ML20148K027
| ML20148K027 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 03/21/1988 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8803300469 | |
| Download: ML20148K027 (95) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l '
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Discussion /Possible Vote on Full Power License for Sot &h Texas Nuclear Project, Unit 1 (Public Meeting)
Location: washington, D.c.
l Date: Monday, March 21, 1988 Pages: 1 - 73 l
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l Ann Riley & Associates Court Reporters 1625 i Street, N.W., Suite 921 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 8003300469 080321~
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G This is an unofficial t r a n s c r i p.t of a meeting of the 7 United States Nuclear Regu l a t ory Cconii ss i on held on 3 3/21/88 . In the Commission's office at 1717 H Street, 9 N . tJ . , (Ja sh i ng t on , D.C. The meeting was open to public 10 attendance and observation. This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain i
12 inaccuracles.
13 The transcript is intended sniely for general 14 informational purposes. As provided by 10 CFR 9.108, it is 15 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed. Expressions of op ir. l on in this transcript 17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs. 'No l I
18 pleading or other paper may be filed with the Cconii s s i on in !
19 any proceeding as the ronuit of or addressed to any statement I i
20 or argument contained hereir., except as the Commission may 21 authorize.
22 23 24 25
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 * * *- i
~4 DISCUSSIOll/POSSIBLE VOTE ON FULL POWER LICEllSE FOR 5 SOUTH TEXAS IlUCLEAR PROJECT, UllIT 1 4 6 * * *
-t 7 PUBLIC HEETING 8 * *
- 9 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 . Room 1130 11 1717 H Street, II . W .
12 Washington, D.C. ,
13 March 21, 1988 '
14 15 The Cominission me t in open session, pursuant to 16 notice, at 2:00 p.m., the Honorable LANDO W. ZECH, JR.,
l 17 Chairman of the Commission, presiding.
18 19 Commi'ssioners Present:
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21 LANDO U. ZECH, Chairman 22 THOMAS H. ROBERTS, Commissioner ,
23 FREDERICK M. BERNTHAL, Commissioner
- I 24 KElillETH ROGERS, Commissioner 25 K Ell!!E T H M . CARR, Commissioner i
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I 2 Staff and presenters seated at table: I 3
4 S. CHILK - SECY 5 W. kills EY 6 G. VAUGHN 7 J. GOLDBERG 8 D. JORDAN 9 J. CALVO l
10 L. CALLAN 11 J. TAYLOR I
12 N. KADAMBI l i
13 U. PARLER - OGC 14 l
15 Audience Speakers:
I 16 1 1
l 17 H. CISNEROS l 18 R. CORREIA l
19 20 21 1
22 23 l
24 25
s a 3
1 P R OC E ED I NG S 2 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Good afternoon, ladies and 3' gentlemen. Today we will hear from the Houston Lighting 4 and Power Company and the NRC Staff concerning the 5 readiness of South Texas Project Unit 1 to receive a full 6 power:1'icense and possibly vote to authorize the Director.
7 of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation after making S the appropriate findings to issue a full power. operating 1
9 license for South Texas Project Unit 1.
10 I understand that copies of the slides to be used-11 "during today's presentation are available in the back of 12 the room. Do any of my fellow Commissioners have opening 13 comments to make?
14 (No response.)
15 CHAIRMAN ZECH: If not, Mr. Jordan, you may 16 begin.
17 MR. JORDAN: =Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of 18 the Commission. I'm Don Jordan, Chairman of the Board of 19 Dicectors and Chief Executive Officer of Houston Power and 20 Lighting Company, P r o j e'e t Manager of the South Texas 21 Project.
, 22 With your permission, I'd like to first introduce 23 some of the people who are here today. Representing the i
24 co-owners are Mrs. Lila Cocker'ill, Chairman of the Board 25 of Trustees of the City Public Service Board of San 4
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.. 4-1 Antonio, and Mr. Arthur Van-Rosenberg,' General Manager of 2 the City Public Service Board.
3 Also in attendance is the Mayor of San Antonio,. 7 4 Mr. Henry Cisneros and City ~ Councilman Bob Thompson and 5 and Weir LaBatt; representing Central Power and-Light-6 Company is Mr. Tom Shockley who is President of that 7 company.
8 As perhaps you know,. Houston Lighting and Power 9 Company is negotiating. to acquire --
10 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Before you goLahead, let me 11 welcome your fellow Texans that are with us here today.
12 MR. JORDAN: Thank you very-much, Mr. Chairman.
13 As perhaps you know, Houston Power and Lighting Company is 14 negotiating to acquire the City of Austin's'16 percent 15 share in South Texas, and those negotiations are nearing 16 completion.
17 Any agreement that would be reached there to 18 transfer interest would of course be subject to approval 19 by the4 NRC and by the Texas Public Utility Commission.
20 The key members'of our nuclear organization ~with 21 me today. are Jerry Goldberg, our Nuclear Group Vice 22 President who will give you an overview of the South Texas 23 Project, who will give our nuclear management I- review 24 our nuclear management and review the basis for our 25 confidence that we are ready to proceed to the ascent of
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1 full power.
2 Mr. Gerald Vaughn, our Vice President of Nuclear 3 operations will be available to_ answer questions-4 concerning staffing, training, and our operations 5 philosophy.
6 Mr. Warren Kinsey, our Plant Manager, will
- 7. describe the plant organization and our operating 8 experience during low power and testing operations.
9 Also representing Houston Lighting and Power 10 Company along with those who will have an active part in 11 the progrm includes Dr. Ed Bishop, President Meritus of 12 the University of Houston, a member of our Board of 13 Directors, and a member of the Nuclear Committee of our 14 Board.
15 I'm honored, Mr. Chairman, and delighted to e
16 appear before you today as the Commission considers '
17 authorizing full power operations for Unit 1 of the South l
., 18 Texas Project. ;
19 STP as much as any project, reflects the-1 20 tremendous change in the nuclear industry over the past !
21 decade or so. Ther'e have been many bumps in the. road.
1 22 We've worked long and hard to reach this moment. We have 23 learned a. lot along the way.
24 As you know, construction at South Texas was 25 initiated late in 1975. In 1980 the Nuclear Regulatory r i- v 1 - --
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1 _ Commission issued a Show Cause order based in part on 2 concerns regarding the implementation of our construction 3 quality assurance program. That order had several 4 beneficial effects.
5 First it provided a time-out which you don't 6 ordinarily get in the middle of constructing a project 7 like this; time to think about the long-term direction of 8 our nuclear program and whether we were fully prepared to 9 meet the challenge.
10 Second, it caused us to tighten our quality 11 programs to reflect the commission's tougher standards in 12 the post-Three Mile Island era and to raise our own '
13 expectations for safe and reliable performance.
14 Finally we also took the opportunity to reinspect 15 and to test essentially all the construction worl: then 16 completed using teams of blue-ribbon experts to verify the- ,
17 adequacy of-our construction.
18 Perhaps most dramatically and painfully, we !
i 19 reached the decision in 1981 that the; project could not be 1
20 completed successfully on anything resembling a reasonable 21 schedule without a change of, architect engineer; a then 22 unprecedented step in the history of the commercial 23 nuclear power industry.
24 We selected Bechtel. Our contract provided that l
25 after a period of review and necessary modification, 1
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1 Bechtel, from a contractural-standpoint at least would 2 then own the engineering work, in effect. Then ue had the 3 equivalent of a midterm design assessment by a third party 4 'with a substantial stake in the outcome.
5 Houston Lighting and Power Company emerged from I 6 the 1980-1982 period a stronger project manager with a '
l 7 clear vision of the commitment and the resources necessary l
8 to meet the test of this demanding technology.
9 . As the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board found 10 based on hearings in 1981 and 1982, the project had really 11 turned the corner.
12 In short, Mr. Chairman and members, we had a
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13 unique opportunity to assess the progress, the problems 1
14 and the outlook for the South Texas Project coincident 15 with the new regulatory requirements which followed in the 16 aftermath of TMI and we took advantage of that 17 opportunity.
18 The turnaround in the design and construction of 19 STP was not a miracle. It was a product of intenso
- 20 effort, dedication, and involvement by our management, our 21 employees, and our contractors.
22' At the Commission meeting only a few months a g o',
23 you spoke, Chairman Zech, of the need for leadership by 24 example at the highest corporate level. During nur period 25 ,o f entrenchment, we reintensified upper management e
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8 1 involvement'and visibility. We searched for and found a 2 seasoned professional in Jerry Goldberg who brought to STP 4
3 and our company the discipline required for a' successful
-4 program. Jerry in turn took the best of our staff and 5 added highly' qualified people in critical areas.
6 I might add parenthetically that South Texas has 7 been an item on the agenda of virtually every Board of 8 Directors' meetings of Houston Lighting and Power Company 9 for the past seven years.
10 In addition, the Board has a special Nuclear 11 Committee headed by former NRC Chairman, Dr. Joseph 12 Hendrie. The NRC Executive Director for Operations and 13 the Regional Administrator have met 'with our Board and had 14 the opportunity to candidly convey their impressions on s
15 matters of importance to the NRC.
16 While this is a moment of pride for us, we 17 approached plant operations with a good deal of, humility.
18 As you noted in another Commission meeting, Mr.
19 Chairman, the operating license vested in the licensee, 20 the trust of the government.and the American people.
21 I personally conveyed this. message to our 22 employees. I've also emphasized the points which all of 23 the members of the Commission have stressed, and to which 24 I fully' subscribed concerning the need for.unromitting 25 attention to detail, fitness for duty,. discipline and
9-1 formality in the conduct of operations, and the absolute 2 necessity far personnel as well as organizational 3 integrity and accountability.
4 I've made a videotape of about four minutes 5 covering.many of the points which I've just outlined, and 6 it has been shown to the STP operating group. I have a 7 copy here ready to show if you care to see it perhaps at 8 the end of this meeting today.
9 I was especially proud when I read the conclusion 10 of the flRC Staff's readiness report, that our people 11 exhibited a sound traini:g background and a mature 12 professional attitude toward plant operations and 13 operational safety.
14 We intend to justify that confidence. I told our 15 employees that excellence will be rewarded with 16 opportunities for further career development.
17 I and my senior management recognize and accept 18 full responsibility for this plant. Leadership by example 19 from the top down has become even more critical. We i
20 intend to provide that leadership.
21 As I told our managers at the South Texas Project 22 site shortly after the plant went critical, our Board and 23 top managemen* will stay involved.
24 Jerry Goldberg who will speak next reports 25 directly to me. He and Mr. Kinsey will discuss our I
10 1 operations philosophy, training and staffing, and the team
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\l 2 effort which is necessary to meet our goal of bs~ing 3 recognized as one of the country's best nuclear 4 operations.
5 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to make 1
1 6' these comments and Mr. Goldberg will now proceed if 7 that's --
8 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Thank you very much. You may 9 proceed.
10 MR. GOLDDERG: Mr. Chairman, Members of the 11 Commission, I am Jerry Goldberg, Nuclear Group Vice 12 President, Houston Lighting and Power Company.
13 My purpose this morning is to outline for you the 14 reasons why I believe that the Unit 1 in the South Texas 15 Project is ready to begin its ascension to full power.
16 My conclusions are based on self-assessment of 17 our readiness which has been documented and submitted to 18 the Commission. I will summarize the high points of that 19 self-assessment.
20 First, the plant meets regulatory requirements 21 relating to design, construction, and engineering. This ;
22 was demonstrated during both the pre-critical and low 23 power testing periods. The additional assurance regarding 24 design and construction is derived from the safe team 25 program which provides the means for STP employees to
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1 identify any concerns that they may have in regard to 2 nuclear safety or quality. The safe team program has in 3 effect provided thousands of additional pairs of eyes to 4 help assure that work was done properly.
5 A recently' issued NRC Staff, report on the safety 6 significance of various allegations relating to the South 7 Texas Project generally confirms the effectiveness of our 8 programs.
9 We encoutered two significant design related 10 problems during pre-critical testing involving the r
11 component cooling water system and the auxillary feedwater 12 system which are discussed in our prepared self-assessment 13 report. These have been satisfactorily resolved and there 14 are no significant outstanding testing deficiencies ,
15 against the plant.
16 I will return to the component cooling water 17 system e.nd auxillary feedwater system problems to discuss 18 some of the important lessons we learned from that '
19 experience, i
- - 20 South Texas also meets regulatory criteria l
21 governing personnel and training e. s well as procedures and Y
22 technical specifications. He have a total =of 49 licensed 23 senior reactor operators and four licensed reactor 24 operators, all of whom have been trained on a 3
25 plant-specific simulator --
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3 _ , 12 1 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Say those numbers again, please.
