ML20217F555

Insp Rept 70-7002/99-12 on 990810-0920.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint & Engineering

ML20217F555
Person / Time
Site:	Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date:	10/08/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20217F552	List: ML20217F548 ML20217F555
References
70-7002-99-12, NUDOCS 9910200350
Download: ML20217F555 (14)

Text

s i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lil Docket No: 70-7002 Certificate No: GDP-2 Report No: 70-7002/99012(DNMS)

Facility Operats United S;ates Enrichment Corporation Facility Name: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Location: 3930 U.S. Route 23 South P.O. Box 628 Piketon, OH 45661 Dates: August 10 through September 20,1999 Inspectors: D. J. Hartland, Senior Resident inspector C. A. Blanchard, Resident inspector Approved By: Monte P. Phillips, Acting Ch!ef Fuel Cycle Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety F

9910200350 991009 PDR ADOCK 07007002 C PDR '

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

United States Enrichment Corporation Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant NRC Inspection Report 70-7002/99012(DNMS) l Ooerations l

• The inspectors identified three examples of inadequate or untimely evaluations of potentially non-conforming conditions. The safety significance was minimal as, in each case, no impact on the operability of safety system components resulted after further system testing or evaluations were completed. (Section 01.1) 1 Mpintenance

• The inspectors identified a minor violation regarding the use of the jumper to allow the return t,f a firewater supe:visory alarm circuit to ncrmal operation. The inspectors determined that the use of the Jumper was an unauthorized temporary modification in non-conformance with plant procedures. (Section M1.1)

• The inspectors observed that the response time testing of Criticality Accident Alarm System slaved homs was successfully completed in EJilding X-1107AV. The inspectors noted a weakness, however, in the level of detail in the test plan which resulted in an aborted test.' (Section M1.2)  ;

. Enoineering

• The inspectors concluded that pbnt staff took sopropriate cetion to address deficiencies identified in an audit of the commercial grade dedication program. (Section E1.1) l l

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Report Details

1. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations O1.1 Untimelv Resolution to Potentially Nonconformina Conditions a.' insoection Scooe (88100)

The inspectors observed the adequacy and timeliness of plant staff's response to potentially non-conforming conditions.

b. Qhgervations and Findinas On August 22, the Paducah Site documented a problem regarding the response time of a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) horn, namely, that an electric horn did not respond within .5 seconds as required by ANSl/ANS-8.3-1986. After discussions with the system engineer for the Portsmouth alarms, the certificatee determined that the issue did not appear to be applicable to Portsmouth at that time. The basis for the reasonable assurance for operability was that Portsmouth did not use the same electric hom in the CAAS, and the system engineer indicated documentation was available that showed the existing homs wou!d respond within the required .5 seconds.

The inspector reviewed the documentation, POEF-T-3536, " Measurement Of The Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Criticality Accident Alarm," dated August 31,1990, and determined that the report documented successful time response testing of a nitrogen-powered cluster hom. However, no documentation was available to demonstrate that electric or nitrogen homs in the slaved facilities would respond within the required .5 seconds. Therefore, the basis for the reasonable assurance of operability was no longer valid.

Later in that day the PSS documented in the log that the site CAAS slaved homs were

operable because ANSl/ANS-8.3-1986 did not apply to the slaved facilities. Upon further review, the certificatee declared the slaved facilities inoperable and entered the applicable Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) action statements. The certificatee subsequently performed testing of the slaved homs and all required for audibility responded within the required .5 seconds.

The inspectors identified a weakness in the certificatee's overall response to the issue.

The inspectors concluded that plant staff's initial basis for operabiiity, which did not consider the slaved homs, was inadequete.

.On August 27, plant staff documented on PR 99-04378 the failure of solenoid valve

. FY-111 at the Extended Range Product (ERP) Station, a Quality (Q) component, to operate due to an apparent foreign substance in the air supply. The PR indicated that i the substance appeared to be desiccate from an air plant hydryer. The ERP Station had

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been out-of-service for an extended outage and the valve had just recently been installed. The PSS documented on the PR that " filters were installed to collect foreign 3

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l substances" but did not document any additional evaluation regarding potential impact on other air-operated safety systems.

i During review of the PR, the inspectors noted that plant staff continued to operate the

! affected air plant equipment without identifying and isolating the source of the desiccant. The inspectors discussed the issue with the PSS, and a compressor in the Building X-330 air plant was removed from service later that day. Plant staff determined that the hydryer on that unit had apparently failed and that a preventative maintenance activity to replace the hydryer was past due. The inspectors did not note any further impact on plant safety systems as a result of the desiccant in the plant air. However, the inspectors identified a weakness in that plant staff's evaluation of the impact on other plant safety systems was inadequate and the actions taken to correct the initial problem were not taken until questioned by the inspectors.

