ML20197B041

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Insp Rept 70-7002/98-202 on 980202-06.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Implementation of Fire Protection Program Commitments & Safe Plant Operations
ML20197B041
Person / Time
Site: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date: 02/27/1998
From:
NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:
Shared Package
ML20197B037 List:
References
70-7002-98-202, NUDOCS 9803100093
Download: ML20197B041 (16)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,

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Inspection Report No. 70-7002/98-202

~ Docket No. 70 7002 r

i j Facility Operator: United States Enrichment Corporation I

}- Facility Name: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant l Observations At: Piketon, OH l Inspection Conducted: Fet,ruary 2-6,1998 i

e inspectors: Yen-Ju Chen, FCOB

, Peter Lee, FCOB Approved By: Philip Ting, Chief Operations Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety i' and Safeguards, NMSS e

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Enclosure l

' 9903100093 980227 PDR ADOCK 07607002 C PDR

2 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT NRC INSPECTION REPORT 70-7002/98-202 The NRC performed a routine, announced fire safety inspection at the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC) Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) in Piketon, Ohio, on February 2-0,1998. The inspection focused on the implementation of PORTS fire protection program commitments and safe plant operations. Major fire safety performance elements reviewed included: fire protection assessment, fire protection systems, general building housekeeping, Fire Services (FS) staffing, fire protection system inspections and maintenance, emergency response, inspector Followup items (IFls), and Compliance Plan (CP) Issues.

Fire Protection Assessment

  • A potential extemal fire which may impact the operation of the autoclaves in Building X-344A was identified. Preliminary and engine 3 ring evaluations were not adequate to address the safety concern raised, especially for a fire-induced UFs relcase accident and a fire-induced malfunction of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety. Compensatory actions have been taken to ensure that no immediate sianificant safety concems exist in the area. The certificate holder had agreed to make further evaluation (Details 1.b).

e The fire safety assessments, in accordance with Safety Analysis Report Section 6.8.2.2, appeared adequate. However, a concern was raised in the performance of Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) Fire Safety Subcommittee to effectively evaluate the facility's fire safety re'ated activities. The certificate holder had agreed to examine this concem (Details 1.b).

Fire Protection Systems

  • The fire protection water supply for the plant is considered adequate and reliable to meet the sprinkler system desigr basis fire demand in the main process facilities and major fires that could occur at the plant (Details 2.b).
  • A few sprinkler heads with deposits of white mineral like material were identified.

Appropriate compensatory actions have been taken. The preliminary results indicated that the deposit would not impact the overall sprinkler performance. The facility is expected to determine the actuation temperature, the root cause of the deposit on sprinkler heads, and the possible performance deficiencies to the interior piping (Details 2.b).

Fire Prevention e The general housekeeping in the process buildings observed was considered adequate (Details 3.b).

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Fire Services Staffirig e A con 3ict was identified regarding the TSR and SAR minimum Fire Services (FS) staffi ig requirements in addition, the minimum staffing requirement established in the TSR may have a potential negative impact on the ability of the FS to perform effective fire figoting operations. However, the implementing procedure is consistent with industry practice and could provide adequate level of coverage. Due to the current minimum staffing level, the facility would have to rely significantly on the availability of mutual aid support and the engineered sprinkler systems in the facilities to mitigate and limit fire growth (Details 4.b).

Fire Protection System Insoection. Testino. and Maintenance e The facility had provided reasonable assurance for reliable operations of wet pipe spnnkler systems through the performance of inspections and testing that is consistent with industry requirements. However, the facility had not performed testing for automatic start up of lube oil sumr cump systems in the main process building to ensure its reliability (Details S.b).

Emeroency Response e Adequate mutual aid agreements between the facility and the nearby municipal fire departments had been established for fire protection support of the Portsmouth plant (Detalis 6.b).

