NRC-97-0022, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-341/96-13.Corrective Actions:Nso Placed Scram Discharge Vol High Level Bypass Switch in Bypass Position

Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-341/96-13.Corrective Actions:Nso Placed Scram Discharge Vol High Level Bypass Switch in Bypass Position

ML20136G856
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	03/10/1997
From:	Gipson D DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
CON-NRC-97-0022, CON-NRC-97-22 NUDOCS 9703180229
Download: ML20136G856 (11)

Text

• . I Douglas R. Gipson Senior Vce Presdent

. Nuclear Generabon DefiOli rerm a 6400 North Dixie Highway Newport. Mehigan 48166 (313) 586-5249 10 CFR 2.201 March 10,1997 NRC-97-0022 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

References:

1) Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 NRC License No. NPF-43

2) NRC Inspection Report 50-341/96013 and Notice of Violation, dated February 6,1997

3) SECY-96-154, " Proposed Revision to NRC Enforcement Guidance for Departures from the FSAR in Violation of 10CFR 50.59 and for  ;

Failures to Update FSAR in Violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e)", dated July 5,1996

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4) Detroit Edison Letter to NRC, " Proposed Technical ,

Specification Change (License Amendment)- Rod Block l Monitor Applicability," NRC-96-0134, l dated December 2,1996 .j

5) NRC Letter to Detroit Edison," Actions Associated With an Amendment Request for the Technical Specifications for the Rod i Block Monitor at Fermi 2,"

dated December 19,1996

6) Detroit Edison Letter to NRC, " Proposed Technical Specification Change (License Amendment) - Maximum Exps nded Operating Domain," NRC-90-0125, dated August 20,1990.

7) General Electric Propriety Report, NEDC-31843P, " Fermi 2 Maximum Extended Operating Domain Analysis," dated July 1990.

Subject:

Reply to Notices of Violation (96013-01,96013-02, g 960i3-03a60i3-06. and 960i3-07) 1S0114 ggDI ,

t 9703180229 970310 PD51 ADOCK 050003412 gggggggggg G PDR ; ,

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1 s b l NRC-97-0022 -

Page 2 Enclosed is Detroit Edison's response to the Notices of Violation (NOVs) contained in Reference 2. The following new commitments are made in this letter:

Maintenance will perform a review of Electrical and I&C procedures to identify leads which experience multiple lifting, and determine if a more positive means of verifying the relanding can be implemented.' It will be emphasized to the technicians that any unusual condition, such as an unlanded lead, should be communicated to their supervisors and to Operations immediately.

Repair of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 12 muffler is planned for the system outage presently scheduled for May 1997.

j Should you have any questions regarding this response, please contact Ronald C. j Wittschen, Compliance Engineer at (313) 586-1267.

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Sincerely, ,

R cc: A. B. Beach G. A. Harris M. J. Jordan A. J. Kugler Region III 1

I Attachment to NRC-97-0022

,. Pap,e 1 Response to Notice of Violation 50-341/96013-01 Statement of Notice of Violation 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," required in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or

' drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.

Abnormal Operating procedure 20.000.21, " Reactor Scram," Revision 38, required in part, that the operator verify that a Scram Discharge Volume Level High alarm was received, followed by the Scram Discharge Volume High water level scram, and then reset the scram.

Contray to the above, on December 4,1996, an operator failed to accomplish the Abnormal Operating Procedure 20.000.21 as prescribed. The operator reset the scram before receiving both the Scram Discharge Volume Level High alarm and scram.

Reason for the Violation During the restoration sequence of a routine surveillance procedure a Nuclear Supervising Operator (NSO) placed the Reactor Mode Switch in the Shutdown position which inserted an expected manual reactor scram signal. The NSO observed the lights on the manual scram push buttons extinguish indicating the ten second time delay for resetting a reactor scram had expired.

The NSO then reset the manual reactor scram signal without first bypassing the scram discharge volume high level circuity. A scram discharge volume high level alarm was received, the scram discharge volume high-high level scram setpoint was subsequently reached, and an unplanned automatic reactor scram occurred per plant design.