On August 27., during the calibration of pH probes for the microfiltration system at Building X-705, a Q system, plant staff discovered that two of the three probes were out of TSR surveillance tolerance. The system engineer generated PR 99-04892 to document the as-found condition and also documented that excess caustic entered the system on August 27 due tc a power surge, raising the pH from 8.0 to as high as 11.8.

Although the PSS declared the system inoperable and requested that an enpineering  !

evaluation be prepared to document the effect of the caustic surge on the probes, he also concluded at that time that the event was not reportable. The basis was that the system had not operated below the level at which the probes were required to actuate by the TSR.

On August 30, the system engineer prepared the evaluation after contacting the probe vendor. The engineer's initial determination was that the ceustic excursion could have ,

had a permanent effect on the probes. The PSS rejected the evaluation because it did not address what actions were required to prevent recurrence. On August 31, the  !

inspectors questioned why the event was not reportable, as it appeared that plant staff had now concluded that the safety system would not have performed its intended function. Upon further evaluation, plant staff determined that the event was reportable as a safety system failure and made the notification to the NRC the following day. Later, on September 10, plant staff retracted the event after discovering that the as-fo'ind data had been misinterpreted and the probes had been operable and actually drifted in the conservative direction.

c. Conclusion The inspcetors identified three examples of inadequate or untimely evaluations of potentially non-conforming conditions. The safety significance was minimal as, in each case, no impact on the operability of safety system components resulted after further system _ testing or evaluations were completed.

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,m 08- Miscellaneous Operations !ssues

. 08.1 Certificatee Event Reports (90712) 1-The certificatee made the following operations-related event reports during the

, inspection period. The inspectors reviewed any immediate safety concems indicated at

! the time of the initial verbal notification. The inspectors will evaluate the associated l wntten reports for each of the events following submittal, as applicable.

Number Ratg Status Title 36018- 08/10/99 Open Safety System Failure, several High Pressure Fire Water Systems were not capable of meeting operability requirements.

36032 08/15/99 Open Safety System Actuation, Building X-333 Low Assay Withdrawal Station compressor area smokehead actuation.

36092 08/30/99 Open Safety System Failure, insufficient number of smokeheads operable at the Low Assay Withdrawal Station while operating above atmosphere.

I 08.2 Bulletin 91-91 Reoorts (97012)

The certificatee mads the following reports pursuant to Bulletin 91-01 during the inspection period. The inspectors reviewed any immediate Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) concems associated with the report at the time of the initial verbal notification. Any significant issues emerging from these reviews are discussed in separate sections of this report or in future inspection reports.

Number Qalt Title 36022 08/11/99 24-Hour Report - NCSA violation, Build;ng X-333, small diameter uranium bearing container rack was discovered to be located directly above a depression around building column that was greater than 1.5 inches deep.

36042 08/18/99 24-Hour Report - NCSA violation, Building X-326, a plastic

' bag was found containing between one and two quarts of water in a drum.

36074 08/25/99 24-Hour Report - NCSA violation, Building X-705, the l dimensions of the leaching basket on the small parts hand

} table were discovered to be greater than the required

l. dimensions.

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! 36207 09/20/99 4-Hour Report - NCSA violation, DOE Regulated Building 1 l X-705 West Annex, loss of geometry control occurred {

when an 8" cylinder being cleaned outgassed.

i 08.3 (Closed) CER 70-7002/98-04: High Condensate level shutoff actuation on Autoclave i

! No. 2 in Building X-343. l (Closed) IFl 70-7002/98003-03: Procedure changes to include valve line-ups. 1 l

These items documented two reportable events, one each in Building X-705 and X-343, that occurred as the result of valve misalignments. Plant staff determined that the root l cause was that valve line-ups were not performed prior to placing systems in service. l The inspectors also noted that plant staff d'd not have a process to control valve position i during troubleshooting evolutions in these buildings, which were not included in the lock- i out/ tag-out process.