. 2 MR. GOLDBERG: 49 licensed senior reactor 3 operators, four licensed reactor operators. ,
, 4 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right.
S' MR. GOLDBERG: .-All of whom have been trained o$ a L
6 plant-specific. simulator which many of you have-spen J
7 during your visits to'the site.
8 The pass rate for our licensed personnel was 86 9 percent. I think it would probably be more meaningful to 10 point out that 14 members of the staff obtained their 11 initial licenses while working at other nuclear 12 facilities, and that each shift will have at least one i 13 senior reactor ope'rator with experience at another large i l
l 14 pressurized water reactor as well as a-senior reactor l
15 operator licensed shift technical advisor.
16 All plant personnel are subject to a stringent 17 fitness for duty program with strong emphasis on random 18 drug testing. The high points of that program are shown 19 on this slide.
l 20 '[ Slide.]
21 MR. GOLDBERG: Our policy is simple: The user of l 1
22 controlled substances identified through random testing ,
I 23 will be immediately discharged.
24 As you might recall from your visit to the site,
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25 Chairman Zech, we planned to provide further educational :
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O- 13' 1 opportunities to qualified end motivated personnel. The '
2 initial phase of the college degree progr ain for nuclear l
3 employees is underway. The, initial phase of the college l
. . l 4 degree program -- excuse me. Any employee can gain entry l l
S to this program, but we have given'first' priority to f l
6 operations personnel. !
l 7 The first class is scheduled to begin in the fall 8 of this year. We will strongly encourage senior reactor 9 operators to obtain college degrees. We believe this
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10 program will provide the opportunity.for plant operators '
11 and other non-degreed employees to enjoy challenging 12 careers as well as assist us in attracting and retaining l 13 good people.
I 14 Our Vice President of Operations, Mr. Gerald 15 Vaughn', is responsible for this pro' gram. He joins Houston 16 Power and Lighting Company after 22 years with the Duke 17 Power Company, the last four of which were as general 18 manager of nuclear stations.
l 19 Procedures governing' operations, maintenance, and 20 surveillance tests have been prepared.
21 As with all new units, procedure development 22 involve shakedown in procedures, some of which was 23 accomplished on the simulator. '
24 I would also like to mention a few additional 25 indicators of'our readiness to proceed with further 4 ,
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1 operations: In security, the process of correcting some 2 early hardware problems as well as other aspects of the s
3 program substantially delayed issuance of the operating
- 4 license. -s 5 But in the first few months'of operation, we 6 continued to identify and report an unacceptable number ~of 7 security events and problems to the NRC. Thiese matters .
8 were recently the subject of,a civil penalty.
9 With further management, attention, and training, 10 the incidents of security problems has declined sharply.
, 11 The improvement over the past five months was noted by the 12 NRC in the letter transmitting the civil penalty notice,
, l 13 and in systematic assessment of licensee performance !
i 14 report issued on March lith. I i
15 We are confident now that the security program is I
16 working effectively. Operational quality a,ssurance i 17 activities have also confirmed our judgment on readiness.
, i i 18 Dozens of operational suryeillances and audits have been I l
i 19 conducted since issuance of the operating license. These 4
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20 are listed in the appendix to our self-assessment report. i 1
21 There were no findings of serious safety consequence. !
22 The status of our maintenance program, which will 23 be discussed by Mr. Kinsey, is also a positive indicator. l 24 The NRC Staff readiness review was quitu l
25 positive. We were pleased by the favorable comments on ;
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15 1 our simulator training program, maintenance program, the 2 quality of our surveillance test procedures, and the 3 conduct of surveillance activities including the 4 involvement of our"QA organization.
5 I was also particularly pleased to read in the 6 Staff report that our operators reflected, in their words 7 a mature, professional attitude toward plant operations 8 and safety, and that there was evidence that they had been 9 indoctrinated in the philosophy of verbatim compliance.
10 We have a formal policy which defines what we 11 expect to see from a true professional at STP, and we do 12 not intend to accept anything less from our people.
13 (Slide.]
14 MR. GOLDBERG: This slide highlights some of the 15 elements of our policy,on professionalism. I would like 16 to point out a few which I particularly emphasize:
17 Attention to detail, learning from mi' stakes, personnel 18 integrity and candor, the need to face facts squarely and 19 deal with their implications; and above all, not to be 20 satisfied with mere compliance and to strive to meet 21 higher standards, 22 The NRC Staff's operational readiness inupection 23 identified five areas of concern which you will find 24 identified in our self-assessment report. Mr. Kinsey will 25 discuss these matters in greater detail as well as other o
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' i, 1 notable e'v e n t 's which have been the subject of corrective 2 action.
3 We believe that all of these matters have~been 4 resolved, altbough some wil'1 require continuing close 5 observation by management. ,
6 Having outlined some of the positive indicators, 7 I would add that we are not fully satisfied with our 8 performance. The best training cannot fully compensate 9 for limitations on practical experience.
10 Houston Lighting and Power Company is keenly 11 aware that it is a first-time utility, and the few events 12 during low power testing underscored the real neaning of 13 this race.
14 I mentioned our design-related problems with the 15 component cooling water system and auxillary feedwater e 16 systems.
17 The component cooling water system matter was 4
18 really our first unusual'and complex problem calling for 19 coordinated action across departmental lines. Our initial 20 response was somewhat disappointing. He did not mobilize 21 our resources, we did not identify responsibilities as ,
22 quickly as I uculd like. I prepared a memorandum after 23 that event analyzing the problems it illustrated and 24 established guidelines to assure coordination between 25 departments, immediate designation of a responsible I A
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1 engineer to be in charge of theLinvestigation, repairs, I
, 2 and related actions.
. 3 The event in general highlighted the need for 4 earlier and more direct management involvement where the 5 problems are unusual, complex, or require a high degree,of 6' coordination. .
7 What was encouraging, howeVer, was the fact that 8 HL&P engineers finally took charge of the situation and 9 directed a highly complex root-cause investigation and i
10 repair effort.
11 When the auxillary feedwater system problem 12 surfaced sometime later, there,was a little ' difficulty in 13 coordinating between departments or in identifying the s i 14 person responsible for resolving it.
15 However, our action did not reflect the type of 16 systematic patient search for the root cause which is 17 essential to solving problems. I saw too much trial and 18 error type responses and not enough disciplined deductive 19 reasoning. As a result, we have substantially expanded 20 training in root cause analysis, and this will require i
21 continued monitoring and observation by"our management at
- 22 all levels. .
, t 23 Lessons learned from the responses to these 24 events have to improved coordination to resolving problems l
25 among our operations, maintenance, engineering, and
.- 4-18 1 quality assurance departments. Both events have thus been 2 "converted to assets. The seasoning gained will assist us-3 in solving other . tough problems should they occur.
4 They've also.been excellent illustrations of the 5- importance in teamwork in such situations.
6 The difference between knowledge and experience
& 7 was also evident in the operational events I meantioned 8 carlier and which will be discussed by Mr. Kinsey.
9 We've taken a number of steps to improve the 10 o'verall performance of the operations staff which include 11 the following: First, we've introduced additional 12 simulator training involving more real life situations 13 auch as operations with equipment out of service for 14 maintebance, not just abnormal conditions.
15 Second, we've assigned to each shift a shift 16 advise *, He is a senior individual with shift supervisor '
17 experience at a previous operating power reactor, and he 18 will be available during power ascension testing to 19 counsel the shift upervisor on those activities most l
1 20 important to attaining quality performance in operations. l 21 These are in addition to our shift technical advisors. I 22 Third, we've made a number of significant
, 23 organizational changes to strengthened plant management.
24 We've ,added two strong plant superintendents, one for each '
25 unit. They report to the plant manager and we believe l
19 1 this will improve his control over both units.
2 We've also strengthen the operations support 3 organization by consolidating the engineering, 4 construction, facility services support functions under 5 seasoned individual. This will further improve the 6 interface with the plant operations staff.
7 The recent ASLB report describes many of the 8 problems I have mentioned as contributors to the rather, 1
9 long period between the issuance of the operating license l 10 and our request for full. power authorization.
11 But we have profitted from the pre-critical and .
3 12 low power testing experience, learning from our mistakes, !
13 identifying the root cause of problems, upgrading certain ,
14 training facilities, and making some beneficial personnel I 15 and organizational changes. Mr. Kinsey will' discuss other 16 steps we have taken.
17 As a result, although we remain a first time 18 utility, we are stronger today than when we first received 19 our operating license. We intend to proceed in a 20 deliberate way performing a self-assessment at 50 percent j 21 power and taking the time necessary to learn'by 22 experience, and moving ahead of the pace consistent with
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23 the development of a mature and fully professional 24 organization. Thank you.
25 CHAIRMAli ZECH: All right. Thank you very much.
., 20
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l MR. GOLDBERG: If there are no other questions, t 2 I'd like to ask Mr. Kinsey if he would --
J 3 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Please proceed, 4 HR. KINSEY: Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Members of 5 the Commission, I am Warren Kinsey, Plant Manager of the 6 South Texas Project Electric Generation Station. I will i
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7 cover three principal subjects: An overview of_ operating ;
1 8 problems encountered during low power testing including a
9 those items of special concern identified by the NRC, our 10 response to these problems, and the status of our 11 maintenance program.
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12 First, a word on the status of the plant. We 13 reached initial criticality on March 8 at 5:08 a.m. Low ]
l 14 power tests have been successfully completed. Subject to !
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15 your authorization, we are ready to proceed with the power l l
16 ascension program which includes a self-assessment of 17 performance at the 50 percent power plateau.
18 There were four principal operating problems 19 during pre-critical testing. )
20 (31ide.]
21 MR. KINSEY: The details in each event are 22 discussed in our prepared se'f-assessment. I will touch 23 .briefly on the highlights of each event here. !
, , 1 24 First, the high head safety injection valve i
1 1 1 25 mispositioning event, which ultimately resulted in a civit i 1
si 21 1 penalty. The mispositioning occurred when a preparation 2 for a mode change in going to Mode 5 to Mode 4, the valves 3 in question were closed in error. This change was not 4 noted by the operator, and the valves remained closed over 5 several shifts after the plant went to Mode 4.
6 This and a related event during the !!RC 7 operationa readiness inspection pointed out deficiencies 4
8 i'.. operator awareness of the status of plant safety 9 systems.
10 A related cause was a failure to properly match 11 the system operating and surveillance procedures involved 12 in a mode change.
13 Those procedures have since been revised and
. 14 other similar procedures have been reviewed for common 15 weaknesses.
16 These events also underscored the need for 17 additional operator training with specie.1 emphasis on mode i 18 change and other evolutions. Retraining has been 19 initiated as a part of ongoing training and 1
20 cequalification activities.
21 Second. The event involving lifting of the 22 pressurizer pressure, PORV valve, was as a consequence of 23 starting a reactor coolant pump with a water temperature j
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24 difference in excess of technical specification limits f 25 between the reactor coolant system cold leg and .$ team 4
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20 1 generator secondary side.
2 Procedures in training have been modified to 3 1
3 provide more specific guidance on the measurement of these 4 temperatures.
5 Third. The main feedwater hydraulic transients,
. 6 or waterhammer events, involved deficiencies in procedures 7 for filling steam generators which have since been 8 corrected and tested to assure their adequacy.
9 Fourth. Procedural deficiencies contributed to 10 the inadequacies and the drill requiring remote shutdown 1
11 of the plant. The procedures were revised to prov;69 more 12 specific guidance to the operators.
13 The experience also pointed out the need for i
14 additional integrated team training of plant operating 15 personnel. After further training, drills were run to l i
16 assure that each member of the plant operations ;
17 organization understood their function.
18 The NRC Staff's operational readiness inspection 19 report identified five concerns requiring resolution prior 1
20 to proceeding beyond 50 percent power. They are shown on l 21 this slide. )
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l 22 (Slide.) I l
1 1 23 MR. KINSEY: I have described our corrective 24 action in Item 1 in connection with the valve i i
25 mispositioning event. I have also described the steps we
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4t2 23 1 have taken to correct Item 3 with respect to remote 2 shutdown of the plant. !
3 The last item on agastat relays is being resolved 4 by replacing these time delay relays on a schedule 5 acceptable to the NRC Staff.
6 The station problem reports in Item 2 are~ used to 7 document, evaluate / and report abnormal conditions or 8 events.
9 The NRC Staff found that while many of the 10 problems identified in the station problem reports were 11 being effectively evaluated in a timely way, our backlog j i
12 was excessive. As a result of further review, 13 priorization ard management attention, this problem has l 14 been resolved.
