Information Notice 1997-07, Problems Identified During Generic Letter 89-10 Closeout Inspections
v> March 6, 1997NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 97-07: PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED DURING GENERICLETTER 89-10 CLOSEOUT INSPECTIONS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alertaddressees to the general conclusions derived from NRC inspections of programs developedat nuclear power plants in response to Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance." It is expected that recipients will review theinformation for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoidsimilar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRCrequirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.BackgroundIn response to operating events, research results, and the findings in NRC Bulletin 85-03,"Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients due to ImproperSwitch Settings," the NRC staff requested in GL 89-10 that holders of nuclear power plantoperating licenses and construction permits ensure the design-basis capability of their safety-related motor-operated valves (MOVs) by periodically reviewing MOV design bases, verifyingMOV switch settings, testing MOVs under design-basis conditions where practicable,improving evaluations and corrective actions associated with MOV failures, and determiningtrends of MOV problems. The NRC staff issued seven supplements to GL 89-10 to providefurther guidance to the industry on implementation of the generic letter.On September 18, 1996, the NRC staff issued GL 96-05, "Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves." GL 96-05 contains detailedguidance on the development of long-term programs to ensure the design-basis capability ofsafety-related MOVs. It also includes updated information on long-term MOV performance.In the area of MOV periodic verification, the recommendations of GL 96-05 supersede thoseof GL 89-10.Over a number of years, industry and NRC activities associated with GL 89-10 haveincreased, reflecting both the evolution of technological development and experience gainedover time and the rising expectations of both the industry and the NRC staff. Activities haveincluded generic communications, workshops, MOV Users' Group meetings, symposia on~ pDR ro juoTec.~7-oo7 f?63OA IN 97-07March 6, 1997 pumps and valves, and a massive MOV testing and analysis effort by the Electric PowerResearch Institute (EPRI). As a result, information on MOV performance has been widelydisseminated over the past few years.
Description of Circumstances
Most nuclear power plant licensees have notified the NRC that they consider their programsto verify the design-basis capability of safety-related MOVs in response to GL 89-10 to becomplete. The NRC staff has been conducting inspections of the development,implementation, and completion of these programs. In performing the inspections, the NRCstaff has followed Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/109, "Inspection Requirements for GenericLetter 89-10, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance." The NRC staffrecently updated this TI to provide guidance on GL 89-10 closeout inspections and on thescope of GL 89-10 programs. The NRC staff plans to complete its review of the GL 89-10programs at most nuclear plants in 1997.Through MOV testing, analyses, and operational events over the past few years, the nuclearindustry and the NRC staff have identified weaknesses in the original design, manufacture,maintenance, and testing of safety-related MOVs. During inspections to review completion ofGL 89-10 programs, the NRC staff has found that some licensees have not fully verified thedesign-basis capability of their safety-related MOVs. For example, the NRC staff has foundthat little testing bases existed in support of original assumptions by some licensees (andactuator and valve manufacturers) for friction coefficients and efficiencies affecting thrust andtorque requirements and actuator output when sizing and setting MOVs. As a result,licensees have had unexpected difficulty in demonstrating to the staff that they haveadequately completed their GL 89-10 programs.When reviewing the development and implementation phases of the GL 89-10 programs, theNRC inspectors identified specific items and concerns that needed attention beforecompletion of the programs. These items and concerns are discussed in the inspectionreports prepared by the NRC staff. During inspections to evaluate completion of theGL 89-10 programs, the NRC staff found that some licensees had not resolved the items andconcerns identified in the previous inspection reports. In addition, some licensees had notrecognized that the MOV program has to be kept up to date on the basis of new informationon MOV performance.In GL 89-10, the NRC staff recommended that MOVs within the scope of the generic