ML20214C526
| ML20214C526 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 02/15/1986 |
| From: | Kropp W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214C321 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8602210168 | |
| Download: ML20214C526 (13) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COP' MISSION BEFORE THE ATOM!C SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
COPWONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY Docket Nos. 50-456
) 50-457 (Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 )
AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE J. KROPP IN SUPPORT OF NRC STAFF'S RESPONSE TO APPLICANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION OF ROREM QA SUBCONTENTION 10F I, Wayne J. Kropp, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
- 1. I am employed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Region III, as Resident Inspector Construction, at the Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2. A copy of my professional qualifications is attached hereto as Exhibit 10F-1.
- 2. As Resident Inspector I am responsible for performing inspections of construction activities to verify compliance with applicabl'ecodes, standards and regulatory requirements.
- 3. The purpose of this Affidavit is to support the NRC Staff's response to Applicants' Motion For Summary Disposition of Rorem QA Subcontention 10F. This subcontention states as follows:
- 10. Contrary to Criterion X, " Inspection" of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Comonwealth Edison Company has failed to ensure that a program for inspection of activities affecting quality was established and executed by or for the organization performing the activity to verify conformance with the documented instructions, procedures and drawings for accomplishing the activity.
860221016e 860218
{DR ADOCK O g6
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F. Electrical Contractor, Comstock, inspected and ,
accepted a junction box which was later determined to have deficiencies in the location of the anchors used for mounting the junction box. Anchors were accepted even though they were 3" from the required location specified by Sargent & Lundy Drawing 20E-1-3571. .
- 4. Ir. preparing this Affidavit I reviewed the following documents:
- a. " Material Facts As To Which There Is No Genuine Issue To Be Heard";
- b. " Testimony of Lawerence V. Jacques (On Rorem Subcontention 10F)";
, c. " Testimony of James h. Gieseker (On Rorem Subcontention 10F)".
- 5. I identified this issue during a routine inspection conducted between March 25 and May 3, 1985, to verify that selected electrical equipment was installed in accordance with design requirements. The electrical equipment selected included an inverter, DC distribution center and three junction boxes. One of the junction boxes inspected was Junction Box IJB217R. I inspected these junction boxes for location. -
l welding, cable bend' radius, separation, mounting configuration and as-built dimensions. My inspection revealed that the electrical contractor had inspected and accepted one of the junction boxes even though the location of the anchors used for the mounting of the junction box were not in accordance with a Sargent & Lundy drawing. For example, the bottom concrete expansion anchor was located 3 inches closer to the bottom of the junction box than specified by the applicable Sargent &
l Lundy drawing. This finding was documented in Inspection Report I
1 l
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Nos. 50-456/85015 and 50-457/85016 (May 16, 1985), the pertinent portion ,
of,which is attached hereto as Exhibit 10F-2.
- 6. The Applicant took several corrective actions to address this violation of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion X. L.K. Comstock issued NCR 4139 to document and track the deficiency in the location of the anchors used for mounting the junction box. All inspection activity in the area of junction box / equipment inspection for the inspector involved was halted until an evaluation of his work could be conducted.
The Applicant determined that the inspector had inspected a total of seven safety r, elated junction boxes since he was certified as an inspector. Another certified LKC inspector was assigned to reinspect all seven junction boxes. This inspector noted no additional discrepancies.
- 7. I verified that LKC issued NCR 4139 which documented the deficiency in the location of the anchors used for mounting the junction box. I also verified the reinspection of the seven junction boxes. To verify the effectiveness of these reinspections, I selected two of the seven junction boxes and verified that there were no dimensional problems. Therefore, I determined that this reinspection effort was acceptable.
- 8. I closed this item in Inspection Report Nso. 50-456/85032 and l 50-457/85031 dated October 4, 1985, the pertinent portion of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 10F-3. The basis upon which I closed this 1
item was the effective implementation of the Applicant's corrective action. The corrective action determined that this issue was an isolated case and did not represent a significant breakdown in Applicant's quality assurance program.
