ML20149L618
| ML20149L618 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 06/25/1996 |
| From: | Congel F NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| To: | Dopp R NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148C622 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9606280050 | |
| Download: ML20149L618 (16) | |
Text
.
s e June 25, 1996 1 l
q MEMORANDUM T0: Richard A. Dopp, Acting Chief Facilities Security Branch Division of Security Office of Administration l e
FROM: Frank J. Congel, Director Incident Response Division D 'd '- N ^ > Ad!
Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR GENERAL, TEMPORARY UNESCORTED I ACCESS TO BUILDINGS OWFN AND TWFN 1
I am requesting that general, temporary unescorted access be granted in both l OWFN and TWFN buildings for the following individuals: l HAAGENSEN Brian C. D0STIE Patrick J.
SSN: SSN:
VANAGS, U1 DECR0 avid W.
SSN: SSN:
Peter J.
WILEY, SSN: h Office location for the above individuals will be in TWFN, fourth floor, in the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data's (AE0D's) DET/IIT work area. NRC Form 89, " Photo-Identification Badge Request" are attached for each individual. . ,
l l j If you require any additional information, please contact me at 415-7476.
) Attachments: As stated i Distribution:
File Center Maine Yankee R/F l IRD R/F DISK / DOCUMENT NAME: A:\ ACCESS.MEM ,
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" - Copy wlo attachment, "E" - Copy wlattachment, "N" = No capt 0FC D:IRD:AE00 ,
i FJCongel:mgc M NAME l l
DATE 06d/96 0FFICIALRECORP, COPY q3,W %
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NRC FORM 89 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION D* TE # "E M *'
me
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l PHOTO-IDENTIFICATION BADGE REQUEST 06/25/96 See Reverse for Pnvacy Act Statement SECTION A -TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTER
. FULL NAME (Lan Fest, M,dene inef'ae) CLEARANCF REQUESTED REQUEST FOR DUILDWG ACCESS J
HAAGENSEN, Brian C. L BUILDING wOuRS aACE OF BiRTu (C4 St.re CouarY, a NWMN 6:WW:N
- SPECIAL SPACE (Spec 4 ' e correi.pr ' ew s X NONE S 6 hun 4e vM6ER DATE OF 0,RTH SPONSORWG OFF'Div@R AEOD
- l. CrTw. , s . . .,e m SPONSORWG OmCE/DIVtSON DIRECTOR - PR'NTED OR rYPED N8YE xl u s CmzEN ['~] AveN . CouNmv Frank J._ COpgel, Director, IRD:AEOD 1
CONTR ACTOR COnTR ACT NuMeeR S1GNATuRe DATE
/ [ ,
PSHA/ Parameter Eng. . A; _ 06/ b/96 CTHER GOVT AGENCY (Spec 4) DATE OF E/P!R ATION SPONSOR 57 FICE .. POWT 6F CONT ACT CONT A C"5 TE.ED< '.
l-El1is Merschoff 415-6954 SECTION B -TO BE COMPLETED BY THE DIVISION OF SECURITY CLE AR ANCE GR ANTED FILE NUMBER BADGE CATEGORY / NUMBER CERT 1FYING OFFICaAL (OlvlSON OF SECUR:TV) .. PRINTED OR TYPED N AYs 4
L DATE O ' *EY C ARD NUMBER KEY C ARD St*'US SIGN A TURE DATE 1 NONE I ADDITIONA lNCORY AT10N
, , J NRC FORM 6a 611 %
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NRC FORM 89 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM MISSION DA TE & REQUEST (11 94; PHOTO.lDENTIFICATION BADGE REQUEST 06/25/96 See Reverse for Pnvacy Act Statement SECTION A - TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTER FULL NAME (last Aest Mode ennt,el)
CLE AR ANCE REQUESTED REQUEST FOR BUILDING ACCESS l DOSTIE, Patrick J. t BurLDiNG SOURS PLACE OF BIRTH Orv State Cosa,/
- Q I _ SPECIAL SPACE (Spec 4 , e computer rones X NONE SOCIAL SECURrTV u ETE OF BIRTH SPONSORWG OFF/Div6R AEOD CmzENSHIP dheca espoccefe boa) ~
SPONSORING OFFICE / DIVISION DIRECTOR - PRWTED OR TYPED N AME B u s CmzEN [-] AuEN - COUNTRY Frank 4. Congel, Director, IRD:AEOD CONTR ACTOR CONTR ACT NUMBER SIGNATURE '/~ DATE
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, OTNER Govt AGENCY (5,ec+; DATE OF EmRATON
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m (> b 7-SPONSORWo rFiCE - POWT re CONTACT Cot ACT $rEtEP-ca.