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4 REPORT DETAILS

. .1. Fire Protection Assessment

!- a. S.com The inspectors reviewed the fire safety / hazard assessment performed for Building X-344A to ensure adequate safety is provided. The inspectors also reviewed the process of performing fire safety reviews for proposed changes, post maintenance, or acceptance testings. Various fire safety self assessments were reviewed to determine their adequacy,

b. Observations and Findinas Buildino X-344A Autoclave Extemal Fire

, Building X-344A is the Toll Enrichment Services Facility that process and ship / receive low i

assay toll product UF.. During the walk through of Building X-344A, the inspectors identified a

potential source of fire associated with the hydraulic systems located below an elevated platform adjacent to the autoclaves, The hydraulic pump systems operate the opening and closing of the autoclaves. The lack of sprinkler protection for the area below the platform was

, also raised as a concein by the inspectors. A problem repo.t, PR PTS-98-00825, was generated to review the inspectors' concem. Subsequent to a preliminary operability evaluation, an engineering evaluation and the compensatory actions taken for administrative control of combustibles were provided to the NRC inspectors. Th:s qualitative evaluation, with reference to a draft combustible loading study conducted for Paducah autoclaves as a basis, concluded that an inventory of 100 gallon lube oil does not present substantial safety hazards.

The absence of sprinkler protection below the grated platform was determined by PORTS to be an acceptable condition, consistent with Factory Mutualinsurance/ loss prevention practices.

PORTS also concluded that a potential of a spray fire could be prevented by the configuration

, - of the hydraulic pump system that requires operator action (i.e., deadman control switch) to

. charge the hydraulic lines for the system. A release of the switch would stop the pump to prevent the flow of oil and de-pressurization of the hydraulic lines, f

I However, the inspectors' review and independent evaluations determined that the potential fire

!- severity associated with the quantity of combustible liquid present would not be cont:dered insignificant. A combustible liquid pool fire involving only a portion of the total quantity of hydraulic oil (e.g.,25 to 50 gallons) could result in a fire with a peak release rate of 5.5 -12 MW and a duration of up to or greater than 10 minutes. The estimated peak energy release rate is noi considered an insignificant fire source. Based on the close proximity of the potential hydraulic oil fire to the autoclaves and UF, cylinders, the inspectors arc concemed that

, increased temperature and pressure may result in the loss of expansion volume and thus increase the potential of a UFe release. In addition, the fire may induce malfunction of SSCs important to safety (e.g., steam cutoff system, autoclave shell high temperature containment shutdown system, pigtails, primary system piping, remote transfer isolation systems, UF, cylinders). The er:gineering evaluation submitted had not adequately addressed these

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5 concems. The inspectors discussed these concems with FS staff by phone on February 20, 1998. The FS had agreed to develop an engineering evaluation to quantify the potential fire severity, identify appropriate technical basis, and determine the potential consequences (e.g.,

potential of a fire induced UF release accident and a fire induced malfunction to SSCs important to safety). This will be tracked as an Unresolved item (URI) 70-7002/98 202-01. I Based on the evaluations and compensatory actions taken, the inspectors determined that no immediate significant concems exist in the area. In addition, the facility is currently protected by a dry pipe sprinkler system, with a sprinkler system design density of 0.18 gpm/sq. ft. and a design area of 3250 sq. ft. The actuation of the sprinklers would provide cooling for the fire area and could limit the potential consequences of increased temperature from an extemal fire.

The availability of the on-site FS and mutual aid also provides additional defense-in-depth for fire protection of the facility.

Fire Protection Desion Reviews and Acceptance Testino FS participates in design reviews to ensure that fire protection requirements and standards are met in proposed changes to system configuratians or facilities. Proceduie XP4-SS-FS1900,

" Design Review," establishes the requirements and process for performing the design review.

FS personnel also perform the post-maintenance or acceptance testing of fire protection systems using established procedures to ensure proper operations and restoration. The inspectors considered tne participation of FS in these reviews appropriate.

Self Assessment Safety Andysis Report (SAR) Section 6.8.2.2 states the commitments for performing self assessments implementing procedure XP2-HR-HR1033, Rev. O, " Organization Self-Assessment Program," identifies four different levels of self-assessments and the responsible organizations for each level. A check list was develooed for conducting assessment in each area. The inspectors reviewed the schedule for FS slf assessments and sample checked the assessment results. No deficiency was identified from :he review.