I
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- 9. I have performed subsequent inspections of five additional ,
junction boxes which are documented in Inspection Reports flos. 50-456/85038 and 50-457/85037 and Nos. 50-456/85051 and 50-457/85049 with no deficiencies were noted.
- 10. Based on the above I agree with Applicant's conclusion that this issue was an isolated incident, and does not represent a general breakdown in Applicant's QA program.
Sc W, 6pynep D '.'Kropp [
Sworn and subscribed before me this 15th day of February,1986 s at't f Notary Rd$lic liyCm'OnL;'5crip:.;c.,;y*",
My Comission expires: -
e 9
hthif /O.f-/
WAYNE J.'KROPP, SR.
Organization: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory. Commission, Region III
Title:
Reactor Inspector Grade: GS-13 Birth Date: September 5,1945 Education: Dundee Community High School, Dundee, IL, 1963 U.S. Navy, Nuclear Power School, 1968 U.S. Navy, Nuclear Plant Operator Training Unit, 1969 Experience:
1984 to Resident Inspector, Braidwood Nuclear Project - Responsible Present for inspecting construction activities in the areas of electrical, mechanical and structural to verify compliance with design requirements and licensing commitments. (NRC) 1983 to Reactor Inspector, Quality Assurance Programs Section -
1984 Inspected various plant sites to verify compliance with licensing commitments in the area of quality assurance. (RRC/DRS - Region III) 1982 to Conruitant Service Engineer - Performed and directed audit and 1983 surveillance activities as the Clinton Nuclear Power Plant Audit Supervisor. (Quadrex) 1980 to Audit Supervisor - Responsible for all audit activities 1982 associated with the Marble Hill Nuclear Project (Public Service of Indiana).
1777 to Procurement QA Supervisor - Res'ponsible for establishing and 1980 implementing the procurement quality assurance program for Black Fox Nuclear Project (Public Service of Oklahoma).
1975 to Source Surveillance Supervisor - Rssponsible for implementation
, 1977 of the source surveillance programs for all power plant under l construction by Brown and Root.
1974 to Quality Control Engineer - Assisted in establishing an l
1975 Architect / Engineer Quality Assurance Program for the design procurement and construction of a nuclear power plant.
(Flour - Pioneer) ,
l 1971 to Technical Specialist - Performed quality assurance audits of 1974 potential suppliers of electrical hardware end equipment.
i Performed surveillance at supplier's facilities to assure
] compliance with specification requirements. (Duke Power Co.)
l l
hY /05-l Wayne J. Kropp, Sr. 2 1965 to Reactor Operator - Nuclear Reactor Operator and Electric Plant -
1971 Operator aboard a nuclear submarine (U.S. Navy).
1965 to Precision Machinist - Employed in the research laboratory making 1965 parts for Mass Probe and other space exploration experiments (St. Procopius College).
e 9
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ; /O./C Z
, REGION III Reports No. 50-456/85015(DRP);50-457/85016(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses Hos. CPPR-132; CPPR-133 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 ~
Inspection At: Braidwood Site, Braidwood, Illinois Inspection Conducted: March 25 through May 3, 1985 Inspectors: R. D. Schulz W. J. Kropp R. N. Gardner Approved By: itti , Director Braidwood Project
[ b l Dste '
Inspection Suarnary Inspection on March 25 through May 3, 1985 (Report No. 50-456/85015(DRP);
50-457/85016(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection of activities with
. regard to licensee action on previous inspection findings and 10 CFR 50.55(e)
~
I rrports, followup on allegations, plant tours, nonconformance reports / corrective action, safety-related' piping, containment coatings, instrumentation, electrical equipment installations., and the Quality Control Inspector Reinspection Program.
The inspection consisted of 352 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors including 30 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: Of the nine areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviaticns
- were identified in five areas, one item of noncompliance was identified in each of the remainin failure to adequately control structural beam modifications (g four areas
- paragraph 4); failure to take adequate corrective action .
pipe support nonconforming conditions (paragraph 5); inadequate review of con-tainment coating process (para box instal).ation (paragraph 9) graph 7); and inadequate inspection of junction l ..
