ML20198B565

Insp Rept 70-7002/98-17 on 981013-1123.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support.Weaknesses Identified with Certificatee Dispositioning of Potentially Nonconforming Conditions

ML20198B565
Person / Time
Site:	Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date:	12/14/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198B563	List: ML20198B558 ML20198B565
References
70-7002-98-17, NUDOCS 9812210011
Download: ML20198B565 (15)

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[ U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-  !

REGION lll L

Docket No: 70-7002 Certificate No: GDP-2 t

Report No: 70-7002/98017(DNMS)

Facility Operator: United States Enrichment Corporation Facility: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant  ;

Location: 3930 U.S. Route 23 South P.O. Box 628 Pikaton, OH 45661 Dates: October 13 through November 23,1998

!nspectors: D. J. Hartland, Senior Resident inspector C. A. Blanchard, Resident inspector Approved By: Kenneth G. O'Brien, Acting Chief Fuel Cycle Branch ,

Division of Nuclear Materials Safety i

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! 9812210011 981214 PDR ADOCK 07007002 C PDR ,

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

United States Enrichment Corporation Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant NRC Inspection Report 70-7002/98017(DNMS)

This inspection report includes aspects of plant operations, maintenance, engineering, and i

plant support. The report covers a six week period of routine resident inspections.

Plant Operations

• The inspectors identified weaknesses with the certificatee's disposiiioning of some 1

potentially non-conforming conditions. Based upon a reevaluation of each issue identified by the inspectors, the certificatee took additional actions to resolve the findings i

and identified a potentially adverse trend associated with the proper dispositioning of i potentially non-conforming conditions. (Section 01.1)

Maintenance and Surveillance ,

e The inspectors identified that the certificatee failed to perform face velocity surveillances

for some Building X-705 ventilation hoods used for radiological activities. The )

inspectors also determined that the certificatee's corrective actions for a previous, i

similar NRC-identified finding associated with Building X-710 hoods were not sufficiently

! comprehensive to ensure that all hoods were properly tested. (Section M1.1)

Enaineerina ,

i e The inspectors determined that the certificatee appropriately identifed the failure

mechanism associated with a specific pipe rupture in Building X-705. However, the j j inspectors also concluded that the certificatee's corrective actions to the pipe rupture  ;

i were not sufficiently comprehensive to ensure that other similar plant systems were not )

j affected by the same failure mechanism. Following an independent evaluation of the

inspectors' findings and additional field walkdowns, the certificatee initiated the j development of a more comprehensive nondestructive evaluation program for some l plant systems affected by chemical corrosion. (Section E1.1) )1 2

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Report Datalla

1. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 Disposition of Potentially Non-Conformino Conditions

a. Inspection Scoce (88100)

The inspectors reviewed the certificatee's disposition of potentially non-conforming conditions.

b. _Qbservations a_Dd Findinas During the inspection period, the inspectors identified weaknesses with the certificatee's dispositioning of some potentially non-conforming conditions, as follows:

e On November 11, the certificatee identified that some nuclear criticality safety approvals (NCSAs) for the storage of small diameter containers were deficient in that the NCSAs did not specify the required spacing between arrays. As immediate corrective ection to the finding, the certificatee calculated the minimum spacing required between arrays and performed a walkdown of plant areas to determine if any arrays were improperly spaced. The minimum spacing was determined to be 66 inches.

During the walkdown, the certificatee identified two areas where the arrays were spaced closer than the minimum required spacing of 66 inches. The first area was in Building X-705. The arrays were found to be only 61 inches apart and were repositioned to meet the minimum 66 inch spacing requirement. The second area was in Building X-710. The arrays in Building X-710 were found to be only 48 inches apart. The inspectors noted that the certificatee did not take any immediate action to re-space arrays in Building X-710 that were found spaced only 48 inches apart.

The inspectors discussed with the certificatee the findings and the certificatee's lack of action to restore the Building X-710 array to compliance with the NCSA minimum spacing limit of 66 inches. During the discussions, the certificatee informed the inspectors that the plant staff had performed a calculation in 1991 which indicated that the as-found spacing was acceptable. The certificatee indicated that the calculation assumed that oily materials were not stored in the room and the certificatee confirmed that oily materials were not present in the room. Although the certificatee's actions appeared to be based on sound technical information, the inspectors noted that the certificatee did not have an approved NCSA to allow for storage of material in that configuration.

