ML20205A861

Insp Rept 70-1151/86-10 on 860616-20.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Organization & Control,Training/Retraining,Nuclear Criticality Safety, Operations Review & Maint & Surveillance

ML20205A861
Person / Time
Site:	Westinghouse
Issue date:	07/07/1986
From:	Kahle J, Kasnicki D, Mcalpine E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205A839	List: ML20205A833 ML20205A861
References
70-1151-86-10, NUDOCS 8608110466
Download: ML20205A861 (6)

Text

.

UNITED STATES

• [p ut % NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y" '

, REGION il y j 101 MARIETTA STREET. N.W.

• 't ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323

.....*' JUL 101986 ,

Report No.: 70-1151/86-10 Licensee: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Nuclear Fuel Division-Columbia, SC 29250 Docket No.: 70-1151 License No.: SNM-1107 Facility Name: Columbia Plant Inspection Conducted: June 16-20, 1986 Inspector:

J. B. Kahle'

• b \

7/7[IS 6 Date Signed AccompanyingPersonneh  ?. b(d 7.f 7fkh D. A a asnicki. t

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Da';e ~ 61gned Approved by: bM

• NE Edward J. NcAlpine, ChieY

~7/7/86 Date Signed Materials Control and Accountability Section, Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of management organization and control, training / retraining, nuclear criticality safety, operations review, and maintenance and surveillance.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• E. P. Loch, Plant Manager

• E. Keelen, Manufacturing Manager

• C. Sanders, Nuclear Material Management Manager

• E. Reitler, Radiological and Environmental Engineering Manager

• R. Montgomery, Radiological and Environmental Engineer R. Burklin, Radiological and Environmental Engineer N. Stevenson, Conversion Area Supervisor S. Shackelford, MAP Team Manager The inspectors also interviewed several other licensee employees.

• Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 20, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(Closed) Violation 86-04-02, Failure to follow a nuclear criticality safety posting in the storage of SNM. Verification was made that the proper nuclear criticality safety sign was affixed to the storage rack and that safe geometry metal containers were stored accordingly. Documentation was

. examined which showed that management disseminated the importance of adhering to nuclear criticality safety posting through workplace meetings.

Discussions with licensee representatives revealed that the licensee reviewed all facility nuclear criticality safety postings to verify that

! correct and appropriate signs were posted. This was confirmed by discussions with operating personnel and through a facility tour

.(Paragraph 7b).

4. ' Management Organization and Controls (88005)

a. Internal Review and Audits The inspector reviewed the monthly nuclear criticality safety audit

reports since October 1985. The reports indicated that items were identified that, responsibility was assigned for corrective action and that corrective action was accomplished by a designated close-out date.

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2 Trend analysis of the data indicated that approximately two items were identified per month. The nature of the items were very minor with no nuclear criticality safety impact. Management personnel stated that they continue to strive for zero items.

No violations or deviations were identified.

b. Safety Committees The inspector verified that the Regulatory Compliance Committee (RCC) and the Columbia Plant Safety Policy Committee met in accordance with the conditions of the license. A licensee representative stated that the licensee has adopted a Risk Management Committee to identify and reduce risks which also is applicable to nuclear criticality safety.

No violations or deviations were identified.

c. Procedure Controls The licensee stated that a consultant had been hired to rewrite the chemical and mechahical operating procedures. A review of several procedures showed that a new format utilizing a " verb action statement" technique was used. Safety concerns and requirements were highlighted at the beginning or at the most appropriate place in the procedures.

Distribution, revision, and control are made in accordance with' Operations Administrative Procedure, Q0AP-002, Operating Procedures (Chemical and Mechanical). This procedure also provides instructions for temporary procedures. There have been no changes in the control of regulatory affairs procedures.

No violations or deviations were identified.

d. Organization There have been no changes in the nuclear criticality safety and radiation protection (Regulatory Affairs) organization. However, i through a workforce reduction program the radiological and environmental engineering function reduced its work force by two l engineers. Management was informed that NRC would continue to closely review the licensee's ability to provide nuclear criticality safety and radiation protection support of operations and to meet regulatory requirements. This is an inspector followup item which will be examined during future inspections (86-10-01).

i

! No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Training / Retraining (88010) l Documentation pertaining to retraining of workers with regard to nuclear criticality safety was discussed with the licensee representatives. The l

3 retraining is accomplished through scheduled orientation sessions and special workplace meetings. Discussion with supervisors and workers confirmed that the retaining had been provided.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Maintenance and Surveillance (88025)

a. The inspector reviewed the methods used by the licensee to establish controls for assuring that personnel were sensitive to taking precautions when maintenance or tests were performed on equipment containing special nuclear material and that the special nuclear materiel was removed prior to maintenance work. Written approval prior to starting work and sign-off upon completion is required by operating supervision.

