ML20236L437

Insp Rept 70-7002/98-07 on 980420-0608.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Maint & Engineering

ML20236L437
Person / Time
Site:	Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date:	07/02/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236L430	List: ML20236L428 ML20236L433 ML20236L437
References
70-7002-98-07, 70-7002-98-7, NUDOCS 9807130008
Download: ML20236L437 (15)

Text

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l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lll l

Docket No: 70-7002

! Certificate No: GDP-2 Report No: 70-7002/98007(DNMS)

Facility Operator: United States Enrichment Corporation Facility Name: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant l l

Location: 3930 U.S. Route 23 South P.O. Box 628 Piketon,OH 45661 Dates: April 20 through June 8,1998 l

Inspector: D. J. Hartland, Senior Resident inspector Approved By: Patrick L. Hiland, Chlof Fuel Cycle Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety l

9807130000 980702 PDR C ADOCK 07007002 pg i

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

United States Enrichment Corporation Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant NRC Inspection Report 70-7002/98007(DNMS)

This inspection report includes aspects of plant operations, maintenance, and engineering. The report covers a seven-week period of routine resident inspections.

Plant Ooerations Several causes contributed to a uranium hexafluoride release at the Tails Station including poor planning and inadequate procedures. One violation was identified.

(Section O1.1)

. A Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) Limiting Condition for Operation was not met during a cylinder sampling evolution at the X-343 Building. One violation was identified.

(Section 01.2)

. Management expectations with regards to autoclave operation in the X-344 Building during a required building evacuation were not clear. In addition, the responders' decision to continue to operate autoclaves in the building appeared nonconservative, as operators were not present to respond to abnormal conditions. One unresolved item (URI) was identified. (Section 01.3)

. Due to a large backlog of planned expeditious handling deposits and production constraints, the certificate was unable to focus on deposit removal and was working on maintaining existing deposits in fluorinating environments. The certificate was developing guidance for implementing the TSRs, as well as an action plan to address the backlog of deposits. One URI was identified. (Section 01.4) i

. The inspector noted that autoclave operators did not appear to be sensitive to the degraded condition of safety-related pneumatic components despite recent NRC findings and discussions at a predecisional enforcement conference. In addition,-

engineering had not providad guidance to operators on how to assess as-found conditions for operability. (Section 01.5)

Fngineerina

. The inspector concluded that the certificate took appropriate action to correct an ,

autoclave containment integrity deficiency. However, the certificate's initial determination that the as-found condition was not a violation of the TSRs was in error. '

One non-cited violation was identified. (Section E2.1)

. The certificate was making adequate progress in the completion of corrective actions for nuclear criticality safety (NCS) program problems (EA 98-12). The majority of the original tasks were on schedule; however, one of the more significant tasks (Task 3, NCSA Upgrade) was behind schedule. Adequate management attention was focused on the corrective action plan efforts. (Section N7.1) J l

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Report Details

1. Onarations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 Uranium Hexafluoride Release at the Talk Station

a. Inspection scope (88100) -

The inspector reviewed the circumstances. surrounding a uranium hexafluoride (UF.)

release at the Tails Station.

b. Observations and Findina_s On May 8 during operation of the Tails Station in Mode 2," Compression /Liquification," a release occurred in the withdrawal room due to a mechanical failure of a pressure transmitter bellows. Upon actuation of the smoke detection system, the operators vented the system to below atmospheric pressure to limit the amount of UF. released.

]l The emergency response team experienced some difficulty in initially isolating the l release. Some outgassing continued after the responders crimped the 1/4 inch  !

instrument tubing that connected the transmitter to the 1-1/2 inch withdrawal header, due to the accumulation ofliquid UF In the failed transmitter. The responders j eventually used dry ice to freeze out the remaining UF in the transmitter and completely stop the release. The incident commander declared an "all-clear" on the emergency response about six hours after the release was initially detected.

The results of air samples taken outside the withdrawal area during the event j demonstrated that no UF, was released outside the Tails Station. Access to the tails

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area was secured and radiological controls requiring a full-face respirator were 1 implemented due to the spread of contamination. The certificate's engineering estimate of the total quantity of material released into the tails area was about 39 pounds of UF.. The certificate made a 24-hour notification to the NRC due the valid actuation of the smoke detection system, as well as the unplanned contamination event.