letterbe tested under design-basis conditions where practicable. In Supplement 6 to GL 89-10,the NRC staff provided guidance for licensees on grouping MOVs that were not practicable totest dynamically. Some licensees have also chosen to group MOVs to minimize the amountof dynamic testing under their GL 89-10 programs. The MOV grouping guidelinesrecommend that dynamic test data be obtained on a reasonable sample of MOVs and thatthe resulting information be applied to the remaining MOVs in the group.During GL 89-10 closeout inspections, the NRC staff found that some licensees providedweak justification for the design-basis capability of MOVs that have not been dynamically IN 97-07March 6, 1997 tested. As stated in Supplement 6 to GL 89-10, the NRC staff considers plant-specific testdata to be the best source of information when attempting to justify the design-basiscapability of MOVs. The plant-specific test data would be obtained from the specific MOVbeing evaluated or, if testing was not practicable, from other similar MOVs under similar fluidconditions at the plant.In developing the justification for the design-basis capability of MOVs that are not dynamicallytested, it is important to consider the extent and reliability of the information being applied tothe MOV under evaluation. For example, MOVs of similar manufacture and fluid conditionshave been found to have a range of performance characteristics. Therefore, reliance on datafrom a few MOVs tested under industry programs or at other plants might be insufficient tojustify the design-basis capability of similar MOVs at a specific plant. Plant-specific testingneeds to be repeatable or at least validated through the performance of statistically validtesting.If MOV-specific data and plant-specific data for similar MOVs are not available, other sourcesof information appropriate for the plant's MOVs must be found. In the search for thisinformation, the range of performance under similar fluid conditions needs to be considered.For example, EPRI made significant efforts to predict bounding thrust requirements throughits program of separate effects tests, flow loop testing, and analytical methodology. In asafety evaluation (SE) dated March 15, 1996 (Accession number 9608070280), the NRC staffapproved the EPRI MOV Performance Prediction Methodology (PPM) when used inaccordance with certain conditions and limitations. Selective application of the EPRI test dataor methodology might not be reliable without full consideration of the NRC staff SE on theEPRI PPM. Further, the NRC staff has determined that it is difficult to select the specificpoint of flow isolation of tested valves and to apply flow isolation data from one valve toanother.Key parameters to be addressed in verifying the design-basis capability of MOVs are valvefriction coefficients (i.e., valve factor), stem friction coefficients, and load sensitive behavior(i.e., rate-of-loading effects). During GL 89-10 closeout inspections, the NRC staff found thatsome licensees were using qualitative arguments to justify assumptions for these quantitativeparameters. As discussed previously, MOVs that have not been dynamically tested need tohave adequate justification for their design-basis capability. The most reliable source ofinformation on valve friction coefficients, stem friction coefficients, and load sensitive behavioris the specific licensee's plant. Licensees can best demonstrate the validity of theirassumptions for these parameters by ensuring that sufficient test data are available for theirspecific plants and by analyzing the data for the plant- and valve-specific parameters.Pressure locking and thermal binding of gate valves were particular MOV performanceproblems identified in GL 89-10. To some extent, the NRC staff has addressed licenseeresponses to this issue in GL 89-10 inspections. The NRC staff issued GL 95-07, "PressureLocking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves," to providespecific recommendations to licensees and to request their responses in regard to pressurelocking and thermal binding of gate valves. GL 95-07 also requested that licensees submit IN 97-07March 6, 1997 their responses to this issue separate from their submittals on their GL 89-10 programs.Nevertheless, the NRC staff may request information from licensees during GL 89-10inspections regarding the operability of specific MOVs found to be susceptible to pressurelocking or thermal binding.On February 28, 1992, the NRC staff issued NRC Information Notice (IN) 92-18, "Potential forLoss of Remote Shutdown Capability During a Control Room Fire." In that IN, the NRC staffalerted licensees to conditions (sometimes referred to as "hot shorts") found at several plantsthat could result in the loss of capability to maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown conditionin the unlikely event that a control room