ML20134C175

Proposed Tech Spec Changes to Sections 3.4 & 3.15 Re Safeguards Instrumentation & Control & Auxiliary Electrical Power Sys.Changes Involve Installation of Degraded Grid Voltage Protection Sys.Util NSHC Determination Encl

ML20134C175
Person / Time
Site:	Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	08/08/1985
From:	COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20134C149	List: ML20134C145 ML20134C175
References
NUDOCS 8508160231
Download: ML20134C175 (9)

Text

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ATTACFNENT -1 PROPOSED ZION APPENDIX A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES TO SECTIONS 3.4 and 3.15 SAFEGUARDS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM Pages Modified 131 133a 135 258 Pages Added 130a E'

8508160231 850008 PDR ADOCK 05000295' P pg 0462K

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

-Actuation Channel No. of Minimum Minimum Operator Action D3scription (Per Unit) No. of Channels Operable Degree of if column 3 or 4 Channels to trip Channels &++ Redundancy cannot be met + Setpoints&

V. Auxiliary Feedwater

1. Manual 1/ pump 1/ pump 1/ pump 0 Maintain Hot Shutdown *** N.A.

2. Automatic 2 1 2 1 Maintain llot Shutdown *** N.A.

3. Steam Generator (S/G)

Water Level low-low l 1. Start Motor 2 per S/G Driven Pumps 3 per S/G any 1/4 S/G 2 per S/G 1 per S/G Maintain llot Shutdown *** 10%

- Narrow Range J

II. Start Turbine 2 per S/G Driven Pumps 3 per S/G any 2/4 S/G 2 per S/G 1 per S/G Maintain llot Shutdown *** 10%

Narrow Range

4. Undervoltage-RCP busses 75%

Start Turbine Driven Pump 4-1/ bus 2 3 1 Maintain flot Shutdown * ** RCP Bus Voltage

5. S.I. Start Motor and Turbine Driven Pumps 2 1 2 1 Maintain llot Shutdown *** N.A.

6. Station Blackout 3-1/hus 2 2 1 Maintain llot Shutdown *** Time Start Motor and Turbine Dependent Driven Pump on Voltage

7. Secondary Undervoltage 2/ bus 2 2 0 N.A. 3846 12% volts for 5 15% min.

Il with inherent time delay of 8 +2 sec.

SEE FOOTNOTES ON PAGE 131b.

ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION SYSTEM - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SETPOINTS 07140 130a 0350A

l PERMISSIVES Setpoint &

P-11 Pressurizer pressure (2/3) below 1915 psig allows manual block of safety injection actuation during a plant cooldown.

P-12 Tavg (2/4) below 540'F allows manual block of High Steam flow safety injection actuation if borated to greater than cold shutdown conditions.

)

2 1

SEE FOOTNOTES ON PAGE 131b.

ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION SYSTEM - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SETPOINTS TABLE 3.4-1 (CONTINUED) 07020 131

Channal Descriptien Device Descr1Dti*n V. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER

1. Manual NA

2. Automatic NA

3. Steam Generator LC-5178, LC-527B, LC-537B, LC-547B Water Level Low-low LC-5188, LC-5288, LC-538B, LC-548B LC-519B, LC-5290, LC-539B, LC-549B

4. Undervoltage - RCP Busses Unit I 447(KP)-142, 447(KP)-143, 447(KP)-144, 447(KP)-145 Start Turbine Driven Pump Unit II 447(KP)-242, 447(KP)-243, 447(KP)-244, 447(KP)-245

5. SI Start Motor and See Section I of this Table.

Turbine Driven Pumps

6. Station Blackout

a. Start Motor Driven Pumps Unit I 427(CV-7)-142, 427(CV-7)-143, 427(CV-7)-144 Unit II 427(CV-7)-242, 427(CV-7)-243, 427(CV-7)-244

b. Start Turbine Driven Pumps Unit I 447(KP)-142, 447(KP)-143, 447(KP)-144, 447(KP)-145 Unit II 447(KP)-242, 447(KP)-243, 447(KP)-244, 447(KP)-245

7. Secondary Undervoltage Unit I 427-1(27D)-147, 427-1(27D)-148, 427-1(270)-149 Protection System 427-2(27D)-147, 427-2(27D)-140, 427-2(270)-149 Unit II 427-1(270)-247, 427-1(270)-248, 427-1(270)-249 427-2(210)-247, 427-2(270)-240, 427-2(270)-249 PERMISSIVES P-11 Pressurizer pressure - PT-455, PT-456, PT-457 P-12 Temperature - TE-411A, TE-411B, 1E-421A, TE-4218, TE-431A, TE-431B, TE-441A, TE-441B ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM INSTRUMENT NUMBERS TABLE 3.4-2 (Continued) -

