ML20203B700

Insp Rept 70-7002/98-201 on 980105-09.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Unannounced Chemical Process Insp of Usec Portsmouth Gaseous Plant at Piketon,Oh.Insp Also Addresses Completion of Compliance Plan Issue 20

ML20203B700
Person / Time
Site:	Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date:	02/17/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203B698	List: ML20203B695 ML20203B700
References
70-7002-98-201, NUDOCS 9802240394
Download: ML20203B700 (8)

Text

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e L-U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS Inspection Report No. 70-7002/98-201 Docket No. 70-7002 Facility Name: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Observations at: Piketon, OH Inspection Conducted: January 5-9,1998 Inspector: Garrett Smith, FCOB Albert Wong, FCOB Approved By: Philip Ting, Chief Operations Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS 9802240394 900217 PDR ADOCK 07007002 C PDR t

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT NRC INSPECTION REPORT 70-7002/98-201 Introduction NRC performed a routine, unannounced chemical process safety inspection of the U.S.

Enrichment Corporation (USEC) Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) at Piketon, OH from January 5-9,1998. The inspection was performed by staff from NRC Headquarters.

The inspection also addressed the completion of Compliance Plan issue 20, " DOE Chemical Safety Third Party Use of Hazardous Chemicals," USEC stated in a June 13,1997, letter to the NRC that this item was completed.

The portions of the chemical process safety program which were reviewed during the inspection included:

. Emergency Response Procedures (88064)

• Site Wide Safety Practices (88059)

Significant Findings and Conclusions Although the information required by Portsmouth emergency response personnel regarding DOE and third party use of hazardous chemicals was available, it was not clear whether the procedural requirements defined in SSI/PO-P001 were being fully implemented. Therefore, an Unresolved item was opened to further evaluate this item.

3 DETAILS 1.0 Site Emergency Response Procedures (88064) 1

a. Insoection Scoce l

The inspectors toured the Plant Control Facility (X-300), the Emergency Operations Center (EOC, X-1020), the Fire Station (X-1007), and the Health Services Center (X-101) to evaluate the emergency response capability of these facilities as they relate to chemical safety. The review consisted of: (1) evaluating emergency response procedures and personnel training records; (2) discussion with plant and medical staff members on issues related to chemical releases; and (3) the response to the high chlorine level alarm actuation at the X-611E building on January 5,1998.

b. Observations and Findinas Emeroency Ooerations Center The EOC appeared well maintained, and all procedures and appropriate reference materials necessary to respond to emergency events were readily available. Each EOC position is staffed by three persons to ensure uninterrupted coverage. All people have been adequately trained to perform their assigned functions with training records kept by the Training Department and the EOC Director's staff. In accordance with PORTS Safety Analysis Report (SAR) Emergency Plan, Section 7.3, drills and exercises were held regularly. No deficiencies were identified.

Emeraency Procedures The inspectors reviewed the following EP procedures:

XP2-EP-EP1050, " Emergency Classification," Rev.1 XP2-EP-EP1055, " Incident Command System," Rev. 0 XP2-SH-SH5030," Actions to Be Taken During a UF., HF, F2 or CIF3 Release,"

Rev.1 In general, all three procedures appeared adequate to respond to chemical safety emergencies. During the review of the Emergency Classification procedure, the inspectors noted that the procedure did not provide guidance for the Emergency Classification levels associated with a Hydrofluoric Acid (HF) release. This guidance is important because it defines the emergency action levels based on the amount of the release. Based on this observation, Portsmouth management generated a problem report to evaluate the need to add HF response guidelines to Appendix B of procedure XP2-EP-EP1050.

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4 Trainino At PORTS, the fire fighters are also the HAZMAT team members. The inspectors reviewed the training requirements of the fire fighters and randomly chose three individuals to verify that tb r actual records could be matched with the training requirements matrix. The .hree individuals were selected from those who had responded to an earlier chlorinated water leak at X-611E (see next section for further discussion). All three people kept their training up to date. No weakness were identified.