fire forced reactor operators to evacuate the controlroom. During NRC inspections of MOV programs and other licensee activities, the NRC staffhas identified weaknesses in the responses of some licensees to potential short-circuiting ofMOV control circuitry in the event of a plant fire.Attachment 1 to this information notice contains examples of licensee problems in supportingspecific aspects of their bases for stating GL 89-10 actions have been completed. Attach-ment 2 contains a list of recently issued NRC information notices.Related Generic CommunicationsBL 85-03 "Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due toImproper Switch Settings," dated November 15, 1985GL 89-10 "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," datedJune 28, 1989GL 89-10 "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," datedSup. 1 June 13, 1990GL 89-10 "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," datedSup. 2 August 3, 1990GL 89-10 "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," datedSup. 3 October 25, 1990GL 89-10 "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," datedSup. 4 February 12, 1992GL 89-10 "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," datedSup. 5 June 28, 1993GL 89-10 "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," datedSup. 6 March 8, 1994GL 89-10 "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," datedSup. 7 January 24, 1996 IN 97-07March 6, 1997 GL 95-07 "Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-OperatedGate Valves," dated August 17, 1995GL 96-05 "Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves," dated September 18, 1996IN 92-17 "NRC Inspections of Programs Being Developed at Nuclear Power Plants inResponse to Generic Letter 89-10," dated February 26, 1992IN 92-18 "Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability during a Control RoomFire," dated February 28, 1992IN 96-48 "Motor-Operated Valve Performance Issues," dated August 21, 1996This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contactslisted below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Thomas T. Martin, DirectorDivision of Reactor Program ManagementOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Thomas Scarbrough, NRR(301) 415-2794E-mail: tgs@nrc.govWilliam Burton, NRR(301) 415-2853E-mail: wfb@nrc.gov
Attachments:
1. Examples of Problems Identified During GL 89-10Closeout Inspections2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
.P *;Attachment 1IN 97-07March 6, 1997 EXAMPLES OF PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED DURING GL 89-10 CLOSEOUT INSPECTIONSThrust and Torque Requirements for Non-Dynamically Tested Motor-Operated Valves(MOVs)Some licensees had made general assumptions regarding the reduction in valve factor thatwere based on increasing valve size, differential pressure, or fluid temperature withoutsufficient test data to justify these assumptions quantitatively. In addition, some licenseeshave had difficulty in justifying the capability of certain MOVs that have been sized and set onthe basis of unsupported assumptions for thrust or torque requirements. Licensees typicallypredict the thrust required to operate gate and globe valves from the sum of (1) the productof a valve factor, differential pressure across the valve, and the area of the valve disk; (2) theproduct of the system pressure and the stem cross-sectional area; and (3) the drag of thevalve packing material on the valve stem. Some licensees assumed a generic valve factor of0.5 (or less) in predicting the thrust required to operate non-dynamically tested gate valveson the basis of their assumption that the selected valve factor was conservative. However,industry and plant-specific gate valve testing has revealed thrust requirements can exceedthat predicted by a 0.5 valve factor. Similarly, industry and plant-specific globe valve testinghas revealed that a valve factor of 1.1 to predict the thrust requirements might not beadequate for all globe valves. With respect to butterfly valves, industry and plant-specifictesting has revealed that vendor calculations might not adequately predict the torque requiredto operate some butterfly valves. On the basis of industry testing and analyses, the ElectricPower Research Institute (EPRI) is revising its application guide for predicting MOV thrustand torque requirements.Use of Industry Valve InformationSome licensees have found that testing of certain MOVs under dynamic conditions isimpracticable and that sufficient test information on similar MOVs at their plants is notavailable. Consequently, these licensees have obtained MOV performance information fromother licensee or industry test programs and the MOV Performance Prediction Methodology(PPM) developed by EPRI. In comparing test data from other sources, it is important tounderstand the similarity of the valves; test conditions of differential