ML20249B052

Insp Rept 70-7002/98-10 on 980601-05.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint & Surveillance & Plant Support

ML20249B052
Person / Time
Site:	Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date:	06/16/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20249B049	List: ML20249B048 ML20249B050 ML20249B052
References
70-7002-98-10, NUDOCS 9806220018
Download: ML20249B052 (10)

Text

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ ,_-- _ -______ - . _-_-_______ ___--__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION ll1 I

Docket No.: 70-7002 Certificate No.: GDP-2 Report No.: 70-7002/98010(DNMS)

Facility Operator. United States Enrichment Corporation Facility Name: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant i

Location: 3930 U.S. Route 23 South P.O. Box 628 )

Piketon, OH 45661 l

Dates: June 1-5,1998 Inspector: C. A. Blanchard, Fuel Cycle Safety inspector Approved by: Patrick L. Hiland, Chief Fuel Cycle Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety .

l t

• ~

98062'0018 990616 PDR ADOCK 07007002 C PDR

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

United States Enrichment Corporation Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant NRC inspection Report 70-7002/98010(DNMS)

Operations -

• The inspector concluded that the first-line managers (FLMs) identified safety-related issues during the Building X-333 quarterly walk-through. Additionally, the inspector observed that the FLMs conducted the Building X-333 quarterly walk-through in accordance with procedural requirements. (Section 07.1)

Maintenance and Surveillance

-* The inspector noted that the certificate failed to perform the required Building X-705 40-ton gantry crane yearly code inspection by May 21,1998, but did not use the crane to perform lifts. Additionally, the inspector identified that yearly code inspection concems for the triple-aught compressor rigging slings delayed the lifting of a triple-aught compressor on June 4. (Section M1.1)

Plant Supoort e The inspector identified a violation regarding 30 of the 37 E-Squad members who were not self-contained breathing apparatus trained as procedurally required and were not placed on work restriction. (Section P2.1) e - The emergency preparedness staff maintained a good inventory of well-maintained emergency response equipment and supplies that were in a state of operational

, readiness. Additionally, the public waming system maintenance and surveillance activities were performed in accordance with procedural requirements and manufacturer's recommendations. (Section P2.2)

• The inspector concluded that the site qualified crisis, response, and regulatory liaison managers were current with required emergency response organization training. The inspector noted that the certificate did not require any process equipment training for health physicists and firefighters who were first responders to emergencies.

(Section P5.1) 2

l r

Report Details

1. Operations i

y 07.0 ; Quality Assurance in Operations 07.1 Certificate's Quarterly Manaaement Production Assessment t

a. Inspection Scope (88005) r I The inspector observed two first-line managers (FLMs) while the FLMs performed a quarterly walk-through of Building X-333 to compare selected activities observed with procedural requirements.

b. Observation and Findinas -

On June 4, the inspector observed the quarterly walk-through of Building X-333 to

! compare select activities performed with Procedure XP2-QA-QA1032, " Management-by-l: Walking-Around," requirements. Procedure XP2-QA-QA1032 required the general manager to assign management-by-walking-around (MBWA) team members to perform performance-based inspections that concentrate on the safe operation and maintenance

( of the facility including nuclear criticality safety, contamination control, configuration f management, logs, work practices, and calibration.

L i' ,

The inspector noted that the two FLMs selected by the general manager had over f 20 years of gaseous diffusion plant (GDP) engineering and operational experience.

During the walk-through, the inspector noted that the two FLMs identified the following issues in Building X-333:

e a panel door open on motor control center-38A1-8; 4

e Procedure XP-CO-CA2367, " Cylinder Operations at LAW," addressed the step l required to successfully complete Checklist A-3617, " LAW Station Withdrawal j Checklist," dated January 21,1998. Procedure XP-CO-CA2367, step 8.3.2, - )

L required the plant control facility (PCF) cascade controller to independently determine the cylinder fill capacity. The X-333 building manager stated the low assay withdraw (LAW) operators and cascade controllers elected to document the PCF cylinder fill capacity on an unofficial form. In addition, the two FLMs identified inconsistencies on the signing of the unofficial cylinder fill capacity forms; L

l e eight cylinders were correctly tagged and secured in the X-333 cylinder cooling area;

e. and the LAW boundary control statian identified the wrong phone number for the area control room (ACR).

I-

! The inspector noted that the FLMs discussed with the building manager each issue prior l to leaving Building X-333. In response to the open motor control center panel door, the inspector noted that the building manager immediately notified the maintenance department of the issue.