A subcommittee rm fire protection was established under the facility's Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC). The responsibilities and organization of the subcommittee are identified in Procedure XP2-SS-FS1035 (the subcommittee charter). According to the p ocedure, the subcommittee is to (1) advise and provide recommendations to the PORC on matters related to fire safety / Fire Protection Progcam, (2) ensure adequate controls are in place to provide the

*el of fire safety, and (3) review ano provide recommendations to the PORC on issues pre:,ented to the subcommittee by the PORC. The inspectors noted that the Fire Protection Subcommittee only conducted two meetings during 1997, and both meetings were in late December. The meeting frequency met the procedural requirement of twice a year; however, the inspectors questioned whether the Fire Protection Subecmmittee had met its intended functions described above. The 1997 PORC Intemal Self Assessment stated that "Other subcommittee oversight responsibilities need to be improved." It appeared that PORC considered its subcommittees need to improve performance. However, during the inspection, the inspectors did not identify any performance indicator that demonstrates deficiencies in the

6 Fire Protection Subcommittee performance. The FS had agreed to assess the Fire Safety Subcommittee's performance.

c. Cnaclugtons A potential external fire which may impact the opvation of the autoclaves in Building X-34dA was identified. The preliminary and engineering evaluations were not adequate to address the safety concem raised, especially for the fire induced UF, release accident and the fire induced malfunction of SSCs important to safety. PORTS had agraed to address the concerns raised by the inspectors.

The fire safety assessments, in accordance with SAR Section 6.8.2.2, appeared adequate.

However, a concem was raised in the performance of PORC Fire Safety Subcommittee. The FS had agreed to assess its performance,

2. Fire Protection Systems l a. Scope The inspectors reviewed the facility's fire water systems to ensure adequate water supply and sprinkler systems to evaluate their material condition.
b. Ot'servations and Findinag Water Sucolies A number of well fields, located north, northeast, and west of the site pumps supply the water needed for process cooling, fire protection, and domestic use. A high pressure fire water distribution system and sanitary water distribution system provides the distribution of water for fire protection throughout the site. The fire protection systems for the main process buildings are fed from the high pressure fire water system (HPFWS). The piping of the HPFWS are looped around the main process buildings. The system consists of an eievated water storage tower (300,000 gallons) and a total of six fire pumps at two separate loestions of the distribution system. These fire pumps are automatically started, altemating between pump houses, based on the water volume in the elevated water storage tower. Water supply for the pumps is provided from the plant raw and make-up water (greater than 7 million gallons) or two 2-million gallon fire water storage tanks. The two 2-mit )n gallon storage tanks and the 300,000 gallon elevated water tower would supply process building sprSkler design demand of 16,000 gpm for a duration of greater than four hours. The availabk water supply at the site is considerad more than adequate to address a design basis fire. The inspectors toured the pump houses and reviewed the annual fire pump test results for all fire pumps. The pump test results indicated that pumps were operable and capable of operating at greater than 90% of the manufacturer rated capacity.

The sanitary and fire water system provides treated water for plant operations, fire protection, and for the hydrants at site, including those surrounding the main process buildings, and sprinkler systems in support buildings, switch yards, and remaining area of the site. The plant

7 raw and make-up water provides the source for this system. The distribution piping is looped, consisting of 8 to 24 inch mains. Four pumps are installed on the system to provide a total pump capability of 8,500 gpm on the system. An elevated 250,000 water storage tank provides approximately 85 psi for the fire protection systems on this distribution system.

Building X-344A &y pipe sprinkler system is supplied by the sanitary and fire water system.

The inspectors considered the plant fire water supply adequete ana reliable to meet design basis fire demand for sprinkler systems.

Sorinkler Systems During the tour of Building X-333, a white c.olored material was found on sprinkler heads on the process floor. The facility had previously identified the presence of white deposits during its sprinkler system walk-downs. Problem reports (PR-PTS 97 5700 and PR-PTS 97-9015) were initiated on June 20 and October 16,1997. The affected sprinkler heads were found in a random fashion and impacted very few sprinkler heads. Appropriate actions were taken l

(Limiting Condition for Operation corrective actions, fire patrol, operability evaluation, maintenance service request) and affected sprinkler heads were replaced. A laboratory service request was initiated by FS on November 14,1997, to determine actuation temperatures for sprinkler heads with mineral deposits. Preliminary results indicated that the actuation temperature was delayed by a few degrees. The finallaboratory test report was not completed j

at the time c7 inspection. FS plans to submit a samplo of sprinkler heads to the sprinkler manufacturer for additional evaluation and testing. The inspectors considered this plari appropriate to ensure that consistent testing raethod is used for determining the sprinkler actuation temperature. The determination of the actuation temperature by the manufacturer, the root cause of the mineral deposit, and the possible performance deficiencies to the interior of sprinkler piping will be tracked as inspector Followup item (IFI) 70-7002/98-202-O'!