- State Of Maine Elli'MerschOff 415-6954
} SECTION B - TO BE COMPLETED BY THE DIVISION OF SECURITY CLEARANCE GRAN E D FILE NUMBER BADGE CATEGORYWUMBER CERTIFYWG OFFICIAL (DIVISION OF SECUR TY) PRtNTED OR TYPED Nave
, L DATE Q KEY C ARD NUMBER KEY CARD ST ATVS SIGNATURE
- DATE ADOITIONAL WFORMAT1ON i
NRCFORM64 (11 -lpe; l f
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NRC FORM 89 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION D^tt > Rt At-p s-u)
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PHOTO-IDENTIFICATION BADGE REQUEST See Reverse Ibr Pnvacy Act Statement l l SECTION A - TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTER FULL NAME (Last Asst Mode motse9 CLEARANCE REQUESTED REQUEST FOR BUILDtNG ACCESS WILEY, Peter J. t BuiLoNG SOURS PLACE Of B>RTH (C@ sfale Coun,y) Q OWFN/'IWFN 6:30-19:00
- SPEC:AL SPACE (Spec 4 e e coreswr er "x-:
bw % ~ ur PO I AEOD CITMashir rae appm6Tre bod SPONSOR'NG OFFICE /DVfSiON OtRECTOR - PR!NTED OR TYPED NAYE x]u$C Tu EN R AveN - Cou~TRv Frank J._Cong,el, Director, IRD:AEOD CONTRACTOR CONTRACT NUMBER $1GNATUREj (
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[ DATE
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06fD/96 CTHER GOVT AGENCY (Scec4) DA'E OF E.APIR ATlON SPONSO,IING OF CE POINT OF[ONTACT CDNTACTS TELEPC l
State of Maine / Governor's Office Ellis Merschoff 415-6954 SECTION B -TO BE COMPLETED BY THE DNISION OF SECURITY CLE AR ANCE GRANTED FILE NUMBER SADGE CATEGORv' NUMBER CERT,FYlNG OFFICIAL (DivlSON OF 4CCURTO . DRtN% J mEDNAY. ~
L DATE
, O KEY C ARD NUMBER REY CARD ST ATJ S S4GN A TURE DATE NONE l
ADDITIONAL MORMATiON l
NRC FORM 69 (11 H) i a
i NRC FORM 89 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DATE OF REQUES' j
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! PHOTO-IDENTIFICATION BADGE REQUEST See Reverse for Pnvecy Act Statement 06/25/96 SECTION A - TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTER FULL NAME (test Fnt Mooe m tta9 CLEARANCE R$ QUESTED REQUEST FOR ButLDM ACCESS I
VANAGS, Uldis Pt Act OF B.RTN cc,,, sr.,e Coon,>;
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myNN BuitaN 6:3g NouR B@
- SPECIAL $ PACE (Spec 4 n e compwrer res X NONE SOCl 6 m HITY NUMBER DATE OF BIRTH SPONSORING OFFIDivlFA AEOD j a aNss P <Crec. .,-.= oon SPONSORmG OrFicuoviS 08 DIRECTOR - PRrNTED OR T< PED NAMe
! Frank J. Congel, Director, IRD:AEOD B u s CIT. ZEN f~~) AUEN - COUNTRY CONTR*CTOR CONTRACT NUMBER SIGNATURE DATE
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06/L 596 OTwEa Govi AGENCY (s,eco; DATE OF EXPIRATION SPONSORING pCE - POINT Of (ONT ACT CONT ACT'S TELEPwCN State Of Maine Ellis Merschoff 415-6954 SECTION B - TO BE COMPLETED BY THE DNISION OF SECURITY CLE AR ANCE GR ANTED FILE NUMBER BADGE CATEGORv/ NUMBER CERTIFY NG OFFICIAL (DIVISION OF SECURITY) PRINTrD OR TYPED NAVE L D A TE
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c KEY CARD NUMBER KEY CARD ST ATUS SIGNA'URE DATE NONE ADOfTIONA L INFORMATION NRC FORM 89 (11 M)
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- U S GOVE ANMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1994- 383 182 4
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, NRC FORM 89 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DATE OF REQUEST (11-94,
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j PHOTO-IDENTIFICATION BADGE REQUEST 7 See Reverse for Pnvacy Act S*stement 06/25/96 SECTION A - TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTER FULL NAME /Last Frst We5 % fear) CLEARANCE REQUESTED REQUEST FOR BulLONG ACCESS CECROW, David W.