~
~
D mH n --
56 PDR
(
The installation attributes verified for compliance with specified requirements incluoed:
lines properly pitched.
as-built dimensions .
clearances (rattle space) separation criteria Four of the instruments selected had been processed through Phase I and Phase II of the piping contractor's Instrumentation Retrofit Verification Program. No problems were noted with these instrume'nts in regards to,the attributes listec above. However, during the walkdown of the instrument lines for 1FT-AF011 and IFT-AF017, it was noted tha* the piping contractor had installed high point vents. These vents were installed to facilitate the removal of any air which could have been trapped. as a result of the -
, instrument lines being routed to avoid interferences. This routing resulted in the instrument lines sloping upward from the process line to the vents and then sloping downward from the vents to the transmitter.
Discussions with operational personnel resp'onsible for calibrating the transmitters revealed that they were not aware of some instrument lines having high point vents. This matter will be monitored to ensure that operations personnel identify which instruments have vents.
While inspecting the installation of instrument 1-PT-544, it was noted that a flex hose was installed in such a manner as to cause a trap to be formed. The piping contractor issued a Nonconformance Report to identify this deficiency. Five other instruments were inspected to verify proper installations of flex hoses. No problems were noted. The improper installation of the flex hose for instrument 1-PT-544 is considered an isolated case at this time.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 9. Electrical Equipment Installation Electrical equipment was selected to verify that the installation was in accordance with established requirements. The documents utilized as the basis for acceptance were S&L drawings 20E-1-3571, 20E-0-3393J. 20E-3391C, 20E-1-3371B and 20E-1-3627. The electrical equipment selected included:
IP05E - Inverter ,
1DC05E - DC Distribution Center IJB215R - Junction Box IJ8271R - Junction Box IJE214R - Junction Box
~-( .
17
- - ........ ... . ..,.. ,,,.. ,,,, ,,,,o p fg g 3 location -
welding (size and location) cable bend radius separation mounting configuration .
as-built dimensions l One junction b~ox, IJB217R, was accepted by L. K. Comstock (LKC) for proper !
installation on August 1, 1984 There were no problems identified by the contractor's inspector except for missing "0" rings. However, the inspect-or determined that the following as-built dimensions were different ttjan the dimensions on Sargent and Lundy drawing 20E-1-3571:
Attribute As-Built Drawing i
Distance from bottom hex head cap screw 15.3/4" 18 1/2" to bottom of box Distance from bottom hex head cap screw 11 1/2" 9 3/4" to middle cap screw Distance from bottom CEA to bottom of box 15 1/2" 18 1/2" i
Distance from bottom CEA to middle CEA 12" 9 3/4" A review of the inspection records (LKC Fonn 38A) revealed that the original inspector did not verify the proper torquing of the hex head cap screws (3). An inspector, while performing a followup inspection to verify the installation of the missing "0-rings" identified by the original inspector, noticed that cap screws were installed and that these cap screws were never checked for torque. He subsequently verified i
the proper torque and amended the original inspector report accordingly.
The failure to execute an inspection of an activity affecting quality to verify conformance with a drawing is considered a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion X (456/85015-08).
, 10. Q. C. Inspector Riinspection Program The licensee instituted a Q. C. Inspector Reinspection Program to provide
, further objective evidence substantiating the quality of the hardware and l the inspector qualification program. The inspector reviewed reinspection data compiled in February 1984 for the electrical contracter L. K. Com-stock, and the overview inspection company, Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory.
The reinspection data disclosed that two of the nine electrical inspectors, l whose work was re-examined, had approximately ten percent of their inspec-i tions categorized as rejectable. The NRC inspector reviewed their quali-
)
ficaticr3s at the time of their inspections and identified that one of the inspectors- did not appear to meet the experience requirements of ANSI N45.2.6 fdr Level I qualification and the other was lacking mock inspection training and specific examinations.