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c. Conclusions The fire water supply at the plant was considered adequate and reliable to meet the design basis fire demand for sprinkler systems in the main process faci!! ties and for major fires that could occur at the plant PORTS sprinkler walk-downs and the inspectors' walk-through identified a few sprinkler heads with deposits of white mineral-like material. Appropriate compensatory actions have been taken. The preliminarv results indicated that the deposit would not impact the overall actuation temperature nor t.ie performance of the sprinklers. The facility had agreed to determine the sprinkler actuation temperature by the manufacture, the root cause of the deposit on sprinkler heads, and the possible performance deficiencies to the interior of sprinkler piping.

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- 3. Fire Prevention

a. Sgggg During the walk through, the inspectors observed the general housekeepMg condition of major process buildings.
b. Observations and Findinas During the lam inspection, the inspectors noticed that the facility's general housekeeping was not adequate, especially in the areas of inadequate lighting and the collection of anti-C clothing.

During this inspection, the inspectors noticed that the general housekeeping has improved.

The insg .; tors wers informed that the facility now has a desig'ated team for maintaining facility lighting to ensure adequate lighting is provided throughout the facility, in addition, the collection of anti-C clothing has been appropriately concentrated in a few designated areas,

c. Conclusion The inspectors considered the general housekeeping in the areas observed adequate.
4. Fire Services Staffino
a. Scope The inspectors reviewed the facility's minimum FS staffing commitments and its current practico to determine its adequacy for performing fire fighting functions.
b. Observations and Findinas The inspectors identified an apparent conflict in the SAR and the Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) regarding the minimum staffing required for the Fire Services. TSR Table 3.2.2-1 requires a minimum staffing of four, and SAR Section 5.4.4 states "the normally scheduled shift staffing is 6 fire services personnel" The FS had agreed to clearly establish a consistent minimum FS staffing requirement, in addition, the inspectors were concemed that the TSR minimum staffing of four may have a potential negative impact on the ability of the FS to perform effective manual fire suppression operations. The TSR considers that two of the four firefighters should be 'on duty and available" during "a run to deliver an individual to a local hospital." Under the described TSR condition, only two firefighters and one officer could be on site to respond to an emergency.

This could increase the time for FS to take emergency actions and cause ineffective firefighting operations. It could potentially increase the risk of firefighter injuries or fatalities.

The industry practice is a minimum of five firefighters (i.e., two person entry team, two person bE,cKup team, and one fire grcund operations officer / pump operator) at the fire ground prior to performing interior firefighting operations. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) code

9 1500 establishes these requirements for fire ground operations. The sechnical or th6 i operational basis for the current minimum staffing in the TSR was not available.

Procedere X P4 SS-FS-1032, " Shift Tumover: Salaries for the Fire Services Operations,"

indicates that five (four firefighters and one officer) was the minimum operational staffing, it is also noted that Procedure XP2 SS-FS1031, " Fire Protection Program," adopts the SAR i commitment of six per onnel staffing (i.e., five firefighters and one officer). The minimum staffing requirement in these procedures would ensure adequate FS performance and would be consistent with industry practices. However, the minimum staff requirements in these procedures are not reflected in the current TSR. The inspectors also noted that the minimum staffing on site may be impacted when FS responds to mutual aid call during off-normal hours.

In response to the inspectors' concems regarding the basis of TSR minimum staffing I requirement and the conflict between SAR and TSR requirements, the facility initiated a problem report, PR PTS-98-00791, to evaluate and provide a basis for the TSR staffing requirement. The resolution for an adequate minimum FS staffing to perform safe and effective fire fighting operations and the required changes to the TSR and/or SAR will be tracked as IFl 70-7002/ 98-202-03. In the interim, the FS maintains a minimum staffing of five for fire suppression response. The inspectors noted that the current normal FS staffing is adequate for a single pumper engine. Due to the minimum staffing, the facility fire protection program would have to rely heavily on the design capability of the automatic sprinkler systems (i.e., design area coverage of 10,000 sq. ft.) to limit fire growth or mitigate a lube oil fire in the early fire development stages within the main process facilities. It also relies on the availability of o'fsite mutual aid support.