15 In connection with Item 4, although the Staff
, 16 found that our surveillance program -- or surveillance 17 procedures were generally,well written and user friendly,
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, 18 they identified several instances where changes in l l
- 19 technical specifications were not correctly reflected in 20 the procedures.
! 21 In response, we have completed a re-review to 22 verify that correct technical specification requirements l
23 have been appropriately translated into the surveillance
- 24 procedures, and we have improved our system of 4 25 accountability for that process. All five items of I
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1 concern identified by the Staff have now been resolved.
2 I believe that we have responded to these 3 operational events in a way which reflects Mr. Goldberg's 4 philosophy that a mistake is to'o valuable to waste. This 5 applies not only to our mistakes,-but those madefby others 6 as well. -
7 We review industry experience carefully including 8 such things as MPOE information, NRC bulletins and 9 notices, and vendor bulletins.
10 MPOE rated our use of idustry operating 11 experience as well above the average for near-term 12 operating plants and rivaling that of raany old6r operating 13 units.
14 Regarding maintenance. I believe South Texas is 15 in good shape for its first operating cycle. He have an 16 extensive preventive maintenance program involving over 17 10,000 activities for Unit 1 and common equipment. Our 18 objective is to devote the majority of our maintenance 19 effort to preventive maintenance.
20 We were pleased that the NRC readiness report 21 found that our preventive maintenance program was thorough 22 and comprehensive, and that preventive maintenanaa 23 activities were well identified and scheduled.
24 The performance of corrective maintenance is 25 based on a classification process. First, items are 1
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1 classified as to priority. Priority one is for those a
2 activities urgently required to maintain safe plant 3 conditions in compliance with regulatory requirements. !
4 Priority two is for those matters which are 5 critical to keep the plant in operation or at its l J
6 authorize power level. There are no current Priority one ;
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7 or Priority two items in our backlog.
8 The third priority includes activities for which 9 there is planning flexibility.
10 (Slide.]
11 MR. KINSEY: This slide shows the breakdown of 12 our Priority three backlog further classified as either
- 13 safety or non-safety related. Each item is also 14 classified as to its effect on plant operations.
15 We established the order in which these items 16 will be handled, takir into account their effect on plant 17 operations, importance to safety, available resources, and 18 the current status of the plant, a
19 Scheduling is performed by our work control 20 centers staffed with representatives from all of neutral 21 plant operation departments, and our construction support i 22 organization.
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23 Priorities are further refined by. management in 24 our plan of the daily meetings that occur at 9 a.m. each
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25 weekday and on weekends as required.
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. 26 1 Our present backlog as shown is approximately 2 1,450 items. Those in that category, operation not 3 effected or about 275. do not effect plant operations in 4 anyway. The balance, about 1,180, is divided between 5 items which are out of service or have some degraded 6 condition; as for example, a packing leak on a valve.
7 As you can see, we have about 280 safety related l
j 8 and 1,176 non-safety related activities. The total l
l 9 backlog represents about five and a quarter weeks of work l
10 based on our current resources.
l 11 We also have a predictive maintenance program l
l 12 employing a group of engineers and technicians who are 13 responsible for monitoring equipment vibration, pump 14 performance, heat exchanger performance, and other l
l 15 parameters to facilitate early diagnosis of problems. We 16 expect to see benefits in terms of both safety and 17 reliability as a result of this program.
18 In the two weeks since initial criticality, South l
19 Texas has completed its low power physics testing program.
l 20 The plant is now in Mode 3 at normal operating pressure 1
l 21 and temperature. We are' completing some maintenance work 22 and expect to take the plant critical this eveni.0 23 Overall, we are pleased with the operation of the l
- 24 plant and staff since initial criticality. The testing ,
i I 35 went very smoothly. Thank you, j l
- 37 i
1 CHA7RMAN ZECH: Thank you very much. Does that ,
2 complete your briefing? ,
3 MR. GOLDBERG: Yes, sir. ,
4 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. _ Questions from my
- 5 fellow Commissioners? Commissioner Roberts? ,
'6 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: No.
1 7 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Commissioner'Bernthal? !
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, it-has been almost ,
l 4
9 a year since I had the opportunity to visit your plant. I
, 10 thought I was coming down shortly before power ascension, 1 i i 11 it turned out not to be the case.
i ,
12 One of the comments that you made -- I don't ,
4 13 recall exactly what the positive action was that you took 14 at the time, but you mentioned that you have something
]
1 15 like 59 SROs and only four Ros. Is that what you said?
] ,
i 16 MR. KINSEY: Yes, sir.
} ?
17 MR. JORDAN: 49 and 4.
l 18 COMMISSIONER BERUTHAL: 49, sorry. Did that l i
- 19 happen by accident or decign? I guess I know the answer, I a
- 20 but I'd like for you to explain that. That's an unusual 21 ratio to say the least.
a ,
22 MR. KINSEY: Commissioner, we purposely tried to ,
23 qualify and license as many candidates as we could at the '
- ^
24 SRO level realizing the benefit of the higher level of f 25 information and intelligence that those people would have' l
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i . 4 ,
. 28
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1 to accumulate in a training process, and also begause'it t' 2 allowed us'to be able to plan for the staffing of Uni't 2.
3 . Currently we have in the li' censing 'pt ocess 50 C
4 candidates for operation of Unit 2 primarily. Of course 5 we will be blending Unit'l and' Unit.2 personnel to'hava a
> , s 6 baseline of experience on Unit 2. And the ratio of ROs is ,
7 much higher;in this second, group than'it was in the s l 8 original group. I l
4
- 9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL
- I see. 'Well in any case, l
10 that's,a commendable policy and I want to urge you to 11 continue it to the extent that you can-with Unit 2, and I l
'12 would also comment, and I suspect at least one other 13 member at the table may comment'on your as'sociated policy 4
. 14 toward urging people to get degrees. As you know, there 15 are pros and cons to this matter, but I'm glad that you've 16 taken the bull by the horns so to speak and decided that 17 you are going pursue a policy of having college degrees in 18 as many of your operators as you can.
/
19 I also wanted to follow-up on an item that I 20 recall had given you some difficulty as of a year or so 21 ago that did not come up today and that was the ques' tion 22 of site security and plant security. ,I assume that those 23 difficulties have been addressed, they don't seem to be 24 assuming very much visibility here today, but maybe.you 25 could comment just a little on that for me.
. -i. -
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r ,
4 ,
4 *
' * . 29 t
L MR. GOLDDERG: I'd like to address'that, z, - -
, i . .
2 Commissioner. We certainly had a significant number of 3 problems just befo~re licensing'and thatLin fhet J delayed s
4 licensing, the better part'of about'two months.
~
5 I think the> core weakness to our difficulties was.
v )
6 a weak training program. 'We.certainly did get that 7 fina"11y under control,,but we had a' continuation of
. 8 difficulties after we received the operating license 9 through the early fall. And I think we really turned the 10 corner probably in late October, and I think I would 11 certainly welcome any comment from the Staff,'but it's our 12 feeling that we've got this thing under real control now.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Good.* I don't expect to 14 go into great detail here,"but maybe Staff could also 1,5 verify that your plant security is now what we expect it 6 should be.
17 Your plant design is a rather different one' as 18 they all are in this country I guess.unfortunately. Yours 19 is different in the sense as I recall that you have three 20 completely independent safety trains which is not common 21 in this country, it is on soma designs in other countries,.
22 but I also recall that your plant or certain elements of 23 the reactor itself has some similarity to a Belgian design 24 where there have been some difficulties with the 25 instrument tubes.
, , , . , , - . . . . . - . a $ y,
g a
30 s
- i 1 -Would hou like to' comment a little bi,t on what ,
2 you-have learned from'that Belgian experience'and whether a
3 you might expect a similar problem at your pl' ant a n d '. w h a t 4 you intend to do about it if you.do see'a problem lying 5 ahead there? -
(j 6 MR. GOLDBERG: Yes, I'd like to respond,
, 7 Commissioner. I believe the plant you're referring to is 8 Tihange.
o 9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: That's right.
10 tR. GOLDBERG: The Tihange plant and the South o
11 Texas plant have both been fitted out with special flow
, limiting devices that were designed by Westinghouse and tested by Westinghouse to eliminate a flow induced 14 vibration problem of the thimble guide tubes.
15 Apparently in the case of Tihange,'they had a, 16 very undes'irable experience. They apparently sustained 17 considerable wear in.a number of tubes, and in one case, 18 they actually ha- a through-wall failure.
19 The Staff needless to say brought this matter to 20 our attention and we undertook to review ~very carefully 21 the design of the flow limiting device as well as trying 22 to understand any differences that might exist between the j 23 Tihange installation and the South Texas installation.
24 While we can't prove this thing in an absolute 25 sense, there is a considerable amount of-circumstantial
'# 4
.) ,
31 l
1 evidence that suggest that when Tihange fit their flow - -
g, 2 limiting devices onto their instal ation,'t'heydkd this 3 during one of their refueling outages,.and the 4 installation was done underwater.'
5 It turns,out that there is-a'rather important
'6 match up between the bottom of this flow limiting device 7 and a support plate. And there also is a fillet weld i n'
.. 8 that area and there seems to be strong evidence that they 9 encountered some interference betweenstheir flow limiting 10 devices and th'e fillet weld so much so that at the last l 1
11 minute, they had to do a field modification lto their flow l 12 ' limiting devices in an attempt to transfer.an' internal
> i 13 su'rface to clear the well. ,
)
i 14 Now we suspect that they were not ab1$ to do that l
l 15 successfully,-and we'further suspect that when they 16 reinstalled those devices, they were not able to see 1
i 17 ' clearly with the~ underwater camera that they were still l 18 having an interference difficulty. '
19 The South' Texas installation on the other hand l 20 was done with'the plant dry, and we-were able, to a c.t u a l l y 21 position technicians right on the support plate and with 22 feeler gauges in -- you know, verify that we had a' tight 23 fit between t/hese fl'ow limiting devices and the support 24 plate.
25 To further confirm that we hopefully would see a a t ,
9
, .7
~ . ,
o ,
32
+ ,,
5
} .t 1 different experience, we undertook.to do a baseline eddy .
g 2 current ex mination of our thimble guide tubes after,we 3 experienced-approximately the equival'ent of eight weeks And the Tihange failure occurred , a t '
~
4 for pump operation.
5 about ,the 16 week mark.
. 6 We were not able to detect any wear on any of our 7 thimbles. We have planned another inspection .
8 approximately 12 weeks'after the start of the new cycle, 9 and I,belleve that will,come due about the time ~,.we 10 complete our 50 percent power, plateau.'
11 CdMMISSIO!!ER BERNTHAL: Very good. I appreciate 12 that and Staff may wish.t'o' comment'further--on that point.
13 One other ques: tion and l'll leb my colleagues ,
14 have a crack here. Why should I not be concerned that a ,
15 steam generator is out of plumb, if you can answer that 16 quickly, as I understand it is? '
s 17 , MR. GOLDBERG: In'the absence of any other 18 information, you have every reason to be concerned. This '
19 problem was first uncovered shortly after Bechtel came on 20 the job following the change of contractors.
21 When this problem was uncovered, we undertook to 22 thoroughly inspect the installation of all nuclear steam
, 23 supply system equipment; that included the steam 24 generators, pressurizer, the reactor vessel.
25 There'were a number of anomalies that were'
. _ _ A '
m s ,
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.. 3 '3 4
P 1 discovered, a thorough technical evaluation was performed l a- .
i
,2 by both Bechtel and Westinghouse as to assuring that the !
'3 equipment as installed would in fact' carry out its 1
l 4 function'cor ectly, that it could fully withstand a l l ,t h e, j 5 operational' stresses and forces for which it was design [d.
i 6 Now had that review. indicated that the 7 installation required. correction,'it certainly would have
~
8 been corrected. A full detailed repo'r.t of'the' entire 9 matter,was furnished to the NRC in 1983. There.is 10 certainly no question ~in our mind that'the installation 11 even though it wasn't a correct installation in the' true 12 sense, i t - tnus evaluated 'and determined to be fully in 13 compliance with the operating requirements.
14 , ' COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Okay., I appreciate that, -
, 3 15 That's all for now, Mr. Chairman.'