3

c. Conclusions The ins'pector concluded that the FLMs identified safety-related issues during the Building .

X-333 quarterly walk-through. Additionally, the inspector observed that the FLMs conducted the Building X-333 quarterly walk-through in accordance with procedural requirements,

11. Maintenance and Surveillance M1.0 Conduct of Maintenance and Surveillance M1.1 Buildina X-705 Crane and Liftina Fixture inspections

p. Inspection Scope (88025)

The inspector performed a tour of Building X-705 to observe maintenance activities in progress.

b. Observations and Findinas 1

I On June 4, the inspector performed a tour of Building X-705 to observe maintenance activities in progress. In discussions with the inspector, the Building X-705 building manager explained a scheduled maintenance activity for the day required the off-loading -)

of a 17-ton triple-aught compressor from a flat bed trailer to a decontamination booth.

J Prior to the scheduled maintenance activity, the inspector observed and discussed the action taken before the use of Building X-705 gantry cranes for lifting a 17-ton triple-aught compressor with the building manager. The building manager explained that generally the 40-ton gantry crane was used to lift the triple-aught compressor. However, on the moming of June 4, a maintenance mechanic identified that the 40-ton gantry crane's yearly code inspection was past due. Subsequently, the inspectc,r visually inspected the i

40-ton gantry crane's yearly code inspection sticker and identified that the next required yearly code inspection date was May 21,1998. The inspector further reviewed the 40-ton gantry crane equipment inspection forms, which the certificate completes prior to each

. use or daily when used continuously, between May 21 and June 3,1998. The 40-ton l gantry crane equipment inspection forms indicated the certificate operated the 40-ton gantry crane on May 26, May 27, and June 3,1998, which fall outside the May 21,1998, required yearly code inspection date. In response to the inspector's observation, the building manager issued Problem Report (PR) PB-98-03739 which identified, in part, that the certificate did not use the 40-ton gantry crane to lift a load but to move the crane north and south on May 26, May 27, and June 3,1998. The inspector identified that l Procedure XP4-CU-CH2104, " Inspection and Operation of X-705 Cranes," required, in l l

part, a current code inspection sticker as a prerequisite for lifting a load. In discussions with the inspector, a code crane inspector explained that the certificate can move, but not lift, with the 40-ton gantry crane without a current yearly code inspection.

Rigging equipment used in Building X-705 was inspected by direct field observation. The inspector identified that the required yearly code inspection expired on one of the two triple-aught rigging slings, in addition, the maintenance mechanic identified discrepancies in the other triple-aught rigging sling's yearly code inspections.

Specifically, the triple-aught rigging sling lifting ring had a 1997 and 1998 yearly code inspection band and the four legs of the sling were banded with only a 1997 yearly code

. inspection band. The maintenance mechanic identified the triple-aught rigging sling 4

yearly code inspection discrepancies to the FLM. The FLM called the code crane department which identified through record review that this triple-aught rigging sling (banded with a 1997 and 1998 yearly code inspection band) was current with the required yearly code inspection.

c. Conclusions The inspector noted that the certificate failed to perform the required Building X-705 40-ton gantry crane yearly code inspection by May 21,1998, but did not use the crane to perform lifts. Additionally, yearly code inspection concems for the triple-aught compressor rigging slings delayed the lifting of a triple-aught compressor on June 4.

IV. Plant Support P2 Status of Emergency Preparedness Procedures and Documentation P2.1 Qualifications of First Responders to Emergencies

a. Inspection Scope (88050)

The inspector reviewed the required training for emergency squad (E-Squad) members and the readiness of the E-Squaci to assist the incident commander (IC) in mitigating an off-normal process condition.

b. Observation and Findinas i

The inspector noted that Procedure XP2-EP-EP1055, " Incident Command System,"

g identified E-Squad and nine other organizations that the IC can request to assist in the l response to an emergency. Procedure XP2-SF-SF1031," Administration of Emergency

_ Squad," provided guidance for maintaining the E-Squad to assist the IC dunng an incident as needed. Procedure XP2-EP-EP1055 required, in part, that E-Squad members successfully pass self-contained breathing apparatus training (SCBA). On June 3, the inspector requested a current list of E-Squad members from the plant shift superintendent (PSS). The E-Squad list presented consisted of 37 members. The inspector asked the l

assistant plant shift superintendent (APSS) and PSS if the current E-Squad members l were qualified to don SCBA equipment. The PSS and APSS stated that they did not believe all 37 listed E-Squad members were SCBA qualified. Subsequently, the inspector l reviewed the training records for the 37 E-Squad members and identified 30 E-Squad members who had not received the required SCBA training. The inspector noted that PR-PTS-98-03709 identified E-Squad members who did not successfully complete the required SCBA training were not issued work restriction letters.