c. Conclusions The minimum staffing established in the Portsmouth TSR has a potential negative impact on the ability of the FS to perform effective fire fighting operations. In addition, a conflict exists between the TSR and SAR regarding the minimum required FS staffing. Based on the current minimum staffing level, the facility would have to rely significantly on the engineered sprinkler systems in the facility to mitigate and limit fire growth and on the availability of mutual aid support. The FS had agreed to evaluate and address the minimum staffing concems.
5. Fire Protection System Insoection. Testina. and Maintenance
a. Scope The inspectors reviewed the inspections and testings for tube oil sump pump, sprinkler systems, and fire pumps.
b. Observations and Findinos Lube Oil Sumo Pumos During the inspection walk-through and interviews, the inspectors noted that automatic start-up of a lube oil sump pump systems were not being tested to ensure automatic start-up. In the

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i 10 event of a fire in the lube oil tank storage a'Jas, the automatic function of a lube oil sump pump would remove water /oll from the pits. This prevents the spill over of the pit area and limits the 4

spread of the lube oil fire. The pumi s will start automatically when a sprinkler flow switch in the pit area and a liquid level detector switch in the pit are activated. This function is described in SAR Section 3.1.1.6.3.4 for limiting fire potential for all tube oil pits in the major process buildings. Testing at an appropriate frequency would ensure that the automatic start up function will operate at the time of need. Based on the importance of its function, the inspectors considered this system a fire protection safety system.

4 The inspectors noted that the facility has established in procedures (Procedure XP4 SS-

FS6221 and XP4 CO CA2635) the monthly testing of manual start capability of the oil sump pumps arid shift visualinspection of the pit on sump ,oumps. However, the testing of the

, autorMtic start up was not included in these procedures and it was not known to have been included in other site procedures or to have been performed in the past, except after the Installation. fr. asunse to the inspectors' inquiry, problem report PR PTS 98-00762 was generated to reme or develop a procedure to establish functional testing of the automatic start-up of the lube oil sump pur'ip systems. The testing of the automatic start-up of the lube oil

sump pumps will be tracked as IFl 70 7002/98 202 04.

j SRnnMer Systems and Fjre Pumos I FS staff conducted the ' ,spection and testing of spinkler systems per Procedure

XP4 SS FS6022, " Test and inspection of Wet Pipe Sprinkler Systems." It met the TSR 1 requirements. The review of surveillance records for Buil
lings X 330, X-333, X 343, and 2

X343A did not identify impairments of wet pipe sprinkler systems. No sprinkler system

deficiency was identified from the facility walk through.

The inspection and testing of wet pipe spdnkler systems in general were consistent with those established by NFPA 25 " Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water Based Fire Protection l Systems." The inspectors noted that sealed control valves were checked during the monthly inspections. Weekly inspection is required by NFPA 25 to provide a greater sssurance against an inadvertent closure or a continued supervishn for closure of spriraler control valves as those provided by chain ano locks and tamper switches, respectively. Various inspection frequenc'es will be reviewed in the future as a re-certification issue.

c. C&QCMlQat The facility hM provided reasonable assuratice for reliable operations of wet pipe sprinkler systems thrc@ the performance e' inspections and testing that is consistent with industry j requirements. However, the facility had nct performed appropriate testing of automatic start up of lube oil sump pump systems in the major process buildings to ensure the reliabi!ity of the automatic start up function at the time of need to limit fire potential T

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6. Em0Igenev Reso_QDit l
a. RQgg l The inspectors reviewed the facility's mutual aid agreement information to ensure that additional fire fighting support will be provided during an emerq.ncy.

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b. Qh33fyallons and Findinal Mutual aid support had been established between the facility and various nearby o'fsite fire departments. Twelve rne departments had agreed to provide available fire fighting equipment and personnelin the event of an emer0ency. It was ncted that Pike Forest Fire Depanment is included in Section 4.32 of the Emergency Plan, but was not included in the most recent

" Agreement for Mutual Aid for Additional Fire Protection." According to Emergency Preparedness, Pike Forest Fire Department has withdrawn from the agreement, and Emergency Preparedness is in the process of preparing a certificate amendment.

c. Conclusioan Adequate mutual aid agreements between the facility and the nearby municipal fire departments had been er.tablished for fire protection support of the Portsmouth plant.
7. Insoector Followuo items IFl No. 70 7002/97 202-03. During inspections97-202 and 97 208, the inspectors reviewed a problem report and plant change revies (PCR) for a canopy that was constructed on the operating floor of building X 330 and blocked flow from the prc existing overhead sprinklers. A decision had been made by the facility to install sprinklers under the canopy. The insoectors had reviewed the hydraulic design of the sprinkler system and determined that the design meets NFPA 13 criteria. During this inspection, the facility has acquired the requimd parts and is in the process of scheduling for installation. This IFl will remain open untii the system is installed and detemiined to be operable.