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Commissioner Carr?
l 1
17 COMMISSIONER CARR: Yes. 'Can you tell me what l l
18 your operations a n d m a i n t e n a n'c e personnel turnover rate 19 is? ,
20 MR. KINSEY: Commissioner, as a matter of fact, 21 Mr. Vaughn and I were just looking at the total turnover 22 in operations. For this year right now it's less than 2 23 percent and that's for a staff of 700 people.
24 In the operations organizaticn, I've lost one 1
25 person, one licensed operator since we licensed last , I
.i i i
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. 3 e t 2 ,, -
- 34 1
-6 "1 month --
or'last year, and then I lost'Y believe two RPGs-1 2 or auxiliary operators in,the entire 1987 time period'.
J 3 In the maintenance' area, I would estimate that l
4 the maintenance personnel, th'at it's less than 5 percent l
, . u 5 for turnover. -
6 COMMISSIONER CARR: Fine. And I understood you 7 to say you had a random drug test program,.
8 MR. GOLDBERG: That is correct, Commissioner.
9 COMMISSIONER CARR': Do,you have any statistics on ay 10 dhat 1ou are finding random as opposed to pre-employment 11 and those kinds of data that you could share with us?
12 MR. GOLDBERG: We'have some statistics which
~
13 unfortunately I think combine'the entire. baseline which 14 'would include new hire's as well.the persons who were 15 already aboard. That's ru'nning aboub3' percent, just 16 under 3, percent. >
17 In the case of the random test, that's running 18 under 1 percent. ,
19 COMMISSIONER CARE: Thank you.
, 20 CHAIRMAN,ZECH: Commissioner Rogers.
21 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: What do youisee as your 22 maintenance backlog in time? About how much does that 23 represent in work? How many months of backlog is'that?
, t 24 MR. KINSEY: Commissioner, right now the way I 25 would describe that would be to say that we have about
. i r
.)
,4-
e
. ,, , 35 4
. il 1 five and a ' q u a'r t e r . w'e e k s of backlog with our current iI 2 resources. Of course'we have new items coming in every ,
3 day and we wouldn't obviously work them off in that 6 mount
, 4 of time,j our goal would be to drive that'down below a !
. 1 5 thousand and as low as we can get.
G Wo see t h a t- the ,-- we've turned the corner in the 1 1
r J 7 maintenance area after'we took the plant critical and 3 we're seeing a downward trend in the backl'og right now. l
)
9 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: You said that your l 10 object'ive is to devo'te the majority.of your maintenance !
.t ,
11 time to preventive maintenance. What does that'mean, 51 l i
12, percent? I mean what --
i 13 MR. KINSEY: Our goal'that we're shooting for is j 14 approximately 60 percent preventive maintenance to 40
, 15 percent corrective' maintenance and' higher if.we can get i t - l.
. \
16 there.
17 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: By when do you expect to .
I
,1 18- get there?
19, MR. KINSEY: I would expect that for the site
)
20 realizing we've got Unit 2 coming on towards the end of I
21 this year, and our resources will be somewhat directed l 22 towards that, it will be in'the 89 -- late '89 timeframe.
, 23 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: That's all.
- I l
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Let me just say, I, too, commend 25 you for your degree program. I.think that's a> sensible a r.
)
y-.- . - -
x .. ,
, 36 a,
1 thing to'do from many standpoints, and I think it will 2, benefit,your comp'any as well bs the safety. "'I t will . , ,
, . 3 benefit your comhany in the future perhaps by developing ->
4 these people that can go into'other positions,of 4 -
s 5 responsibility. But also it gives them an added strength 6 I believe during-the course o 'f performance of their
' i i .1 7 duties. .
l 8' Commissioner Roberts.
9 ,
' COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: Where are they going to go l 10 to school? ' 7 I
(
11 MR. GOLDBERG: I wondernif I could qualify Mr.
-12 Vaughn who is following this program very closely. I 13 MR. VAUGHN: This is a' program ,we workod'out i i
1( similar to what other utilities have done with the ' '
. 15 University of Maryland. 'It's about a.five year program -- I b
16 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: Okay.
-- it's computer' based --
17 MR. VAUGHN:
18 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: Thank you.
19 MR. VAUGHU: Yes, sir.
20 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Also,'I think your fitness for 21 duty program is an excellent one from all Ive heard, and 22 I commend you for your ability to put in place a random i 1 23 testing program. ',
24 Your 50 percent hold point I think is sensible
.. s
- 25. and a very good cautious way to proceed. I know the Staff e
4 a 1
. . . - ,-, __ .,#, - , _ _ , , , , _ _ _ . . - , - #vr , - , . ,,,,, .-.-
-_ .- . - - - . . - ..- . . -__ ~ - - - - - - - . .- - . -- .. . _-
s ( ,
, 37 ,
> \
,i 1 will be working very closely with you on that.
4 2 Your emphasis-on professionalism, and I saw your l
~ '
,e ,
3 slide from the time I was out there -- I~think.you'cre
. ..a s 4 changed a couple of articles, but not too nuch I guess --
y 5 'but that em'phasis on professionalism and especially as it i , 1 6 would apply to your analysis acrons the Board of root, 7 causes and other problems as you get going I think would 8 be very --
should stand you in good stead.
9 'I think, too, today your ausessment of your 10 problems and your rather candid assessment of some of the
.11 problems you've had is refreshing. I would ay that if 12 -you get a license to go to commercial-power operation, the 13 biggest challenge you' have,is to recognize the difference'
^
1 know you' have been
~
14 between construction and operations.
shor)t period ,of time, you've some 15 critical Cor a ,
~
16 experience to date, but I would emphasize again..the i
17 challenge that every new licensee has that starts e
18 operating a plant and especially if you haven't been l
19 experienced as your company is not, your first plant.
20 'So when you go*into operations'from construction','.
21 it's like giving birth to a baby, all of sudden it's alive 22 and it's with you and it's going to be there forever and 23 it's a lot different'than just a rather inert plant'that 24 you've been building for so long.
25 'So I'would say your efforts towards> ,
i 4
6 e t
s ,
n
$ % 7 38 c
, l 1 . professionalism and the emphasis y o'u v placed on your 2 gperators will stand you in good stead for that,,but 3 there's nothing like real experience. So your'50 percent 4 hold point is excel 1~ent. I think you should be cautious 5 and careful in recognizing that it-is a first experience 6 for you, and do it s l'o w and easy. ,
7 With t h_a t I think, unless my fellow Commissioners 3
8 'have other comments. ,
9 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: I've got one.
10 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Yes. >
11 COMMISSIhNER ROBERTS: Mr. Jor. dan introduced the 12 distinguished Mgyor of San hntonio. Is the Mayor here i n 13 support of a full power license? <
14 MR. JORDAN: Yes, I,think so.
15 MR. C I S H E R'O S : We are here in full support --
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Would you' step up to 'the l
17 microphone, please, Mr. Maior, and identify yourself, '
18 please, for our reporter. Thank you very much. '
19 MR. CISNEROS: My name is Henry Cisneros, I'm the j s
20 Mayor of San Antonio. We are partners in the South Texas 21 Nuclear Project and have been since the outset, a 28 22 percent partner. '
23 ~ Mayor Lila Cockrell, my predecessor, is nott 24 Chairman of'the City'Public Ser7tice Board which is a fully l
25 owned subsidiary of the City of San Antonio which is the i a y
)
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g..
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1 1 generator of power and distribution system owned by the 2 City of San Antonio. She is here also, 3 We are in full suppot of this. 'This has been a e 4 long effort, investment in it of the City of. San Antonio 5 ratepayers' m o n e,y , passage of bond issues which we have 6 .done consistently since 1973. 6 7 .We have labored with Don Jordan and the group 8 through the change from Brown & Root to Bechtel' as 4 9 engineer and then EBASCO as the' constructor. ,
10 The last few years have been a totally different 11 story than the early years of the project. t We are 12 impressed with the management turnaround, have monitored 13 very carefully the Commission's reviews of the project, 14 and I would say to you that we could not be stronger in 15 our hopes that you will act'to see this project to 16 operation.
,17 We have invested a long time,and we're anxious to 18 begin receiving commercial power from this project.
19 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Thank you very~much, Mr. Mayor.
20 Appreciate it.
21 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Mr. Chairman.
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Yes, Commission'er Rogers.
23 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Yes, just one other little 24 question. I've perceived that the thing that really makes 25 a power plant safe or not is involvement from the very top s
.-. - , - , . - , ~ _ . _
e -
_. . , . . ~ _ .
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40
., e 4 3 1 all the way down to the very bottom of the organization.
a, 2 And I'm just curious, Mr. Goldberg, where is your office 3 and hoO much time do you spend at the site?
i 7 4 MR. GOLDBERG: I have two. offices, Mr.
, 5 Commissioner. One office is downtown and I'm gener,a,lly
'6 there a, maximum of two days a week, it's usually just one 7 day a week, I. spend the fest of my time on-site and it has 8 been that way I'd say for at least the last four years.
9 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: 'Thank you. When was your 10 Board of Directors out to visit the site last? *
, 11 MR. JORDAN: I couldn't, Commissioner, give you 12 the exact d a t e ', but they've been down several times. As a 13 matter of fact, the' Nuclear Committee of the Board goes 14 down on a regular basis to se'e the plant.
15 We don't have a single Director who hasn't been 16 down there, and as I said they review the progres s' of l 17 this plant every single month in the regular Board of 18 Directors', meetings. ,
19 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Is there some kind of an 20 oversight committee of the Board that relates to this l l
21 project? ,
22 MR. JORDAN: Yes, there is. We call it the 23 Nuclear Committe'e. It consists of four outside directors, 24 there are no inside directors on that Board -- I mean on 25 that committee. It's chaired by a Dr. Joe Henry and ,
_ _ , , _ . , - , V "
, .- 41'
- 1- includes three other outside directors one of which is Dr.
2 Bishop who io. here today. ', a o
3 They meet monthly in addition to the regular 4 Board meetinga to receive, reports and to review the
+
3 progress of the plant and do go.down to the project qui e ,
6 regularly. . .
3 > ,
, +
- 7 COMMISSIONER. ROGERS: Well, I think-that's very 8 importante 4 7
9 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Let-me just, emphasize too,since 10 it has just been brought up, the importance that a l'1 of us 11 place on management in v olv e m e n t .' I have since changed ,
12 that term to "leadership involvement" because it 13 connotates more people than resources, you need bc.th of i
14 course, but it really is true if there's any key to 15 successful nuclear power operations, in my judgment, it's 16 leadership involvement. That means all of.you here, l
17 includings the support of your Board, the support of your ,
18 community. i l
19 But it truly is a leadership challenge and it -
l 20 means that you're interested in the details, yqu're 21 interested in all the aspects of this demanding 22 technology. So I'm glad that Commissioner Rogers has l i
23 brought up that point. It's one that we all feel very
+
24 strongly about.
25 All right. If there are not other questions'from 1
s -
'_ .._1___
v<. 4 ,
" ~
. _. 42 f
i 1 my fellow Commissioners -- Commissioner Bernthal.
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Let me make just one 3 comment. I guesa'it will be a year in June, is that 4 right, when I visite'd the plant, and I must say'that at 1 5 that stag'e in your construction, which was largely 6 complete, the plant's physical condition, the housekeeping 7 of the plant was as probably as good as I have seen of ,any F8 plant in that stage of this construction progress and 9 . development. I
~
10 I hope and I trust that the maintenance policies
. 11 and procedures that you put in place .that brought it.to 12 that point continue and that 'you're also above average i
13 today as you approach the Commission d'ecision for full 14 power operation and I would appreciate hearing f: rom the 15 Staff too whether that tradition has caught on and endured there, but I wanted to compliment you on t'h a t point 16 17 because at least as of almdst a year ago, your plant was 18 really in first-rate physical condition as you were trying
- 19 to prepa'e r for operations then.
20' Thank you. That's all, Mr. Chairman.
l 1
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. Then 'if we may call -l1 22 on the Staff, and thank you very much for your i 23 ' presentation, gentlemen. ,
l 24 MR. JORDAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
25 MR. TAYLOR: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. tie're
-- _ ,_ _ .._- . _ . , _ _ _ _ _, _ ~. , --
e <
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43 4
1 .here to presentxthe results of the Staff review for the 2 full power licence for South Texas.
