ML20202F028
| ML20202F028 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant |
| Issue date: | 12/05/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202E991 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-7002-97-11, NUDOCS 9712080203 | |
| Download: ML20202F028 (11) | |
Text
. _ _ _
1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
i REGION 111 Docket No:
70-7002 Corlificate No:
GDP 2 inspection Report No:
70 7002/97011(DNMS)
Facility Operator:
United States Enrichment Corporation Facility Name:
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Location:
3930 U.S. Route 23 South P.O. Box 628 Piketon, OH 45661 Dates:
November 2, through 7,1997 L
Inspector.
C. A. Blanthard, Fuel Cycle inspector, Region ill Approved By-Patrick L. Hiland, Chief Fuel Cycle Branch J
I 9712080203 971205
{DR ADOCK 07007002 PDR k
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
United States Enrichment Corporation Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plard NRC Inspection Report 70-7002/97005(DNMS)
Plant Operations Activities observed were conducted safely and in accordance with procedures and postings. (Section 01.1)
The inspectors observed a cytender sampling evolution in Building X-343 and noted the operator responded promptly and effectively to fix a leaking pigtail connection.
(Section 01.2)
The inspectors found inaccurate answers to some problem reports because of poor communication between the problem report initiator and tta individual responding to the problem report. (Section 08.1)
Nntenance and Surveillance i
The inspectors concluded that overall radworker practices were good and maintenance workers effectively used personal protective equipment. (Section M1.1)
Maintenancs activities were generally completed thoroughly end professionally.
Maintenance workers and maintenance fir;;t line managers ensured that a cascade cell was negative (when uranium hexafluoride concentrations requirements were met) and that approriate hazardous work permits were completed and follow 3d during the replacement of a compressor seal. (Section M2.1 and O1.1)
The inspectors noted a weakness in the amount of details in the progress logs of the e
work packages. (Section M3.1)
The inspectors identified a violation, in that, workers who were directing activities containing nuclear criticality safety approval requirements were'without current required nuclear criticality refresher training. (Section MS.1)
Emeraency Preparedness The inspectors determined that the availability of appropriate XP2 emergency procedures e
at the switch houses would help to facilitate the staffs ability to correctly respond to emergency conditions. (Section P3.1) 2 1
Report Details
- 1. Operations
- 01 Conduct of Operations-01.1 Observation of a Comoressor Seal Replacement a.
Inspection Scope (88020)
The inspectors observed the replacement of seal 33-8-g in Buildmg X 333 to compare maintenance activities observed with the appropriate written procedure, b.
Qhservation and Findinas:
The inspectors reviewed tha work procedure (WP) for appropriate approvals before the initiation of maintenance e.:tivities. The electrical work permit (EWP), radiation work i
permit (RWP), and scut and tagout (LOTO) permits were approved and current at the time of the seal replacement. Several maintenance workers explained in detail the LOTO process. The inspectors noted that the maintenance first line manager (FLM) had performed the pre job briefing to review the WP, pertinent personal nrotective equipment (PPE) requirements, as low as reasonably achievable concepts M Wuce personnel 4
exposure, and the applicable pemiits.
The inspectors observed that the workers had two copies of the seal replacement procedure at the work site. One copy was used within the controlled area and the other outside the controlled area. The inspectors noted that maintenance workers were vigilant in referring to the procedure during special measuring and alignment activities. The maintenance workers acted accordingly and followed each
- CAUTION' and " NOTE" section in the procedure. The maintenance workers demonstrated special care to ensure that they did not damage the o-ring seal and shaft surfaces.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors determined that the maintenance activities observed were in conformance with the applicable procedure.
01.2 - X-343 Cylinder Samplino Observation a.
Inspection Scope (88020)
The inspectors observed the sampling of a cylinder to verify compliance with procedural requirements.
b.
Observation sad Findinas The inspectors noted that the operator identified that a pigtail connection leaked after hook up. As required by the procedure, the operator notified the FLM of the condition.
The FLM directed the operator to tighten the pigtail connection. The inspectors noted '
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that the' operator rechecked all the pigtail connections for leaks ' fter tightening the pigtail a
connection that had leaked.