As corrective action, plant staff revised applicable Building X-705 and autoclave operating procedures to require valve alignment verification following maintenance, after extended periods of a system being out of service, or after other activities that could result in valves being in abnormal positions Plant staff also implemented a valving l order procedure for troubleshooting activities not covered by existing procedures. The i inspectors noted that the actions taken should prevent recurrence, and these items are closed.

1 08.4 (Closed) Comoliance Plan lasue 25. " Operations Proaram" The description of the ,

noncompliance for this issue required the development of an improved operations l program, including revision of existing prot ' iures, implementation of new procedural requirements, and training of appropriate personnel consistent with the commitments in j Section 6.5 of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR). The inspectors reviewed the '

certificatee's closure package for this item and verif!ad that the required procedures have been revised or developed and that the appropriate personnel have been trained.

The NRC had previously identified a violation regarding the certificatee's failure to develop alarm response procedures for alarms, such as cell load and cell coolant alarms in the cascade area control rooms. The inspectors will use that item (VIO 70-7002/99006-02) to track the corrective actions to that deficiency.

The item also required that continuing training material and qualification requirement development would be completed and appropriate personnel trained and qualified for

' those position described in Section 6.5 of the SAR. These commitments were addressed in Compliance Plan Issue 26, " Systems Approach to Training," which was reviewed and closed in inspection Report 70-7002/99007. This item is closed.

08.5 (Closed) Comoliance Plan issue 28. " Event Investiaations and Regguina Proaram" The description of the noncompliance for this issue required the implementation of the event investigation and reporting program described in Section 6.9 of the SAR. The certificatee committed to approve a nuclear regulatory event reporting procedure and an event investigations procedure that defined the process and assigned i responsibilities and authority for implementation. The inspectois reviewed Procedures

[ UE2-RA-RE1030, " Nuclear Regulatory Event Reporting," and UE2-RA-Cl1040,

" Conducting Event investigations," and verified that the SAR requirements were 3

implemented in the procedures and that appropriate personnel were trained. This item is closed.

ll. Maintenance l

M1 Conduct of Maintenance Activities M1,1 Unauthorized Jumper installed Durina Sorinkler System Maintenance ,

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a. inspection Scope (88103)

The inspectors reviewed the installation of a tempora y jumper during sprinkler system i maintenance. '

b. Observations and Findinas On August 20, during review on the PSS logs from the previous shift, the inspectors noted that the PSS had authorized the installation of a temporary jumper during sprinkler head replacement on System No. 475 at Building X-326. The function of the l jumper was to clear the supervisory alarm that actuated when the system control valve l was closed to isolate the head. The jumper installation allowed for the remaining systems (476-486) on the circuit to maintain alarm capability as required by TSR 2.7.3.3.

The inspectors reviewed Procedure XP2-GP-GP1033," Lifted Leads And Jumpers," and noted step 7.6 stated that if jumpers were left in place, a modification was required to be completed prior to putting the system back into normal operation. The inspectors determined that the certificatee was in violation of the procedure because the remaining systems on the circuit were returned to normal operation with the jumper installed. The inspectors discussed the issue with the on-shift PSS, who indicated that he was i investigating the same issue. However, the inspectors noted that the PSS had not taken any immediate action to restore compliance with the procedure. By the end of the shift, plant staff completed the repairs, the jumper was removed, and System No. 475 j was declared operable. The on-shift PSS issued a problem report to document the ]

" potential" procedure noncompliance. l l

t Return of the remaining systems on the alarm circuit to normal operation with the jumper ,

installed was a violation of Procedure XP2-GP-GP1033, as described above. As l

corrective action, plant staff put a hold on the use of jumpers for this application until  ;

plant procedures were changed to authorize their use. As no operability issues resulted j from the inappropriate jumper installation, the failure to follow procedure constituted a l violation of minor safety significance and is not subject to formal enforcement action.  !

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c. Conclusion The inspectors identified a minor violation regarding the use of the jumper to allow the return of the supervisory alarm circuit to normal operation. The inspectors determined that the use of the jumper was an unauthorized temporary modification in non-conformance with plant procedure.

