ML20127F293
| ML20127F293 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Westinghouse |
| Issue date: | 03/07/1985 |
| From: | Kahle J, Mcalpine E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127F179 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-1151-85-02, 70-1151-85-2, NUDOCS 8505200384 | |
| Download: ML20127F293 (8) | |
Text
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UNITE 3 STATES o
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NUCLEAR RE*aULATORY COMMISSION
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ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30303 MAR 131985 Report No.:
70-1151/85-02 f
Lice'nsee: Westingh'ouse Electric Corporation Nuclear Fuel Division s
Columbia, SC 29250 Docket No.:
70-1151 (Fuel Division)
License No.:
SNM-1107 Facility Name: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Inspection Conducted:
February 19 - 22, 1985 Inspector:
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9 3/7/85 J. B. Kahl4~
Date Signed Approved by:
b Nil D A w 3/7/95 E. J. McAlpiik, Chief
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Date Signed Material Control and Accountability Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 32 inspector-hours on site in the areas of management organization's criticality safety, operations review and followup on noncompliance and followup on significant events.
Results:
One violation was identified-failure to limit weight of cartridge filters to be washed to within specified limits.
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8505200384 850412 PDR ADOCK 07001151
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Licensee Employees Contacted
- M. D'Amore, Acting Manager, Columbia Plant
- P. Lock, Deputy Plant Manager and Acting Manager,: Operations G. LaBurgere, Manager,-Conversion G. Lowder, Manager,. MAP -
- W. Goodwin, Manager, Regulatory Affairs C. Sanders, Manager, Nuclear Materials Management
- E.'Neitler, Coordinator, R&E Engineers R. Fischer, R&E Engineer N. Stevenson, Conversion. Area Supervisor B. Lewis, Conversion Area Supervisor R. Burklin, R&E Engineer:
H. King, Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineer-R. Montgomery, Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineer L. Brazell, MAP Area Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included two technicians and six operators.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 22, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
A violation described in paragraph 7.b, failure to limit the' weight of cartridge filters in a special container was discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the findings and took no exception.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
(Closed). Violation 84-10-01, Establishment of " Cut Zone" in a " surface density" area. The inspector verified that operators' and supervisors were provided refresher training in Regulatory Affairs procedures pertaining to nuclear criticality safety.
" Surface density" floor areas within the conversion area have been painted with a contrasting color to better identify " surface density" areas.
(Closed) Violation 84-10-02, Procedure RA-301, Criticality Control Criteria, was unclear and was not concise in that operators were unaware that temporaryf storage areas and carts were to be posted. The inspector verified that the Regulatory ' Affairs Procedure RA-301 was revised and L
2 expanded the criteria to clarify when nuclear criticality signs are required better defined the types of storage which require specific Regulatory Affairs approval.
Operators and supervisors were provided refresher training pertaining to the revisions of this procedure. During tours of the control area the inspector noted that storage areas and carts were posted in accordance with tha procedural requirements.
4.
Management Organization and Controls (88005) a.
Organization The licensee's organization for the implementation of the radiation safety and nuclear criticality safety programs (Regulatory Affairs) was reviewed with licensee, representatives. There have been no significant changes in the Regulatory Affairs structure in the past year.
It was noted by the inspector that the Manager, Regulatory Affairs is acting as-the Manager of the Radiation Protection Engineering Component.
Licensee representatives stated that there are no immediate plans to fill this position. The Regulatory Affairs Licensing Engineer has been assigned to coordinate the activities of the Radiation Protection Engineers.
-The licensee has established a new Deputy Plant Manager position. It was also noted that another nuclear criticality safety engineer has joined the Radiation Protection Engineering staff since the previous inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Procedures Control The inspector examined the Regulatory Affairs procedures.
Procedure RA-100, Preparation and Revision of RA Procedures, provides instruc-tions and guidance for the format, revision and distribution of RA procedures.
Examination of the nuclear criticality safety procedures showed that they conformed to the requirements of RA-100. All nuclear criticality safety procedures had been revised since the previous inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
Internal Review and Audit The inspector reviewed the monthly nuclear criticality safety audit reports since July 1984.