The inspectors noted that the operator referenced the samping procedure that was
. located on a dedicated stand next to the autoclave throughout the cylmder samping process.- The operator observed and responded to each " CAUTION" and
- NOTE" section and communicated with the central control conter (CCC) per the requirements of the procedure. The operator called the CCC once during the sampling process to request clarification on the samping evolution status. The inspectors noted that the operator took special care in ensuring that no foreign material was introduced into the autoclave. The operator completed the required procedural paper work and the autociave interior foreign meterial exclusion checklist (A-4530).
- c.
Conclusions The inspectors determined that the operator was systematic in complying with each step delineated in th sampling cylinder procedure and ensuring that the autoclave remained free of foreign material.
08
_ Miscellaneous Operationa lasues 08.1 Problem Reportina Answer Evaluation a.
10)DeClion SCoDe (88005)
The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and timeliness of responses made to close out problem reports (PR).
b.
Observation and Findinas The inspectors interviewed operators and a departmerit manager regarding the accuracy and completeness of PR responses. The operators interviewed stated that the responses to some prs did not address the PR concems in enough detail. The operators interviewed stated that the individual responding to the PR, at times, did not understand the concem of the PR The inspectors noted that the individual responding to l
the PR rarely asked the PR initiator for clarification of the issue, in addition, the inspectors reviewed several prs issued by the power operations perscnnel and found the answers to be brief and nonconclusive.
In discussions with the inspectors, the corrective action program manager stated that the certificatee had recently instituted several initiatives to improve the accusscy of PR responses. The inspectors leamed that the corrective action program manager recently began reviewing all PR responses for accuracy and completeness before being issued.
The inspectors also noted during a daily moming meeting a manager identified the lack of j_
a conclusive PR answer and requested the answer to be corrected.-
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f c.
Conclusions The inspectors found that the PR responses reviewed were limited and unclear caused by a lack of communication between the PR initiator and the individual responding to the PR.
II, Maintenance M1-Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Adherence to Radiological Protection Safety Reauirement;-
s.
Inspection Scope (88025)
The inspectors observed the replaooment of a compressor sealin Building X-333 to determine if the maintenance operation was performed safely to protect the health and safety of the workers.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors noted that radiological postings and boundaries were generally well maintained. The inspectors noted that all of the workers had attended the WP briefing that addressed the special PPE required for the job. The RWP had been appropriately reviewed and signed by all workers entering the controlled work area.- Housekeeping was good in and around the work area. The controlled boundary area was secured and appropriately labeled. The RWP, specified by the WP, required full face respirators with GMC-H cartridges, double latex gioving, Anti C cloth coveralls and hoods for PPE during the seal removal and decontamination activities. The inspectors determined that workers entering the controlled area were aware of the hazards of the work area and the requirements for PPE. The inspectors observed that workers donned tha PPE as 4
spee.ified in the RWP and correctly performed the required positive and negative fit test when donning their respirator. Workers were observed performing thorough surveys when exiting the controlled area. In addition, inspectors observed that equipment l
removed from the controlled area was appropriately surveyed.
c.
Conclusion'-
The inspectors concluded that overall radworker practices were good. The inspectors observed effective use of PPE.
M2 -
Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment 4
M2.1 Seal Replacement Test Eauipment a.
InsDection SCoDe (88010)
The inspectors reviewed the method and test equipment used to determind the
. concentration of uranium in a cascade during the replacement of seal 33-8-9 in Building X 333 on November 6.
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Observation and Findinas j
- The inspectors noted that intomal cascade ceN maintenance did not commence until t'w isolated cracado coirs uranium hexafluonde (UF.) concentration requirement was estabhshed. The isolated cascade ceu was considered at a negative when the UF.
concentration requirement was met The certificatee used a sample buggy to remove 3
- gas from the isolated system, to verify the cascade cell was negative.
I The inspectors reviewed the celibration records associated with test equipment used to deterraine the UF concentration. The inspector venfied that the certificatee had met the required frequency of cabbratiorie foi this equipment. In addition, the inspectors determined that the WP clearly specified at what poird in the maintenance evolution wort. ors could not proceed with the seal replacement until the cascade cell was at a negative. The inspectors verified that no work past this point had occurred and that the maintenance workers understood this requirement as specified in Procedure XP2-GP-i GP1030, " Work Control Process."
c.
Qg[Lclusions 1
The inspectors determined that observed instrumentation used to certify that the cawade cell was negative met required calibration requirements. The maintenance FLM and workers demonstrated a thorough understanding of requirements to ensure that the cascade cell was negative before breaching the system.