No violatiuns or deviations were identified.

b. The inspector verified that the nuclear criticality safety evacuation alarms were calibrated in accordance with the licensee's procedures and licensee conditions.

No violations or deviations were identified.

c. The inspector verified that the large tanks where liquid wastes are accumulated were periodically inspected for accumulations of solids containing special nuclear material in accordance with the licensee's procedures.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Nuclear Criticality Safety (88015)

a. Facility Modifications and Analyses The inspector examined several nuclear criticality safety review requests and the associated analyses. The inspector verified that approved evaluation methods were used and that the calculations and analyses were checked by a second individual. The inspector also verified that the analyses included a post-installation review and sign-off authorizing the use of the equipment.

No violations or deviations were identified.

b. Tours During tours of the plant the inspector verified that areas and equipment were properly posted as required by the license and licensee procedures. The inspector verified that containers of special nuclear i

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4 material were placed in approved storage areas and racks (crit zones) and that moderation control procedures were being followed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Operations Review (88020)

a. Safety Systems and Limits The inspector verified that the following safety systems were provided and/or tested in accordance with license and procedural requirements.

(1) A UF 6detection method in the steam condensate system.

(2) A pressure relief valve and a liquid level detector and alarm in the UF6 (steam-type) vaporizers.

(3) Remote closing devices for the UFc cylinder valves without the need to remove the vaporizer hMads.

(4) Methods for cooling the UF6 cylinders.

No violations or deviations were identified.

b. Tours During tours of the work areas the inspector observed that special nuclear material was handled and stored in accordance with operating procedures and posted instructions. Log books were checked for adherence to operating limits. The inspector verified that procedures were available to operating personnel, and discussions with operators and supervisors revealed that workers were aware of procedural requirements. The inspector discussed the housekeeping conditions in the incinerator and solvent extraction area. Management representatives acknowledged that the conditions needed improvements and that they were taking measures to improve housekeeping in all areas as well as the waste and scrap reprocessing areas.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Event (93710 and 36100)

The MAP furnace room fire which occurred on Monday, May 26, 1986, was discussed with licensee representatives. Hydrogen from a leaking line ignited at a flange joint during a welding operation. Efforts to extinguish the flame resulted in a rupture of the hydrogen line and a fire which damaged the electrical controls to a sintering furnace. Licensee representative explained the details of the fire and the corrective actions taken to prevent a recurrence. Surveillance results indicated minimum

5 airborne radioactivity and surface contamination. However, an investigation revealed that the sintering furnace and associated piping may not have been installed in accordance with the installation specifications. The licensee determined that tin-lead solder which melts at a lower temperature was used in certain copper fittings rather than silver brazing. The licensee is negotiating with the vendor regarding this matter. The licensee notified Region II by telephone soon after the fire occurred and submitted a report to Region II pursuant to 10 CFR 20.403(b)(4) on May 27,1986. A 10 CFR 21 evaluation performed by the licensee revealed that the event was not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21 for the following reasons:

a. The low melting point solder joints appear to be properly constructed based upon visual examinations and leak checks performed on the hydrogen piping.

b. The existence of low melting point solder, per se, does not represent a direct hazard; a heat source is required to melt the solder.

c. The low melting point solder does not meet the definition for

" Defect" as defined in 10 CFR 21.3(d):

(d)(1) a basic component is not involved (d)(2) a basic component is not involved (d)(3) 10 CFR 50 is not applicable (d)(4) a basic component is not involved.

d. There was no major reduction in the degree of protection provided to public health and safety (i.e., the definition of a

" substantial safety hazard" was not met).

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. UF6 Cylinders (92706)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures for receiving, weighing, and processing Model 30A and 30B UF 6 cylinders. The procedures contain precautionary measures to assure that overfilled or overweight cylinders are not located in the vaporizers. The inspector reviewed the procedures and discussed with licensee representatives the techniques, methods and precautionary measures for processing the 8-A cold trapping cylinders.

Operators were familiar with the precautionary requirements and the potential consequences of heating and overfilled cylinder. It was apparent that the licensee had completely reviewed tacir procedures pertaining to UF 6 cylinders and trained the workers with regards to heating overfilled cylinders.

No violations or deviations were identified.