Text

Proposed Tech Specs Adding New LCO That Addresses Requirements for Main Feedwater Isolation,Regulating & Bypass Valves
	ML20202J714
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	02/13/1998
From:	; TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20202J712	List: ML20202J710; ML20202J714;
References
	NUDOCS 9802230199
	Download: ML20202J714 (17)
	v • d • e

1

e INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVillLANCE RE0VIREMENTS .

SECTION f1E 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT I'ALATION VALVES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-17 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL Hydrogen Monitors......................................... 3/4 6-24 Electric Hydrogen Recombiners............................. 3/4 6-25 Hydrogren Mitigation l

System..............................

3/4 6-2Sa R21l7 3/4.6.5 ICE CONDENSER Ice Bed................................................... 3/4 6-26 Ice Bed Temperature Monitoring System..................... 3/4 6-?S Ice Condenser Doors....................................... 3/4 6-29

, Inlet Dcor Position Monitoring System..................... 3/4 6-31 Divider Barrier Personnel Access Doors and

. Equipment Hatches....................................... 3/4 6-32 Containment Air Return Fans............................... 3/4 6-33 Floor Drains.............................................. 3/4 6-34 Refueling Canal Drains.................................... 3/4 6-35 Divider Barrfer Seal...................................... 3/4 6-36 3/4.6.6 VACUUM RELIEF LINES....................................... 3/4 6-38 R201 3/4,7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE Safety Va1ves............................................. 3/4 7-1 Auxil i ary Feedwater Sys tem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-5 Condensate Storage Tank................................... 3/4 7-7

. Activity.................................................. 3/4 7-8 ain-Steom, Lina _IsolaMon-Valvasm . . . . . . . . c_ . . .

1/ aid M

/%N fhwn7tX IsudTmq fa;uwwt Ava AyMu VAwd . .. . . 3N_7-lh j 3/4.7.2

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INERATOR'TRESSURE/TEMPERATUkE TTFITATiDN. . . .T.7. 3/4 .7-11 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM............................ 3/4 7-12 3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER SYSTEM Es sen ti al Raw Cooling Water System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-13 October 4, 1995 e r a. .av . . .

9002230199 900213 VIII Amendment No. 116, 197,213 PDR ADOCK 05000327 P PDR j

ELNfT SYSTEMS b

.ana.immsa_u LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.6 Four main feedwater isolation valves (MFIVs), four main feedwater regulating valves (MFRVs), and four MFRV bypas.s valves shall be OPERABLE.

1 APPLICABILITYi,i40 DES 1, 2, and 3 -

AC".iOH .,

i

a. With one or more MFIVs inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is returned to OPERABLE status or closed or isolated within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; otherwise, be-in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months tnu in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ,

b. Witt,one or more MFRVs inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valvs is returned to OPERABLE status or closed or isolated within 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months st otherwise, be in at .least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT S!!UTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ,

c. With.one or more MFRV byphas valves inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is returned to OPERABLE status I or closed or isolated within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ,

d. For each MFIV, MFRV, or MFRV bypass valve that has been closed or isolated.to satisfy Action a., b., or c. above, verify that it is closed or isolated once per 7 days,

e. With two valves in the same main feedwater flow path inoperable, isolate the affected flow path within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ,

f. Separate entry into the above ACTIONS is allowed for each valve-or flow path. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

/

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.6 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, verify each MFIV, MFRV, and MFRV bypass valve closes en an actual or simulated automatic actuation signal at least once per le months.

'SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 7-10a Amendment No.

.A y 4

_ - _ _ - - _ - - - ~

( .-

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY The limitations on secondary system specific activity ensure that the resultant off-site radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture. This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 1.0 GPM primary to secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to 1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and 2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occers within conteinment. .The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the surveillance requirements are consistent

.- ssumptions used in the accident analyses.

b 5 ERT* - >-

7. 2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The-limitations of 70*F and 200 psig are based on a steam generator RT of 25*F and are sufficient to BR prevent brittle fracture HDT 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The 0PERABILITY of the component cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the essential raw cooling water system ensures that R16 sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident conditions within acceptable limits.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-3 Amendment No. 12 Revised 08/18/87 h

INSERT 3/4'7.1.6

. MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION, REGULATING, AND BYPASS VALVES Isolation of the main feedwater (MFW) system is provided when ,

required to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break, feedwater line break, excessive feedwater flow, and loss of normal feedwater land station blackout) accident. Redundant isolation capability is provided on each feedwater line consisting of the feedwater isolation valve (MFIV) and the main feedwater regulating valve (MFRV) and its associated bypass valve. The safety function of these valves is fulfilled when closed or isolated by a closed manual isolation valve.