M3 -
Maintenance Procedures and Documents i
M3.1 Comcletion of Maintenance Work Packsoe Proaress Loos a.
Inspection Scope f88025)
The inspectors reviewed a select number of WP progress logs for effectiveness. In addition, 'he inspectors compared the required maintenance worker qualification with a select number of maintenance workers, b.
Observation and Findinas The inspectors arbitrarily selected three completed WPs from the Building X-333 area control room (ACR) to review the progress logs for completeness. The three progress 4
logs reviewed did not address the as-found condition cf components or specify in enough detail the last completed maintenance step for an effective shift change. The operation manager stated that there was value in identifying the condition of the components during disassembly to aid in the development of the future WP. In addition, a maintenance FLM 1
stated that limited tumover informat'on on progress logs caused confusion after weekends. The maintenance manager explained that more guidance needed to be included for completing the progress log. The maintenance manager stated that the
- Procedure XP2-GP-GP1030, " Work Control Process," Section 6.8.2 G would be revised to specify the amount of process log detail.
i The inspectors reviewed the training records for the six maintenance workers who
- replaced the compressor seal 33-8-9 in Building X-333 on November 6. The i
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requiremords to perform this type of maintenance activity included radiatson worker (RW) 11, nuclear criticalsty safety (NCS) 11, Ted nical Safety Requirement (TSR), respiratory.
LOTO, and extreme temperature training. - The inspectors verified that the maintenance workers had completed these training requirements. In adddeon, the inspector vertfled that required refresher training for these workers in NCS, TSR, and RW 11 was current.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors noted that the maintenance workers have not documented the WP progress logs in enough detail. The maintenance workers that performed the replacomord of the seal 33-8-g in Building X 333 on November 8 were current with all i
required training requirements.
M5 Maintenance Staff Training and Qualification 2
M5.1 Trainina and Retrainino I
a.
inspection Scope (88010)
The inspectors reviewed the RW 11, NCS II, and TSR refresher training status for the tite.
b.
Qhservations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the nuclear safety significant training requirements for workers.
The certificates identified that nuclear safety significant training included TSR, NCS, and RW training. The training manager explained that this training requires initial classroom training followed by refresher training every two years. The training manager explained that the certificatee provided refresher training to improve job-related knowledge and skills and to promote safety, safeguards and security, and environmental protection j
awareness. The inspectors noted that workers who use procedures containing nuclear criticality safety approval (NCSA) requirements receive additional NCS training. In i
addition, supervisors that direct work that contain NCSA requirements receive special supervisory NCS training. Managers restrict workers in performing work activities that require the nuclear safety significant training unless a qualified worker accompanies them.
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The inspectors noted that managem received a monthly report that identifwxi workers who were past due,30 days to expiration, and 60 days to expiration on required refresher training. In addition, the training manager demonstrated the capability of the online computer program that was accessible to all managers. This computer system identified the training history of all workers, when training or refresher training classes expire for all workers, and the training requirements for every position at the site. The training manager demonstrated how managers could compare the training requirements for
- activities to be performed with the current training credentials of the worker. The training manager explained that the mandatory nuclear safety significant refresher classes were offered a minimum of twice a month and that the training department arranged for additional courses when requested by managers. On November 6, the inspectors discovered that 80 workers were past due on the mandatory nuclear safety significant
. refresher training throughout the site since October 31,1997. In addition, the inspectors leamed thtt the training manager documented this on a training requirement notification 7
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l letter issued to managers. The inspectors discovered that many_ workers identified as
- past due in the October 31,19g7, letter had been identified as past due in the previous month's training requiremord notification letter. The inspectors did not verify that the 80
- workers had performed work under procedures which contained nuclear criticailty safety.-
approval requirements.
Technical Safety Requirement 3.4 requires, in part, that the training program shall be established, implemorded, and maintained as described in Section 6.6 of the Safety Analysis Report. Section 6,6.1.2 of the Safety Analysis Report requires, in part, that plet procedures, organization training developreent, and administrative guides contain trauGg requirements which delmeate continuing training for employees. _ Procedure XP2-TR-TR1030, ' Conduct of Training," requires, in part, that personnel who work under procedures containing nuclear criticalsty safety approval requirements receive nuclear critk ety safety refresher training every two years. The inspectors investigated the work activities performed by a select number of individuals listed in the October 31,19g7, 4
training requirement notification letter. The inspectors identified that from November 1 through 6,1997, three FLMs who had not received NCS refresher training since October l
1995, had performed and directed work that required the use of procedures which contained nuclear criticality safety approval requirements. This is a Violation (VIO 70-7002/97011 01).
i c.