The Corrective Steps That Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved Immediate corrective actions by the NSO were to place the scram discharge volume high level  :

bypass switch in the bypass position and then properly reset the unplanned automatic reactor scram. A night order was issued which briefly described the event and reminded Operators of the procedural guidance for resetting reactor scrams. Licensee Event Report (LER)96-021 was l issued December 30,1996.

The Corrective Steps That Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violatio_g:

This event will be included in the Operations Experience portion of Training Cycle 97-02 for licensed and non-licensed Operators, as was discussed in LER 96-021.

Date When Fu'l Compliance Will be Achieved l

. Detroit Edison is presently in full compliance. i I

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Attachment to NRC-97-0022

. Page 2 Response to Notice of Violation 50-341/96013-02 Statement of Notice of Violation 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," required in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or

' drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.

Operating Conduct Manual, Chapter 5, " Control of Equipment," Revision 5, Step 2.1, requires in part, that only operations personnel shall operate plant systems and equipment.-

Contrary to the above, on October 30,1996, plant personnel instead of operations personnel operated the spent fuel pool manual fill valves and overfilled the pool.-

Reason for the Violation On October 29,1996 with the spent fuel pool (SFP) water level higher than normal, water entered -

the ventilation ducts located just above the normal water level. This resulted in spills onto the third and fourth floors located below as water dripped from the ventilation system. The manual valve normally used for filling the SFP, was found to be two turns open.

The Corrective Steps That Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved An investigation was initiated and all individuals in the area of the fill valve were interviewed.

None of the personnel admitted to opening the manual valve. The investigation ultimately concluded that the most probable scenario was that a contract employee performing a decontamination task had opened the spent fuel pool manual fill valve [G4100F015]. The individual was apparently attempting to obtain water for a hose connection to complete a decontamination function. It does not appear to have been a malicious act. The individual is no longer employed at Fermi. -

This was an isolated event and reflects poorjudgment on the part of one individual. All personnel including contract personnel had previously been trained not to operate plant equipment without expressed Operations approval. No further corrective actions are necessary.

Date When Full Compliance Will be Achieved Detroit Edison is presently % full compliance.

- Attachment to NRC-97-0022

, Page 3 Response to Notice of Violation 50-341/96013-03 Statement of Notice of Violation 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V," Instructions, Procedure '

Nawings," required, in l part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented int .s, procedures, or s drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and be accomplishu in accordance with these instmetions, procedures, or drawings.

Contrary to the above, on November 6,1996, Surveillance Procedure 44.030.251 and I 44.030.253, " Reactor Vessel Water Level Channel A/C Logic Tests," were inadequate in that j they failed to verify that electricallead KKl8 was properly connected aner removal in the i procedure.

4 The inspectors reviewed the completed surveillances and found that the documentation for relanding the KKl8 lead was not conclusive; the I&C policy on how procedure steps were signed resulted in one person signing for all steps being performed, including verifications, based on reports from workers. The inspectors also determined that neither of the last two surveillances which were known to have lifted the KKl8 lead,44.030.251 and 44.03G 253, " Division 1 Reactor Vessel Water Level Channel Functional Tests (Channels A and C)," adequately verified that it was relanded. The normal methodology used for I&C procedures for relanding leads was to either .

independently verify the lead to have been returned to normal, or else functionally test that part of

, the circuit. Neither was done in the case of these procedures.

Reason for the Violation Recirculation Motor Generator (MG) set "A" had been shutdown at the completion of the Fiflh Refueling Outage (RF05) with no abnormalities. The reactor building rounds operator subsequently found that the field breaker was not in the open position. It should have tripped open when the MG set was shutdown. It was determined that a lined and taped lead prevented

. relay K54 from picking up and closing the contacts to the field breaker trip coil. The cause of the lifted lead could not be determined.

The Corrective Stens That Have Been Taken ai the Results Achieved All personnel working in the area were interviewed; work documents which involved lifting the KKl8 lead were reviewed; work documents involving the same panel were reviewed; and Security performed an independent investigation. The investigation into the event identified that the KKl8 lead was found in the lified condition by technicians doing unrelated work. They taped the lead to prevent electrical contact with the panel door. The cause of the lifted lead could not be determined, although the security investigation concluded it did not appear to be done with malicious intent.