18
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMtISSION [(I?IM /d b3 REGION III -
Report Nos. 50-456/85032(DRP);.50-457/85031(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. CPPR-132; CPPR-133
. Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: ,Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Braidwood Site, Braidwood, IL Inspection Conducted:
June 24 through September 6, 1985 Inspectors: R. D. Schulz W. J. Kropp Approved By: W. S. Little, Director IDCT o 4 ses Braidwood Project Date t Inspection Summary
\. Inspection on June 24 through September 6.1985 (Report Nos.
50-457/8503MDRP)) 50-456/85032(DRP):
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced safety inspection of licensee action en previously identified items, work activities observed during plant tours, procurement, control supervisioninstrumentation, reactor coolant piping, pipe supports, quality electrical contractor, piping wall thickness, reactor 4
vessel internals, electrical items, and mechanical equipment. The inspection consisted inspector of 299 onsite hours inspector hours during onsite by two NRC inspectors including.43 off-shifts.
Results:
Of the nine areas inspected, no violations were identified in seven creas, one violation was identified with an example in each of the remaining creas (failure to follow drawing instructions with regard to the installation cf instrument flexible hoses Paragraph 5; and failure to follow a procedural requirement Paragraph 7). with regard to the reinsta11ation of a component pipe support -
e
b(. /0. 5 3 preclude recurrence. The inspector also verified the licensee's corrective action which consisted of issuing a letter to site contractors requiring that samples with known defects be included in practical examinations when feasible. The inspector verified letter BRD# 10,936 was issued by the licensee's QA department and that this letter addressed the use of weld coupons with known defects for practical examinations. The inspector reviewed a practical examination administered to a prospective weld inspector on August 29, 1985. The component utilized for this practical examination was an installed conduit hanger (CP-6) for conduit CIA 31A7. This component had weld defects consisting of insufficient weld size, slag inclusion, and no welder stamp . The prospective weld inspector correctly identified the weld defects. The inspector
.also , reviewed the qualification packages of four individuals recently certified as Level II weld inspectors and noted that the practical examination utilized installed items which had weld defects such as insufficient weld length, incorrect fillet size, lack of fusion, and arc strikes. This item is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 456/85015-08: L. K. Comstock Quality Control inspector accepted junction box IJB217R which was later determined to have deficiencies in the location of the anchors used for the mounting of the junction box. The licensee's corrective action consisted of issuing NCR 4139 to identify that junction box IJB217R was not installed per Sargent & Lundy drawing 20E-1-3571, detail 9784. The inspector verified NCR 4139 was issued on April 30, 1985. In addition to issuing NCR 4139, the licensee's corrective action consisted of reinspecting junction boxes which had been inspected by the Quality Control inspector who had accepted junction box IJB217R. It was determined from a computer print out that this Quality Control inspector had inspected a total of seven (7) safety-relatedjunctionboxes. This reinspection was performed by another inspector certified as a Level II. No problems were noted with these junction boxes and the dimensional discrepancies with junction box IJB217R were considered to De an isolated case. The NRC inspector selected two (2) of these junction boxes and also noted no dimensional problems. The results of the inspection of these two junction boxes are discussed in Paragraph 11 of this report.
This item is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 456/85023-01; 457/85024-01: Failure to maintain the cleanliness of cable trays and control of bolting material. The' cable trays identified as containing miscellaneous items have been l cleaned. Commonwealth Edison issued letters to site contractors emphasizing the need to maintain cable trays free of foreign objects. The electrical contractor has assigned additional cleanup personnel to cable tray cleanup. The NRC inspectors have verified, during plant tours, that the cleanliness of cable trays is now being l adequately maintained. On June 17, 1985, Commonwealth Edison directed the site contractors to place special emphasis on the control of bolting materials, including directing the contractors to store all bolts and nuts in burlap bags. Uncontrolled bolting 1
7
& /0J-3 l
l
- a. IE Information Notice No. 84-52 identified two vendors that had shipped pipe to another nuclear power plant in which 20% of the ,
pipe shipped from one vendor and 40% of the pipe shipped from the other vendor did not meet the minimum wall thickness requirement of the ASME Code. The worst case found was 5.3% below the required minimum wall thickness. The notice stated that this cannot be assumed to be a limiting worse case. Commonwealth Edison has identified the pipe they have received from the two vendors and is instituting a nondestructive examination program to ascertain if any reduced wall thickness pipe was received at Braidwood and if there is any safety significance. This is an open item (456/85032-04; 457/85031-04).