The certificate's investigation team concbded that the transmitter bellows ruptured due to hydraulic pressure in the UF, system. The cedifiestee had removed the steam system, which provided indirect heating to the UF, system, from service for repairs earlier in the day. During the steam outage, a UF freeze-out apparently developed.

When the steam was restored, an hydraulic force was created when liquid UF, formed and expanded within the solid deposit in the piping. The certificate concluded that direct heating from a steam leak did not occur. The certificate believed that the force was created from uneven, indirect heat-up of the solid ufo from separate zones in the housing.

The certificate identilied several causal factors for the event including:

. Poor planning by operations personnel to implement controls to prevent tails from freezir g out during the steam outage. Housing temperatures were not monitored during the outage.

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The operators did not recognize that a freeze-out had developed. The operators erroneously attributed flow problems experienced earlier in the shift to the reduced level of feed from the autoclaves.

• ' Plant Procedure XP4-CO-CA2380, " Operations Of The Tails Station," did not provide guidance for withdrawal during steam outages, including symptoms to

, monitor that could indicate a freeze-out in the liquid header. Requirements for l l temperature monitoring, evacuation of headers to prevent freeze-out, or controls j l for reheating the line were also not included.

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! The inspector noted that the certificate's actions to completely isolate the release did

- not appear timely. Fire Department personnel making the initial entry into the area were not familiar with the tails system operation or design. As a result, the initial responders i had difficulty determining what specific actions were required to isolate the release. The j

. Inspector noted that the shift operators, who were knowledgeable of the system, could l

l not enter the area because they were not qualified to wear the self-contained breathing i apparatus. Generic concems regarding the training and qualifications of"E-squad" members were previously discussed in inspection Report 70-7002/98010, dated

! June 16,1998.

! Technical Specification Requirement (TSR) 3.9.1 required that written procedures be l prepared, reviewed, approved, implemented, and maintained to cover operator actions j l to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents described in Safety Analysis .

l . Report Chapter 4. ,

1 Safety Analysis Report, Table 4.2.8 lists hydraulic rupture of a frozen line during reheating of the line as a potential hazard requiring administrative controls for

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i prevention.

l Contrary to the above, Plant Procedure XP4-CO-CA2380," Operation of the Tails Station," used for administrative controls during the conduct of operation at the Tails Station during reheat operations on May 8,1998, did not provide adequate controls to prevent the hydraulic rupture of a frozen line during reheating, a Violation (VIO 70 7002/98007-01).

c. Conclusion l

l The inspector concluded that several causal factors contributed to the release at tails l Including poor planning and inadequate procedures. One violation was identified.

l -01.2 Technical Safetv Reautrement Violation During Samoling i: volution

a. inspection Scone (88100)

The inspector reviewed the circumstances regarding a TSR violation that occurred

. during a cylinder sampling evolution at the X-343 Building.

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b. Observations and Findings On May 25,, while operators were rolling a cylinder in Autoclave No. 5 in preparation for sampling, the high cylinder temperature safety system actuated. The operators followed 4

l the alarm response procedure and notified the first line manager (FLM). The operators determined that the probable cause of the actuation was a loose thermocouple wire.

The FLM reviewed TSR 2.1.3.3 and, believing that the sampling evolution was in i

l Mode IV, " Feeding, Transfer or Sampling," directed the operators to continue with the operation. TSR 2.1.3.3, allowed continued operation in Mode IV with an inoperable cylinder high temperature system channel. However, when the FLM notified the plant shift superintendent (PSS) of the condition, the PSS noted that the operation was i actually in Mode Ill, " Cylinder / Pigtail Operations," when the safety system actuation occurred. Therefore, transition to Mode IV with the inoperable channel was not allowed.

By that time, the operators had already taken the sample, thus violating the TSR.

1 During the followup inspection, the inspector noted at least two causal factors which contributed to the failure to meet the TSRs:

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During performance of Procedure XP2-US-F01112, "Out-Of-Service / inoperable l SSC Tracking," the FLM did not request an operability determination from the PSS prior to proceeding with the sampling evolution.