Attachment to

NRC-97-0022

. Page 4 The Fermi practice for continuous use procedures is that each step must be performed in the sequence given, and when required, signed off as it is completed before proceeding to the next

step. For the procedures noted in the violation, the surveillance requires actions in different locations. These actions are managed by the control room technician directing each step of the procedure in the order specified. When directed, each step of the procedure is completed by one technician, reported to the control room and verified, when required by procedure, by a second technician that also reports completion to the control room technician. The control room technician initials each step as it is reported to him. This is the normal methodology for relanding wires. This process was used in both of the last two surveillances which were known to have lined the KKl8 lead.

The Corrective Steps That Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations:

It will be emphasized to the technicians that any unusual condition, such as the unlanded lead, should be communicated to their supervisors and to Operations immediately. Maintenance will perform a revice> of Electrical and I&C procedures to identify leads which experience multiple lining, and dearmine if a more positive means of verifying the relanding can be implemented.

Date When Full Compliance Will be Achieved Full compliance was achieved when the lead was properly relanded.

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Attachment to

, NRC-97-0022

. Paige 5 1

I Response to Notice of Violation 50-341/96013-06 i

l Statement of Notice of Violation 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Actions," required in part, that in the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition.

Contrary to the above, on January 11,1996, the licensee determined that a bame plate inside the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 12 mumer was loose, but failed to take action to correct the 4 deficiency in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance of the system. j P

Reason for the Violation ]

The inspectors agreed based on their observations that the EDG 12 operability was unchanged.

However, the inspectors were concerned that the Closed to Process (CTP) method of handling this issue did not handle ultimate resolution with the proper attention due a safety system. Low significance was assigned based on a low probability of catastrophic failure, rather than evaluating the consequences of further degradation. The CTP procedure did not require the changes to the l intended corrective action be reviewed with those responsible for the original action. Also, the J informal method by which the ongoing assessment of EDG 12 operability was handled was considered weak, particularly because it resided with a single individual.

forrective Steps Taken and the Results Achieved The metallic rattle in the exhaust mumer for EDG 12 was investigated, the vendor contacted, and an operability determination made. The probable cause of the noise was determined to be due to a loose bame plate inside the mumer. Based on the vendors recommendation the system engineer began monitoring the mumer noise during engine runs. Cylinder exhaust temperatures were also monitored for indications of potential mumer degradation. The EDG was determined to be operable and a work request for the repair / replacement of the mumer was initiated. Based on the conclusion that the EDG was operable, and that the ongoing monitoring indicated degradation was not increasing, the planned corrective actions were appropriate. The repair was not assigned a high priority since the EDG was operable. The consequence of further degradation was recognized to be that the EDG may not be operable, but additional degradation was not observed.

The System Engineer is the most knowledgeable person to make the operability determination and this determination was discussed with appropriate Operations, Maintenance, and Vendor personnel before being issued. The subsequent formal review agreed with the initial determination that the EDG was operable.

The September 1996 EDG system outage had been planned assuming approval of the Technical Specification change request to increase the outage time LCO to 7 days. When the approval was not received, the system outage was canceled. The next system outage is May 1997 and the scheduled repair of the mumer was subsequently revised. The decision to accomplish the repairs

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. Attachment to i - NRC-97-0022 1 Page 6 during the planned system outage was based on the following: (1) Based on the ongoing i monitoring of the muffler, degradation was not increasing and the EDG remained operable. The

repair was not required to establish operability. Based on this determination, the repair was i assigned an appropriate priority and was scheduled to be accomplished during a suitable window. )

(2) The repair would require that EDG 12 be declared inoperable and an LCO Action Statement

entered with the associated impact. Repair during the planned system outage would not require i an additional entry into a Technical Specification Action Statement. However, if monitoring indicated an increase in degradation, the EDG could be declared inoperable, and the repair l performed during the operating cycle.