PLOC DIRTW 'C,fy $fam Covery) t Q
Bggg g g yg g
- SPECIAL SPACE (Speedy se compunwrooms) 1' X NONE se DATE OF BIRTH PON
- D Cm2ENSHIP (Casca appewam ooaf SPONMfNG OFFICE /OtVISION DRECTOR ~ PRINTED OR TYPED NAME B u S CmzEN R AtiEN - COUNTRY PrankJ./4nM1, Director,IRDAEOD CONTP rTOR CONTRACTNUMeeR SIGNATURE y / DATE Northeast Engineering, Inc.
OrNE1 wCVT AGENCY (Spectfy)
. m 06# 596
, DATE OF EXPIRATION SPONSORING F E - POINT OF yNTACT CONTACT'S TELEPHONE State of Maine Ellis eschoff 415-6954 SECTION B - TO BE COMPLETED BY THE DMSION OF SECURITY CLEARANCE GR ANTED FILE NUMBER BADGE CATEGORyrNUMBER CERTIFYING OFFICIAL (DVISION OF SECURITY) - PRICED OR TYPED NAME L DATE ,
Q KEY CARO NVMBER KEY CARD ST ATUS SIGNATURE DATE NONE CDCmONAL INFORM A TION NRC FOHM 69 (119A) a 1
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APPENDIX B
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em' i
,j MYAPC cooling water, and the RER het6i; exchanger E-3B is supplied with 4,000 to i
(
5,000 gym from the secondary compenent cooling system.
While in the recirculation mode, tho two containment spray pumps are each capable of pumping approximately .J,700 gpm through the residual. heat removal exchangers; 700 spm flow to the charging pumps while the remaining 3,000 gpm are directed to the spray header. Because the spray chemical addition and the refueling tanks are interconnected, the concentrated sodium hydroxide solution is added proportionally to the water which leaves the refueling water tank.
The concentrated spray chemical solution has a higher density than the borated water stored'in the refueling water tank; th.erefore, their levels are not equal when the liquids are in hydrostatic balance.
6.3.5 Desien Evaluation i I
The containment spray system consists of two completely independent systems, each of which is designed for 100 percent of the required capability. A )
third, full-capacity pump, together with valves and interconnecting piping, allows spray or low pressure safety injection pump maintenance to be performed with no loss of system reliability.
The spray pump design is compatible with the low pressure safety injection duty require.aents of the low pressure safety injection pumps, but not for residual heat removal duty. The spray pumps are located in the safeguards building outside the containment. Each pump cubicle is an individual,
~
shielded compartment to provide maximum reliability and accessibility for maintenance and repair. On a loss of off-site power, the diesel generators are used to supply emergency power to the safeguards active components.
6-15 Rev. 2, 9
e MYAPC Reutine testing ensures the operability of the pumps. The attention given to the selection of these pumps, the redundancy of power supplies, the design margins, and the fact that three full-capacity pumps are installed, assure a high degree of pump availability.
The residual heat removal heat exchangers are designed to section III, Class C, of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, and are of welded const ruction .
4 The containment spray system operates at a higher pressure than the component cooling water system.
The containment spray pumps are always provided with greater than the minimum required NPSH to assure reliable pump operation during the safety injection and recirculation modes of operation following a major less-of-coolant
( incident.
The safeguards sump design consists of four barriers which provide strainer protection and prevent debris f rom entering the rectreulation system. In addition, insulation debris screens have been added to erane wall openings.