Therefore, the feedwater isolation function may be considered OPERABLE if its respective valves are OPERABLE, if they are maintained in a closed and deactivated position, or if isolated by a closed manual valve. The 72-hour completion time to either restore, close, or isolate an inoperable valve takes into account the redundar.cy afforded by the remaining OPERABLE valves and the low probability of an event occurring that would require isolation of the MFW flow paths during this time period. The 8-hour completion time for-two inoperable valves in one flow path takes into account the potential for no redundant system to perform the required safety function and a reasonable duration to close or isolate the flow path. Although the steam generator can be isolated with the failure of two valves in parallel, the double f ailure could be an indication of a conson mode failure and should be treated the same as the loss of the isolation function. The 7-day frequency to verify _that an inoperable valve is closed or isolated is reasonable based on valve status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls to ensure the valves are closed or isolated.

l INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS SECTION EAGE 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES.............................. 3/4 6-17.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL Hydrogen Monitors......................................... 3/4 6-24 Electric Hydrogen Recombiners............................. 3/4 6-25 R203 Hydrogen Hitigation System................................ 3/4 6-26 l 3/4.6.5 ICE CONDENSER Ice Bed................................................... 3/4 6-27 Ice Bed Temperature Monitoring System..................... 3/4 6-29 Ice Condenser Doors....................................... 3/4 6-30 Inlet Door Position Monitoring System..................... 3/4 6-32 Divider Barrier Personnel Access Doors and Equipment Hatches....................................... 3/4 6-33 Containment Air Return Fans............................... 3/4 6-34 Floor Drains.............................................. 3/4 6-35 Refueling Canal Drains.................................... 3/4 6-36 Divider Barrier Sea 1...................................... 3/4 6-37

R188 2/4.6.6 VACUUM RELIEF LINES...................................... 3/4 6-39 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE Safety Va1ves............................................. 3/4 7-1 Auxiliary Feedwater System................................ 3/4 7-5 Condensate Storage Tank................................... 3/4 7-7 Activity.................................................. 3/4 7-8 in4teae4iae-lulat4eaJalvas, . . - = -

M-MAIN l'ctD&TTR .Tsoyrvig datuurrwi,itwo a ass %w .s N 7-to<

3/4.7. ENERATOR W 53uxt/rfnFc N 1GTA ....~.T.....

3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM............................ 3/4 7-12 t

October 4 1995 VI!! Amendment No. 188, 203 SEQUOYAH - UNIT.2

PLANT SYSTEM 9 h'~l& hb MAIN PEEDWATER ISOLATION, REGULATING. AND BYPASS VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.6 Four main feedwater isolation valves (MFIVs), four main feedwater l regulating valves (MFRVs), and four MFRV bypass valves chall be OPERADLE.

APPLICADILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 1

ACTION:

6. With one or more MFIVs inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is returned to OPERABLE status or closed or apolated within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SFUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ,

b. With one or more MPRVs inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is returned to OPERABLE status or closed or isolated within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

c. With one or more MFRV bypass valves Anoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is returned to OPERABLE status or closed or isolated within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 houts and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

6. For each MFIV, MFRV, or MFRV bypass valve that has been closed or isolated to satisfy Action a., b., or c. above, verify that it is closed or isolated once per 7 days.

e. With two valves in the same main feedwater flow path inoperable, isolate the affected flow path within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within g the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

f. Separate entry into the above ACTIONS is allowed for each valve or flow path. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.6 In addition to the requirements of specification 4.0.5, verify each MFIV, MFRV, and "RV bypass valve clo9es on an actual or simulated automatic actuation signal at least once per 18 months.

