ML20203D679

Proposed Tech Specs Re Design Changes to Scram Discharge Vol & post-LOCA Vacuum Breakers

ML20203D679
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	04/14/1986
From:	MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20149B991	List: ML20203D679
References
TAC-60587, TAC-60588, TAC-60589, TAC-60590, TAC-60591, TAC-60592, TAC-61264, TAC-61518, NUDOCS 8604220287
Download: ML20203D679 (19)

Text

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION (Continued)

2. If the inoperable control rod (s) is inserted, within one hour disarm the associated' directional control valves ** either:

a) Electrically, or b) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves, j Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

l 3. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

j c. With more than 8 control rods inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUIDOWN l

within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

one y Wan one.

d. With ee scram discharge volume vent valve and/or %e-scram discharge l volume drain valve inoperable, :!rt: the H:grdh .;h:( ) .Jih'-

l 1 t r ,Trestore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

.IN SEMT~*" l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

4.1.3.1.1 The scram discharge volume drain and vent valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. At least once per 31 days verifying each valve to be open,* and

! b. At least once per 92 days cycling each valve through at least one

! complete cycle of full travel.

4.1.3.1.2 When above the low power setpoint of the RPCS, all withdrawn control

! rods not required to have their directional control valves disarmed electrically l or hydraulically shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by moving each control rod at l least one notch:

a. At least once per 7 days, and

b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when any control rod is immovable as a result of excessive friction or taechanical interference.

4.1.3.1.3 All control rods shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of Surveillance Requirements 4.1.3.2, 4.1.3.3, 4.1.3.4 and 4.1.3.5.

• These valves may be closed intermittently for testing under' administrative controls.

• • May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status.

8604220287 860414 PDR ADOCK 05000416 p PDR GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 1-4 M4ab Ant- 80, I

l INSERT FOR PAGE 3/4 1-4 i

[

e. With two scram discharge volume vent valves and/or two scram discharge volume drain valves inoperable and open, restore one valve in the vent l line and one valve in the drain line to OPERAPLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and restore all valves to OPERA 3LE status within the next 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> or close at least one vent valve and one drain valve and be in at least 110T

, SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

f. With any scram discharge volume vent valve (s) and/or any scram discharge j volume drain valve (s) inoperable and closed except when required by Action statement e above, restore all valves to OPERABLE status within 8 l hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

l f

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l J16ATTC86032401 - 5 l

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.1.3.1.4 The scram discharge volume shall be determined OPERABLE by demonstrating:

a. The scram discharge volume drain and vent valves OPERABLE /1Wuww cent":! cd: 2 e scr - tested ':ce : re ! centre! red cer'!;2 st!~'

cf !::: th r 2r car ! t; E9T 90 DEME! at least once per 18 months, by verifying that the drain and vent valves:

1. Close within 30 seconds af ter receipt of a signal for control rods to scram, and

2. Open when the scram signal is reset.

b. Proper level sensor response by performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the scram discharge volume scram and control rod block level instrumentation at least once per 31 days.

d 1

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GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 1-5 A% < ndwd,*T 00- l 1

2. NPE-85/16 (Additional Submittal)

SUBJECT:

Technical Specification 3/4.6.5, Page 3/4 6-46.

DISCUSSION: Mississippi Power and Light (MP&L) Company proposed changes to the subject technical specification in a letter dated January 29, 1986. Item 3 of that letter requested changes to allow implementation of a design change to add position indicators with redundant indication and alarm in the Control Room for the check valves associated with the Drywell Post-LOCA Vacuum Breaker System.

Recent discussions with NRR staff have resulted in modificatione to the previous submittal. These modifications are submitted in this letter and include the following:

1. The new Action d of Technical Specification 3/4.6.5 proposed in the January 29, 1986 submittal is modified with an Action d that is all inclusive and that does not refer to Action a. This is an editorial change which does not change the action requirements that were proposed in the previous submittal.

2. The January 29, 1986 submittal proposed the deletion of Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.b.l. This subnittal deletes that request and retains the 31 day surveillance in the technical specifications.