IFl No. 70-7002/97 208 01. During inspection 97 208, the inspectors identified that the classroom training for firewatch did not include lessons-learned information from recent fire safety incidents. The inspectors reviewed the updated training material and determined it adequate. In addition, there were discrepancies in the interpretation of OSHA regu!ations regarding firewdch hands-on training. After reviewing a letter from OSHA dated 1986 and the facility's practice, the inspectors determined that the facility's current treining for firewatch is acceptable. This IFl was closed.

IFl No. 70 7002/97-208-02. The facility provided lightning / grounding protection information during this inspection. The facility's lightning protection system was designed and installed in accordance with NFPA 70, Na'ional Electric Code, which does not require periodic inspection and maintenance. The facility conducted a spot check to verify the condition of the grounding system more 40 years after the installation. No corrosion or damage was identified. At this time, the facility does not plan to initiate an inspection or maintenance program for the

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' 12 grounding system. The inspectors considered the current physical condition of the grounding i system was adequate and the facility's action was acceptable. This IFl was closed.  ;

e IFl No. 70 7002/97 208 03. The inspectors raised concems regarding the distribution of I portable fire extinguishers in the facihty. During this inspection, the facility provided a letter from OSHA dated 1986 regarding the exemption of OSHA regulation on portable fire extinguisher

_ distribution. After evaluation of the facility's practice, the inspectors detemuned that the l facility's current practice acceptable. This IFl was closed.
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8. Comoliance Plan issuga Compliance Plan issue 18. Both the Emergency Preparedness and the FS are still working on the corrective actions identified in Problem Reports PR PTS 97 7666 and PR-PTS 97 7678.

During this inspection, Emergency Preparedness had made the emergency packets controlled documents and developed a procedure for the preparation of the emergancy packet and its document control. Emergency Preparedness is still coordinating with FS, nuclear criticality safety (NCS) staff, and Plant Shift Superintendent to identify the necessary NCS 'nformation for the emergency packets. The FS has identified the necessary fire safety information to be included in the emergency packets. The FS is in the process to disseminate such information ,

in the Emergency Packet. These actions are scheduled to be completed by April 1,1998. This CP issue will remain open pending the completion of the corrective actions.

9. Exit Meetina Summarv Inspectors met with PORTS management representatives throughout the inspection. The exit l meeting was held on February 6,1998. No classified or proprietary information was involved.

At the exit meeting, PORTS management and staff acknowledged the def'clencies identified, and committed to take appropriate actions, i

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13 EARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Agreement for Mutual Aid for Additional Fire Protection, Lockheed Martin Utility Service, Inc.,

dated 12/19/97 EVAL X340 SE-001, "An Engineering Evaluation to Determine if Sprinkler Protection is Necessary over the Autoclaves Hydraulic Systems in X 344 A," dated 2/10/98 FMR Technical Report,"cire Protection Review Revisit No. 2 Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Piketon, OH," dated 6/90 Interoffice Memorandum, Boesch to Distribution,

Subject:

Sprinklers Under X-344 A Autoclaves, dated 2/5/98 GAT-1028, " Reliability Study: Sanitary and Fire Water System, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant," dated 3/81 GAT 1014, " Reliability Study: Fire Protection Equipment, High Pressure Fire Water System, and associated Sprinkler Systems, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant," dated 12/80 Memo, from Snook to Armstrong,

Subject:

X 4601 Annual Fire Pump Test Results, dated 5/23/97 Memo, from Snook to Armstrong,

Subject:

X 6644 Annual Fire Pump Test Raults, dated 5/23/97 POEF-1156," Recurrent Reliability Study , Fire Protection Equipment High Pressure Fire Water System and Associated Sprinkler Systems" POEF 822 97-047," Operability Evaluation PR PTS-97 9015, Six Sprinkler Heads in X 333 Bldg. with Mineral Deposit on the Fusible Link," dated 10/16/97 Problem Report No. PTS 98-00825, dated 2/5/98 Problem Report No. PTS-98-00791, dated 2/4/98 Problem Report No. PTS-97 00762, dated 2/3/98 Problem Report No. PTS-97 9015, dated 10/16/97 Problem Report No. PTS-97 5700, dated 6/20/97 Procedure UE2 HR-C01030,

  • Problem Reporting" Procedure UE2 TO-NS1032," Operability Evaluations arid Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions"