Based upon the inspectors' findings and a reevaluation of the issue, the certificatee took action to separate the arrays in Building X-710 to ensure conformance with the goveming NCSA minimum spacing requirement of 66 inches.

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i e On November 12, the certificatee retracted an event report that was initially made on September 21,1998. The event report described the certificatee's <

identification of a deficient NCSA for the storage of convertera in the Building X-700 disassembly area. The NCSA required that only " trace amounts" of uranium bearing material be present in the converters. The certificatee's basis for retracting the event report was that non-destructive analyses of the converters did not reveal any " appreciable deposits" of uranium.

The inspectors noted that the NCSA did not define " trace amounts" but assumed that the converters would be decontaminated in Building X-705, to remove loose "

contamination, prior to storage in Building X-700. Since the converters had not been decontaminated prior to their storage in Building X-700, as assumed in the NCSA, the :nspectors determined that the retraction of the event was not justified.

Based on the inspectors' findings and a reevsluation of the issue, the certificatee withdrew the retraction on November 17.

• On November 9, the certificatee discovered that some components failed as-found testing during calibration of the high cylinder pressure shutdown loop on Autoclave Number 3 in Building X-343. In addition, the certificatee identified l that the measuring and test equipment (M&TE), used to perform the last calibration on that loop, was out-of-tolerance during the performance of the as-found checks.

The inspectors noted that the certificatee took appropriate action to assure that  !

the loop was properly calibrated prior to retuming the autoclave to service. '

However, the inspectors also noted that the affected M&TE had been used to calibrate two other in-service autoclaves in Building X-343. At the time of the L inspectors' review of the issue, the plant staff had not taken any action to review the status of the affected Building X-343 inservice autoclaves. l

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The inspectors discussed the findings with the plant shift superintendent (PSS) l office on the following day. Given the inspectors' findings, the PSS requested -i plant staff to evaluate the impact of the prior use of the now out-of-tolerance M&TE. Subsequently, the plant staff indicated that the M&TE was within tolerances for the range involved in the autoclave calibration activities.

In response to the inspectors' findings and other previous examples of the PSS staff making operability determinations using incomplete documentation, the certificatee identified a potential adverse trend and generated Problem Report (PR) 98-7651 in order to track the development of a plan to address the problem.

The certificatee's plan to address the apparent adverse trend associated with the i dispositioning of potentially non-conforming conditions with be tracked as an 1 Inspector Followup item (IFl 70-7002/98017-01). i

c. Conclusion The inspectors identified weaknesses with the certificatee's dispositioning of some  ;

potentially non-conforming conditions. Based upon a reevaluation of each issue  !

identified by the inspectors, the certificatee took additional actions to resolve the findings j l

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and identified a potentially adverse trend associated with the proper dispositioning of l potentially non-conforming conditions. The inspectors will track the certificatee's l long-term actions as an inspector followup item.

08 Miscellaneous Operations issues

08.1 Certificatee Event Reports (CERs)(90712)

The certificatee made the following operations-related event reports during the inspection period. The inspectors reviewed any immediate safety concems indicated at the time of the initial verbal notification. The inspectors will evaluate the associated written reports for each of the events following submittal, as applicable.

Number Date Status Title N/A* 11/04/98 Closed 10 CFR 95.57 (b)- an employee entered through the security portal without an identification badge 35009 11/06/98 Open an actuation of two smoke heads, safety system components, in the Building X-330 tails withdrawal area N/A* 11/13/98 Closed 10 CFR 95.57 (b) - a security officer failed to verify the photograph of an employee, maintained in portal rack, prior to granting the employee plant access N/A* 11/18/98 Closed 10 CFR 95.57 (b) - an uncleared employee l was not escorted in Building X-344

• Discussed in Section P8.2.

08.2 Bulletin 91-01 Reports (97012)

The certificatee made the following reports pursuant to Bulletin 91-01 during the inspection period. The inspectors reviewed any immediate NCSA concems associated l with the report at the time of the initial verbal notification. Any significant issues

, emerging from these reviews are discussed in separate sections of this report or in future inspection reports.

