ML20235G964

Insp Rept 70-1151/87-10 on 870615-19.Major Areas Inspected: Nuclear Criticality Safety & Previously Identified Unresolved & Followup Items

ML20235G964
Person / Time
Site:	Westinghouse
Issue date:	06/30/1987
From:	Mcalpine E, Troup G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235G932	List: ML20235G931 ML20235G938 ML20235G964
References
70-1151-87-10, NUDOCS 8707140441
Download: ML20235G964 (6)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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,. REGION 11 101 M ARIETTA STREET, N.W, j^

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• ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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1 Report No.: 70-1151/87-10 l Licensee: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Commercial' Nuclear Fuel Division Columbia,~SC 29250 i

Docket No.: 1151- License No.: SNM-1107 Facility Name: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Inspection. Conducted: J ne 9, 1987 Inspector: .

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CC~Troup, Tutl Fafilities Project Inspector Date Signed Approved by: E hi % C @ . 6/3O[P7 Date Signed E. J. McAlpVne, Chief, Materiltl Control- and Accountability Section, Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

Scope: 'This routine, unannounced inspection entailed nuclear criticality safety and previously identified unresolved and followup items.

Results: One violation was identified - failure to comply with posted nuclear

) . criticality safety requirements.

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2 REPORT DETAILS

1. Key Persons Contacted

• E. P. Loch, Plant Manager W. L. Goodwin, Manager, Regulatory Affairs

• J. Hubich, Manager, Chemical Manufacturing

• E. K. Reitler, Jr. , Manager, Radiological and Environmental Engineering C. F. Sanders, Manager, Nuclear Materials Management J. W. Heath, Jr. , Manager, Health Physics Operations

• R. D. Montgomery, R&E Engineer J. F. Baker, R&E Engineer The inspectors also interviewed several other licensee employees.

• Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2. Exit Interview I The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 19, 1987, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. Management representatives acknowledged the violation of nuclear criticality safety posting requirements and discussed the immediate actions being taken to prevent recurrence. Management representatives also acknowledged the error in their written response to IFI 87-01-29, and agreed to submit a supplemental response to clarify the corrective actions being taken. The licensee did not identify any materials provided to the inspector as proprietary.

3. Operations (88015)

a. During a tour of the plant areas on June 17, 1987, the inspector observed a cart designated for the storage of scrap sludge material.

Three pans of material were placed on the top of the cart, one on top of the other two. All three containers were observed to contain scrap materials. The criticality control sign attached to the cart specified the authorized storage on top of the cart as "2 pans, 1 high."

b. License Condition No. 9 requires that licensed material be used in accordance with the statements, representations, and conditions contained in Chapter 2, 3, and 4 of the application. Section 2.3.1.9 of the application states that storage of licensed material shall be subject to one or more of the following controls: (1) nuclear  !

criticality safety postings with applicable rules, (2) designated floor markings or devices, and (3) physical constraints for individual containers or stacks of containers. The inspector noted that this storage was a violation of the license as material uas' not stored in accordance with the criticality safety posting. (87-10-01)

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c. This condition was similar to a violation identified in inspection report 70-1151/86-04 when material in the MAP area was stored in containers not authorized by the criticality safet,y posting. The inspector also noted that findings in the licensee s internal audit program (paragraph 4.c) had identified items where material was improperly stored. . Consequently, the need to emphasize compliance with criticality safety requirements was discussed in a telephone

conversation between W. E. Cline, Chief, Nuclear Materials Safety and l Safeguards Branch, Region II, and W. L. Goodwin,. Manager, Regulatory Affairs, and members of their staffs on June 25, 1987.

4. Nuclear Criticality Safety (88015)

a. Facility Changes and Modifications The inspector examined six nuclear criticality safety review requests and the associated analyses. The inspector verified that approved evaluation methods were used and that the calculations and analyses were checked by a second individual. The inspector also verified that the analyses included a post-installation review and sign off authorizing the use of the equipment.

The licensee has been processing material of a hi,gher enrichment than previously processed (but within the license enrichment limit). The inspector reviewed the Nuclear Safety Analysis reports (NSAs) for the processing of this higher enrichment through the ADV and scrap recovery systems and verified that the appropriate analyses had been performed, reviewed, and approved prior to introducing the higher enrichment material.

No violations of deviations were identified.

b. Nuclear Safety Analyses The inspector discussed the methods used to perform nuclear safety calculations with the cognizant individuals and verified that the methods used were in accordance with the licensee requirements. The inspector also discussed the methods used by the licensee's contractor in performing computer calculations as part of nuclear safety analyses.

No violations of deviations were identified.

c. Audits The inspector reviewed the monthly criticality audit reports for the period of March - May,1987, and verified that the audits were conducted at the required frequency and in accordance with a plan, as required by the licensee. The reports identified problems to be rectified, the responsible individuals, and an action date.

Correction of identified items and the close-out date were documented. The adequacy of corrective actions was also reviewed and documented in subsequent licensee audits.

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No violations or deviations were identified by the inspector.

d. Criticality Monitoring System The inspector reviewed the calibration records for the criticality monitoring systems in the existing fuel conversion and fabrication areas and the MAP area and determined that the calibrations were performed in accordance with the license requirements. L 1

The licensee'is currently installing a new criticality monitoring system and a new hazard alarm system (fire, gas, chemical). The  ;

criticality monitoring system is a computer based system with periodic data recording and visual displays of individual detector readouts and alarms. The inspector discussed the installation, calibration, and operation with licensee representatives, and also discussed the status of procedures for operation and response to alarms as well as instruction / training for the security guards.