HF First Aid Treatment Most of the PORTS high risk chemicals (e.g., UF, and F2 ), when exposed to air, will react with the moisture and form HF. Therefore, the inspectors focused their attention on the plant's capability of treating HF burns during an emergency involving major chemical releases.

The inspectors toured the Health Services Center (X-101). The medical staff was I

fully aware of the locations where the emergency first aid supplies were stored. The inspectors were shown the two medicines used to treat HF burns: Zephrin and Calcium Gluconate. Both were within their effective shelf life. The inspectors also reviewed procedure XP4 SH-HS2146, " Hydrogen Fluoride Injuries," Rev.1, and found no discrepancies. Next, the inspectors visited the Fire Station (X-1007) to learn the HAZMAT team's ability to provide first aid to HF burn victims. The ambulance was equipped with a HF first aid kit. The medicines were provided by the medical staff and were within their expiration date. All HAZMAT team members were properly trained to field administer first aid to HF burn victims.

The inspectors noted that the HAZMAT team posted a one-page procedure on the first aid kit. Due to the infrequent use of this kit, the procedure serves as an operator aid when the HAZMAT team is called upon to render first aid.

X-611E Chlorinated Water Leak The PORTS GDP chlorinates their domestic, fire, and sanitary waste water with gaseous chlorine. The one-ton chlorine cylinders and chlorine eductors are located in X-611E. There are a total of three separate water lines in X-611E; each one has a metal coupling made of a copper based material. The rest of piping is PVC.

Gaseous chlorine is educted into water upstream of the metal coupling. On the morning of January 5,1998, a chlorine alarm was received from X-611E. The alarm was caused by a leak that originated from two 1/4" holes on the line #1 coupling.

Upon discussion with the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) on duty and the Fire Chief who responded to this incident, the inspectors noted that the HAZMAT team took the appropriate steps to cordon off the road leading toward X-611E. They followed established procedures (including donning personal protective equipment) to enter the room where the alarm was activated and stop the leak. During the entire

5 evolution, close coordination between the HAZMAT team and the PSS was maintained. No deficiencies were noted. '

c. Conclusions The PORTS GDP has adequate control over its emergency response procedures.

The Emergency Operations Center (X-1020) was equipped with necessary emergency response procedures and the reference materials that would be utilized in the event of a chemical risk. The medical staff and HAZMAT team were well equipped to provide first aid to HF burns victims. The HAZMAT team was trained to handle accidental spills, as evidenced in the January 5,1998, chlorinated water spill incident. Their training records were kept up to date. No deficiencies were identified in the area of Emergency Response Procedures.

2.0 Site Wide Safety Practices (88059)

a. Scope The inspectors reviewed PORTS site wide safety practice program implementing procedures. Specifically, these programs were evaluated with respect to chemical safety practices.

b. Observations and Findinas l Site wide safety procedures are general requirements that help minimize the potential t

safety and heclth hazards associated with operations at the Portsmouth GDP.

Specifically, the inspectors reviewed two procedures:

Procedure XP2-SH-IS1038, " Instructions for Safety and Health Work Permit,"

Rev.1, December 31,1997.

Procedure XP2-SH-SH5030, " Actions to be taken during a UF., HF, F2 or CIF3 Release," Rev.1, March 22,1996.

In general, these procedures define the requirements to provide a consistent method for both documentation of the potential safety and health hazards during work planning, and the immediate response actions to be taken as a result of a hazardous chemical release.

These procedures provide clear requirements to minimize the potential safety and health hazards associated with plant operations.