. During performance of Procedure XP4-TE-FD2705, " Liquid Sampling in X-342 and X-343," neither the FLM nor the assigned operators verified the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) requirements prior to entry into Mode IV and obtaining a sample.

TSR 1.6.2.2.d requires that entry into an Operational Mode that is applicable to a particular LCO shall not be made unless the conditions for the LCO are met without reliance on provisions contained in the action statement.

TSR 2.1.3.3 required that both channels of the UF, cylinder high temperature system be operable in Modes 11, IV, and VI. Contrary to the above, on May 25,1998, the certificate transitioned from Mode lll to Mode IV on Autoclave No. 5 at the X-343 Building with an inoperable UF, cylinder high temperature channel, a Violation (VIO 70 7002/98007 02),

c. Conclusion The inspector concluded that the TSR violation occurred due to failure to follow plant procedures.

01.3 Autoclave Ooeration During Building Evacuation a, insoection Scoos (88100)

The inspector reviewed the circumstances regarding the evacuation of the X-344 Building in response to a "see and flee."

l b. Observations and Findings On May 18 an air sampler alarmed in the X-344 Building, indicating a suspected UF, i

release. After an operator confirmed that a pigtail was smoking, the building was evacuated and the emergency team responded. Due to some communication problems, the responders initially tightened the piug on the wrong end of the pigtall. As 5

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a result, negative air samples were not received and an "all clear" was not declared until almost 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after the emergency response was initiated. No radiological consequences resulted, as the release was minor in magnitude.

During followup, the inspector noted that Autoclave No.1 continued to operate in Mode 11, " Heating," during the entire time that the building was evacuated. The l

l Inspector also noted that Procedure XP4-TE-UH5140, "Use Of X-344 UF, Gas Release  !

Containment System," allowed for operator discretion with regards to whether or not j shutdown of the autoclaves was necessary upon evacuation. The building was provided with a UF, gas release alarm pushbutton that, when depressed, placed all autoclaves in containment. In addition, a remote display panel was provided to allow operritors to verify the status of the autoclaves. l l

, During Interviews with operations personnel following the event, the inspector noted i- that, although an FLM did briefly enter the building curing the emergency respcrise to

! monitor the status of the autoclaves, the responders did not consider shutting down the operating autoclave.

l The inspector noted that management expectations with regards to continued operation

of the autoclaves during a building evacuation were not provided in addition, the Inspector noted a concem that the responders' decision to continue to operate {

l autoclaves In the building might be nonconservative, based on the fact there were ao '

operators present to respond to potential abnormal conditions.

!- Similar concerns regarding the certificate's "see and flee" policy in the cascade buildings were previously discussed in inspection Report 70-7002/98005, dated May 18,1998. The inspector's review of the certificate's review and resolution of the ,

issue regarding guidance for autoclave operation during a building evacuation is an l Unresolved item (URl 70 7002/98007 03).

. c. Conclusion The inspector concluded that management expectations with regards to act'ons to be l taken with autoclaves during a building evacuation were not provided, in addition, the l Inspector noted a concem that the responders' decision to continue to operate autoclaves In the evacuated building might be nonconservative, since operators were not present to respond to abnormal conditions, i= 01,4 Technical Safety Reaulrament implementation issue With Planned Expeditious Handling (PEH) Deoosits

a. insnection Scope  ;

The inspector reviewed the certificate's implementation of TSRs for moderation control L ~o f PEH deposits.

L b. Observations and Findings On May 14 the certificate identified that three cells containing PEH deposits had exceeded 180 total days (cumulative) in Condition B, a potential violation of

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TSR 2.2.3.15. Condition B required that the deposits be pressured with dry air to 6

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greater than 14 psia, and that the equipment containing 1 o deposits be removed within 180 days.

The certificate had previously transitioned these cells between Condition B and Condition A, which required that the deposit be maintained in a fluorinating environment  ;

and had no time limit for removal of the equipment. Operators initiated Problem Report l PTS-98-03280 to document the concem of whether the 180-day limit was cumulative or l l did the clock reset after the deposits were placed back in Condition A.