0533t/0534t 133a 0098A

ACTUATION CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL DESCRIPTION CHECK CALIBRATION FUNCTION TEST I V .- STEAMLINE ISOLATION

1. Manual Actuation N.A. N.A. R.

2. Automatic Actuation N.A. N.A.

• M

3. High-High Containment Pressure See Item II Above

4. High Steam Line Flow in Coincidence with Low-Low Tavg See Item I Above or Low Steam Pressure V. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER

1. Manual N.A. N.A. R 2 2. Automatic N.A. N.A. M

3. Steam Generator S R Q Water Level Low-Low

4. Undervoltage - RCP Busses N.A. R R

5. Safety Injection See Item I on Page 134_

6. Station Blackout N.A. R R

7. Secondary Undervoltage M R R l

PERMISSIVES

1. P-ll N.A. N.A. Q

2. P-12 N.A. N.A. Q S - Once per shift M - Once per month N.A. - Not applicable R - Once per refueling shutdown - calibration of these instruments may be done as much as six months prior to the start of refueling outage and still satisfy this requirement.

ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM TESTING AND CALIBRATION REQUIREMENTS TABLE 4.4 (Continued) 01140 135

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.15.1.8 (continued) 4.15.1.B 3. Refueling outage testing

'I

a. During each refueling outage the diesel generators shall be started and loaded under simulated LOCA and Loss-of-Offsite power conditions, and run for a minimum of' 5 minutes in each case, with emergency loads.

. The proper diesel-generator J starting and loading time, required bus load shedding, and sequential starting and operation of emergency equipment shall be verified.

b. During each refueling outage, the diesel generator shall be loaded to 4000 KW and held at l this load for one hour after the diesel generator operating temperatures have stabilized.

c. During each refueling outage, the capability of the diesel generator to reject a load of 4000 KW shall be demonstrated.

This test need not be performed on the common diesel (0) if it was performed in conjunction a

with the previous refueling outage of the other unit.

07020 258

-ATTACHMENT 2 DESCRIPTION OF ZION'S DEGRADED GRID PROTECTION-SYSTEM Two undervoltage relays are being installed on each 4160 volt Class lE bus. . This relay scheme is connected to a two-out-of-two per bus logic.

When the voltage on a 4160 volt Class lE bus ((1)247, (1)248, (1)249) falls below 3846 (+2%) volts for 8 (+2) seconds, the newly-installed undervoltage relays will de-energize and a 5 (+5%) minute timer will be activated. When the five minutes expire, the iiff-site power supply breaker will be tripped, isolating the 4160 volt bus from the degraded grid.

Subsequently, the diesel' generator will start, load shedding will occur, and the Class lE loads will be sequenced back '.7 to the bus.

The proposed Technical Specifications identify the undervoltage relays, setpoints, required logic, and defines the overall testing requirements.

0462K l

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ATTACHMENT 3 EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION PROPOSED CHANGES TO ZION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS APPENDIX A - SECTIONS 3.4 AND 3.15 DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT REQUEST An amendment to the Zion Facility Operating License is proposed to incorporate the operability, testing, calibration, and functional requirements of the Degraded Grid Voltage Protection System.

BACKGROUNO 10 CFR 50.92 states that a proposed amendment will involve a no significant hazards consideration if the proposed amendment does not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

In addition, the Commission has provided guidance in the practical application of these criteria by publishing eight examples in 48 FR 14870.

The discussion below below addresses each of these three criteria and demonstrates that the proposed amendment involves a no significant hazards consideration.

BASIS FOR NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Does the proposed amendment I

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from f

any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a marg!n of safety?

DISCUSSION - ITEM 1 The installation of' degraded grid voltage protection provides additional assurance that a stable source of power for the required safety related equipment will be available. This increases the probability that the equipment will be capable of performing the required function. Thus, the probaollity and consequences of the previously analyzed accidents have not been increased.

DISCUSSION - ITEM 2 Reference (a) established the design criteria that spurious operation of the degraded grid protection system would not occur. Reference (b) states that this design goal has been met. Thus, this modification can only serve to enhance the power supply's reliability and does not create the possibility of a new type of accident.

l

, DISCUSSION - ITEM'3 The margin of safety is increased by this change. As discussed above, the safety-related power supply should be more reliable when protected against a degraded grid voltage.

- It should be noted that the proposed Technical Specifications i represent new controls governing the operation of the newly installed protection system. Thus, example (ii) is applicable to the proposed change.

[ Example (ii) reads as follows:

i (ii) A change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or i control not presently included in the technical specifications: for example, a more stringent surveillance requirement.

l Therefore, since the application for amendment satisfies the criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.92 and is similar to examples for which no i significant hazards consideration exists, Commonwealth Edison Company has made a determination that the application involves no significant hazards consideration.

0462K

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