(

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-10a Amendment No.

"\

s.

I PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY The limitations en secondary system specific activity ensure that the

-resultant off-site radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture. This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 1.0 GPM primary to secondary tube _ leak in the steam generttor of the affected steam line. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to 1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and 2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event L a steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the surveillance requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

MSOt.T *

.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70*F and 200 3g psig are based on a steam generator RT of 25'F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture. NDT 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the component cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.4 ESSENTIALRAWCOOLI[G_WATERSYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the essenti(? "w coolir.. water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity _ is availat,.e for continued operation of safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling

. capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, it, consistent with the assumptions used in the accident conditions eithin acceptable limits.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 8 3/4 7-3 Revisec 18/18/87 (BR) BR-1 Revised: 03/23/90 (BR-1)

4 .

INSERT 3/4'.7.1.6 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION, REGULATING, AND BYPASS VALVES Isolation of the main feedwater (MFW) system is provided when required to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break, feedwater line break, excessive feedwater flow, and loss of normal feedwater (and station blackout) accident. Redundant isolation capability is provided on each feedwater line consisting of the feedwater isolation valve (MFIV) and the main feodwater regulating valve (MTRV) and its associated bypass valve. The safety function of these valves is fulfilled when closed or isolated by a closed manual isolation valve.

Therefore, the feedwater isolation function may be considered OPERABLE if its respective valves are OPERABLE, jf they are maintained in a closed and deactivated position, or if isolated by a closed manual valve. The 72-hour completion time to either restore, close, or isolate an inoperable valve takes into account the redundancy afforded by the remaining OPERABLE valves and the low probability of an event occurring that would require isolation of the MFW flow paths during this time period. The 8-hour completion time for two inoperable valves in one flow path takes into account the potential for no redundant system to perform the required safety function and a reasonable duration to close or isolate the flow path. Although the steam generator can be isolated with the failure of two valves in parallel, the double failure could be an indication of a common mode failure and should be treated the same as the loss of the isolation function. The 7-day frequency to verify that an inoperable valve is closed or isolated is reasonable based on valve status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls to ensure the valves are closed or isolated.

ENCLOSURE 3 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAN NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN)

UNITS 1 and 2 l PROPOSED TECNNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE TS 97-03 i

REVISED PAGES

I. AFFECTED PAGE LIST Unit 1 Index Page VIII 4 7-10a B 4 7-3 8 4 7-3a Unit 2 Index Page VIII b 7-10a B k 7-3 B h 7-3a II. REVISED PAGES See attached.

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INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I i

1 SECTION PAGE ;

i 3/4.6,3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-17 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL-

. HYDROGEN ANALYZERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6+24 ELECTRIC HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS - W . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-25 l HYDROGEN MITIGATION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-25a lR217 3/4.6.5 ICE CONDENSER ICE BED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6 26 ICE BED TEMPERATURE MONITORING SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6 28 ICE CONDENSER DOORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6 29 INLET DOOR POSITION MONITORING SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 > 31 DIVIDER BARRIER PERSONNEL ACCESS DOORS AND EQUIPMENT HATCHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-32 CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FANS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-33 FLOOR DRAINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-34 REFUELING CANAL DRAINS . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-35 DIVIDER BARRIER SEAL , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , 3/4 6-36 3/4.6.6 VACUUM RELIEF LINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 0-38 lR201 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE SAFETY VALVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-1 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-5 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-7 ACTIVITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-8 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES . . . . . . . , . . . . 3/4 1-10 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION, REGULATING, AND BYPASS VALVES 3/4 7-10a l 3/4.7.2 STRAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION . . . . . 3/4 7-11 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM , . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-12 3/4.7.4- ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER SYSTEM , . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-13 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 VIII Amendment No. 116, 197,