Sump screens have been sized to pass no particle larger thaa I/16 inch and therefore reduce the potential for clogging of spray nozzle orifices in the recirculation phase.
l l
i 6-16 Rev. 2, 3, 12 j l
l J
NYApC The.bar screen consists of 3/8-inch stainless steel rods spaced 1 inch on center. Inside the bar screen are the flat screens shown in Figure 6.3-2 which are attached to 3-inch wide channels, coarse mesh 3/4-inch square openings on the outer face and fine mesh 3/16-inch openings on the inner face.
The partition screen shown in Figure 6.3-3 which is placed in the center of the sump, thus dividing it in half, has a coarse mesh screen on either side of the center fine mesh screen. Its primary purpose is to ensure full-flow operation even though the screens in one-half of the sump collapse or plug.
Finally, fine mesh 3/16-inch opening cylindrical sump screens, shown in Figure 6.3-4, used over each of the two suction pipes in the sump bottom provide additional strainer protection and constitute a fourth barrier to keep debris out of the recirculation system.
6.3.6 Test and Inspections periodic tests and inspections are performed during normal operation and refueling operations to ensure the integrity and operability of the spray systems.
Rev. 2 6-17
l
, i i, i l- MYAPC i
] 1ABLE 6.3.1
- CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM DATA i
Containment SDray Pump
{
Quantity 3 i
- _ Type Vertical deep well Stages 2 Rated flow, gpm . 3,700 !
Differential head, ft 305 i Brake horsepower (at .0. gr - 1.0) 345 Motor horsepower 350 i Materials
] Pump discharge casing A 351 GR CFB austenitic
- stainless steel ,
- Shaft A 276, Type 304 austenitic l
) stainless steel 4
Impellers A 351, GR CF8 austenitic stainless steel Soray Chemical Additional Tank 2
Quantity 1
, Type Vertical cylinder Volume liquid at normal level, gal 15,400 Material Austenitic stainless steel i Design code ASME Section VIII Operating pressure Atmospheric
, Operating temperature, F 65 NaOH concentration maximum percent 25
}
} Residual Heat Exchancers 1 l Quantity 2 ,
Shell Side Tube Side i Code ASME Section ASME Section
. III Class C III Class C Design pressure, psig 150 600 Design temperature, F 250 450 Material Carbon steel Austenitic stainless steel Fluid Component Boric acid cooling Na0H solution Flow Ib/hr 2 x 10 1.5 x 100 Rev. 3, 11
_ _ .~. __ _ _- _ _
l 2
. MYAPC'
- 2. Piping is hydrostatically tested at the mill in accordance with the method prescribed in applicable ASTM specifications.
l
- 3. Cast valve bodies are 100 percent radiographically and i s
dye penetrant inspected in accordance with ASME Code.
Section VIII. i I
i .
- 4. Valve bodies are hydrostatically tested in the shop in accordance j with ASTM Specification 351. j
- 5. Field welds are 100 percent radiographically inspect in accordance )
with the methods prescribed in USAS B31.1. I 1
l l 6. Field welds are hydrostatically tested in accordance with USAS j B31.1 with the exception of the piping from the refueling water )
tank to the tank isolation valves. l 6.2.3.7 Residual Heat Exchangers i
The two residual heat exchangers, normally used to remove residual and decay heat during plant shutdowns, are used to cool water pumped from the-containment sump during recirculation. The units are designed to accept 70*F to 300'F transient in 5 seconds. These units are described in more detail in Section 9.9.
6.2.4 Desian Evaluation v The design basis and system requirements during a loss-of-coolant incident are met with flow to the core from two of three safety injection tanks and two-thirds the flow delivery of one charging pump and one low pressure safety injection pump. The active components of the safety injection system which are required to operate during this incident are location outside of the.
containment, except for the MOVs associated with hot leg injection. The required MOVs are qualified for operation in the post-LOCA environment to which they are exposed. The system is designed to Class I seismic criteria to withstand the appropriate seismic loads simultaneously with other applicable loads without losing operational integrity. During recirculation, one charging pump 6-7 Rev. 7, 11
+
l_,*W #
, -..- . - . . . - . . - . - - . - - . . - . . - - . . - - - . _ . . . . - . . _ . . . _ . . = . - - . . - .
c
- :o i MYAPC l, '
- . has sufficient capacity to maintain the water level in the reactor vessel
- ' above tbc core. Ability to meet the core protection criteria is assured by l -the following design features.