Number Date Title l 35020 11/11/98 4 Hour Report - NCSAs PLANT 006 and PLANT 025 were deficient because the NCSAs failed to specify the l minimum required spacing between storage arrays I

(see Section O1.1) 35025 11/12/98 4 Hour Report - a Building X-710 NCSA was deficient because the NCSA did not include sufficient controls to preclude the stacking safe slabs l 5 l

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083 (Closed) CER 70-7002/97-19: Autoclave high condensate level shutoff actuations in Building X-343. The certificatee determined that the actuations were the result of a drop in internal autoclave pressure which allowed water to back up in the condensate drain line. The drop in pressure occurred during a phase change in uranium hexafluoride (UF.) being heating in a 14 ton cylinders in the 6 foot (feed-only) autoclaves. The certificatee had also previously identified a design inadequacy with the autoclave ,

4 condensate system which was being addressed as part of the nuclear safety upgrade project. Pending completion of the upgrade project, the certificatee changed the applicable operating procedures to prohibit the heating of 14 ton cylinders in the smaller autoclaves. The inspectors verified that the action has been effective in preventing  :

recurrence and this item is closed.

08.4 (Closed) CER 70-7002/97-20: Building X-343 autoclave shell high pressure containment safety system actuation. The certificatee determined that the cause of the safety system actuation was the failure of a steam regulator to control autoclave steam pressure during a period of time when the cylinder contents were progressing through a rapid phase change while being fed at the maximum rate to the cascade. The failure of the regulator to control steam pressure resulted in the steam pressure overshooting the maximum setpoint. As a corrective action for the cause of this event, the certificatee changed the operating procedures to limit the cylinder feed rates during the initial feeding process thereby allowing cylinder temperatures to stabilize. The inspectors verified that the action has been effective in preventing recurrence of the event and the item is closed.

ll, Maintenance and Surveillance M1 Conduct of Maintenance and Surveillance M1.1 Buildina X-705 Fume Hood Face Velocity Surveillances

a. Inspection Scooe (88102)

The inspectors reviewed the certificatee's method to test face velocity for fume hoods '

used for radiological activities in Building X-705.

b. Observations and Findinos On October 22, during a routine tour of Building X-705 the inspectors observed that fume hoods, used for radiological activities, were not labeled with calibration stickers.

The inspectors noted that the Safety Analysis Report (SAR), Section 5.3.2.10 required the certificatee to annually ensure an adequate hood face velocity for hoods used for radiological activities. During discussions of the observations with the building manager, the inspector was informed that maintenance personnel performed surveillances of the hood face velocity and maintained documentation of the completed surveillances.

However, the building manager later informed the inspectors that the surveillance documentation could not be located for several hoods used for radiological activities in Building X-705. >

Based on an independent review of the inspectors' findings and the lack of proper documentation of previous surveillances, the certificatee placed hoods used for 6

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radiological activities involving four sets of solution hand tables and two cleaning pits out-of-service in Building X-705 and issued a PR 98-07225.

The inspectors noted that a similar issue had been previously documented as a violation >

(VIO 70-7002/98004-02) in NRC Inspection Report 70-7002/98004. The inspectors reviewed the certificatee's corrective actions for violation and determined that the corrective actions did not include a systematic plant-wide evaluation of all ventilation  ;

hoods for compliance with SAR requirements. In response to the inspectors' findings,  ;

the plant staff issued PR 98-07442 which required that hoods be tested throughout the site. Subsequently, the certificatee identified additional hoods in Building X-720 that required the testing.

Upon completion of the testing for the Building X-705 hoods used for radiological {

activities, the inspectors reviewed the applicable work packages. The inspectors  :

l noted that the work instructions used surveillance criteria established in j Procedure XP4-TS-LS4102, " Testing of Fume Hood Face / Capture Velocity Using Manual Data Entry." The procedure was developed to test conventional fume hoods i and local exhaust systems in Buildings X-710 and X-760. During tours of the Building X-705 hoods used for radiological activities, the inspectors noted that the j design for the hoods used for radiological activities were different than the design of the conventional laboratory hoods, in addition, the inspectors determined that neither engineering or industrial hygiene personnel were consulted during development of the work packages to ensure that the procedure was appropriate for use on the Building X-705 hoods.

Based upon the inspectors' findings, the system engineer visually inspected the

, Building X-705 hoods and determined that the methodology outlined in the work l packages was in accordance with applicable guidelines and standards. On November 16, the certificatee successfully corripleted as-found testing on all the X-705 hoods with no negative findings. In addition, the certificatee prepared Procedure XP2-SH-lH2299, " Evaluation of Ventilation Systems," to described the appropriate surveillance methods for each of the onsite radiological hoods.