3 With me today is Dr. Tom Murley, director.of the 4 Office of Ne. clear Reactor Regu'1ation, Mr. Prasad Kadambi 5 who'ib the Project Manacdr, and I believe Mr. Jose Calvo i
6 will join us at'the table on my right, and also the 7 Regional Administrator, Bob Martin, is not here otoday I
8 because of a death in the family over the weekend. Here 9 for the Region, Mr. Joe Callan on my right backed up by 10 the Branch Chief, Mr. Constable. And if he will stand, 11 and Mr. Dan Carpenter who is the Senior Resident at douth 12 Texas. '
13 I '*1 1 now,ask Dr. Murley to begin the '
14 presentation. '
)
15 CHAIRMAM ZECH: All right. Thank you very much.
16 You may proceed.
17 MR. MURLEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We're here' 18 ~
today to discuss with.the Commission the background of our 19 activities at South Texas and the recent actions t,h e Staff 20 has taken to arrive at our conclusion that the South Texas 21 Unit 1 plant has been constructed safely and can and will 22 be operated safely.
23 Mr. Kadambi is going to talk about the background 4 24
~
and the licensing issues, Mr. Callan is going to talk 25 about construction experience, r'eadiness for operation;
. g 4
, 3
/
- 1 44 ,
1 and finally Mr. Calvo will talk about the review of the 2-
+
inspection findings from the GAP allegations. tir . Kaddmbi ,
1
, , t
, 1 3 will le.ad off. >
4 CHAIRMAN Y,ECH: All right.' Thank you very much.
5 MR. KADAMBI: Good afternoon, !!r . Chairman, c 6 fellow Commissioners. May I have the next slide, please.
7 (Slide.)
8 MR. KADAMBI.! This slide shows the outline of the 9 Staff pr'esentation. The next slide, please.
I 10 (Slide.) . ,
11 MR. KADAMBI: The background information is j
12 largely -- has largely been cov,ered by the licensee. I'd )
13 like to proceed on to the next one, please.
14 (Slide.) '
15 MR. KADAMB'I: On this slide, I point out some of l
1 16 the siting aspects., The South Texas Project is located in !
. i 17 a relatively sparsely populated-region. The emergency 18 preparedness has been completely reviewed and approved 19 including F Ei! A review. Next slide, please.
20 (Slide.] l l
"21 MR. KADAMBI: This silde shows some of the design )
l 22 aspects of the plant. The nuclear steam supply system is l
23 the only RESAR-41 plant in the U.S.
24 Some of the unique features at this plant are the 25 qualified display' processing system which'ia a '
A W
,..,n-g, , - - - .
,. 9
- s. '
. 45 1 t
> i i
'l microprocessor base system which provides safety grade 2 display and control. 1 i
3 The South Texas Project has taken advantage'ok l
. . i 4 the broad scope rule in applying l'ak.before e break l
. i 5 methodology-in the re, actor coolant sys tem arid beyond.
6 e
The reactor coolant temperatures are measured by 1
7 resistance temperature detectors,which;directly s e n's e the i 8 liquid temperatures,. ,
i 9 The thimble --Linstrumentation thimble tube issue ;
i 10 wh'chi you heard about is also unique at South Texas and 11 the auxiliary feed water system has also some unique 12 aspects which I will cover a little bit later. Ilext 13 ,
' slide, please. , j l
'14 (Slide'.}
15 MR.'KADAMBI: This slide shows the major' 16 milestones for the South Texas Project. Most of the e <
17 rail e s t o n e s have been achieved since'1986 with low power ,
> 18 license being issued on August 21st, 1987. Next slide,
\
19 please. 6 20 [ Slide.]
23 MR. KADAMBI: Mr. Callan will now address the "
r 22 construction overview.
- 25 MR. CALLAN: Thank you. I'm Joe Callan, the 24 Director of the Division of the Reactor Project's in Region ti 25 IV.
i g- 4 -
- g. .-. - . .. .
. ~ - . . -
.a '46 i e i t j t l
I 1 Much of-this material on the slide has been j
^
2 covered by the licensee. I think the most significant.
3' regional perspective that I c a'n add has..been to nbte the 4 steadily improving performance if the licensee in the i 5* construct, ion area. ,
6 The turning of the corner I think of their 7 construction performance was in 1981, coincident with the 8 replacement-of Brown & Root with Bechtel.
- t 9 In particular, our inspectors have confirmed a-10 very' strong, aggressive.constuction QA program that id' 11 continuing on Unit 2, and as well as str$ng involved i
12 management in the construction effort.
13 The most recent SALP report which was recently ;
1 14 issued confirms this positive trend in the construction J
i 15 area.
16 I'd like to make one comment about the inspection <
17 hours for Unit 1. That figure of 17,, 6 0 0 r e pr e s e n t s the l
18 construction inspection effort. He listed separately the !
19- 5,000 manhours devoted to investigations. To put that in 20 perppective,' the 17,000 figure, it's somewhat higher than 21 the numbers of i,nspection hours tihat were performed on 22 Braidwood II, Vogel, and Beaver Valley. lie x t slid 9,,
23 please. ,
24, (Slide.i ,
25 MR. C A L L All: In addition to the routine i a
S 4 I
. , ~)
.A
- (3 j ., . 47
' ' k s 9
- .1 1 opera'tions inspection program, two operational reediness 2 team inspections have been performed. One was porformed ;
3 before the ' issuance . of the lowjpower license, and the-f 4 second more recently in January.
5 All of the significant findings from these team 6 inspections have been satisfactorily cl osed out . 'I think 7 it's significant to note that experienced resident 3 i
8' inspectors from other sites were utilitized heavily on
^'
, 9 these teams t o p r o'v i d e the broadest possible operations
> 10 perspective. We also used large numbers of'hesdqua'ters r 11 inspectors. ,
12 Further, since, January 1988, partly in response 13 to operational errors and concerns that I'll talk about in 14 a minute, the Region went to an aug.mented resident effort 15 at the site. We had three full-time residents a t' the site 16 and we augmented that team of three with an additional tuo )
17 rer.ident inspectors that we pulled from other sibes in a 18 rotatingebasis. So we've maintained a level of four'to i 19 five resident inspectors in the operations area since .
1 20 January.
>\
21 As I said, the reason that we went to augmented !
'l 22 inspection coverage -- resident inspection coverage has -
20 related to some operational errors.' The errors that were 24 of concern occurred since the issuance of the low power 25 license, and two of these errors led to the issuance'of a i
- 1 .
i 1
, 48' j
1 civil penalty in the January timeframe.
2 The types of errors that have occurred'can 3 generally be categorized into two types. The first being,
., e 4 the failure of the control room operators to maintain
< 1 5 tight control over safety system status to ensure )
a 6 operability. This is especially true' during mode changes, p
7 There were a coupl+ of instances where valves were out of 8 ,. position as the plant changed mode; in one instance from 9 Mode 3 to Mode 4 -- I'm sorry, from Mode 4 to Mode 3.
10 It's the regional view that these errors can be 11 aptributed partly to the difficulty in transitioning from, 12 as the Chairman said, from a constructiom mentali ty td an 13 operating mentality. ,
14 The second catego,ry of errors relates to the 15 failure to ensure that all tech-specs surveillance
~
16 requirements are properly reflected in station procedures.
17 Our inspection accivities since chese error's have 18 occurred have confirmed that HL&P's comprehensive
- 19 corrective action in response to these errors has been 20 effective'. ,
21 Going down on the slide, we note that early on in
, 22 this most recent SALP period which began 1 January 1987, 23 HL&P had significant problems in the securi.ty area. In 1
24 fact, those concerns relative to securi.ty were a factor in O , t 25 the issuance ot the low power license. Since the issuance '
_ - . ~ . . _ _
. 49 1 of the low power license, we have noticed and noted strong 2 improvement in that area and have no signi'ficant concerns 3 relative to security. Next slide, please.
4 (Slide.)
5 MR. CALLAN: I'll turn it back over to Prasad at 5
- 6 this point.
7 MR. KADAMBI: Thank you, Joe. I shall now 8 describe some of the features of the proposed full power
)
9 license. , ;
10 One of the characteristics of the low power 11 license -- major license condition was in the area of
' 12 physical security; this issue has b'een resolved. l 13 The license carries four exemptions. The first 14 three of these are already incorporated into the* low power 15' license, and two of them are standard parts of most of the
- 16 recent licenses which have come before the commission, f
17 The one on containment air lock provides relief 18 for testing when personnel entry occurs into the 19 containment.
4 !
20 The second one on the' application of'GDC-50 is 1
21 applied to the component cooling water system return line 22 from the fan coolers. The fan' coolers are provided for 23 containment atmosphere cooling.
L ' s 24 The exemptiorr relates do the pa'rt of the' 25' component cooling water line which is not n e e,d e d after an a
4 .
e 50
~
1 accident. '{hi s part-of the'line has to be isolated after 2 an accident. The Staff requires two valves to accomplish 3 this isolation. The South Texas Project currently has one 4 valve and will install the other at thg first Etafueling 5 outage. The Staff' finds this to be. acceptable.
i 6 The exemption on the criticality monitoring 7 system is a,nother standard exemption which has-been a part 8 of recent '
licenses. ,, j i
9 The last of the exemptions is related to the i
l 10 updated FSAR and was requested by the licensee so they 3 ..
11 could maintain a single FSAR document.for both one Unit 1 and 12 2. Since Unit 2 they-expect will r$ceive a low power 13 ' license, they expect a fuel load in December of 1980. The l
14 Staff has granted an exemption up tb August of 1990 to i
)
15 develop a common document for bqth units. !! ext slide, 4 16 please. .
l 17 (Slide.) 9 l
l 18 MR. KADAMBI: I'd like to address some of the 19 component related issues which were dealt with by the 20 Staff a,nd these parallel remarks ofthe licensee l
21 essentially. I won't go into much detail on these other 22 than to say that on each issue the Staff has followed"the i
23 licensee's actions, and at this point the corrective 1
24 . actions are complete.
25 I'd like . to riow --
i i
?.
51' 1 MR. MURLEY: Are you done with this?
2 MR. KADAMBI: Yes, unless there's --
if there are 3 any questions. .
4 MR. MURLE'Y: Okay, I would r 't mention that --
i 5 Commissioner Bernthal, you asked.about the steam generator 6 being out of plumb and my staff has looked a$ that just 7 recently in the stress, report, a they are satisfied that 8 the stresses are we'll within allowablere there.
- 9. COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Ju:s t as a matter of 10 curiosity,,how much o'u t of plumb dons "out'of plumb" mean 11 in angle or feet? >
12 MR. MURLEY: Well, as I -- perhaps I'll let .Tose 13 get into that because he did look'into it in his ,
14 investigation as a team assessment reporter.
15 MR. CALVO: Understand, if yor're lool:ing l 16 perpendicular it's about 15 inches from the bottom that l
17 was out of wack, wh e r 'e I gbess if we're looking at the i
18 angle, it was a'very small 3, 4 degrees angle, but when !
i ( ,
j 19 you're looking, it's abouc 15 inches. '
20 COMMISSIGNER BERNTHAL: Okay. ' Thanks .
21 MR. MURLEY: So that then leads into the, review 22 work that Jose Calvo and his team did, and I'll let him 23 move into that.
- 24 CHAIRMAN ZECH
- All right. You may proceed.
25 MR. CALVO: My name is Jose Calvo. I was the --
')
n , . . - . , . , . - , , -
_,.~--n. -e.., -
~,.
l 1
- 52 b
1 I'm the Project Director for all the Region IV plants o 2 except Comanche Peak.
3 I was e.ssigned as the manager to lead a team to 3 4" 4 review the allegations by the Government Accountability
\
S Project on the South Texas Project.' ,
f 1
6 What I would like to do, I'd like to give you a, i 1
7 overall - quick overall to tell you what we did, and give 1
8 you a summary of it, and then'I will follow by the process i 9 that we used to come up with the conclusions th'at we did.
10 The safety significance assessment team reviewed 11 all the GAPS allegations. The majority of the allegations 12 were found to be lacking in specificity. The allegations 13 were categorized according to discipline, equipment, and 4
14 common characteristics, e 15 The allebations which were technically oriented 16 in potential safety significance were selected for further s
17 review. Those allegations judged to have the highest 18 potential safety significance were selected for on-site 19 inspection.
20 The SSAT interviewed allegers to obtain l
21 additional information before and during the on-site 1 e
i 1
22 inspection of the South Texas Project facility. l 23 The on-site inspection was conducted on January 24 the 18th to the 22nd, 1983. The inspection findings had l l
25 identified no substantive safety issues.
- L . , _ . _ - . .
- o i ;
. 53 l l
W
- 1 1 Come of the-allegations were accepted here at 1' l 2 some point in $he construction history of the South Texas 3 Project -- South Texas Project facility, but the team 4 determined that the South Texas-Project quality a'ssurance 4
, r t.
5 program was successful in identifying the concerns and -
l 3 i 6 applying appropriate corrective
- actions.