pressure, temperature,and flow; diagnostic equipment and uncertainty; evaluation of the data and any anomalies(such as high static seating loads); and calculation of valve factor (including flow areaassumptions). In addition, sufficient data need to be obtained to account for the variability inthrust requirements for similar valves under applicable conditions. EPRI tested a sample ofvalves of varying manufacture, type and size to validate a bounding methodology forpredicting thrust requirements for a wide variety of valves. The NRC staff identified concernsregarding certain specific MOV tests by EPRI during its review of the methodology. Theseconcerns were resolved with respect to the bounding nature of the EPRI methodology indeveloping the NRC staff safety evaluation.Some licensees were not addressing the results of the EPRI methodology that predictedpotential valve damage and unpredictable thrust requirements for specific valves, and some Attachment 1IN 97-07March 6, 1997 licensees did not address the limitations on the applicability of the EPRI methodology (suchas limitations due to the specific valve manufacturer).Justification for Stem Friction Coefficient and Load Sensitive Behavior AssumptionsThe efficiency of the conversion of actuator output torque to stem thrust is a function of thestem friction coefficient and the dimensions of the valve stem and its thread. Load sensitivebehavior relates to the change in this efficiency when different thrust levels are exertedthrough the stem. Typically, as the thrust level increases, the stem friction coefficientincreases and the thrust delivered at the torque switch trip decreases (referred to as a "rate-of-loading" effect). Some licensees initially assumed a stem friction coefficient of 0.15 (orless) or rate-of-loading effect of 15 percent (or less) and planned to justify these assumptionsas part of their dynamic testing under GL 89-10. However, in some cases, insufficient dataor higher-than-expected values obtained during the MOV testing caused the staff to questionthe licensee's initial assumptions when the data were evaluated in a statistically validmanner. For example, one licensee may have to revise the initial assumption for rate-of-loading effects up to 25 percent. Stem friction coefficient and rate-of-loading effects mayvary between MOVs because of factors such as stem lubricant, lubrication frequency,environmental conditions, and manufacturing tolerances of the stem and stem nut.Therefore, i is difficult to apply information on stem friction coefficient and rate-of-loadingeffects from sources other than the licensee's testing program. EPRI developed boundingvalues for load sensitive behavior associated with gate valves as part of its MOV PPM. TheNRC staff discusses conditions and limitations of the EPRI methodology in a safetyevaluation dated March 15, 1996. Also, some licensees have improperly considered loadsensitive behavior (or rate-of-loading effects) to be a random uncertainty, rather than a biaserror or a bias/random combination error.GrouDing of MOVsIn GL 89-10, the NRC staff recommended that licensees test their safety-related MOVs underdesign-basis conditions where practicable. In Supplement 6 to GL 89-10, the NRC staffreiterated that recommendation but provided information on grouping MOVs in situationswhere a licensee either is not able to test some MOVs under design-basis conditions orchooses not to dynamically test some MOVs. For example, the NRC staff considered itimportant to (1) assess, when grouping MOVs, such similarities as valve manufacturer, modeland size, valve flow, temperature, pressure, installation configuration, valve materials andcondition, seatlguide stresses, and performance during testing; (2) test a representativesample of MOVs in each group (nominally 30 percent and no less than 2 MOVs); (3) testeach MOV in a group with diagnostics under static conditions; and (4) evaluate any adverseinformation from individual MOV testing and determine its applicability to the entire group.Some licensees have used approaches for grouping and testing MOVs other than thosedescribed in Supplement 6 to GL 89-10. The NRC staff has found that some licensees havenot adequately justified testing only one MOV in a group, or a very small sample of MOVs inthe group. Also, some licensees have selected a valve factor based on a sample of teststhat does not accommodate reasonable variation in the valve factor for other MOVs in the Attachment 1IN 97-07March 6, 1997 group (for example, the bounds on the valve factor for a group of valves was not alwaysappropriate for the scatter observed in the data). Although some licensees have groupedMOVs in ways that could not be justified, some other licensees have established such a largenumber of groups (as many as 50) that it is difficult to have sufficient test data for eachgroup. Some licensees have adequately