The impact of performing the repair during the Fifth Refueling Outage (RF05) was reviewed in the aggregate. Logistics of resources, space limitations and congestion, and schedule and manpower changes were all reviewed. A determination was made that this repair would potentially preclude efficient execution of the other higher priority work in the area. Therefore the ,

repair was not added to the RF05 schedule. I For Level 3 Deviation Event Requests (DER) " Closed to Process" (CTP) allows closure of the  !

DER for items oflow significance which have been identified in another work process and are i being tracked to completion in it. Unless there is a change in operability as determined by the system engineer, there is no need to change the priority or the original decision.  !

The informa, monitoring of EDG muffler noise has been captured in a procedure to formalize the review for degradation. Other parameters such as cylinder exhaust temperatures were already included in the procedure.

The Corrective Steps That Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations:

l Repair of the EDG 12 muffler is planned for the EDG systems outage scheduled for May 1997.

Date When Full Compliance Will be Achieved Detroit Edison is presently in full compliance.

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Attachment to NRC-97-0022

Page 7 i Response to Notice of Violation 50-341/96013-07 i

Statement of Notice of Violation

! 10 CFR 50.59, " Changes, Tests and Experiments," permitted the licensee to make changes in the 1 I

facility as described in the Safety Analysis Report, without prior Commission approval unless the j proposed change involved a change in the technical specifications or an unreviewed safety question. It further required that a change to the facility described in the Safety Analysis Report, H j which does involve a change in technical specifications, shall be submitted in an application for

amendment oflicense per 50.90. l J

Contrary to the above, on November 11,1996, the licensee failed to submit'a technical -!

specification change which was required to ensure that mechanical overpower limits for the new

core would be met during a rod withdrawal error event as described in the Safety Analysis  ;

Report.

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The inspectors determined that Safety Evaluation 96-0128, Revision 0, and the associated .

i Preliminary Evaluation, evaluating the COLR for the cycle 6 core, were inadequate in that they j improperly concluded that a TS change was not required to ensure that mechanical overpower  !

limits would be met during a rod withdrawal error event.- Instead, the licensee issued TSC 96-004 j to indicate that the RBM operability requirements of the COLR would be followed, beyond the j TS requirements.

l The NRC concluded that a change was required to the existing TS in order to ensure that mechanical overpower limits would be met during a rod withdrawal error event.

Rea 1.f,r the Violation Amendment 69 to the Fermi 2 Operating License was based on Detroit Edison's submittal of the ARTS (APRM Rod Block Technical Specification Improvement) Rod Block Monitor Technical Specification Change (Reference 6). General Electric (GE) report NEDC-31843P (Reference 7) was referenced in that submittal as the basis for the proposed Technical Specification (TS) changes. Section 15.0 of the GE report, entitled " Rod Block Monitor System Description and

- Requirements," provides an in-depth discussion of the Rod Block Monitor (RBM) system evaluation and requirements provided by the ARTS improvement, including the generic Rod Withdrawal Error (RWE) analysis that forms the basis for the system and the RBM Technical specihcation. Specifically, Section 15.3 discusses the RWE analysis and Section 15.5 specifies the 1GM system operability requirements. Mechanical Overpower Limits (MOP) or 1% plastic strain limits were not discussed as the basis for the RBM operability requirements. The stated basis for the system and the operability requirements only address protection of the MCPR safety limit. GE' considered MOP to be an additional fuel design consideration which is outside the design and licensing basis of the ARTS RBM system.

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y o . Attachment to .

NRC-97-0022 l . Paige 8 t.

TS 3,1.4.3 and 3.3.6 describe the conditions under which the RBM must be operable. During the performance of the Cycle 6 reload licensing analysis it was determined that it was necessary to l take credit for the Rod Block High Trip Setpoint (HTSP) Analytical Limit in order to meet the

MOP performance requirements dudng portions of Cycle 6. The results of this analysis form the basis fr s limits in the Cycle 6 Core Operating Limits Report (COLR). In order to ensure that -

MCF units are met, Detroit Edison therefore included a requirement in the COLR for Cycle 6 to

! ensure that at least one RBM channel was OPERABLE when moving control rods with thermal power greater than or equal to 30% of rated THERMAL POWER. Operation in accordance with the change was not prohibited by the existing TS, As discussed above, preservation of the MOP and plastic strain limits were not considered to be the bases for the RBM operability requirements.