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c. Condusions The procedures reviewed appear adequate to address the appropriate chemical ,

safety concerns.  ;

3.0 Compliance Plan item #20

a. Insoection Scoce On June 13,1997, USEC stated in correspondence to NRC that Portsmouth Compliance Plan Issue 20 was complete. This item concerned the DOE Chemical Safety and Third Party use of hazardous chemicals. The inspector reviewed the program that formally implemented the compliance plan item.

b. Observations and Findinos

, This compliance plan item was put into place because the NRC wanted to ensure that DOE provided information through established communication channels to USEC regarding the hazardous chemicals used by DOE and third parties present at the PORTS site that could impact nuclear operations. Therefore, DOE and USEC agreed to promptly provide each other with pertinent information concerning any activities that could have a potential safety impact on the operations at the site.

During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed several documents concerning this issue. Specifically, the following documents were reviewed:

USEC and DOE Resolution of Shared Site issues at the Gaseous Diffusion Plants J.W. Parks, DOE, and G.P. Rifakes, USEC, dated January 25,1996,

. Administration of Shared Site issues, Procedure SSI/PO-P001, dated October 30, 1996,and Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Hazards Assennment, POEF-ERWM-34, dated November 1994.

The "USEC and DOE Resolution of Shared Site issues at the Gaseous Diffusion Plants," dated January 25,1996, specifies that DOE will provide to USEC a detailed description of any hazardous materials used or stored on-site and that such descriptions shall be updated promptly to reflect changes in third-party activities. If the hazardous material exceeds the current threshold riuantities or subsequent modifications to the threshold quantities that are specified in 40 CFR 68, 302, and 355 and 29 CFR 1910.119, a safety risk analysis will be performed to identify the hazards and mitigating actions in accordance with those regulations.

Although the three documents reviewed have indicated that the third party use of hazardous chemicals at the Portsmouth GDP has been characterized in the past and

discussions with the PSS and emergency response personnelindicated that this type of information is available for emergency response purposes, the inspectors were not fully satisfied that the requirements of the Administration of Shared Site issues, Procedure SSl/PO P001 were fully implemented. Based on this, the inspectors opened URI 70-7002/98 201-01 to further evaluate the implementation of this program.

c. Conclusion Although the information required by Portsmouth emergency response personnel regarding DOE and third party use of hazardous chemical was available, it was not clear whether the procedural requirements defined in SSl/PO-P001 were being fully implemented. Therefore, an Unresolved Item was opened to further evaluate this item.

4.0 Followup on Prev" . aly identified items a, IFl 70-7002/97-204-04 (Closed)

This item concerned the disposal of two F, tanks located at the west side of the X-710 building. The inspectors reviewed procedure XP4-TE-FG6645," Evacuating F2 Pig," effective date December 15,1997. This procedure provides instructions for the evacuating of the two F, pigs located at X-710. The review of this procedure indicates that it is technically adequate to safely evacuate the F, and that the procedure was developed and approved per existing plant procedures. Based on the review of this procedure, this IFl is considered closed.

b. IFl 70-7002/97-204-05 (Closed)

This item concerned the review of procedure CN4.10, " Treating Oil Contaminated Compressors with F2 ." Since this item was opened, the procedure was placed on hoJd and will have to be evaluated by facility management prior to being used. Since this procedure was placed on hold, the IFl is closed.

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' 1 MANAGEMENT MEETINGS Inspectors met with PORTS management representatives throughout the inspection. The exit meeting was held on January 9,1998. No classified or proprietary information was identified.

The following is a list of exit meeting attendees:

USEC QQE:

S. Martin J. Orrison K. Tomko '

R. Gaston NBC:

C. Sheward L. Fink G. Smith J. Shewbrooks A. Wong D. Ruggles D. Hartland T.Jayne M. Hasty K. Davis T. Hester G. Salyers D. Rockhold M. Redden J. Parker J. Johnson LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS F, Fluorine HF Hydrofluoric Acid

, USEC - United States Enrichment Corporation PORTS - Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant PSS Plant Shift Superintendent CIF 3 Chlorine Trifluoride IFl Inspector Followup Item URI Unresolved item

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