justified including MOVs with small variations in sizeinto the same group in order to minimize the number of groups and allow sufficient data to beobtained for each group.De-raded Voltage CalculationsThe NRC staff discussed in Supplements 1 and 6 to GL 89-10 determination of the voltageassumed at MOVs for design-basis conditions. Various methods are used by licensees todetermine the reduction in voltage from the grid lo the MOV being evaluated. DuringGL 89-10 closeout inspections, the NRC staff found that some licensees had not fully justifiedtheir assumptions for the grid voltage assumed in their MOV calculations. For example,some licensees assumed full grid voltage as the starting point for calculations, rather than thedegraded grid relay setpoint.Justification for Weak Link AnalysesIn Information Notice 96-48, "Motor-Operated Valve Performance Issues," the NRC staffdiscussed recent failures of MOV keys. Some licensees have also identified cracks in motorshafts for some MOVs. Further, missing bolts or incorrect bolting material has been found insome MOVs. These problems could be related to inadequate justification of the weak linkcomponents in MOV analyses. For example, replacement of a motor pinion key with a key ofstronger material could cause the weak link to shift to another internal part, such as themotor shaft.Analytical Evaluation of Potential Pressure Lockinq of Gate ValvesIn Supplement 6 to GL 89-10, the NRC staff provided one acceptable approach foraddressing potential pressure locking and thermal binding of MOVs. In GL 95-07, "PressureLocking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves," the NRC staffgave more detailed information and recommendations to address potential pressure lockingand thermal binding of gate valves.During recent GL 89-10 inspections, the NRC staff identified weaknesses in someapproaches used by licensees to evaluate the effects of pressure locking of MOVs. Somelicensees are relying on analytical approaches (without test-based justification) to provideconfidence that the motor actuator can overcome the thrust resulting from pressure locking ofits valve. The NRC staff found that some licensees assumed overly optimistic actuatorefficiencies in predicting the thrust delivered by the motor actuator under pressure lockingconditions. In addition, the staff found that some licensees have insufficient justification forassumptions of significant leakage from the valve bonnet over a short period, and of a verylow increase in bonnet pressure with rising temperatur Attachment 1IN 97-07March 7, 1997 Evaluation of Test DataSome licensees have not thoroughly evaluated test data to ensure that the results arereliable. For example, an abnormally low thrust requirement or a back-calculated valve factormight indicate that the design-basis differential pressure and flow were not achieved duringthe test. Further, anomalies in the data traces could reveal valve or actuator damage. Somelicensees have not justified extrapolation of test data based on percentage of design-basisdifferential pressure and absolute value of differential pressure as discussed in the EPRIMOV program.Trackina and Trendinq of MOV ProblemsTracking and trending are important aspects of a licensee's periodic verification program.The NRC staff provided comments on MOV tracking and trending methods in initial reports ofGL 89-10 inspections. It also identified weaknesses in the development of MOV tracking andtrending methods at some nuclear plants. During GL 89-10 closeout inspections, the NRCstaff found that some licensees have not fulfilled their plans to develop MOV tracking andtrending methods and that some licensees have highly informal methods without specificguidelines or schedule K)Attachment 2IN 97-07March 6, 1997 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to97-0691-85,Rev. 197-0597-04Weaknesses in Plant-Specific EmergencyOperating Proceduresfor Refilling theSecondary Side of DryOnce-Through SteamGeneratorsPotential Failures ofThermostatic ControlValves or DieselGenerator JacketCooling WaterOffsite NotificationCapabilitiesImplementation of a NewConstraint on RadioactiveAir EffluentsDefacing of Labels toComply with 10 CFR20.1904(b)03/04/9702/27/9702/27/9702/24/9702/20/97All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors withwith once-throughsteam generatorsAll holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactorsAll holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors andtest and researchreactorsAll materials, fuelcycle, and non-powerreactor licenseesAll material licenseesinvolved with disposalof medical waste97-03OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit IN 97-07March 6, 1997 GL 95-07 "Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-OperatedGate Valves," dated August 17, 1995GL 96-05 "Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves," dated September 18, 1996IN 92-17 "NRC Inspections of Programs Being Developed at Nuclear Power Plants inResponse to Generic Letter 89-10," dated February 26, 1992IN 92-18 "Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability during a Control RoomFire," dated February 28, 1992IN 96-48 "Motor-Operated Valve Performance Issues," dated August 21, 1996This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contactslisted below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.original signed byThomas T. Martin, DirectorDivision of Reactor Program ManagementOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Thomas Scarbrough, NRR(301) 415-2794E-mail: tgs@nrc.govWilliam Burton, NRR(301) 415-2853E-mail: wfb@nrc.gov