This design change is scheduled for implementation not later than startup following the first refueling outage. As done on several recent technical specification changes involving design changes to the plant, it is requested that the NRC issue the change with an open effective date and require that MP&L notify the NRC within 30 days of the effective date of implementation of the affected technical specification changes.

JUSTIFICATION: New Action d was proposed to be added to Technical Specification 3/4.6.5 to address the steps to be taken when a rotor operated vacuun breaker isolation valve is inoperable. Those steps as t proposed in the January 29, 1986 submittal included declaring the associated drywell Post-LOCA vacuun breaker inoperable and followinF the requirements of Action a for an inoperable vacuum breaker. Discussions with NRR staff have resulted in rewording the proposed Action d such that all the action requirements are included without reference to Action a. MP&L considers this change to be editorial in nature since no new action requirements are involved.

J14 MISC 86032602 - 1

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.b.1 was proposed to be deleted in the January 29, 1986, submittal because MP&L could not determine the basis for the precent 31 day surveillance requirement on the vacuum breakers, isolation valves and associated position indication. The NRR staff has indicated in recent discussions with MP&L that the 31 day surveillance requirement was imposed by the Staff as an increased frequency of testing over the quarterly ASME Section XI testing requirement. This 31 day. test frequency was imposed on Post-LOCA Vacuum Breakers while the quarterly ASME Section XI test was retained for normal vacuum relief to reflect the increased importance of the Post-LOCA Vacuum Relief function. In response to these discussions with NRR staff, MP&L proposes that the 31 day surveillance tests be retained in the technical specifications.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION:

The proposed changes in this submittal involve an editorial change to a previous submittal and the retention of present surveillance requirements in the technical specifications.

Therefore, the changes proposed in this submittal involve no significant hazards considerations.

The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because one change is purely editorial in nature and the other retains current surveillance requirements. The 31 day surveillance requirement is more stringent in frequency than the ASME code required quarterly test thus providing added assurance of Post LOCA Vacuum Breaker System operability.

The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of cccident from any accident previously evaluated because of the editorial nature of the change to Action d of Technical Specification 3/4.6.5 and the retention of current surveillance requirements on the Post LOCA Vacuum Breaker System.

The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because no margin of safety is affected considering the editorial nature of one change and the retention of present surveillance requirements in the other change.

J14 MISC 86032602 - 2

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.5 DRYWELL POST-LOCA VACUUM BREAKERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.5 All drywell post-LOCA vacuum breakers shall be OPERABLE and closed.

APPLICABILITY: GPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

l ACTION: .

l

a. With one drywell post-LOCA vacuum breaker inoperable for opening but known to be closed, restore the inoperable vacuum breaker to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. [

5

b. With one drywell post-LOCA vacuam breaker open, restore the open vacuum y

. t,reaker to the closed position within I hour or be in at least HOT SHUT- -

l DOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following f;- a l

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. )^

c. With the position indicator of an OPERABLE drywell post-LOCA vacuu.c breaker $[4 inoperable, verify the vacuum breaker to be closed at least once per 24 k hours by local indication. Otherwise declare the vacuum breaker inoperable.

(Scc tictc 1) l4

• P SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.5 Each drywell post-LOCA va:uum bred er shall be:

a. Verified closed at least once per 7 days.

b. Demonstrated CPERABLE:

1. At least once per 31 days by:

a) Cycling the vacuum breaker and isolation valve (s) through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

b) Verifying the position indicator OPERABLE by observing expected valve movement during the cycling test. (See Notc 1) l*

2. At least once per 18 months by:

a) Verifying the pressure differential required to open the vacuum breaker, from the closed position, to be less than or equal to 1.0 ps id, and -tSee-Hote-1-)- l+

b) Verifying the position indicator OPERABLE by performance of a

- CHANNEL CALIBRATION. ( S c c ficte-1-}--  !*

d., With c6. d.rpell post -LOC A vacu.wm brea.ker isol d on valve lo operable 0.nd. c.lo s e d. , ec5 bore t he inopero.ble. vo.caurn b(caker isolab io,v valve to OPERABLE slabus within 7'2. hours o r be in o.t l ea s t Nor '5 H u.roow/V uiithin %e next IZ hours or.d. i n Cot-D '

S Hu.TD o w y wiskin -kke ho llou>ing 2 + ho urs .