7 Considering the satisfactory findings, the 8 remaining allegations considered technically oriented by 9 the team were closed out because they were found to beH 10 duplicated or related to the allegations being inspected 1
s 11 by the team, or because the subject . natter conveyed by the 12 allegations involved the implementation of the quality 13 assurance criteria which was found acceptable by the team.
14 The bottom line is that the team revieued all GAP l l
15 .' I allegations, and has identifiad no safety issues which l 16 ]
will affect safe operation of the South Texas Project j 17 facility.
I 18 If you will allow me, I'd like to go with the --
19 explain the process that we did to reach this conclusion.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Yes, and if don't mind, I 21 think it would be useful just for the public record here 22 to cite one or two of the outstanding items that you 23 perhaps spent a good deal of time on.
24 ' MR . CALVO: Yes, I intend to do'this. !!$ny 25 communications between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4
. - . . - . . . _- - . - - . . - - , ...u. %
e s' '
jf * .
54 1 and the Government Accountability Project -- an agreement 2 was reached between the Office of the Secretary, Dir e c to r 3 for Operations and GAP, the Government' Accountability 4 Project, that will permit the NRC Staff to review GAP's 5 ellegations.
6 The initial assessment of GAP's allegation 7 summaries indicated that the Staff could not establish' the 8 safety significance be5 ore because of lack of specific 9 information.
10 In order to obtain this information, the team was 11 assembled, the safety significance assessment team or 12 SSAT, to review the GAP's allegation files at Washington, 13 D.C.
14 I was the team director and I had also with me 15 here the team leader, if I may present the team leader, 16 Rich Correia, will you please stand up. s And next to him i 17 are the two deputy team leaders, Pat Milano and 18 Ed Thomason. And behind the team leader is Paul Connor, 19 the project' manag'er. Now the other members of the team 20 can stand up.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Yes, the whole team stand up, 22 please, so we'll know. Okay. All right. Thank you very
'23 much.
24 MR. CALVO: The team consisted of about --
25 approximately 15 people,with experience in mechanical, 4
--+-k- m rs - m-, ---r- , - - - - - g --w u- --, - -- - - - *
.7
, 55 l
I 1 electrical, instrumentation, c i v '.1, 's t r u c t u r a l and I 2 metallurgical engineering; quality assurance, quality.
3 control, inspection operations, construction, project -
4 management, and related activid es.
5- It_ collectively represunted 350 years of 6 engineering and scientific experience of which 250 were*in 7 the nuclear field. ,
1 8 The initial screening of GAP allegation records 9 at the GAP headquarters'in Washington, D.C. reveal' that a i
10 large majori ty of the allegations were not specific enough !
)
11 in identifying a particular component, a particular l
12 system, or a particultar area in the plant for which the l 13 alleger had expressed concern.
14 The team reviewed approximately 700 allegations.
15 After further review, the team determined that 120 of 16 those allegations were repetitious; 240, theh were 17 harassment, intimidation, and wrongdoings; and 1.40 were l l
13 considered by the team as non-safety related.
19 CHAIRMAN 'ZECH : But'you reviewed all 700 --
20 MR. CALVO: All 700.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All of them to determine what the 22 appropriate disposition might be?
23 MR. CALVO: That's correct.
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH: You evaluated that?
l i 25 MR. CALVO: That's correct. As I go through --
t 4
- , ,.n. -,, _. , . , . . .
9 g- .
.- 56 1 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Each one of them?
2 MR. CALVO: Each one of them.
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Okay. Thank you.
4 MR. CALVO: Now the final review indicated that 5 of the original 700 allegations 213 remained as possible 6 candidates for further review. Samples of these 7 allegations were pipe joints not properly installed, 8 heating and ventilation aad air conditioning duct work a,nd 9 supports not installed per specifications; o r. e was the 10 steam generator was out of plumb. It was not only one, l
11 when we looked at it, we found out that two were out of 12 plumb.
13 20 percent of the valves were installed 14 backwards. Ancther one was the rachem cable splicer did 15 not meet safety standards, there was-one about a crack in 16 the basement of the fuel handling building, which by the 17 way we could not find it.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: These are all allegations 19 now.
20 MR. CALVO: Allegations, agreed.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Let's make that clear.
22 MR. CALVO: It was alleged that built items do 23 not agree with design configurations. The team reviewed 24 only 213 allegations in detail and placed them in 25 categories according to the discipline, the equipment, and
. , 57 1 common characteristics.
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Were some of those ones that you 3 read us just a minute ago, I, presume those are the ones 4 you couldn't track.down or you couldn't find the 5 specific -- not enough specificity to find out exactly 6- what the problem was. Is that what you're telling us?
7 MR. CALVO: Yes. Out of the tota'l 700 8 allegations, there was only about 16 allegations which 9 referred to some specific component in the plant.
10 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Well, some of those things you 11 , read sound pretty general me to me. I'd have a hsrd time 12 finding some of that stuff.
13 MR. CALVO: Well, the steam generator out of 14 plumb, I think we have --
15 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Oh, yes, you can find that, but I :
16 mean some of the others. !
l i
17 MR. CALVO: And the others are very general in i 18 nature, so we have to develop a plan.
l 19 CHAIRMAN ZECH: But did you try to track that 20 down, and try to find out the specific things that were --
J 21 MR. CALVO: We tried to.
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. !
l 23 MR. CALVO: We contacted the allegers to obtain )
24 additional information.
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right, l
, ,w . , , .
58
,7 o .,
1 MR. CALVO: We would review the 213 allegations 2 in detail and, place them in categories according to i
3 discipline,. equipment, and common characteristics.
4 From this category, the team selected for ~inside 5 inspection .those allegations that it was judged to be the 6 highest potential. safety significance. Ten primary and 61 7 secondary allegations were selected for that purpose.
8 The 71 allegations selected for inside inspection 9 were representative of all the technical concerns conveyed 10 by the allegers represented by GAP and bound the 213 11 allegations either specifically or in a generic basis.
12 The selected allagations encompassing areas such 13 as piping and mechanical components, valves, heating and 14 ventilation, welding, electrical cables, quality 15 a s s u.v a n c e , quality control and so forth.
16 To compensate for the lack of specificity --
17 specific detail, the team developed a plan for inspecting-18 the allegations that provided for a broad, generic look 19 that will bound the generalized concerns conveyed by the 20 allegations. Also the team made arrangements to talk to -
21 the allegers to obtain additional specificity.
22 The 71 allegations selected'for inspection 23 involved 19 allegers; however, only ten allegers could be 24 reached, and those ten were interviewed by the team.
25 With only a few exceptions, the a d di t i c.na l A ,, _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ __--_-_---------.A.- - - - -
s -
. x ,3 ,
, , 59 t
'l information provided by. t h,e allegers continued to be 2 deficient on specific ' details.
-3 'The team, after the inspection plan,was done, . the 4 team was to decide during the week of January 18th to the.4 i
a' 5 22nd'and during that' time, the interviews with the '
6 allegers continued. -
. 4 7 CHAIRMAN ZECH: At the site.
l 8 MR. CALVO: At the site. And all the interviews 9 were done' over the telephone, there was a couple of cases 10 where there was face .to face contact with the allegers.
11 The team, as a result of this inspection, 12 identified no substantive concern. !
13 Also the team found out that several allegations 4 14 were substantiated at sometime during the -~ in the l 15 construction history of the plant; however, the team also 16 found out that the South Texas Project quality 17 assurance-quality control program was successful in
- le identifying them and applying proper corrective action.
i ,
19 To give you an idea of the allegations that it 20 was substantiated, samples of them are the polar crane and )
21 the orbital bridge inside the containment track was out of 22 the alignment. It was substantiated, but we also found 23 out that it was properly corrected.
24 The steam generator out of plumb, as you hearo it 25 today, yes, we found out that in 1983, Bechtel found out I
r' ,r , .
J 60,
.t
~1 that problem; we reviewed the communicat. ion-between #
2 Eachtel and Westinghouse, and.'we determined that, y e s',
~
3 there wws an audible that justified that it was out of-4 plumb. >
5- We also brought the NRC St.aff to look furt'her i
6 into this matter to see if'there*was any problems with 7 these things.
8 So these are the kind of things that we,-- they 9 were true at the time that it happened, but they were
([j
~
10 substantiated.
11 There was another one where concrete i
12 reinforcement --
reinforcing bars while concrete was .being <
13 drilled. We found out that that var substantiated', but '
14 they have a program in place that took care.of all these i
1,5 things. i 16 As a result of the inspection, we found only one
)
~
17 deficiency -- the team found'the deficiency., It had to du 18 with the recham cable splices. Okay.
15 Before the NRC Staff had requested the licensee, 20 to do a 100 percent reinspection on -11 the recham 21 splices. I believe there are approximate'y about 3,300 of )
i 22 them. They did it, and what we did, we were trying to 23 verify because we had an allegation about problems with 24 the splices, to see how well they did it. And while we 25 were doing it, we determined that one particular
' l
7 e ,
, t 61 k e
'1 allegation that we~ selected,'it h'as not been're-inspected.
2 We did call the utility --
the utility uas $
3 working with us, and on their,own initiative, they s a i.d i
i well, let's look at it to see if,they.got any others.
5~ Well they re-looked at . 2,300 and they found . six 6 more that needed to.be' re-worked. '
7 I sent'to members of the team sometime to' verify 8 n o't about the recham. splices, to see how they were'done, 9 becausetthere was a problem with the recham splices, whereL 10 you have generated generic implications in other 11 disciplines: Civ"il, structural, mechanical. They' spent -
12 three or four days up there and determined,.no. There was 13 a problem with the way the pro'jrams,for selecting the -
14 splices for inspection was dona,'so we feel that was a 1
15 unique case and there was no generic implications.
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Did they fix those that th~ey had 17 problems with?
18 MR. CALVO: Yes, the problem was fixed. The six 19 ones were corrected and fixed and verified.
20 JUDGE KULHUAN: All right.
, 21 MR. CALVO: And we asked them to --
from now on 1
1 22 to revise the precedures so this won't happen into the 23 future. We had brought with us some rechan cable splices.
24 They are available for the Commission examination later if 25 they wish to, 1 .
b__ _ , , .,- - _ . - - c ~
,. y 62 1 We also, out of the 71 that we took, we found 50 '
2 of them were unsubstantiated. Some of them say the 3 alleged problematic c'ooling sysdem should have two valves 4 instead of one, we found out that one' valve, that's all it 5 had and that's okay, not only in this plant, but in other 6 Westinghouse plants. ,
7 ,
We found out that 20-percent ,o f the. valves 8 installed backwards, we couldn't find out. We looked at a 9 lot of valves. We looked at a lot of the hardware on that 10 plant. We not only looked at the paper, but we looked at 11 a lot of hardware we walked down, we constantly looked at 12 the things.
' ~
13 Also we found cut another one that was alleged .
14 that we could not substantiate, the heating and 1
- i f ventilation and ait condi':ioning welds not cleaned before 16 caulking. We looked at a horrendous amount of welds in 17 Unit 2 and Unit No. 1 ar d we could not find out the 18 problem. We find out the weld was perfectly done.
19 By the way, th3 a four and a half days that we 20 spent on the site, they aere truly actually --
we were 21 working 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> a day and it was actually fairly
- 22 thorough. We could have stayed there longer had we found 23 some problems, but we didn't quite find the problems'that 24 the allegations were trying to convey.
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH: You think you had sufficient
, .u ,
63-
, s j ,
f o
1+ time?
ll I think we had -- had we' find so$e
~
2' '
MR. CALVO:
1 3 problems, truly I would have had sufficient time.
, .But thp 4- thing was going well, we were collecting information'and .
5> most of the things 't h a t we looked at, we found out that 3 ,
6 the QA-QC program -- '
7 CHAIRMAN ZECH: So you,think you did have 8 sufficient time? ,
9 MR' CALVO:
. For the work that we did, we have.
, s 10 As a result of the broad, generic, and problematic look 11 given to the areas of concern by the team'to compensate 12 for the lack of specificity, the team inspected many other '
13 areas of hardware 'and QA-QC characteristics. The ,
14 allegations only pointed you in the direction; the team 15 went broader and wider to find out where the genetic
- 16 implications were.
i 17 ,
Also the team reviewed the NRC Region IV 18 inspection reports in an independent manner, a1so reviewed 19 the Houston Lighting and Power ~ safety report -- safety ;
i 20 investigation report. The-team is a group that )
i i
21 investigated alle'gations for the utility -- not to agree 22 with them, to find out that it was -- because of the total 23 lack of specificity, we wanted to be sure that there was 24 something there that would give us a clue what the 25 allegers were saying. We used that a,s inputs to give us
4 -> 4 8
4 . 64-1 an insight in the allegations.