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f M1.2 Special Testina of CAAS Slaved Horn

a. Insoection Scone (88102)

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The inspectors observed time response testing for the CAAS slaved horns in Building X-1107AV.

b. Observations and Conclusions On August 26, the inspectors observed time response testing of the CAAS slaved horns in Building X-1107AV in response to the issue discussed in Srction 01.1 above. Plant staff prepared and received approval by the Plant Operations Review Committee for engineering test plan TP-RT-1999-0513, " Radiation Alarm Signal Response Time Test,"

to conduct the testing. The inspectors observed the implementation of the test plan. i The inspectors observed that the horns responded within the required .5 seconds. l However, the inspectors noted a weakness in that the plan did not contain the level of detailed step-by-step instructions provided in a procedure typically used to verify operability of a plant safety system. As a result, when plant staff tested the second horn located in the building, it did not initially sound because a switch located in Building 300 remained in the " test" position from the previous test. Therefore, the test was aborted and had to be performed again,

c. Conclusion The inspectors observed that the response time testing of CAAS slaved horns was successfully completed in Building X-1107AV. The inspectors noted a weakness, however, in the level of detail in the test plan which resulted in an aborted test.

M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M8.1 (Closed) CER 70-7002/98-05: Some autoclave containment isolation valves not capable of closing when relying on safety related backup air supply reservoirs.

The NRC issued a Severity Level lli violation (VIO 70-7002/98005-07) to the certificatee for this event.' This item is closed based on previous review of the corrective actions taken, as documented in inspection Report 70-7002/98016.

M8.2 (Closed) CER 70-7002/98-13 : Safety System Actuation, Cascade Automatic Data Processing Uranium Hexafluoride (UF.) smoke detector actuation in Building X-333.

- The plant staff determined that the safety system actuated from a small out-gassing of UF, that occurred as the result of a seal failure. The seal failure was caused by a groove that had worn in the compressor shaft. This groove allowed a small amount of UF, process gas to flow out of the vented cavity to the atmosphere. The plant staff ,

replaced the compressor shaft and has formed a committee to trend seal failures and l recommend maintenance and operation improvements to determine required seal replacement frequencies. The inspectors reviewed the actions taken and had no further ,

issues. The item is closed. i i

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. M8.3 ' (Closed) CER 70-7002/98-14 : Safety System Actuation, Cascade Automatic Data Processing UF6 smoke detector actuation at the Building X-340 Tails Withdrawal Area.

! The plant staff determined that the safety system actuated from a small out-gassing of L UF that occurred from the copper to monel brazed joint on a buffer supply line. The

( plant staff believed the root cause of the outgassing was the inadvertent bumping of the i

tubing during maintenance activities. Maintenance personnel were issued a lessons leamed emphasizing the importance associated with damaging small tubing and components within housings during maintenance activities. The inspectors reviewed the actions taken and had no further issues. The item is closed.

M8.4 (Closed) CER 70-7002/98-15 : Safety System Failure, Building X-344 Autoclave No. 2 j o-ring failure.

Plant staff heard steam leaking from Autoclave No. 2 in Building X-344 during the heating of an UF, cylinder and shut down the autoclave as required by the appliesale procedure. Plant staff identified that the o-ring that seals the autoclave head anc onell surfaces separated at the spliced joint. The root cause for the o-ring separation was a misalignment between the autoclave shell and head. As corrective action, plant staff replaced the o-ring and realigned the head and shell surfaces of the autoclave. The inspectors noted no negative trend in o-ring failures and consider the item closed.

Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Commercial Grade Dedication

a. Insoection Scope (88100)

' The inspectors reviewed plant staff's corrective actions to findings identified during an audit of the commercial grade dedication program

b. Observations and Findinas The certificatee conducted an audit of the commercial grade dedication program. The audit identified one significant finding, namely, that plant procedure XP3-EG-EG1076,

" Preparation and Control of Engineering Specification Data Sheets (ESDS)," did not fully implement the requirements of corporate procedure UE2-BM-PC1038, " Dedication of Commercial Grade items." Specifically, the audit noted that ESDSs seldom specified a dedication method and inspection attributes. For those ESDSs that included the attributes, the audit noted that many did not meet the criteria for critical characteristics.