The following day, the inspector noted that Cell 29-5-8 remained in Condition B; however, no immediate evaluation had been documented by the certificate to ensure that compliance with the TSR was being maintained. In response to the inspector's question, the certificate retumed the cell to Condition A.

Subsequently, the certificate prepared Engineering Evaluation No. Eval-X800-PP-001 which concluded that reactivity of fluorinating agents with hydrated uranium deposits adequately removed any moisture from the deposit. However, the inspector noted that l resetting the 180-day clock could allow a deposit to remain in shutdown cascade L equipment for an indefinite period of time.

The inspector observed that because of the large backlog of deposits and production constraints, the certificate was unable to focus on deposit removal, but was concentrating efforts on working to maintain existing deposits in fluorinating environments. At the end of the inspection period, the certificate was developing guidance for implementing the TSR, as well as an action plan to address the backlog of deposits. The inspector's review of the adequacy of the certificate's implementing i guidance for the TSR and the action plan is an Unresolved item (URI 70 7002/98007-04).

c. Conclusions l

The inspector concluded that, due to the large backlog of deposits and production constraints, the certificate was unable to focus on deposit removal but was working to maintain existing deposits in fluorinating environments. The certificate was developing l guidance for implementing the TSR, as well as an action plan to address the backlog of l deposits. One URI was identified.

01.5 Air l_eak From Autoclave Solenoid Bank l

j a. inspection Scope l

The inspector assessed material condition during plant walkdowns with regards to operability of safety-related systems,

b. Observations and Findings On May 27, during a routine walkdown of safety systems in the X-343 Building, the inspector observed what appeared to be an excessive amount of air blowing from the solenoid bank of Autoclave No. 2. The solenoids functioned to ensure that autoclave isolation valves went closed on a safety system actuation.

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The inspector informed building operations of the condition, who determined upon review that reasonable assurance could not be established that the system would perform its intended safety function. The operators then removed the autoclave from service.

The certificate performed as-found testing and determined that the system would have performed as designed. The certificate then replaced a leaking solenoid and placed the autociave in service.

Previously, the inspector identified a problem, as documented in Inspection Report 70-7002/98005, dated May 18,1998, with respect to the failure of several containment valves to be able to perform the intended safety function due to the degraded condition of safety-related pneumatic components. Nevertheless, the inspector was concemed that the Buildirig X-343 operators did not appear to be sensitive to the potentially degraded safety system components. In addition, engineering had not provided guidance to Building X-343 operators on how to assess as-found conditions for operability. In response to the inspector's observations, the certificate initiated a lessons leamed bulletin to stress the importance to maintain a questioning attitud6 with respect to potentially degraded conditions.

- c. Conclusions I

The inspector noted that Building X-343 operators did not appear to be sensitive to the potentially degraded safety system components. In addition, engineering had not provided guidance to operators on how to assess as-found conditions for operability.

08 Miscellaneous Operations issues 08.1 Certificate Event Renorts (90712)

The certificate made the following operations-related event reports during the inspection period. The inspector reviewed any immediate safety concems indicated at the time of the initial verbal notification. The Inspector will evaluate the associated written reports for each of the events following submittal.

Number Status Iitle 34138 Open Small outgat; sing of uranium hexafluoride occurred in the tails withd awal area.

34172 Open . Autoclave steam shutdown alarm due to a high condensate level condition.

34308. Open Operations Personnel discovered NCSA requirement not  !

being maintained in X-326 Building.

34340 Open Potential compromise of classified information due to an  ;

unsecured classified reposticry, 34341 Open X-330 Building NCSA requirement not being maintained.

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l 08.2 Bulletin 91-01 Renorts (97012)

The certificate made the following reports pursuant to Bulletin 91-01 during the .

Inspection period. The inspector reviewed any immediate nuclear criticality safety  !

concerns associated with the report at the time of the initial verbal notification. Any

! significant issues emerging from these reviews are discussed in separate sections of this report.

l Number Data Iitle 34151 04/29/98 4-Hour Report - NCSA does not document that double contingency is met for wet air inleakage and lube oil inleakage for extended range product withdrawal station.

! 34189 05/06/98 24-Hour Report - ops personnel observed conflicting indications from adjacent stages, j 34192 05/07/98 24-Hour Report - Sample results for Cell 29-5-8 indicated the cell was not in a fluorinating environment.