The number of self identified violations dropped significantly since the previous inspection in July 1984.
Since September 1984, the number of violations have ranged from zero to two per month. A review revealed that most of the violations were of licensee imposed procedural requirements and the nature of the violations were very minor with no nuclear criticality safety impact.
3 The inspector discussed the status of the licensee's remedial action program to reduce to the number of items identified by the Regulatory Affairs audit and inspection program.
(1) A trend analysis for internally identified. nuclear criticality safety items has shown the number to be significantly reduced.
(2) Training through refresher courses with high visibility of nuclear criticality safety and operations management was completed in November 1984.- Licensee representatives stated there was a good response to the training sessions and they felt that this aspect of the remedial action program had a significant impact on the improvements noted.
(3) The nuclear cr.iticality safety procedures were revised to clarify requirements and personnel were trained with respect to the revised requirements.
(4) Additional supervision was added to the Conversion and Pellet areas with emphasis placed on supervisor / operator interfacing for improved direction of operations.
(5) Process engineers have been assigned to back shift on a temporary basis.
A new management position was created to coordinate back shift activities for improved quality of product and to determine root causes of violations for proper corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
Licensee representatives states that these programs have been effective in helping to reduce the number of self identified violations.
(6) Operations personnel performed weekly facility tours to observe and report compliance with housekeeping, industrial safety, radiation protection and nuclear criticality safety requirements.
These reports were distributed to cognizant individuals for correction and to emphasize the awareness of the importance of adhering to plant procedures and requirements.
During tours of the control area and discussions with licensee operators the inspector observed that housekeeping conditions were improved and the operators were aware of the nuclear criticality safety requirements.
Licensee representatives stated that the tours by Operations personnel have been reduced to bi-weekly frequency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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d.
Safety Committees The inspector reviewed the minutes of the Regulatory Compliance Committee meetings.
The Regulatory Compliance Committee functions as the ALARA committee.
The minutes showed that the Committee met more frequently than required by License Condition No.19 and that an ALARA report hr.d been submitted to plant management as required by License Condition No. 21. The minutes showed that the required members were present and the items of discussion met the requirements of the license.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
OperatorTraining/ Retraining (88010)
The inspector examined the agenda and training records for providing nuclear criticality safety refresher training to supervision and operations personnel.
Verification was made that the training met the licensee commitments regarding training to reduce the number of self identified violations. Discussions with supervision and operators confirmed that the refresher training had been provided.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Nuclear Criticality Safety (88015) a.
Facility Changes and Modifications The inspector examined several nuclear criticality safety review requests and the associated analyses.
Verification was made that approved evaluation methods were used and that a second authorized individual checked the calculations and analyses.
The inspector discussed the procedure and the associated documentation used by the licensee to assure that equipment and systems were installed as designed and that the installation was in accordance with the nuclear criticality safety analysis.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Criticality Monitoring System The inspector verified that the nuclear criticality monitoring alarm system was tested and calibrated in accordance with the license requirements.
In March 1984, the licensee notified Region II of an evacuation of the plant due to a false alarm of the nuclear criticality safety alarm system because of a malfunction of a detector.
Licensee representatives stated the malfunction was a result of drift in the alarm circuit; however, they have not experienced false alarms since that time.
The alarm system is not current state-of-the-art detection and alarm instrumentation and the licensee is currently evaluating the need to upgrade the system.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5 c.
Potential Unsafe Collection Systems As a result of a telephone call from Region II on November 6,1984, regarding the potential for an accumulation of special nuclear material in unsafe geometry systems, such as ventilation ducts, scrubbers, large tanks, etc., a review was made of plant systems which may represent a potential for accumulation cf uranium.
Although, the licensee had established detection and surveillance procedures to detect accumula-tion of uranium at inventory times (every six months), all systems within the plant were reviewed including existing procedures. As a result of this review additional systems were identified for surveil-lance, additional procedures were developed to alert supervision to potential system problems, results are now documented, investigation levels were established, and evaluation requirements have been established if any accumulation are detected. Licensee representatives stated that consideration is being given to securing remote type monitoring instrumentation to eliminate potential safety problems associated with the monitoring of elevated large ventilation ducts.