No violations or deviations were identified.

e. SNM Containers The inspector discussed shippi,ng containers used for SNM with the cognizant licensee representatives and determined that no new designs are in use. The inspector observed during tours of plant areas that the shipping containers are of approved designs as evidenced by the D0T specification markings.

Boron glass Raschig rings are used in certain liquid tanks as a secondary criticality control method. The license requires that the rings and tanks be checked annually for settling, minimum volume and B203 content. The inspector reviewed the records for the settling minimum volume determinations and B203 content made in 1985 and 1986.

No violations or deviations were identified.

f. Procedures The inspector reviewed two new procedures and revisions to two other procedures relating to nuclear criticality safety. All of the procedures were reviewed and approved in accordance with Section 2.6.1.2 of the license application.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Review of the Operational Safety Assessment Findings (92701) i An Operations Safety Assessment was conducted by the NRC at the a.

licensee's facility in January 1987. Findings of the assessment were reported in Inspection Report 70-1151/87-01. By letter dated May 21, 1987, the licensee responded to the assessment findings and described the corrective actions being taken on the identified weaknesses and the improvement items.

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b. The inspector reviewed the status of the correction actions with licensee representatives. The licensee has placed these items into the computerized Commitment Tracking System, and has identified responsible individuals and target completion dates for each time. I For these items which have been completed, the tracking system j identifies the action and completion date. The status of open items J is periodically updated.

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c. Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 87-01-29 dealt with the testing of pressure relief valves on a regular basis to assure operability of the valves. The licensee's response to this IFI was that there are no pressure relief valves installed on either the ADU or IDR vaporization system and that each ADU vaporization chest incorporates a pressure relief rupture disk. The inspector questioned this response as Section 2.2.11.2 of the license application refers to the installation of pressure relief valves on steam chest vaporizers.

During a tour of the UF6 bay the inspector observed that pressure relief valves are installed on each of the stream chest vaporizers and brought this to the attention of licensee representatives. In  ;

subsequent discussions, licensee representatives acknowledged that'  :

pressure relief valves are installed and that the response was in- I error. As part . of the UF6 - vaporizer steam control upgrade '

modification, new pressure relief valves are to be installed.

Licensee management representatives stated that the new valves would be put in the periodic test / maintenance program, and also committed to submitting a revised response to IFI 87-01-29 describing the actions being taken on this item, by July 13, 1987.

d. The following IFIs identified in the Operational Safety Assessment were also reviewed during the inspection.

1. (Closed) IFI 87-01-01, Industrial Safety Audit Functions. The industrial safety function is now within the Regulatory Affairs organization. Additionally, procedures RA-102. Plant Inspection Program for Regulatory Comp'liance, and RA-104, Regulatory Affairs Safety Reviews, incorporate individual safety and fire protection criteria into the Regulatory Affairs functions.

2. (Closed) IFI 87-01-02, Policies and Practices for Safe Geometry s as Primary Control. Procedure RA-300, Nuclear Criticality i Safety Design and Review Criteria specifies that safety geometry shall be the primary control to be used for nuclear criticality safety. The procedure also requires a detailed justification for the review of situations where favorable (safe) geometry is not proposed.

3. (Closed)IFI 87-01-04, Procedure for Performing Nuclear Critical l Safety Calculations. The criteria for performing surface density, solid angle and KENO calculations has been incorporated into procedure RA-300, Nuclear Criticality Safety Design and Review Criteria. At present, KEN 0 calculations are not performed by the licensee. Licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments concerning the need for

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.. 6 more detailed instructions for performing KEN 0 calculations and stated that the instructions will be issued once they are ready to perform such calculations, in conjunction with the qualifications of analysts under IFI 87-01-05.

4. (Closed) IFI 87-01-20, Hazards of Dust Suspension in Dissolution Area. Licensee representatives informed the inspector that the primary source of the airborne suspensions were acid leaks.

Sampling around the area showed chemical concentrations below the TLVs. Efforts to reduce the leaks and better ventilation in the dissolvers has reduced the suspensions. This iten is closed for record purposes.

6. Unresolved Item Followup (92701)

a. During the Operational Safety Assessment, an unresolved item (UNR 87-01-06) was identified concerning the storage of incinerator ash in an area which is not under moderation control, and has a sprinkler system installed. The licensee's response to this item stated that while the incinerator ash is " dry", it is not required to be " dry" as the containers are under concentration control, and the storage arrangement maintains adequate safety margins.

b. The ash storage had previously been under moderation and mass control. When the sprinkler system was planned, the storage array and controls were reevaluated and changed to favorable geometry and concentration control for each unit, and storage spacing control for interactions. NSA 484 documented the evaluation of the geometry, concentration control and interaction criteria between units as well as the reflection effects of the water spray from the sprinkler system. The evaluation showed that the storage arrangement met the nuclear safety criteria of the license as well as the double contingency criteria. The inspector reviewed the NSA package and determined that it had been reviewed and approved in accordance with the licensee procedures, and that the acceptance criteria were in accordance the licensee requirement.

c. Based on the licensee's response, the NSA records, and inspection of the areas, the inspector informed licensee management that the Unresolved Item was closed.

7. Transportation Accident

a. On June 8, 1987, a shipment of seven fuel containers, each containing two assemblies, from the Columbia facility to a reactor overturned on I-40 outside of Knoxville, Tennessee. The containers were returned to the licensee for inspection of the assemblies.

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b. The inspector discussed the inspection of the assemblies with j licensee representatives. In addition to visual and dimensional examinations, fuel rods from selected assemblies were removed and non-destructively tested for integrity. No defects were identified which would indicate degradation at integrity the inspector has no further questions at this time.

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