Technical Safety Requirement 3.9.1 required that written procedures be implemented for activities described in Appendix A of Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.11, " Procedures."

Appendix A of Section 6.11, described training as an activity that shall be implemented in accordance with written procedures. Procedure UE2 TR-TR1030, " Conduct of Training,"

Revision 0, Change B, dated July 31,1997, required, in part, that organization / group managers place work restriction on employees where training is deficient. Procedure XP2-SF-SF1031, " Administration of E-Squad," Revision 0, dated October 16,1996, required, in part, E-Squad members successfully pass self-contained breathing apparatus

! training. The failure to place work restrictions on 30 E-Squad members whose training l' was deficient from February 1,1998 to June 3,1998, in that they did not pass self-5

)

1 I

l

~ contained breathing apparatus training is a Violation of TSR 3.9.1 (VIO 70-7002/98010-01).

c. Conclusions l The inspectoridentified a violation that involved 30 of the 37 E-Squad members who were not SCBA trained as procedurally required and were not placed on work restriction.

P2.2 Status of Emeraency Preparedness Activities

a. Inspection Scope (88050)

The inspector toured the emergency operation center (EOC), emergency response vehicle (ERV), and emergency response room (ERR), to determine whether the emergency response equipment, instrumentation, and supplies located in these emergency repositories were maintained in a state of operational readiness. The decontamination trailer and field team monitoring kits were also inspected. _The inspector also reviewed the original design bases for audible coverage of the public waming system j (PWS) and weekly, monthly, and semiannual testing and maintenance related to the [

' testing of the PWS and controls.

l b. Observations and Findinos l The inspector noted that the ERV and ERR contained the quantities and equipment l identified in the EP and implementing procedures. Cabinets containing emergency equipment and field kits were clearly identifiable, contents were orderly, and well maintained. Survey meters examined were calibrated and operational, and self-contained breathing apparatus air tanks were full. In addition, the inspector verified via documentation (in support of maintenance, periodic tests or surveillance) that inventory and operability checks were timely, and that equipment and instrumentation stored at selected locations (Fire Service's emergency response vehicles and ERV) were operational and property maintained.'

I The inspector reviewed the original design bases for the PWS sirens documented in Repost ERCl-R/88-05," Siren System Design Evaluation for tt,e Department of Energy's ,

Piketon, Ohio Facility." Report ERC -R/88-05 identified that the PWS was designed to

. comply with NUREG-0654, "Crite,ria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," and FEMA-REP-10, " Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants," for siren-alerting systems at commercial nuclear power plants.

I Specifically, the minimum acceptable design objectives for coverage by the PWS system l- were:

e The capability to provide an alert signal to the population throughout a two-mile immediate notification zone within 15 minutes; e The selection and location of sirens that included a minimum of 60 decibel (dbt).

sound pressure level outdoors was provided to all populated areas within the immediate notification zone.

The inspector reviewed the 1988 PWS audible test results and verified the results met audible coverage contained in Report ERCl-R/88-05.

6

I

~

l The inspector noted that the certificate did not measure sound pressure level of the

- sirens during the samlannual PWS testing. The inspector asked the emergency response manager (ERM) what design bases supported that the PWS audible capacity had not degraded since the original system installation. The ERM stated audible test results indicated no degradation in PWS performance between 1988 and 1994. On June 4, the ERM contacted the PWS manufacturer concoming the degradation of the PWS system and documented the conversation in Portsmouth GDP Letter, POEF-170-98-255, "Whelen Factory Representative Analysis." Portsmouth GDP Letter, POEF-170-98-255, identified that the PWS manufacturers technical service representative stated a sound pressure reading for the PWS was not necessary because the PWS system's self-diagnostic test will indicate sound pressure level degradation if the impedance measurement changes. The inspector verified that the certificate tested the PWS system impedance during the weekly surveillance test.