GRAND GULF-t, 1 3/4 6-46 i A mendment Mo. I

3. PS-85/05 SUBJFCT: Technical Specification Figure 5.1.1-1, page 5-2 Technical Specification 5.6.1.a page 5-6 DISCUSSION: It is proposed to adjust the exclusion area radius of 696 meters in Figure 5.1.1-1. (Exclusion Area and Caseous Effluent Release Points). The radius is presently measured from the center lines of reactor units one and two. However, the radius chould be meneured from the unit one reactor only. It is also proposed to change the referenced FSAR section 4.3, in the Grand Gulf technical specification 5.6.1.a (Fuel Storage) to FSAR section

9.1. JUSTIFICATION

Figure 5.1.1-1 of the Grand Gulf Technical Specification shnus an exclusion area with a radius of 696 meters which is Inbeled as being measured from the center line of the unit one reactor.

However, the northern half of the exclusion area is measured from the center line of the unic two reactor and the southern half is measured from the center line of the unit ene reactor

) on the present Figure 5.1.1-1. It is proposed that the exclusion j area be adjusted such that the 696 meters he measured from the center line of the unit one reactor only. This change in the exclusion area is needed to reflect the exclusion area for only Grand Gulf Unit 1.

Section 5.6.1.a of the Grand Gulf Technical Specifications references FSAR section 4.3, Nuclear Design. This reference should be changed to reference section 9.1, Fuel Storage and Handling. Section 9.1 of the FSAR discusses calculational uncertainties, biases, and limits as pertaining to Fuel Rack Design. FSAR section 4.3 discusses Nuclear Design in general and does not detail Fuel Rack Design, therefore this reference to FSAR Section 4.3 should be changed.

l l SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS:

The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability of consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the changes are considered purely i administrative in nature and do not affect either the l probability or consequences of any previously evaluated l accidents. The change involves adjusting the northern part of l the radius in Figure 5.1.1-1 to reflect Unit I as tb2 center point of the exclusion area and correcting a refer (nced FSAR section in the technical specifications.

l l J16ATTC86010802 - 1 l

l

The proposed changes do.not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because no changes were made to plant system, hardware or procedures that could result in the creation of a new or different kind of accident.

The proposed changes do.not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because of the purely administrative nature of the changes.

Therefore, the proposed changes involve no significant hazards considerations. -

e E

J16ATTC86010802 - 2

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DESIGN FEATURES 5.5 METEOROLOGICAL TOWER LOCATION 5.5.1 The meteorological tower shall be located as shown on Figure 5.1.2-1.

5.6 FUEL STORAGE CRITICALITY 5.6.1 The spent fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with:

a. A k,ff equivalent to less than or equal to 0.95 when flooded with unborated water, including all calculational uncertainties and biases as described in Section ,4rf of the FSAR.

7./

b. A nominal 12 inch center-to-center aistance between fuel assemblies placed in the storage racks.

5.6.1.2 The k eff f r new fuel for the first core loading stored dry in the spent fuel storage racks shall not exceed 0.98 when aqueous foam moderation is

< assumed.

1 DRAINAGE l . 5.6.2 The spent fuel storage pool is designed and shall be maintained to prevent inadvertent draining of the pool below elevation 202'S 1/4".

CAPACITY

! 5.6.3 The spent fuel storage pool is designed and shall be maintained with a storage capacity limited to no more than 1270 fuel assemblies.

5.7 COMPONENT CYCLIC OR TRANSIENT LIMIT 5.7.1 The components identified in Table 5.7.1-1 are designed and shall be maintained within the cyclic or transient limits of Table 5.7.1-1.