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Procedure XP2 EG NS1030,
  • Safety Evaluation of As Found Discrepancies"
Procedure XP4 CO-CA2635, " Lube Oil Pit Sump Pump Routine inspection"

] Procedure XP4 SS FS1013," Placing Sprinkler Systems Out of Service" Procedure XP4 SS FS1031," Fire Protection Program" Procedure XP4 SS FS1900," Design Review" i

l Procedure XP4 SS FS6221, " Lube Oil Sump Pump System" I

a . Procedure XP4 SS FS6022," Test and Inspection of Wet Pipe Sprinkler Systems" Wet Pipe Sprinkler Systems Surveillance Records: Area 1 Wet Pipe Sprinkler System Annual Inspection TSR Required X 100, X 101, X 102, X 103, X 343, X 533, X 6331, X-640-1, X 6619, X 6644, X 7725, X 7727 (dated 9/19/97,10/18/97,11/22/97, and 12/14/97) ,

i Wet Pipe Sprinkler Systems Surveillance Records: Area 2 Wet Pipe Sprinkler System - Annual Inspection TSR Required X 326, X-626-1, X-623, X 770, X 3000, X 3001, X 3002, X 3012, X 5000, X 5001B (dated 9/8/97,10/06/97,11/20/97, and 12/28/97) i Wet Pipe Sprinkler Systems Surveillance Records: Area 3 Wet Pipe Sprinkler System-Annual

[ Inspection TSR Required X 330, X 112, X344A & B, X 530, X-530G, X 6301, X 751, X 847, X 1020, X 6000, X 7721 (dated 9/25/97,10/25/97,11/28/97, and 12/26/97)

Wet Pipe Sprinkler Systems Surveillance Records: Area 4 Wet Pipe Sprinkler System Annual-Inspection TSR Required X 100, X 101, X-102, X-103, X-104, X 106, X 300/SCADA, X 608, X-611, X 700/700A, X 705, X 710, X 720/7200, X-746, X750, X 801, X 1000, X 1007, X 3346 (dated 9/19/97,10/15/97,11/24/97, and 12/09/97) 4 WO No. 9802566-01, " Work installations for installation of New Potter," dated 2/3/98 Water Flow Transmitters X 333, Transmitter #151, dated 2/3/98 1

INSPECTION PROCEDURE USED IP 88055 Fire Protection s

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1 15 l ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSEQ i

Ooened i i

l 70-7002/98 202 01 URI Evaluate the potential of an external fire in Building X 344A.

5 Develop an engineering evaluation to quantify the potential fire

, severity, identify appropriate technical basis, and determine the potential consequences.

1 70 7002/98 202 02 IFl For the sprinkler heads with mineral deposits, determine the actuation temperature, the root cause of the deposits, and the possible impact to the Interior of sprinkler piping.

i 70 7002/98 202 03 IFl Evaluate and provide the basis for the minimum FS staffing requirement in TSR Make the necessary changes to TSR and/or i SAR to clarify minimum FS staffing commitment.

, 70-7002/98-202 04 lFI The testing of the automatic stan up of the lube oil sump pumps.

Closed 70-7002/97 208 01 IFl Fire watch classroom training material update and hands on training frequency evaluation.

4 70 7002/97 208 02 IFl Assurance of building lightning protection and its maintenance and inspection.

70-7002/97 208 03 IFl Establishment and documentation of the enteria for the placement of portable fire extinguishers.

Discussed 70-7002/97 202 03 IFl The installation of new sprinklers under a canopy in Building X 330.

70-7002/CP lasue 18 Pt1 Update the emergency packets to include adequate NCS and FS
information, and make the emergency packets controlled documents.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED J. Morgan

  • General Manager L. Fink' SS&Q P, Hopkins* ENGRG R. Gaston* NRA C. Blacketon* NRA J. Parker
  • S&FS K. Zimmermann* FS N. Boesch* FS
  • Denotes exit meeting attendees.

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CP Compliance Plan FS Fire Services HPrWS High Pressure Fire Water System IFl Inspector Follow up ;tems NCS Nuclear Criticality Safety NFPA National Fire Protection Association PCR Plant Change Review PORC Plant Operations Review Committee PORTS Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant GAR Safety Analysis Report

.SSC Structures, Systems, and Components TSR . Technical Safety Requirement URI Unresolved item USEC United States Enrichment Corporation

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