The certificatee's failure to perform the face velocity testing on ventilation hoods used for radiological activities in Building X-705 was a violation of minor safety significance of requirements included in the Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) and is not subject to formal enforcement action, r

c. Conclusions i

The inspectors identified that the certificatee failed to perform face velocity surveillances j

' for some Building X-705 ventilation hoods used for radiological activities. The inspectors also determined that the certificatee's corrective actions for a previous, I similar NRC-identified finding associated with Building X-710 hoods were not sufficiently )

comprehensive to ensure that all hoods were properly tested.

M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M8.1 (Closed) URI 70-7002/98015-02: Compliance Plan Issue 42 required the certificatee to develop and implement a testing method for the smoke detection system that correlated

the detectability of" test smoke" with the detectability of UF.. Following the inspectors' 7

identification that the testing had not been performed, the certificatee developed a work instruction to performed the testing as a one-time test. However, the inspectors determined that the Compliance Plan required the ce tificatee to utilize the revised testing methodology for all Technical Safety Requirement (TSR)-related surveillances conducted after July 1997. In addition, the inspectors noted that Section 6.11 of the SAR required all TSR-related surveillances to be implemented using formal procedures,  !

reviewed and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC).

1 Based upon the inspectors' findings, the cortificatee reevaluated the use of a work instruction to perform the testing and concluded that the testing should be conducted l using PORC-approved procedures. As a result, the certificatee revised the applicable l surveillance procedures to include the new methodology. The procedure revisions were PORC-approved and the testing was performed for all of the involved smoke detection j system heads. The certificatee did not identify any non-conformances as a result of the l repeat testing. 1 i

The certificatee's failure to use a PORC-approved procedure to perform TSR-related surveillances was a violation of minor safety significance of SAR requirements and is not subject to formal enforcement action. The certificatee's corrective actions to address a generic issue regarding the use of work instructions in lieu of approved procedures will continue to be tracked by VIO 70-7002/97005-02.

M8.2 (Ooen) URI 70-7002/98016-02: The inspectors identified that certain surveillance test records did not appear to incorporate the minimum data required by the QAP.

- Specifically, procedures used for routine TSR testing of withdrawal station pigtail isolation valves required only documenting the acceptability of the tests rather than the test results (i.e., closure time for the valves).

During a followup review of the issue, the inspectors noted that the certificatee did not measure the closure time of autoclave valves during routine TSR surveillances. Instead, the valve closing times were measured during post maintenance testing following valve maintenance. Sections 4.2.3.2 and 4.2.3.4 of the SAR assumed the valves close in 1 15 seconds as a part of the accident analysis for UF, releases from autoclaves. The inspectors discussed the findings with plant staff and based upon an independent review of the inspectors' findings, the certificatee decided to incorporate the measurement of valve closure times into the routine surveillances. The inspecWrs will track incorporation

! of the measurement requirement into the procedures as part of this unresolved item.

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E1 Conduct of Engineering  !

! E1.1 Buildina X-705 Recoverv Off-Gas Pioina Failure i a. Inspection Scope (88101)

! The inspectors reviewed an engineering evaluation for a piping failure -In the Building X-705 recovery area.

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l b. Observations and Findi.ngg l On August 12,1998, an off-gas pipe rupture occurred during normal operation of a l

l uranium recovery system pre-evaporator in Building X-705. The certificatee reported l that the pipe rupture resulted in between 20 and 50 gallons of uranyl nitrate leaking onto  :

the floor below the evaporator. The inspectors observed that the rupture was located l next to a pipe elbow weld and was approximately 1 inch long.

i in response to the pipe rupture, the certificatee performed a nondestructive examination l (NDE) of the recovery system that included the use of a visualinspection technique for  !

system piping, a TeleVideo scope to inspect each "C" pre-evaporator tube, and ultrasonic testing (UT) thickness measurements of system piping at random locations. l Results of the visual inspection technique indicated a significant reduction in the wall l

' thickness of portions of the pre-evaporator off-gas piping. For example, a section of the l off-gas piping had thinned to 0.012 inches from a 0.154 inches nominal wall thickness.  ;

The inspectors noted that the wall thinning appeared to be isolated to the off-gas piping. l i

Other ultrasonic measurements indicated only minimal changes in the thickness of piping and tubes in the recovery evaporators and other selected recovery system i

locations.  ;

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The certificatee determined, as documented in Engineering Evaluation,

" EVAL-SE-1998-0276," that the pre-evaporator off-gas pipe failed as the result of .

accelerated internal corrosion. The certificatee determined that a mixture of acid and l chloride solutions was the primary cause of the corrosion and that fluoride ions may

( have also contributed. The certificatee identified that the Building X-710 and l Building X-720 waste streams were the source of acid and chloride solutions. In l addition, the certificatee's metedlurgical evaluation determined that the off-gas piping j corrosion resistance properties may have been degraded as a result of excessive l heating during the manufacturing or welding processes.