4 GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 5-6 //ggogg gg.

2

4 '. PS-85/02

SUBJECT Technical Specification Bases 3/4.3.2; page B 3/4 3-2 DISCUSSION

It is proposed to change the 13 second diesel generator start time to 10 seconds in the subject technical specification bases.

. Mississippi Power & Light Company (MP&L) submitted a proposed i change to Facility Operating License NPF-13 in a letter to Mr.

Harold R. Denton from Mr. J. P. McGaughy (AECM-84/0319), dated June 22, 1984, changing the diesel start times in Table 3.3.2-3, Isolation System Instrumentation Response Times. This proposed change would make Bases 3/4.3.2 consistent with Technical Specification Table 3.3.2-3.

4 JUSTIFICATION: When MP&L corrected the Isolation System Instrumentation i Response time Table 3.3.2-3 to reflect a 10 second diesel generator start time, the correction to the associated bases waa inadvertently omitted. Even though the bases are not part of the technical specifications, MP&L believes that corrections and updates should be provided, as identified, to reflect technical specification requirements. The 10 second diesel generator start time is also consistent with the provisions of Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS:

The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in-the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because this change is purely administrative in nature. Table 3.3.2-3 was updated when Amendment 13 to Facility Operating License NPF-13 was issued to reflect the 10 second diesel generator start time. The subject bases should have been corrected when the change was made to Table 3.3.2-3.

The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously

, evaluated because no accident analyses are affected by this change.

The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in j the margin of safety because of the purely administrative nature of the change.

Therefore, the proposed change involves no significant hazards considerations.

a d

l J13 MISC 86011002 - 1

INSTRUMENTATION BASES ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUNENTATION (continued) theA.C.powersupplyislostandisrestgredbystartupoftheemergencydiesel generators.

In this event, a time of g seconds is assumed before the valve starts to move. In addition to the pipe break, the failure of the O.C. operated valveigassumed;thusthesignaldelay(sensorresponse)isconcurrentwith the IT second diesel startup. The safety analysis considers an allowable inventory loss in tion with the J3'gach case second which in turn determines the valve speed in conjunc-delay. It follows that checking the valve speeds and the,F3iecond time for emergency power establishment will establish the response time for the isolation functions. However, to enhance overall system relia-bility and to monitor instrument channel response time trends, the isolation actuation instrumentation response time shall be measured and recorded as a part of the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME.

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or greater than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.

3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The emergency core cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate ability actions of the operator to mitigate the consequences of accidents that are beyond the to control. This specification provides the OPERABILITY requirements, trip setpoints and response times that will ensure effectiveness of the systems to provide the design protection. Negative barometric pressure fluctuations are accounted for in the trip setpoints and allowable values specified for drywell pressure-high. Although the instruments are listed by system, in some cases the same instrument may be used to send the actuation signal to more than one system at tne same time.

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or greater than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.

3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) recirculation pump trip system provides a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an anticipated transient. The response of the plant to this postulated event falls within the envelope of study events in General Electric Company Topical Report NED0-10349, dated March 1971 and NE00-24222, dated December 1979, and Section 15.8 Appendix 15A of the FSAR.

The end of-cycle recirculation pump trip (E0C-RPT) system is a part of the Reactor trip.

Protection System and is an essential safety supplement to the reactor The purpose of the E0C-RPT is to recover the loss of thermal margin which occurs at the end-of-cycle. The physical phenomenon involved is that the void reactivity feedback due to a pressurization transient can add positive reactivity to the reactor system at a faster rate than the control rods add negative scram reactivity.

Each E0C-RPT system trips both recirculation pumps, reducing coolant flow in order to reduce the void collapse in the core during two of the most limiting pressurization events. The two events for which the E0C-RPT protective GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-2 btfLNbMENT No.

5. NPE-86/07

SUBJECT:

Technical Specification Table 3.3.7.4-1; Page 3/4 3-71.