Attachments:
Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 11/27/961. Examples of Problems Identified During GL 89-10Closeout Inspections2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesDOCUMENT NAME: G:\WFB\IN_89_10 *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCETo receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box cbopy wlo attachmentvendosure E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure N = No copy=OFFICE Reviewers BCEMEB BCXPECB lIjjj-jNAME TScarbrough*with RWessman* AChaffee* TfartinWBurton:jkd*comments wlcommentsDATE 12/03/96 12/06/96 01/03/97 02d097, _ OFFICIAL RECORD COPY IN 97-03* t February 11, 1 97 GL 95-07 "Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power peratedGate Valves," dated August 17, 1995GL 96-05 "Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety elated Motor-Operated Valves," dated September 18, 1996IN 92-17 "NRC Inspections of Programs Being Developed a Nuclear Power Plants inResponse to Generic Letter 89-10," dated Febrdry 26, 1992IN 92-18 "Potential for Loss of Remote Sutdown Capability during a Control RoomFire," dated February 28, 1992IN 96-48 "Motor-Operated Valve Perforpiance Issues," dated August 21, 1996This information notice requires no specific action, or written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contactslisted below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor-Regulation (NRR) project manager.Thomas T. Martin, DirectorDivision of Reactor Program ManagementOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Thomas Scarbrough, NRR(301) 415-2794E-mail: tgsenrc.govWilliam Burton, NRR(301) 415-2853E-mail: wfb@nrc.gov
Attachments:
Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 11/27/961. Examples of Problems Identified During GL 89-10Closeout Inspections2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesDOCUMENT NAME: G:\WFBUIN_89 10 *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCETo receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box C=Copy w/o attachment/enclosure E=_opy Wth attachment/enclosure N No pyOFFICE Reviewers l BC\EMEB I BC\PECB ID M.NAME TScarbrough*with RWessman* AChaffee* ToirartinWBurton:jkd*comments w/commentsDATE 12/03/96 12/06/96 01/03/97 02A497OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Isbi.IN 96-xxK) December xx, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contactslisted below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Thomas T. Martin, DirectorDivision of Reactor Program ManagementOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts: Thomas Scarbrough, NRR(301) 415-2794E-mail: tgsenrc.govWilliam Burton, NRR(301) 415-2853E-mail: wfb@nrc.gov
Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices2. Examples of Problems Identified During GL 89-10Closeout InspectionsDOCUMENT NAME: G:\WFBUN_89j10 *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE la cowy of this document Indicate in the box C=Coov wio attachmentlenclosure E=Coov with attachmentlenclosure N =i j4 ICOWvTo receiveOFFICE Reviewers I BC\EMEB _ BC\PE7f A) I D\DRPM INAME TScarbrough*wifth RWessman* AChake\, TMartinWBurton:jkd*comments w/comments ) I_ _ _DATE 12/03196 12/06/96 D l @ V 1 2/ /96OFFICIAL RECORD COPY <( (vII -/f 1
- .IN 96-xx* .iDecember xx, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ihave anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact one 9We technical contactslisted below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Re ion (NRR) project manager.Tho T. Martin, Directorision of Reactor Program ManagementOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts: Thomas S rbrough, NRR William Burton, NRR(301) -2794 (301) 415-2853E- l: tgs@nrc.gov E-mail: wfbenrc.gov
Attachments:
1. List of Re tly Issued NRC Information Notices2. Examp of Problems Identified During GL 89-10seout InspectionsDOC ENT NAME: G:AWFB\IN 89 10To receive a co of this document. Indicate In the box C=copy wlo attachment/enclosure E=Copy Wtth attachmentlenclosure N = No copyOFFI Reviewers l BC\EMEB BC\PECB l I DUDRPMNAME TScarbrou3WP it{Wessm ) ACh47/ -g0 TMartinWBurton jkd _f__ __mDATE 123/96 61J96 1 /15/77 Il1 /96OFFICIAL RECORD COPY