05000282/FIN-2011002-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Appropriately Complete an Operability Recommendation on the Unit 1 Fuel Oil System |
| Description | An inspector-identified finding of very low safety significance and an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, was identified due to the failure to properly complete an operability recommendation for the Unit 1 fuel oil system in accordance with Procedure FP-OP-OL-01, Operability/Functionality Determination. Specifically, the licensee used a mission time that was not supported by any licensing or design basis document. In addition, the new mission time was inappropriately considered an enhancement to operability. Once a supportable mission time was used, the licensee declare the Unit 1 fuel oil system inoperable due to having an inadequate fuel oil volume. Corrective actions for this issue included entering of this issue into the corrective action program, increasing the fuel oil volume, and implementing an independent review group to review the adequacy of all operability recommendations. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. In addition, this finding impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using a Phase 3 SDP evaluation, the regional senior reactor analyst determined that this finding was of very low safety significance because the Unit 1 emergency diesel generators would have been able to start and run for the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> assumed in the probabilistic risk assessment using the fuel oil contained in a single storage tank. This finding was determined to be crosscutting in the Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program area, because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate this problem (including classifying, prioritizing and evaluating the condition for operability) such that the resolution addressed the cause (P.1(c)). |
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
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| Report | IR 05000282/2011002 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Feliz-Adorno R Langstaff K Stoedter L Kozak |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Prairie Island - IR 05000282/2011002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Prairie Island) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Prairie Island)
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