34199 05/07/98 24-Hour Report - Small release of UF,in tails withdrawal area caused by ruptured bellows in transmitter.

34209 05/12/98 24-Hour Report - Two polybottles found less than 23 inches apart.

34226 05/14/98 24-Hour Report - Loss of one of the two criticality barriers.

34235 05/14/98 24-Hour Report - HPV pressure differential transmitter on the LAW system had not been calibrated.

34249 05/16/98 24-Hour Report - Actuation of the high condensate level shutoff system due to an actual high condensate level condition.

34259 05/19/98 24-Hour Report - Failure to have redundant equipment available and operable to perform the required safety function of warning personnel.

34349 06/04/98 24-Hour Report - Loss of the double contingency matrix.

11. Maintenance M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M8.1 (Closed)_WQ 70-7002/97008-02: Inadequate chemical safety controls provided in

procedure for X-joint removal. As corrective action, the certificate revised applicable maintenance procedures to provide guidance for hydrofluoric acid abatement prior to opening a process gas system, in addition, the certificate revised the work control process to incorporate provisions for the use of safety and health work permits during the planning process. This item is closed.

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l 111. Engineering E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment l E2.1 Autoclave containment Integritv Issue

a. Insnaction Scone (88101)

The inspector reviewed the circumstances regarding a containment integrity issue that was identified by the certificate.

b. Observations and Findings On May 5 an operator in the X-343 Building identified that the location of the signal tap for the feedback line to the steam pressure reducing valve was located between the i two steam supply containment valves for each autoclave. The operators noted that the i plant drawings showed the line outside the boundary. The certificate immediately declared all the X-343 Autoclaves inoperable, with the exception of Autoclave No. 6, because autoclave containment integrity was in question. The condition did not exist for Autoclave No. 6 because the condition was corrected as part of the nuclear safety upgrade project.

The certificate took the appropriate action to correct the deficiency prior to retuming the affected autoclaves to service. However, the certificate initially determined that the as-found condition was not a violation of TSR 2.1.3.5. The basis for the determination, as documented in Engineering Evaluation POEF-821-98-054, was that previous pressure decay testing of the feedback loop demonstrated that leakage was within TSR limits. In addition, the certificate concluded regulator valve pressure rating and material of construction were acceptable.

During followup discussions with certificate personnel, the inspector noted that bases used in the engineering evaluation could be used to mitigate the significance of the as-found condition. However, the inspector pointed out that the feedback loop was l outside the containment boundary as defined by POEF-CM-003, " X-343 Q, AQ-NCS, and AQ System Boundary Definition Manual." In response, the certificate revised the engineering evaluation and recharacterized the event as a TSR violation.

Due to recent configuration control problems and failure to properly maintain and test autoclave systems, the certificate initiated a team to perform a safety system verification. The team's action plan included three parts:

. Ensure existing testing and surveillance verify the design safety function;

. perform a walkdown of the autoclave safety systems to verify consistency with plant drawings; and

. Ensure that the Safety Analysis Report accurately described autoclave design, operation, setpoints, and testing.

Expected completion date is the end of August 1998. Failure to maintain autoclave containment integrity is a violation of TSR 2.1.3.5. However, due to the mitigating factors discussed above, this nonrepetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is 10

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being treated as a Non-cited Violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC '

Enforcement Policy (NCV 70 7002/98007 05).

c. Conclusions i

The inspectors concluded that the certificates took appropriate action to correct the  !

autoclave containment integrity deficiency However, the certificate's initial l determination that the as found condition was not a violation of the TSRs was in error. I One NCV was identified.

N7 Miscellaneous Nuclear Criticality Safety issues N7.1 Followuo of Corrective Action for Problem in the Nuclear Criticality Safety Proaram.

a. inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the status of the certificate's progress in implementing their  !

nuclear criticality safety (NCS) program corrective action plan. For the purpose of this inspection, the inspector reviewed the most recent NCS Corrective Action Plan Quarterly Status Report dated May 7,1998 (GDP 98-0104); discussed implementation methodology with cognizant NCS engineer; and observed an NCS action plan progress 3 meeting on April 20. In addition, the inspector discussed the current status of corrective

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action progress with the Engineering Manager and the General Plant Manager.