EL3NT SYSTEMD MAIN PEEDWATER. ISOLATION, REGUT.ATING. AND BYPASS VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.6 Four main feedwater isolation valves (MFIVs), four main feedwater regulating valves (MFRVs), and four MFRV bypass valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 ACTION:

a. With one or more MFIVs inoperable,. POWER OPERATION may-continue provided the inoperable valve is returned to OPERABLE status or closed or isolated within 72 houras otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in llOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. With one or more MFRVs inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is returned to OPERABLE status or closed or isolated within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; otherwise, be in at lealt HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ,

c. With one or more MFRV bypass valves inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is returned to OPERABLE status or closed or isolated within 70 hour8.101852e-4 days 0.0194 hours 1.157407e-4 weeks 2.6635e-5 months st otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the followit.g 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

d. For each MFIV, MFRV, or MFRV bypass valve that has been closed or isolated to satisfy Action a., b., or c. above, verify that it is closed or isolated once per 7 <*1'es.

e. With two valves in the same main feedwater flow path inoperable, isolate the affected flow psth within e hoursi otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ,

f. Separate entry into the above ACTIONS is allowed for each valve or flow path. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILIANCE REQUIREMENTS i

4.7.1.6 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, verify each MFIV, MFRV, and MFRV bypass valve closes on an actual or simulated automatic actuation signal at least once per 18 months.

SEQUOYAH.- UNIT l' 3/4 7-10a Amendment No.

+.

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY The limitations on secondary system specific activity ensure that the resultant off site radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture. This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 2.0 GPM primary to secondary tv.be leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident ana)yses.

3/4.7.1.t MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVJfg The OPERADILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator wi.11 blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to 1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and 2) limit the pressure rise within containtoent in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the surveillance requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.1.6 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION. REGULATING. AND BYPASS VALVES Isolation of the main feedwater (MFW) system is provided when required to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break, feedwater line break, excessive feedwater flow, and loss of normal feedwater (and station blackout) accident. Redundant isolation capability is provided on each feedwater line consisting of the feedwater isclation va e (MPIV) and the main feedwater regulating valve (MFRV) and its associated bgass valve. The safety function of these valvec in fulfilled when closed or isolated by a closed manual isolation valve. Therefore, the feedwater isolation function may be considered OPERABLE if its respective valves are OPERABLE, if they are maintained in a closed and deactivated position, or if isolated by a closed manual valve. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months completion time to either restore, close, or isolate an inoperable valve takes into account the redundancy afforded by the remaining OPERABLE valvea and the low probability of an event occurring that would require isolation of the MFW flow paths during this time period. The 8-hour completion time for two inoperable valves in one flow path takes into account the potential for no redundant system to perforn the required safety function and a reasonable duration to close er isolate the flow path. Although the steam generator can be isolated with the failure of two valves in parallel, the double failure could be an indication of a common mode failure and should be treated the same as the loss of the isolation function. The 7-day frequency to verify that an inoperable valve is closed or isolated is reasonable based on valve status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls to ensure the valves are closed or isolated.

3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMIT W O!!

The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced streosen in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70*F and lBR 200 psig are based on a steam generator RT of 25'F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture. NDT SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-3 Amendment No.

l

__U

_P_LANT SYSTEMS BASES

. _ . . _ . . , . . . . . . . _ _ _ _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ . _ . . . _ . . . . . . _ . . . . . . . _ . _ o 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSIIg The OPERABILITY of the component cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assunptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER SYSTEM h The OPERABILITY of the essential raw cooling water system ensures that R16 sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident conditions within acceptable limits.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-3a Amendment No. 12

_ _____.- J

j c.

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< LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.6.3- CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES . . . . . . . . .. -

. . . 3/4 6-17 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL HYDROGEN MONITORS . .-. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-24 ELECTRIC HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS - W . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6 25 HYDROGEN MITIGATION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 3/4 6-26 lR203 3/4.6.5. ICE CONDENSER ICE BED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-27 ICE BED TEMPERATURE MONITORING SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . .7/4 6-29 ICE CONDENSER DOORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-30 INLET DOOR POSITION MONITORING SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6 32 DIVIDER BARRIER PERSONNEL ACCESS DOORS AND EQUIPMENT HATCHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-33 CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FANS . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 3/4 6-34 FLOOR DRAINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 G-35' REFUELING CANAL DRAINS . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-36 DIVIDER BARRIER SEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-37

'.s / 4 . 6 . 6 ' VACUUM RELIEF VALVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-39 lR188 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

.3/4.7.1 . TURBINE CYCLE SAFETY VALVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-1 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-5 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-7 ACTIVITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-8 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-10 ;

MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION, REGULATING, AND BYPASS VALVES . 3/4 7-10a l 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION . . . . . 3/4 7-11 3/4.7.3 .