Conclusions The inspectors identified workers who were directing activities containing NCSA requirements without current required refresher training. This is a violation, in addition, the inspectors noted numerous workers restricted from performing NCSA required activities due to being past due on RW 11, NCS II, and TSR refresher training.
lit. Plant Suonort P3 Emergency Procedures and Documentation P3.1 Severe Weather Response a.
lnspection Scope (88050)
The inspectors discussed with operators, from a select number of facilities, the actions they would take to respond to a severe weather condition, b.
Observation and Findinas The inspectors observed that the emergency exits and tomado sheltering location in Building X-611; water treatment facility, were accessible. ~ The facility emergency packet i
._ for this facility correctly identified the emergency exits and tomado uhelter location. The building custodian stated that the supervisor reviewed yearly with their staff the appropriate sheltering locations and routes of access with employees.
The facility emergency packets for Buildings X-533 and X-530, electrical switch houses, did address the correct location for sheltering during a tomado but referenced an obsolete -
tomado response procedure. The facility emergency packets referenced a tomado 8
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i response procedure that had been replaced by a severe weather condition procedure.
However, the inspectors noted that the operators demonstrated a clear understanding of where to seek sheher during an emergency condition. in discussions with the inspedors, the operators did indicate that including the applicable emergency procedures in each 4
switch house controlled procedure manual, would be useful to the employees. The power l
utilities group managar indicated to the inspectors on November 4, that select XP2 emergency procedures would be included in the switch house controlled procedure manuals, and that the emergency packets would be changed to reference the severe weather condition procedu.e The inspectors had no further concems regarding this
- issue, c.
Conclusions The inspectors determined that the availability of appropriate XP2 emergency procedures at the switch houses will help to facilitate the staff's ability to correctly respond to emergency conditions.
.V. Manaaement Meetinos X1 Exit Meetina Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of the plant staff ah; management at the conclusion of the inspection on November 7,1997. The plant staff and management acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the plant staff whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietaiy. No proprietary information was identified.
Y i
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PARTIAL UST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Lockheed Martin Utility Services (LMUS)
- J. Morgan, Acting General Manager
- M. Hasty. Engineering Manager
- C. Sheward, Maintenance Manager-
- R. McDermott, Operations Manager D. Fosson, Cascade Group Manager
- J. Voroes, Conective Actions Program Manager
- R. Lipfert, Training and Procedures Manager
- D Couser, Training Marmger
- D. Rockhold, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- S. Casto, Work Control Manager
- D. Rogers, Planning Group Manager R. Able, Power Department Manager M. Rodden, Emergency Response Manager United States Enrichment Corporation
- L Fink, safety, Safeguards & Quality Manager
- R. Gaston, Nuclear Regubtory Affairs Manager
- S. Martin, Nuc!:'ar Regulatory Affairs Nuclear Reaulatory Commission (NRC)
- C. Blanchard, Fuel Cycle inspector
- D Hartland. Resident inspector
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting on November 7,1997.
INSPECTipN PROCEDURES USED IP 88005 Maintenance Organization and Controls IP 83010 Operator Training / Retraining IP 88020 Operations Review IP 88025 Maintenance and Surveillance Testing l
l 10
lTEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED opened 70 7002/97011 4 1 VIO The inspectors identified three FLMs who had not received required two year NCS refresher training but had performed and directed work that required the use of procedures containing nuclear criticality safety approval requirements.
Closed None Discussed None LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ACR Area Control Room ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable CCC Central Control Center EWP Electrical Work Package FLM First Line Manager iOTO Lockou', nad Tagout LMUS Lockheed Martin Utility Services NCS Nuclear Criticality Safety NCSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval PDR Public Document Room PPE Personal Protective Equipment ppm Parts per million PR Problem Report psia Per Square Inch Absolute RW Radiation Worker RWP Radiation Work Permit UF, Uranium Hexafluoride VIO Violation WP
. Work Package 11 i
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