DISCUSSION: The proposed change to Technical Specification Table 3.3.7.4-1 adds a Control Room to Shutdown Panel Transfer Switch. This change is necessary to support a design change required by License Condition 2.C.(22). The License Condition requires that MP&L install electrical isolation switches between the Control Room and the Division I remote shutdown panel. Installation of the isolation switches is scheduled for implementation during the first refueling outage. Therefore, as with several recent technical specification changes involving design changes to the plant, it is requested that the NRC issue the change with an open effective date and require that MP&L notify the NRC within 30 days of the effective date of implementation of the affected technical specification changes.

JUSTIFICATION: The remote shutdown system consists of two panels containing instrumentation and controls needed to carry out the shutdown function if an evacuation of the Control Room should be necessary. The design as described in FSAR Section 7.4.1.4 has been reviewed by the NRC and found to be acceptable in accordance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 and other applicable criteria identified in Table 7.1 of the Standard Review Plan (reference SER Section 7.4.2, September 1981).

' Additional design requirements were determined necessary to satisfy post-fire alternate shutdown requirements of Appendix R to 10CFR50. By letters, dated December 28, 1983 and January 17, 1985 (AECM-83/0802 and AECM-85/0014), MP&L provided descriptions of-proposed revisions to incorporate isolation capability between the Division I Remote Shutdown Panel and corresponding Control Room circuits. NRC approval of the proposed design change was provided by letter, dated February 15, 1985 (MAEC-85/0053).

The design change provides an isolating transfer switch that assures operability of required control functions at the remote shutdown panel should a fire require Control Room evacuation. The transfer switch electrically isolates the Control Room from the Division I remote shutdown panel control circuits. Only the Division I remote shutdown panel must be isolated from the Control Room since the Division I and Division II J14 MISC 86032601 - 1

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remote shutdown panels are in separate fire areas. A fire in the Division I remote shutdown room would not affect Division II circuits which could be used to maintain control from the Control Room.

A significant feature of the design change is a transfer panel that consists primarily of.approximately 36 lockout relays plus a " master" switch which electrically operates all of the relays. The operator only has to throw one switch which will remove the control function from all Division I Control Room circuits that are duplicated on the remote shutdown panel. Control can be returned to the Control Room selectively, as desired.

! Thus, the panel design gives the operator the capability of selective restoration and total isolation of the Control Room Division I safe shutdown functions contained on the Division I_ remote shutdown panel.

The proposed change to Technical Specification Table 3.3.7.4-1 is necessary to support the design change required by License Condition 2.C.(22). The design change will be implemented during the first refueling outage, now scheduled for September 1986.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION:

The design change associated with this proposed technical specification change will provide electrical isolation between the Control Room and the Division I remote shutdown panel as required by License Condition 2.C.(22). The design change will assure operability of required control functions at the Division I remote shutdown panel even for an event wherein fire damage occurs in the Control Room.

The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the electrical isolation feature to be installed will not interfere with the normal functioning of the remote shutdown system; and, the isolation feature provides added protection such that the capability to effect a plant shutdown from the Division I remote shutdown panel will not be precluded as a consequence of an accident wherein fire damage occurs to circuits in the Control Room.

The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the only accident of concern is a fire in the Control Room that destroys J14 MISC 86032601 - 2

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. safe shutdown circuits. Further, the change provides additional. assurance of the capability to effect a plant shutdown from the remote shutdown panel.

i The proposed change does not involve a significant

^

reduction in the margin of safety because with the installation of the approved design change, safety will be enhanced in that additional assurance is provided

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that the remote shutdown function can be achieved. The j design change to the remote shutdown system extends the system capability such that fire damage in the Control

} Room will not preclude use of the Division I remote shutdown panel as a mechanism for performing safe

shutdown functions.

Therefore, the proposed change does not represent a

, significant hazards consideration.