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b. Observations and Findings ,

! The inspector noted that the cognizant NCS engineer was aware of the overall l ' corrective action plan status and was able to discuss the reasons for the inability to j l complete some of the scheduled activities as initially intended. As examples of  ;

completed nuclear criticality safety approvals (NCSAs), the NCS engineer provided the j inspector with two completed NCSAs," Cascade Operations in the X-333 Building," and  !

" Wastewater Treatment (Microfiltration System)." A detailed review of the completed NCSAs was not performed during this inspection; however, the two NCSAs appeared complete and provided information on the passive, active, and administrative NCS controls.

The inspector observed one NCS corrective action plan weekly status meeting and noted that meeting participants were generally well prepared to discuss the specific areas of responsibility. The meeting was chaired by the Engineering Manager and sufficient details were presented to assure management awareness of the progress, or

. lack of progress, on each of the corrective action plan tasks and subtasks. ]

l The inspector discussed with the Engineering Manager and the General Plant Manager  !

the certificate's need for extending the scheduled completion dates (GDP 98-0053) for j 4 of the original 19 tasks described in the NCS corrective action plan. Subsequently, l the certificate presented the status of their NCS corrective action plan and the bases D for scheduled completion date changes at a public meeting held at the NRC ]

Headquarters on May 15.  !

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c. Conclusions in general, the certificate was making adequate progress in the completion of corrective actions for NCS program problems. The majority of the original tasks were on schedule; however, one of the more significant tasks (Task 3, NCSA Upgrade) was behind schedule because of available resources and the actual time needed to provide training prior to implementation.

Adequate management attention was focused on the corrective action plan efforts, and for the one meeting observed, sufficient information was provided by the participants to assure the accuracy of progress reports.

V. Management Meeting XI Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of the facility management on June 8,1998. The plant staff acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the plant staff whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Lockheed Martin Utility Services i

• J. M. Brown, General Manager '

'S. Fout, Operations Manager

• M. Hasty, Engineering Manager

• D. B. Waters, Acting Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Manager United States Denartment of Energy J. C, Orrison, Site Safety Representative United States Enrichment Corocration

• L. Fink, Safety, Safeguards & Quality Manager J. H. Miller, USEC Vice President, Production

• Denotes those present at the exit meeting on June 8,1998.

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 88100: Plant Operations IP 88101: Configuration Control IP 97012: Inoffice Reviews of Written Reports on Nonroutine Events l

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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 70-7002/98007-01 VIO Inadequate Procedure For Tails Operation During Steam Outage 70-7002/98007-02 VIO TSR Violai'on During Sampling Evolution 70-7002/98007-03 URI Guidance For Autoclave Operation During Building Evacuation 70-7002/98007-04 URI Action Plan To Address Backlog Of PEH Deposits 34138 CER Small outgassing of uranium hexafluoride occurred in the tails withdrawal area 34172 CER Autoclave steam shutdown alarm due to a high condensate level condition 34308 CER Operations Personnel discovered NCSA requirement not being maintained in X-326 Building 34340 CER Potential compromise of classified information due to an unsecured classified repository

'34341 CER X-330 Building NCSA requirement not being maintained Closed 70-7002/97008-02 VIO Inadequate Chemical Safety Controls During X-Joint -

Removal 70-7002/98007-05 NCV Autoclave Containment Integrity Issue Discussed None 14

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1 LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers CER Certificate Event Report CFR Code of Federal Regulations l-CofC - Certificate of Compliance IFl Insp3ction item IP inspection Procedure LCO Limiting Condition for Operation LMUS Lockheed Martin Utility Services NCS Nuclear Criticality Safety NCSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval NCV Non-cited Violation NOV Notice of Violation NRA Nuclear Regulatory Assurance NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commiscion PDR Public Document Room PEH Planned Expeditious Handling PGDP Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant PSS Plant Shift Superintendent QAP Qual.ty Assurance Plan TSR Technical Safe'.y Requirement UF, Uranium Hexafluoride URI Unresolved item VIO Violation l

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