As corrective action to the leak of uranyl nitrate solutions, the certificatee replaced the defective pre-evaporator off-gas piping with upgraded stainless steel pipe and fittings. ,

The certificatee also used a controlled welding process during fabrication of the piping in 1 order to stabilize the metallurgical properties of the steel. In addition, the certificatee j stopped processing waste streams that contained elevated levels of chlorides and mixed acids.

The inspectors noted that the certificatee's corrective actions did not include an evaluation or inspection of other plant piping systems for the potential or presence of deteriorated conditions. However, the inspectors were aware of several Building X-705 piping systems that processed corrosive solutions and thereby may be susceptible to j the same type of failure mechanism. One of the Building X-705 systems was the  !

microfiltration system which consisted of a 7000-gallon storage system with 430 feet of j schedule 10 (approximate 1/8 inch thick) stainless steel piping suspended from the roof i trusses.

The inspectors noted that the certificatee did not have a sampling program to evaluate i j the compatibility of the stored solutions with stainless steel or an NDE program to i 1 monitor system integrity. In addition, the inspectors determined that the waste streams

sntering the microfiltration storage system contained fluorides, citric acid, nitric acid, and

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chloride solutions which were potentially corrosive to stainless steel. The inspectors 9

were also aware that, in the past, the certificatee had repaired pin hole leaks in the stainless steel piping apparently caused by corrosion pitting due to intergranular 4 deterioration.

Based upon an independent evaluation of the inspectors' findings, the certificatee performed a generalinspection and walk-down of Building X-705 systems in an attempt to identify any existing leaks. During the walk-downs, the certificatee identified several pin hole leaks in the overhead microfiltration piping. The leaks appeared to have been caused by the corrosion pitting. In addition, the certificatee identified a leak caused by a defect along a weld bead of a pipe fitting.

At the end of the inspection period, the certificatee was developing NDE sampling criteria for use in analyzing observed piping defects and in order to establish a '

microfiltration storage system piping baseline. The inspectors will continue to evaluate the certificatee's corrective actions to identify and address piping systems exposed to corrosive solutions as an Inspector Followup item (IFl 70-7002/98017-02).

c. Conclusion

The inspectors determined that the certificatee appropriately identified the failure mechanism associated with a specific pipe rupture in Building X-705. However, the inspectors also concluded that the certificatee's corrective actions to the ruptured pipe were not sufficiently comprehensive to ensure that other similar plant systems were not affected by the same failure mechanism. Following an independent evaluation of the inspectors' findings and additional field walkdowns, the certificatee initiated the development of a more comprehensive NDE program for some plant systems affected by chemical corrosion.

E8 Miscellaneous Engineering lasues E8.1 (Closed) CER 70-7002/97-01: Cascade Automatic Data Processing UF, smoke detector actuated at the tails withdrawal station in Building X-330. The certificatee determined that the system actuated from an out-gassing of UF, that occurred as the result of a defective compressor discharge block valve bellows. The certificatee's root cause investigation determined that the buffer system, which employed a preset system pressure control system, did not maintain the bellows pressure greater than process gas pressure. To correct this problem, the certificatee designed and installed a variable pressure buffer system which maintained the buffer air supply at a constant differential above the process gas. The certificatee also installed a v riable pressure buffer system at the low assay withdrawal statio.n, and planned to install a similar system at the extended range product station during the current extended station outage. The inspectors concluded that the certificatee's corrective actions were reasonable and considered the CER closed.

IV. Plant Support P8 Miscellaneous Plant Support issues P8.1 (Closed) VIO 70-7002/97011-01 and VIO 70-7002/98008-01: The violations involved deficiencies with the certificatee's training program. Violation 70-7002/97011-01 involved three front line managers who performed procedures with nuclear criticality 10

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Violation 70-7002/98008-01 involved the certificatee's failure to update training l requirement matrices to include mandatory training needs for newly appointed  !

managers.

The certificatee's root cause investigation determined the training program deficiencies l were caused by managers not understanding and enforcing training program requirements. In addition, the certificatee identified that the training program process for ensuring that required training was correctly identified and appropriate work ,

limitations were issued for deficient training was inadequate.