Licensee representatives stated that they have not detected a1y significant accumulation in large unsafe geometry systems.
No violations or deviations were detected.
7.
Operations Review (88020) a.
Safety Systems The inspector verified the following safety systems were provided and tested in accordance with procedures.
(1) Remote closing of the cylinder valves when the cylinders are in the vaporizers.
(2) UF6 detection system on the steam condensate lines with alarms to alert operators.
(3) Pressure relief valves on steam lines to the UF6 vaporizers.
(4) Liquid level detectors on the steam type UF6 vaporizers.
(5) Leak testing of the UF6 cylinder-to-conversion system connections prior to heating.
(6) A system for cooling the UF6 cylinders with assurance that the quick disconnects would match.
(7) A system to prevent backflow from the hydrolysis columns to the UF6 cylinders.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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b.
Tours I
During the inspection, several tours were made of the control areas to l
observe operations and the areas outside the plant.
Special nuclear i
material was stored in arrays, on carts and storage locations in accordance with posted instructions. Material was being processed in accordance with operating procedures with one exception.
On February 19, 1985, the inspector observed a hopper on a scale in front of the washing machine in the Scrap Reprocessing area which was full of "cuno" cartridge fiiters. The inspector asked a nearby operator how much weight (filters plus the contained special nuclear material) was in the hopper. The operator attempted to operate the scale but was unsuccessful. A chief operator was summoned and he was unable to make the scale work.
The chief operator had the scale tagged out.as being inoperable. The fi.lters were removed from the hopper and placed in 5 gallon buckets. A later weighing of the filters, after a replacement scale was obtained, showed a total weight of 37.5 kgs.
From discussions with licensee representatives and an examination of l
Operating Procedure CSR5015, Washing Machine, it was determined that l
the filter level in the hopper was not to exceed a specified level unless the gross weight (filters plus special nuclear material) was less than 36.000 kgs. In any case, the 36.000 kgs limit was not to be exceeded. Licensee supervision could not provide a reason or the cause as to why the 36.000 kgs limit had been exceeded nor did they know when i
the scale became inoperable.
Licensee representatives were informed that failure to maintain the contents of the hopper to within the specified limit of 36.000 kgs was a viola' on of their operating procedures (85-02-01).
As part of the tours of the process areas, the inspector toured the new Manufacturing Automation Project (MAP) area.
This project uses the Integrated Dry Route (IDR) process for converting UF6 to uranium oxide.
l Most of the equipment and systems have been evaluated using depleted uranium. Operating supervision stated that several minor design and equipment changes were made to alleviate encountered problems. They stated that the evaluated with depleted uranium was on schedule and so far no serious operational, process, operator training or safety problems had been. encountered.
Nuclear criticality safety engineers stated that they were performing a detailed review of the various systems to assure that all safety related instrumentation and safety equipment were installed and operated as designed. No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Event (93710) l On January 18, 1985, a plug developed in a line between the UF6 cylinder and IDR conversion unit.
In unplugging the lire, UF6 was released to the i.
vaporization bay at a rate which exceeded the temporary " elephant trunk" i.
exhaust capacity.
Also, at this time, the vaporization bay emergency l
exhaust system was inoperable because the main circuit breaker was in the l
"off" position, t
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7 Operators wore respiratory protection breathing devices; however, two operators experienced skin irritation.
There were no significant internal exposures to personnel.
As a result of an' investigation by the licensee, the following corrective measures have been taken to prevent recurrence.
(1) The line to the pressure sensing device and transmitter (where the plug appeared to be) has been shortened to reduce the quantity of material in a " dead end" line and to eliminate hcating difficulties.
(2) The set point of the heat trace lines has been increased.
(3) Another heat trace line has been added to all UF6 transfer lines. This provides for duct heat tracing.
(4) The nitrogen purge and pressure testing system has been redesigned to provide purging capability of more of the UF6 transfer lines.
l (5) The vaporization bay emergency exhaust for system has been placed on the operating equipment weekly check sheet list.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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