The inspector reviewed the PWS weekly, monthly, and semiannual surveillance tests for compliance with Procedure XP2-EP-EP4001, " Test and Inspection of the Public Waming System," and the manufacturers testing recommendations. Through record review, the inspectoridentified that the certificate had performed a PWS surveillance test in accordance with Procedure XP2-EP-EP4001 for the period reviewed (since March 3, 1997). Additionally, the inspector identified that the PWS surveillance required by Procedure XP2-EP-EP4001 exceeded the PWS manufacturers recommendations. )

Specifically, the inspector noted that the PWS manufacturers surveillance guidance did not specify a weekly maintenance surveillance or a load test on the emergency back-up battery. The inspector noted that the certificate's battery load test for the PWS batteries per Procedure XP-GP-EM6203, " Battery Load Testing on Public Waming Siren System

~( ME202AC)," followed good industrial practice for testing batteries for degradation.

I

c. Conclusions The emergency preparedness staff maintained a good inventory of well-maintained emergency response equipment and supplies that were in a state of operational readiness. Additionally, the inspector identified that the PWS maintenance and surveillance were performed in accordance with procedural requirements and manufacturers recommendations.

I P5 _ Staff Training and Qualification in Emergency Preparedness l PS.1 Emeraency Plan and Implementing Procedures

a. Inspection Scope (88050)

The inspector reviewed a sample of training records for emergency response organization (ERO) personnel. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the qualifications of firefighters (FF) and health physicists (HP) (first responders to an emergency) for mitigating an off-normal process condition.

I l-7

b. Observations and Findinas i

The inspector reviewod training records for ERO personnel for compliance with training requirements of Procedure POEF-TR-04," Training Development and Administrative guide for Emergency Management." The inspector determined that the site qualified crisis, response, and regulatory liaison managers had completed, and were current, with the required emergency response training courses as required by Procedure POEF-TR-04.

The inspector discussed with the ERM the qualification of the FF and HP personnelin responding to off-normal plant conditions during an emergency. Procedure UE2-HP-RP1036, " Radiological Protection Training and Qualification," specified the training requirements for HPs and Procedure XP2-SS-FS1031, " Fire Protection Program,"

specified the training requirements for FFs. The inspector noted that these procedures do not require process equipment training for HPs or FFs, who were first responders to an emergency and were required to communicate to the IC off-normal process conditions.

The ERM stated that the IC required HPs and FFs, at times, to make process system manipulations to stop an off-normal process condition (for example: plug a process leak),

but that the IC had the option of requesting additional onsite support to mitigate an off-normal process condition.

c. Conclusions The inspector concluded that the site qualified crisis, response, and regulatory liaison managers were current with required ERO training. The inspector noted that the certificate did not require any process equipment training for HPs and FFs who were first responders to emergencies.

V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary Tne inspector presented the inspection results to members of the plant staff and management on June 5,1998. Plant staff acknowledged the findings presented. The inspector asked the plant staff whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

8

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

.i Lockheed Martin Utility Services (LMUS)

• J. Anzelmo, Commitment Manager

• T. Boss, Work Control

• T. Brooks, Operation Manager l M. Brown, General Manager -

• S. Casto, Work Control Manager ,

M. Conkel, Mechanical Cascade Maintenance Manager l

• D. Couser, Training Manager M. Hasty, Engineering Organization Manager ,

R. Lipfert, Training and Procedures Organization Manager R. McDermott, Operations Organization Manager i i J. Oppy, Feed and Transfer Manager l l *M. Redden, Emergency Response Manager D. Rogers, Work Control Manager

• R. Smith, Health Physics Manager J. Thompson, Health Physics United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)

• C. Blackston, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Specialist I

• L. Fink, Safety, Safeguards and Quality Manager l D. Waters, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Manager I

• Denotes those present at the June 5 exit meeting.

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 88005: Management Organization and Controls IP 88025: Maintenance and Surveillance Activities l IP 88050: Emergency Preparedness ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened l

70 7002/98010-01 VIO Failure to place work restrictions on 30 E-Squad members whose self-contained breathing apparatus training was deficient.

Closed None Discussed None

\

l LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ACR Area Control Room APSS Assistant Plant Shift Superintendent ji 'CFR ' Code of Federal Regulations l dbl decibel l EOC Emergency Operation Center l ERM Emergency Response Manager ERO Emergency Response Organization ERR Emergency Response Room i

ERV Emergency Response Vehicle FF Firefighter FLM First-Line Manager GDP Gaseous Diffusion Plant HP- Health Physicist LAW - Low Assay Withdraw MBWA Management-by-Walk-Around NRC. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l PCF Plant Control Facility PR Problem Report PSS Plant Shift Superintendent PWS Public Waming System SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus VIO Violation l

I I

I l

10 l

L_ . . _ . .. . . . . . _ _ _ . . __

. , . . ,