- l. A high-capacity passive system, which requires no outside source of i power, will supply large quantities of borated water to rapidly recover
! the core after a major loss-of-coolant incident.
i j 2 .- A pumping and water storage system with redundant components will inject i- borated water into the reactor coolant system providing the core protection for small reactor coolant system breaks. The system is ;
capable of keeping the core covered with borated water while core cooling continues after the passive system supply has been injected. In addition, this system will remove reactor core decay and stored heat during long-term operation af ter the reactor coolant system rupture. I Instrumentation and sampling provisions allow monitoring of the recirculated coolant.
1
- 3. Spare components are provided to assure system availability during pump maintenance outages. A third spray pump is provided as a spare for either one of the LPSI or.the spray pumps. A third charging pump is also provided as a spare for the HPSI pueps.
- 4. Redundant on-site emergency power supplies are provided in the form of two diesel generators, each having the capacity for sufficient safeguards ;
operation.
- 5. All active components which must function for core protection can be tested during normal reactor operation.
- 6. Instrument sensors are tested for function at operating conditions.
- 7. Extensive shop and pre-operational tests are performed to verify component and system operation.
6-8
- 8. All of the active components, except for three valves associated with hot leg-injection. are located outside the containment where they are protected from incident-generated missiles and from post-incident environmental conditions.
- 9. The three safety injection lines are arranged such that movement 1
of a ruptured reactor coolant pipe will not cause a subsequent
- failure of injection lines feeding into other coolant loops.
4 i
- 10. All pumps and critical valves can be actuated from local controls
} should the main control room be inaccessible.
i
- 11. All components, piping, power supplies, etc.. in the safety i
injection support systems are designed to Class I seismic criteria.
12, Pumps and valve operators are arranged so that any leak in the safety injection system will not flood out or shut down the entire system.
injection mode of operation following a major loss-of-coolant '
accident always exceed that required by the pumps. A momentary, inadvertent loss of NPSH would result in a momentary reduction in '
flow and no damage to the pump.
- 14. The sa'ety injection tank isolatio valves are motor-operated fr:m diesel generator supplied buses. Power to the motor and the motor controls will be locked off at the motor control center. The control switches for the valves are key-locked and operated only under administrative control. The position of each valve is continuously indicated at the main control board by a separate power supply. A third power supply is used to alarm in the control room if any safety injection tank isolation valve is not open.
The effect. eness of the safety injection system to satisfy the criteria stated for core protection is demonstrated by the analysis presented in Section 14.
6-9 Rev. 11
MYAPC borated water for adding shutdown capability during rapid cooldown of the reactor coolant system which might result from the rupture of a steam line.
The steam line break analysis is presented in Section 14.11 of this report. '
r 6.2.2.2 Low Pressure Safety Iniection System The low pressure safety injection (LPSI) system is designed to inject borated water into the reactor vessel to flood and cool the core upon the depressurization of the reactor coolant system following a major loss-of-coolant accident. This system includes three safety injection tanks and two LPSI pumps.
The safety injection tanks are approximately 46 percent filled with borated water and are provided with a 225 psig nitrogen cover gas. The gas pressure provides the driving head required to transfer the tank liquid into the reactor vessel when the reactor cooloot system pressure falls below that of the cover gas. This borated water flows through two check valves located in ;
the line connecting each tank to the reactor coolant system.
The two LPSI pumps are also used to inject borated water from the refueling water tank into the reactor vessel upon depressurization of the reactor coolant system. A spare pump is provided which can be used either as an LPSI pump or alternately as a containment spray pump (see Section 6.3). This pump can be lined up from either one of the two suction headers from the refueling i water tank.
6.2.2.3 System Actuation All safety injection equipment starts on a safety injection actuation signal derived from the instrumentation logic described in Section 7 of this report. .
Upon a containment pressure of 5 psig or upon a low pressurizer pressure of l
1.585 ps.ig, the instrumentation circuity will produce the SIAS required to !
automatically start the safety injection pumps and position the valves for i borated water injection to the reactor coolant system.