. b. (0 pen) Part 21 (456/85-03-PP; 457/85-03-PP) Guyon Alloys, Inc. -
notified the NRC Vendor Program Branch on February 14, 1985 that Commonwealth Edison procured 3/4" nominal pipe from one of their manufacturers for the Braidwood Station, and a small quantity of this pipe was discovered to have imperfections. The worst case found was .013 inches below minimum wall thickness. Mandrel extrusion gouges appear to be the cause of the deficiency and the licensee is evaluating the issue with regard to other heats of pipe furnished by the same manufacturer. The evaluation involves both visual inspections and eddy current examination. Stress calculations will be performed after examination as necessary.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
- 10. Reactor Vessel Internals The inspection of the Unit 1 reactor's guide tubes by Westinghouse personnel was witnessed by the inspector. This inspection was supervised by a Westinghouse Level III Quality Assurance (QA) Engineer. A review of this individual's certification record revealed that he had two years experience in inspecting reactor vessel internals, five years experience as a QA Field Surveillance Engineer, and four years experience 'as a Nuclear Product QA Engineer. This inspection was performed in accordance with Westinghouse Specification 2464A20, Revision 1, " Reactor Internals Assembly Specification." This specification required an internal profile ;
of the guide tube assemblies per Westinghouse Specification 2463A59, Revision 4, " Environmental Internals Profile Inspection Procedure." The inspector reviewed the inspection records for guide tubes CCE-43 and CCE-24. The calibration record for the recorder utilized in these guide l
tube inspections was also reviewed with no problems being noted.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 11. Electrical Items .
The inspector selected junction boxes 1JB1971 and IJB1733A which were reinspected by an L. K. Comstock Level II Quality Control inspector as a result of violation 456/85015-08. The inspector verified that the following attributes were in compliance with established requirements:
l 19
6.to.ics !
l 1
- junction box installed per latest drawings as to size, location and '
box type, ,
e junction box identification is. correct, o junction box is free of any internal or external damage, ,
- junction box is clean, i.e. no debris, tools or foreign materials are stored in or on the junction box, e clearances have been maintained.or documented for engineering review.
The follo'ing w drawings were used in the inspection:
Junction Box Drawings 1JB1733A 20E-0-3373 20E-0-3393J 1JB1971A 20E-0-3361 20E-0-3393U The removal of two junction boxes, 2JB377R and 2JB011R, was reviewed to i verify that the method for removing these items was in compliance with j
established requirements. The inspector reviewed Rework Report #1043 which documented the removal of these junction boxes on February 21, 1985. No problems were noted with the removal process.
The records for the installation of bars for the purpose of supporting kellums grips were reviewed and found acceptable. The installation of these bars were for cables routed to panels 1AN01J and 1CX05J. The records included a Weld Inspection Record (Form 19) and a Component Fabrication / Installation Traveler (Form 244). Detail G on drawing 20E-0-3393P was utilized for the installation of these bars. The
. inspector also reviewed the records for the installation of Radiation l Monitor, 1RE-AR0248. The records reviewed included a Concrete Expansion l Anchor (CEA) Traveler 20418. The inspector also verified 1RE-AR029B was mounted per the requirements identified in drawing 20E-6-3391T, Detail 7020.