As corrective action, the certificatee issued a directive to organizational training representatives and database administrators. The training directive required the training program staff to issue current individual training status reports to cognizant managers l whenever a change was made to a training matrix or when an individual was assigned to  ;

a new position. The certificatee also reminded organizational managers and I organizational training representatives of the existing requirement to impose work limitations on employees with deficient training requirements.

in response to generic issues with the training program, the certificatee took some additional actions as described in inspection Report 70-7002/98016. The inspectors 1 concluded the certificatee's specific corrective actions to the two violations were I reasonable and the violations are considered closed. However, the inspectors will j continue to track the certificatee's additional corrective actions to the generic issues as a <

part of the corrective actions for VIO 70-7002/98010-01. 1 P8.2 , (Ooen) URI 70-7002/98013-04: The certificatee's implementation of corrective actions to address an adverse trend with reportable security infractions. The certificatee ]

reported three security infractions during the inspection period:

1 On November 4, an employee with a proper security clearance entered the plant i through a portal without a security badge. The guard failed to verify that the i employee was carrying the badge as required by the security plan.

On November 13, an employee with a proper security clearance entered the plant after the employee's unescorted site access had been temporarily suspended. The guard on duty when the employee entered the plant failed to check the employee's picture badge against a copy maintained at the entry portal and used as a confirmation of continued site access authorization.

On November 18, the plant security staff identified that a contractor, without a proper security clearance for unescorted access to the plant site, was not escorted as required by the plant security plan. The inspectors were informed that the assigned escort had left the site, following a shift change, without transferring responsibility for the individual to another cleared individual.

The certificatee's review of the incidents determined that none resulted in compromise of classified information. As corrective action to the latest infractions, the certificatee planned to upgrade employee training to include escort requirements for uncleared personnel, in addition, the certificatee plant to revised security procedures to require the guards to perform a side-by-side comparison of individual badges with the copies l

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! V. Manaaement Meetinas l

X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of the facility management on November 23,1998. The plant staff acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the plant staff whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified. i 1

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Lockheed Martin Utility Services

• J; Brown, General Manager

• S. Casto, Work Control Manager l *S. Fout, Operations Manager

• P. Hopkins, Acting Engineering Manager L *J. Morgan, Enrichment Plant Manager

! *P. Miner, Regulatory Affairs Manager

• M. Wayland, Maintenance Manager United States Enrichment Corooration

• L. Fink, Safety, Safeguards & Quality Manager l J. Miller, USEC Vice President, Production

• Denotes those present at the exit meeting on November 23,1998.

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 88100: Plant Operations IP 88101: Configuration Control-IP 88102: Surveillance Observations IP 97012: In-office Reviews of Written Reports on Nonroutine Events ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 070-7002/98017-01 IFl Plan to address apparent adverse trend in disposition on non-conforming conditions.

070-7002/91.717-02 IFl Evaluate actions to identify and appropriately address piping l systems exposed to corrosive solutions.

r. Closed L 070-7002/97011-01 VIO Manager directed nuclear criticality safety activities without current l required training.

070-7002/98008-01 VIO Failure to update training requirement matrixes and identify mandatory training needs for newly appointed managers.

070-7002/98015-02' URI Development and testing of smoke detector system in accordance with Compliance Plan issue 42.

, 070-7002/97 CER ' Cascade Automatic Data Processing UF, smoke detector i: actuation at the tails withdrawal station in Building X-330.

070-7002/97-19 CER Autoclave high condensate level actuations at Building X-343.

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l: 070-7002/97-20 CER Autoclave shell high pressure containment safety actuation at Building X-343.

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070-7002/98016-02 URI Surveillance test records did not incorporate minimum data required by QAP.

070-7002/98013-04 URI Corrective actions to address adverse trend in security infractions.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CER Certificate Event Report.

CFR Code of Federal Regulations DNMS Division of Nuclear Material Safety IFl Inspection Followup Item IP inspection Procedure M&TE Measuring and Test Equipment NCSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval NDE Non-destructive Examination NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PORC Plant Operations Review Committee PR Problem Report PSS Plant Shift Superintendent QAP Quality Assurance Program SAR Safety Analysis Report TSR Technical Safety Requirement UF, Uranium Hexafluoride UT Ultrasonic Testing URI Unresolved item USEC United States Enrichment Corporation VIO Violation 15