. Critical characteristics were defined as those required to verify that the item would perform its intended function and meet the design requirements for its application.

i As immediate corrective action to the findings, plant staff prepared and approved an evaluation that concluded that the operability of plant systems was not impacted. This )

was based primarily on the performance of post maintenance testing of safety system i con:oonents after installation. In addition, the certificatee stopped the practice of accepting safety system components without establishing inspection criteria in an l

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l approved ESDS. The inspectors reviewed a sample of ESDSs prepared since then and noted that the appropriate critical characteristics and inspection criteria were identified.

l c. Conclusion-l The inspectors concluded that plant staff took appropriate action to address deficiencies l identified in an audit of the commercial grade dedication program, and that those corrective actions should prevent recurrence of the deficiencies.

58 Miscellaneous Engineering issues l E8.1 (Closed) CER 70-7002/98-02 : Actuation of Calciner Discharge Collector Probe Detection System in Building X-705.

Plant staff determined that the safety system actuation was caused by blockage of the calciner exhaust ventilation which caused concentrate solution to flood the feed scrubber column. The flooded feed scrubber filled the interior of the calciner with steam. The steam condensed on the level probes which caused the safety system actuation.

l Plant staff determined that the root cause for overfeeding the feed scrubber column was inadequate procedural detail to control the head pressure across the metering pump.

The inspectors noted that the engineering analysis identified that the inlet head pressure exceeded the outlet pressure which allowed solution to push through the metering pump. The excessive inlet head pressure was caused by high level of concentrate in the storage columns. Plant staff noted that Procedure XP4-CU-CH1200, " Operation of the Electric Calciner," did not restrict the solution height in the storage columns.

The inspectors noted that plant staff revised Procedure XP4-CU-CH1200 to include a verification of the concentrate storage column level and appropriate feed pump setting.

Specifically, the inspectors noted that Procedure XP4-CU-CH1200 required the operators to visually observe the solution level in the three concentrate storage columns, check the feed pump setting before starting feed to the calciner, and perform feed flow calculations once per shift. The inspectors noted that the actions taken were effective in

preventing recurrence of the ovent. The inspectors consider the item closed.

E8.2 (Closed) CER 70-7002/98-07 : High Condensate Level System (HCLS) actuation on Autoclave No. 6 in Building X-343.

Plant staff determined that the HCLS actuation was caused by the installation of the wrong orifice in the condensate drain line steam trap. The inspectors noted that the nuclear safety upgrade (NSU) modification package specified a size "No.1" orifice for the replacement steam traps and the strainer installed contained a size "No.10" orifice.

This size "No.10 orifice was approximately 1/5th the flow area of the size "No.1" orifice.

Plant staff tested and found that the size "No.10" orifice restricted the flow of condensate during the autoclave heating cycle which allowed the water to back-up in the condensate line resulting in an HCLS. The root cause of the HCLS was the failure to maintain adequate configuration control of the non-safety related strainer.

As corrective action, plant staff developed and implemented a system to control the ordering and verification of specific non-safety components. In addition, the plant staff 7

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revised the autoclave NSU project pre-operational test to include a water flow test and boroscopic examination of the condensate drain lines. The inspectors reviewed the actions taken and had no further issues. The inspectors consider the item closed.

E8.3 (Closed) CER 70-7002/98-09 :_ HCLS actuation of Autoclave No. 4 in Building X-043 Plant staff determined that the HCLS actuation was caused by the installation of the wrong non-safety bucket in the steam trap in the condensate drain line. The inspectors noted that the installed bucket had a smaller continuous air vent hole than the specified steam trap and no thermic air vent as required. Plant staff determined that the combination of no thermic air vent and the restricted vent caused the air to bind in the steam trap which prevented ti;e flow of condensate through the trap and resulted in the HCLS actuation.

As corrective acticn, plant staff inspected all in-service aute ; laves to ensure that the correct steam trap was installed. In corf nction with the c .n.ective action for the event dbcussed in Sec' ion E8.1, the plant stat ;teloped and ;nplemented a system to control the ordering and verification of sp afic non-safet) components. The inspectors reviewed the actions taken' and had no further issues. Tne inspectors consider the item closed.