63 Rev. 11 l
. . - - - -. _ -. . ~- _--.- , . - . --
. MYAPC I
The low-low pressurizer pressure safety injection initiation instrumentation has been designed te provide the necessary protection for the loss-of-coolant accident. This instrumentation meets the standards of quality, redundancy and independence rr. quired for functioning under all adverse plant conditions experienced Curing a loss-of-coolant accident. The containment high pressure safety injection initiation instrumentation was provided es a backup trip for those large breaks which might produce severe transients in the reactor coolant system. Furthermore, these instrumentation setpoints are adequate to protect the core over the entire spectrum of break sizes.
Both high pressure and low pressure headers of the safety injdction, systems feed into the three reactor coolant loops as shown in Figure 6.3-1. The feed lines of the high pressure header join the transport lines from the low pressure safety injection header penetrating the containment to connect into I the safety injection tank outlet to the cold leg of each loop.
As previously stated, the safety injection systems also function during post accident core cooling. This function is initiated either by operator action or by a recirculation actuation signal derived from RWST low level switches. Upon such a signal, the containment spray pump suctions are transferred from the RWST to the containment sump. This signal also stops the LPSI pumps and transfers the HPSI pump suctions from the RWST to the outlets of the residual heat exchangers. The spray pumps must be operating to satisfy the NPSH requiremtnts of the HPSI pumps during the recirculation mode of operation.
The'HPSI ,ystem also functions during pcst accident core cooling tc supply injection to the loop hot legs through the loop fill header piping. Hot leg injection is initiated manually by the operators at 15 to 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> following the accident. The purpose of hot leg injection is to prevent the precipitation of boron in the core in the event of a cold leg break. The 1 6-4 Rev. 2, 10, 11 i j
4 e
HYAPC operators manually operate valves to bypass flow from one of two safety injection trains to the loop fill header piping and into the loop hot legs.
6.2.3 System components 6.2.3.1 Hich Pressure Safety Iniection Pumps The HPSI pumps are horizontal, multi-stage pumps. A full description of the HPSI or charging pumps is given.in Section 9.1 of this report.
6.2.3.2 Low Pressure Safety Iniection Pumps The two low pressure safety injection pumps have two stages and are of the vertical deep well type. They are provided with mechanical face seals backed up by a throttle bushing. The seals are designed for operation at 400'F and are provided with a seal leak-off co'.lecting system. The pumps are designed and tested under thermal transients that are more severe than those which could occur even under incident conditions. Table 5.2.1 summarizes the LPSI pump design data.
6.2.3.3 Safety Iniection Tanks The three safety injection tanks are sized to ensure that two of the three tanks will provide sufficient water to recover the core following the most severe loss-of-coolant incident. The tanks contain borated water at a minimum boron concentration of 1,720 ppm and they are pressurized with nitrogen at 230 psig (+10 psig, -25 psig).
Level and pressure instrumentation is provided to monitor the availability of the tanks during plant operation. Provisions have been made for sampling, filling, draining, venting and correcting boron concentration. The tanks are carbon s, teel internally clad with stainless steel. Design, construction and overpressure protection are in accordance with the ASME Code,Section III, Class C. The data summary for the safety injaction tanks is given in Table 6.2.2.
6-5 Rev. 11
X \1 01- U 10 US 1 _ s f ). \-0 LATL- ._ i i
l Los Alamos NATIONAL LABORATORY hhl@l Technology & Safety Assessment Division l TSA 11, Probabilistic Risk & Hazard Analysis Group, MS K557 l Los Alamos, New Mexico 87545 l l
FAX NUMBER VERIFICATION (505) 667-5531 (505) 667-6231 TO: Norm Lauben I US Nuclear Regulatory Conunission ,
FAX: (301)415 6382 l
FROM: Mary Timmers/ Harold Sullivan Los Alamos National Laboratory Phone: (505) 667-9198 l
I Number of pages, including the cover shect: M Date transnutted: 9/19/96 Verified: l
- m ,
Approval: AN./ l Cy: CRM-4, MS A150 l MESSAGE: Attached is llarold's report. Please call me if there are transalission problems. or questions. As I understand it, Harold will be back in the office for a bit tomorrow.
nA Maw ,
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