2 It was determined that this report will offer 3 additional insight on.the allegations being reviewed by 4 the team.
, 5 Now considering the satisfactory inspection 6 findings and everything else that we have done, the t e a n; 7 determined that many of the allegations that was left, 8 there was about 70 -- 71 were inspected. The other 119 of 9 tnose, we found out that they were duplicated and they 10 related to the work, the review that the team was doing; 11 l therefore, the team concluded that 119, 71 were. inspected, '
12 119 were duplicated or related; therefore, it only left 13 about 23 allegations remaining. Of those 23 allegationc, ;
14 we found that four were duplicated and 19 we could not 1
15 bound them, by what the team did, we found out that the 16 subject matter conveyed by those allegations, it related 17 to QA criteria which had been reviewed by the team and 18 found acceptable --
19 CHAIRMAli ZECH: You couldn't bound them because 20 they weren't specific enough; is that correct?
21 MR. CALVO: That's right. It was not specific l 22 enough, it could not be bounded. But again the criteria, 23 it was reviewed by the team in many cases and we found it 24 acceptable. So we're saying --
25 CHAIR!!AP ZECH: The quality assurance-quality l
l
r . ,
. > 65 +
, 1 ' control review yo'u think covered or would have covered it?
2 HR. CALVO: That's correct. So based on that, we 3 concluded that'those 19 allegations were not of',immediate 4 safety concern and we will review for it when additional 5 information becomes available to the Staff. ,
6 'The conclusion is that the SAT review of all 7 GAP's allegations has identified,no substantativo safety 8 issues that w i l l d e l a y 'i n the NRC's consideration for a 9 full power license for South Texas Unit No. 1.
10
~
I must also say that the Office of the '
11 Investigation is evaluating GAP's allegations concerning 12 harassment and intimidation, and any technical concern 13 expanding from these efforts will be further reviewed by 14 the NRC Staff for safety significance. 'Before I finish 15 this --
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Before you go off that, excuse i l
17 me. Did I underctand you to say concerning the' harassment l
18 and intimidation, that is ongoing, that as of now though 19 you don't see any safety significant issues that would 20 delay restart; is that correct? Is that what you're 21 telling me? ;
22 MR. CALVO: Yes, that's what I'm going to tell 23 you. l 24 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Well tell me about it.
25 MR. CALVO: Well, tell me about it. Okay. All 'l
- 7 7
_v. - - - -
y.
1,
,. ,' , 66 4 1 the GAP -- if,we can put in there a B-10. Slide B-10, i
2 please.
3 (Slide.) >
1 ..
4 MR. CALVO: This isl.the summary of all the 5 harassment and intimidation allegations. What;the. team 6 did, we looked a,t all these 240 as well as we looked at all the others and we're tbying to determine whether there 7 '
8 was any safety related matters, any technical oriented 9 matters where we feel that the team should look at.,
10 We had 240 and of the 240 we found out that 95 i 11 involved the same. area that the team has covered before:
12 Heating and ventilation, Quality assurance, so forth and 13 so on.
l 14 We found out that-145 of those have no safety 1
4 15 content. I'll give you for instance. Millions of. feet of 16 cable was scraped due to incompetent engineering 17 measurements, that's a wrongdoing. 20,00 pounds of 18 stainless steel disappeared from plant, but they were i
19 logged as received by West.inghouse.
20 MR. MURLEY: Jose, I think that's probably .
I 21 enough. You get the' flavor of the --
- 22 MR. CALVO: Okay. So the conclusion of these U
- 23 things was that based on what the technical staff had 24- reviewed, every one of the the items being referred to O I ,.
1 25 and satisfied themselves that none had underlying safety
. - - -.y . _ . ._ - - . . , - . - - - , ,
,a . -_ . -. . - . - . - -,. . - - .. - . -- - - .
. -w 1- , .
s; a*< ,, , - '
- 67 e
> , l 1 significance. ,.
, 2 S e c,o n d , the Staff observed that many of the
- 3 allegations simply had nothing to.do with whether the
'4 pla'nt is designed and constructed-safely; and three, there
.t .,.
, 5. was no trails or patterns helping identify that'may'be r
, q 36 indicative of management breakdown in ensuring tho' quality ,
7 'of the South Texas Project. installation. - 4 8 And finally, it is the Staff's judgment thaE 9 there is adequate assurance that_ South Texas can be '
L ,:
10 operated with no undue risk to the public health and
~
1
? 11 safety. This judgment is based not only on what the
. 12 safety significant assessment review did show, but also on ,
13 the overall licensing and inspection-programs' performed by 14 the NRC Staff over the years, r with ai
~
15 Upon completion of the OI efforts -- dealing 16 harassment and intimidation and' wrongdoing, any techni<:a1 ,
17 concern expanding from this effort will be further i 18 reviewed by NRC Staff for safety, significance.
, i l
. 19 That's all I have to say. I'm finished.
] < 20 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right.
i, i l i
21 MR. TAYLOR: Tom.
t j 22 MR. MURLEY: On conclusion then, Mr. Chairman, a
23 the Staff supports issuance of a1 full power license to the u
4 L
24 South Texas Project Unit 1.
I '
25
- CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right.
4
,.- . - . .m , , - - - -
, y.. f
- 6 8-1 ,
MR. MURLEY: Th'at concludes the Staff's !
)
2 presentation.
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. Thank you very much.
4 Questions from my fellow Commissioners?' Commissioner i 5 Roberts? '
O COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: I want to hear youisay it 3
7 again. Is it the opinion'of the St'aff that this plant can 8 go to full power without undue risk to pub $ic health'and 9- safety?
10 MR. MURLEY: Yes, sir.
11 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: Thank you.
12 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Commissioner Bernthal? .;
a 13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: You may have addressed --
] 14 in fact you have addressed some of these issues already, 4
4 15 but in the executive summary of your operational readineas 16 report, you list five --
one, two, three, four, five items 17 in 'particular, I believe, that you indicated were i
important for safe operation o,f the facility, asking that 18 ;
19 those issues be followed up on. I won't go through the 20 whole list here, but perhaps you'can on the record here go 21 through them briefly and a s tt u r e u s that each of those 2
22 items has b e e r.' s a t i s f i ed .
23 MR. TAYLOR: Yes, Mr. Callan from the Region 24 would address that, sir.
25 MR. CALLAN: Commissioner, I'm Joe Callan from I i ,
t q
> +
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1 Region IV'.' All five have been closed out during er .
2 inspection activities that occurred >two weeks ago.
3 Two of the items, the item relating to control of 4 safety' system status and the item relating to inclusion of '
5 tech-spec surveillance requirements in plant procedures,'
6 as I mentioned earlier, were the subject of escalated 7 e'nforcement and received in-depth corrective action as a 8 result of that.
9 The other three items, the item pertaining to the !
10 ability -- the demonstrated ability for remote shutdown, f
11 the upgrading of commercial grade, agastat relays, and
, 12 review of the backlog of the problem reports have as I 13 said been closed out about two weeks ago. That report,has '
14 not been issued, however.
15 COMMISSIONER BER!iTHAL: If I take two of these l 16 items, they would seem to suggest that the licensee'needs 17 to organize some of its efforts a little better. !
18 One was the question of the tech-spec changes and l 19 follow those in a more disciplined way, and the other as 20 you've just indicated was the resolution of problems that 21 were outstanding and overdue. I take it though that in 22 your judgment that process has been tightened up 23 adequately now. 1
- i 24 MR. CALLAN: Yes, sir. There are two issues ,I 1 '
25 here. One was the process itself in order to ensure that
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in other words the adequacy of the program, and the i 2 second with implementation of the program, and ue found L-j 3 problems on both counts. ,
4 The correction of the specific issues that were 5 identified was relatively straightforward; the correction 1
i 6 or the enhancements to the programs, the processes, took a j 7 little bit longer. And as'I said, . we were able to close 8 those out.
- l 9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: i One other hardware item 20 that came up at some point here in the process was that of
, 11 certain threaded fasteners that were being used at the 12 plant, and the question being whether there were some --
i i
13 what's the word, forgeries'I guess, that did not really
, r 14 meet the. required ASME or ASTM codes. Could yo,u-enlighten 15 us a little bit on that issue'and tell us how you resolved 16 that question?
17 MR. KADAMBI: That was one of the allegations J
18 that was received -- l 19 MR. CALVO: I think if I may, I may refer that to 20 the team leader if you don't mind to a'n s w e r that question. i 21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Okay. !
! 22 ' CHAIRMAN ZEclT: Please come to the microphone and
! i 23 identify yourself for the reporter.
4 24 MR. CORREIA: My name is Richard Correia. I was j
j 25 the ' safety r.ignificance assessment team leader.
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1 T.he concern was counterfeit or uiiqualified ,
4 2 fasteners at STP, itc was one of the allegations that wo 1
4 3 did review. We did find thut'as,part of Bechtel's review 4 of issues at South Texas w$en they took over, this was one 5 of the items that they-looked into. They did an extensive 6
review of all fasteners on site which initiated from a MRC 7 vendor inspection. They didn't stop at that,,they looked i +
8 at all fasteners, made determinations that there were some
- 9 fasteners that did not meet specificat' ions, some was a 10 matter of paperwork, other was actual hardware pro $lems.
11 They discarded those that they could absolutely 12 not assure themselves were to specification; and the 13 others, it was a matter of paper corrections. They did a.
14 take care of those --
15 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Did they fix the ones that needed
'16 fixing? ,
17 MR. CORREIA: Yes, they did.
18 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right.
19 COMMISSIOMER B EF.MTH A L : Okay.
, Thank you very
- 20 much. '
21 CHAIRMAM ZECH: dll right.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I would just make one 23 observation and that is it is my understanding that the ,
24 Staff expended something dike 3,000 or 3,300 staff and "
25 contractor hours'into reviewing this raft of late L
+ . ,
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, l' allegations for the South Texas plant. This was at a cost 2 of r,omething in the neighborhood a quarter of a million 3 dollars to the government, so we certainly didn't treat 4 those allegation lightly. I know'that you all have worked t
5 very long, very hard on~these issues, and we appreciate 6 that. ,
s +
i 7 I simply wanted to state for the record that some 8 representations notwithstanding, there has been a grea't j 9 deal of attention in time and effort spent to resolving '
, 10 these questions. Thank you very much. :.
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH:. All right. Commissioner Carr?
12 COMMISSIONER CARR: No. !
i 13 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Commission hogers? ,j 14 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: No. , !
, t 15 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Let me just'ask, are there any l 16 remaining prerequisites or any remaining findings that you '
> i
, 17 have to make then to authorize the plant to go to full l 18 power?
19 MR. MURLEY: No, I don't believe so.
4 20 MR. TAYLOR: There are none, sir. We've c he c!t ed 21 the Region.as recently as a few hours ago. ,
22 CHAIRMAN ZE'CH: All right. Fine. 'Let me also 23 commend the Staff for an extraordinary effort in the very i
24 dif"icult circumstances when we don't get allegations to .
25 look at when they are so hard.to come by. It's very i
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1, difficult to look,into something that you can't determino l'
2 what the problem is. We feel responsible for looking into v ,
3 allegations as you can see with the great effort,that han '
4 been made to do that. i b We do feel we treat allegations seriously but we
,6 need to know wha,t they are in order to treet them d' i
7 seriously'. -
i e, l So I commend. the Staff for the effort that they 8
- 9 made under rather difficult' circumstances. -
f 10 . In summarizing then, I believe that the licensee -
1 11 has, as has the Staff, told us that t. hey've concluded that 12 South Texas Project Unit 1 has satisfied the requirementa 13 for issuance of a full power license; consequently unless '
- 14 my fellcw Commissioners have-any other comments, are we i
j 15 prepared to vote?
16 (A chorus of ayes.]
17 CHAIRMAli ZECH: If we are, those Colamissioners in l
i 4
( 18 favor of authorizing the Staff to issue a' full p2wer 19 license for South Texas Project Unit 1., please signify by 20 saying aye. '
i
, >21 (A chorus of ayes.]
