' Location: - . Plymouth, MA j

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Dates: August 27 28,1997 Y- Inspectors: G. C. Smith, St. Security Specialist -

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. R. Rosano, Sr. Program Manager -

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Michael C. Modes, Chief -

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- Approved by:

Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Safety- 1

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.

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On August 19,1997, an individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and Vermont that left four people dead. - The individual was subsequently killed in a confrontation with Vermont law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement authorities later found bomb making materials stored at the individual's residenc Because the individual had been granted access to three nucit e.: power plants, special NRC inspections were initiated at each of the plants to determine if the access authorization programs, as implementec, identified information that should have precluded the individual from being granted unescorted acces The licensee's access authorization program was inspected August 27 and 28,1997, and determined to meet the regulatory requiremsnts. The NRC did not identify any information, used by the licensee in processing the individual for access authorization, that should have precluded the licensee from grariting the individual unescorted access to the secured i portions of their plan .

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Bgport Details 88- Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues S8.1 StatIAl

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On August:19,1997, an individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and Vermont that lef t four people dead. The individual was subsequently killed in a .

confrontation with Vermont law enforcement authorities.- Law enforcement authorities later found bomb making materials stored at the individual's residence in New Hampshire. Because the individual had been granted unescorted access to three nuclear power plants, specialinspections wero initiated at each of the plants

- to assess implementation of the licensee's access authorization (AA) programs in order to determine if they met tho regulatory requirements and the licensee's physical security plans, and to determine if any information was or should have -

been identified during the AA process that should have precluded the individual ,

being granted unescorted acces The individual had been granted unescorted access to Vermont Yankee in 1992 and 1995 and to Pilgrim in 1997 basad on completion of all componer,ts of the access authorization program. The individual was granted unescorted access to Indian Point (IP) 3, based on a transfer of access authorization from Pilgrim and an update -

of his activities for the approximate 2 month period between the time he left Pilgrim and began work at IP 3, as provided for in the AA requirements. The NRC inspection included a review of the AA programs at Vermont Yankee, Pilgrim and IP S8.2 Access Authorization Proaram and Procedures Insoection Scone The inspectors reviewed the licensee's security plans and access authorization procedures and conducted interviews to assess the licensee's access authorization program, Observations and Findingg The review of the licensee's security plan (the Plan) and AA preedures disclosed that the Plan and procedures, as written and implemented, satisfied the requirements el 10 CFR 73.56, " Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants," and followed the guidance contained in Regulatory Guide 5.66,_" Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants." Interviews with personnel disclosed they were knowledgeable of the AA requirements contained in the regulations, the Plan and the AA procedure Conclusions The inspectors' review disclosed that the licensee's AA program, as implemented, met all regulatory rec,uirement __

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S8.3 Backaround Investiaation (BI) Elements Insoection Scope The inspectors reviewed records and conducted interviews in order to determine the adequac of the program in determining the true identity of the individual and to

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develop liformation concerning employment history, educational history, credit historv, criminal history and character and reputation of the individual prior to granting unescorted access, Observation and Findjngi The inspectors reviewed the results of the individual's background investigation (BI)

and determined that the scope and depth of the BI met the licensee's program commitments and provided the information required by the program commitments on which to base a determination for access authorization. In accordance with 10 CFR 73.57, the licensee is responsible for initiating critninal history checks on individuals applying for unescorted access authorization and for considering all information received from the U.S. Attorney Gc.1eral. One licensee (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation) submitted fingerprint cards to initiate the criminal history check twice (once in 1992 and once in 1995), in both cases, prior arrests were identified. The inspectors determinod that the information had been properly evaluated and adjudicated prior to granting unescorted access, in addition, Bostor? Edison submitted fingerprint cards to initiate the criminal history check in December 1996. The information received back from the criminal history check indicated no prior arrest data. The NRC is pursuing this issue with the FBI to determine why the prior arrest data was not identified during the 1996 criminal history check, Conclusion Although the 1996 criminal history check did not identify any prior arrests, the inspectors concluded that there were no deficiencies in the processes used by either licensee to ir.itiate the enminal history check S8.4 Psycholoaical Evgluations IDsoection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensee's psychological testing program procedures to insure they met applicable requirement Observations. Findinas and Conclusions The licensee contracted with licensed psychologists to provide oversight of the psychological testing program and to perform the requisite evaluations. After the psychological tests were administered, the answer sheets were forwarded to the psychologist for evaluation, and if the need for a clinical interview was indicated,

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- the psychologist conducted the interview and recommended either access or denial to the licensee. The individual was psychologically tested in 1992,1995 and 199 The 1992 test indicated the need for a clinicalinterview and the psychologist conducting the interview recommended, after conducting the interview, that site access be grante The inspectors determined that the licensees' psychological evaluation program was ,

t,eing implemented in accordance with applicable regulatory requirement S8.5 Behavior Observation Prooram-(DOP) Insocction Scong The inspectors reviewed the Behavior Observation Program training procedures and lesbon plans and conducted interviews to determine the effectiveness of the ,

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licensees' program Observations and Findinog Yhe programs were instituted as part of, and as an element in common with, the licensees' Fitness for Duty (FFD) program. Review of the procedures and lesson plant indicated that they met all regulatory requirements. Interviews with several of the individuals' pu;t supervisors indicated that they had a knowledge of program requiiements e they demonstreted an awareness and sensitivity to detect and report adve; r 'innges in behavior, Conclu_sino The inspectors concluded that the BOP was being effectively implemente S8.0 Tomoorarv Access Authorization ininggtion Scone The inspectors reviewed records that included the results of abbreviated scope investigations, which were used as the basis for granting temporary unescorted access authorization, as permitted by the rul Observations Findinos and Conclusions The records of the abbreviated scope investigations were determined to contain adequate information (character and reputation frorn a developed reference, past year's employment history, and a credit check) on which to base temporary access authorization. The inspectors noted that, in these records of abbreviated scope investination, there was no data which necessitated rescission of access auth5tation following receipt of the full S year investigatio __

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i S8.7 Audha  !

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The inspectors reviewed the most recent audits of the contractors used by each  !

licensee to conduct B j Observations and Findinas  ;

i The inspectors' review disclosed that the audits were comprehensive in scope and i

. ' depth. The audit findings were administrative in nature and no programmatic  :

deficiencies were identifie ,

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S8.8 Search Eaulomant

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The inspectors reviewed the licensees' procedures for testing personnel and i package search equipment, reviewed maintenance records for search equipment and observed licensee testing of the search equipment to assess its effectivenes !

, Observations and Findinas Test procedures were adequate to properly evaluate the search equipment -[

performance, maintenance records indicated that the equipment was not  !

experiencing any unusual maintenance problems, and testing of the equipment

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determined that it was operable, i Conclusign [

The inspectors determined that the personnel and pacl: age search equipment was being tested and maintained in accordance with applicable security plan .

requirements and was capable of performing its' intended function l X1 Ealt interview _

An exit interview was conducted by telephone on September 3,1997. At that -

time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the preliminary findings were presented. The licansees acknowledged the preliminary inspection ,

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i PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONNEL CONTACTED  ;

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J. Neal, Protection Services Department Manager t N. Desmond, Regulatory Relations Manager E. Neary, Security Operations Supervisor W. Riggs, Nuclear Services Group Manager T. Campbsll, Security Services Supervisor C9Dtintt0L R. Wheat, Project Manager, Protection Technology N. Medcalf, Administrator, Protection Technology  ;

C. Stanley, Security Specialist, Protection Technology j All of the above licensee personnel were present at the exit meeting conducted by i telephone on September 3,1997. The inspectors also Interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel, f

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