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-12

-SEQUOYAH --UNIT 2- VIII Ametidment No.188, 203, 1

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PLANT SYSTEMS

, MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION, REGULATING. AND BYPASS VALVEg LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.6 Four main feedwater isolation valven (MFIVs), four main feedwater regulating valves (MFRVs), and four MFRV bypass valves shall be OPERABLE.

I APfLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 ACTION:

a. With one or more MFIVs inoperable, POWER OPER12 ION may continue provided the inoperable valve is returned to OPERABLE status or '

closed or isolated within 72 houras otherwise, ce in at least HOT STAND 3Y wj*.hin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ,

b. With one or more MFRVs inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is returned to OPERABLE status or closed or isolated within 7.1 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY following 6 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the hours, c.

With one or more MFRV bypass valves inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is returned to OPERABLE status or closed or isolated within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; otherwise, be -in at least- HOT STANDBY following 6within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in : OT SHUTDOWN within the hesrs.

d. For each MFIV, MFRV, or MPRV bypass valve that has been closed or isolated to satisfy Action a., b., or c. at)ve, verify that it is closed or isolated once per 7 days.

'e. With two valves in the same main feedwater flow path inoperable, isolate the affected flow path within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ; otherwise, be in at leastfollowing the HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within

f. Separate entry into the above ACTIONS is allowed for each valve or flow path. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMElRS 4.7,1.6-In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, verify each MFIV, MFRV, and MFRV bypass valve closes on an actual or simulated automatic actuation signal at least once per 19 months.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 1/4 7-10a Amendment No.

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$ e EJJJnr SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY The limitations on secondary system specific activity ensure that the resultant off-site radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture. This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 1.0 GPM primary to secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STPAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to 1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and 2) limit the pressure riee within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves witnin the closure times of the surveillance requirements are consistent D with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7,1.6 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLAT70N. REGt*LATING . AND J PASS VALVES Isolation of the v. min feedwater (:MFW) system is provided when required to mit! gate the consequences of a steam line break, feedwater line break, excessive feedwater flow, and loss of normal feedwater (and station blackout) accident. Redundant isolation capability is provided on each feedwater line consisting of the feedwater isolation valve (MFIV) and the main feedwater regulating valve (MFRV) and its associated bypasa valve. The safety function of these valves is fulfilled when closed or isolated by a closed manual isointion valve. Therefore, the feedwater isolation function may be considered OPERABLE if its respective valves are OPERABLE, if they are maintained in a closed and deactivated position, or if isolated by a closad manual valve. The 72-hour completion time to either rtatore, close, or isolate an inoperable valve tr.kes into account the redundancy afforded by the remaining OPERABLE valves and the low probability of an event occurring that would require isolation of the MFW flow paths during this time period. The 8-hour comI letion time for two inoperable valven in one flow path takes into account the potential for no redundant system to perform the required safety function and a reasonable duration to close or isolate the flow path. Although the steam generator can be isolated with the failure of two valves in parallel, the double failure could be an indication of a common mode failure and should be treated the same as the loss of the isolation function. The 7-day frequency to verify that an inoperable valve is closed or isolated is reasonable based on valve status indications a;ailable in the control room, and other administrative controls to ensure the valves are closed or iso)C sd.

3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOP PRESSUNE/ TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum al' aable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70*F and 200 psig are basud on a steam generator RT of ~3*F and are sufficient to prevent BR brittle fracture. NDT SEQUUYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-3 Amendment No.

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PLANT SYSTEMS b

BASES 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the component cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.4 EESENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER SYSTEM ,

The OPERABILITY of the essential raw cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this eyetem, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in che accident conditions within acceptable limits.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-3a j

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