)
22 CHAIRMAll ZECH: Opposed? Opposed, no. The vote 23 is five to zero in favor. We stand' adjourned.
s I
24 (Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m. the meeting was i
25 adjourned,)
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3 2 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 3 '
4 This is to certify that the attached events of a -
'5 meeting of, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissicn er4 titled:
6 ,
7 TITLE OF MEETING: Briefing on Full' Power Licensing of South Texas Nuclear Project, Unit 1 '
2 8 PLACE OF MIETING: Washington, D.C. '-
9 DATE OF MEETING: March 21, 1988 '
10 '
, .- s-11 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 12 i
transcript thereof for the file of the Commission taken .
13 stenographically by me, thereafter reduced to typewriting by l 14 me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and 15 that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the i 16 foregoing events.
17 18 '
b * ' ' %*J ~ ' ~ ', ~ .
i Mario Rodriguez 19 20 21 '
22 Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd. '
23 24 25
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-0USTON LIGH-~::NG S POWE:l C043ANY FULL 30WER COMMISSION BFIEFIbG i -
SOU~i TEXAS P:l0cECT ELECT:IC GEbElAT::NG STATION 4 ARCH 21, 19E8 o
I
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__.-___-.._____________u_- __ __. _ __. _-_____ _ --_a -r - - - - - -*e e -
-- ^ ~ - - -
0
=:: \ESS -:R EL Y e 3asec on EE:: S \UivARC Guicelines o ~ ~ en <ey Jrocram e:.emen s o Written policy oUnion briefing o Top management support o Contractor notification oPolicy communication o Law enforcement liaison o Behavior observation oDrug S Alcohol Testing training o Implementation o Employee assistance j training programs i
2-7 -
SC_~ EXAS JROuEC~~ 1
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3R: = ESS::: \ A _::S V n
11 Il Jolng :llngs rig aInsatiable Attention To Detail sDedicated To Learning From Mistakes aNot Satisfied With Performance Because of Increasing Expectations aHigh Level of Energy Expenditure
~
aIntellectual Curiosity _
mRecognize Both Privately And Publicly, The Contribution Of Others aHigh Degree Of Personal Integrity aAccepts Critique And Uses The Information aFaces Facts Squarely And Deals With Implications aHigh Degree Of Candor -
mAnticipates Problems eInnovative In Solving Problems sExercises Initiative .
, 2-9C i
3r i n c i J a :. :JerE :inc Jr o 3 :.e ms e F-SI Va:.ve Mispositioning o Pressuri7_er PORV _.ifting e VFW Fydraulic Transients -
1 e Remo~:e Slu~:cown 3
3-11A -
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! Concerns in NRC Operational Feadiness ::nspection Feport
- i. Operator sensitivity to plant status mode change
~
requirements
- 2. Timeliness of Station Problem Report (SPR) investigations
- 3. Problems in control room evacuation drill
- 4. Technical specification / surveillance procedure inadequacies
- 5. Use of commercial grade agastat relays
V A:: \ ~~ E \ A\ E 3A C 3 SAFETY NON-SAFETY OUT OF SERVICE 3 61 DEGFADEJ 03EFATION 210 908 m
SYSTEM OPERATION -
67 207 NOT AFFECTE]
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COMMISSION BRIEFING
- a ON FULL POWER LICENSING 2 0F THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNIT 1 ,
MARCH, 1988 N. PRASAD KADAMBI PROJECT MANAGER (301) 492-1337 l
l l
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6
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A-1
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- OUTLINE
! BACKGP0UND f SITING PLANT DESIGN LICENSINGMILESTONES CONSTRUCTION EXPERIENCE READINESS FOR OPERATION THE OPERATING LICENSE -
PRE-CRITICALITY OPERATIONS REVIEW 0F ALLEGATIONS FROM GAP STAFF CONCLUSION ,
1 A-2 m
n .
BACKGROUND OWNERS HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY CENTRAL POWER CITY OF SAN ANTONIO J
CITY OF AUSTIN OPERATOR HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER EXPERIENCE FIRST NUCLEAR PLANT FOR UTILITY SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTIES DURING CONSTRUCTION PHASE OVERCOME ,
i SUCCESSFULLY ,
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I A-3
---__._j
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SITING i
LOCATION MATAGORDA COUNTY, 10 MILES INLAND FROM GULF 0F MEXICO, PRIMARILY AGRICULTURAL AREA POPULATION ,
10-MILES: 2800 50-MILES: 300,000 U
NO MAJOR CITY IN 50-MILE RADIUS.
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FULL-PARTICIPATION EXERCISE ON :
APRIL 8, 1987 l
ONSITE AND OFFSITE PREPAREDNESS !
FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY,
(
A-4
)
PLANT DESIGN I
VENDOR WESTINGHOUSE REACTOR AND TURBINE l
ARCHITECT / ENGINEER l BROWN 8 ROOT UNTil 1981 BECHTEL AFTER 1981 CONSTRUCTOR BROWN 9 R001 UNTil 1981 EBASCO AF,TER 1981 NSSS ONLY RESAR-41 IN U.S.
FOUR-LOOP, THREE-TRAIN SYSTEMS FOURTEEN FOOT CORE 3800 MWT CONTAINMENT ;
CYLINDRICAL WITH HEMISPHERICAL TOP l AND STEEL LINER l
l
- l UNIQUE FEATURES QUALIFIED DISPLAY PROCESSING SYSTEM LEAK-BEFORE-BREAK APPLICATION IN RCS l AND BEYOND RCS TEMPERATURES MEASURED BY RTDs IN MAIN COOLANT PIPING BMI THIMBLE TUBE VIBRATION LIMITING DEVICE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM l
I ,
1 l
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LICENSING MILESTONES I
\
DECEMBER 1975 CP ISSilED JULY 1978 ' FSAR DOCKETED l MARCP 1986 DRAFT ENVIRONMENTIL STATEMENT ISSUED i
APRIL 1986 SAFETY EVALUATION ISSUED l JUNE 1986 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR l
( '
SAFEGUARDS FULL-COMMITTEE MEETit!G
' 1 JUNE 1986 FINAL ENV!PONMENTAL STATEMENT i
AUGUST 1986 ASLB DECISION OM SAFETY HEARINGS DECEMBER 1986 MATERIALS LICENSE APRIL 1Q87 EMERGEtlCY PPEPAREONESS GRADED l
EXERCISE AUGUST 1987 LOW POWER LICENSE
(
l A-6
CONSTRUCTION OVERVIEW CONSTRUCTION HISTORY CONSTRUCTION PERMIT ISSUED"DECEMBER 1975 WORK STOPPED UNDER SHOW CAUSE ORDER APRIL 1980 BECHTEL BECOMES A/E SEPTEMBER 1981 ,
APPR0XIMATELY 32,500 NRC INSPECTOR MANHCURS ON CONSTRUCTION INSPECTIONS AND INVESTIGATION, 17,600 MANHOURS FOR UNIT 1 INSPECTIONS ' COMPLETED) ;
10,000 MANHOURS FOR UNIT 2 INSPECTIONS (90% COMPLETE) l 5,000 MANHOURS FOR INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES I
l SPECIAL INSPECTIONS SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE INSPECTION LATE 1979 i (LED TO STOP WORK ORDER 1980)
- l REGION I MOBILE NON-DESTRUCT 1VE EXAMINATION TEAM INSPECTION 1984 AND 1986' CONSTRUCTION APPRAISAL TEAM ICAT) INSPECTION IN 1985 l
l A-7
OPERATIONAL READINESS
- 1 INSPECTIONS ROUTINE INSPECTION PROGRAM l JUNE 1987 TEAM INSPECTION JANUARY 1988 TEAM INSPECTION l AUGMENTED INSPECTION (?A-HOUR COVERAGE DURING l FUEL LOAD AND CRITICALITY, ADDITIONAL RESIDENT l INSPECTOR COVERAGE DURING START-UP TESTING)
RESULTS ,
STRONG OVERALL OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS SOME WEAKNESSES WERE IDENTIFIED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS ,
' i PERSONNEL ERRORS (CIVIL PENALTY FOR INADE0VATE CONTROL OF SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS)
RECENT OPERATOR PERFORMANCE REFLECTS INCREASED EMPHASIS ON CONTROL OF SYSTEM STATUS, SECURITY PROGRAM INITIALLY IDENTIFIED AS WEAK RESULTING IN A DELAY IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE LOW POWER LICENSE. THE SECURITY PROGRAM HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY UPGRADED AND IS NOW ACCEPTABLE. i l
CONCLUSIONS i
IDENTIFIED HARDWARE PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED, OPERATOR PERF0PMANCE HAS IMPROVED SUBSTANTIALLY,
- SECURITY PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED, A-8
, l 1
THE OPERATING LICENSE l
MAJOR LICENSE CONDITION FOR LOW POWER OPERATION WAS l ON PHYSICAL SECURITY, THE ISSUE HAS BEEN RESOLVED. '
EXEMPTIONS GRANTED IN FOLLOWING AREAS l (A) CONTAINMENT AIR LOCK LEAK TESTING (10 CFR 50, l APPENDIX >J) PROVIDES RELIEF FOR THE TESTING OF CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS AT TIMES WHEN CONTAINMENT l INTEGRITY IS NOT RE0VIRED.
(B) SCHEDULAR EXEMPTION ON APPLICATION OF GDC-57 RELATED'T0 THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM RETURN LINE FROM FAN COOLERS, 1
(C) CRITICALITY ALARM SYSTEM (10 CFR 70,24)
THISEXEMPTIONC0dTINUESTHATWHICHWAS PREVIOUSLY GRANTED FURSUANT TO 10 CFR 70,24, i PROVIDES RELIEF FOR THE INSPECTION AND l STORAGE OF UNIRRADIATED FUEL ASSEMBLIES, I (D) SCHEDULAR EXEMPTION REGARDING SUBMITTAL OF THE UPDATED FSAR S0 THAT A COMMON DOCUMENT-CAN BE USED FOR BOTH UNITS, A-9
t 0
PRE-CRITICALITY OPERATIONS a
MAJOR COMPONENT RELATED CONCERNS ADDRESSED DURING PRE-CRITICALITY PERIOD WERE (A) COMPONENT, COOLING WATER (CCW) HEAT EXCHANGER TUBE DAMAGE i (B) AUXILIARY'FEEDWATER (AFW) PIPING SYSTEMS (C) IN-CORE 1,NSTRUMENTATION THIMBLE TUBES
\
CCW TUBES REPAIRED TO CORRECT EXCESSIVE FLOW INDUCED !
VIBRATION, TUBES STIFFENED AND PLUGGED j PIPING AND VALVES REPAIRED IN AFW SYSTEM TO SOLVE WATER HAKMER PROBLEMS, TESTING PERFORMED TO CONFIRM RESOLUTION, EDDY CURRENT TESTS SHOW SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF THIMBLE TUBES, TESTS WILL BE PERFORMED AFTER 12 WEEKS OF OPERATION FOR CONFIRMATION, ISOLATION VALVES AND LEAK DETECTION WILL BE INSTALLED DURING FIRST REFUELING OUTAGE, 1 1
e A-10
7 R_EVIEW 0F ALLEGATIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (GAP)
A SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE ASSESSMENT TEAM ADDRESSED
, ALL ISSUES INVOLVED IN ALLEGATION INFORMATION FROM GAP, -
RESULTS OF THE SCREENING AND REVIEW PROCESS TOTAL NUMBER OF ALLEGATIONS FROM GAP 700 ALLEGATIONS SCREENED FOR FOLLOWUP 213 ALLEGATIONS SELECTED FOR INSPECTION 71 (A) SUBSTANTIATED BUT PROBLEM CORRECTED 21 (B) UNSUBSTANTIATED 50 DUPLICATED AND RELATED ALLEGATIONS 119 LACKING SPECIFICITY BUT 23 ENVELOPED BY QA/0C REVIEW 213 CONCLUSION (A) ALLEGATIONS DO NOT SHOW ANY SAFETY SIGNIFICAtlT PROBLEMS AT SOUTH TEXAS, UNIT 1 WHICH WOULD AFFECT SAFE OPERATIONS i
(B) ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE ALLEGATIONS WERE SUBSTANTIATED, THE LICENSEE'S QUALITY l ASSURANCE AND C0flTROL PROGRAMS HAVE i
DEMONSTRATED THE CAPABILITY TO CAPTURE THE ISSUES AtlD IMPLEMENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.
(C) At!Y INFORMATION FROM OH-GOING INVESTIGATIONS WILL BE FOLLOWED-UP FURTHER AS NEEDED, A-11 __ . __,
, as ,
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STAFF CONCLUSION THE STAFF SUPPORTS ISSUANCE OF A FULL POWER LICENSE TO THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNIT 1, i
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Attached are copies of a Commission meeting transcript and related meeting
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