The inspector selected five conduits, which were recently inspected by L. K. Comstock (LKC) quality control inspectors, to verify the effective-ness of LKC's inspections. The conduits were inspected for:
- segregation code label
- size of conduit
- separation criteria
- the number of conduit supports t
- correct hanger welding detail l
- acceptable welding on hangers
- correct bolting material
- flex conduit fittings 20
1
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SUBCONTENTION 12.E Subcontention 12.E. as admitted in the proceedings, states,:
- 12. Contrary to Criterion XVI, " Corrective
, Action," of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B, Commonwealth Edison Company has failed to ensure that measures were established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified I
and corrected. And in the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, Applicant failed to ensure that the cause of the -
condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition.
E. Although BCAP had identif,ied that Level I QA inspectors had inspected and accepted construction activities, this nonconfoming condition was not documented as a BCAP
! observation. (Inspection Report 85-06 Exhibit II.)
In its Motion for Sumary Disposition, App 1fcant contends that Rorem -
.Subcontention 12.E is premised on a factual error. 5ee Applicant's Motion at 4. The Staff agrees and, as explained below, shares Applicant's view that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact regarding this subcontention. Consequently, the Motion for Surmary Disposition should be granted.
The item giving rise to Rorem Subcontention 12.E was identified by Region III NRC Inspector R.N. Gardner during a special inspection of Applicant's Braidwood Construction Assessment Program (BCAP). Affidavit of Ronald N. Gardner In Support of NRC Staff's Response To Applicant's Motion for Sumary ' Disposition of Rorem QA Subcontention 12.E at 17 (hereinafter "Gardner Affidavit"). As NRC Inspector Gardner indicates, he had been infcmed by BCAP personnel that they would not identify as a nonconforming condition instances in which a Level I inspector had
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inspected and approved construction activity. M.;seealso Inspection ,
Report Nos. 50-456/85006 and 50-457/85006 (attached as Ex. 12.E-2 to Gardner Affidavit). At that time reliance upon a Level 1 inspector to approve construction activities was regarded as a violation of ANSI N45.2.6 and of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion II. See Affidavit of John M. Jacobson In Support of NRC Staff's Response to Rorem Subcontention 3.C at 16. Criterion XVI of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B requires, inter alia, that condition adverse to quality., such as nonconformance, "be promptly identified and corrected." Based on information received from authori;ed BCAP personnel, NRC Inspector Gardner was led to understand that BCAP personnel would not document as a nonconformance the acceptance of construction activities by Level I QC inspectors. Gardner Affidavit at 17. It was on this basis that Appli-cant was cited for violating Criterion XVI of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B. See Ex. 12.E-2.
Subsequent to the issuance of Inspection Report Nos. 50-456/85006 and 50-457/85006, the Staff was informed by Applicant that BCAP personnel had in fact issued an obsbrvation documenting inst'ances in which con-struction activities had been inspected and approved by Level I QC in-spectors. Gardner Affidavit at 17. At the time Inspection Report Nos.
50-456/85005 and 50-457/85006 was issued, however, NRC Inspector Gardner l
had not been informed by BCAP personnel that, despite their previous
, statements to the contrary, an observation documenting the use of Level I QC inspectors would be, and in fact had been, issued. M. NRC Inspector Gardner verified the issuance of the subject BCAP observation and, after confirming that fact, the NRC Staff informed Applicant on June 27, 1985,
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that the violation would be withdrawn. Gardner Affidavit at 18; see also .
Ex. 12.E-3. This matter will be closed formally in the final BCAP inspection report expected to be issued by the Staff in Febuary 1986. ,
Gardner Affidavit at 19. .
The " violation" forming the basis of Rorem Subcontention 12.E is based on a factual error. The salient fact is that BCAP personnel did not fail to identify instances in which Level I QC inspectors were used to inspect and accept construction activities. Consequently, the facts underlying Rorem Subcontention 12.E do not indicate that Applicant has violated 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI by failing to assure that conditions adverse to quality as "promptly identified and corrected." Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact to be heard, and Applicant is entitled to a favorable decision on the subcontention as a matter of law. Therefore, the Motion for Summary Disposition on Rorem Subcontention 12.E should be granted.
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