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J14 MISC 86032601 - 3

TABLE 3.3.7.4-1 (Continued)

REMOTE SHUTOOWN SYSTEM CONTROLS MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE CONTROL Div 1 Div 2 b

12. RHR Injection Valves 2 gb

13. RHR Test Line Valve 1 1

14. RHR HX Cond. to RCIC Valve 1 1

15. RHR HX Flow to Suppression Pool Valve 1 1

16. RHR Discharge to Radwaste Valve 1 1 D D

17. RCIC Steam to RHR HX Valve 2 2

18. Diesel Generator HX Inlet Valve 1 1

19. Safety / Relief Valves D b 6 6 coutston stoort To CHMTD uk N FAN E l-  %

20. [DELETCC] 1 A ANSPGR S so ITCH l $ a

21. RCIC Turbine Flow Controller 1 N

' 22. RCTC Suction Flow Suppression Pool Valve 1 NA-

23. RCIC Injection Shutoff Valve 1 NA

24. RCIC Suction From CST 1 NA

25. RCIC Recirc. Main Flow Bypass Valve 1 NA

26. RCIC Test to CST IB Valve 1 NA

27. RCIC Test RTN to CST OB Valve 1 -NA

28. Steam to RCIC Turbine Valve 1 NA

29. RCIC Turbine Trip & Throttle Valve 1 NA

30. RCIC Turbine Cooling Water Valve 1 NA

31. RCIC Turbine Local Control Select Switch 1 NA

32. RCIC Gland Seal Compressor 1 NA

33. Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valve Reset Switch 1 1 NOTE: a. 1 per cooling tower fan

b. I per valve GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-71 Amendment No. 9, ~ l

4

6. NPE-85/01

SUBJECT:

Technical Specification Table 3.3.7.9-1.g. page 3/4 3-88 DISCUSSION: It is proposed to change the fire protection cabinet number for module SH13-U730 in the subject technical specifications to read SH13-P930 instead of the present 1H13-P930.

JUSTIFICATION: The present technical specifications list the fire protection cabinet for module SH13-U730 in the GGNS Unit 1 Control Room as 1H13-P930. A review of appropriate drawings has indicated that the correct designation for this fire protection cabinet is SH13-P930 which indicates that this cabinet is shared for Units 1 and 2. This discrepancy was identified and tracked as material nonconformance report number 0001-85.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION:

The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because it changes only the fire protection cabinet number in the GGNS Unit 1 technical specifications.

The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the furetion of the fire protection cabinet has in no way been alterod.

The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because of the administrative nature of the change.

Therefore, the proposed change involves no significant hazards considerations.

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J16NLSIM85121601 - 2

TABLE 3.3.7.9-1 (Continued)

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE" ll) ll}

ROOM ELEV ROOM NAME HEAT FLAME SM0KE Ik77) M M

3. Zone 2-12 6/0 10302 133' Day Tank Area 10310 133' Div. I Diesel Gen. Room 10403 158' Div. I Diesel Gen. Room 0/7 (Deluge)

e. STANDBY SERVICE WATER PUMP HOUSE

1. Zone 2-1 4/0 1M110 133' SSW Pump Rs. A IM112 133' SSW Va've Re. A 2M110 133' SSW Pump Rm. B 2M112 133' SSW Valve Rm. B

f. .CHARC0AL FILTER TRAINS

1. Standby Gas Treatment System Filter Trains'A & B 2/0 (Allison Thermistor Wire)

Auxiliary Building E1. 139'

2. Control Room Standby fresh Air System Filter Trains A & B 2/0 (Allison Thermistor Wire)

C.ontrol Building El. 133'

g. CONTROL B'JILDING (PGCC HALON SYSTEMS)

OC503 166' Control Room (Unit 1 side)

Module /Halon Panel ,

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1H13-U700/1H13-P900 0/10 10/0 1H13-U701/1H13-P901 0/10 15/0  :

1H13-U702/1H13-P902 0/9 14/0 1H13-U703/1H13-P903 0/11 17/0 1H13-U720/1H13-P920 0/7 13/0 SH13-U730/1ll1 ^^30 + 0/11 12/0 1 1H13-U738/1H13-0938 0/10 12/0 SH13-U739/5H13-F939 0/5 14/0 SHl3-P930 ---

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-88 Arnenolment No. -

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