Additionally, this measure was more restrictive than the existing TS.

An evaluation in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 was initiated to implement  !

the Cycle 6 COLR and it was determined that the proposed change did not involve a change to the TS, nor an unreviewed safety question. The evaluation considered the 10 CFR 50.59 term

" involves a change to the TS" to mean the change is prohibited by or conflicts with the existing

. TS, This is consistent with past practices at Fermi 2, and is believed to be consistent with industry practice in general.- There are many examples in the industry where this interpretation appears to have been used. For instance, errors discovered in the 10 CFR 50.46 ECCS evaluation model have been compensated by administrative controls more restrictive than the TS required actions to preserve analysis results.

Detroit Edison notes the general lack of regulatory guidance in the interpretation of 10 CFR 50.59. Reference 3, however, would seem to support the Detroit Edison interpretation that the term " involves" is intended to mean " conflicts" with an existing TS. Examples of violations relating to failure to identify necessary technical specifications appear to use " conflict with existing technical specifications" as the threshold for a violation. Nevertheless, Detroit Edison recognizes the NRC's sensitivity to seeking required approval when necessary. Reference 3 was ,

approved by the Commission on September 27,1996. This document indicates that the regulatory process of 10 CFR 50.59 is appropriate unless there is an unreviewed safety question or a conflict with an existing technical specification. The discussion of example I.C.5 describes a failure such that a required license amendment was not sought. In this example the change to the TS is required because the change involves a conflict with the technical specifications. Clearly in the case of the Cycle 6 COLR change there was no cor.flict. The additional measures were more restrictive than the existing TS.

SECY-97-035 dated February 12,1997 identified proposed staff guidance regarding 10 CFR 50.59 to be issued for public comment. While the guidance of Section III.L, " Licensee Identification of Technical Specifications that are not ' Adequate Compliance with the Design L Bases," appears to relate directly to this situation. This section notes that the staff has previously not promulgated guidance on this issue. Additionally, SECY-97-035 notes that any changes in e industry guidance will be subject to 10 CFR 50.109 Backfit review prior to final issuance.

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f Attachment to NRC-97-0022

. Page 9 Corrective Steps That IIave Been Taken and the Results Achieved ARer discussion of this issue with the NRC, Detroit Edison submitted a license amendment request (Reference 4) for the RBM applicability, even though an amendment was not believed to be required. This was done to support the startup schedule from the finh refueling outage in the event NRC management decided that approval of a license amendment was necessary prior to restart.

NRC actions in this case appear to be inconsistent with this violation. This violation is based on the 10 CFR 50.59 requirement that prior NRC approvalis required for changes involving unreviewed safety questions or changes to the technical specifications. The mechanism 10 CFR 50.59 provides for obtaining such prior approval is a Ucense Amendment pursuant to 10 CFR  ;

50.90. Detroit Edison submitted a license amendment request pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90 prior to operating the plant in the conditions for which the RBM was required to preserve the MOP limits. l The NRC did not issue a license amendment prior to restart. Rather, a letter (Reference 5) acknowledging the license amendment request and administrative controls was issued. If Reference 5 constitutes " prior approval" in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, then it must be concluded that the license amendment was not necessary.

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The Corrective Steps That Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations:

Detroit Edison notes that the draft guidance discussed in SECY-97-035 does not fully resolve issues associated with this violation. Accordingly, Detroit Edison intends to actively participate with comments on the guidance when it is issued for public comment. Additionally, Detroit ,

Edison intends to seek appropriate clarification of the terms in 10 CFR 50.59, if necessary, by a i formal request for interpretation by the General Counsel as provided by 10 CFR 50.3.

l Date When Full Compliance Will he Achieved  !

Detroit Edison is presently in full compliance.

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