IV. Plant Support P8 Miscellaneous Plant Support issues

' P8.1 (Closed) CER 70-7002/98-11. CER 70-7002/98-20 and CER70-7002/99-01: Unsecured security containers found open in controlled access areas on plant site.

The plant guard force discovered security containers unattended and unlocked in controlled access areas on the plant site. In each case, the guard immediately secured the Spen security container. The custodians conducted an inventory of the security containers and found all classified material present and undisturbed. The security investigations determined that cleared employees failed to properly secure tne containers.

The plant staff concluded that thue was no loss or compromise of classified material because the containers were within the controlled access area which required appropriate access authorization level for entry or positive escort by a cleared individual.

As corrective action, a lessons leamed was issued to appropriate personnel regarding the importance of properly securing classified information. The inspectors reviewed the actions taken and had no further issues. The inspectors consider the items closed.

V. ManaaementEttilDat

, X1 Exit Meating Summary 1

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of the facility menagement on September 20,1999. The facility staff acknowledged the findings presented and indicated concurrence with the facts, as stated. The inspectors asked the plant staff whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.

No proprietary information was identified.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED t United S***== Enrichment Corooration r

i;1 *M. Brown, General Manager L' i *S. Casto, Work Control Manager.

l- D. Couser, Training Manager

[ L. Fink, Safety, Safeguards & Quality Manager l - S. Fout,' Opeations Manager j *B. Helme, Engineering Manager p . P. Miner, Regulatory Affairs Manager

• P. Musser, Enrichment Plant Manager -

l. *M. Wayland, Maintenance Manager -

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• Denotes those present at the exit meeting on September 20,1999.

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 88100: Plant Operations IP 88102: - Surveillance IP 88103: Maintenance.

IP 90712: In-office Reviews of Written Reports on Non-routine Events L ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 36018' ^CER Safety Systom Failure, several High Pressure Fire Water Systems L were not capable of meeting operability requirements.

l 36032 CER Safety System Ac'uations, Building X-333 LAW station compressor area Cascade Automatic Data Processing actuation.

36092 CER Bafety System Failure, insufficient number of smokeheads operable at the Low Assay Withdrawal Station while operating above atmosphere.

Closed 70-7002/98-02 CER ' Actuation of Calciner Discharge Collector probe Detection System in Building X-705.

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70-7002/98-04 CER High condensate level shutoff actuation on Autoclave No. 2 in Building X-343.

70 7002/98-05: CER Eome autoclave containment isolation valves not capable of closing when relying on eafety related backup air supply reservoirs.

3 < 70-7002/08-07: CER High Condensate Level System sctuation on Autoclave No. 6 in Building X.-343;

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.-.70-7002/98-09 CER High Condensate Level System actuation en Autoclave No. 4 in Building X-343.

' 70-7002/98-11' CER Unsecured Security Container in Building X-710.

70-7002/98-13 CER Safety System Actuat:on, Cascade Automatic Data Processing UF8 smoke detector actuation at Building X-333 L

70-7002/98-14 . CER ' Safety System Actuation, Cascade Automatic Data Processing UF6 smoke detector actuation at the Building X-330 Tails .

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70-7002/98-15: CER Safety System Failure, Building X-344 Autoclave No. 2 o-ring failure.

70 7002/98-20 ' CER Unsecured Security Container found open in the X-100 Building.

70-7002/99 CER Unsecured Security Container found open in the X-104 Building.

70-7002/98003 IFl Procedure changes to include valve line-ups.

f Compliance Plan issue 25 Operations Program Compliance Plan issue 28 ' Events Investigations and Reporting Program Discussed i none l

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CAAS Criticality Accident Alarm System CER Certificate Event Repcrt CFR Code of Federal Regulations DNMS Division of Nuclear Material Eafety DOE Department of Energy ERP Extended Range Product ESDS Engineering Specification Data Sheets GDP Gaseous Diffusion Plant HCLS High Condensate Level System IR Inspection Report NCSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval NCV Non-Cited Violation NMSS Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards NRC - fJuclear Regulatory Commission NSU Nuclear Safety Upgrade PDR Public Document Room PR Problem report PSS Plant Shift Superintendent Q Quality SAR Safety Analysis Report TSR Technical Ssfety Requirements UF. Uranium Hexafluoride

.USEC United States Enrichment Corporation VIO Violation -

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